Week 9: Discussion: Online Aggression

Historically, in the wake of interpersonal violence, the restriction of individual freedoms has often followed. This pattern can be observed at various levels of analysis. A recent example at the level of national policy includes the passage of the contro- versial USA PATRIOT Act by the US Government in October, 2001, following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since that time, the Act has been widely criticized for weakening government protection of civil liberties. Prior research has demonstrated that surveillance by an authority figure(s) in itself tends to be experienced as con- trolling (Lepper & Greene, 1975). Towns and cities routinely institute curfews, along with various other restrictions of freedom, following violent

riots. At the person-level, parents, teachers, and various other authority figures very typically respond to violent behavior by exercising more control and taking away the rights of others to choose. Certainly, these measures of increased control and restricted freedom are effective toward achieving some desired ends, at least temporarily,

Interpersonal control, dehumanization, and violence: A self-determination theory perspective

Arlen C. Moller1,2 and Edward L. Deci3

Abstract Interpersonally controlling approaches are often used to keep individuals in line, ostensibly in order to create a safer, more civilized society. Ironically, emerging research findings indicate that when people feel controlled, they often respond by behaving in a less civilized, more antisocial manner (Gagné, 2003; Knee, Neighbors, & Vietor, 2001; Mask, Blanchard, Amiot, & Deshaies, 2005; McHoskey, 1999). The present research investigation explored whether a process of mechanistic dehumanization might help to explain the observed relation between interpersonal control and antisocial behavior, specifically with regard to tendencies toward violence. The results indicated that a significant relation between interpersonal control and tendencies toward interpersonal violence was partially mediated by perceived mechanistic dehumanization.

Keywords aggression, autonomy, dehumanization, hostility, interpersonal control, mechanistic, self-determination theory, violence

Paper received 27 December 2008; revised version accepted 31 August 2009.

1Northwestern University 2Gettysburg College 3University of Rochester

Corresponding author: Arlen C. Moller, Department of Preventive Medicine, 680 N Lake Shore Dr., Suite 1220, Chicago, IL, USA [email: [email protected]]

Article

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1) 41–53

© The Author(s) 2009 Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermission.nav

DOI: 10.1177/1368430209350318 http://gpi.sagepub.com

G P I R

Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

42 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

and have much intuitive appeal. However, emerg- ing research on self-determination theory suggests that these controlling strategies may also have unintended and ironic consequences. Studies on interpersonal control indicate that when people feel that their autonomy has been thwarted, they often respond by behaving in an even less civilized and more antisocial manner (Duriez, Vansteenkiste, Soenens, & De Witte, 2007; Gagné, 2003; Kernis, 1982; Knee et al., 2001; Mask et al., 2005; McHoskey, 1999). The present research investiga- tion explored whether the observed relation between interpersonal control and antisocial ten- dencies might be at least partially explained by a process of dehumanization. We review here the extant evidence for this model, including previous research indicating that dehumanization is also predictive of antisocial behavior (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008; Haslam, 2006; Kelman, 1976; McAlister, Bandura, & Owen, 2005). We also pres- ent new data linking the experience of being con- trolled with mechanistic dehumanization; that is, feeling less human, and viewing humans as more machine-like.

Defining autonomy versus interpersonal control Self-determination theory (SDT) posits that all human beings share a basic and universal psycho- logical need for autonomy (Deci & Ryan, 1985a, 2000, 2002, 2008). In this framework, autonomy is defined as a subjective experience, character- ized by feeling free and by endorsing one’s actions. In particular, the experience of auton- omy is characterized by feeling free of interper- sonal coercion. In accord with SDT, when people feel more autonomous, they experience greater psychological and physical well-being, they are happier and healthier. However, to the degree that satisfaction of the need for autonomy is thwarted, research findings indicate that people suffer both psychological and physically.

The psychological need for autonomy is thwarted, namely, by forces related to interpersonal

control—the attempts by other people to pres- sure, manipulate, or otherwise influence one’s will. These forces not only include overt tactics, such as the use of tangible rewards and punish- ments used to control people, but also more subtle forms of control, such as the use of con- tingent regard. People are contingently regard- ing in so far as their love and affection are given or withdrawn contingently on another person’s behavior. Controlling language can also be used to subtly pressure people, and includes words such as, should, must, and have to (i.e., telling someone, “you should really work harder”). Finally, yet another form of control identified by self-determination theory involves pressure that comes from within a person. That is, when people pressure themselves in such a way that they do not feel as though they are freely or entirely endorsing their actions. From a self- determination theory perspective, these internal forms of pressure result from a process of incompletely internalizing (or introjecting) con- trolling forces that originate outside a person, and thus can ultimately be traced back to inter- personal control.

Interpersonal control, antisocial behavior, and violence Research linking the experience of interpersonal control to antisocial behavior and violence has begun to accumulate in a variety of forms. We begin by reviewing this evidence.

