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399 2013

10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00016-6

Terrorism A Global Perspective

This chapter is primarily the work of Dr. Vladimir Sergevnin, Editor of the Law Enforcement Executive Forum journal and Research Manager of the Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board Executive Institute, along with the previous work on terrorist tactics by Dr. Robert Fischer, with coauthors Colonel Fred Berger, U.S. Army ret., and the late Dr. Bruce Heininger. Portions of this chapter were published as “Terrorism: Nothing New—A Predictive Model for Handling Terrorist Incidents,“ Illinois Law Enforcement Executive Forum Special Edition, 2(1): 2002.

OBJECTIVES

The study of this chapter will enable you to:

1. Understand the problems associated with defining terrorism.

2. Briefly discuss the evolution of terrorist tactics.

3. Identify major terrorist organizations.

4. Know the various motivations for adopting terrorist tactics.

5. Identify some of the tools being used to combat terrorism.

Introduction With the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. and world community became explosively aware of the power of terrorism as a tool of war. Although terrorism is not a new tool of war, the sheer magnitude of the attack on the World Trade Center has assured terrorist groups recognition beyond that horrendous event. This attack, the first since the 1812 attack on the continental U.S., made a deep impact on the American government, the people’s collective psychology and the national security industry. Today, there is virtually no organization, agency or business in the U.S. that does not have, in one way or another, a security plan for terrorist attack. Nationally there are thousands of agencies and institutions, training entities, universities and colleges, and websites providing information, research, education, and recommendations related to terrorist incidents and appropriate security. It can be explained only because the threat of terrorist acts against the U.S. has significantly elevated since the end of the 1980s along with an increased level of public awareness. All this has created a tremendous increase in counter-terrorism investments on indi- vidual, local and governmental levels. According to recent data, in 2010, the U.S. total military expenditure is 41 percent of the world military spending at $ 1.7 trillion, with China at 9 percent, Russia at 4 percent and Iran at 0.5 percent.1

Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from apus on 2020-08-16 13:11:32.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00016-6

400 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

The Western world has heavily invested in a so-called “war on terror“ with mostly vague and predominately controversial results. Ideologically, the last century generally saw decen- tralized terrorist groups converge into anti-Western and anti-Christian movements that do not require constant operational communications, but produce an unlimited stream of individual terrorist recruits and cells by the means of self-indoctrination and radicalization via advanced channels of communications. Geopolitically, the USA transformed from a firm ally of the Muslim world fighting against the Soviet Union during the war in Afghanistan to a definite enemy for many Muslim countries. Iraq has since become a new epicenter for jihad against the Western powers. Two consecutive invasions by Christian superpowers, with different politi- cal systems, insured Muslim’s public opinion that these aggressions are religiously motivated. Tactically, the terrorist movement shifted from targeting governmental officials and military to killing civilians in an unprecedented scale, using effective, precise and flexible potential of the suicide missions. Al-Qaeda and its leaders not only survived the widest and best-equipped hunt, but became ideological and tactical leaders and icons for thousands and thousands of followers.

Terrorism will be a major world concern for the visible future, although the hype factor may be more significant than the actual probability of becoming a victim. In 1986 only 12 U.S. citizens were killed and 100 wounded in worldwide international terrorism. In 1987 the num- ber killed dropped to 7, with only 40 wounded. By 1989, 16 U.S. citizens were killed and only 19 wounded.2 In 1995, 70 attacks were directed toward U.S. businesses abroad3 and 10 were killed. The following numbers of the U.S. citizen deaths caused by international terrorism from 1995 to 2000 provides some explanation as to why terrorism has not been a priority for the U.S. government prior to 9/11: 1996—25, 1997—6, 1998—12, 1999—5, 2000—19.4 Between January 2005 and May 2006 there were only 9 American civilians wounded as a result of terror- ist attacks and in 2006, 28 American citizens were killed while overseas. In 2009, there were 25 U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide. This is less than the number of dogs fatally killing humans (32 deaths) in the U.S during the same period.5

In 2006, in the European Union countries there were less than 500 terrorist incidents, while Islamist-authored attacks accounted for less than 1 percent of the recorded incidents over the same period.6 In 2009, 60 percent of all terror attacks occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.7

Still, the loss of even one life and the fear associated with becoming a victim cannot be overestimated. With the events of the mid-1990s, including the bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, the capture of the Unibomber, and the bombing at the Olympics in Atlanta, terrorism reached the forefront of the American public’s interest. Experts agreed that terrorism in the United States was just beginning. Their predictions were too accurate as evidenced by perhaps the most spectacu- lar terrorist attack to date, the destruction of the twin towers and World Trade Center complex using hijacked commercial airplanes.

The impact on corporate United States is very significant. Terrorists have targeted 20 of the top 25 U.S. firms. And terrorism has had an impact on almost all international firms. The largest firms have taken security precautions. An analysis of American business victimization by terrorist attack demonstrated that almost every type of U.S. business overseas has been

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Chapter 16 l Terrorism 401

targeted.8 Terrorism threats made against the Fortune 1000 companies increased from 17 in 1998 to 40 in 2003.9

One of the newer (but certainly not new) trends in attacking companies has been assault on executives—primarily kidnapping for ransom. Risk insurance, and the provision of related risk and crisis management services, has become an established industry and it is estimated that as much as $100 million in premiums is paid globally each year.10 (Chapter 8 provides additional information on terrorism insurance.)

This practice has been common in many foreign countries such as sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East, and is also increasing in the United States; the problem seems to be related to the increase in terrorism throughout the world. To be able to develop adequate protection for executives, security managers must understand the terrorist problem and the strategies of various terrorist leaders.

Although the number of terrorists may be small, their actions have a great deal of impact. Throughout the world there are more than 42 major terrorist organizations, which vary in size from a few members to several hundred.11 In all, there are more than 3,000 members. According to the Office of International Criminal Justice at the University of Illinois–Chicago, there were 300 extremist groups operating around the globe less than 10 years ago.12 However, only four or five such groups have enough members and support to be transnational threats. The real problem arises from terrorist sympathizers. Most of these groups have support from various governments and thus have access to automatic weapons, surface-to-air missiles, anti- tank weapons, and sophisticated bombs. In 1988 Pan Am Flight 103 was blown from the air over Scotland by a bomb. In 2002 SAM handheld missiles targeted a commercial jetliner flying over Africa. Luckily the aircraft took evasive action and survived.

Why does terrorism exist? Although political terrorism often appears irrational and unpre- dictable to victims and observers, it is very rational from the terrorist point of view. Basic to most terrorist theory is that violence will bring the uncommitted masses into the conflict on the side of right—of course, the terrorist point of view. Terrorist actions are violent because:

1. They show the strength of the group. 2. They are provocative, causing the general population to pay attention to the group’s activities.

Today terrorism is a very viable method of attracting not only local, but also national or world attention through the mass media.

In the last few years, terrorist organizations have shifted their focus from governments to business and other soft targets. Since 1975, targeting of businesses has become more wide- spread even in the United States. According to Global Terrorism Database, between 1998 and 2003, terrorists targeted 17 businesses in the USA.13 Attacks on private businesses in New York, Chicago, and on the West Coast are indicative of this trend. Terrorists use the rich nation/poor nation issue whereby multinational and other large companies are portrayed as exploiters of the poor. Many of these large companies are rich enough to pay enormous ransoms, and in the past, have paid the ransoms. Coupled with government target-hardening (increased security mea- sures such as state-of-the-art hardware) stances, this makes companies more attractive targets. Because of these trends, businesses are more vulnerable to terrorism than at any time in the past.

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402 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

Despite this vulnerability, the cost of the additional security measures must always be jus- tified because businesses are profit-oriented. In many cases, chief executive officers (CEOs) view the cure as worse than the disease, and many CEOs are unwilling to give up their per- sonal liberty and freedom for protection. These same CEOs generally are unwilling to concede that their firms could be targets for terrorists. In addition, many corporations are willing to pay ransoms rather than invest in protective measures because they believe that a possible ransom will work out cheaper than constantly spending money on security.

The United States and many other countries, however, have adopted a posture of not mak- ing concessions to terrorists. Following the destruction of the World Trade Center, President George W. Bush declared a worldwide war on terrorism. The vast majority of the world’s gov- ernments joined him.

Current Issues The last decade has seen tremendous changes in the international terrorism activities all over the world. The recent history of international terrorism attacks, from the World Trade Center to the hostage situation in Beslan, Russia (2004), and Glasgow airport bombing attempt (2007) has activated mass media and expert attention, reminding citizens over the globe that interna- tional terrorism is not distant from each and every one, and is capable of affecting national and global security. International cooperation in countering terrorism is becoming very strong. When the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001 a total of 136 countries offered a range of military assistance.

There is definite abuse in the use of the term terrorism by mass media and various politi- cal groups and movements. Despite the tremendous amount of research and publications, international terrorism remains a phenomenon that is not clearly understood, adequately ana- lyzed, and effectively controlled. The limited scope of international terrorism analysis can be explained by political, ideological, and behavior approaches, which easily can overshadow the real substance of the phenomena.

