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2010 20: 417International Criminal Justice Review Adam Lankford

Do Past U.S. Acts Constitute Terrorism? Implications for Counterterrorism Policy

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Do Past U.S. Acts Constitute Terrorism? Implications for Counterterrorism Policy

Adam Lankford 1

Abstract Internationally, there are more than 100 different definitions of terrorism, and even within the U.S. government, there are multiple standards. This lack of consistency has helped fuel a heated debate between the West and Islamic extremists about who is truly terrorizing whom. This article evaluates charges that several past U.S. acts constitute terrorism and makes specific recommendations for how the current administration should address this problematic issue in order to increase U.S. legitimacy worldwide and help it win the war of ideas. It appears that the best approach may be for leaders to admit that the United States has engaged in terrorist-like behavior in the past, but condemn such actions as unfortunate and vow that they will not be repeated. This strategy would be similar to the President’s public statements regarding past acts of U.S. torture, and would still allow for significant differences between the United States and terrorist organizations in their respect for international humanitarian law.

Keywords middle/near East Asia, terrorism/homeland security, violent behavior

Introduction

The global conflict between Western powers and Islamic extremists has been much more than

simply a military clash—it has also been a war of ideas (Lankford, 2009b; Powell, 2003). Both sides

care greatly about winning the hearts and minds of the masses, and both spend a tremendous amount

of time, money, and effort publicly justifying their actions (Rosenau, 2005).

However, in recent years, it has appeared that the United States is losing this battle (Biedermann,

2004; Lankford, 2009b). Following the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, international support

for Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden has grown quite high, and anti-Americanism has also increased.

According to a series of 2007 Pew Research Center surveys, more than 30% of Muslims in eight different countries have expressed confidence in bin Laden ‘‘to do the right thing regarding world

affairs’’ (Pew Research Center, 2007). These numbers are as high as 57% in Palestine, 52% in Nigeria, 41% in Indonesia, and 38% in Pakistan (Pew Research Center, 2007). In addition, when

1 Department of Criminal Justice, The University of Alabama, AL, USA

Corresponding Author:

Adam Lankford, Department of Criminal Justice, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA

Email: [email protected]

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asked in 2009 whether they ‘‘favor the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism’’ or ‘‘oppose the U.S.-led

efforts to fight terrorism,’’ anti-American sentiments were even higher: 86% of respondents in Palestine opposed the U.S. efforts, along with 79% in Jordan, 73% in Egypt, 58% in Lebanon, 56% in Pakistan, and 55% in Turkey (Pew Research Center, 2009b). To some extent, the underlying question here may be ‘‘who do you trust?’’ Deservedly or not, it appears the United States has not

made significant progress in this area.

In part, this war of ideas has been marked by the controversy over the word ‘‘terrorism’’ itself.

Past research indicates that the meaning of ‘‘terrorism’’ has become increasingly politicized and now

seems to represent much more than merely the description of an activity (Broomhall, 2004; Claridge,

1996; Friedrichs, 2006; Lazar, 2002; Saul, 2005; Wilkinson, 1981). As Claridge (1996, p. 49)

explains, ‘‘To call one’s opponent a terrorist is regarded as the ultimate condemnation.’’ In turn,

Lazar (2002, p. 14) further describes how ‘‘terrorism is now universally viewed as a term of oppro-

brium, a label that everyone wishes to pin on their enemies and that no one wishes to be pinned on

themselves.’’ At times, it almost seems like a synonym for evil: like the ultimate slur, it can be used

to portray one’s enemy as undeniably wrong and one’s own side as undeniably right. In recent years,

this type of labeling bias has been identified by critics as a central feature of the U.S.’s counterter-

rorism rhetoric. In the eyes of many, America’s use of the terms ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘terrorist’’ has

become untrustworthy, self-serving, overly politicized, and even downright hypocritical (Broom-

hall, 2004; Friedrichs, 2006; Lazar, 2002; Saul, 2005).

However, despite these criticisms, the election of President Barack Obama rekindled hopes that

the United States could once again make headway in winning hearts and minds around the world.

Almost immediately after being elected, the President began to redefine the U.S. approach to what

had been previously labeled the ‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ discarding that controversial phrase,

which had been translated by some as actually meaning the ‘‘War against Whomever is Pissing Off

the United States at the Moment’’ (Lazar, 2002, p. 20). He also commenced a series of new diplo-

matic initiatives (BBC News, 2009; Cooper & Stolberg, 2009). Furthermore, in a gesture that largely

symbolized international hopes for future global change, Obama was awarded the 2009 Nobel Peace

Prize (CNN, 2009).