An early study, conducted by Kernis (1982), investigated the influence of three motivational orientations (autonomy, control, and impersonal) on the type of anger expression and degree of subsequent aggressiveness following a self- esteem threat. The autonomy orientation is char- acterized by seeing one’s behavior as freely chosen, whereas the control orientation is charac- terized by seeing one’s actions as controlled by external contingencies, such as rewards and pun- ishments. The impersonal orientation is the extent to which a person believes that attaining desired outcomes is beyond his or her control

Moller and Deci 43

and that achievement is largely a matter of luck or fate. The results indicated that those who scored higher in autonomy orientation (felt more free) behaved less aggressively in the lab, while higher scores on both the control and impersonal orien- tation scales were related to more self-derogation (i.e., self-directed aggression). A later study by Knee and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that control motivation orientation also predicted feeling more driving anger as a result of other drivers’ actions, and was associated with more aggressive driving and more traffic citations. A follow-up study by Neighbors, Vietor, and Knee (2002) monitored 111 participants’ experiences driving throughout a 10-day period. Again, con- trol orientation was related to more anger and aggression while driving.

In a related line of research on prosocial ver- sus antisocial behaviors, Gagné (2003) found that an autonomy orientation strongly predicted pro- social activities both in general, across different contexts (Study 1), and, specifically, at work (Study 2). Also, autonomy support from parents and managers were each marginally significant predictors of prosocial behavior. Gagné ran sev- eral meditational models demonstrating that sat- isfaction of the psychological need for autonomy partially mediated the relation between autonomy orientation and prosocial behavior, and fully mediated the relation between autonomy support and prosocial behavior, in both studies. Mask and colleagues (2005) also investigated the relation between trait-level autonomy and prosocial behaviors. A measure of trait-level autonomy, or self-determination, predicted more prosocial behavior (e.g., helping others) and less moral dis- engagement, less interpersonal harm (e.g., being verbally aggressive), and less aggressive driving- related behaviors (e.g., driving drunk).

The experience of being controlled can also be operationalized by assessing the nature of one’s goals or aspirations, as extrinsic goals (e.g., financial success) are understood to be more con- trolled, while intrinsic goals (e.g., building com- munity) are understood to be more autonomous. In line with this, McHoskey (1999) found that a control ori entation and extrinsic (controlled)

goals were significantly related to having greater Machiavellianism, defined as one’s willingness to manipulate others, while autonomy orientation and intrinsic (autonomous) goals were signifi- cantly related to Machiavellianism in the inverse direction. Further, McHoskey found that auton- omy orientation was negatively related to nihil- ism, while control orientation was positively related to self-estrangement and antisocial behav- iors (such as cheating in an exam, plagiarism, stealing, vandalism, getting drunk several nights a week, promiscuity, and being arrested for driving while intoxicated). Recently, Duriez and col- leagues (2007) followed up on this work, examin- ing the relation between extrinsic (controlled) and intrinsic (autonomous) goals, right-wing authori- tarianism, social dominance, and racial prejudice. The authors found that an emphasis on extrinsic goals was positively related to prejudice across two studies, and that social dominance partially mediated the relation. The partial mediation found in these studies, however, leaves open the potential for future research to identify other important process variables, such as dehumanization.

Dehumanization, antisocial behavior, and violence Dehumanization is a psychological construct which has been very broadly defined as the denial of humanness to others, the negative conse- quences of which have been well documented empirically. These consequences include various forms of antisocial behavior, especially violence directed toward those dehumanized. Although an exhaustive review of this literature is beyond the scope of the present article (for a recent, more comprehensive review, see Haslam, 2006), we highlight here some of the most robust and com- pelling findings.

Goff and colleagues (2008) found evidence that White participants implicitly associated Blacks and apes (i.e., animalistic dehumaniza- tion), and this association in turn was related to increased endorsement of violence against Black suspects in a criminal justice context. In a

44 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

follow-up, archival study the authors found that news articles written about Blacks convicted of capital crimes were more likely to contain ape- relevant language than news articles written about White convicts. Further, in the archival data, those who were portrayed as more apelike in these articles were more likely to be executed by the state than those who were not. These findings reported by Goff and colleagues, taken together with Duriez and colleagues’ (2007) findings that having more controlled goals was related to greater racial prejudice, are consistent with the assertion that dehumanization may play a role in linking interpersonal control with racial prejudice and endorsed violence against Blacks.

Following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, McAlister et al., (2005) interviewed 1,499 participants in order to explore the tendency for people to support the use of violent military force in retaliation. Endorsement of military force increased signifi- cantly following the terrorist attacks, and the results suggest that one important mediator of endorsing military force involved dehumanizing the enemy (e.g., “terrorists do not deserve to be treated like human beings”, and “enemy rulers and their followers are no better than animals”), as dehumanization increased significantly from pre- to post-September 11th.

