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Introduction Transnational Threats and Opportunities

Alison Brysk

Globalization—the growing interpenetration of states, markets, communi- cations, and ideas across borders—is one of the leading characteristics of the contemporary world. International norms and institutions for the pro- tection of human rights are more developed than at any previous point in history, while global civil society fosters growing avenues of appeal for citi- zens repressed by their own states. But assaults on fundamental human dig- nity continue, and the very blurring of borders and rise of transnational ac- tors that facilitated the development of a global human rights regime may also be generating new sources of human rights abuse. Even as they are more broadly articulated and accepted, the rights of individuals have come to de- pend ever more on a broad array of global actors and forces, from ministries to multinationals to missionaries.

What are the patterns of the human rights impact of globalization? Are new problems replacing, intensifying, or mitigating state-sponsored repres- sion? Are some dynamics of globalization generating both problems and op- portunities? How can new opportunities be used to offset new problems? And how has the idea and practice of human rights influenced the process of globalization?

How does globalization—which liberals claim will promote development, democracy, personal empowerment, and global governance —instead pre- sent new challenges for human rights? Globalization is a package of trans- national flows of people, production, investment, information, ideas, and authority (not new, but stronger and faster).1 Human rights are a set of claims and entitlements to human dignity, which the existing international regime assumes will be provided (or threatened) by the state. A more cosmopolitan and open international system should free individuals to pursue their rights, but large numbers of people seem to be suffering from both long-standing

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state repression and new denials of rights linked to transnational forces. The essays in this volume show that the challenge of globalization is that unac- countable flows of migration and open markets present new threats, which are not amenable to state-based human rights regimes, while the new op- portunities of global information and institutions are insufficiently accessi- ble and distorted by persistent state intervention.

The emergence of an “international regime” for human rights (Donnelly 1986), growing transnational social movement networks, increasing con- sciousness (Willetts 1996), and information politics have the potential to ad- dress both traditional and emerging forms of human rights violations. The United Nations has supervised human rights reform in El Salvador, Cam- bodia, and Haiti, while creating a new high commissioner for human rights. The first international tribunals since Nuremberg are prosecuting genocide in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Transnational legal accountability (Stephens and Ratner 1996) and humanitarian intervention promote uni- versal norms and link them to the enforcement power of states. Thousands of nongovernmental organizations monitor and lobby for human rights from Tibet to East Timor (Boli and Thomas 1999). Alongside principled propo- nents such as Amnesty International, globalization has generated new forms of advocacy such as transnational professional networks (Doctors without Bor- ders), global groups for conflict monitoring, and coalitions across transna- tional issues (Sierra Club–Amnesty International). New forms of communi- cation allow victims to videotape their plight, advocates to flood governments with faxes, Web sites to mobilize urgent action alerts. But the effectiveness of global consciousness and pressure on the states, paramilitaries, and in- surgents responsible for long-standing human rights violations varies tre- mendously. And access to the new global mechanisms is distributed unevenly, so that some of the neediest victims—such as the illiterate rural poor and refugee women—are the least likely to receive either global or domestic redress.

Beyond this interaction of new solutions with old problems, new human rights problems may result from the integration of markets, the shrinking of states, increased transnational flows such as migration, the spread of cul- tures of intolerance, and the decision-making processes of new or growing global institutions (Kofman and Youngs 1996; Mittelman 1996; Held 2000). The increasing presence of multinational corporations has challenged la- bor rights throughout Southeast Asia, along the Mexican border, and beyond. Increasing levels of migration worldwide make growing numbers of refugees and undocumented laborers vulnerable to abuse by sending and receiving states, as well as transnational criminal networks. Hundreds of Mexican na- tionals die each year crossing the U.S. border; in contrast, 450 German mi- grants were killed during forty years of Europeans crossing the Berlin Wall. International economic adjustment and the growth of tourism are linked to

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a rise in prostitution and trafficking in women and children, affecting mil- lions in the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the post-Soviet states and even the United States. The U.S. State Department estimates that one to two mil- lion persons each year are trafficked for various forms of forced labor and “modern- day slavery”—including almost 50,000 annually to the United States (Richard 1999). The same Internet that empowers human rights ac- tivists increases government monitoring, instructs neo-Nazis, and carries transnational death threats against dissenters. Unelected global institutions like the World Bank, international peacekeepers, and environmental NGOs administering protected areas increasingly control the lives of the most pow- erless citizens of weak states.

