Effective Surveillance System
Introduction to Security Ninth Edition. DOI: © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
165 2013
10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00008-7
Interior and Exterior Security Concerns
OBJECTIVES
The study of this chapter will enable you to:
1. Recognize the role of doors and windows as security risks.
2. Identify various types of locks and associated hardware.
3. Have a basic understanding of surveillance equipment and its proper use in security operations.
4. Understand the significance of having security involved in building design and remodeling.
5. Realize the growing importance of “interoperability” among various security devices through the use of information and equipment technology.
Introduction Besides the clear-cut concerns for the perimeter and exterior security, other security vulner- abilities for the facility might be either a part of the perimeter, part of the interior, or both. This chapter deals with security concerns that could be either interior or exterior problems depend- ing on the type of facility. For example, a freestanding retail outlet store has problems of perim- eter security that include windows, doors, and roof. The same store located within the confines of a mall may not be as concerned with the windows and doors or with perimeter defense that must be overcome before the attacker can concentrate on the store, because the mall is a buffer.
On another level, the entire area of physical security thinking is changing as technology continues to develop. Not only are the devices used in physical security more sophisticated, but the ability to integrate various physical security operations is now not only possible, but becoming the standard. That is not to say that the traditional lock and key, guard and camera are no longer in use. But the truth is that in many operations this is old technology that has been replaced by 21st century modern computer-based operations. In fact, network and web- based platforms are allowing companies to develop security systems that at one time were only science fiction dreams.
However, with this new technology come new challenges in the protection of the hardware and software used in these operations. More will be said on protection of the computer and its components in Chapter 17.
8
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166 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Buildings On or As the Perimeter When the building forms part of the perimeter barrier or when, as in some urban situations, the building walls are the entire perimeter of the facility, it should be viewed in the same light as the rest of the barrier, or it should be evaluated in the same way as the outer structural bar- rier. It must be evaluated in terms of its strength, and all openings must be properly secured.
In cases of a fence joining the building as a continuation of the perimeter, there should be no more than 2 inches between the fence and the building. Depending on the placement of windows, ledges, or setbacks, it might be wise to double the fence height gradually to the point where it joins the building. In such a case, the higher section of the fence should extend 6 to 8 feet out from the building.
Windows and Doors
Windows and other openings larger than 96 square inches should be protected by grilles, metal bars, or heavy screening when they are less than 18 feet from the ground or when they are less than 14 feet from structures outside the barrier (that is, trees and other buildings). Doors that penetrate the perimeter walls must be of heavy construction and fitted with strong locks.
Since both the law and good sense require that there be adequate emergency exits in the event of fire or other danger, provision must be made for such eventualities. Doors created for emergency purposes only should have exterior hardware removed so that they cannot be opened from the outside. A remotely operated electromagnetic holding device can secure them, or they can be fitted with alarms so that their use from inside will be substantially reduced or eliminated.
Windows It is axiomatic that windows should be protected. Since the ease with which most windows can be entered makes them ready targets for intruders, they must be viewed as potential weak spots in any building’s defenses. Most forced break-ins are through window glass—whether such glass is installed in doors or windows.
In most industrial facilities, windows should be protected with grillwork, heavy screen- ing, or chain-link fencing. In some cases, however, caution dictates that they may be needed as emergency exits beyond strict requirements of fire laws. Or where they might be needed to lead in fire hoses, consideration should be given to hinging and padlocking protective cover- ings for easy removal.
BURGLARY-RESISTANT GLASS In applications such as prominent administration and office buildings, where architectural considerations preclude the use of such relatively clumsy installations as mesh or indus- trial screen, the windows can be immeasurably strengthened by the use of either UL-listed (which means that the material or item so designated has met the standards of Underwriters Laboratories) burglary-resistant glass or one of the brands of UL-listed polycarbonate glazing material. Both of these products are considerably more expensive than is plate glass and are
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 167
generally used only in those areas where attack can be expected or where a reduction in insur- ance premium would justify the added expense (see Figure 8-1).
Standard plate glass can be given some measure of resistance if it is covered with a 4- to 6-millimeter cover of mylar. This is a low-cost operation, but the mylar needs to be replaced every 5 years. As little as a 2-millimeter cover of mylar can keep glass from fragmenting. Thus the mylar cover is good protection from flying shards associated with bombings. Since the first bombing of the Trade Center and the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, vari- ous studies have supported the need to mandate some type of coating for windows in build- ings that might be targeted for terrorists’ attacks.
As opposed to tempered glass, which is designed to protect people from the danger of fly- ing shards in the event of breakage, UL-listed burglary-resistant glass (frequently referred to as safety glass) resists heat, flame, cold, picks, rocks, and most other paraphernalia from the intruder’s arsenal. It is a useful security glazing material because it is durable, weathers well, and is noncombustible. On the other hand, it is heavy, difficult to install, and expensive.
The plastic glazing sold under various trade names is optically clear, thin, and easy to install. Acrylic glazing material that appears as Plexiglas generally does not meet UL standards for
burglar-resistant material; it is much stronger than ordinary glass, however, and has many use- ful applications in window security applications. It is also lighter in weight and cheaper than either safety glass or plastic glazing and at 1¼ inches thick is UL approved as a bullet-resistant barrier.
FIGURE 8-1 Shatter-resistant film. (Courtesy of the www.ShatterGARD.com Glass Protection Experts.)
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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168 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
All these materials have the appearance of ordinary glass. Obviously, any window so hard- ened against entry must be securely locked from the inside to protect against intrusion from the outside. This implies a strong window frame and supporting construction.
“SMASH AND GRAB” ATTACKS Burglary-resistant glass is used to a considerable degree in banks and retail stores where there has been a very real need to prevent “smash and grab” raids on window displays and showcases.
It should be noted that UL-listed burglary-resistant glass is a laminate of two sheets of flat glass (usually 3⁄16-inch thick) held together by a 1⁄16-inch layer of polyvinyl butyl, a soft trans- parent material. In this thickness, laminated glass is virtually indistinguishable from ordinary glass; hence burglars may try with a hammer or iron bar to break what they suppose to be a plate-glass window. It is only after they have made a few unsuccessful tries that they realize the material is not penetrable.