Present-day international terrorism is quite different from old-fashioned terrorist acts, such as assassinations (Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914) or bombing (Russian Emperor Alexander II in 1881). Modern forms of international terrorism are more lethal and suicidal, more ideologically religious, and technologically advanced. The incidents of international ter- rorism caused around 1,500 deaths worldwide in the period 1991–1996.14 Generally speaking, the human life value vacuum of international terrorists has struck humankind at the beginning of the 21st century.

According to the Department of State there are three trends in terrorism that were identi- fied in 2006:

1. emergence of more and more decentralized operatives or groups in terrorism activities; 2. “sophistication” of terrorist activities through informational technologies and Internet

finance; 3. convergence of terrorist activity and international crime.15

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Chapter 16 l Terrorism 403

The lack of coordinated efforts at the international level means that different countries’ security agencies must assume some of the initiative in establishing partnerships on the basis of similar approaches and standards.

This chapter is an attempt to make a contribution to America’s ongoing international prepared- ness effort. It is designed for academic and pedagogical purposes to provoke interest and contro- versy. This chapter will demonstrate to students how international terrorism is defined and will shape the conclusions reached about terrorist characteristics and counterterrorism implications.

Historical Background International terrorism has existed throughout the history of man and society. There are sev- eral epicenters from which modern terrorism has evolved.

Europe

Europe is a motherland of modern terrorism. Members of a radical society or Jacobin Club of revolutionaries promoted the Reign of Terror and other extreme measures were active mainly from 1789 to 1794. French revolutionaries used terror as a remedy for political transformation:

One of the original justifications for terror was that man would be totally reconstructed; one didn’t have to worry about the kinds of means one was using because the reconstruction itself would be total and there would be no lingering after-effects …16

The “Terror the Order of the Day” or Que la Terreur soit a L’ordre du jour (Carlyle, 2002) was designed as a temporary domestic policy oriented on suppression of the enemies of the French Revolution, but its legacy provided international implications for more than two centuries. The original purpose of terror was to eliminate any opposition to the revolutionary Jacobins’ regime and to consolidate power. The latest applications of governmental or state terrorism can be found in Soviet Russia (Civil War, 1918–1921), Communist China (Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 1966–1969), and Cambodia (Khmer Rouge Regime, 1975–1979).

These early experiments with state or governmental terrorism outlined several important objectives of this method of governing.

From the French revolutionaries who employed the strategies of international terrorism against European countries to Russian terrorists that carried us into the 19th and 20th centuries, we can observe a steady trend to gain political and ideological objectives. Marxism reinforced this orientation.

Considerable numbers of leftist and right-wing terrorist organizations were formed in the late 1960s in Europe, including Germany’s Red Army Faction (RAF), France’s Action Directe, Italy’s Red Brigades, and German neo-Nazism.

Marxism

Karl Marx along with Friedrich Engels developed the communist doctrine of the class strug- gle, which has been a major agency of historical change. They theorized that the capitalist

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404 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

system would inevitably, after the period of the dictatorship of proletariat, be superseded by a socialist state and classless communist society. A dictatorship of the proletariat is necessary to ensure the removal of the capitalist society. The dictatorship is above the law because it is the law and therefore can be unlimited. By introducing the First International Working Men’s Association of communist organizations in 1864 Marx and Engels launched the idea of interna- tional or global socialist revolution employing any means of class struggle, including terrorist tactics against dominant classes. The international character of the proletarian revolution was derived from the international development of the capitalist society.17

Russia

Russia has a long history of coexisting with political terrorism and lives under fear of terror. Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin promoted the fundamental philosophical basis for uti- lization of terrorism as the tool for revolution proclaiming the concept “propaganda of the deed.” Sergei Nechaev might be called the extremist forerunner of modern Russian terrorism; Dostoevsky used him as a model for the revolutionary protagonist of The Devils. He was the father of political terror, which he developed as a revolutionary tool as early as 1869, when he published the Revolutionary Catechism, in which he defined a revolutionary as: A man who is already lost … he has broken all links with society and the world of civilization, with its laws and conventions, with its social etiquette and its moral code. The revolutionary is an impla- cable enemy, and he carries on living only so that he can ensure the destruction of society.18

For Nechaev, when it came to revolution, the end always justified the means. He believed that a terrorist must be:

… hard towards himself, he must be hard towards others also. All the tender and effem- inate emotions of kinship, friendship, love, gratitude, and even honor must be stifled in him by a cold and single-minded passion for the revolutionary cause. There exists for him only one delight, one consolation, one reward and one gratification—the success of the revolution. Night and day he must have but one thought, one aim—merciless destruction. In cold-blooded and tireless pursuit of this aim, he must be prepared both to die himself and to destroy with his own hands everything that stands in the way of its achievement.19

This trend became even stronger 10 years later when the rebel group named itself the People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya), the name under which the radicals were responsible for the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The objective of the group was to cause a coup or over- throw the Russian government. They believed that the assassinations would be the trigger for revolution and would finally change the order of the regime.

The Bolsheviks and Lenin inherited terrorist approaches and converted them into the state policy. The communist state developed two main types of terrorism. First, there was the inter- nal policy of using terror for the benefit of establishing a so-called “dictatorship of proletariat.” The goal was to suppress and physically eliminate opposing forces in the country and convince the population to be loyal to the new regime. In September 1918 the Russian communist gov- ernment officially announced the policy of “Red Terror.” Hundreds of thousands died; millions were scared.

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Chapter 16 l Terrorism 405

Second, there was support for international terrorism with the goal of causing destruction and chaos, resulting in a world communist revolution. There were many cases of state-supported terrorist actions. Soviet secret police (NKVD, OGPU, KGB) even established a special depart- ment, which was in charge of the elimination of popular political figures worldwide (e.g., the assassination of Leon Trotsky in August 1940).

Stalin developed terrorism as one of the most powerful tools of state policy, but individual and group terrorism were almost unknown under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. Isolated acts of terrorism by individuals (e.g., the explosion in Moscow’s subway in January 1977) got the state security agencies’ (KGB and MVD) attention, and terrorists were arrested and exe- cuted almost immediately.

Ireland

Ireland has been one of the longstanding centers of modern terrorism. At the end of the 19th century the Irish Republican Brotherhood (originally formed by Irish immigrants in New York City) had launched a campaign of assassinations and bombing against the British. The Easter Rising of 1916 helped to establish the Irish Republican Army, which was the main political and terrorist organization pushing for the formation of the Irish Free State.

Terrorism related to Northern Ireland has significantly diminished in recent years, with the Provisional IRA, Dissident Irish Republican terrorist groups and the main Loyalist groups ceas- ing their terrorist campaigns and engaging in the peace process. On 8 May 2007, the Northern Ireland Executive was successfully restored with the creation of a new government under a power-sharing agreement between nationalist and Unionist political parties.

Palestine

The new chapter of international terrorism was opened in the 1960s with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), led by Yassir Arafat. This Palestinian group vowed to fight the war of attrition against the occupying Israeli forces. In 1982 the Soviet Union initiated and sponsored the International Conference of the World Center for Resistance to Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reaction, and Fascism, which was held in Tripoli. This meet- ing resulted in the formation of a committee consisting of Libya, Cuba, Iran, Syria, and North Korea. The goal of this committee was the establishment of international terrorist training pro- grams to prepare fighters to battle against all types of oppressors, primarily the United States.20

In 2007, an important transformation of power happened in Palestine. Hamas, a radical Islamist political group, forcibly seized control of Gaza from rival Fatah, an essentially secular Palestinian group. Therefore, for the first time, the significant part of Palestinian territories— the Gaza Strip—is under the authority of a radical group that regularly uses terrorist tactics.21

Chechnya

In 1999 Islamic justice was established in Chechnya. Terrorism, including a series of bomb- ings in Moscow (several hundred people were killed there), erupted. After that, several thou- sand Islamic militants, armed members of a Chechen Muslim fundamentalist group whose

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406 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

aim was to merge Dagestan with neighboring Chechnya in a single Islamic state, invaded Dagestan. Russia responded with police and military attacks by federal forces, and the mili- tants retreated; the incident contributed to Russia’s decision to invade Chechnya later in 1999. International extremist organizations, including Osama bin Laden (in May, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed by a U.S. Special Operations force) and other criminal associations, backed the Chechen terrorists. The territory of Chechnya is used to host and train terrorists from Arab countries and some Western European countries. The numerous terrorist groups are free and go unpunished and make raids in the territory of Russia. In 1999 there were 20 terrorist acts in the Russian Federation registered by the MVD security agency. In 2001 representatives of terrorist organizations were registered by the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) in 49 of 89 states in Russia, and in 2001, the terrorist groups twice attempted to gain access to Russian nuclear munitions dumps. Security agencies do not exclude the possibility that terrorist groups may directly attack nuclear installations.