Given the potential for significant new progress in the war of ideas, it is particularly important

that we reexamine charges of American terrorism. Although Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries have built

their anti-American campaign around many lies and distortions, perhaps the most dangerous weapon

in their arsenal is the charge that the United States itself carries out terrorism. Indeed, the most con-

vincing lies are often based on small truths, and these charges have the potential to be particularly

effective because they are not an obvious fabrication. Unlike Al Qaeda’s charges that the CIA delib-

erately infects foreign babies with the HIV virus or that the U.S. military hides land mines in huma-

nitarian food drops (Elshtain, 2003), accusations of American terrorism are not simply transparent

caricatures. Around the world, there are many people who are already familiar with past U.S. acts

that have caused death and terror. That these acts might also constitute terrorism is a relatively easy

cognitive leap. These charges are not only believable and thus capable of fueling anti-Americanism,

but they are also potentially effective as direct justifications for future terrorism. After all, Al Qaeda

spokesmen can argue, if a superpower like the United States can use these methods, then ‘‘we can do

it too.’’ And around the world, many people agree with them (Pew Research Center, 2009a).

Ultimately, the moderates who support or sympathize with Al Qaeda will not be won over by

force, so they must be engaged in other ways. If their complaints about past U.S. terrorist acts are

indeed valid, it may be worth it to admit the mistakes, apologize, and try to move on. Naturally, this

response would not be an immediate solution to anti-Americanism around the world, but it might be

a step in the right direction. However, if these charges are indeed flawed, the United States must be

able to explain to the world exactly what its definition of terrorism is and precisely how its own

behavior has differed.

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This article will (a) review past definitions of terrorism and outline criteria for the current study,

(b) evaluate charges that several past U.S. acts constitute terrorism, and (c) make specific recom-

mendations for how the administration should address this problematic issue, in order to increase

U.S. legitimacy worldwide and help it win the war of ideas.

Definitions of Terrorism

Historically, there has been a constant search for clarity through a universal, internationally

shared definition of terrorism (Saul, 2005). However, scholars have identified more than 100 differ-

ent definitions of terrorism—many of which contradict each other (Hoffman, 2006). The United

Nations itself has struggled to reach a consensus about a single definition of terrorism. An ad hoc

committee established by the General Assembly has been working on a comprehensive convention

on international terrorism since 1996, but as of its 12th session in March 2008, a full agreement on

‘‘a clear legal definition of terrorism’’ had yet to be reached (United Nations, 2008, p. 6). However,

there is a general agreement within the United Nations that terrorist offenses are acts which lead to

death, serious bodily harm, or serious property damage when their purpose is ‘‘to intimidate a pop-

ulation, or compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any

act’’ (Dandurand, 2009). In addition, regional organizations such as the African Union have reached

some degree of internal consensus and the European Union has made important contributions in this

area. In particular, the European Union’s (2002) Council Framework Decision on Combating Ter-

rorism has helped to clarify terrorism as a legal concept and has served as a template for discussions

elsewhere, including within the United Nations. However, international debates about the definition

of terrorism still persist.

Even within the United States government, there are multiple definitions of terrorism. The U.S.

Code, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) each

use different official definitions of terrorism (see Table 1). In large part, these different definitions

may have arisen because of different priorities within the government—legal priorities, military

priorities, and operational priorities, depending on the context and organization involved. However,

the resulting lack of a single standard reduces consistency and may contribute to negative percep-

tions about the transparency and legitimacy of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

However, despite their differences, the U.S. definitions have many variables in common. Based

on some of these definitional areas of overlap, this article will use the following criteria to assess

whether an act constitutes terrorism: it must involve illegal acts, be violent, be premeditated, be

Table 1. U.S. Definitions of Terrorism

Source Definition

U.S. Code, Title 22, Chapter 38, Paragraph 2656f (d)(2)

‘‘premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents’’ (U.S. Code Collection, 2008)

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) ‘‘The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological’’ (U.S. Department of Defense, 2009)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ‘‘The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives’’ (FBI, 2009)

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politically motivated, be intended to intimidate or coerce, and deliberately target civilians. Illegality,

violence, premeditation, and political motivation may appear to be rather straightforward and self-

explanatory concepts, but in practice, they can be harder to determine, as the forthcoming analysis of

past U.S. acts will demonstrate. However, it is the final two variables—the intention to intimidate or

coerce and the deliberate targeting of civilians—which demand further exposition at this point.