Even though such attackers may flee empty-handed, the owners in such situations are left with windows with webs of cracks over the surface of the outer layer of glass, making replace- ment of the entire pane necessary in applications where appearance is important. Insurers in many cases require that laminated glass be clearly identified to discourage what would be a futile but damaging assault by the “smash and grab” attacker.
SCREENING It can also be important to screen windows. First, this might protect their use as a means by which employees can temporarily dispose of goods for later recovery. The smaller the goods being manufactured or available on the premises, the smaller the mesh in the screen must be to protect against this kind of pilferage.
Second, as was noted earlier, any windows less than 18 feet from the ground or less than 14 feet from trees, poles, or adjoining buildings should receive some protective treatment unless they are well within the perimeter barrier and open directly onto an area outside the building that is particularly well secured.
Doors
Every door, whether exterior or interior, must be carefully examined to determine the degree of security required. Such an examination will also determine the type of construction as well as the locking system to be used on each door.
The required security measures at any specific door will be determined by the operations in progress within the facility or by the value of the assets stored or available in the various areas. The need for adequate security cannot be overemphasized, but it must be provided as part of an overall plan for the safe and efficient conduct of the business.
When this balance is lost, the business may suffer. Either the security function will be downgraded in favor of a more immediate convenience, or the smooth flow of business will be impeded to conform to obtrusive security standards. Either of these conditions is intolerable in any business, and it is a management responsibility to determine the balance required in establishing systems that will recognize and accommodate production and security needs.
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 169
Door Construction and Hardware Doors are frequently much weaker than the surface into which they are positioned. Panels may be thin, easily broken wood or glass. Locks may be old and ineffective. The door frame may be so constructed that a lever or a plastic card can be inserted between the door and jamb to disengage the bolt in the lock. Even with a properly hung door, if the jamb is of soft mate- rial (unreinforced aluminum or light pine), it can be peeled or ripped away from the bolt. This technique is referred to as spreading. The locking bolt must throw at least an inch into the jamb for security applications. Heavy wood or metal doors with reinforced jambs can go a long way in reducing the potential for spreading.
In some cases, doors are entered by pulling, a technique whereby the lock cylinder is ripped from the door and the locking mechanism is operated through the opening left in its face. The installation of a special, hardened steel key cylinder guard can overcome this kind of assault. Or cylinders should be flush or inset to prevent them from being wrenched out or “popped.” Figure 8-2 illustrates common techniques of attacking doors and door frames.
Door hinges may also contribute to a door’s weakness. Surface-mounted hinges with mounting screws or hinge pins exposed on the exterior side of the door can be removed and entrance gained on the hinge side. To complicate the matter, the door can be replaced on its hinges after the intruder has finished, and in most cases, the intrusion will never be detected. Without any visible sign of forced entry, very few insurance policies would pay off on the stolen merchandise.
To prevent this unhappy chain of events, hinges should be installed with the screws con- cealed and with the hinge pins either welded or flanged to prevent removal.
Locks and Keys
Attacks against Locks Although direct forcible assault is the method generally used to gain entry, more highly skilled burglars may concentrate on the locks. This may be their only practical means of ingress if the door and the jamb are well designed in security terms and essentially impervious to forcible attack.
Picking the lock or making a key by impression are the methods generally used in attacks against traditional locking systems. Both require a degree of expertise. In the former method, metal picks are used to align the levers, pins, discs, or tumblers as an authorized key would, thus enabling the lock to operate. Making a key by taking impressions is a technique requiring even greater skill because it is a delicate, painstaking operation requiring repeated trials.
Because both of these techniques are apt to take time, they are customarily used to attack those doors where the intruder may work undisturbed and unobserved for adequate peri- ods of time. The picked lock rarely shows any signs of illegal entry, and often insurance is not collectible.
Locks as Delaying Devices The best defense against lock picking and making keys by impression is the installation of special pick-resistant, impression-resistant lock cylinders or the use of magnetic cards
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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170 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
FIGURE 8-2 Common attack methods on doors and door frames. (Reprinted with permission of National Crime Prevention Institute, School of Justice Administration of National Crime Prevention Institute, School of Justice Administration, University of Louisville, from Edgar et al., The Use of Locks [Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1987], pp. 72–76.)
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 171
(as commonly used in the hotel industry and discussed later in this chapter) in place of tra- ditional keys. They are more expensive than standard cylinders but in many applications may well be worth the added cost. Generally speaking, in fact, locks are the cheapest security investment that can be made. Cost cutting in their purchase is usually a poor economy since a lock of poor quality is virtually useless and effectively no lock at all.
The elementary but often overlooked fact concerning locking devices is that in the first place they are simply mechanisms that extend the door or window into the wall that holds them. If, therefore, the wall or the door itself is weak or easily destroyed, the lock cannot be effective.
In the second place, it must be recognized that any lock will eventually yield to an attack. They must be thought of only as delaying devices. But this delay is of primary importance. The longer an intruder is stalled in an exposed position while he or she works at gaining entry, the greater are the chances of discovery. Since many types of locks in general use today provide no appreciable delay to even the unskilled prowler, they have no place in security applications.
Even the highest-quality locking devices are only one part of door and entrance security. Locks, cylinders, door and frame construction, and key control are inseparable elements; all must be equally effective. If any one element is weak, the system breaks down.
All locks are essentially composed of three parts: the operating mechanism, the keying device, and the latch or bolt. Any number of combinations may be involved in any lock, and to under- stand a lock, one must understand the variety of items that exist in each of the essential parts.
Latches and Bolts The simplest latch is the spring lock. Its value as a security device is negligible. Spring locks are designed primarily as latching devices to hold a door closed for privacy. Since the latch is spring-loaded and has a tapered side so it will slide smoothly over the strike plate, it can easily be opened with a plastic or celluloid strip or a credit card.