For the past several years terrorist attacks have mutated from Chechnya to other republics in the region. During this period there have been several extremely sophisticated and well- coordinated attacks. Internationally funded Chechen-led groups returned to hostage-taking as a terrorist tactic in the raid on Beslan’s School in September 2004 in which 334 people were killed, including 186 children. Chechen terrorist groups shifted from mostly military operations to the following tactics: random attacks on military installations; random attacks on tourists, and the deliberate killing of foreign-aid workers; incidents of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and bombing of apartment buildings (in 1999–2005 more than 5,000 people were kidnapped by Chechen terrorists); and terrorist attacks on economic infrastructures, including energy distri- bution, transportation, and banking.

Terrorism in the 21st Century

State Sponsors of Terrorism Since the beginning of the communist rule in Russia, state sponsors of terrorism provide politi- cal, financial, operational and military support to terrorist groups around the world. Without such states, terrorist groups would not have the same level of stability and ideological support. The limited success of international efforts materialized in Libya’s renouncing, in 2003, terror- ism and abandoning its WMD programs. North Korea shut down its nuclear program in 2007.

Diminishing the volume of state sponsorship for terrorist groups forces them to explore links with transnational and national organized crime entities. Several countries are tak- ing steps in preventing this symbiosis. In June 2000, the Anti-Terrorist Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan) was established with the purpose of coordination of counterterrorism measures in the territory of the former Soviet Union. In November 2001, the main organized crime administration of the criminal police service at the MVD established a special section for fighting terrorism and extremism. National police offices in the seven federal districts have already set up terrorism sections. The officers intend to cooperate with foreign law enforcement bodies in carrying out antiterrorist activities.

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In 2007, the U.S. State Department included the following countries as sponsors of terror- ism: Sudan, Cuba, Iran, and Syria. As of August, 2011, this list has not changed. Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as “not fully cooperating” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts.22

There is very little evidence that Cuba is currently active in international terrorism. The State Department described Iran as the most active state supporter of terrorism. Iran and Syria continue to support groups such as Hamas and Hizballah and, according to former President George W. Bush, Iran supports al-Qaeda.

Implications of a Changing World Law enforcement officials around the world have reported a significant increase in the range and scope of international terrorist activity since the early 2000s. It is in contrast with the 1990s when the total number of terrorist incidents worldwide declined, but the percentage of terror- ist acts resulting in fatalities had grown.23

Recently the number of incidents has grown from about 11,000 in 2005 to around 14,000 in 2006, and fatalities are up from about 14.5 thousand to about 20.5 thousand.24 According to the Department of State globally, in 2006, the number of terrorist incidents increased 25 percent in comparison with 2005.25 However, 2009 experienced a decline as the number of worldwide ter- rorists incidents dropped to 10,999.26

The level and severity of this activity and the accompanying growth in the power and influ- ence of international terrorist organizations have raised concerns among governments all over the world—particularly in Western democracies—about the threat terrorists pose to democ- racy and stability in many countries and to the global economy. In 2006, mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorist incidents claimed more than 20,000 lives, which is 5,800 more deaths than in 2005. International terrorist networks have been quick to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world politics, business, technology, and commu- nications that have strengthened democracy and free markets and brought the world’s nations closer together.

The end of the Cold War resulted in the shift of political and economic relations not only in Europe but also around the world. This change opened the way for substantially increased trade, movement of people, and capital flows between democracies and free market countries and the formerly closed societies and markets that had been controlled by the Soviet Union. These devel- opments have allowed international terrorists to expand their networks and increase their cooper- ation in illicit activities and financial transactions. Terrorists have taken advantage of transitioning and more open economies to establish financial ventures that are helpful in budgeting interna- tional terrorist activities: training camps, “sleeper cells,” purchase of weaponry and explosives.

International terrorists have extended their reach by building globe-circling infrastructures. Lebanese Hizballah, whose presence now reaches most of the continents, has led the way. But other terrorist organizations, with agendas as diverse as the Palestinian group Hamas or the Sri Lankan Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, have their active presence far from the lands where their objectives are focused.27 And of course, following the bombing of the World Trade Center in September 2001, al-Qaeda has taken its place as a major world terrorist “player.”

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Present day terrorist networks are loosely structured, acting without an operational structure and with regular connections across the globe. They are bound by shared extremist ideology or experiences. Some of these networks are directly connected to al-Qaeda, but most are autono- mous, and both work to carry out terrorist attacks, and are influenced by radical beliefs shared over the Internet. The terrorists draw their motivation from sporadically delivered messages articulated by leadership icons such as Osama bin Laden (now deceased).

Revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies have brought most of the world population closer together. Terrorist networks just as easily use modern tele- communications and information systems. Sophisticated communications equipment greatly facilitates international terrorist activities including coordination of terrorist acts and affords terrorists sufficient security from law enforcement counterterrorist operations.

Through the use of digital technologies, international terrorists have an unprecedented capability to obtain, process, and protect information from law enforcement investigations. They can use the interactive capabilities of advanced computers and telecommunications sys- tems to plot terrorist strategies against U.S. representatives and institutions all over the globe, to find the most efficient routes and methods for financial transactions, and to create international virtual networks. Some terrorist networks are using advanced technologies for counterintelli- gence purposes and for tracking law enforcement operations.

The modern mega trend of globalization and the reduction of barriers to movement of peo- ple, commodities, and financial transactions across borders have enabled international terrorist networks to expand their global reach. International terrorist groups are able to operate increas- ingly outside traditional models, take quick advantage of new opportunities, and move more readily into the most vulnerable areas of the Western world. The major international terrorist groups have become more global in their operations and have developed more threatening goals. Since the end of the Cold War, terrorist groups from Middle Eastern countries have increased their international presence and worldwide networks or have become involved in more lethal terrorist acts. Most of the world’s major international terrorist groups are aiming toward the United States.

In Search of a Definition for International Terrorism Numerous attempts to produce the general definition of terrorism were more focused on terror- ism as a concept (converging it with intentions and justifications) than a term and consequently include the damaging impact from ideologies and political partisanships.

The first recorded definition of terrorism was given in the 1795 supplement of the Dictionaire of the Academe Francais as system regieme de la terror. The Jacobins used the term when speaking and writing about themselves.

At present there is no precise or widely accepted definition of international terrorism, or terrorism in general. The difficulty in defining derives from: a) highly politicized usage of ter- rorism and terrorism-related terminology for national or ideological purposes; b) vagueness of boundaries for terrorist acts in comparison with crime, military actions, use of force, threat; c) attempts to infuse a concept into a term rather than defining a phenomenon. Alex Schmid

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Chapter 16 l Terrorism 409

surveyed more than a hundred definitions of terrorism and found two characteristics of the definition:

l An individual is being terrorized. l The meaning of the terrorist act is derived from its target and victims.28

It shows that we are experiencing only the initial stage in scientific analysis of the phenom- ena. There are many approaches in analyzing and defining international terrorism and the most influential should be mentioned.

Political

Political analysis of international terrorism views it as one of the instruments in a political process. The Marxist–Leninist ideology and many other revolutionary factions accept terrorism, including international terrorism, as a legitimate instrument in the class struggle. For Marxist–Leninists, the political goal justifies the means. The political goal is above any law or moral code in the current society. These ideologies believe that it is not immoral for social revolutionaries to use terrorism because it leads to fulfillment of the political goal.

Governmental institutions of the United States are implementing the political approach in analyzing and defining terrorism. Information pertaining to the political definition of terrorism is contained in Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d). That statute contains the following definitions:

l The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

l The term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.

l The term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.

The U.S. government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analyti- cal purposes since 1983. At the same time not all terrorist acts have political motivation. This approach will exclude those whose motivation is religious or personal, and they are not trying to change any political institution in the foreign society.

Criminal

Most of the terrorists will claim to be not criminals, but freedom (religion, ideology, special inter- est) fighters. Almost all of the terrorist acts are characterized as criminal violence, which are violating criminal codes and punishable by the criminal justice system of the state. In this case terrorism is defined as “a crime, consisting of an intentional act of political violence to create an atmosphere of fear.”29 Some definitions of international terrorism will include just violence, but a few years ago, for example, the Islamic Army in Yemen warned foreigners to leave the country if

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410 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

they valued their lives but did not actually carry out its threat.30 Using a criminal justice approach we will find no terrorism, because any of the acts will be just a crime.

Militaristic

Several international lawyers see a possible solution to the dilemma of a definition in the laws of war. If the laws of war are applied to terrorists they will be treated as soldiers who commit atrocities in international armed conflicts.31 If this approach will be utilized, then we have to treat our own citizens as people in the war zone to prevent possible terrorist acts. Also, not all terrorist acts have international character.

The Physiological Approach

The physiological approach suggests a tendency to imitate behavior that is successful in deliver- ing a message to the public. This approach analyzes the power of inspiration drawn from the media. David G. Hubbard concludes that much of terrorist violence is rooted not in the psy- chology but in the physiology of the terrorist, partly the result of “stereotyped, agitated tissue response” to stress.32 From this approach, international terrorism is targeted more at an audi- ence or the public in general rather than the immediate victims. But this definition will exclude those terrorist acts that targeted one person, or a very limited circle of the public, or the military. In this regard the violence against the American battleship Cole is not considered terrorism.