As both of the FBI (2009) and DOD (2009) definitions stipulate, terrorism is intended to intimi-

date or coerce people or governments into some specific behavior desired by the attacker. Terrorism

is not simply designed to destroy buildings or kill masses of people (Laqueur, 1999). By striking

psychological blows, terrorists usually intend to have an exponentially larger symbolic effect than

the direct fallout from the attacks themselves. However, although coercing governments may be

their ultimate aim, terrorists usually attempt to do this by intimidating civilians, who are then

expected to influence their governments’ policies (Pape, 2005). As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu (1995) has warned, it is much easier for terrorists to intimidate the masses and influence

the government through them than it is to get a state leader to change a policy or back down on his or

her own. Through their successful attacks and the resulting heightened fear, terrorists often attempt

to convince the public that their governments are acting in a way that puts citizens at risk, or that

citizens’ only chance of once again being safe is for them to get rid of their leaders or force their

current government to meet the terrorists’ demands (Netanyahu, 1995).

Another critical aspect of how terrorism will be defined for this article’s purposes is by the specific

nature of its victims. One thing which distinguishes terrorism from many other forms of political vio-

lence is that terrorism can be said to deliberately and strategically target civilians. When the U.S. Code

Collection (2008) mentions that terrorist violence targets ‘‘noncombatants,’’ it brings attention to this

key variable, although the definition of the word ‘‘noncombatant’’ itself can be debated. However, the

key is that according to this criterion, attacks which solely target soldiers, who have been profession-

ally prepared to defend themselves and are somewhat aware of the risks they face, would not constitute

terrorism. Again, by this definition, terrorism is primarily aimed at unarmed civilians, who not only

become the psychological targets of terrorists’ intentions to intimidate or coerce, but also the literal

targets of terrorists’ bullets and bombs. The amount of deliberation or strategic targeting required

by terrorists to fulfill this criterion can also be disputed, but that issue will be discussed at a later point.

Beyond outlining the definitional criteria used in the current article, it is also important to

acknowledge that the notion of state terrorism is itself a matter of some dispute. Some critics—and

governments—suggest that by definition, ‘‘terrorism’’ cannot be carried out by the state and that it is

only the province of non-state actors. However, this contention is often used to camouflage morally

and legally questionable government actions as legitimate and necessary, given the ‘‘emergency’’

circumstances (Claridge, 1996; Sproat, 1991; Wilkinson, 1981). By contrast, many scholars argue

that the concept of state terrorism is both valid and vital (Broomhall, 2004; Claridge, 1996;

Friedrichs, 2006; Lazar, 2002; Saul, 2005; Wilkinson, 1981). As Claridge (1996, pp. 49–50) explains,

it is critical both that academics are able to objectively define and identify state terrorism for their stud-

ies, and also that practitioners and human rights activists can use the definition of terrorism against

states to ‘‘expose the hypocrisy of governments who are employing terrorist strategies.’’ Ultimately,

the primary differences between state terrorism and non-state terrorism are the actors, the methods

of attack, and the anticipated benefits, more than the psychological functions of attacks or the effects

on the victims of violence (Claridge, 1996). Like attacks committed by non-state actors, state terrorism

can be both domestic and foreign (Sproat, 1991). Meanwhile, there is a danger that the exact same acts

that are condemned as ‘‘abductions,’’ ‘‘hostage-taking,’’ ‘‘murders,’’ or ‘‘blackmail’’ when carried out

by non-state actors will be considered legitimate ‘‘arrests,’’ ‘‘imprisonments,’’ ‘‘executions,’’ or

‘‘negotiations’’ when they are carried out by states (Sproat, 1991).

In recent years, this type of double standard has seemingly fueled distrust and anti-Americanism,

which in turn appears to have undermined U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In this post-9/11 context,

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Broomhall (2004, p. 441) has warned of the self-serving ‘‘tendency to characterize the conduct of

non-State opponents as ‘terrorist’ while depicting the State’s own conduct as purely defensive of the

‘public order’ or ‘national security.’’’ Similarly, Friedrichs (2006, pp. 89–90) spoke for many when

he detailed how the power to define terrorism has become the power to ‘‘define the international

public enemy,’’ and that if the United States continues to operate with a self-serving definition of

terrorism, it may steadily lose credibility around the world.