The next type of latch is the dead latch. This latching device combines the advantages of the spring lock with a means of protecting the latch from carding. The dead latch is a simple device that holds the spring latch in position when the door is closed. When the door is unlocked, the device is in an open position to allow the latch to operate as a simple spring latch. But when the door is locked, the strike plate depresses the device so that the spring latch becomes “dead”: it will no longer move unless the operating device manipulates it. The basic problem with the dead latch as a security device is that the overall length of the latch is still not long enough to keep the door from being forced open by prying between the door frame and the door.
To overcome the problem of springing doors, a dead bolt lock is needed (see Figure 8-3). The dead bolt gets its name from the fact that it does not have a tapered side and is dead in the door whether it is open or closed. The only way to manipulate a dead bolt is with an oper- ating mechanism (key, electric switch, and so on). Dead bolts are generally long enough to overcome the problem of springing the door. Some intruders have attacked dead bolts with hacksaws, however, and cut their way through the brass alloy. To overcome this problem, the better dead bolts have a case-hardened pin in the center of the dead bolt to frustrate the use of a hacksaw.
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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172 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Keying Devices and Systems Keying devices (which include lock and key) and the mechanisms they operate are many and varied in usage and style. A brief review of the types of keying and locking devices in general use and of their characteristics follows.
FIGURE 8-3 Common dead bolt locks. The bolt should extend at least 1 inch beyond the door edge. Other locks, however, that use an interlocking principle (for example, jimmy-resistant rim locks) also offer good security. If glass is within 40 inches of the lock, a double cylinder dead bolt (with keys needed for opening both sides) should be installed. This makes it impossible for a criminal to break the glass and reach inside to unlock the door. Be certain to have the key readily available so that fast exits are possible in the event of an emergency.
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 173
1. Warded locks are generally found in pre-World War II construction in which the keyway is open and can be seen through. These are also recognized by the single plate that includes the doorknob and the keyway. The security value of these locks is nil. These locks are only found in older construction and are becoming rare.
2. Disc tumbler locks, initially designed for use in the automobile industry, have been replaced in that industry with pin locks, combination and proximity devices (discussed later in this chapter). Because the disc tumbler lock is easy and cheap to manufacture, however, its use has expanded to other areas such as desks, files, and padlocks. The life of these locks is limited because of their soft metal construction. Although these locks provide more security than do warded locks, they cannot be considered very effective. The delay afforded is approximately 3 minutes.
3. Pin tumbler locks are in wide use in industry as well as in residences (see Figure 8-4). They can be recognized by the keyway, which is irregular in shape, and the key, which is grooved on both sides. Such locks can be master keyed in a number of ways, a feature that recommends them to a wide variety of industrial applications, although the delay factor is 10 minutes or less.
4. Lever locks are difficult to define in terms of security since they vary greatly in effectiveness. The best lever locks are used in safe deposit boxes and are for all practical purposes pickproof. The least of these locks are used in desks, lockers, and cabinets and are generally less secure than are pin tumbler locks. The best of this variety are rarely used in common applications, such as doors, because they are bulky and expensive.
Removable Cores In facilities that require a number of keys to be issued, the loss or theft of keys is an ever-pres- ent possibility. In such situations, it might be well to consider removable cores on all locks. These devices are made to be removed if necessary with a core key, allowing a new core to be inserted. Since the core is the lock, this has the effect of rekeying without the necessity of changing the entire device, as would be the case with fixed-cylinder mechanisms.
Keying Systems Keys are generally divided into change, submaster, master, and occasionally grand master keys.
1. The change key: One key to a single lock within a master-keyed system. 2. The submaster key: Will open all the locks within a particular area or grouping in a given
facility. In an office, a submaster might open all doors in the accounting department; in an industrial facility, it might open all locks in the loading dock area. Typically, such groupings concern themselves with a common function, or they may simply be located in the same area even if they are not otherwise related.
3. The master key: Where two or more submaster systems exist, a master key system is established. Such a key would open any of the systems.
4. The grand master key: One that will open everything in a system involving two or more master-key groups. This system is relatively rare but might be used by a multipremise operation in which each location was master keyed, while the grand master would function on any premise.
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174 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Obviously, master and submaster keys must be treated with the greatest care. If a master key is lost, the entire system is threatened. Rekeying is the only really secure thing that can be considered, but the cost of such an effort can be enormous.
Any master-key system is vulnerable. Beyond the danger of loss of the master itself and the subsequent staggering cost of rekeying—or, even more unfortunate, of the use of such a key
FIGURE 8-4 Pin tumbler lock. (A) A cutaway of a pin tumbler lock, showing the springs and tumblers. When the correct key is inserted into the lock, it will align all of the tumblers in a straight line to allow the plug to turn and operate the locking mechanism. (B) Locked position. Notice how the spring is forcing the tumbler to project partway into the inner core (plug) of the lock, making it impossible for the plug to rotate. (C) Unlocked position. The tumbler is now outside the plug, thereby allowing it to be rotated. (Courtesy of Medeco Security Locks, Inc.)
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 175
by enterprising criminals to loot the facility—there is the problem that it necessarily serves a lesser lock. Locks in such a system are neither pick-resistant nor resistant to making a key by impression.
On the other hand, relative security coupled with convenience may make such a system preferable in some applications but not in others. Only the most careful evaluation of the par- ticular circumstances of a given facility will determine the most efficient and effective keying system.
Rekeying In any sizable facility, rekeying can be very expensive, but there are methods of lessening the disruption and staggering cost that can be involved in rekeying. Outer or perimeter locks can be changed first, and the old locks can be moved to interior spaces requiring a lower level of security. After an evaluation, a determination of priorities can be made and rekeying can be accomplished over a period of time, rather than requiring one huge capital outlay all at once. Of prime importance is securing keys so that such problems do not arise.