Psychological Approach

The psychological approach is not interested in the political or social contexts of international terrorists, but in the terrorists’ personalities, their recruitment, and induction into terrorist organizations, beliefs, attitudes, motivations, and careers.

Some researchers view terrorism as a “syndrome.” Recent results, thus far, found little sup- port for the syndrome view. The psychological nature of terrorism’s users is consistent with the tool view, affording an analysis of terrorism in terms of goal and means psychology.33

The weak points of this approach are that the analysis isolates the phenomena from the social and political context of international terrorism, and a slight presumption is made that international terrorists are born, not made.

Group Behavior

Another productive approach describes terrorism as rational strategy decided by group.34 This approach is rather close to the political one because it requires collective decision making in the utilization of terrorist tactics to reach group goals. Group behavior is wider than the politi- cal approach because it can include, for example, criminal acts of international terrorism, in which the goals will not be political.

Very often the definitions of terrorism mention only “groups” or clandestine agents as an active core of this type of activity. But in this case we’re excluding state-sponsored interna- tional terrorism.

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In order to understand international terrorism, one must always assess what exactly con- stitutes terrorism and the definition in use. International terrorism or terrorism has to be ana- lyzed as an instrument, not a concept.

Multifactor Approach

International terrorism preferably can be viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon. It would be misleading to analyze it by a single-cause approach. International terrorism can be attributed to the same type of events as social revolution, revolt, uprisings, and any kind of political, social, ideological, or religious unrest. Terrorism in general, and international terror- ism in particular, is an instrumental phenomenon, and as a remedy could be utilized for mul- tiple causes, forces, organizations, individuals, etc.

Terrorism as a Tactic, Instrument, or Method Terrorism is a term describing a method or instrument of utilizing violence, intimidation, threat, and fear against an individual, a populace, or a government. Terrorists use a wide range of force, violence, and brutality with the purpose to manipulate human behavior and illegally reach goals.

Goals are diverse but can be grouped into the following categories:

l Political—change of regime, overthrow the government, coup d’etat, damage relations between the countries, disgrace to political system, and so on

l Social—upset social order l Economic—damage to economic order; upset the budget; interrupt vital supplies like oil,

gas, electricity l Ethnic and religious—fundamentalist sects, racism, genocide, spread of new beliefs l Ideological l Personal

It depends on the target (domestic or international) or forces (individual, group, criminal, military, state sponsored) in categorizing and separating domestic from international terror- ism. Any kind of individual, global, regional, or local player can use it. We have to separate ter- ror as application of fear for criminal or insane purposes from political terrorism, which has a definite objective: political power. Application of fear is a universal method in military opera- tions, criminal justice systems (punishment), and so on.

Terrorism in general is a wide range of criminal acts with a focus on use of violence and destruction or threat of violence and destruction to inculcate fear. The acts are undertaken by an individual, an organized group, or a state driven by generally ethnic, religious, nationalist, separatist, political (including governing), ideological, mentally deviant, and socioeconomical motivations. It is a vast area of crime with a flavor of nontraditional motivation.

Numerous publications describe international terrorism as terrorist acts with interna- tional goals, targets, and consequences,35 or as acts committed by a group or individual that

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are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States or whose activities transcend national boundaries.

These definitions are not accurate because, for example, stealing of diplomatic mail should be included in them. International terrorism is a term describing the utilization of fear and intimidation, including violence, brutality, and invasion of privacy, across national boundaries with the purpose of political, social, economic, ideological, religious, ethnic, or cultural change.

The concept of traditional “war” requires the mobilization of political, financial, and indus- trial resources for the development and production of modern weapons.

The concept of traditional “international terrorism” requires the mobilization of political, financial, and industrial resources for the development and production of modern homeland security and defense. It is much more expensive because instead of a front we have an unlim- ited number of potential targets.

Terrorism requires more efforts in the political sphere, which can eliminate potential grounds for terrorism activity.

Characterizing Modern Terrorism Ideological Shift

At the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century the dominant form of international terrorism was an ideological one. The phenomenon of ideological terrorism brought it to the global stage via bombings and extermination of “enemies of communism” beginning from around 1917, perpetrated by such states as the USSR, and lately by groups such as Red Army Faction, Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, etc. The end of the Cold War has resulted in the shift from anti-democratic or anti-capitalist, Marxist-based ideologically motivated international political terrorists to ethnic and religious terrorism. One of the rea- sons why the ethno-religious type of international terrorism became dominant recently is the globalization of the Western type of economy and culture in traditionally culturally and economically endemic countries, such as in the Middle East region and Asia. International terrorism has an anti-American, anti-Western orientation because these countries view the spread of “global Western economy and culture,” an increasing U.S. presence in the Middle East (Israel, Iraq, Afghanistan) and Pacific Rim, Western development of the Caspian oil reserves (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan), and flourishing Western technological devel- opment in the Middle East and Pacific Rim as a threat to their powers and traditional ways of governing. It’s not surprising then, that many of the international terrorist organizations are state sponsored.

Marxism was a dominant basis for terrorist ideology (1848 to the end of the 1980s). Communist ideology sought a global communist revolution through initiating riots, uprisings, and coups against imperialism and “weak bourgeois national governments.” The period from 1848 to 1917 saw political parties and trade-union organizations sponsored by individuals and opposition groups. From 1917 to the end of the 1980s was a period characterized by state- sponsored ideological “warfare,” the states being mainly Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact states.

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International terrorism networking was established through the First, Second, Third, and Fourth International and national communist or totalitarian organizations.

The First International, as it was to be called, was formed in 1864 in London and composed of various elements: French, Italian, and British. Marx composed the Inaugural Address of the International, which is now considered a historic document. The organization stood for efforts of workers against anarchists and middle-class reformers of the time.

The Second International was founded in 1889 in Belgium. The primary members were German and Russian social democrats. The group worked to advance labor legislation and to strengthen the democratic socialist movement. It failed in its primary concern, the prevention of war. With the outbreak of World War I, the International collapsed.

The Third or Communist International was created in 1919 under the leadership of Lenin. The goal of this group was to bring about world revolution. The group was not supported by many mainstream socialists and was dissolved in 1943.

The role of ideology is still significant and old-fashioned “revolutionary” organizations continue to exist, such as the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front and the Peruvian Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path). But the dominant terrorist ideology has ethno- religious character. The spread of ethno-religious ideology is a basis for international terror- ism based on ethno-religious conflicts in the Caucasus, Balkans, Middle East, South Asia, and central Africa.

The comparison of communist and radical Islam ideology demonstrates some close simi- larities and explains the attractiveness in many former socialism-sympathetic countries.

Ethno-religious ideological activities are very often state-sponsored, which gives them more informational stability and coordination. Ethnic ideology is dealing with ethnic identity, solidarity, self-determination, and domination. Religious ideological activities usually are ori- ented toward establishing “pure and the only true religion” and aimed at the spreading of cer- tain beliefs and defeating modern, Western ideology.

The 21st century is promising to be a century of an ideological war for radical religious indoctrination opposing Free World ideology, beliefs and values. It will be fought by all means of propaganda in the format of modern channels of communications.

Modern terrorist organizations realized much earlier than Western governments the power of propaganda. Unlike with communist propaganda, democratic governments are mostly hesi- tant in aggressive ideological response because of the religious underlining of the radical Islam propaganda. It should be realized that counter-ideological measures can be more effective than military and should focus on: promoting democratic values; providing a Western view on events inside Islamic countries: supporting education, social activity, especially for women; controlling terrorist virtual communications; depicting terrorists as criminals, not freedom fighters.

Terrorist organizations utilized websites to conduct psychological warfare, generating publicity and disseminating propaganda; data mining; fund-raising; recruitment and mobi- lization; networking; planning and coordination; and sharing information on their activities, organization, plans, and political, religious, and social goals to glorify their actions. If in 2005 there were more than 4,300 websites with terrorist affiliation and content, in 2006 the FBI

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counted as many as 6,000 extremist websites. Since January 2006, the primary clearinghouse for jihadist information releases has been an Internet outpost called the Al-Fajr Center. Al-Fajr Center has many divisions that are devoted to hacking, intelligence, propaganda, publica- tions, multimedia and cybersecurity. Other influential online groups are the Ansar e-Group, the Jihadi Brigades and the Global Islamic Media Front, also known as GIMF.36 Some recent reports conclude that Internet chat rooms are now major venues for recruitment and radical- ization by terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, and video-hosting websites like YouTube broaden the outreach.37 According to the FBI, in 2006 Al-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s official media component, released 48 propagandist videos with various focus topics, the most al-Qaeda ever released in one year.38 For the majority of terrorist organizations, the destruction of American and Western values and establishing “true religious order” worldwide is the main goal of these ideological activities. Law enforcement and security forces can concentrate their efforts on: isolating radicals in the community using a non-biased approach within and outside the department, outreach to ethnic groups (communication with ethnic representatives), and recruitment from ethnic groups.

