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10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00013-0

Transportation Security Issues and Regulation

OBJECTIVES

The study of this chapter will enable you to:

1. Understand the growing importance of security in the transportation industry.

2. Discuss the changes that have occurred in the airline industry since September 11, 2001.

3. Identify some of the technology that is being used to improve security in the transportation industry.

4. Discuss the role of the federal government in establishing security standards in the area of transportation security.

Introduction The first thought that most Americans have regarding transportation security has to do with airlines and the hijackings that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. Still, transportation security has been a growing security problem since 1970, when the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Small Business estimated that almost $1.5 billion in direct loss was attributable to cargo theft.1 By 1975 the U.S. figure had reached $2.3 billion; by 1990 it had climbed to $13.3 billion, according to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) figures. These figures do not reflect pilferage and unreported crimes, which represent a minimum of 5 to 10 times the amount of the reported crimes. Worldwide, cargo losses have been estimated at $30 billion.2 In 2006 the FBI reported that an estimated $15–$30 billion was lost to cargo theft in the United States. In March 2006, the category “cargo theft” was added to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) System through a provision of the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act.3

The indirect costs of claims processing, capital tied up in claims and litigation, and mar- ket losses from both nondelivery and underground competition from stolen goods can cost between two to five times the direct losses.4 This equates to an estimated $2 to $5 for every $1 of direct loss—a $30 billion to $150 billion annual loss in the U.S. national economy. Worldwide, this may amount to another $60 billion to $150 billion.

The problem continues to increase in severity. According to the FBI, cargo theft has become a significant concern as noted by the government’s focus on including it as its own category in the UCR. The shipment of goods is vital to the economy and ultimately to the survival of the country. Since the 1970 figures were established, the growth of international

Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. ProQuest Ebook Central <a onclick=window.open('http://ebookcentral.proquest.com','_blank') href='http://ebookcentral.proquest.com' target='_blank' style='cursor: pointer;'>http://ebookcentral.proquest.com</a> Created from apus on 2020-08-10 13:23:19.

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00013-0

320 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

transportation systems using containers that can be transported by truck, ship, and rail has developed to the extent that land bridges, particularly in the United States, have been thoroughly established. These land routes carry millions of dollars of goods from other countries over our rail system on stack trains through the United States. The liability for the contents of these containers, moving via land bridge, is shared among a multitude of ocean carriers, rail companies, and truckers. The security concerns for the safe handling of this movement of goods are many and include many different groups: rail police, state and local police, and customs officials as well as other federal authorities.

Still, cargo security is only one part of the concern in the 21st century. The Department of Homeland Security has made the transportation business one of many priorities in efforts to protect citizens from the threat of terrorism. As noted in Chapter 1, transit agencies have taken serious steps to improve security for passengers. The problems are enormous in a system that relies on public accessibility and rapid movement.

The Role of Private Security Because it appears that cargo theft is more a problem of “inside jobs” than “highway robbery,” it would appear that by far the greatest burden falls on the security apparatuses of the private concerns involved.5 It is true that public law enforcement agencies must make a greater effort to break up organized fencing and hijacking operations, and they must find a way to cut through their jurisdictional confusion and establish more effective means of exchanging information. But the bulk of the problem lies in the systems now employed to secure goods in transit.

On the other hand, public transportation problems require carefully planned cooperative ventures between public law enforcement and private security. The very nature of public transportation requires that private security protect the infrastructure of transit companies, while public law enforcement provides protection of the public’s highways. Heightened security of the early 21st century due to increased threats of terrorism resulted in public law enforcement personnel providing security for railroad bridges and at public transit terminals.

There is no universally applicable solution to this problem. Every warehouse, terminal, and means of shipment has its own particular peculiarities. Each has weaknesses somewhere, but certain principles of cargo security, when they are thoughtfully applied and vigorously admin- istered, can substantially reduce the enormous losses so prevalent in today’s beleaguered transport industry.

A good loss-prevention manager must recognize that the key to good cargo security is a well-organized cargo-handling system. As Louis Tyska and Lawrence Fennelly note, cargo loss exists whenever the “three C’s of cargo theft” are present.6 The three C’s are con- fusion, conspiracy, and the common denominator (the dishonest employee). Confusion is a primary ingredient and represents the loss-prevention specialist’s opportunity to reduce theft. Confusion arises when an adequate policy does not exist or, if it does exist, when it is

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Chapter 13 l Transportation Security Issues and Regulation 321

not followed. Tyska and Fennelly identify the following activities as great contributors to the confusion variable:

1. Personnel entering and exiting the specific facility. These people include everyone from repair people to regular employees.

2. Movement of various types of equipment, for example, trucks, rail cars, and lift trucks. 3. The proliferation of various forms of paper—freight bills, bills of lading, manifests, and so on.

Conspiracy builds on confusion. Two or more people take advantage of their positions and the confusion to steal. Many major cargo security losses would not occur, however, without the common denominator, the dishonest employee. When the security manager is dealing with more than cargo pilferage, monitoring the employee is essential. The manager must be aware of the preceding variables. By eliminating any one variable, opportunities for theft are reduced.

Accountability Procedures The paramount principle is accountability. Every shipment, whatever its nature, must be identified, accounted for, and accounted to some responsible person at every step in its move- ment. This is difficult in that the goods are in motion and there are frequent changes in account- ability, but this is the essence of the problem. Techniques must be developed to refine the process of accountability for all merchandise in transit. Technology has now advanced to the point where much merchandise can be tracked using geographic positioning systems (GPS).