Yet another example of dehumanization being related to violence concerns the use of dehuman- ization in connection with genocidal conflicts (Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Haslam, 2006; Kelman, 1976). Historical accounts reveal that the perpetrators of genocidal violence have often espoused ideologies that likened the victims to vermin and various other “lower” life forms. This form of dehumanization was documented in cases that include the Jews during the Holocaust, Bosnians during the Balkan wars, and Tutsis dur- ing the genocide in Rwanda. A number of authors have argued that the process of dehumanization may make it possible for humans to inflict greater harm on others by virtue of allowing them to exclude a group or individual from moral consid- eration, also known as moral disengagement (Bandura, 2002; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara,

& Pastorelli, 1996; Bandura, Underwood, & Fromson, 1975; Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990).

Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) explored this relation across three experiments; specifically, the tendency for people to infrahumanize (an implicit form of dehumanization) an out-group in response to interpersonal violence. That is, when participants were told that their in-group (humans, British, White Americans) had perpetuated mass killing of an out-group (aliens, Australian Aborigines, and Native Americans), they responded by infrahuman- izing the out-group more, but only if they also per- ceived a collective responsibility for their in-group’s actions. The authors theorized that the process of infrahumanization, in this case, was a strategy for people to escape collective guilt and reestablish psy- chological equanimity.

Interpersonal control and dehumanization Haslam (2006) recently reviewed the broad litera- ture on dehumanization, and developed a new model, differentiating between two forms of dehumanization: animalistic and mechanistic. Animalistic dehumanization involves denying uniquely human attributes to others, representing them as animal-like, whereas mechanistic dehu- manization involves denying human nature to others, representing them as objects or automata. The present investigation focused on mechanistic dehumanization, specifically with regard to what Montague and Matson (1983) referred to as “technological dehumanization” or “the reduc- tion of humans to machines” (p. 8). Montague and Matson posited that this form of dehuman- ization is a cultural consequence of postmodern society’s pursuit of industrialization, robotic effi- ciency, and regularity, and a number of theorists have since expressed concern over the potential consequences of technological dehumanization, per se (Beckers & Schmidt, 2001; Nissenbaum & Walker, 1998). In designing the present investiga- tion, we hypothesized that the experience of being controlled may lead people to feel less human themselves, and as a consequence see both themselves and other human beings as

Moller and Deci 45

objects or machines, as opposed to autonomous, living organisms. To the extent that animals are understood to be autonomous, we specifically hypothesized that interpersonal control may lead to mechanistic, as opposed to animalistic, dehumanization.

Although, to the best of our knowledge, this hypothesis had not been previously tested, sev- eral lines of research and theory offer converging indirect support. deCharms (1968), for example, wrote of experiencing oneself as an origin or pawn in the context of personal causation, and posited that when one feels controlled, coerced, or manipulated by another person, they come to feel more pawn-like, and effectively less human. The concept of autonomy as understood in self- determination theory is derived to a large mea- sure from deCharms’ work on personal causation, and the pawn metaphor has been used to charac- terize feeling controlled since (Ryan & Grolnick, 1986). Kelman (1976) posited that dehumaniza- tion involves denying a person “identity”—the perception of the person “as an individual, inde- pendent and distinguishable from others, capable of making choices” (p. 301, italics added), thus recognizing a possible conceptual connection between autonomy and dehumanization.

Empirical research has already linked the experience of self-determination to the human capacity for empathy, which is one aspect used to define humanness. Mask and colleagues (2005) found that greater self-determination was related to more empathy. Further, in this study, empathy mediated the relation between self-determination and helpfulness, interpersonal harm, and aggres- sive driving-related behaviors. A second form of indirect support linking interpersonal control to dehumanization concerns the experience of vital- ity, or life force. Subjective vitality is defined as the state of feeling alive and alert, and is consid- ered an aspect of eudaimonic well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2001). The experience of being con- trolled has been negatively related to vitality at both the state level and trait level in numerous studies (Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006; Nix, Ryan, Manly, & Deci, 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2008; Ryan & Frederick, 1997).

In the present investigation, we principally sought to directly test the hypothesis that interpersonal control is positively related to dehumanization, specifically mechanistic dehu- manization. We also sought to replicate and extend previous research findings linking inter- personal control and dehumanization to a ten- dency toward violence, and extend that research by including a range and variety of previously underexplored indicators to operationalize this tendency.

Method Participants Some 235 (194 female) adults completed the web questionnaire. Data was collected on-line during a five-month period using a web survey method (February 2005 through June 2005). Participants were recruited from several sites which host links to social psychology web research, including: http://www.socialpsychology.org, http://www. yahoo.com, http://genpsylab-wexlist.unizh.ch, http://psych.hanover.edu/research/exponnet. html. All participation was voluntary and no form of extrinsic compensation was provided. The mean age for participants was 25.08 years (range: 18–62). The ethnic make-up was as follows: 76.2% White, 4.3% Asian or Pacific Islander, 3% Black, 10.6% Hispanic, 5.1% Other. The highest level of education attained by participants in the sample ranged from some high school education to the highest levels of graduate education: 1.7% some high school, 7.2% high school diploma, 44.3% some college, 11.5% associates degree, 14.0% bachelors degree, 6.4% some graduate school, 7.2% master’s degree, 7.7% held a PhD, MD, or JD.