In this volume, we attempt to map new territory, bring together diverse perspectives, challenge conventional wisdom, and begin to cumulate re- search to address these questions and contradictions. Our aim is not to in- troduce a new theory of globalization, but rather to identify generalizable patterns from diverse developments. In order to make sense of these devel- opments, we must first consider the general trends of human rights and glob- alization. Then we can map patterns in the globalized development of hu- man rights threats and opportunities.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL ARENA

Human rights are a set of universal claims to safeguard human dignity from illegitimate coercion, typically enacted by state agents. These norms are codified in a widely endorsed set of international undertakings: the “Inter- national Bill of Human Rights” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights); phenomenon-specific treaties on war crimes (Geneva Conventions), genocide, and torture; and protections for vulnerable groups such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. International dialogue on human rights has produced a distinction between three “generations” of human rights, labeled for their historical emergence. Security rights encompass life, bodily integrity, liberty, and sometimes asso- ciated rights of political participation and democratic governance. Social and economic rights, highlighted in the eponymous International Covenant, comprise both negative and positive freedoms, enacted by states and others: prominently, rights to food, health care, education, and free labor. More re- cently discussed collective rights may include rights such as membership in a cultural community and access to a healthy environment (Chris Brown 1997). These “generations” of rights often involve different sets of actors and different levels of state accountability.

While the origins of the international human rights regime, U.S. foreign

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policy, NGO monitoring, and much previous scholarship have focused on security rights, this project will entertain a broader conception of linked po- litical, social, and cultural rights grounded in the Universal Declaration. A focus on security rights may be desirable for clarity and manageability, as well as because security rights of life and freedom are “basic” or enabling rights that make the pursuit of other rights possible (Shue 1980). However, human rights claims have an inherently expanding character, which requires the consideration of every type of threat to human dignity under a range of changing social conditions. Thus, both liberty and survival may involve so- cial issues, such as the right to free labor and to organize for better labor conditions. Some vulnerable groups, notably women and indigenous peoples, may face linked threats that emanate from public and private actors, and seek cultural freedoms to meaningfully participate in civic life. Furthermore, the very process of globalization blurs distinctions among categories of rights: hu- manitarian intervention seeks to rescue ethnic groups, women working as prostitutes are beaten by police for “bothering tourists” to feed their children, and rights to privacy and expression collide on the Internet (also see Mc- Corquodale and Fairbrother 1999). In this volume, these linked rights can be delineated by granting priority to those rights that enable others and those violations that present the greatest harm to victims.

Human rights values derive from and are justified by reference to philo- sophical constructions of human nature, cultural and religious traditions, demands from civil society, and international influence. In practical im- portance, the latter two political factors are the most important source of human rights in the contemporary world (Perry 1998; Montgomery 1998). Accordingly, despite frequent violations in practice, international consen- sus has implanted human rights as a nearly universal vocabulary of debate, aspiration, and civic challenges to state legitimacy.

Analysts of human rights have identified a variety of psychological, social, economic, and political patterns that put societies “at risk” of human rights violations. These generally include authoritarian government, civil war, strong ethnic cleavages, weak civil society, power vacuums, critical junctures in economic development, and military dominance (Mitchell and Mc- Cormick 1988; Haas 1994; Donnelly 1998b). Above all, the study of human rights teaches us that human rights violations usually reflect a calculated (or manipulated) pursuit of political power, not inherent evil or ungovernable passions (Gurr 1984; Human Rights Watch 1995b). One of our first tasks is to analyze the effect of globalization on these risk factors.

The effect of globalization on state-based human rights violations will de- pend on the type of state and its history. In newly democratizing countries with weak institutions and elite- controlled economies (Russia, Latin Amer- ica, Southeast Asia), the growth of global markets and economic flows tends to destabilize coercive forces but increase crime, police abuse, and corrup-

4 introduction

tion. Global mobility and information flows generally stimulate ethnic mo- bilization, which may promote self- determination in responsive states but more often produces collective abuses in defense of dominant-group hege- mony. On the other hand, the same forces have produced slow institutional openings by less fragmented single-party states (like China and Mexico). In much of Africa, globalization has ironically increased power vacuums, by both empowering substate challengers and providing sporadic inter vention, which displaces old regimes without consolidating new ones. Some of the most horrifying abuses of all have occurred in the transnationalized, Hobbes- ian civil wars of Sierra Leone, Angola, and the Congo.

