Effective Surveillance System
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Introduction_to_Security_----Chapter10.pdf
Introduction to Security Ninth Edition. DOI: © 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
217 2013
10.1016/B978-0-12-385057-7.00010-5
The Inner Defenses Intrusion and Access Control
OBJECTIVES
The study of this chapter will enable you to:
1. Identify the security measures aimed at protection of assets within a physical structure.
2. Evaluate various types of identification systems.
3. Know how to evaluate various types of safes, vaults and files.
4. Discuss various alarms and alarm systems.
Introduction Once the facility’s perimeter is secured, the next step in physical security planning is to mini- mize or control access to the facility’s or the building’s interior. The extent of this control will depend on the nature and function of the facility: The controls must not interfere with the facility’s operation. It is theoretically possible to seal off access to a given operation completely, but it would be difficult to imagine how useful the operation would be in such an atmosphere.
Certainly no commercial establishment can be open for business while it is closed to the public. A steady stream of outsiders, from customers to service personnel, is essential to its eco- nomic health. In such cases, the security problem is to control this traffic without interfering with the function of the business being protected. Isolated manufacturing facilities must also provide for the traffic created by the delivery of raw materials, the shipping of fabricated goods, the provision of services, and of course the labor force, which may be operating in several shifts.
All such traffic tends to compromise the physical security of the facility. But security must be provided, and it must be provided appropriately for the operation of the facility being served.
Within any building, no matter whether it is located inside a perimeter barrier or is a part of the perimeter wall, it is necessary to consider the need to protect against the internal thief as well as the potential intruder. Whereas the boundary fence is primarily designed to keep out unwanted visitors (not altogether forgetting its function in the control of movement of autho- rized personnel), interior security must provide some protection against the free movement of employees and others bent on pilferage as well as establishing a second line of defense against the unannounced intruder.
Since every building is used differently and has its own unique traffic composition and flow, each building presents a different security problem. Each must be examined and ana- lyzed in great detail before an effective security program can be developed.
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Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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218 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
It cannot be overemphasized that such a program must be implemented without in any way interfering with the orderly and efficient operation of the facility to be protected. It must not be obtrusive, and yet it must provide a predetermined level of protection against criminal attack from outside or inside.
The first points of examination must be the doors and windows of buildings within the perimeter. These must be considered in terms of effectiveness no matter whether the building walls form a part of or constitute in themselves the perimeter barrier (as we have already dis- cussed in Chapter 8) or they are a true second defense line where the building under examina- tion is completely within the protection of a barrier.
Doors to Sensitive Areas Doors to equipment rooms, computer installations, research and development, and other sen- sitive areas should be equipped with automatic door-closing devices and fitted with strong dead bolts and heavy latches.
In cases where an area is under heavy security but has any degree of traffic, it might be well to consider the installation of an electric strike to secure the operation and control the traffic. This kind of unit is a locking device controlled remotely by a security person, permitting entry of a recognized, authorized person only when a button is pressed to release the lock. Because it requires someone on hand at all times for its operation, this system can be expensive. It must be examined with the cost-versus-security cost equation in mind. Continuing development in biotechnology and related computer technology is providing other options that will be dis- cussed later in this chapter.
Supply room and tool room doors should be secured whenever those rooms are not actu- ally in use. Even when they are in use, entrance into these areas must be restricted. The usual construction of such restraints consists of either a “dutch” door, in which the bottom half is secured, or a counter that can be closed off by heavy screening, chain-link fencing material, or reinforced shutters.
Special care should be taken in the storage of small items of value. Such merchandise or material is highly subject to theft by virtue of its value for resale or personal use combined with the ease with which it can be stolen. Although such items may be stored in a facility of any construction capable of providing security, it has been the experience of many firms that uni- formly stacked rows, piles, or pallets of such items within a cage-type construction that pro- vides instant eyeball inventory is the best protection. Such precautions will vary from business to business, but they must be carefully systematized to control this potentially troublesome area of loss.
Office Area Doors Doors between production and office areas or between heavily trafficked areas and office spaces must be examined for the likelihood of their use for criminal purposes. Their construc- tion and locking hardware will be determined by such a survey. In most cases, these passages
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 219
will be minimum-security areas during regular working hours because there is usually a need for movement between these areas. When there is little or no use of the office area, these doors should be secured.
Traffic Patterns Doors must be analyzed for their function when laying out the security plan. In some cases, they may serve a dual purpose as, for example, fire doors, which are designed to close auto- matically in the event of a fire. These doors, which may remain open at the discretion of man- agement, must be fitted to form an effective and automatic barrier to the spread of fire. They may be desirable when fire doors separate a production area from a warehouse or storage area. During those times when the production area is in operation but the warehouse is not, such fire doors can perform a security function by remaining closed.
In other cases, doors must be examined in an effort to establish a schedule for their use. Employee entrances that are the authorized points of passage for all employees may be staffed by security personnel, depending on whether the control point is established there or farther out on the perimeter. These doors could be secured once the employees have entered, thus denying entrance to unauthorized visitors as well as preventing any employees from wander- ing out to the fence or the parking lot or any other location where they might cache contraband for later pickup or transport.
It is axiomatic, however, that any door used as an entrance will in a time of emergency be used as an exit by some employees. This is true in apartments and office buildings and even in industrial facilities where the employees are thoroughly familiar with the premises. No mat- ter what or how many designated emergency exits or procedures there may be, some individu- als in a time of tension or near panic will seek out the door with which they are most familiar. The entrance then must always be considered an emergency exit, and it should be equipped with panic hardware. To protect against surreptitious use, it should also be fitted with at least a local alarm.