Invoice System

This accountability must start from the moment an order is received by the shipper. As an example of a typical controlled situation, we might refer to a firm that supplies its salespeo- ple with sales slips or invoices that are numbered in order. In some cases paper invoices are still used, but in today’s world of technology, the computer form has replaced much of the old paper world. Whether invoiced using paper or the computer, this step in establishing a record is very important if any control is to be maintained over product order and delivery. Without proper records, whether numbering of hard copies or computer entries, sales slips could be destroyed and the cash, if any, pocketed; or they could be lost so that the customer might never be billed. When these invoice forms are tracked, every invoice can and should be accounted for. Even those forms that have been spoiled by erasures or physical damage should be voided and returned to the billing department.

Merchandise should only be authorized for shipment to a customer on the basis of the reg- ular invoice. This form is filled out by the salesperson receiving the order and sent to the ware- house or shipping department. The shipping clerk signs one copy, signifying that the order has been filled, and sends it to accounts receivable for billing purposes. The customer signs a copy of the invoice indicating receipt of the merchandise, and this copy is returned to accounts receivable. It is further advisable to have the driver sign the shipping clerk’s copy as a receipt for the load. In some systems, a copy of the invoice is also sent directly to an inventory file for

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322 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

use in inventory and audit procedures. Returned merchandise is handled in the same way but in reverse.

In this simplified system, there is a continuing accountability for the merchandise. If any- thing is missing or unaccounted for at any point, the means exist whereby the responsibility can be located. Such a system can only be effective if all numbered invoices are strictly accounted for and merchandise is assembled and shipped only on the basis of such invoicing. The temp- tation to circumvent the paperwork for rush orders or emergencies frequently arises, but if a company succumbs, losses in embezzlement, theft, and/or lost billing can be substantial.

Similarly, transport companies and freight terminal operators must insist on full and unin- terrupted accounting for the goods in their care at every phase of the operation—from shipper to customer.

The introduction of the computer, bar coding, scanners, radio frequency identification (RFID), and electronic signature technology has made the process of accounting for merchan- dise from the point of purchase by the wholesaler to delivery at the retail outlet a reality. Bar coding provides not only the information discussed in the previous paragraphs but also addi- tional information that allows security to trace losses to the specific persons with responsibility for the merchandise at the time of the loss.

Separation of Functions

Such a system can still be compromised by collusion between or among people who consti- tute the links in the chain leading from order to delivery unless efforts are made to establish a routine of regular, unscheduled inspection of the operations down the line and, depending on the nature of the operation, regular inventories and audits. It is advisable, for example, for the shipper to separate the functions of selecting the merchandise from stock from those of pack- ing and loading. This will not in itself eliminate the possibility of collusion, but it will provide an extra check on the accuracy of the shipment. And as a general rule, the more people (up to a point) charged with the responsibility and held accountable for merchandise, the more dif- ficult and complex a collusive effort becomes.

In order to fix accountability clearly, it is advisable to require that each person who is at any time responsible for the selecting, handling, loading, or checking of goods sign or initial the shipping ticket that is passed along with the consignment. In this way, errors, which are unfor- tunately inevitable, can be assigned to the person responsible. Obviously any disproportion- ate number of errors traced to any one person or to any one aspect of the shipping operation should be investigated and dealt with promptly.

Similarly, at the receiving end, the ticket should be delivered to a receiving clerk. Appropriate personnel who verify the count of merchandise received without having seen the ticket in advance should then unload the truck. In this way, each shipment can be veri- fied without the carelessness that so frequently accompanies a perfunctory count that comes with the expectation of receiving a certain amount as specified by the ticket. It will also tend to eliminate theft in the case of an accidental, or even intentional, overage. Since the checkers do not know what the shipment is supposed to contain, they cannot rig the count.

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Chapter 13 l Transportation Security Issues and Regulation 323

Driver Loading

Many companies with otherwise adequate accountability procedures permit drivers to load their own trucks when the driver is taking a shipment. This practice can defeat any system of theft prevention because drivers are accountable only to themselves when such a method of loading is in effect. The practice should never be condoned. It is worth the investment of time to have others check the cartons tendered to the driver. The potential losses in theft of merchandise by overloading or future claims of short deliveries would almost certainly exceed the costs involved in the time or personnel involved in instituting sensible supervisory procedures.

Theft and Pilferage

Targets of Theft An analysis of claims data from the transportation industry shows that a few very specific com- modities attract the attention of pilferers and thieves. These items are often referred to as “hot products.” These are items that are in demand and easily disposed of such as computers, enter- tainment equipment, name-brand clothing and footwear, perfume, jewelry, cigarettes, and prescription drugs.7

But the kinds of things stolen vary considerably, depending on the location and the nature of the merchandise. Thieves might prefer to steal part of a shipment of clothing, but if none is available, they might just as vigorously pursue a truckload of dog food as long as there is a means of disposing of it. Anything can be stolen if the thief is given an opportunity. Anything that has a market—and nothing would be shipped unless a market existed—can be considered attractive to a thief.

It is important for transportation industry managers to recognize that all merchandise is susceptible to theft but at the same time to know the high-loss items at their locations so that they can exert extra efforts to secure such goods. It is also useful to know that motor carriers are the victims of more than 74 percent of the theft-related losses, rail and maritime carriers account for about 24 percent, and air cargo losses make up the difference.8

Pilferage According to the U.S. Department of Justice, as much as 80 percent of cargo theft losses are the result of a series of minor thefts.9 The exact amount, however, cannot be established because of extensive nonreporting of these crimes. Thefts of this nature are generally held to be impul- sive acts, committed by persons operating alone who pick up an item or two of merchandise that is readily available when there is small risk of detection. Typically the pilferer takes such items for personal use rather than for resale because most of those who are termed pilferers are unsystematic, uncommitted criminals and are unfamiliar with the highly organized fenc- ing operations that could readily dispose of such loot.