But the literature on human rights has also moved beyond the conven- tional wisdom that situated human rights violations and remediation pre- dominantly within the state, to suggest ways in which globalization creates new opportunities to challenge the state “from above and below” (Brysk 1993; Risse et al. 1999). Human rights research has produced both evidence of new capabilities for monitoring, pressure, and sanctions (Alston and Steiner 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998), along with reports of new types and venues of abuse (Human Rights Watch 1996; Fields 1998; Rickard 1998; Pe- ters and Wolper 1995). In general, analysts of globalization find that states’ international integration improves security rights, but increases inequality and threatens the social rights of citizens (Crossette 2000; Milner 1998). How- ever, neither economic development nor economic growth in and of them- selves improve human rights performance (Montgomery 1998: 325; Amartya Sen 1999; Tan 1999). In addition to globalization and growth, findings on the effectiveness of international pressure on state human rights policy sug- gest that target states must be structurally accessible, internationally sensi- tive, and contain local human rights activists for linkage (Burgerman 1998; Sikkink 1993).

There is little systematic evidence available on the overall human rights impact of global flows and actors, and that which does exist is often contra- dictory. For example, quantitative studies that demonstrate improved secu- rity rights where MNCs (multinational corporations) are present (Meyer 1998) contrast with case studies documenting multinational reinforcement of state coercion and labor suppression (Arregui 1996; Ho et al. 1996). Other scholars suggest that the impact of multinationals depends more on their type of production, customer base, or sending country than their globaliz- ing nature (Spar 1998). Similarly, some studies indicate that even within “eco- nomic globalization,” different types of global economic flows at different times will have different impacts on democracy and human rights (for ex- ample, for Li and Reuveny 2000, trade is negative but foreign direct invest- ment is positive). There is some basis for believing that new global human rights mechanisms, such as transnational NGO campaigns, may be particu- larly effective against transnational actors like multinationals. Analysts argue

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that transnational human rights threats can be most easily met by transna- tional human rights campaigns, since it is easier to access transnational ac- tors than repressive states, transnationals cannot cloak their abuses in sov- ereignty rationales, global elites are increasingly amenable to “rights talk,” and global civil society can provide local linkages for transnational networks (Rodman 1998; Brysk 2000a). The research in this volume suggests that the human rights impact of globalization depends on three types of factors: the type of globalization involved, the level of analysis addressed, and the type of state that is filtering globalizing flows.

GLOBALIZATION: RIGHTS AND WRONGS

What do we mean by globalization? While some analysts treat globalization as a predominantly economic process or even a synonym for global capital- ism (Greider 1997; Korten 1995), others focus on the growth of interna- tional institutions and organizations (Ruggie 1998). Some scholars empha- size the impact of transnational demographic, environmental, and cultural flows (Kearney 1995; Sassen 1998, 1996), while others plot the emergence of cross-border networks that may constitute a “global civil society” (Kaldor 1999; Lipschutz 1996; Wapner 1996). In this project, these developments are seen as facets of a linked, albeit uneven, process. In an extension of Jan Aart Scholte’s definition, globalization is an ensemble of developments that make the world a single place, changing the meaning and importance of distance and national identity in world affairs (Scholte 1996b: 44).2 Never- theless, aspects of globalization that occur simultaneously may have very dif- ferent logics and impact for human rights—as the sections of this book reflect.3

In order to analyze globalization as a comprehensive process, it must be recognized as a dynamic process, that is, a change over time. One of the biggest challenges to analyzing the current era of globalization is the observation of historical periods with similar elements and very different political results (Hirst and Thompson 1996). However, globalization need not be entirely new to be significant, and significant in new ways. Some suggest that glob- alization has occurred in waves, with the current wave linked to U.S. hege- mony and the emergence of a “democratic peace” in the core of the world economy.4 The current wave of globalization does surpass previous eras in the breadth, scope, and intensity of the combination of connection, cos- mopolitanism, commodification, and communication. It is this combination of norms, flows, institutions, and markets that has particular political con- sequences for human rights.