Procedure Each measure was presented on a separate web- page in the order described below. The order with regard to scale presentation was not counterbal- anced. Instructions specific to each scale were presented at the top of each page.

46 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

Measures

General Causality Orientation Scale (GCOS) This is an individual difference measure of peo- ple’s relatively enduring motivational orientations and was developed for use with individuals who are at least 17 years of age. Subjects answered three questions for each of 17 vignettes regarding how likely they were to interpret events in certain ways (Deci & Ryan, 1985b). The three questions corre- sponded to autonomy, control, and impersonal causality orientations. A 5-point scale was used for each question (1 = very unlikely, 5 = very likely). The autonomy orientation assesses the extent to which a person is oriented toward aspects of the environment that stimulate autonomous motiva- tion, are optimally challenging, and provide infor- mational feedback. The control orientation assesses the extent to which a person is oriented toward being controlled by rewards, deadlines, structures, ego-involvements, and the directives of others. The impersonal orientation assesses the extent to which a person believes that attaining desired outcomes is beyond his or her control and that achievement is largely a matter of luck or fate. An example of a vignette from the GCOS is: “You are a plant supervisor and have been charged with the task of allotting coffee breaks to three workers who cannot all break at once.” Participants were asked to rate how likely they would be to respond in each of the following ways: (a) “Telling the three workers the situation and having them work with you on the schedule”; (b) “Find out from someone in authority what to do or do what was done in the past”; or (c) “Simply assigning times that each can break to avoid any problems.” Likelihood ratings to each hypothetical response correspond to dif- ferent motivational orientations (in this case, auto- nomy orientation, control orientation, and impersonal orientation, respectively). The internal reliability of each subscale was acceptably high: Cronbach’s alpha levels of .86 (autonomy orienta- tion), .77 (control orientation), and .84 (impersonal orientation).

Self-Determination Scale (SDS) The SDS was designed to assess individual differences in the

extent to which people tend to function in a self- determined way (Sheldon, 1995; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). It is thus considered a relatively endur- ing aspect of people’s personalities which reflects: (1) being more aware of their feelings and their sense of self; and (2) feeling a sense of choice with respect to their behavior. The SDS is a 10-item scale, with two 5-item subscales. The first subscale is awareness of oneself, and the second is perceived choice in one’s actions. Each items consists of two statements, and participants are asked to rate the degree to which one statement is more true of them on a 7-point scale (1 = only statement A is true of me; 7 = only statement B is true of me). For exam- ple, “A. I always feel like I choose the things I do; B. I sometimes feel that it’s not really me choosing the things I do” (Perceived Choice); and “A. My emo- tions sometimes seem alien to me; B. My emotions always seem to belong to me” (Awareness). The internal reliability of each subscale was acceptably high; Cronbach’s alpha levels were .73 (Awareness) and .77 (Perceived Choice).

Autonomy psychological need satisfaction The autonomy subscale from the Basic Psychological Need Satisfaction (BPNS) scale was used to assess the degree to which participants experienced satisfaction of the basic psychological need for autonomy in their lives (Baard, Deci, & Ryan, 2004; La Guardia, Ryan, Couchman, & Deci, 2000). The self-report measure consists of seven items (e.g., “I feel free to be who I am”) rated on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all; 7 = very much). The internal reliability was acceptably high; Cronbach’s alpha was .73.

Composite interpersonal control A compos- ite measure of interpersonal control was created by standardizing the five subscales related to this core concept (GCOS–Autonomy Orien- tation; GCOS–Control Orientation; SDS– Awareness; SDS–Perceived Choice; BPNS– Autonomy), reverse scoring when appropriate, and summing the resulting scores. This compos- ite measure broadly represents the extent to which one feels they have been controlled by other people in their life.

Moller and Deci 47

Mechanistic dehumanization Aron and col- leagues (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Aron, Melinat, Aron, Vallone, & Bator, 1997) developed the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) measure to assess closeness between two individuals by asking about the degree to which individuals feel that another person, initially a romantic partner, is a part of their conceptualization of self. The mea- sure has since been widely adapted to measure individuals’ experiences of closeness with peers, parents, family members, organizations, and groups (e.g., Deci, La Guardia, Moller, Scheiner, & Ryan, 2006). The IOS consists of seven pairs of circles labeled Self and Other, that overlap to various degrees, creating a 7-point, interval scale. Participants select the pair that best describes their relationship. For our purpose of measuring dehu- manization, participants selected circles represent- ing the degree of overlap between “human beings” and “machines” (collective mechanistic dehuman- ization; 1 item) and between “me” and “machines” (individual mechanistic dehumanization; 1 item). The correlation between responses on these two items was r = .41, p < .001, a moderate size correla- tion indicating that although collective and indi- vidual forms of mechanistic dehumanization share significant overlap, they are nonetheless conceptu- ally distinguishable as well. Given that no hypoth- eses were postulated with regard to distinguishing these two forms of mechanistic dehumanization, the two items were also z-scored and combined to create a composite indicator of overall mechanistic dehumanization.