Charges of American Terrorism

The years since 9/11 have been marked by many debates and controversies, but one of the most

notable has been the continued debate between the West and the Islamic extremists about who is

truly terrorizing whom. The United States and its allies have proclaimed that Al Qaeda and its sub-

sidiaries are ‘‘terrorist organizations’’ and that the supporters of their movement are ‘‘terrorist spon-

sors’’ or ‘‘terrorist sympathizers.’’ Meanwhile, many Al Qaeda spokesmen vehemently insist that the

West’s use of the term ‘‘terrorism’’ is corrupt propaganda, and that it is really the United States and

its allies who have spread terror to all corners of the earth. For instance, in December 2001, bin

Laden accused the United States of repeated terrorist strikes, claiming that in the Middle East and

Asia, the United States has been ‘‘bombarding entire villages without any justification but with the

purpose of terrorizing people only and making them scared of hosting the Arabs or coming close to

them’’ (Rubin & Rubin, 2002, p. 266). More recently, failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad

claimed in court that his actions were a direct answer to the ‘‘U.S. terrorizing the Muslim nations and

the Muslim people’’ (Greenwald, 2010). He specifically referenced U.S. Predator drone attacks in

Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, which ‘‘kill women [and] children’’ (Greenwald, 2010).

In turn, captured Al Qaeda terrorist Khalid Sheik Mohammed, one of the masterminds behind

9/11, has similarly suggested that U.S. labels are so meaningless that even historic moments revered

by many Americans should be called into question. At a hearing at Guantanamo Bay, Mohammed

dismissed the manipulation of ‘‘the language of any war’’ and compared himself to George

Washington, claiming that if Washington had been captured by the British, he would have been

defined in similar terms to those used today against Al Qaeda (Malinowski, 2008). Although the idea

of comparing the first President of the United States of America to one of Al Qaeda’s terrorist lead-

ers may seem absurd, there is at least some merit to Mohammed’s point. If the British had crushed

the American revolution, George Washington and his co-conspirators probably would not have been

called terrorists, but they would have been treated like them. Benjamin Franklin was clearly quite

aware that those who signed The Declaration of Independence in 1776 would face severe punish-

ments if the British prevailed. As he famously remarked, at the very least, they would be executed

as traitors: ‘‘We must indeed all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang separately’’

(Malone, Milhollen, & Kaplan, 1975, p. 91).

In June 2009, Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, who appears to have authorized past terrorist

attacks himself (Evans, 2009; Horovitz, 2009), levied a similar charge. ‘‘What’s the difference

between the U.S. airstrikes on our homes and bin Laden’s actions?’’ he asked (David, 2009). His

clear implication: there is no difference.

These accusations also come from other critics around the world. For instance, the Delhi

Women’s Petition (2003, p. 278) insists that ‘‘the war unleashed by the U.S. on the people of

Afghanistan’’ is a ‘‘deplorable act of terrorism.’’ Similarly, the alliance of Transnational Feminists

(2003, p. 272) agrees with this contention, warning that ‘‘terror roams the world in many guises and

is perpetrated under the sign of many different nations and agents. It is our contention that violence

and terror are ubiquitous.’’ Along these same lines, after America’s military response to 9/11, terror-

ism scholar Hensman (2003, pp. 35–36) insisted that there was no significant distinction between

U.S. ‘‘terrorism’’ and the attacks carried out by Al Qaeda. She argued that they ‘‘share some basic

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premises in common: all human beings are not born equal, and it is justifiable to kill innocent

civilians in the pursuit of a political objective.’’ As she concludes, ‘‘the apparent choice—Bush

or bin Laden—is really no choice at all’’ (Hensman, 2003, pp. 35–36). In a separate analysis, Lazar

(2002) provides evidence that, from a broad historical perspective, one could almost say that ‘‘We’re

all terrorists.’’ He suggests that the Union Army may have engaged in terrorism during America’s

Civil War with its torching of homes and plantations throughout the South, while the British

Royal Air Force’s World War II bombing of Dresden, Germany—which the U.S. Army Air Force

participated in as well—may also have qualified as terrorism (Lazar, 2002). This latter case is also

identified by McKee (1984, p. 15), who argues that the theorists whose work ultimately set the stage

for the Dresden bombing were really advocating ‘‘an all-out attack on noncombatants, men, women,

and children, as a deliberate policy of terror.’’