A more globalized world is simultaneously more connected, cosmopolitan, commodified, and influenced by communication. Connection is a functional pa- rameter of globalization, involving increasing numbers, volumes, and salience

6 introduction

of transnational flows of bodies, business, information, and norms. The sec- tions of this volume are organized around these flows: transnational migra- tion and citizenship, global markets and commodification, international uses of information and communication, and transnational norms embodied in attempts at governance. The cosmopolitan dimension is structural; the evolu- tion of multiple, linked, and overlapping centers of power above and below the state. This is closely related to James N. Rosenau’s analysis of a “multi- centric” turbulent world. Commodification highlights distinctive characteris- tics of expanding world markets and their relationship to other flows, insti- tutions, and states. As Richard Falk’s contribution details, globalization as commodification means that increasing spheres of social relationship are based on exchange value, including citizenship. The underlying causal dy- namic that has catalyzed and intensified each of these dimensions of glob- alization is communication, which combines an increase in technical capacity and volume, a shift in the distribution of capabilities, a diversification of channels, and an expansion of content (Deibert 1997). As Shayne Weyker and Clifford Bob discuss, communication carries both information and norms, affective images and transnational identities. Both terrorism and the international response also reflect these characteristics.

What are the effects of globalization? Optimists suggest that transnational integration will empower citizen challenges to state power (Falk 1995; Rose- nau 1997), while revisionists assert that globalization reiterates national and/or market exploitation (Bhabha 1998a; Burbach et al. 1997; Brecher and Costello 1994; Mander and Goldsmith 1996). One attempt to resolve this debate delineates good and bad forms of globalization; “globalization from above” versus “globalization from below.” (Hunter 1995; Falk 1994) Another set of scholars contend that a deeper process of globalization has transformed the fundamental forms of world politics through changing iden- tities, evolving social forms such as networks, and the diffusion of an in- creasingly influential world institutional culture that includes support for hu- man rights or at least democracy (Robertson 1992; Castells 1997; Meyer et al. 1997). This project suggests, instead, that different elements and levels of globalization may produce distinct effects of empowerment, exploitation, and evolution; also Friedman 1999).

But these diverse effects are not random or wholly ambiguous. Previous research suggests that world politics is clustered in three streams, with dis- tinctive logics: the interstate realm, global markets, and transnational civil society. These domains are differentially accessible and responsive to human rights appeals, with civic actors most amenable and states most resistant to a reconstruction of existing relationships. Furthermore, the appeals of tar- get groups are facilitated when markets, states, and transnational social forces are separable rather than working in tandem (Brysk 2000a). Globalization is most positive for human rights when it enables the exchange of informa-

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tion and the formation of new identities, and most negative when it rein- scribes borders and props up repressive states. Global markets, on the other hand, generate systematically contradictory effects that depend heavily on the type of state and sector involved. Meanwhile, global civil society intro- duces new norms, which sometimes become institutionalized as evolving hu- man rights standards, and, ultimately, objects of interstate enforcement. Re- cent events suggest that a fourth realm of transnational violence may have its own patterns and effects.

We can thus begin to map the effects of different forms of globalization on different kinds of rights (see table 1). Increased mobility provides refuge to some but also opportunities for abusive policing and economic exploita- tion. Global markets also increase economic exploitation, but may provide increased monitoring of social and security conditions. Information facili- tates campaigns for all types of rights, as well as the formation of transna- tional networks and reporting to the emergent “international human rights regime.” And governance provides a new array of enforcement tools, from intervention to law to economic sanctions.

Meanwhile, these streams of globalization are unfolding at different lev- els of analysis—the second key factor suggested by our approach. Rosenau’s contribution examines the human rights impact of globalization across states and concludes that transnational flows and institutions are constructing evolv- ing responses to “the most obstreperous actor” (still usually a state). By con- trast, Richard Falk distinguishes globalization above and below the state, at- tributing threats mainly to unaccountable transnational market forces and institutions, partly combated by the struggles of grassroots global civil soci- ety. Donnelly introduces the missing element of globalization through the state, which he finds highly problematic for social rights, in ways that also reiterate the distinction between different streams of globalization and their differential effect on rights.

8 introduction

table 1. Streams of Globalization and the Effect on Rights

Mobility Markets Information Governance (Maher, (Milner, Cabezas)* Pangalangan)* (Wekyer, Bob)* (Sandholz, Fox)*

Security rights refuge, abusive monitoring, HR regime intervention, policing abusive policing campaigns legal action

Social rights exploitation exploitation campaigns sanctions Collective diasporas homogenization empowerment alternatives rights (see Brysk 2000b)

*Chapters in this volume.