Such pilferage is always difficult to detect. Because it is a crime of opportunity, it is rarely committed under controlled circumstances that can either pinpoint the culprit or gather

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324 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

evidence that would later lead to discovery. Generally the items taken are small and readily concealed on the person or easy to transport and conceal in a car.

Pilferage is usually aimed at items in a freight or cargo terminal awaiting transshipment. In such instances, merchandise may be left unprotected on pallets, handcarts, or dollies await- ing the arrival of the next transport. In this mode, it is highly susceptible to pilferage as well as to a more organized plan of theft.

Broken or damaged cases offer an open invitation to pilferage if supervisory or security personnel fail to take immediate action. Accidental dropping of cases to break them open is a common device used to get at the merchandise they contain. If each such case is carefully logged—listing the name of the person responsible for the damage as well as the names of those who instantly gather at the scene—a pattern may emerge that will enable management to take appropriate action.

Whatever form pilferage takes, it can be extremely costly. Although each individual instance of such theft may be relatively unimportant, the cumulative effect can be enormous. Eighty percent of an estimated total direct loss of $30 billion worldwide adds up to a staggering bill for petty theft.

Deterring Pilferage Here again, accountability controls can provide an important deterrent to pilferage loss. If some one person is responsible for merchandise at every stage of movement or storage, the feasibility of this kind of theft can be substantially reduced.

In cases where it does occur, a rapid and accurate account of the nature and extent of such loss can be an invaluable tool in indicating the corrective action to be taken. Properly super- vised accountability controls can locate the point along the handling process where losses occurred and, even in those cases where they will not identify the culprit, these controls will underscore any weaknesses in the system and indicate trouble areas that may need more or different security application.

Movement of personnel in cargo areas must be strictly controlled. All parcels must be subject to inspection at a gate or control point at the entrance to the facility. Private automo- biles must be parked outside the area immediately encompassing the facility, and beyond the checkpoint. All automobiles should be subject to inspection on departure if a parking area inside the boundaries of the facility is provided.

Every effort should be made to keep employee morale high in the face of such security efforts. Though some managements have expressed an uneasiness about inspections and strict accountability procedures, fearing that they might damage company morale, it should be pointed out that educational programs aimed at acquainting employees with the problems of theft and stressing everyone’s role in successful security have resulted in boosting morale and in enlisting the aid of all employees in the security effort.

Here, as in other areas of security, employees should be encouraged to report losses imme- diately. They must never be encouraged to act as informers or asked to report on their cowork- ers. If they simply report the circumstances of loss, it is the job of security to carry forward further investigation or to take such action as may seem indicated.

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Chapter 13 l Transportation Security Issues and Regulation 325

Large-Quantity Theft While the point-to-point trafficking of merchandise utilizing storage containers has reduced the amount of petty theft, the number of load thefts has increased. According to a report pre- pared by Todd Roehrig and Treven Nelson, at least two cargo containers disappear from the Port of Los Angeles every day.10 The FBI reports that freight trailer losses range between $12,000 and $3 million depending on the type of load.11 Thefts in such amounts are no longer in the category of pilferage, but rather theft engaged in by one or more persons who are in it for profit—for resale through traffickers in stolen goods.

Thieves may or may not be employees, but because in either case they need informa- tion about the nature of the merchandise on hand or expected, they will usually find accom- plices inside who are in a position to have that information. They are interested in knowing what kinds of cargo are available in order to make a decision about what merchandise to hit, depending on its value and on the demands of the fencing organization with which they deal.

Dealers in stolen goods are subject to the vagaries of the marketplace in the same way legitimate businesspeople are. Whereas a certain kind of merchandise may find a ready mar- ket today, it may move slowly tomorrow. Such dealers are anxious to move their goods rapidly not so much because of fear of detection (even if they are found, mass-produced goods of any nature are difficult if not impossible to identify as stolen once they find their way into other hands) but because they generally want to avoid the overhead and the attention created by a large warehousing operation.

Removal of Goods Once the thieves have the information, they need to arrange to take over the merchandise and remove it from the premises. To do this, they will usually try to work with some employee of the warehouse or freight terminal.

In cases where accountability procedures are weak or inadequately supervised, thieves have few problems. In tighter operations, they may try to bribe a guard, or they might forge the papers of an employee of a customer firm. They might even create confusion—such as a fire in a waste bin or a broken water pipe—in order to divert attention for those few moments needed to accomplish the actual theft. Generally the stolen goods are taken from the facility in an authorized vehicle driven either by the thieves, who have false identification papers and forged shipping documents, or by an authorized driver who is more often than not working with the thieves.