Key Management Whether traditional keying systems or state-of-the-art digital operations, every effort should be exerted to develop ways whereby keys and access to keying information remain in the hands of security or management personnel. In those cases where this is not possible or practical, there must be a system of inventory and accountability. In any event, keys should be issued only to those demonstrably responsible persons who have compelling need for them. In the case of digital keying systems, management requires understanding the hardware, software, digital security and encryption, as well as a carefully developed program of information/key manage- ment. Though possession of keys and access to restricted areas is frequently a status symbol in many companies, management must never allow access on that basis.
Keys should never be issued on a long-term basis to outside janitorial personnel. The high employee turnover rate in this field would suggest that this could be a dangerous prac- tice. Employees of this service should be admitted by guards or other building employees and issued interior keys that they must return before leaving the building.
By the same token, it is bad practice to issue entrance keys to tenants of an office building. If this is done, control of this vital security point is lost. A guard or building employee should control entry and exit before and after regular building hours. If keys must be issued to tenants, however, the lock cylinder in the entrance should be changed every few months and new keys issued to authorized tenants.
The security department must maintain a careful, strictly supervised record of all keys issued. This record should indicate the name and department of the person to whom the key was issued as well as the date of issue. In today’s environment records should be kept on keys from creation to disposal.
A key depository for securing keys during nonworking hours should be centrally located, locked, and kept under supervision of security personnel. Keys issued on a daily basis or those issued for a specific, one-time purpose should be accounted for daily. Keys should be counted and signed for by the security supervisor at the beginning of each working day.
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176 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
When a key is lost, the circumstances should be investigated and set forth in writing. In some instances if the lost key provides access to sensitive areas, locks should be changed. All keys issued should be physically inspected periodically to ensure that they have not been lost, though unreported as such.
Master keys should be kept to a minimum. If possible, submasters should be used, and they should be issued only to a limited list of personnel especially selected by management. Careful records should be kept of such issuance. The list should be reviewed periodically to determine whether all those authorized should continue to hold such keys.
Before a decision can be reached with respect to the master and submaster key systems and how such keys should be issued, there must be a careful survey of existing and proposed security plans, along with a study of current and planned locking devices. Where security plans have been developed with the operational needs of the facility in mind, the composition of the various keying systems can be readily developed.
Locking Schedules Door-locking schedules and responsibilities must be established and supervised vigorously. The system must be set up in such a way that a procedure for altering the routine to fit imme- diate needs is possible, but in all respects the schedule, whether the master or the temporary plan, must be adhered to in every detail. A breakdown in such a system, especially in large offices, institutions, or industrial facilities, could represent just the opportunity an alert crimi- nal is waiting for.
A Managed Key Program There are perhaps three parts to a good managed key program: key creation, key usage and key breach policies.
Key creation should be controlled. Every new key should be recorded in a permanent record with the usual who, what, where, when, why, and how information. Key use in digital systems can be tracked. Traditional keys are generally understood in the context of security and are pro- tected by the user. On the other hand many users do not understand the digital key and its vul- nerabilities. Given recent technologies, encrypted information contained on key cards might be read by someone in close proximity without any actual physical contact with the key.
Key breaches are also a problem. It is possible to know when a traditional key system is breached or likely to be breached. If a key is lost or stolen, key management can make appro- priate decisions regarding the need to rekey. However, when the breach is from lock com- promise the attack might go unnoticed and never addressed. In the case of digital keys, the opposite is true. It may not be obvious that someone has stolen digital key information, but in systems that track key usage it is possible to know that someone accessed a restricted area through tracking software. Again, this information is of value only when audited.
Other Operating Mechanisms for Access Control Besides the traditional key and lock, other mechanisms have been developed for access con- trol purposes. These systems, as noted earlier, have in many instances replaced the traditional metal key. The following are commonly used in security applications.
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 177
1. Combination locks are difficult to defeat since they cannot be picked and few experts can so manipulate the device as to discover the combination. Most of these locks have three dials that must be aligned in the proper order before the lock will open. Some such locks may have four dials for greater security. Many also have the capability of having the combination changed quickly.
2. Code-operated locks are combination locks in which no keys are used. They are opened by pressing a series of numbered buttons in the proper sequence (see Figure 8-5). Some of them are equipped to sound an alarm if the wrong sequence is pressed. The combination of these locks can be changed readily. These are high-security locking devices. Because this type of lock can be compromised by “tailgating” (more than one person entering on an authorized opening), it should never be used as a substitute for a guard or receptionist.
3. Card-operated locks (see Figure 8-6) are electrical or, more usually, electromagnetic. Coded cards are about the size of a credit card. These frequently are fitted with a recording device that registers time of use and identity of the user. The cards serving as keys also serve as company identification cards. As with code-operated locks, tailgating can occur with this lock as well. In addition, the readers identify the card, not the individual. The hotel industry
FIGURE 8-5 Code-operated lock. (Courtesy of KABA, www.kaba-ilco.com.)
FIGURE 8-6 Card reader. (Courtesy of FlexIso- MifareCard/Indala.)
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178 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
has been making the switch from traditional key systems to the electronic locking systems over the past 10 years. The advantages of these systems are many, including the following:
a. Security staff no longer need to spend hours rotating key cores and keeping detailed logs. b. Card keys can be programmed to function in a variety of ways. c. Lost cards can be deactivated in a matter of seconds. d. The systems often allow hotels to keep track of the time and number of entries at a
given site.1
There are several types of card-operated systems on the market.
a. Magnetic coded cards are of two basic designs. The first contains a flexible magnetic sheet sealed between two sheets of plastic. The second contains a magnetic strip along one edge of the card. The code is created by magnetizing spots on the sheet or strip. The code can be erased if it is exposed to a strong magnetic field. It is possible to duplicate the magnetic pattern and create false cards.
b. Wiegan Effect cards rely on short-length magnetic wires embedded within the card. Cards contain up to 26 wire bits, which make millions of code combinations possible. The card is immune to demagnetization and difficult to copy.
c. Optical coded cards contain bar codes similar to those found on products in most grocery stores. Early cards used the visible bar codes and were easy to duplicate. Today’s product contains bar codes visible only under ultraviolet or infrared light.
d. Proximity cards (see Figure 8-7) do not need to be inserted into a reader or scanned. These cards send a code to a receiver via magnetic, optical, or ultrasonic pulses.
e. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a form of proximity technology relying on radio frequency identification. The system has a signaling device (badge or tag) and readers. Coupled through an integrated system, data can be recorded and managed by computer systems that track all types of information such as time admitted and number of entrances versus exits. Frost and Sullivan, industry analysts, predicted that 80 percent of the access control market would be RFID-based by 2006. Today RFID badges have become commonplace due to the flexibility in the ability to recode the cards and associated hardware.