These levels of analysis overlap with the streams of globalization. Global mobility operates across and through the state, and the rights impact is gen- erally more positive across and more negative through—both Kristen Ma- her and Amalia Lucia Cabezas suggest that policing creates more violations than migration itself. Global markets may be across (financial flows), above (multilateral trade and financial institutions), through (economic adjust- ment), or below (grassroots protests, shifts in local production or con- sumption). This is part of the problem in assessing the contradictory effects of markets on rights (Wesley Milner’s analysis is across and above, while Raul Pangalangan’s is through and below). Global information is predominantly across and below the state, hence it tends to facilitate rights unless bottle- necks develop through (Weyker) or above (Bob) the state. Finally, global governance appears as the paradigm of globalization from above. But Fox explores a trilateral struggle between a multilateral institution above, a trans- national campaign below, and recalcitrant states in the middle, while Wayne Sandholtz shows that globalization from above can partially supersede the state level—when states have lost legitimacy across the international system. The latter has wider implications for the study of global governance, as it suggests that the development of global norms and institutions is actually a three- or four-level game, not just an interstate coordination problem (Evans et al. 1993; Smith et al. 1997).

Finally, our analysis shows that the human rights impact of globalization is filtered through the type of receiving state (Holm and Sorensen 1995). Much of the literature on globalization has overlooked the effect of global- ization on the state; globalization has produced a new “globalized state”— changing rather than eroding sovereignty (Ian Clark 1999). As some schol- ars have argued, power is moving from weak states to strong states, from all states to markets, and away from state authority entirely in certain domains and functions (Strange 1998; Schmidt 2000). At the same time, the state is the main administrator of globalization. As one partisan of globalization puts it, globalization means that the quality of the state matters more, since the state is “the operating system for global capitalism” (Friedman 1999: 134). Thus, the struggle for human rights in a global era is now from above, from below—and still through the middle.

THE GLOBALIZED STATE AS THREAT

In the security sphere, states respond with increased repression to frag- mentation, transnationalized civil war, and uncontrolled global flows such as migrants and drug trafficking. Transborder ethnic diasporas help inspire civil conflict, while the global arms trade provides its tools. Even extreme civil conflicts where states deteriorate into warlordism are often financed if not abetted by foreign trade: diamonds in the Congo and Sierra Leone, co-

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caine in Colombia. While nonstate actors like insurgents and paramilitaries pose increasing threats to human rights, state response is a crucial multiplier for the effect on citizens. Since all but the most beleaguered states possess more resources and authority than rebels, they can generally cause more damage—and human rights monitoring in a wide variety of settings from Rwanda to Haiti attributes the bulk of abuses to state (or state-supported) forces. States also differ in their ability and will to provide protection from insurgent terror campaigns (like that in Algeria).

Global economic relationships can produce state policies that directly vi- olate social and labor rights and indirectly produce social conflict that leads to state violations of civil and security rights. While globally induced economic adjustment may cut state services and intensify poverty and protest, global windfalls of wealth may also underwrite repressive and predatory states, as in Angola, where oil revenues have fueled repression and civil war (Harden 2000). It is states that largely determine labor rights and security response to labor dissidence; states also regulate multinationals, certify unions, and form joint ventures with global investors.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP

Just as globalized states may present new threats alongside long-standing pat- terns of repression, globalization offers states declining opportunities to serve as a source of human rights protection. Increasing numbers of residents of increasing numbers of states are less than full citizens. Over 25 million people are international refugees, while an estimated similar number are economic migrants—mostly undocumented and generally lacking civil rights (Mills 1998: 97–124). Refugee camps can also become sites or sources of human rights violations, as in Rwanda, Lebanon, Guatemala, and Indonesia. Within many countries, internally displaced persons, rural-urban migrants, and iso- lated peasants (often illiterate) are also undocumented and lack rights and civil status. In China alone, an estimated 100 million people are unregistered domestic migrant workers (Solinger 1995). Many millions around the world live in occupied territories or emergency zones where citizenship was never granted or has been suspended. A number of the states hosting the world’s 300 million indigenous people assign them special juridical status— often tutelar y—which may fall short of conventional citizenship. Similarly, a significant number of states (especially in the Middle East) circumscribe the rights of the female half of their populations—and personal status codes con- travene international human rights standards and sometimes directly deny citizenship or nationality (Chinkin 1999). Analysts of globalization speak of variable levels and configurations of citizenship within the same state, de- pending on the triangulation between a given sector, state power, and transnational forces, and even regional zones of limited citizenship (such as

10 introduction

limitations on movement, speech, and assembly in export-processing zones) (Ong 1999).