Disposal of Stolen Goods Disposal of the goods usually presents no problem because it is customary for thieves to steal from an order placed for any one of certain kinds of merchandise. The loot is normally pre- sold. In its July 2006 press release on cargo theft FBI Unit Chief Eric Ives describes a cargo theft enterprise that is well organized at regional and even national levels. The organization includes the thieves, brokers (fences), drivers (Lumpers) and specialists at foiling anti-theft locks.12

It might be noted at this point that it is for this reason principally that cooperation between private security and public law enforcement is so vital in the war against cargo theft. No thief

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326 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

will continue to steal unless there is a ready market for the stolen goods. In the hearings of the Select Committee on Small Business, one of the most inescapable conclusions was that the fences were the kingpins behind the majority of the thefts taking place. They dictated the nature of the merchandise to be taken, the price to be paid, and the amount wanted. They directed the thefts without ever becoming involved—in many cases never even seeing the merchandise they bought, warehoused, and sold. Without the fences—many of whom are otherwise legiti- mate businesspeople—the markets would shrink, the distribution networks would disappear, and losses would be dramatically reduced. Another possibility discovered by a major retailer has been the theft of merchandise by employees who either sell merchandise at local flea mar- kets or advertise in local papers. One individual reportedly stole electronic items and developed a business through advertising in local papers for some time before getting caught.

Unfortunately, only sporadic efforts have been made to break up the big fencing operations, and the business of thievery thrives. Any assistance that private security can give to public law enforcement by way of instant and full reports on thefts can help combat these shady opera- tions, and all private industry will benefit immeasurably in the long run.

Terminal Operations

Terminal operations are probably more vulnerable to theft than other elements of the shipping system. Truck drivers mingle freely with personnel of the facility, and associations can readily develop that lead to collusion. Receiving clerks can receipt goods that never arrive; shipping clerks can falsify invoices; and checkers can overload trucks, leaving a substantial percentage of the load unaccounted for and therefore disposable at the driver’s discretion.

Here again, these thefts can be controlled with a tight accountability system, but too often such facilities fail to install such a procedure or to follow up on it after it is in effect. This is poor economy, even under the most difficult situations when seasonal pressures are at their highest.

Railway employees on switching duty at a freight terminal can also divert huge amounts of goods. They can easily divert a car to a siding accessible to thieves who will unload it at an opportune time. This same device can be employed to loot trucks that have been loaded for departure the next morning. Unless these trucks are securely locked and parked where they are under surveillance by security personnel, they can be looted with ease. Drivers can park their trucks unlocked near a perimeter fence for later unloading unless the positioning and securing of the vehicle is properly supervised.

In all cases, a professional thief is someone with a mission. Such people cannot be deterred by the threat of possible detection. They recognize the possibility, accept the risk, and make it their business to circumvent detection. Only alert and active countermeasures will serve to reduce losses from their efforts.

Surveillance

There must be strict surveillance (human and/or CCTV) at entrances and exits, and there must be patrol activity at perimeters and through yards, docks, and buildings. Key control must be

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Chapter 13 l Transportation Security Issues and Regulation 327

tight and painstakingly supervised. Cargo should be stored in controlled security areas that are enclosed, alarmed, and burglar-resistant. High-value cargo should be stored in high-security areas within the cargo area. Special locks, alarms, and procedures governing access should be employed to provide the highest possible security for these sensitive goods. The use of CCTV (closed-circuit TV) and other surveillance technology is covered in Chapter 8.

Shipments of unusual value should be confidential, and only those employees who are directly concerned with loading or unloading or transporting such shipments should be aware of their schedules. Email and fax information about such movements should be restricted, and trailer numbers should be covered while the vehicle is in the terminal. Employees involved in any way with such shipments should be specially selected and further indoctrinated in the need for discretion and confidentiality.

A Total Program

Adequate physical security installations supported by guard and alarm surveillance will go a long way toward protecting the facility from the thief or terrorist, but these measures must be backed by proper personnel and cargo movement systems, strict accountability procedures, and continuing management supervision and presence to ensure that all systems are carried out to the letter. Regular inspections of all facets of the operation, followed by prompt remedial action if necessary, are essential to the success of the security effort.

Planning for Security It is important to the security of any transportation company, shipper, or freight terminal oper- ation to draw up an effective plan of action to provide for overall protection of assets, whether general cargo or people. The plan must be an integrated whole wherein all the various aspects are mutually supportive.

In the same sense, in large terminal facilities occupied by a number of different companies, all individual security plans must be integrated to provide for overall security as well as for the protection of individual enterprises. Without full cooperation and coordination among partici- pating companies, much effort will be expended uselessly and the security of the entire opera- tion could be threatened.

Such a plan should establish area security classifications. Designated parts of the building or the total yard area of the facility should be broken down into controlled, limited, and exclu- sion areas. These designations are useful in defining the use of specific areas and the mounting security classifications of each.

Controlled, Limited, and Exclusion Areas

Controlled areas are those restricted as to entrance or movement by all but authorized person- nel and vehicles. Only part of a facility will be designated a controlled area because general offices, freight receiving, personnel, restrooms, cafeterias, and locker rooms may be used by all personnel, some of whom would be excluded if these facilities were located within an area

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328 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

where traffic was limited. Within this area itself, all movement should be controlled and under surveillance at all times. A fence or other barrier should additionally mark it, and access to it should be limited through as few gates as possible.

Limited areas are those within the controlled area where an even greater degree of security is required. Sorting, handling of broken lots, storage, and reconstituting of cases might be vulnerable functions handled in these areas.

Exclusion areas are used only for the handling and storage of high-value cargo. They normally consist of a crib, vault, cage, or room within the limited area. The number of people authorized to enter this area should be strictly limited, and the area should be under surveil- lance at all times. Since such areas should be locked whenever they are not actually in use, careful key control is of extreme importance.

Pass Systems

All employees entering or leaving the controlled area should be identified, and their authori- zation to be there should be checked. Each employee should be identified by a badge or pass, using one of the several systems discussed in Chapter 10.