Organizational Shift

There are three basic organizational levels of international terrorism:

1. Individual international terrorism often has criminal motivation (e.g., revenge, intimidation, and any other personal motives). It is close to organized crime activities. It is difficult to detect this form of terrorist. Mentally retarded individuals carried out some individual international acts.

2. Group terrorism requires organization and some type of leadership, recruitment, training, and retention of members.

3. State terrorism is one of the political tools utilized by a government, which establishes a specific agency or uses a legitimate state institution for gaining domestic or international benefits for the regime.

The current shift in the organizational sphere is increasingly away from state-sponsored international terrorist activities and to groups of terrorists. The process of decentralization of international terrorism was initiated by several factors. The modern world relies on very close economic and political interrelations between the countries. It is a tremendous political and economic disadvantage for any state to associate itself with international terrorist activities. Libya and Iraq are strong examples of governments that made all possible efforts to disassoci- ate themselves with terrorist incidents. In May 2002 Libya agreed to pay $2.7 billion compensa- tion for the Lockerbie bombing and has tied the money to the lifting of U.S. and United Nations sanctions. Libya continues to deny involvement in the explosion, which downed Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988 and killed 259 passengers and crew along with 11 Lockerbie residents. The meth- ods by which states sponsor international terrorism and support these “isolated” groups are almost untraceable. In November 2002 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was investi- gating whether a charitable contribution by Saudi Princess Haifa al-Faisal, wife of Bandar bin

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Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, may have indirectly benefited two of the hijackers of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Because these groups cannot rely on open sponsorship from the state agencies, they turn more to involvement with international and domestic organized crime syndicates, and self-financing. International terrorist groups are more isolated and loosely organized than in the past, when under the influence of Soviet bloc sponsorship they were more or less interconnected and had centralized structure.

Geographical Shift

International terrorism once threatened Americans only when they were outside the country. The primary source of it was known as the Soviet bloc. Today international terrorists attack Americans on their home soil. There is more than just one major source of international terror- ist activity. International terrorism gained a global character. Oceans or borders cannot stop it.

The Near East and South Asia are the regions responsible for 90 percent of the nearly 300 high-casualty attacks in 2006 that killed 10 or more people. Of the 14,000 reported attacks, 45 percent—about 6,600—of them occurred in Iraq where approximately 13,000 fatalities—65 percent of the worldwide total—were reported for 2006. Violence against civilians in eastern and sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Sudan and Nigeria, rose 64 percent in 2006, rising to 422 from the approximately 256 attacks reported for 2005. The number of reported incidents in 2006 fell in Europe and Eurasia by 15 percent from the previous year, for South Asia by 10 percent, and for the Western Hemisphere by 5 percent. The nearly 750 attacks in Afghanistan during 2006 are 50 percent more than the nearly 500 attacks reported for 2005 as fighting intensified during that year. The overall number of people injured in terrorists’ incidents rose substantially in 2006—by 54 percent—with most of the rise stemming from a doubling of the reported number of injuries in Iraq since 2005.39 Between 2005 and 2010, 88.4 percent of ter- rorist attacks took place in the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia. Only 0.2 percent occurred in North America.40

Tactical Shift

In the past, international terrorism used more single assassinations and hostage situations. Airline hijackings have become unpopular among international terrorists because few coun- tries will let them land, and chances are very high that they will be deported back to the coun- try where the international terrorist incident was originated. Only 19 countries have extended their support to include asylum to aviation hijackers.41

According to the U.S. State Department the number of international terrorist attacks in 2001 declined to 346, down from 426 the previous year, 2000. A total of 3,547 persons were killed in international terrorist attacks in 2001. In 2000, 409 persons died in terrorist attacks.42 International terrorism became more lethal. Most of the international groups are turning to indiscriminate killings of civilians. In the 1990s a terrorist incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death or injury than an incident 2 decades ago.43 In the 21st century, terror- ism has become more destructive and focuses on mass causalities, tremendous loss of prop- erty, and financial and economic downfall. Terrorists also shifted their focus on to more soft

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targets, such as schools, hospitals, etc. In 2006, attacks on children were up more than 80 per- cent, with more than 1,800 children killed or injured.44

International terrorist missions became more suicidal. In the past, terrorist groups did not exclude the possibility of becoming victims of counterterrorist security measures. Terrorist groups today are recruiting young volunteers to carry out violent acts. It is much harder to deal with this kind of terrorist because they don’t utilize the natural concept of human life. Some of the law enforcement tactics in these cases will not work.

Most international terrorist groups shifted to the following tactics:

l Random attacks on military and diplomatic installations. l Random attacks on tourists and the deliberate killing of foreign-aid workers. l Incidents of kidnapping, hostage-taking, and bombing of apartment buildings have

become frequent in the republics of the former Soviet Union. l Terrorist attacks on economic infrastructures, including energy distribution, transportation,

banking, and tourism have become routine in Colombia. l Bomb threats.

Another significant tactical focus shift is suicide bombing. A suicide attack is an operational method in which the very act of the attack is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator. The typical type of bombing attacks carried out in the 1970s and 1980s were time bombs. This modus operandi often failed due to early or late detonation without many people concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the explosion, or as an outcome of early detection by law enforce- ment or civilians prior to detonation. Later, during the 1990s, terrorist organizations started to use remote controls to detonate their explosives. The remote control provided the bomber with the ability to detonate the bomb with optimal timing in order to cause the maximum number of casualties and damage. The suicide attack, like the smart bomb, is the most sophis- ticated tactic used by terrorist organizations since it provides the perpetrator with control of both the timing and location of the attack and, therefore, produces the maximum number of casualties and damage. Globally in the 1980s there were 4.7 suicide attacks per year while in: 2001—81; 2002—91; 2003—99; 2004—163; 2005—460. Eighty percent of suicide attacks since 1968 occurred after 9/11, with jihadis representing 31 of the 35 responsible groups.

Technological Shift

From relatively primitive means of technology (guns, explosives, and conventional weaponry), international terrorism shifted to highly sophisticated technologies such as weapons of mass destruction and chemical and biological weapons. According to the U.S. State Department, for instance, Iran, seen as the most active state sponsor of terrorism, has been aggressively seek- ing a nuclear arms capability.45 North Korea decided in December 2002 to restart nuclear installations at Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.–North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994. Three atomic reactors will be able to produce 207 kilograms of plutonium annually, which is enough for the manufacture of nearly 30 atomic bombs per year.46

Modern Islamic terrorists have expressed interest in developing the capability to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt the banking communications, important infrastructures like

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transportation, medical services and others which will have economic costs, and undermine public confidence. Some terrorist websites provide instructions on how to create and spread viruses, develop code, and promote hacking plans. One of such online communities calling itself “Electronic Jihad” in October 2006 claimed it had designed and used a hacking program to syn- chronize a distributed denial-of-service attack against an Israeli website.47 Businesses and cor- porations are addicted to easily compromised protocols and commercial Internet products to manage networks that increase the probability and vulnerability to cyber attacks by terrorists.

Organized Crime Shift

One of the more significant shifts since the early 1970s has been the growing involvement of organized crime groups with terrorist organizations. For example:

l In Peru from the late 1980s until the early 1990s the extremist Sendero Luminoso insurgents profited from protecting coca fields and extorting drug traffickers operating in the Andean region they controlled.

l In Western Europe, members of the terrorist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey have engaged in drug trafficking and other crimes to help finance local operations.

l In Colombia, since the late 1980s, Marxist insurgents have not been able to rely on financial support from Cuba and Russia. Some insurgent fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) generate substantial revenue by taxing and protecting coca cultivation, cocaine processing, and drug shipments in the areas they control. The U.S. government estimates that the FARC may earn as much as half of its revenue from involvement in the Colombian drug trade.48

With the substantial decline in state-sponsored international terrorism support, many ter- rorist networks reach out to criminal networks to acquire arms and supplies that cannot be obtained through more traditional or legitimate channels. International organized crimi- nal groups are well-connected to outside gray arms merchants, transportation coordinators, money launderers, and other specialists who can provide the weapons and other logistics sup- port once given by state sponsors. International organized crime groups cannot exist without corrupt contacts in law enforcement agencies, which are crucial in smuggling operations of weapons and other contraband for terrorist groups.

Characterizing International Terrorist Groups

This form of terrorist activity began to spread in the second half of the 20th century with the increase in the number of terrorist organizations and the expansion of social support for ter- rorism. In the recent Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Umar Abd al-Hakim’s 1,600 page publication, The Call to Global Islamic Resistance (2005), which is among the most frequently mentioned jihadi strategy books, they make a strong statement that the future of jihad is individual and small terrorist groups, with no chains connecting them to al-Qaeda leadership.49

This form of terrorist activity involves hiring participants to different terrorist organizations, personnel training on methods and ways of conducting terrorist acts, and preparation for the forthcoming terrorist acts—rehearsals of terrorist acts, separate stages of terrorist operations,

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and so on. The common practices in recruiting a jihadist are: 1) identifying individuals with appropriate ideology; 2) indoctrination; 3) cultivating the desire for jihad; 4) training and prep- aration for terrorist act.