FIGURE 8-7 Proximity tags. (Photo courtesy of HID Corporation.)
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4. Biometric systems are designed to recognize biological features of the individual before access is granted. These systems are in fact identity verification systems that use personnel characteristics to verify identity. While these systems bring the James Bond/Jason Borg gadgetry to real systems, they are also currently handicapped with problems relating to the fact that physical characteristics of people do change with physical injuries, stress, and fatigue. There are several types of this state-of-the-art technology. a. Fingerprint recognition systems (see Figure 8-8) optically scan a chosen fingerprint area
and compare the scanned area with the file of the person to be admitted. b. Signature recognition systems rely on the fact that no two people write with the same
motion or pressure. Although forgers can duplicate the appearance of the signature, the amount of pressure and motions used in creating the signature will differ.
c. Hand geometry recognition systems (see Figure 8-9) use the geometry of the hand. The system basically measures finger lengths and compares them with the authorized files.
FIGURE 8-8 Fingerprint recognition system. (Courtesy of KABA.)
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FIGURE 8-9 Hand geometry recognition. (Courtesy of Handkey II Ingersoll Rand, www.handreader.com.)
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d. Speaker verification systems use the uniqueness of voice patterns to determine identification and control admittance. The system uses soundproof booths and requires that the person to be identified repeat a simple phrase, usually four words in length.
e. Eye retina recognition systems (see Figure 8-10) analyze the blood vessel pattern in the retina of the eye. These patterns vary widely even between identical twins. The chance of false identification using this system is one in a million.
f. Facial recognition systems are among the latest entry 5. Padlocks are detachable, portable locks that have a shackle adapted to be opened for
engagement through a hasp or chain. Padlocks should be hardened and strong enough to resist prying. The shackle should be close enough to the body to prevent the insertion of a tool to force it. No lock that will be used for security purposes should have fewer than five pins in the cylinder. Padlocks can be supplied with a function that prevents the withdrawal of a key until the lock is closed.
FIGURE 8-10 Eye retina identification system. (Courtesy of KABA.)
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It is important to establish a procedure requiring that all padlocks be locked at all times even when they are not securing an area. This will prevent the possibility of the lock being replaced by another to which a thief has the key. The hardware used in conjunction with the padlock is as important as is the lock itself. It should be of hardened steel, without accessible screws or rivets, and bolted through the door to the inside, preferably through a backing plate. Shackles should be forged of hard- ened steel, ⅜-inch in both the heel and toe. The bolt ends should be burred.
6. High-security locks (see Figure 8-11). Virtually every lock manufacturer makes some kind of special high-security lock that is operated by nonduplicable keys. A reliable locksmith or various manufacturers should be consulted in cases of such need.
7. The iButton is an extension of the “smart card” technology being used by the banking industry. The iButton contains a hermetically sealed computer chip in a stainless steel container. The iButton can secure information and can provide information for security.2
It appears that as the technology allows, old systems are being supplanted by technology. One example of the ability to use old systems with new technology is the “electronic key.” This key looks and is used like a regular metal key, but contains the electronic characteristics of a smart card. The key does not have any cuts: it is an electronic key that can be fitted to existing door hardware.3
FIGURE 8-11 Modern high-security lock with e-key access. (Photo courtesy of LA GARD, INC, A MASCO Company.)
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A 1996 study predicted that the then popular existing magnetic strip cards would be phased out shortly after 2000. The same study predicted that in 2000 there would be 550 million smart cards.4 In 2010 various versions of smart cards, RFID cards and other similar technologies dominate large firm access control technology. The initial uses were in replacing store cards. However, this high-tech card now is accepted by credit card companies, banks, and others. Over half of all transactions in retailing and banking are now handled by smart card technol- ogy. Other uses include access control for physical security, computer information access control, and health care cards. Other uses include access to mobile telephone networks and multipurpose ID cards in colleges, universities, and the workplace.
Locking Devices In the previous list we considered the types of locks that are generally available. It must be remembered, however, that locks must work in conjunction with other hardware that affects the actual closure. These devices may be fitted with locks of varying degrees of security and may themselves provide security to various levels. In a security locking system, both of these factors must be taken into consideration before determining which system will be most effec- tive for specific needs.
1. Electromagnetic locking devices hold doors closed by magnetism. These electrical units consist of an electromagnet and a metal holding plate. When the power is on and the door secured, they will resist a pressure of up to 1,000 pounds. A high frequency of mechanical failures with this type of lock can create problems. Inconvenienced employees will often block the door open or jam the door-bolting mechanism so that the lock no longer operates. Quality equipment, preventive maintenance, frequent inspections, and quick response to problems will minimize these problems.
2. Double-cylinder locking devices are installed in doors that must be secured from both sides, requiring a key to open them from either side. Their most common application is in doors with glass panels that might otherwise be broken to allow an intruder to reach in and open the door from the other side. Such devices cannot be used in interior fire stairwell doors since firemen break the glass to unlock the door from the inside in this case.
3. Emergency exit locking devices are panic-bar installations allowing exit without use of a key. This device locks the door against entrance. Because such devices frequently provide an alarm feature that sounds when exit is made, they are fitted with a lock that allows exit without setting of the alarm when a key is used.
4. Recording devices provide for a printout of door use by time of day and by the key used. 5. Vertical throw devices lock into the jamb vertically instead of the usual horizontal bolt.