Vehicle Control

The control of the movement of all vehicles entering or leaving a controlled area is essential to the security plan, as is checking the contents. All facility vehicles should be logged in and out on those relatively rare occasions when it is necessary for them to leave the controlled area. They should be inspected for load and authorization.

All vehicles entering the controlled area should be logged and checked for proper docu- ments. The fastest and most efficient means of recording necessary data is by use of optical readers that record information digitally in the company’s computer system or the camera system, such as a Regiscope, which will record all of the required information digitally on a single photograph/record. This should include the driver’s license, truck registration, trailer or container number, company name, waybill number, delivery notice, a document used to authorize pickup or delivery, time of check, and the driver’s picture if it is not on the driver’s license.

The seal on inbound loaded trailers should be checked, and the driver should be issued a pass that is time-stamped on entering and leaving the area and that designates the place for pickup or delivery.

All vehicles leaving the area should surrender their passes at the gate where their seals will be checked against the shipping documents. Unsealed vehicles will be inspected as will the cabs of all carriers leaving the facility. Partial load vehicles should be returned to the dock from time to time on a random basis for unloading and checking cargo under security supervision. They should also be sealed while they are in the staging area.

Loading and unloading must be carefully and constantly supervised since it is generally agreed that the greater part of cargo loss occurs during this operation and during the day- light hours.

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Chapter 13 l Transportation Security Issues and Regulation 329

Other Security Planning

The security plan must also specify those persons having access to security areas, and it must specify the various components necessary for physical security such as barriers, lighting, alarm systems, fire protection systems, locks, and communications. It must detail full instructions for the guard force. These instructions must contain both general orders applicable to all guards and special orders pertaining to specific posts, patrols, and areas.

There must be provision for emergency situations. Specific plans for fire, flood, storm, or power failure should be part of the overall plan of action. Who to call in an emergency should also be specified.

After the security plan has been formulated and implemented, it must be reexamined peri- odically for flaws and for ways to improve it and keep it current with existing needs. Circulation of the plan should be limited and controlled. It must be remembered that such a plan, however well conceived, is doomed at the outset unless it is constantly and carefully supervised.

Security Surveys

Security managers of freight terminals or companies engaged in shipping will be continually occupied with surveys of the facility under their security supervision. Security surveys were discussed in detail in Chapter 7.

An initial survey must be made to formulate the security plan governing the premises. It should be thorough enough to detect the smallest weaknesses in the operation and to pro- vide the information needed to prepare adequate defenses. Further surveys will be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the program established, and follow-up surveys should deter- mine whether all regulations and procedures are being followed. Additional surveys may be necessary to reevaluate the security picture following changes in operational procedures in the facility or to make special studies of particular features of the security plan.

Inspections

In addition to these surveys, essentially designed to evaluate the security operation as a whole or to reevaluate it in the light of changing conditions, the security manager should make regu- lar inspections of the facility to check on the performance of security personnel and to check the operating condition of the facility (see Figure 13-1). Such inspections should include potential trouble areas and should not overlook a check of fire equipment and alarm systems.

Education

If the security plan is to succeed, it must have the full cooperation and support of all employees in the facility. A continuing program of education in the meaning and importance of effective security can only achieve this in every phase of the business.

All personnel should be indoctrinated at the time of their employment, and a continuing program should be instituted to update the staff on current and anticipated problems. More advanced courses on procedures might be instituted for management personnel. Part of this

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330 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

program should be devoted to educating employees about the importance of security to each individual and job.

Security reminders are also important to keep the subject of security constantly alive in the minds of everyone. Posters, placards, and notices prominently posted are all effective devices for getting the message across. Leaflets or pamphlets covering more details can be distributed to employees in their pay envelopes.

Cargo in Transit The Threat of Hijacking/Sabotage

Although the crime itself is dramatic and receives much publicity, armed hijacking of an entire tractor-trailer with a full load of merchandise represents only 1 percent of the losses suffered by the shipping industry as a whole. This is clearly not to say that it is a minor matter. On the contrary, such a crime is of extreme importance to the carrier taking the loss because the enor- mity of the theft represents a huge financial blow in one stroke, whatever its significance in the overall percentages.

There is, however, little that can be done by a driver who is forced over by a car carrying armed and threatening hijackers. When it comes to that point, the driver has little choice but to comply. The load is lost, but hopefully the driver is unhurt. There is little that private secu- rity can do in such cases, and it is indeed fortunate that the incidence of such crimes is as low as it is. The matter is in the hands of public law enforcement agencies and must be handled by them.

If there is cause to believe that hijacking of a load is an imminent possibility, trucks should be scheduled for nonstop hauls and rerouted around high-risk areas. Schedules should be

FIGURE 13-1 A truck cargo inspection. (Photo courtesy of Zistos Corporation, Hauppauge, NY, www.zistos.com.)

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adjusted so that carriers do not pass through high-risk areas at night. In extreme cases, trucks might be assigned to travel in pairs or in larger convoys. Company cars can follow very high- value loads that are deemed especially vulnerable. Two look-alike trucks might make it more difficult to pinpoint the specific desired shipment. Such procedures constitute selective protection at best since they can be used only infrequently and are impractical for general application. The second driver, however, would be assigned the task of identifying the persons, the vehicle used, and so on and of reporting the hijacking if it occurs.

Other aspects of theft or sabotage on a line haul can be dealt with, however, and it is impor- tant that procedures be established that will serve to protect the cargo.