The same, of course, is true of the designated emergency exits. These doors should, in addi- tion, be stripped of all exterior hardware since they are not intended for operational use at any time.
Personnel doors leading to and from the dock area must be carefully controlled and super- vised at all times when the dock is in use. These and dock doors must be secured when the area is no longer operational.
Fire doors in office buildings should be fitted with alarms to prevent surreptitious use and access to the interior. Use of public stairwells should be prohibited or discouraged unless doors from them open into reception areas.
Traffic Control Controlling traffic in and out and within a facility is essential to the facility’s security pro- gram. Perimeter barriers, locked doors, and screened windows prevent or deter the entry of
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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220 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
unauthorized visitors. But because some traffic is essential to every operation no matter how highly classified it may be, provision must be made for the control of this movement.
Specific solutions will depend on the nature of the business. Obviously retail establish- ments, which encourage high-volume traffic and regularly handle a great deal of merchandise both in and out, have a problem of a different dimension from that of the industrial operation working on a highly classified government project. Both, however, must work from the same general principles toward providing the greatest possible security within the efficient and effective operation of the job at hand.
Controlling traffic includes the identification of employees and visitors and directing or limiting their movements and the control of all incoming and outgoing packages and of trucks and private cars.
Visitors
All visitors to any facility should be required to identify themselves. When they are allowed to enter after they have established themselves as being on an authorized call, they should be limited to predetermined, unrestricted areas. The obvious exception is in firms where the pub- lic has free access to the facility, for example, retail stores.
If possible, sales, service, and trade personnel should receive clearance in advance on mak- ing an appointment with the person responsible for their being there. Although this is not always possible, most businesses deal with such visitors on an appointment basis and a system of notifying the security personnel can be established in a majority of cases.
Businesses regularly called on unannounced—by salespeople or other tradespeople— should set aside a waiting room that can be reached without passing through sensitive areas.
In some cases, it may be advisable to issue passes that clearly designate them as visitors. If they will be escorted to and from their destination, a pass system is probably unnecessary.
Ideally, all traffic patterns involving visitors should be short, physically confined to keep them from stray- ing, and capable of being observed at all points along the route. In spread-out industrial facilities, they should take the shortest, most direct route that will not pass through restricted, sensitive, or dangerous areas and will pass from one reception area to another.
To achieve security objectives without alienat- ing visitors or in any way interfering with the opera- tion of the business, any effective control system must be simple and understandable (see Figure 10-1). It must incorporate certain specific elements in order to accomplish its aims. It must limit entry to those people who are authorized to be there and be able to
FIGURE 10-1 Visitor/contractor ID. (Courtesy of Temp Badge.)
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 221
identify such people. It must have a procedure by which persons may be identified as being authorized to be in certain areas and must prevent theft, pilferage, or damage to the assets of the installation. It must also prevent injury to the visitor.
Employee Identification Small industrial facilities and most offices find that personal identification of employees by guards or receptionists is adequate protection against intruders entering under the guise of employees. In organizations of more than 50 employees per shift or in high-turnover busi- nesses, this type of identification is inadequate. The opportunity for error is simply too great. In 2004, the White House noted that there were “wide variations in the quality and security of forms of identification used to gain access to secure Federal and other facilities where there is a potential for terrorist attacks.”1 Breaches of security at the White House are rare but not impos- sible. In November 2009, Tareq and Michaele Salahi were admitted to the White House state dinner for the Indian Prime Minister. They were not on the guest list.2
With the continually changing technology, James Bond type access controls are becom- ing common. Facial imaging along with already in use biometric identity and access control technology will make it unlikely that access to secured areas will be gained by another, other than the person intended. The International Biometrics Group projects that facial recognition will represent more than $1.4 billion or 19 percent of the $7.4 billion non-AFIS market by 2012. Fingerprint matching is predicted to be 25%.3
The most practical and generally accepted system is the use of badges or identification cards (see Figure 10-2). Generally speaking, this system should designate when, where, how, and to whom passes should be displayed; what is to be done in case of loss of the pass; pro- cedures for retrieving badges from terminating employees; and a system for cancellation and reissue of all passes, either as a security review or when a significant and specific number of badges have been reported lost or stolen.
To be effective, badges must be tamper-resistant, which means that they should be printed or embossed on a distinctive stock that is worked with a series of designs difficult to reproduce. The use of holographic designs embedded in the badge has made duplication more difficult. They should contain a clear and recent photo- graph of the bearer, preferably in color. The photo- graph should be at least 1 inch square and should be updated every 2 or 3 years or when there is any significant change in facial appearance, such as the growing or removal of a beard or mustache. It should, in addition, contain vital statistics such as date of birth, height, weight, color of hair and eyes, sex, and both thumbprints. It should be laminated and of sturdy construction. The recent increased use of smart card ids, which contain all the above information in electronic format, has also reduced
FIGURE 10-2 Employee identification card. (Courtesy of Temp Badge.)
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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222 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
the ability to counterfeit ids in operation using this type of technology. In cases where there are areas set off or restricted to general employee traffic, it might be color-coded to indicate those areas to which the bearer has authorized access.
The latest entry into badge protection is holography. The introduction of holography into badge control systems reduces the chance of counterfeiting cards. Holograms incorporated with other technology advances from the past 15 years have produced an identification card system that is almost forgery-proof while incorporating computer accountability.
If a badge system is established, it will only be as effective as its enforcement. Facility guards are responsible for seeing that the system is adhered to, but they must have the cooperation of the majority of the employees and the full support of management. If the system is simply a pro forma exercise, it becomes a useless annoyance and would better be dispensed with.