This form also involves establishing contacts with other terrorist groups and creating and maintaining connections with organized crime institutions, representatives of illegal firearms businesses, and drug dealers. A high level of secrecy and specialization of terrorist group par- ticipants according to different functions (e.g., hiring personnel, recognizers, warriors, produc- tion specialists of combat substances and cover documents, secret apartment maintenance staff ) are common for organized terrorist activity. There are several certain characteristics of international terrorist groups.

Seeking Political Gain Hatred and the quest for political changes or status quo outside their own country dictate more international terrorist network decisions than any other single motive. It is this consuming desire for political power that typically drives and sustains international terrorism.

Motivation In 1974 Dr. Frederick Hacker reported to the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Internal Security, Hearing on Terrorism, that all terrorists fall into three basic motivational groups:

1. Criminal—motivated mainly by personal gain 2. Mentally deranged—personal motivation, often accompanied by delusions or

hallucinations 3. Political—motivation toward a real or imagined strategic goal

Islamic fundamentalists (i.e., Osama bin Laden) have political and often mentally deranged characteristics.50 The current shift in motivation is from Marxist-based ideology to ethnic nationalism and religious extremism.

According to Jerrold M. Post (1984), religious international terrorists are more dangerous than the average political or social terrorists, who have a mission that is somewhat measur- able in terms of public attention or government reaction; the religious terrorist can justify the most horrific acts “in the name of Allah,” for example.51 Terrorism that is religiously motivated is growing quickly, increasing the number of killings and reducing the restraints on mass indis- criminate murder. For religious terrorists, as for social revolutionary terrorists, violence is mor- ally justified and legitimate.

Seeking Publicity Almost all international terrorist groups are seeking publicity to promote themselves and their agenda, and to discredit those in opposition to them. International terrorist groups are highly motivated to publicize every act of terrorism in order to show the state’s inability to control the terrorist activities. The propaganda of terrorism is connected with attempts to gain pub- lic approval of a terrorist activity as a form of political fight, with substantiation of its legal use and also with direct initiative calls to terrorist activities, which may lead to real commitment

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of criminal actions and involve separate individuals or groups committing severe violent crimes. These appeals are realized verbally or by distributing written or visually demonstrative materials.

Requiring Member Loyalty through Ideological, Religious, Ethnic, and Other Considerations The purpose of this preference is that the terrorists generally believe that they have to accom- plish some global mission, such as communist revolution, liberating Palestine, continuing jihad, etc.

Structure Generally, international groups maintain a structure with defined leadership–subordinate roles, through which the group’s objectives are achieved. Recently, because more groups are based on religious motives and may lack political or nationalistic agenda, they have less need for hierarchical structure. International terrorist groups have a tendency to rely on loose affilia- tions with like-minded groups in different countries.52

Tactical Diversity Typically, international terrorist groups are utilizing more than one method of violent acts— suicide bombings, bombings, assassinations, sabotage communications, armed assaults, kid- nappings, barricade and hostage situations, and hijackings.

Assistance With the creation of large terrorist institutions, terrorist assistance is becoming more impor- tant in the overall system of terrorism. Main variations of this assistance are extremist groups financing and providing the means for terrorism, providing facilities for training their mem- bers, and harboring and hiding them after committing terrorist acts. This assistance can be used by states (so-called terrorism sponsors) as well as by representatives of business circles and ethnic and other social groups that express sympathy to terrorist organizations or sup- port them because of their common political interests. There may also be direct involvement with extremist organizations in conducting tasks of legal political institutions to influence their enemies.

Organizational Maturity In most cases international terrorist groups have a high level of organizational stability and do not depend on the continuing participation of one or a few individuals for their existence. For example, al Qadea was designed during the 1980s as a worldwide recruitment and sup- port network for the purpose of resisting the former Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan that was backed with financial aid from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other states. It is important to appreciate that al Qadea’s organizational structure is complex by design. During the 1980s resistance fighters in Afghanistan developed a worldwide recruitment and support network with the aid of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other states. In the early 1990s this

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network, which equipped, trained, and funded thousands of Muslim fighters, came under the control of Osama bin Laden. Al-Qaeda (“The Base”) is a network of groups spread throughout the world, with a presence in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Jordan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Syria, Xinjiang in China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Indonesia, Mindanao in the Philippines, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Dagestan, Kashmir, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Azerbaijan, Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia, and in the West Bank and Gaza.

As hierarchy, al-Qaeda is organized with the emir-general, at the top, followed by other al-Qaeda leaders and leaders of the different groups. Horizontally, it is integrated with 24 constituent groups. The vertical integration is formal; the horizontal integration, informal. Immediately below the emir-general is the Shura Majlis, a consultative council. Four com- mittees report to the Shura Majlis: (1) military, (2) religious-legal, (3) finance, and (4) media. Members of these committees conduct special assignments for Saif al Adel and his operational commanders. Operational effectiveness at all levels is reached by compartmentalization and secrecy. While the organization has evolved considerably since the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa in 1999, the basic structure of the consultative council and the four committees remains intact.53

In addition, almost all of the international terrorist organizations have developed training functions.

Violent Nature Terrorist groups routinely utilize violence to advance and protect their interests. These groups are ruthless and suicidal in protecting their interests from rivals and law enforcement alike. Unprecedented violence—bombings, hostage taking, contract killings, kidnappings, and large- scale massacres—has increased with competition for political, ideological, and religious purposes.

Weaponry For many years international terrorism analysts did not believe that the terrorists were will- ing to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But present-day reality shows that religious extremists and sects with messianic or apocalyptic mind-sets have a tendency to use WMD or any kind of equivalent approaches. Such religious groups as al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo are inclined to use equivalents of WMD. The September 11, 2001 attack by al-Qaeda and the sarin attack on the Tokyo (Japan) subway system on March 20, 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo demonstrated this new shift in the utilization of new terrorist technologies.

To complicate this already critical situation, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibility of nuclear terrorism has increased. As reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “The current trafficking situation shows disturbing upward trends, substantial quantities of materials are likely to remain at large, and the potential for an accident or use of smuggled nuclear materials probably is increasing…” The seri- ousness of potential nuclear losses is evident from the number of thefts reported by the Russian Interior Ministry officials. In 1993 they reported 27 thefts of nuclear materials and 27 incidents in 1994. Globally from 1993 to 2003 there were registered 540 attempts of illegal

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nuclear materials trade including 182 incidents with materials that can be used in assem- bling nuclear weaponry.54

Dirty bombs pose an ongoing terrorist threat that the United States must be prepared to counter. The representative of the 9/11 Commission stated in 2004 that al-Qaeda is still inter- ested in using a radiological weapon or “dirty bomb,” which was confirmed in September 2006 by a statement by then leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.55

This tendency of utilizing unconventional weapons shows the international terrorism asymmetry—the usage of unconventional weapons against expected conventional weapons. This shift requires in many instances the development of connections with the arms dealers, or those who can manufacture arms (the Chechen terrorists have connections with a machine- gun manufacturer in Kovrov, Russia, for example). International terrorism groups are involved in such organized crime activity as weapons smuggling.

Finance Financial support to international terrorist groups comes from many sources, including state sponsorship, organized crime, and drug and human trafficking. Most of Marxist and leftist ter- rorist organizations are suffering now from a lack of funding because of the disintegration of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries. As was mentioned above, international terrorists’ fund- ing and logistical networks cross borders, are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to disrupt with economic sanctions.

Funds can be moved to terrorists in many ways. It can be done through financial insti- tutions such as banks that have secret accounts. For example, half of 15,000 accounts of Clearstream Clearinghouse in Luxembourg are unpublished. This institution was suspected of moving Osama bin Laden’s money. Among the international banks with the most secret accounts are: Citibank (271), Barclays (200), Crédit Lyonnais (23), and the Japanese company Nomura (12). Also, there are 2,000 investment companies, banks, and subsidiaries of banks— mainly British, German, American, Italian, French, and Swiss—with unpublished accounts.56 Western Union and similar businesses are able to send money worldwide in 15 minutes and no bank account, background check, or ID is required to send less than $1,000. According to the U.S. Treasury, al-Qaeda, Hamas, and other terrorist groups use Muslim charities for financial transactions. The Holyland Foundation charity of Richardson, Texas, has been used to support the families of Arab suicide bombers on the West Bank affiliated with Hamas.57

Reducing the Risk of Terrorism

Since 9/11 the U.S. has made visible progress in terrorism prevention planning and education. However, the modern history of international terrorism shows that it is not realistic to elimi- nate it or to control it, but it is possible to reduce it. For this purpose, it is not enough to just improve antiterrorism legislation to solve the problems created by terrorism globally. This is because the laws on terrorism are aimed to suppress terrorist activity and to punish those who are responsible, but it is much more important to prevent such activity from occurring in the first place. Even a successfully conducted antiterrorist operation with the terrorists’ capture

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and apprehension cannot compensate its damages and cannot be evaluated completely posi- tively, because it shows missed opportunities to prevent such an act.