Some versions lock into both jamb and lintel. A variation of this device is the police lock, which consists of a bar angled to a well in the floor. The end of the bar contacting the door is curved so that when it is unlocked it will slide up the door, allowing the door to open. When it is locked, it is secured to the door at one end and set in the floor at the other. A door locked in this manner is virtually impossible to force.
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6. Electric locking devices are installed in the same manner as are other locks. They are activated remotely by an electric current that releases the strike and thus permits entrance. Many of these devices provide minimal security since the engaging mechanisms frequently offer no security feature not offered by standard hardware. The electric feature provides a convenient method of opening the door; it does not in itself offer locking security. Because such doors are usually intended for remote operation, they should be fitted with a closing device.
7. Sequence locking devices are designed to ensure that all doors covered by the system are locked. The doors must be closed and locked in a predetermined order. No door can be locked until its designated predecessor has been locked. Exit is made through the final door in the sequence, and entry can be made only through that same door.
While traditional locking devices and systems continue to dominate many security opera- tions, the use of electronic access controls continues a trend that is projected to only increase. According to the Freedonia Group, this market will continue to increase at a rate of 11.9% through 2012 with expenditures of approximately $6 billion.5
Roofs and Common Walls
An important though often overlooked part of the perimeter is the roof of the building. In urban shopping centers or even in small, freestanding commercial situations where the building walls are the perimeter, entry through the roof is common. Entry can be made through skylights or by chopping through the roof—an activity rarely detected by passersby or even by patrols.
Buildings sharing a common wall have also frequently been entered by breaking through the wall from a poorly secured neighboring occupancy. All of these means of entry circumvent normal perimeter alarm systems and can therefore be particularly damaging.
Surveillance Devices Surveillance of a facility both internally and externally has traditionally been conducted by patrolling security personnel who watch for any signs of criminal activity. If they spot any trouble, they are in a position to take such action as necessary. Patrols cannot be everywhere, however, and with the present emphasis on cost-effectiveness, other methods have been introduced to supplement or replace patrols. A wide variety of surveillance devices, including motion picture cameras, sequence cameras, and closed-circuit television (CCTV) monitors with video and digital cameras, are being used. However, the traditional systems have rapidly been replaced with digital technology.
Effective surveillance systems are expected to produce two possible end results. First, a good system should produce an identifiable image of persons engaging in criminal behavior or violating company policy. Second, the system should also serve as a deterrent. Although there is no way to determine how many attempts are discouraged because of the presence of the sys- tem, one definite advantage is that surveillance systems generally mean lower insurance rates.
The major factor limiting the use of surveillance devices is the cost of installation and maintenance. In addition, some companies worry about the possible negative impact of these
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 185
systems on employee morale, although this is becoming increasingly rare as cameras become commonplace not only in the workplace, but in public areas as well.
CCTV systems are the state-of-the-art surveillance devices and in most cases have replaced still and motion picture systems. The CCTV systems coupled with recording (VCR) equipment or computers (digital systems) are exceptionally flexible (see Figure 8-12). The tapes or digital records can be erased and reused, a definite cost savings in comparison with other systems. In today’s market digital has rapidly replaced VHS, which is viewed as too limiting—maintenance intense, remote accessibility problems, and difficult to integrate with other systems.6 Problems associated with VHS are reduced or not present with digital technology.
Current technology developments have produced CCTV that is used for laparoscopic sur- gery. Improved lens design has also produced cameras that can identify objects within a ¾-square foot from more than 100 miles in space. With the improved technology, the CCTV has become one of the most sought-after systems in the security market.
FIGURE 8-12 CCTV systems. (Courtesy of Vicon Industries.)
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Technological advances allow CCTV technology to be used where it would not have been effective 10 years ago—in areas such as loading docks and automatic teller machines. The reduced size of the camera also allows for a greater number of applications (see Figure 8-13). Cameras may easily be placed in covert locations such as wall receptacles, clocks, and manne- quins. The reduced price and improved reliability of color cameras have enabled banks, retail stores, museums, and others to add color evidence to their security capabilities.
The “starlight” cameras allow for good video reproduction at 0.0001 lux (the amount of light produced by stars on a clear night) compared to the previous 0.1 lux level. CCTV technology adds the ability to use thermal cameras with current systems. These cameras detect and trans- mit heat images. They will work in the light or in pitch-black environments.
Finally, the ability to network a widespread surveillance system and monitor multiple sites remotely from a central location is a reality (see Figure 8-14). Remote video management sys- tems (RVMS) are now being used to monitor multiple VCRs and video-signaling devices at
FIGURE 8-13 The new first-generation smart camera. (Courtesy of Pelco, www.pelco.com.)
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 187
thousands of locations.7 Modern integrated surveillance systems through the use of digital cameras connected worldwide via wide area networks (WANs), local area networks (LANs), and the Internet have truly expanded and revolutionized monitoring capabilities.
The above improvements in CCTV technology have resulted in a move to replace or aug- ment existing security systems with CCTV. As the demand for digital cameras continues to increase, analog CCTV equipment will eventually be phased out of use. This trend is predict- able as security operations continue to integrate video, alarm systems, and access control into a seamless operation. Networking is becoming the technology to build complete security sys- tems that allow central stations to monitor operations around the world.
Once a decision has been made to purchase a system, careful planning must precede the purchase. Poor planning generally means wasted funds and a system that does not do the required job. Several questions should be asked before any purchase, among them the following:
l Is the camera to be visible and used as a deterrent to crime or hidden and used in civil or criminal prosecutions? Most businesses would rather prevent a crime than go to the effort and expense of prosecution and therefore prefer visible camera locations. In addition, hidden camera sites cost more, because there is not only the investment in the camera, but also expenses for hiding the camera.
l What effect, if any, will the sun have on the operation of the system? Sunlight is variable in intensity, and good light conditions may deteriorate as the day progresses into dusk. In addition, sunlight can cause glare. A CCTV system may allow for changes in the setting of the recording cameras to help adjust for changes in light intensity.
l Where is the best location for a camera? In banks, for instance, placement might be where customers do not immediately notice the camera. In many cases, this is accomplished by placing the camera over the exits. This permits narrow-angle coverage of an area where the subject must approach the camera directly at a time when he may be comparatively off- guard (for example, you might catch a bank robber removing his disguise). In these cases, the teller does not have to signal the camera until the robber is on the way out of the bank.