Under the Department of Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-12, issued August, 2004, the Federal government established a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal government to employees and government contractors and their employees.4
Pass Systems
As we have just noted, all employees entering or leaving a facility or area should be identified and their authorizations to be there should be checked. This can be achieved through one of many badge systems. Three possible systems are as follows:
l The single-pass system, in which a badge or pass coded for authorization to enter specific areas is issued to an employee, who keeps it until the authorization is changed or until leaving the company.
l The pass-exchange system, in which an employee entering a controlled area exchanges one color-coded pass for another that carries a different color code specifying the limitations of the authorization. On leaving, the employee surrenders the controlled-area pass for the basic authorization identification pass. (In this system, the second pass never leaves the controlled area, thus reducing the possibility of switching, forging, or altering.)
l The multiple-pass system is essentially the same as the exchange system, but it provides an extra measure of security by requiring that exchanges take place at the entrance to each restricted area within the controlled area.
Package Control
Every facility must establish a system for the control of packages entering or leaving the prem- ises. However desirable it might seem, it is simply unrealistic to support a blanket rule forbid- ding packages either in or out as a workable procedure. Such a rule would be damaging to employee morale and in many cases would actually work against the efficient operation of the facility. Therefore, since the transporting of packages through the portals is a fact of life, they must be dealt with in order to prevent theft, misappropriation of company property, and con- cealment of dangerous materials (i.e., biological or chemical agents or bombs).
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 223
If it is deemed necessary, the types of items that may be brought in or taken out may be limited. If such is the case, the fact must be publicized and clearly understood by everyone.
Packages brought in should be checked for content. If possible, where they are not to be used during work, they should be checked with the guard to be picked up at the end of the day. In most cases, spot-checking will suffice.
Whatever the policy concerning packages—whether they are to be checked or inspected— that policy must be widely publicized in advance. This is to avoid the appearance of discrimi- nation against those whose packages are opened and examined or those that are denied entrance in conformity with company policy.
Files, Safes, and Vaults The final line of defense at any facility is in the high-security storage areas where papers, records, plans, cashable instruments, precious metals, or other especially valuable assets are protected. These security containers will be of a size and quantity that the nature of the busi- ness dictates.
Every facility will have its own particular needs, but certain general observations apply. The choice of the proper security container for specific applications is influenced largely by the value and the vulnerability of the items to be stored in them. Irreplaceable papers or original documents may not have any intrinsic or marketable value so they may not be a likely target for a thief, but because they do have great value to the owners, they must be protected against fire. On the other hand, uncut precious stones or even recorded negotiable papers that can be replaced may not be in danger from fire, but they would surely be attractive to a thief. They must therefore be protected against theft.
In protecting property, it is essential to recognize that, generally speaking, protective con- tainers are designed to secure against either burglary or fire. Each type of equipment has a specialized function and provides only minimal protection against the other risk. There are containers designed with a burglary-resistant chest within a fire-resistant container that are useful in many instances, but these too must be evaluated in terms of the mission.
Whatever the equipment, the staff must be educated and reminded of the different roles played by the two types of containers. It is all too common for company personnel to assume that a fire-resistant safe is also burglary-resistant and vice versa.
Files
Burglary-resistant files are secure against most surreptitious attacks. On the other hand, they can be pried open in less than half an hour if the burglar is permitted to work undisturbed and is not concerned with the noise created in the operation. Such files are suitable for nonnego- tiable papers or even proprietary information since these items are normally only targeted by surreptitious assault.
Filing cabinets with a fire rating of 1 hour and further fitted with a combination lock will probably be suitable for all uses but the storage of government-classified documents.5
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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224 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Safes
Safes are expensive, but if they are selected wisely, they can be very important investments in security. Emphatically, safes are not simply safes. They are each designed to perform a par- ticular job to provide a particular level of protection. The two types of safes of most interest to the security professional are the record safe (fire-resistant) and the money safe (burglary-resis- tant). To use fire-resistant safes for the storage of valuables subject to theft—an all too common practice—is to invite disaster. At the same time, it would be equally careless to use a burglary- resistant safe for the storage of valuable papers or records because, if a fire were to occur, the contents of such a safe would be reduced to ashes.
Safes are rated to describe the degree of protection they afford. Naturally, the more protec- tion provided, the more expensive the safe will be. In selecting the best one for the require- ments of the facility, a number of questions must be considered: How great is the threat of fire or burglary? What is the value of the safe’s contents? How much protection time is required in the event of a fire or of a burglary attempt? Only after these questions have been answered can a reasonable, permissible capital outlay for their protection be determined.
Record Safes Fire-resistant containers are classified according to the maximum interior temperature per- mitted after exposure to heat for varying periods of time. A record safe with an Underwriters Laboratories (UL) rating of 350-4 (formerly designated “A”) can withstand exterior temperatures building to 2,000°F for 4 hours without permitting the interior temperature to rise above 350°F.
The UL tests that result in the classifications are conducted to simulate a major fire with its gradual buildup of heat to 2,000°F, including circumstances where the safe might fall several stories through the fire-damaged building. In addition, an explosion test simulates a cold safe dropping into a fire that has already reached 2,000°F.
CASE STUDY
Assets Corporation has accepted a contract to assist a small start-up firm, Memory Backup, in creating a security program to protect its new automated memory stick technology. Assets’s owner, James Fisk, has assigned you the task of evaluating the need for safe storage. The following information is provided:
The company keeps all its records on its own memory sticks. There is very little cash or other negotiables kept on the premises. The information regarding the development and production of the memory stick is also recorded on a memory stick. Threats include disasters, both natural and manmade, and theft, both internal and external. The firm cannot afford to lose the materials related to the manufacture of the stick to competitors
What type of storage container would you tell Mr. Fisk to recommend in his security plan for Memory Backup?