A lot of negative consequences occur during the preparation stage of a terrorist act. Usually other crimes are committed before a terrorist attack (e.g., burglary; illegal weapon possession; acquisition of explosives, toxins, and radioactive substances). A substantial number of groups and even layers of society are getting involved in different negative criminal consequences; social tension is increasing; international, interethnic, and religious controversies are growing; legal nihilism is spreading; and opponent aggression is increasing. The most effective preven- tion and of course the most expensive and difficult is early prevention. Today, the U.S. govern- ment focuses on several main activities that can reduce the risk of terrorism:

1. Analyze, localize, and minimize those social, political, financial, and other factors that create fertile ground for international terrorism. It is necessary for these purposes to study thoroughly this phenomenon and its roots and reasons. Studying and explaining motives of the widespread cases of international terrorism and subsequent data gathering and assessment can play an important role in determining sets of problems that need to be solved in the near future—economic, social, and political.

2. One of the effective remedies in terrorism prevention activities by security agencies is an implementation of programs that reward individuals for information that leads to the prevention of terrorist acts or that leads to apprehension of people committing such acts.

3. Launch an information campaign designed to disclose the criminal and violent nature of terrorist groups and organizations. Build public awareness about the legal consequences of participation in any activities related to terrorism.

4. Develop public safety programs to protect vulnerable objects and locations. 5. Enhance community participation in “terrorist watch” programs. 6. Improve intelligence by increasing the cooperation between law enforcement agencies

worldwide. 7. Enhance information sharing by centralizing and increasing the protection of the

integrated information system of security forces globally. 8. Improve training for security forces by developing realistic antiterrorist action scenarios

and organizing regular exercises for security forces and citizenry. 9. Foster coordination between security forces and communities on the basis of model local,

state, and federal plans of responding to terrorist attacks. 10. Develop a general policy of covering terrorism through the mass media. Legal issues of

mass media participation in antiterrorism activities have not been thoroughly illustrated. Law enforcement agencies should try not to broaden the scale of psychological war. If pro-terrorism statements appear, and unfortunately they do, they strengthen terrorists’ courage. Agencies shouldn’t mix terrorism with politics and ideology and should not depict it as an international plot against the United States as a whole. Wrongful and contradictory understandings of causes and roots of international terrorism became a result of insufficient antiterrorism actions in Russia.

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Political leaders of the United States consider counterterrorism as one of the most impor- tant state tasks. Some of the main trends in this activity are legislative improvement, strength- ening cooperation between communities and law enforcement agencies, creation of special task forces, increasing federal agencies’ personnel, dealing with terrorism problems, and pro- viding better technical equipment.

American security agencies trying to put pressure on the forces supporting terrorism will use all available resources, including military ones, to the full extent to punish terrorism, to assist and collaborate with other countries, and to not allow any weaknesses in dealing with terrorists.

International intelligence gathering is coordinated through Interpol today. Interpol’s involvement in the fight against international terrorism materialized during the 54th General Assembly in Washington in 1985 when Resolution AGN/54/RES/158 was passed calling for the creation of a specialized group within the then Police Division to “… coordinate and enhance cooperation in combating international terrorism …” Interpol’s multinational police cooper- ation process has a three-step formula for dealing with terrorism, a formula all nations must follow: (1) pass laws specifying that the offense is a crime; (2) prosecute offenders, and cooper- ate in other countries’ prosecutions; and (3) furnish Interpol with and exchange information concerning the crime and its perpetrators.59 The challenges for the intelligence community are enormous—uncovering “sleepers” currently residing in both urban and rural settings is crucial to disrupt and prevent the next attack, as there seems little doubt that we must expect another attack. The truly global nature of the terror threat cannot and must not be confined to profiling of an ethnic group. The global nature of the organization means that greater efforts and com- munication must come from intelligence communities around the globe.

Specific Threats and Responses Executive Protection

Countermeasures against terrorism for businesses are not as costly as executives may believe. Of course, no program can entirely guarantee protection against attack. But a business can take action to lessen its attractiveness as a target. In general, executive protection programs include target hardening, bodyguard operations, and training sessions to teach executives how to avoid being identified as targets, and what to do if they become targets. The key to success in executive protection is preplanning for a possible attack. One successful approach has been the crisis management team (CMT).

A company’s CMT is made up of a carefully selected group of experts in a variety of fields who meet several times a year to discuss how to prevent attacks and what to do if an executive is kid- napped or another type of threat is received by the firm (for example, a bomb threat). In general these teams are composed of a senior executive, a team leader, a security executive, a police liai- son, a medical consultant, a lawyer, a financial adviser, a communications expert, and a terror- ist liaison. Each team member brings specific knowledge that will be crucial should a threat be received. The senior executive is responsible for making the final decisions. The security exec- utive must coordinate security operations for the facilities involved to protect other employees

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or company property. The police liaison is responsible for seeing that the authorities are fully apprised of the situation and that the company cooperates with the civil authorities to its full- est ability. The medical consultant must have access to medical files on each executive so that a medical profile can be developed to help the kidnappers keep the victim in good health. The lawyer interprets what actions the company can take without violating company policy or vari- ous laws. This is particularly vital when multinational corporations are involved in negotiations with foreign countries. In the past, several firms that cooperated with terrorists in an attempt to recover kidnapped executives found that the governments involved prohibited such negotia- tions and subsequently confiscated the firms’ assets. The financial adviser is necessary to deter- mine how and if funds can be pulled together to meet demands. Ideally most firms do not have large sums of cash simply lying around. Rather, firms invest their capital in equipment, stocks, and bonds. The communications expert handles any direct communications desired by the ter- rorists. In many cases the authorities may handle this operation. The terrorist liaison may be the most difficult member to recruit; this person must understand terrorist organizations and their intentions. The terrorist liaison must analyze the terrorists’ demands and predict their responses to actions by the company. In general, a psychologist, psychiatrist, or sociologist fills this role.

Regardless of what actions a firm takes to prevent or respond to terrorist attacks, it is most important that some action be taken. The problem must be recognized, and some type of planning must follow. According to Joseph Marog, manager of the Counterterrorism Training Program for the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, there are six trends that security managers should consider when developing security programs:

1. Terrorism will remain a persistent international problem. “Not only will it not go away, but it is continually evolving.”

2. There will be an emergence of transient groupings of terrorists such as those involved in the World Trade Center bombing.

3. Terrorists will increasingly use “soft targets” such as businesses. 4. Attacks will become more lethal. 5. More attacks will go unclaimed. 6. The lines will become less clear between domestic and foreign terrorism.60

Bombs and Bomb Threats

Any business, industry, or institution can become the victim of a bombing or a bomb threat. Most telephone bomb threats—approximately 98 percent—turn out to be hoaxes. The tar- get of the threat, however, has no way of knowing whether a real bomb has been planted. Contingency planning is necessary for an organization to be able to protect its personnel and property from the hazards of an explosion. In the absence of a specific response plan, the bomb threat will often cause panic. This may be the precise result the caller seeks.

Controlling access to the facility; having adequate perimeter barriers and lighting; checking all parcels and packages; locking areas such as storerooms, equipment rooms, and utility clos- ets; and taking note of any suspicious persons or of anyone not authorized to be in an area are all measures that can thwart a bomb planter as well as a thief or other kind of intruder.

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Contingency plans should specify who will be responsible for handling the crisis and del- egating authority in the event a bomb threat is received. The officer in charge of responding to a bomb threat must be someone who will be available 24 hours a day. A control center or command post provisioned for communication with all parts of the facility and with law enforcement agencies should also be designated. All personnel who will be involved in the bomb threat response must receive training in their assignments and duties. Plans should be in writing.

Telephone Operator’s Response

The telephone operator’s role is critical in handling the bomb threat call. The operator should receive training in the proper response so as to elicit from the caller as much information as possible. The two most important items of information to be learned are the expected time of the explosion and the location of the bomb. The operator should remain calm and attempt to keep the caller talking as long as possible in hopes of gaining information or clues that will aid investigators. The caller’s accent, tone of voice, and any background noises should be noted. Many organizations provide telephone operators with a bomb threat report form for recording all information (see Figure 16-1).

After receiving a bomb threat call, the operator must inform the designated authority within the organization (the chief of security, for example). Law enforcement authorities, and others in the organization, will be notified in turn according to the written contingency plans.

Search Teams

A decision must be made whether to conduct a search of the premises and how extensive the search should be. If possible, employee teams rather than police or fire department officers should conduct the search. Employees are familiar with their work area and can recognize any out-of-place object. An explosive device may be virtually any size or shape. Any foreign object, therefore, is suspect.

Basic techniques for a two-person search team include the following:

1. Move slowly and listen for the ticking of a clockwork device. (It is a good idea to pause and listen before beginning to search an area to become familiar with the ordinary background noise that is always present.)