Global Positioning System (GPS)

With the development of accurate, commercially available tracking systems, it is now possible for trucking firms and individuals to track vehicles in a cost effective, real-time, mapping and reporting environment. Such systems make it possible to know when a truck is not following planned routes or spending too much time stopped.

Personnel Qualifications

The cardinal rule in the management of a transportation concern is that those assigned to line hauling duties must be of the highest integrity. Drivers and helpers must be carefully screened for job suitability and trustworthiness before they are hired, and personnel and secu- rity managers must carefully evaluate them before they are given this critical responsibility. An irresponsible driver can cost the company all or part of a load, and whether the loss is uninten- tional or the result of the driver’s carelessness, the cost to the company will be the same.

Many cases have been reported where drivers set themselves up as victims of a hijack. This is difficult if not impossible to prevent unless the honesty of the driver is unquestionable—an attitude that can only be determined by a careful screening process and regular analysis of the person’s behavior and performance. Any changes in a driver’s demeanor or lifestyle should be noted, as deterioration of morale or a basic change in attitude toward the job might lead to future problems.

Procedures on the Road

All employees should receive specific instructions about procedures to be followed in every predictable situation on the road. The vehicle should be parked in well-lighted areas where it can be observed. It should be locked at all times, even if the driver sleeps in the cab. Trailers should be padlocked as well as sealed. A high-security seal, requiring a sizable tool to remove it, should always be used on valuable shipments that are parked overnight.

Drivers must be instructed never to discuss the nature of their cargos with anyone. Thieves frequently hang out at truck stops hoping to pick up information about the nature of loads passing through. All too often, the most innocent conversations among truckers can lead to the identifica- tion of a trailer containing high-value merchandise that, when it is spotted, becomes a target.

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The driver should never deviate from the preplanned route. In the case of a forced detour or a rig breakdown or if in any way the schedule cannot be met, the driver must notify the nearest terminal immediately.

Trucks should be painted on the top as well as on the sides to facilitate identification by helicopter in the event of theft.

Seals

Among the many seals available today, the one in most common use is the metal railroad boxcar type. This is a thin band of metal that is placed and secured on the trailer in such a manner that the door or doors cannot be opened without breaking it, thus revealing that the doors have been opened and a theft has, or may have, taken place. They are easy to break and must be broken when the destination has been reached and the merchandise is unloaded. They in no way secure the doors but are placed there simply as a device to indicate whether the doors have been opened at any point between terminal stops. Each seal is numbered and should identify the organization that placed the seal (see Figure 13-2).

All doors on a trailer must be sealed. Those trucks or trailers with multiple doors may habit- ually load by only one, in which case those doors not in regular use may carry the same seal for months at a time with only the rear being regularly sealed and unsealed.

Seal numbers must be recorded in a permanent log as well as in the shipping papers. The dock superintendent or security personnel should be responsible for recording seal numbers and affixing seals on all trucks. The seals should be positioned in such a way that locking handles securing the door cannot be operated without actually breaking the seal. Some truck or railway car locking devices are so large that several seals may have to be used in a chain to properly seal the carrier. In this case all seal numbers must be recorded.

Resealing Trailers loaded to make several deliveries along the route must be resealed after each stop. To accomplish this, enough seals must be issued to be placed on the truck after each delivery is made. In this case, the truck is sealed at the point of origination and the seal number logged

FIGURE 13-2 Security seals in common use. (Courtesy of E.J. Brooks Company.)

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and entered in shipping documents. The additional, as yet unsealed, seals are also logged, and the numbers to be used at designated points of delivery are entered in the shipping documents.

When the first checkpoint is reached, the receiving clerk verifies the seal number of the truck. After the merchandise is unloaded, the consignee, not the driver, as directed by the ship- ping documents, affixes the next seal. This procedure is followed at all stops, including the last one. There, a seal is affixed to the now-empty vehicle, which may return to the point of origin, where the seal will again be checked against the shipping documents.

Empty trailers should also be sealed immediately after being unloaded. This practice will discourage the use of empties to remove unauthorized material from dock areas, and it does not preclude the necessity of physical inspection of all vehicles leaving the controlled areas.

Seal Security All seals must be held under the tightest possible security at all times. Previously unissued seals should be logged and secured on receipt. They should then be issued in numerical order, and the assignment of each should be duly noted in the log. The seal supply should be audited daily; a careful check to account for each seal, issued or not, should be made at the same time. Without such regular inventories, the entire system can be seriously compromised. As a fur- ther part of such audit, all seals that are damaged and cannot be used, as well as seals taken from incoming vehicles, should be logged and secured until they can be destroyed.

Modern Technology and Seals As with most areas of security, technology has entered the picture. Whereas metal and plastic seals can be tampered with, the new electronic seals require advanced technological information before criminals can compromise their integrity. In addition, the new system avoids the problems associated with the distribution of stocks of seals to depots and ensuring their safe storage. The electronic seals work much like electronic locks and can be monitored by the push of a button.13

Special Issues in Airline Security In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the airline industry fell under close scrutiny by the U.S. government. What had gone wrong with passenger screening? How did hijackers board the plane? These questions prompted other questions relating to the security provided for airlines in general (see Figure 13-3).

The problems associated with security for airlines and overlapping responsibilities among airlines, customs, police, and airport security have confounded airports. Still, most airlines have a well-developed security program to combat cargo thefts.