Aggression Trait-level aggression was assessed using Buss and Perry’s (1992) 29-item Aggression Measure. The measure includes subscales assess- ing: Physical Aggression (9 items), Verbal Aggression (5 items), Anger (7 items), and Hostility (8 items) subscales. Statements (e.g., “Once in a while I can’t control the urge to strike another per- son”) are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely uncharacteristic of me; 7 = extremely characteris- tic of me). The internal reliability of each subscale was acceptably high; Cronbach’s alpha levels were .82 (Physical Aggression), .72 (Verbal Aggression), .85 (Anger), and .85 (Hostility).

Acceptance of violence Trait-level acceptance of violence was assessed using the 14-item Maudsley Violence Questionnaire (MVQ; Walker, 2005). Statements (e.g., “I am totally against vio- lence”) are rated as either true or false. The internal reliability of this scale was acceptably high; Cronbach’s alpha was .79.

Composite violence A composite measure of aggression was created by standardizing the five subscales related to this core concept (AM– Physical Aggression; AM–Verbal Aggression; AM–Anger; AM–Hostility; and Acceptance of Violence), reverse scoring when appropriate, and summing the resulting scores. This composite measure broadly represents one’s tendency toward the expression of interpersonal violence.

Results A linear regression approach was used to analyze these data. The models run were organized by testing for evidence of the following relations: (1) interpersonal control predicting tendencies toward interpersonal violence; (2) interpersonal control predicting dehumanization; (3) dehu- manization predicting tendencies toward interper- sonal violence; (4) mediation; and (5) moderation.

Interpersonal control ↔ interpersonal violence Interpersonal control was operationalized in five different ways (GCOS–Autonomy Orientation; GCOS–Control Orientation; SDS–Awareness; SDS–Perceived Choice; BPNS–autonomy), as well as with a composite measure of all five. Tendencies toward interpersonal violence were also operationalized in five different ways (AM– Physical Aggression; AM–Verbal Aggression; AM–Anger; AM–Hostility; and Acceptance of Violence), as well as a composite measure. The correlations between the measures of inter- personal control and tendencies toward inter- personal violence are summarized in Table 1. Consistently, trait-level measures of experienced control were positively correlated with tendencies toward interpersonal violence, while measures of

48 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

experienced autonomy were negatively correlated with tendencies toward interpersonal violence. This pattern of correlations remained significant when controlling for gender.

Interpersonal control ↔ mechanistic dehumanization The correlations between measures of interper- sonal control and dehumanization are summa- rized in Table 2. Consistently, trait-level measures of experienced control were positively corre- lated with the experience of dehumanization, while measures of experienced autonomy were negative correlated with the experience of dehu- manization. This pattern of correlations remained significant when controlling for gender.

Mechanistic dehumanization ↔ interpersonal violence The correlations between measures of mechanis- tic dehumanization and tendencies toward inter- personal violence are summarized in Table 3. A consistent pattern of significant positive correla- tions was found between dehumanization and indicators of a tendency toward interpersonal vio- lence (physical aggression, anger, and hostility),

with the notable exception of verbal aggression. This pattern of correlations remained significant when controlling for gender.

Mediation: Interpersonal control → mechanistic dehumanization → interpersonal violence Next, we tested whether mechanistic dehumaniza- tion would mediate the relation between interper- sonal control and tendencies toward interpersonal violence. Baron and Kenny (1986) presented four steps for establishing mediation. Step 1 involves showing that the independent variable (i.e., inter- personal control) is related to the outcome (i.e., a tendency toward interpersonal violence). This requirement was met; composite interpersonal control was significantly related to composite interpersonal violence, β = .49, p < .001. Step 2 involves showing that the independent variable is related to the mediator (i.e., mechanistic dehu- manization). This requirement was met, compos- ite interpersonal control was significantly related to composite mechanistic dehumanization, β = .25, p < .001. Step 3 requires that the mediator affect the outcome variable, controlling for the independent variable. This requirement was met; composite mechanistic dehumanization was

Table 1. Interpersonal control ↔ tendencies toward interpersonal violence

Physical aggress.

Verbal aggress.

Anger

Hostility

Accept violence

Composite aggress.