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 225
The actual procedure for the 350-4 rating involves the safe staying 4 hours in a furnace temperature that reaches 2,000°F. The furnace is turned off after 4 hours but the safe remains inside until it is cool. The interior temperature must remain below 350°F during heating and cooling-off periods. This interior temperature is determined by sensors sealed inside the safe in six specified locations to provide a continuous record of the temperatures during the test. Papers are also placed in the safe to simulate records. The explosion impact test is con- ducted with another safe of the same model that is placed for ½ hour in a furnace preheated to 2,000°F. If no explosion occurs, the furnace is set at 1,550°F and raised to 1,700°F over a ½ hour period. After this hour in the explosion test, the safe is removed and dropped 30 feet onto rubble. The safe is then returned to the furnace and reheated for 1 hour at 1,700°F. The fur- nace and safe then are allowed to cool, after which the papers inside must be legible and not charred.
Computer media storage classifications are for containers that do not allow the internal temperature to go above 150°F. This is critical because computer media begin to distort at 150°F and diskettes at 125°F.6
Fire resistant safes are rated based on: the type of material being protected, the length of time it is protected without damage, and whether the container can withstand an impact. UL has three basic classes:
350—protect paper products 150—protect magnetic tapes 125—protect flexible computer disks7
Insulated vault-door classifications are much the same as they are for safes except that the vault doors are not subjected to explosion/impact tests.
In some businesses, a fire-resistant safe with a burglary-resistant safe welded inside may serve as a double protection for different kinds of assets (see Figure 10-3), but in no event must the purposes of these two kinds of safes be confused if there is one of each on the premises. Most record safes have combination locks, relocking devices, and hardened steel lock plates to provide a measure of burglar resistance. It must be reemphasized that record safes are designed to protect documents and other similar flammables against destruction by fire. They provide only slight deterrence to the attack of even unskilled burglars. Similarly, the resistance provided by burglar-resistant safes is powerless to protect contents in a fire of any significance.
With the increased use of electronic media in place of paper records most safe manufactur- ers offer some type of media safe, designed with the specific purpose of allowing for protection of electronic data. There are USB desktop drives that are now fire and water resistant. These drives come with many different options regarding amount of storage, temperature rating and length of time.8
Money Safes Burglary-resistant safes (see Figure 10-4) are nothing more than very heavy metal boxes with- out wheels, which offer varying degrees of protection against many forms of attack. A safe with a UL rating of TL-15, for instance, weighs at least 750 pounds, and its front face can resist attack
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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226 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
FIGURE 10-3 Fire-resistant safe. (Courtesy of Diebold, Incorporated.)
FIGURE 10-4 Burglary-resistant safe. (Courtesy of Diebold, Incorporated.)
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 227
by common hand and electric tools for at least 15 minutes. Other safes will resist not only attack with tools but also attack with torches and explosives.
The classification system uses the following: TL refers to hand tools and drills, TRTL adds torches, and TXTX adds explosives. The number following the letters indicates the minimum amount of time that the safe will stand attack, in minutes.9 Because burglary-resistant safes have a limited holding capacity, it is always advisable to study the volume of the items to be secured. If the volume is sufficiently large, it might be advisable to consider the installation of a burglary-resistant vault, which, although considerably more expensive, can have an enormous holding capacity.
Securing the Safe Whatever safe is selected must be securely fastened to the structure of its surroundings. Police reports are filled with cases where unattached safes, some as heavy as a ton, have been stolen in their entirety—safe and contents—to be worked on in uninterrupted concentration.
A convicted criminal told investigators how he and an accomplice had watched a super- market to determine the cash flow and the manager’s banking habits. They noted that he accu- mulated cash in a small, wheeled safe until Saturday morning when he banked it. Presumably he felt secure in this practice since he lived in an apartment above the store and perhaps felt that he was very much on top of the situation in every way. One Friday night, the thief and his friend rolled the safe into their station wagon. They pried it open at their leisure to get the $15,000 inside.
Pleased with their success, the thieves were even more pleased when they found that the manager replaced the stolen safe with one exactly like it and continued with the same banking routine. Two weeks later, one man went back alone and picked up another $12,000 in exactly the same way as before.
It has become a common practice to install the safe in a concrete floor, where it offers great resistance to attack. In this kind of installation only the door and its combination are exposed. Because the door is the strongest part of a modern safe, the chances of successful robbery are considerably reduced.
Vaults
Vaults are essentially enlarged safes. As such, they are subject to the same kinds of attack and fall under the same basic principles of protection as safes.
Because it would be prohibitively expensive to build a vault out of shaped and welded steel and special alloys, the construction, except for the door, is usually of high-quality, reinforced concrete. There are many ways in which such a vault can be constructed, but however this is done, it will always be extremely heavy and at best a difficult architectural problem.
Typically vaults are situated at or below ground level so they do not add to the stresses of the structure housing them. If a vault must be built on the upper stories of a building, inde- pendent members that do not provide support for other parts of the building must support it. It must also be strong enough to withstand the weight imposed on it if the building should col- lapse from under it as the result of fire or explosion.
Fischer, R., Halibozek, E., & Walters, D. (2012). Introduction to security. Retrieved from http://ebookcentral.proquest.com Created from apus on 2020-07-29 16:22:33.
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228 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
The doors of such vaults are normally 6 inches thick, and they may be as much as 24 inches thick in the largest installations. Because these doors present a formidable obstacle to any criminal, an attack will usually be directed at the walls, ceiling, or floor, which must for that reason match the strength of the door. As a rule, these surfaces should be twice as thick as the door and never less than 12 inches thick.