Meanwhile, alongside people who are not citizens, states have diminished capacity to control the conditions of citizenship — even for those securely inscribed within the juridical and social status. Obser vers of states under- going both political and economic liberalization decry the emergence of “delegative democracy,” which is characterized by “low-intensity citizenship” (O’Donnell 1994; Stahler-Sholk 1994). More and more legal citizens lack effective accountability for power relationships; their lives depend on dis- tant investment decisions, organizational resolutions, religious edicts, and information campaigns. “Economic liberalization is exacerbating the gap be- tween rich and poor within virtually all developing regions. At the same time, other elements of globalization are increasing the inequalities of political power and influence, as well as highlighting new dimensions of inequality. For one group of countries globalization is eroding the cohesion and via- bility of the state” (Hurrell and Woods 1999: 1). These global forces are of- ten translated into local conditions in opaque ways, which deepens the gap of information, knowledge, and control further. Since migration is the transnational flow with the strongest claim to state control, it is interesting that Maher and Cabezas each note a “citizenship gap” both for aliens to de- veloped countries and citizens of developing countries (vis-à-vis tourists).5

TYPES OF STATES AND THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION

Beyond these general trends of accelerating threats and declining oppor- tunities, the impact of globalization on human rights conditions differs in different types of states. Many analyses of transnationalism suggest that the impact of global forces on various issue-areas is filtered by domestic charac- teristics (Risse-Kappen 1995; Keohane and Milner 1996)— even straight- forward economic effects depend on a state’s factor endowments, economic institutions, and policies (Stewart and Berry 1999).6 One scholar outlines a general pattern of types of states with different patterns of international in- teraction: premodern, Westphalian modern nation-states, and postmodern, with the former and latter departing significantly from standard scholarly assumptions of sovereignty, anarchy, and self-help (Sorenson 2000).

We can further develop these distinctions, and the tendencies of differ- ent types of globalizing states for human rights performance and the citi- zenship gap. First, in collapsing and “failed” states such as large sectors of Africa, foreign aid and international organizations often simultaneously prop up power vacuums and assist victims (Ignatieff 1998). Globalization brings increased market flows and weak intervention, but little accountability and no definitive governance. Here, the citizenship gap is most severe, as victims lack control at the community, state, and international level. In second place,

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aspiring theocracies like Afghanistan—which make war on women—are less a return to tradition than a reaction against foreign penetration sustained by international identity politics. Victims lack both state citizenship and voice in the religious/ethnic community, which engenders “private” violations. Sim- ilarly, ethnocracies are both inspired by and reactive to international forces. Sometimes international organizations intervene, as in Kosovo. However, in- terveners, ethnocratic and emerging states, and ethnic communities all vio- late rights (the way ethnic Albanians in Kosovo are now persecuting Serbs), and none are subject to citizen accountability. Next, the few remaining “hard states”—such as China—seem to be evolving toward what has been labeled “market Leninism,” in which centralized political control coexists with (and indeed may depend upon) opening to global markets. But in such states, growing international influence does seem to foster some partial increase in transparency, the rule of law, and international cooperation—although it has not yet produced systematic improvement in human rights. The citizenship gap here is predominantly democratizing the state, and secondarily access- ing market pressures. Most of Latin America, parts of Southeast Asia, and many post-Soviet states are now “low-intensity democracies,” with globaliz- ing electoral regimes systematically skewed by social inequalities and weak states. Residents of these areas have low- quality citizenship and no access to the market forces that dominate their states. Even postmodern, liberal cap- italist democracies experience human rights impacts from globalization, be- coming more connected and aware but simultaneously overloaded in state capacity to process diverse and complex issues. We too lack full control over global markets, although we are more insulated from their effects than cit- izens of weak or authoritarian states. We are also more dependent on the opportunity of the globalization of information, but thus more vulnerable in those situations where information is a threat: as surveillance, ideology, or terror.

GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

These essays were written during 2000, before the September 11th terror- ist attacks on New York and Washington ushered in a new world order framed by renewed security threats, directly targeting globalization, along with an international military response. While in some ways these events go beyond the scope of issues considered in this volume, in others they strengthen the relevance and urgency of this analysis.