FIGURE 8-14 Control console. (Courtesy of Winsted Corp.)
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When the camera is placed to photograph the teller/cashier area, attempting to trigger the camera manually may endanger the employee.
l Should the placement of the camera be high? High placement is not as efficient as it is often thought to be. Persons photographed from high locations may not be recognizable. A good spot is just high enough to see over obstacles and to protect the camera from curious observers.
l What type of lighting is in use? Sodium systems produce poor color accuracy. Ideally the camera system and lighting plan should be coordinated to allow for the most accurate recording of details.
A site survey is essential to effective planning. This survey is generally presented in the form of a diagram with the areas to be protected drawn to scale. The diagram should include blind spots, areas of high loss potential, exits, windows, cash registers, electrical outlets, and other data significant to the site. Lighting requirements can be determined by using an illumination meter. Record the information on the diagram, and measure illumination at both the bright- est and the darkest times of the day. Levels of light should generally not be below 20 to 40 or above 250 foot-candles (fc). If the level falls below 20 fc, you will need additional lighting or other camera equipment; if it rises above 250 fc, you will need special filters. Study the traffic flow to discover the greatest usage.
The future might increase the role of surveillance into the area of decision making. Manufacturers are developing cameras that not only watch and record, but also interpret what they see. There are hints that cameras may soon be able to detect unattended baggage at air- ports, guess a person’s weight or analyze the way you walk.8 The European Union is funding research in this area to include cameras and robots. According to Richard Bowden, University of Surrey professor, “if you have a robot with a camera that looks down a road and it knows it is normal behavior for people to just walk along, then it will know that if somebody shimmies up a drainpipe, it is something the system has not seen before.”9
Cameras systems are becoming an increasing part of a company’s and community’s pro- gram of protection. A Philadelphia neighborhood recently installed a $120,000 high-tech cam- era system that can detect suspicious activity, photograph faces and license plates from three blocks away and eventually send real-time video straight to a police squad car.10
In Baltimore where 350 cameras were installed in 2005, violent crime in the areas with cam- eras has fallen 15%.11
Old Construction Older buildings—particularly, though certainly not exclusively, office buildings—present a host of different and difficult security problems. Exterior fire escapes, old and frequently badly worn locks, common walls, roof access from neighboring buildings, unused and forgotten con- necting doors—all increase the exposure to burglary.
It is vital that all such openings are surveyed and plans made for securing them. Those windows not designated as emergency exits must be barred or screened. Where windows
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 189
lead to a fire escape or are accessible to adjacent fire escapes, their essential security must be accomplished within the regulations of the local fire codes. Fire safety must be a primary con- sideration. In cases where prudence or the law (or both) dictate that locks would be a hazard to safety, windows should be alarmed and the interior areas to which these windows provide access must be further secured. Here, security can be likened to any army retreating to second- ary or tertiary lines of defense to establish a strong and defensible position.
It is also well to consider the danger of attack from neighboring occupancies in shared space where entry might be made from a low-risk, badly secured premise into a higher-risk area that might otherwise be well protected against a more direct attack.
New Construction Modern urban buildings, though security conscious in varying degrees, present their own problems. Most interior construction is standardized. Fire and building codes are such that corridor doors can resist most attacks if the hardware is adequate. Corridor ceilings are fixed, and entrances to individual offices usually offer a fairly high degree of security.
On the other hand, modern construction creates offices that are essentially open-top boxes. They have solid exterior walls (though interior walls are frequently plasterboard) and a con- crete floor. But nothing of any security value protects the top. The ceiling is simply a layer of acoustical tiles lying loose on runners suspended between partition walls. In the space above these tiles—between them and the concrete slab above—are vital air conditioning ducts and wiring for power and telephones.
In effect, any given floor of a building has a crawl space that runs from exterior wall to exte- rior wall. This may not be literally so in every case, but the net result stands. It means that vir- tually every room and every office is accessible through this space. Once this crawl space is reached from any occupancy, the remaining offices on that floor are accessible.
Extending dividing walls up to the next floor will not solve the problem, because this dry- wall construction is easily broken through and, in any case, it must be breached to allow passage of all utilities. Alarms of various kinds, which are discussed later in this book, are rec- ommended to overcome this problem.
Security at the Building Design Stage Once a building has been constructed, the damage has been done. Security weaknesses begin to manifest themselves, but it is far too expensive to make basic structural changes to correct them. Guard services and protective devices that might not otherwise have been necessary must be instituted. In any event, there will be some considerable expense for protection that could easily have been incorporated into the design of the building before construction began. This kind of oversight can be very expensive indeed.
Unfortunately, we have not yet arrived at the point where the need for security from crimi- nal acts is as automatic a consideration as is the need for efficiency or profits. Architects’ inter- est in design for protection of buildings and grounds is usually minimal. They traditionally
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leave such demands to their clients, who usually are unaware of the availability of protective hardware and who are rarely competent to deal with the problems of protective design.
This situation may be changing following the growing apprehension of possible terrorist attacks. Events such as the destruction of the World Trade Center, as well as attacks on build- ings in many other countries, may prompt designers to consider the incorporation of secu- rity in their designs. The construction industry, in response to issues raised in the review of the failure of the twin towers of the World Trade Center, has revised its MasterFormat system to include more security concerns. The MasterFormat system is the work of the Construction Specifications Institute.
In addition, the growing awareness of potential crime problems has directed more atten- tion toward the important role that building design can play in security. There have been some efforts on the part of the federal government to accentuate the architect’s role in security.