If it is at all possible, a vault should be surrounded by narrow corridors that will permit inspec- tion of the exterior but that will be sufficiently confined to discourage the use of heavy drilling or cutting equipment by attackers. It is important that there be no power outlets anywhere in the vicinity of the vault; such outlets could provide criminals with energy to drive their tools.
Container Protection
Because no container can resist assault indefinitely, it must be supported by alarm systems and frequent inspections. Capacitance and vibration alarms are the types most generally used to protect safes and file cabinets. Ideally any container should be inspected at least once within the period of its rated resistance. Closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance can, of course, provide constant inspection and, if the expense is warranted, is highly recommended.
By the same token, safes have a greater degree of security if they are well lighted and located where they can be seen readily. Any safe located where it can be seen from a well-policed street will be much less likely to be attacked than one that sits in a darkened back office on an upper floor.10
Continuing Evaluation
Security containers are the last line of defense, but in many situations, they should be the first choice in establishing a sound security system. The containers must be selected with care after an exhaustive evaluation of the needs of the facility under examination. They must also be reviewed regularly for their suitability to the job they are to perform.
Just as the safe manufacturers are continually improving the design, construction, and mate- rials used in safes, so is the criminal world improving its technology and techniques of successful attack. Because of the considerable capital outlay involved in providing the firm with adequate security containers, many businesspeople are reluctant to entertain the notion that these con- tainers may someday become outmoded—not because they wear out or cease to function, but rather because new tools and techniques have nullified their effectiveness. In 1990 a series of attacks on financial institutions in a major West Coast city, in which the burglars used drainage tunnels to enter vaults from beneath the facilities, pointed out that vaults are not impregnable.
In selecting security containers, it is important that the equipment conform to the needs of the risk, that it be regularly reevaluated, and that, if necessary, it be brought up to date, how- ever unwelcome the additional outlay may be.
Inspections In spite of all defensive devices, the possibility of an intrusion always exists. The highest fence can be scaled, and the stoutest lock can be compromised. A knowledgeable professional can
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contravene even highly sophisticated alarm systems. The most efficient system of physical pro- tection can eventually be foiled.
It is necessary, therefore, to support each element of the system continually with another element—remember the concept of defense in depth. The ultimate backup surveillance must never let down.
Guard Patrols
Visual inspections by irregular patrols through office spaces or an industrial complex, or con- stant CCTV surveillance of these same areas, are vital to the success of the security program.
It is equally important to sweep the facility after closing time. “Hide-ins” are common in offices or retail establishments. These are thieves who conceal themselves in a closet or util- ity room and wait for the establishment to close and for everybody to go home. After hide-ins take what they are looking for, the only challenge is to break out. The chances of catching such thieves in a premise protected only by perimeter alarms are remote indeed. They must be picked up on the sweep when guards go through the entire facility from top to bottom or from east to west to see that everyone required to do so has left.
Specific duties of guards on patrol are discussed elsewhere, but in general, it should be noted that patrols should be made at least once each hour, more often if the area and the size of the guard force permit.
Particular attention must be paid to any signs of tampering with locks, gates, fences, doors, or windows. The presence of piles of rubbish or materials should be noted for the possibility of concealment—particularly if they are near the perimeter barrier or in the vicinity of storage areas.
In the patrol of office buildings, it is wise to stop occasionally for a long enough period of time to listen for any sounds that might indicate the presence of an intruder.
It is equally important that patrols in any facility be alert to any condition that might prove hazardous. These might be anything from an oil slick in a typically trafficked area to a heater left on and unattended. Those conditions presenting an immediate danger must be corrected immediately; others must be reported for correction. All of them must be noted in the log and on the appropriate form.
Alarms In order to balance the cost factors in the consideration of any security system, it is necessary to evaluate the security needs and then determine how that security can, or more importantly should, be provided. Because the employment of security personnel can be costly, methods must be sought to improve their efficient use and to extend the coverage they can reasonably provide.
Protection provided by physical barriers is usually the first area to be stretched to its opti- mum point before looking for other protective devices. Fences, locks, grilles, vaults, safes, and similar means of preventing entry or unauthorized use are employed to their fullest capacity.
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230 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Since such methods can only delay intrusion rather than prevent it, security personnel are engaged to inspect the premises thoroughly and frequently enough to interrupt or prevent intrusion within the time span of the deterrent capability of the physical barriers. In order to further protect against entry should both barrier and guard be circumvented, alarm systems are frequently employed.
Such systems permit more economical use of security personnel, and they may also substi- tute for costly construction of barriers. They do not act as substitutes for barriers as such. But they can support barriers of lesser impregnability and expense, and they can warn of move- ment in areas where barriers are impractical, undesirable, or impossible.
The latest changes in this area add video clip confirmation of what is detected. This live streaming and recorded information make it possible to determine the priority of response and improve the probability of apprehension.
In determining whether a facility actually needs an alarm system, a review and evaluation of past experience of robbery, burglary, or other crimes involving unauthorized entry should be part of the survey preparatory to the formulation of the ultimate security plan. Such experi- ence, viewed in relation to national figures and the experience of neighboring occupancies and businesses of like operation, may well serve as a guide for determining the need for alarms.
Kinds of Alarm Protection
There are three basic types of alarm systems providing protection for a security system:
1. Intrusion alarms signal the entry of persons into a facility or an area while the system is in operation.
2. Fire alarms operate in a number of ways to warn of fire dangers in various stages of development of a fire or respond protectively by announcing the flow of water in a sprinkler system, indicating either that the sprinklers have been activated by the heat of a fire or that they are malfunctioning. (Fire alarms will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.)
3. Special-use alarms warn of a process reaching a dangerous temperature (either too high or too low), of the presence of toxic fumes, or that a machine is running too fast. Although such alarms are not, strictly speaking, security devices, they may require the immediate reaction of security personnel for remedial action, and thus deserve mention at this point.