Increased Security Measures

Even before September 11, 2001, airport security had been increased throughout the world. The United States, while increasing security, often lagged behind security operations in other countries. However, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration has for many years pro- vided training for airport police officers. In recent years the Airport Law Enforcement Agency

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Network (ALEAN) has taken a lead in organizing programs and communication among airport police departments. The FBI has also increased its interest in aviation security issues. However, even with the increased emphasis on security issues, the perceived quality of security screen- ing, of passengers in particular, has been found inadequate. As a result the U.S. government passed the Airport Security Federalization Act of 2001.

Specific Solutions for a Specific Problem

On November 6, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Senate Bill 1447, “An Act to Improve Aviation Security.” The act, known as the Airport Security Federalization Act of 2001, soon set into motion the federalization of airport security. The act placed the responsibility for civil aviation security functions under the Under Secretary of Transportation. The Secretary’s specific functions include the following:

l Receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security l Assess threats to transportation l Develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security l Make other plans related to transportation security, including coordination of

countermeasures with appropriate departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the U.S. government

l Serve as the primary liaison for transportation security to the intelligence and law enforcement communities

l Supervise all airport security and screening services using Federal uniformed personnel14

There are other functions listed in the act, but it is clear that airport security is now firmly under the control of the U.S. government. This approach follows that developed in other countries, which have also been combating air crimes for several decades.

In March 2003 the FBI announced that selected airports would receive antimissile technology to protect against shoulder-launched missiles fired at planes taking off or landing. The program was prompted by the attack on an Israeli plane over Kenya in November 2002.15

FIGURE 13-3 Airport security. (Courtesy of BEI Security, Inc.)

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In November/December 2006, the TSA began a program of additional screening of employees at Chicago’s O’Hare International and Midway airports. Workers, including delivery truck drivers, city workers, and food vendor employees, had been required to show identification or swipe security badges through electronic readers to gain access to security areas; they are now required to face extra measures to include inspection of vehicles and pat-downs. The TSA is using this increased security at more than 100 airports.

The TSA is also developing additional personnel to serve as “bomb-appraisal officers.” These individuals are part of the TSA “bomb-appraisal officer program, which is based on a quick psychological screening of passengers through the use of observation techniques.16

In 2007 the U.S. government began asking foreign counties to allow pilots to carry guns in the cockpit when they fly overseas. While the program, now over 4 years old, allows thousands of U.S. pilots to carry guns on domestic flights, some countries are wary of allowing armed pilots on international flights. Congress cut $11.5 million from the last two budget requests for armed pilots because the program was not spending all of its allocation.17 While thousands of pilots have opted for the training, many are not interested in being armed.

Even with the emphasis on airline security measures, problems continue to be found. While passenger suitcases loaded onto flights are regularly screened for explosives, other cargo that fill the bays generally are not screened. The disparity has been noted in Congress, where some repre- sentatives are calling for all air cargo to be inspected at the same level as baggage. The estimated cost of the program would be $6 million. The TSA argues that current standards are sufficient to prevent a bomb from getting on board. Security officials argue that a security zone surrounding the cargo packages during their journey from source to destination is sufficient.18

In November, 2001, the U.S. government launched an effort to secure the global supply chain. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) is a voluntary government– business initiative intended to strengthen and improve overall international supply chain and U.S. border security. This initiative is intended to bring together, in a cooperative relationship, the owners of the international supply chain, including importers, carriers, consolidators, brokers and manufacturers.19 Essentially, businesses are asked to ensure the integrity of their security program and practices in coordination with their supply chain partners. Through participation in this program trade-related businesses receive priority processing for inspec- tions, reducing border delay times. Businesses interested in participating can contact the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Other Transportation Industry Responses to Terrorism Bus Transportation

The American Bus Association (ABA) established its Anti-Terrorism Action Plan in 2002. The association sought to increase awareness of potential hijackers and improve security plans for transit companies, including protection of the bus industry infrastructure. As noted in Chapter 1, cooperative ventures among the federal government, local law enforcement, and local bus companies have placed cameras throughout the bus system, including on-board

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buses and in terminals. At the 2005 ABA Board meeting, Board members were informed that the DHS had provided $50 million in security grants to the bus industry.20 In 2007 the TSA pro- vided support for intercity bus operations through the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program as part of the DHS Infrastructure Protection Program. The Intercity Bus Security Grant Program is designed to assist fixed route intercity and charter bus services.21

Maritime Operations

The U.S. Coast Guard has provided major leadership in this arena. It has called for the inspec- tion of high-risk cargos at the point of shipment. Agreement among more than 100 govern- ments has lead to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

The Coast Guard has also stepped up its inspections efforts. Sea marshals are assigned to “high interest” vessels arriving and departing from U.S. ports. Additional Department of Homeland Security measures are discussed in Chapter 1.

Amtrak/Local Commuter Trains

The public rail system is struggling with controls. Terminals have been secured to some extent by limiting access to underground areas. Increased presence of security personnel is apparent. Tickets are now checked before passengers are allowed into final waiting areas and, in some operations, positive identification is being requested.

The Department of Homeland Security has on occasion requested local, state, or National Guard units to assist in monitoring key bridges and terminal facilities.