GCOS Autonomous orientation -.23** -.01 -.17* -.26** -.26 -.25** Controlled orientation .34** .33** .21** .34** .30** .41** Impersonal orientation .18** .05 .23** .48** .10 .28**

SDS

Perceived choice -.19** -.13 -.28** -.44** -.08 -.36** Awareness -.28** -.14* -.27** -.54** -.10 -.31**

BPNS

Autonomy satisfaction -.25** -.14* .29** -.55** -.15* -.37** Composite control .41** .24** .33** .53** .30** .49**

Note: Aggress. = Aggression; * p < .05; ** p < .01.

Moller and Deci 49

significantly related to composite interpersonal violence, controlling for composite interper- sonal control, β = .17, p < .05. The fourth and final step for establishing mediation looks at the relation between the initial predictor variable and the outcome, controlling for the mediator. If this effect drops to zero, there is full media- tion, if it drops significantly (Sobel, 1982), there is partial mediation. The requirements for par- tial mediation were met. When composite mech- anistic dehumanization was controlled for, the relation between composite interpersonal control and composite interpersonal violence dropped (from β = .49 to β = .45); a Sobel test confirmed that this drop was significant, Sobel’s z = 2.43, p = .01. Each of the models required for establishing mediation remained significant when controlling for gender.

Moderation

Several regression models were run exploring the potential for direct relations discussed above to be moderated. In each case, the interaction and main effects were treated as continuous variables. First, composite interpersonal control, composite dehumanization, and the two-way interaction of these variables were regressed onto composite interpersonal violence as an outcome; the interac- tion was nonsignificant, β = -.01, t(229) = -0.16, p = .87. Next, regression models were run testing whether age or sex moderated the relations between either composite interpersonal control and composite interpersonal violence, or com- posite dehumanization and composite interper- sonal violence; none of these interactions approached significance, all ts < 1.21.

Table 2. Interpersonal control ↔ mechanistic dehumanization

Human–machine Me–machine Composite dehumanization

GCOS Autonomous orientation -.09 -.05 -.08 Controlled orientation .10 .29** .23** Impersonal orientation .17** .20** .22**

SDS

Perceived choice -.29** -.22** -.31** Awareness -.25** -.15* -.23**

BPNS

Autonomy satisfaction -.38** -.24** -.37** Composite control .18** .25** .25**

Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01.

Table 3. Mechanistic dehumanization ↔ tendencies toward interpersonal violence

Physical aggress.

Verbal aggress.

Anger

Hostility

Accept violence

Composite Aggress.

Human–machine .21** .03 .17* .29** .06 .20** Me–machine .22** .12 .13* .27** .16* .24** Composite dehumanization .25** .09 .18* .33** .13* .26**

Note: Aggress. = Aggression; * p < .05; ** p < .01.

50 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

General discussion

The results of the present investigation replicated and extended the evidence for two important conceptual patterns: (1) the relation between the experience of interpersonal control and a ten- dency toward interpersonal violence; and (2) the relation between experiencing interpersonal con- trol and the experience of dehumanization. Further, it introduced evidence for an important new conceptual connection relating the experi- ence of interpersonal control to the experience of dehumanization. The data suggest that trait- level experiences of interpersonal control were positively related to both interpersonal violence, and to the experience of mechanistic dehuman- ization, whereas feeling more autonomous was negatively related to these variables. Especially important were the findings linking the experi- ence of interpersonal control to greater mecha- nistic dehumanization (and greater autonomy to feeling more human, and less machine), the first data of their kind. Further, the relation between interpersonal control and interpersonal violence was shown to be partially explained (or mediated) by mechanistic dehumanization, although the amount of variance accounted for was very small.

Limitations and future directions The correlational nature of the data from this study represents an important limitation, specifi- cally with regard to establishing causality. Future studies will need to investigate the relations explored here using experimental designs; specifi- cally, manipulating the experience of control (or the provision of choice) in order to test whether being more controlled indeed causes people to feel less human, and in turn behave more violently. Another limitation of the present investigation was a reliance on self-report measures of the cen- tral concepts. Violent behavioral tendencies can also be assessed more directly in the lab; for example, by using the allocation of hot sauce (Lieberman, Solomon, Greenberg, & McGregor, 1999) or volume of noise-blast administered (Taylor, 1967). Additionally, given that mechanistic

dehumanization was found to partially (as opposed to fully) mediate the relation between interpersonal control and tendencies toward interpersonal vio- lence, and that only a small degree of variance was accounted for, this implies that the relation between interpersonal control and interpersonal violence is complex and that multiple psycholo- gical constructs, in addition to mechanistic dehu- manization, may be required to offer a more complete account.

The process through which interpersonal con- trol may lead to dehumanization and interper- sonal violence could be a developmental process, not easily observed in a lab setting. For this rea- son, future studies should employ a longitudinal design to help establish the direction of the rela- tions explored here. For example, by investigating how controlling parenting styles, such as contin- gent regard toward children, may lead to dehu- manization and violence among adults. Such studies could also include indicators of overt vio- lence, such as convictions for violent crimes among at-risk populations.