Alarms do not, in most cases, initiate any counteraction. They serve only to alert the world at large or, more usually, specific reactive forces to the fact that a condition exists for which the facility was fitted with alarms. However, many modern alarms are integrated with computer systems that can and do take predetermined actions in response to an alarm condition.
Alarm systems are of many types, but all have three common elements:
1. An alarm sensor: A device that is designed to respond to a certain change in conditions, such as the opening of a door, movement within a room, or rapid rise in heat.
2. A circuit or sending device: A device that sends a signal about whatever is sensed to some other location. This may be done via an electrical circuit that transmits the alarm signal over a telephone, fiber optic lines, or through air waves.
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3. An enunciator or sounding device: A device that alerts someone that the sensor has detected a change in conditions. The device may be a light, a bell, a horn, a self-dialing phone, or a punch tape.
The questions that must be answered in setting up traditional simple alarm systems are:
1. Who can respond to an alarm fastest and most effectively? 2. What are the costs of such response as opposed to response of somewhat lesser efficiency? 3. What is the comparable predicted loss factor between these alternatives?
In modern integrated systems, the computer makes predetermined choices that include notification of appropriate personnel and perhaps activation of cameras and recording devices.
Alarm Sensors
The selection of the sensor or triggering device is dependent on many factors. The object, space, or perimeter to be protected is the first consideration. Beyond that, the incidence of out- side noise, movement, or interference must be considered before deciding on the type of sen- sor that will do the best job. A brief examination of the kinds of devices available will serve as an introduction to a further study of this field.
Electromechanical Devices These are the simplest alarm devices used. They are nothing more than switches that are turned on by some change in their status. For example, an electromechanical device in a door or a window, their most common application, is held in the open, or noncontact, position when the door or window is closed (see Figure 10-5). Opening either of these entrances breaks the magnetic contact, engaging the device and thus activating the alarm.
Such devices operate on the principle of breaking the circuit. Since these devices are sim- ply switches in a circuit, they are normally used to cover several windows and doors in a room or along a corridor. Opening any of these entrances opens the circuit and activates the alarm. They are easy to circumvent in most installations by jumping the circuit, or tying back the plungers with string or rubber bands can defeat them from within.
Pressure Devices These are also switches, activated by pressure applied to them. This same principle is in regu- lar use in buildings with automatic door openers. In security applications, they are usually in the form of mats. These are sometimes concealed under carpeting, or, when they logically fit the existing decor, are placed in a strategic spot without concealment. Wires leading to them are naturally hidden in some way.
Photoelectric Devices These use a beam of light, transmitted from as much as 500 feet away, to a receiver. As long as this beam is directed into the receiver, the circuit is inactive. As soon as this contact is broken, however briefly, the alarm is activated. These devices are also used as door openers.
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232 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
In security applications, the beam is modulated so that a flashlight or some other light source cannot circumvent the device, as can be done in non-security applications. For greatest security, ultraviolet or infrared light is used—although an experienced intruder can spot even these unless an electronic flicker device is incorporated into the device. Obviously the device must be unde- tectable because, once the beam is located, it is an easy matter to step over or crawl under it.
In some applications, a single transmitter and receiver installation can be used—even when they are not in a line of sight—by a mirror system reflecting the transmitted beam around corners or to different levels. Such a system is difficult to maintain, however, since the slightest move- ment of any of the mirrors will disturb the alignment, and the system will cease operating.
Motion Detection Alarms These operate by radio frequency or ultrasonic wave transmission (see Figure 10-6). The radio frequency (or microwave) motion detector transmits waves throughout the protected area from a transmitting to a receiving antenna. The receiving antenna is set or adjusted to a spe- cific level of emission. Any disturbance of this level by absorption or alteration of the wave pat- tern will activate the alarm.
FIGURE 10-5 (A) Recessed switches and magnets help make a neat and attractive installation. Because they are concealed, they are more tamper-resistant. (B) Larger switches are sometimes easier to install. Since they are recess mounted, they are hidden from view, and their size is not noticeable. (C) Surface-mounted switches, although visible, are the least expensive and easiest to install. (Photo courtesy of Ademco.)
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 233
The false-alarm rate with this device can be high, because the radio waves will penetrate the walls and respond to motion outside the designated area unless the walls are shielded. Some such devices on the market permit an adjustment whereby the emissions can be tuned in such a way to cover only a single area without leaking into outside areas, but these require considerable skill to tune them properly.
The ultrasonic motion detector operates in much the same way, as does the radio fre- quency unit, except that it consists of a transceiver that both transmits and receives ultrasonic waves. One of these units can be used to cover an area. Or they may be used in multiples where such use is indicated (see Figure 10-7). They can be adjusted to cover a single, limited area or broadened to provide area protection.
The alarm is activated when any motion disturbs the pattern of the sound waves. Some units come with special circuits that distinguish between inconsequential movement (such as flying moths or moving drapes) and an intruder.
Ultrasonic waves do not penetrate walls and are therefore unaffected by outside movement. They are not affected by audible noise in itself, but such noises can sometimes disturb the wave pattern of the protective ultrasonic transmission and create false alarms.
Passive infrared motion detectors do not transmit a signal for an intruder to disturb. Rather, moving infrared radiation is detected against the radiation environment of the room (see Figure 10-8). This detector is designed to sense the radiation from a human body. Sunlight, auto headlights, heaters, and air-conditioning units can trigger false alarms.
Dual-tech motion sensors combine the traits of passive infrared detectors with either microwave or ultrasonic technology.