Under the umbrella of environmental security, concepts of crime prevention through envi- ronmental design (CPTED) have received added attention in recent years. Early work in this field concentrated on residential security, particularly in public housing, with Oscar Newman’s major study of “defensible space” being a pioneering work.12
This approach to crime prevention through environmental design has important impli- cations for private security. It seeks to bring together many disciplines—among them urban planning, architectural design, public law enforcement, and private security—to create an improved quality of urban life through crime prevention. And in particular it encourages awareness of crime-prevention techniques through physical design.
Security Principles in Design Certain principles should always be considered in planning any building. Without them, it can be dangerously vulnerable. Some areas of consideration are listed below.
1. The number of perimeter and building openings should be kept to a minimum consistent with safety codes.
2. Perimeter protection should be planned as part of the overall design. 3. Exterior windows, if they are less than 14 feet above ground level, should be constructed
of glass brick, laminated glass, or plastic materials, or they should be shielded with heavy screening or steel grilles.
4. Points of possible access or escape that breach the exterior of the building or the perimeter protection should be protected. Points to be considered are skylights, air-conditioning vents, sewer ducts, manholes, or any opening larger than 96 square inches.
5. High-quality locks tied to smart card technology should be employed on all exterior and restricted area doors for protection and quick-change capability in the event of cardkey loss.
6. Protective lighting should be installed. 7. Shipping and receiving bays should be widely separated from each other. 8. Exterior doors intended for emergency use only should be fitted with alarms. 9. Exterior service doors should lead directly into the service area so that nonemployee traffic
is restricted in its movement.
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10. Dock areas should be designed so that drivers can report to shipping or receiving clerks without moving through storage areas.
11. Employment offices should be located so that applicants either enter directly from outside or move through as little of the building as possible.
12. Employee entrances should be located directly off the gate to the parking lot. 13. Employee locker rooms should be located by employee entrance and exit doors. 14. Doors in remote areas should be fitted with alarms.
Of growing interest is the need for some type of standardization of products in both the sur- veillance and access control areas. The need for interoperability between network video products and access control drives the desire for hardware and software standardization. ONVIF reports that standardization would benefit system integrators, manufacturers and, of course, end users.13
Summary While the basics of interior and exterior security theory remain constant, the tools used to establish the systems have improved. Systems that integrate all aspects of security are becoming commonplace. Smart cameras work with monitors, switchers, recorders, access control devices, and computers to allow operators to efficiently monitor and control a multitude of locations from one central station operation. Biometric technology implementation is growing at a rapid pace and should continue to be an area of advancement in the security industry. Geoff Kohl, editor, SecurityInfoWatch.com noted in 2007 that “our industry (security) is still heav- ily focused on gates, fences, analog cameras, guards and old reed-style contacts for intrusion detection. While… mag strip cards and security fencing may still define much of commercial security, it’s rapidly moving beyond that. The industry as a whole is paying a lot more attention to IT.”14 Along with the interest in technology is the desire to integrate security systems into one interactive operation that includes: access control, surveillance, assets tracking and employee monitoring. And along with the security industry’s interest will be increased interest from the criminal element. According to Ray Bernard, “The security industry has changed. It will be the rule that hacker’s conferences will include sessions on how to hack physical security systems.”15
CASE STUDY
You are the security director for IBID International, a large manufacturer. You have decided to conduct a security survey of the company’s administrative building. You have received the security survey report form (see Appendix C) and a blueprint of the building (see Figure 8-15). Your approved recommendation will be presented to senior management for final approval and funding. Fill out the survey form. As you do so, look over the blueprint and note directly on your blueprint what you would do and where you would make security improvements in the building and its interior.
You should succinctly, clearly, and logically draw together your findings on the physical security survey. This narrative should briefly provide an overview of each problem and its recommended solution or correction.
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192 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
FIGURE 8-15 Floor plan.
Corporate offices – IBID
Stairs
Safe
Payroll
Computer center
Kitchen
H a llw
a y
H a llw
a y
H a llw
a y
H a llw
a y
Hallway
Cafeteria
Sales group BReceptionSales group A
Research and development
1st floor
Main entrance
2nd floor
Reception President's office
Purchasing, order processing, and mail
Accounting and control
Personnel
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Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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Chapter 8 l Interior and Exterior Security Concerns 193
Review Questions 1. What factors need to be considered when you are purchasing and installing locking devices
for security purposes? 2. Describe the basic principles of an effective key control plan. 3. What are the two end results of an effective surveillance system?
References [1] Beaudry M. Locking in hotel security. Secur Manage November 1996;37.
[2] Access and beyond: read/write tokens open new possibilities. Security December 1996;23.
[3] Electronic keys: hardware feel, high-tech benefits. Security August 1996;19.
[4] Market for smart cards to increase 8-fold by 2000. Security January 1996;15–6.
[5] Kosk N. Access control: leveraging the legacy. Access Control Trends Technol May/June 2010;p. S-8.
[6] Security surveillance and monitoring systems to 2000. April 1996, <www.freedoniagroup.com>. [7] Messenbrink J. The Digital rEVOLUTION. Security, downloaded 1/14/2003, <www.securitymagazine.
com/security/cda/articleinformation/coverstory/bnpcoverstoryitem/0,5409,82693,00.html>. [8] <www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2007/02/26/surveillance_cameras_latest_job_interpret_
the_threats_they_see/>.
[9] Security management daily, February 28, 2007 excerpted from Engineer (02/26/2007).
[10] Security management daily, February 28, 2007 excerpted from Philadelphia Inquirer (02/26/2007).
[11] Security management daily, February 28, 2007 excerpted from Columbus Dispatch (02/25/2007).
[12] Newman O. Defensible space: crime prevention through urban design. New York: Macmillan; 1973.
[13] ONVIF highlights in store. Access control trends and technology, May/June 2010. p. S-10.
[14] Kohl G. The week that was: a recap – February 3–9, 2007, listserve e-mail to [email protected], 2/09/2007.
[15] Security Technology Executive, May 10, 2010. p. 15.
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:19:56.
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