2. Divide the room to be searched into two halves. Search each half separately in three layers: floor to waist level, waist to eye level, and eye to ceiling level.

3. Starting back-to-back and working toward each other, search around the walls at each of the three height levels; then move toward the center of the room.

If a suspicious object is found, it must not be touched. Its location and description should be reported immediately to designated authorities. A clear zone with a radius of at least 300 feet should be established around the device (including the floors above and below). Removal and disarming of explosive devices should be left to professionals. Those assigned to search a particular area should report to the control center after completing the search.

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Evacuation

Evacuating the facility for any reason, particularly in response to a bomb threat, is a drastic reaction to the potential danger. There clearly are situations when such an extreme course is indicated, but such a decision should never be undertaken lightly. It is essential that a thor- ough and exhaustive dialogue relative to this complex problem be undertaken at the earliest opportunity so that plans and policies may be formulated prior to any actual pressure caused by such an emergency. Many experts in the field argue that a total evacuation is rarely if ever indicated. The argument concerns the risk of exposing a great number of people to the blast when the location of the bomb is unknown. Whenever personnel are moved about in large

FIGURE 16-1 Telephone bomb threat information form.

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groups, the possibility of exposure to injury is increased. Moreover, the movement of large numbers under the threat of bombing can create panic—a very dangerous situation.

A bomber who has shown familiarity with the facility by placing a bomb on the premises can be assumed to be familiar with normal and perhaps even abnormal or emergency traffic patterns of that facility. The bomber has probably placed the bomb in such a way as to create the greatest possible injury and havoc. In such a situation, total evacuation might serve only to expose the greatest number of employees to injury and death.

It has also been found that hoaxers or mischief-makers may be encouraged by a mass evac- uation to repeat such calls and to subject the facility to a string of bomb threats.

The decision whether to evacuate will be made by management of the threatened facility, often in conjunction with law enforcement officials. It may be decided to evacuate the entire facility, only the areas in the vicinity of the suspected bomb, or (unless a device has actually been discovered) not to evacuate at all. Detailed plans are necessary to ensure safe and orderly evacuation. Personnel should leave through designated exits and assemble in a predetermined safe area. Elevators should not be used during evacuation. Doors and windows should be left open for increased venting of the explosive force.

When authorities have determined that the bomb threat emergency has ended, all personnel who have been notified of the threat should be informed that normal operations are to resume.

Other Specific Response Issues in the United States For additional information on specific responses to terrorist threats in the United States, see Chapter 5 on Homeland Security. Chapter 5 provides information on responses by the federal, state and local government, private sector companies, and joint responses.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda, the self-proclaimed terrorist group that destroyed the World Trade Center, contin- ues to be a major concern for the Department of Homeland Security. In 2007, the U.S. intel- ligence community identified al-Qaeda as the most serious terrorist threat to the homeland, with plans of high-impact plots and attempts to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks where they would not hesitate to use them. The Department of Homeland Security continued to encourage homeland businesses, security, and law enforcement agencies to be vigilant. Because the group has been careful and metic- ulous in its planning of attacks in an effort to inflict the greatest number of casualties, the Department believes that there are indicators that an organization or facility has been targeted by the group. In its Information Bulletin 03-004, “Possible Indicators of Al-Qaeda Surveillance,” the department lists the following indicators:

l Unusual or prolonged interest in security measures or personnel, entry points and access controls, or perimeter barriers such as fences or walls

l Unusual behavior such as staring at or quickly looking away from personnel or vehicles entering or leaving designated facilities or parking areas

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l Observation of security reaction drills or procedures l Increase in anonymous telephone or email threats to facilities in conjunction with suspected

surveillance incidents indicating possible surveillance of threat reaction procedures l Foot surveillance involving two or three individuals working together l Mobile surveillance using bicycles, scooters, motorcycles, cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles,

boats, or small aircraft l Prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, demonstrators, shoe

shiners, food or other vendors, news agents, or street sweepers not previously seen in the area l Discreet use of still cameras, video recorders, or note taking at non–tourist-type locations l Use of multiple sets of clothing, identifications, or the use of sketching materials l Questioning of security or facility personnel

Nuclear and Radiological Threats

While it is impossible to accurately predict the extent of threat from nuclear or radiological devices, the fear is real. An attack on a nuclear power facility (see Figure 16-2), while unlikely, could be catastrophic. Given the comments earlier in this chapter referring to the loss of radioac- tive materials from the now defunct Soviet Union, the fear is substantiated. To support this fear, on May 2, 2002, Jose Padilla was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport. Padilla, return- ing from Pakistan, was suspected of plotting to use a “dirty bomb” in the United States.61 Still, the probability of any individual or company being the victim of such a fearsome device is minimal.

Bioterrorism

The threat of bioterrorism in the United States is real. The anthrax scares in Washington, D.C., on November 14, 2001, and Florida, New Jersey, and New York in 2001 and 2002 brought the reality home. Bioterrorism is the use of biological agents to produce illness or death in

FIGURE 16-2 Nuclear power plant.

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people, animals, or plants. These agents can be distributed by air or as contaminants in food or water. Gas masks (see Figure 16-3) can be used for protection against airborne agents by first responders, military personnel, and civilians in the event of a wide-scale event.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has identified biologics that can be used as weapons, including: anthrax, smallpox, botulism, Ebola, and several other lesser known diseases. Only with rapid identification and containment can these biologics be con- trolled. There are many excellent Internet sites that provide detailed information for anyone interested in learning more about bioterrorism (see Appendix B).

Chemical Agents

Although not biologics, chemical agents can perform the same actions as viruses, toxins, and fungi/bacteria. Chemical agents include poisonous gas, liquids, and solids. One of the best known chemical agents, used during World War I and most recently in Iraq on Kurdish resis- tance groups, is mustard gas. This gas attacks the skin, eyes, lungs, and even the gastrointesti- nal tract.

Cyber Terrorism

While almost everyone who uses the Internet can relay stories of virus problems, identity theft, and other problems, most are not aware of the possibility that terrorists might use viruses or physical attacks to shut down the Internet. The media has publicized the use of the Internet by terrorists for communication and electronic transfer of funds. But will terrorists ever consider attacking the Internet? The answer is a resounding yes. According to a CIA report to the U.S. Senate Select Committee, al-Qaeda has expressed the intention of developing skills necessary for an effective cyber attack.

Despite the CIA report, only three federal agency computer systems were able to pass General Accounting Office security evaluations. While some of the problems may be associ- ated with agency problems, flawed software products have left holes in otherwise well-planned systems.

The solution may come from the recently established Common Criteria (CC), an interna- tional program attempting to establish standards against which security products may be eval- uated to provide assurance of the products’ security features.62

FIGURE 16-3 Gas masks for civilian use. (Courtesy of IBN Protection Property, www.domesticfront.com.)

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430 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

The Future/Summary During 2002, despite the capture or death of many al-Qaeda and other extremist leaders, there were 12 major terrorist attacks worldwide, killing at least 300. According to Control Risks Group, a private consulting firm that evaluates international business risks, the global com- munity should expect “more of the same.” Car and truck bombings will be the most common method of attack. The firm predicts that the major targets will be the United States and British and Israeli military and diplomatic facilities. Other sites include businesses frequented by for- eign visitors such as shopping malls, restaurants, bars, and supermarkets. Infrastructure facili- ties such as energy companies and transportation (including oil refineries) may continue to be targeted. Still other targets identified by Control Risks’ report are commercial shipping and aviation, schools, and churches, as well as individual Western leaders.63

CRITICAL THINKING What is your definition of terrorism? Defend your position. Is it possible to find arguments to defend the use of terrorism as a tool in waging war? Consider the American Revolution and its use of tactics in combating the British.

Review Questions 1. Where did the first “terrorist” groups first appear? What was the reason for such activities? 2. Discuss trends in terrorism over the past two decades. 3. Outline a proper response to a bomb threat.

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[42] Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S. State Department Report, 2002.

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[46] Niksch L. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service, downloaded 1/24/2003, <http://fas.org>.

[47] United States Institute for Peace Press, “Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges,” 2006; Global Issues Report, “Electronic Jihad Group Coordinates Sophisticated Hacking Attacks,” October 10, 2006.

[48] Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, 2000.

[49] Brynjar Lia. (February 2007) “Al-Suri’s Doctrines for Decentralized Jihadi Training.” Online: <http://www. jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=217>.

[50] Fischer R, Berger F, Heininger B. Terrorism: nothing new—a predictive model for handling terrorist inci- dents. Law Enforcement Executive Forum March 2002 [23+].

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[53] Spindlove JR. Terrorism and countering the threat. Law Enforcement Executive Forum March 2002.

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[55] Dirty Bomb Vulnerabilities Taff Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 2007. Released in conjunction with the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations July 12, 2007 hearing, p. 1.

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[60] Terrorism: assessing the threat. Secur Manage September 1996:40–2.

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[63] The Shape of Things to Come. Secur Manage March 2003:20.

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