The nature of the threat, its targets and impact, and the response all in- dicate the growing power of globalization as a parameter of political action. The emergence of transnational civil networks capable of state-level crimes against humanity depends upon the globalizing patterns of connection, com- munication, and even commodification (via financial networks). It is inspired

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by a transnational ideology of a radical, extremist version of Islamic funda- mentalism that is largely reactive to economic and cultural globalization, and thus targets sites and symbols of both cosmopolitanism and hegemony. The shattering impact of threats to globalizing flows such as air travel on the world economy and daily life demonstrate how deeply dependent we have become on these connections. And even the U.S.-sponsored response has gone be- yond the historical standard reaction of a great power under direct attack; it is more internationalist, multisectoral in its treatment of areas like migra- tion and finance, and much more conscious of human rights issues such as laws of war, refugees, and humanitarian assistance.

While the crisis of 2001–2002 has diminished global levels of migration and economic exchange, it has increased flows of communication and gov- ernance. And the new world order has not diminished the salience or fun- damentally altered the pattern of the human rights impact of any of the forms of globalization. Indeed, the impact on human rights of the new global threat of terrorism itself largely follows the logic suggested by this volume, with the most deleterious spillovers linked to state-regulated migration and gover- nance (intervention), mixed results of markets, and enduring avenues of ap- peal via global communications. Our second factor, the type of state, is also relevant, as liberal democracies are most vulnerable to the new threat, while failed states suffer disproportionately from the response. The final element— level of analysis—matters in a new way that will require further study, as in- ternational authorities above and through the state struggle to respond to unaccountable forces across and below state boundaries.

The first global conflict of the new millennium marks a new phase in the development of human rights, which should heighten our attention to the issues examined in this volume. The persistence of human rights as a focus of legislative and public debates on security measures in the United States and Germany, as well as the widespread efforts to foster tolerance and sup- port for Muslim minorities, show that liberal human rights standards have shifted the agenda beyond those of previous conflicts. Although such stan- dards are not always achieved, and new security policies sometimes do vio- late civil liberties, human rights norms and networks remain legitimate and incorporated in international policymaking and the politics of the dominant international powers.

Yet the background and supporters of the terrorists demonstrate the lim- itations of liberal conceptions, and the connections between chronic denials of economic, social, and political rights and a climate of dysfunctional po- litical violence. Without excusing or justifying the moral responsibility of ter- rorists, we must understand the conditions that make perpetrators more likely to arise and gain credence. The emergence of new human rights threats from the ashes of Cold War struggles, at the haunting edges of the globalizing world economy, should remind us to broaden our attention beyond the core

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conflict of each era—to consider those at the peripheries, whose pain or pathology may well become the theme of the next epoch. In this new world order, it is ever more urgent to deepen our understanding of the new global threats to human rights, even beyond the normative and cosmopolitan con- nections charted below—for our own survival.

MAP OF THE VOLUME

In this volume, we try to assess the impact of globalization on human rights and the impact of human rights on globalization. The chapters cannot pos- sibly encompass the full range of either globalization or human rights, but they do sample across the spectrum of threats and opportunities. Although most of the chapters are global in focus, those that concentrate on a place or region include the United States (Maher), Latin America (Cabezas), Asia (Pangalangan), and Africa (Bob). Similarly, the contributors bring a variety of methodologies to bear on common questions: theoretical deduction (Falk, Rosenau, Donnelly), cross-national quantitative study (Milner), policy analy- sis (Maher, Fox, Sandholtz), and case studies (Cabezas, Bob).

The first section, “Citizenship,” analyzes the effect on rights as people cross borders and states shift capabilities and goals. This essay has identified a broader “citizenship gap,” as globalized states introduce new threats and pro- vide declining opportunities to citizens, while increasing numbers of resi- dents lack citizenship claims. Illustrating the latter dynamic, Kristen Maher deconstructs the immigration policy of the largest receiving nation, the United States, in relation to labor flows from Latin America and the rights ideology of liberalism. In a complementary geography and analysis, Amalia Lucia Cabezas shows how prostitution in the Dominican Republic is consti- tuted by global economic adjustment and northern tourism. However, her contribution also emphasizes both the role of the state as an intervening ac- tor in economic development and policing and sex workers’ transnational mobilization for labor and security rights.