Yet another future direction for this line of research concerns relating the feeling of being more controlled by others to different forms of violence. Specifically, self-determination theory differentiates between controlled motivation that is entirely a function of external contingencies (e.g., tangible rewards or punishments), also referred to as external regulation, and controlled motivation that is derived from internal contin- gencies (e.g., pride or shame), also referred to as introjected regulation (Ryan & Connell, 1989). As people can feel pressured or controlled by forces internal or external to the self, the target of one’s aggression may also vary. That is, aggression and violence may be focused inwardly against the self (e.g., suicide, and various forms of self-mutila- tion), and violence can, of course, be focused outwardly against others (e.g., murder, and vari- ous forms of assault). As such, we offer a specu- lative hypothesis that introjected forms of controlled motivation may be more strongly related to inwardly focused violence, whereas external forms of controlled motivation may be more strongly related to outwardly focused

Moller and Deci 51

violence. Future research is needed to test this hypothesis, as well as the possibility that distinct forms of dehumanization (e.g., me-machine vs. humans-machines) may play an important medi- tational role in understanding this predicted relation.

Finally, although this research study focused on mechanistic forms of dehumanization, future research is needed to investigate whether inter- personal control may also be related to more animalistic forms of dehumanization. Haslam (2006) posits that these two categories of dehu- manization (animalistic and mechanistic) can be considered conceptually distinct; however, this does not rule out the possibility that they might share common antecedents. Interpersonal con- trol may also be related to animalistic dehuman- ization. In particular, the concept of animalistic dehumanization may be more closely related to the experience of controlling others, as opposed to being controlled oneself, as animalistic dehu- manization is understood to include an implicit vertical comparison and the belittling or degrada- tion of the other(s). This follow-up hypothesis is yet another to be explored in the future.

Conclusion In sum, the present investigation offers a very early indication of the potential role that dehu- manization may play in terms of understanding the complex relation between the psychological experience of interpersonal control and the ten- dency toward violence. The preliminary evidence, however, indicates that authority figures at vari- ous levels (e.g., policy makers, managers, teachers, and parents) would do well to temper their ten- dency to respond to violence with measures that thwart people’s psychological need for autonomy, as the ultimate consequence of these strategies may ironically be to induce even greater violence, as a function of dehumanization. We anticipate that further unraveling the complex dynamics between interpersonal control, dehumanization, and violence, at various levels of analysis, and in a wide range of contexts, will be an important and generative area for future research.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Gabriela Llenín for her help creating the web survey used for this research. Additionally, we thank Guy Roth for his insightful feedback and creative suggestions for follow-up research. Finally, a special debt of gratitude is owed to Rachel Naylor for her humanizing influence during the composition of this manuscript.

References Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion

of other in the self scale and the structure of inter- personal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 596–612.

Aron, A., Melinat, E., Aron, E. N., Vallone, R., & Bator, R. (1997). The experimental generation of interpersonal closeness: A procedure and some preliminary findings. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 363–377.

Baard, P. P., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2004). Intrinsic need satisfaction: A motivational basis of perform- ance and well-being in two work settings. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 34, 2045–2068.

Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Moral Education, 31, 101–119.

Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G. V., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral disen- gagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 364–374.

Bandura, A., Underwood, B., & Fromson, M. E. (1975). Disinhibition of aggression through dif- fusion of responsibility and dehumanization of victims. Journal of Research in Personality, 9, 253–269.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator– mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical con- siderations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182.

Beckers, J. J., & Schmidt, H. G. (2001). The structure of computer anxiety: A six-factor model. Computers in Human Behavior, 17, 35–49.

Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. (1992). The Aggression Questionnaire. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 452–459.

52 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 13(1)

Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infra-humanization as a response to col- lective responsibility for intergroup killing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 804–818.

Chalk, F., & Jonassohn, K. (1990). The history and sociol- ogy of genocide: Analyses and case studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

deCharms, R. (1968). Personal causation. New York: Academic Press.

Deci, E. L., La Guardia, J. G., Moller, A. C., Scheiner, M. J., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). On the benefits of giving as well as receiving autonomy support: Mutuality in close friendship. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 313–326.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985a). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York: Plenum Publishing Co.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985b). The general causal- ity orientations scale: Self-determination in person- ality. Journal of Research in Personality, 19, 109–134.

Deci, E. L. & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self- determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227–268.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (Eds.). (2002). Handbook of self-determination research. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2008). Facilitating optimal motivation and psychological well-being across life’s domains. Canadian Psychology, 49, 14–23.

Duriez, B., Vansteenkiste, M., Soenens, & De Witte, H. (2007). The social costs of extrinsic relative to intrinsic goal pursuits: Their relation with social dominance and racial and ethnic prejudice. Journal of Personality, 75, 757–782.