Capacitance Alarm Systems Also referred to as proximity alarms, capacitance alarm systems are used to protect metal containers of all kinds. This alarm’s most common use is to protect a high-security storage
FIGURE 10-6 Motion detector alarms. (From Robert Barnard, Intrusion Detection Systems [Boston: Butterworth- Heinemann, 1981], p. 125.)
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234 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
area within a fenced enclosure. To set the system in operation, an ungrounded metal object (such as the safe, file, or fence mentioned above) is wired to two oscillator circuits that are set in balance. An electromagnetic field is thus created around the object to be protected. Whenever this field is entered, the circuits are thrown out of balance, and the alarm is initiated. The electromagnetic field may project several feet from the object, but it can be adjusted to operate only a few inches from the object when traffic in the vicinity of the object is such that false alarms would be triggered if the field extended too far.
Sonic Alarm Systems Known variously as noise detection, sound, or audio alarms, these operate on the principle that an intruder will make enough noise in a protected area to be picked up by microphones that
FIGURE 10-7 Indoor ultrasonic motion detection patterns. (From Don T. Cherry, Total Facility Control [Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1986], p. 134.)
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 235
will in turn activate an alarm. This type of system has a wide variety of uses, limited only by the problems of ambient noise levels in a given area. The system consists simply of a microphone set in the protected area that is connected to an alarm signal and receiver. When a noise acti- vates the alarm, a monitoring guard turns on the receiver and listens in on the prowler.
FIGURE 10-8 Indoor infrared motion-detection patterns. (From Don T. Cherry, Total Facility Control [Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1986], p. 135.)
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236 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
Such a system must be carefully adjusted to avoid setting off the alarm at every noise. Usually adjustment is set to sound the alarm at sounds above the general level common to the protected area. The system is not useful in areas where background noise levels are so high that they will drown out the anticipated sounds of surreptitious entry. This device may also come with a sound discriminator that evaluates sounds to eliminate false alarms.
Vibration Detectors Vibration detectors provide a high level of protection against attack in specific areas or on spe- cific objects. In this system, a specialized type of contact microphone is attached to objects such as works of art, safes, or files, or to surfaces such as walls or ceilings. Any attack on, or movement of, these objects or surfaces causes some vibration. This vibration is picked up by microphones, which in turn activate alarms. These units may be adjusted for sensitivity, which will be set according to their application and environment. Here again, discriminator units are available to screen out harmless vibrations. These units are very useful in specific applications because their false alarm rates are very low.
Certain additional alarm devices are currently in use as perimeter protection, as discussed in Chapter 9.
Some of the alarm sensors discussed in the preceding paragraphs can be defined as pro- viding point protection. Electromechanical devices, capacitance alarms, and pressure devices, for instance, will be activated only when a specific area (point of entry) has been crossed, a door or window has been opened, or an object has been moved. On the other hand, ultrasonic, microwave, and passive infrared alarm systems protect large spaces, even entire rooms, against intrusion. These “volumetric” alarms, however, can be triggered by any number of environ- mental factors normally present in the protected space. Each alarm system has different strengths and weaknesses, and to assure effective performance, the total environment should be analyzed before selecting the specific system. Table 10-1 briefly summarizes the factors that affect these systems.
Alarm Monitoring Systems
Monitoring systems currently available are:
1. The central station: This is a facility set up to monitor alarms indicating fire, intrusion, and problems in industrial processes. Such facilities are set up for a number of clients; all are serviced simultaneously. ADT is a familiar name in this business. On the sounding of an alarm, a team of security officers may be dispatched to the scene and the local police or fire department may be notified. Depending on the nature of the alarm, on-duty plant or office protection is notified as well. Such a service is as effective as its response time, its alertness to alarms, and the thoroughness of inspection of premises fitted with alarms.
2. Proprietary system: This functions in the same way as does a central station system except that it is owned and operated by the company (for example, Deere and Company) rather than a contractor (for example, ADT), and is located on company property. Response to all alarms is generally by the facility’s own security or fire personnel.
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Table 10-1 What Detector to Select: Space Protection Guide
Environmental and Other Variables Ultrasonic Passive Infrared Microwave
Vibration No problem with balanced processing, some problem with unbalanced
Very few problems Can be a major problem
Effect of temperature change on range A little A lot None Effect of humidity change on range Some None None Reflection of area of coverage by large metal objects
Very little None unless metal is highly polished
Can be a major problem
Reduction of range by drapes, carpets Some None None Sensitivity to movement of overhead doors Needs careful placement Very few problems Can be a major problem Sensitivity to small animals Problem if animals close Problem if animals close but can
be aimed so beams are well above floor
Problem if animals close
Water movement in plastic storm drain pipes No problem No problem Can be problem if very close Water noise from faulty valves Can be a problem, very rare No problem No problem Movement through thin walls or glass No problem No problem Needs careful placement Drafts, air movement Needs careful placement No problem No problem Sun, moving headlights through windows No problem Needs careful placement No problem Ultrasonic noise Bells, hissing, some inaudible noises
can cause problems No problem No problem
Heaters Problem only in extreme cases Needs careful placement No problem Moving machinery, fan blades Needs careful placement Very little problem Needs careful placement Radio interference, AC line transients Can be problem in severe cases Can be problem in severe cases Can be problem in severe cases Piping of detection field to unexpected areas by AC ducting
No problem No problem Occasional problem where beam is directed at duct outlet
Radar interference Very few problems Very few problems Can be problem when radar is close and sensor pointed at it
Cost per square foot large open areas In between Most expensive Least expensive Cost per square foot divided areas, multiple rooms
Least expensive Most expensive In between
Range adjustment required Yes No Yes Current consumption (size of battery required for extended standby power)
In between Smallest Largest
Interference between two or more sensors Must be crystal controlled and/or synchronized
No problem Must be different frequencies
This list is intended as a guide only and does not represent absolutes but suggests areas for consideration. Source: Aritech Corp.