In “Commodification,” the book turns to the globalization of markets. Richard Falk highlights the political impact of economic globalization, and the contradictions between economic and political liberalism for social rights. Wesley Milner’s comprehensive study of economic liberalization establishes the differential impact of structural integration on different types of rights. By contrast, Raul Pangalangan documents and analyzes mobilization against the deleterious effects of multinational labor exploitation in Asia.

“Communication” examines the influence of information flows and global civil society on human rights. Shane Weyker provides an overview of the inherent potential and pitfalls of the new information technologies for human rights activists. Clifford Bob documents the power and distortions of transnational communications and network appeals, through a compar-

14 introduction

ative case study of Nigeria’s Ogoni. Both authors emphasize the social con- text of information and the organizational politics of NGOs. James Rosenau applies his pioneering analysis of global turbulence to the cosmopolitan gov- ernance of “most obstreperous actors.”

The next section, “Cooperation,” explores the emerging exercise of in- stitutional authority across borders on behalf of human rights. Jonathan Fox explores an increasing mechanism of international accountability: transna- tional mobilization against a global institution. Then, his chapter outlines the limitations of institutional reform, seeking largely social and collective rights. Wayne Sandholtz chronicles the emergence and limitations of a norm and practice of humanitarian inter vention—when global human rights standards trump state sovereignty. Finally, Jack Donnelly analyzes the evolv- ing role of state power in filtering the impact of globalization on human rights.

CONCLUSION

This introduction has begun to lay out some of the patterns of the human rights impact of globalization. Taken together, the essays in this volume help to answer the other questions that frame the inquiry. The contributors show how globalization generates both threats and opportunities for human rights, and many assess new forms of human rights accountability.

Like so many other studies of human rights, this one must conclude that the effectiveness of both new and old human rights mechanisms is “half full.” Transnational advocacy, international law, sanctions, intervention, media campaigns, lobbying states, and empowering victims does make a difference across borders as within them. Migrants’ rights may improve, markets can be better monitored, international organizations may become more ac- countable, intervention can restrain or remove abusive power holders or combatants. But these improvements are uneven, and the new range of global threats is not matched by the new global opportunities.

We argue that these differences in threat and response can be better un- derstood in terms of the type of globalization, the kind of rights affected, and the filtering role of the state. Ultimately, this differentiated approach should allow a more differentiated response to new challenges. It may also move analysis of globalization beyond reflexive condemnation or enthusi- asm, largely rooted in preexisting perspectives, toward a theoretical appre- ciation of a multivalent social process in its own terms.

The improvement of human rights requires strengthening existing mech- anisms to confront new challenges, but also addressing the second half of our mandate: increasing the influence of human rights on globalization. Among other things, this means improving awareness and analysis of the con- nections between different kinds of rights, the distinct facets and implica-

transnational threats and opportunities 15

tions of globalization, and the new forms of communication and governance necessary to meet the new challenges. The essays in this volume point the way toward that goal. The concluding analysis will attempt to sketch the im- plications of such a program for the theory and the practice of globalization.

NOTES

Versions of this chapter have been presented at the American Political Science As- sociation’s 1999 meeting and the January 2000 conference on Globalization and Hu- man Rights at University of California Irvine, funded by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation. The author wishes to thank participants in both confer- ences, and especially Jack Donnelly, for constructive comments that have influenced the concepts and analysis presented here.

1. While the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have slowed certain global- ization flows in the short run, the shape and long-term trend of globalization remain significant.

2. Scholte 1996b also reminds us that recognition of globalization does not re- quire it to have touched all actors, replaced the state, become the primary motor of international relations, unfolded in a linear fashion, or guaranteed equal access to new world orders (45).

3. Kudrle 1999, which also postulates communications, market, and “direct” (mainly global governance) forms of globalization, labels human rights a “globalism- enhanced psychological externality” (18).

4. I am grateful to Gerson Shafir for this suggestion. 5. Thanks to Sharon McConnell for this observation. 6. This is not an inevitable or structural phenomenon but a contingent devel-

opment of historical legacy with state strategies and identities. For example, while Singapore and Taiwan have pursued similar paths of political economy based on ini- tial authoritarianism, Taiwan has opted to expand social consensus and the rule of law to full democratization and position itself as a beacon of democracy (Tan 1999).

16 introduction