Gagné, M. (2003). The role of autonomy support and autonomy orientation in prosocial behavioral engagement. Motivation and Emotion, 27, 199–223.

Goff, P. A., Eberhardt, J. L., Williams, M. J., & Jackson, M. C. (2008). Not yet human: Implicit knowledge, historical dehumanization, and contemporary con- sequences. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 292–306.

Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10, 252–264.

Kelman, H. C. (1976). Violence without restraint: Reflections on the dehumanization of victims and

victimizers. In G. M. Kren & L. H. Rappoport (Eds.), Varieties of psychohistory (pp. 282–314). New York: Springer.

Kernis, M. H. (1982). Motivational orientations, anger, and aggression in males. Doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester.

Knee, C. R., Neighbors, C., & Vietor, N. (2001). Self-determination theory as a framework for understanding road rage. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31, 889–904.

La Guardia, J. G., Ryan, R. M., Couchman, C. E., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Within-person variation in secu- rity of attachment: A self-determination theory perspective on attachment, need fulfillment, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 367–384.

Lepper, M., & Greene, D. (1975). Turning play into work: Effects of adult surveillance and extrinisic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 479–486.

Lieberman, J. D., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & McGregor, H. A. (1999). A hot new way to meas- ure aggression: Hot sauce allocation. Aggressive Behavior, 25, 331–348.

Mask, L., Blanchard, C. M., Amiot, C. E., & Deshaies, J. (2005). Can self-determination benefit more than the self ? A pathway to prosocial behaviours. Poster presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology’s Annual Meeting, New Orleans, Louisiana, January.

McAlister, A. L., Bandura, A., & Owen, S. V. (2005). Mechanisms of moral disengagement in support of military force: The impact of Sept. 11. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 25, 141–165,

McHoskey, J. W. (1999). Machiavellianism, intrinsic versus extrinsic goals, and social interest: A self- determination theory analysis. Motivation and Emotion, 23, 267–283.

Moller, A. C., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Choice and ego-depletion: The moderating role of autonomy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1024–1036.

Montague, A., & Matson, F. (1983). The dehumanization of man. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Neighbors, C., Vietor, N. A., & Knee, C. R. (2002). A motivational model of driving anger and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 324–335.

Moller and Deci 53

Nissenbaum, H., & Walker, D. (1998). Will computers dehumanize education? A grounded approach to values at risk. Technology in Society, 20, 237–273.

Nix, G. A., Ryan, R. M., Manly, J. B., & Deci, E. L. (1999). Revitalization through self-regulation: The effects of autonomous and controlled motivation on happiness and vitality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 266–284.

Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social Issues, 46, 1–20.

Ryan, R. M., & Connell, J. P. (1989). Perceived locus of causality and internalization: Examining reasons for acting in two domains. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 749–761.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). To be happy or to be self-fulfilled: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. In S. Fiske (Ed.), Annual review of psychology (Vol. 52, pp. 141–166). Palo Alto, CA: Annual Reviews, Inc.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2008). From ego-depletion to vitality: Theory and findings concerning the facilitation of energy available to the self. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 2, 702–717.

Ryan, R. M., & Frederick, C. M. (1997). On energy, per- sonality and health: Subjective vitality as a dynamic reflection of well-being. Journal of Personality, 65, 529–565.

Ryan, R. M., & Grolnick, W. S. (1986). Origins and pawns in the classroom: Self-report and projective assess- ments of individual differences in children’s per- ceptions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 550–558.

Sheldon, K. M. (1995). Creativity and self-determination in personality. Creativity Research Journal, 8, 61–72.

Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., & Reis, H. R. (1996). What makes for a good day? Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 1270–1279.

Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equation mod- els. In S. Leinhardt (Ed.), Sociological methodology 1982 (pp. 290–312). Washington, DC: American Sociological Association.

Taylor, S. P. (1967). Aggressive behavior and physiologi- cal arousal as a function of provocation and the ten- dency to inhibit aggression. Journal of Personality, 35, 297–310.

Walker, J. S. (2005). The Maudsley Violence Questionnaire: Initial validation and reliability. Personality and Individual Differences, 38, 187–207.

Biographical notes arlen c. moller is a research assistant professor in the Department of Preventive Medicine at North- western University. He received his BA in Psy- chology from Cornell University, and his Ph.D. in Social and Personality Psychology from the University of Rochester. His research focuses on issues related to human motivation and well-being.

edward l. deci is a professor of psychology and the Gowen Professor in the Social Sciences in the Department of Clinical and Social Psy- chology at the University of Rochester. He received his Ph.D. in Psychology from Carnegie Mellon University. His research examines a vari- ety of issues in human motivation, isolating basic processes and testing their application to education, health care, parenting, mental health, and work organizations in the US and across cultures. Using both laboratory and field methods, his work focuses primarily on the nature and development of self-determination. For more detail, please see: http://www.psych. rochester.edu/SDT/