In response to questions regarding the application of airline security measures to rail pas- sengers, the Department of Homeland Security has spent $7 million to test screening equip- ment that would reliably stop terrorist attacks similar to those on the Madrid and London rail systems. The 2006 tests showed that the technologies tested each had significant problems. Many devices triggered excessive false alarms, and some took too long to screen passengers. Robert Jamison, Deputy Director of the Transportation Security Administration, said there are no plans to put the tested technology to work. However, the assessment of the testing program concluded that the effort to screen rail passengers needed significant investments. With over 12 million passengers traveling on the subways and rail lines each day, the need is great.22

In Los Angeles the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which manages the city’s subway system, is considering adding security. To date the system, which has been known for a lack of traditional subway components such as turnstiles, gates, attendants and police officers, has relied on surveillance cameras. However, a late 2006 incident where mercury was spilled on a platform and remained undetected for eight hours has convinced MTA officials that additional security may be needed.23

Oil and Gas

Transportation of oil and gas, as well as other liquids and gases, is completed through millions of miles of pipelines. The Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) began inspecting the system in 2002. The OPS is also requiring pipeline operators to develop plans to

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reduce risks and respond to disasters in areas where pipeline failures would have the greatest impact on populations or ecological systems.

In 2006 a liquid natural gas facility in Massachusetts had its security breached by intrud- ers who slipped through the fence and took pictures of themselves standing on the storage tank stairwell. While the incident was recorded by CCTV the company waited for 5 days to file a report with Massachusetts authorities. Massachusetts Representative Edward Markey noted, “This incident raises serious questions about the adequacy of the perimeter security and surveillance monitoring in place at this facility.” Markey is a senior member of the House Homeland Security Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee.24

Summary One of the fastest-growing crimes appears to be theft of merchandise in transit. Even with gains in reducing petty pilferage, new containerized transportation has brought on new prob- lems, including the theft of entire containers of merchandise. Control of merchandise during transit is often difficult but, through proper employee screening and security applications, the problem may be controlled. However, it is unlikely, given the financial incentives for thieves, that the problem will ever be eliminated.

While airport security has undergone federalization in the United States due primarily to the increased threat of terrorist attacks, similar to operations in other countries, it would be unwise to consider applying all of these security concepts to all transportation/cargo security problems. Still, given the events of the past few years where passenger trains and buses have been attacked in European countries, additional scrutiny is certainly called for.

CRITICAL THINKING What are the real issues that need to be considered in implementing additional security measures on public transportation in the United States?

Review Questions 1. Why is it said that the greater burden in preventing cargo thefts falls on private security

rather than on public law enforcement? 2. Describe the operation of an invoice system that would establish accountability for all

merchandise in shipments. 3. What are some policies and procedures that would be effective in deterring pilferage? 4. Define controlled areas, limited areas, and exclusion areas. 5. Offer procedures for the control of the movement of and contents in all vehicles entering or

leaving a controlled area. 6. Describe the measures taken by governments and companies in response to terrorism.

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References [1] Crime against small business: A report of the small business administration transmitted to the select

committee on small business, United States Senate. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office; 1969.

[2] Salkin S. Safe and Secure? Warehousing Manage, December 1999.

[3] Cargo Theft’s High Cost. FBI press release 07/21/2006, downloaded 7/11/2007.

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office. In: Report by the comptroller general of the United States: promotion of cargo security receives limited support. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office; 1980.

[5] It’s a Crime. Viewpoint 1999;24(2), downloaded 12/12/2002, <www.aais.org/communications/viewpoint/ vp24_2.htm>.

[6] Tyska L, Fennelly L. In: Controlling cargo theft. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann; 1983. pp. xxvii–xxix.

[7] Atkinson W. How to protect your goods from theft. Logistics Manage Distrib Rep, March 2001.

[8] It’s a Crime.

[9] United States Department of Justice. 1332 Charging Theft from Interstate Shipment—Dollar Thresholds, Local Efforts. Criminal Resource Manual 1332 (October 1997), downloaded 12/12/2002, <www.usdoj.gov/ usaoo/eousa/foia_reading-room/usam/title9/crim01332.htm>.

[10] Roehrig T, Nelson T. Cargo Theft, downloaded 12/12/2002, <www.ucalgary.ca/MG/inrm/industry/theft. htm>.

[11] Cargo Theft’s High Cost, FBI.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Smart tags, seals computerized advantages. Security March 1997:65.

[14] Mayhew C. The detection and prevention of cargo theft. Trends and issues in crime and criminal justice. Australian Institute of Criminology; September 2001.

[15] FBI: Airports to Take Anti-missile Measures, CNN.com March 31, 2003, downloaded 4/4/2003, <http:// cnn.travel.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?actions=cpt&expire=-1&urlIC=5857474&f>.

[16] Security Management Daily, February 28, 2007 excerpted from Chicago Tribune, (02/27/2007).

[17] Frank T. U.S. Asks to Arm Pilots Abroad. USA Today, <www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2007-02-07-us- pilots-guns_x.htm>.

[18] Lipton E. Security debate centers on tougher standards for inspections of air cargo. The New York Times February 8, 2007.

[19] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, CBP.gov, C-TPAT Overview, dtd. 12/13/2007. <http://www.cbp. gov/xp/cgov/trade/cargo_security/ctpat/what_ctpat/ctpat_overview.xml>.

[20] Chairman Young, Pundit Tony Blankley, DHS Officical & Fuel Expert Address ABA Board Members at Fall 2005 meeting, <www.buses.org/Press_Room_the_report_newsletter/2126.cfm>.

[21] Intercity Bus Security Grant Program, <www.tsa.gov/join/grants/ibsgp.shtm>. [22] Frank T. USA Today, Security devices falter in rail tests, usatoady.com/news/nation/2006-02-13-rail-

security_x.htm.

[23] Guccione J, Blankstein A. Call for more security inside Los Angeles’s subway system. Christian Sci Monit, 02/12/2007.

[24] Crocker M. Platforms, pipelines, and pirates. Secur Manage June 2007:77–86.

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