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alters, D . (2012). Introduction to security. R
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238 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
3. Local alarm system: In this case, the sensor activates a circuit that in turn activates a horn, a siren, or even a flashing light located in the immediate vicinity of the area fitted with alarms. Only guards within hearing distance can respond to such alarms, so their use is restricted to situations in which guards are so located that their immediate response is assured. Such systems are most useful for fire alarm systems because they can alert personnel to evacuate the endangered area. In such cases, the system can also be connected to local fire departments to serve the dual purpose of alerting personnel and the company fire brigade to the danger as well as calling for assistance from public fire-fighting forces.
4. Auxiliary system: In this system, installation circuits are connected to local police or fire departments or 911 centers by leased telephone lines or in very modern designs wireless systems. The dual responsibility for circuits and the high incidence of false alarms have made this system unpopular with public fire and police personnel. In a growing number of cities, such installations are no longer permitted as a matter of public policy.
5. Local alarm-by-chance system: This is a local alarm system in which a bell or siren is sounded with no predictable response. These systems are used in residences or small retail establishments that cannot afford a response system. The hope is that a neighbor or a passing patrol car will react to the alarm and call for police assistance, but such a call is purely a matter of chance.
6. Dial alarm system: This system is set to dial a predetermined telephone number or numbers when the alarm is activated. The number(s) selected might be the police, the subscriber’s home number, or both. When the phone is answered, a recording states that an intrusion is in progress at the location fitted with alarms. This system is relatively inexpensive to install and operate, but because it is dependent on general phone circuits, it could fail if the line(s) being called were busy or if the phone connections were cut.
Cost Considerations
The costs involved in setting up even a fairly simple alarm system can be substantial, and the great part of this outlay is not recoverable should the system prove inadequate or unwarranted. Its installation should be predicated on exposure, concomitant need, and on the manner of its integration into the existing, or planned, security program. Even companies that offer low cost or free installation of home and small business systems require a monthly contract to monitor the newly installed alarms. Nothing is totally free.
This last point is important to consider because the effectiveness of any alarm procedure lies in the response it commands. As elementary as it may sound, it is worth repeating that most alarms take no action; they only notify that action should be taken. There must therefore be some entity near at hand that can take that action. Too often, otherwise effective alarm sys- tems are set up without adequate supportive or responding personnel. This is at best wasteful and at worst dangerous. The best systems are integrated with computers so that the computer can initiate action while waiting for human response.
In many instances, alarm installations are made in order to reduce the size of the guard force. This is sometimes possible. At least if the current guard force cannot be reduced in number, those additional guards needed to cover areas now fitted with alarms will no longer be required.
Good business practice demands that the expense of alarm installations be undertaken only after a carefully considered cost and effectiveness analysis of all the elements. If the
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Chapter 10 l The Inner Defenses 239
existing security personnel can cover the security requirements of the facility, no alarm sys- tem is needed. If they can cover the ground but not in a way that will satisfy security stan- dards, more guards are needed, or the existing force must be augmented by an alarm system to extend their coverage and their protective ability. The costs and effectiveness must be studied together with an eye toward the efficient achievement of stated objectives.
Summary Almost all sources of the security equipment industry predict growth, indicating that there is a growing use of technology and equipment to supplement security staffs. Much new technology
FIGURE 10-9 In-depth physical security. (From Don T. Cherry, Total Facility Control [Boston: Butterworth- Heinemann, 1986], p. 148.)
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240 INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY
and equipment is available to the security manager today. Some of it is useful, some not, but none of it is better than the use to which it is put or the system into which it is integrated. No equipment can stand on its own. It can be used only if it is employed properly, fully, and effectively, and to be effective, all the components of the security system must work together. Figure 10-9 shows what security devices and types of barrier protection are commonly used for each line of defense.
A reasonable level of security cannot necessarily be assured with a single line of defense. Depending on the level of security desired, several layers of protection in an integrated system may be required.
CRITICAL THINKING Knowing about the various security techniques that are available for the protection of assets, is it possible to develop a virtually attack-proof security system? Is this even desirable? What are the potential problems, if any?
Review Questions 1. What are the elements necessary for an effective visitor access control system? 2. Explain the characteristics of each of the common types of alarm systems. 3. Give an example of a situation in which a motion-detection alarm might be deployed
effectively. Under what circumstances would an ultrasonic system be chosen over a radio frequency system?
4. Describe how passive infrared detectors operate. What environmental variables must be considered to assure proper operation?
References [1] Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-12, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, August 27,
2004, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08>. [2] Benson P. Secret Service report details 91 breaches, CNN Politics, <http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-07/
politics/secret.service.breaches>, downloaded 9/19/2010. [3] Face in Hand; Biometrics Company Bioscrypt to Merge with A4Vision Facial Recognition Company
Security Magazine, e-mail list serve January 23, 2007.
[4] Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-12,
[5] Diebold Direct Security Catalog. Canton, OH: Diebold; 1990. p. 10.
[6] Ibid.
[7] <www.vaultandsafe.com/safe_ratings_classifications.shtml>, downloaded 9/24/2010. [8] <www.klsecurity.com/fireproof_safe.htm>, downloaded 9/24/2010. [9] <www.vaultandsafe.com/safe_ratings_classifications.shtml>, downloaded 9/24/2010. [10] Jeffery CR, Hunter RD, Griswold J. Crime prevention and computer analysis of convenience store robber-
ies in Tallahassee, Florida. Florida Police J 1987:65–9.
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