Along with the Boston Tea Party, some other acts of terrorist-type behavior that these critics point

to are President Harry Truman’s decision to drop nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in

1945, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to allow CIA operatives to infiltrate Iran and over-

throw the prime minister in 1953, President Ronald Reagan’s decision to bomb Libya in 1986, and

President George W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 (David, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2002).

These five cases will be reviewed in an attempt to determine to what extent they appear to con-

stitute terrorism. It is important to acknowledge that these past U.S. acts are not a random sample

from America’s long history. They have been selected here for two primary reasons. The first is that

they offer a more representative sample than selecting cases at random: these acts are substantively

different from one another and thus raise different kinds of questions about different forms of alleged

terrorism. Naturally, there are other types of violence or military action that could be selected in

future studies, and these five are not the only variations that exist. However, these acts include a

violent demonstration as precursor to a national liberation movement, the nuclear bombing of cities,

a covert coup in a foreign land, a set of targeted airstrikes, and a full-scale military invasion. The

second reason for focusing on these five cases is simply that they are all relatively well-known his-

torical events. The importance of these cases being well known is that they continue to influence the

U.S.’ broader attempts to win the hearts and minds of its critics around the world. Unlike more

obscure acts, these cases are commonly referenced in contemporary discussions about America’s

purported hypocrisy on the subject of terrorism (David, 2009; Rubin & Rubin, 2002).

Do Past U.S. Acts Constitute Terrorism?

In order to win the war of ideas, the U.S. government should take these charges seriously, inves-

tigate them, and respond to them. Not just because bin Laden or his fellow extremists care about

these issues, but because they seem to represent the sentiments of many people around the world.

The key is to determine whether these charges of American terrorism are accurate, or whether they

are just unfair, hostile accusations. Obama himself has noted that around the world, many people

resent America’s wealth and power, and are quick to criticize the United States whenever they get

the chance, regardless of the facts (CNN, 2009). That is why it must be made much more clear how

close these American acts actually come to meeting the U.S.’s own definitions of terrorism.

1773 The Boston Tea Party

Technically, the United States of America did not actually exist in 1773, so the Boston Tea Party

could not possibly constitute a past U.S. act. However, it was carried out by many future Americans,

supported by some of the nation’s founding fathers, and is deeply entrenched as a seminal moment in

U.S. history.

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Looking back, it certainly appears that like some acts of the American Revolutionary War, the

Boston Tea Party might be considered by critics to be a terrorist attack. This so-called party was

actually an illegal act of defiance: a large group of men boarded several ships carrying British tea,

and promptly dumped over 300 chests into the water. By British standards, this act was certainly

‘‘the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property’’ (FBI, 2009), and it apparently

involved not only the destruction of tea, but also the violent tar and feathering of several British

subjects (Cobbett, 1813). Like many modern-day demonstrations against lawful governments, this

act took place in the context of a larger resistance movement. What remains disputed is whether

it was the spontaneous political outburst of a frustrated, lawless mob, or rather a premeditated protest

intended to intimidate or coerce the British government into respecting colonists’ rights to not be

taxed without representation. If it was the latter, as Samuel Adams contended after the incident

(Alexander, 2002), it could potentially qualify as an act of terrorism.

1945 U.S. Nuclear Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan

In May 1945, Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allied powers, closing the European chapter of

World War II. In July 1945, the United States, British, and Chinese issued the Potsdam Declaration

to Japan, which demanded that the Asian nation surrender or face ‘‘prompt and utter destruction’’

(Walker, 1997, p. 72). However, the declaration did not specifically mention the potential use of

nuclear bombs. Japanese leaders did not agree to these terms of surrender, and less than 2 weeks

later, President Truman ordered U.S. forces to drop nuclear bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and

Nagasaki. Between 150,000 and 246,000 people were killed, the vast majority of whom were not

soldiers (Radiation Effects Research Foundation, 2007).

Although this was clearly an act of war, it does not quite contain all of the key variables from the

U.S. definitions of terrorism. It was premeditated and politically motivated. It was violent and it did

target innocent civilians. In addition, it was clearly part of a psychological strategy to intimidate and

coerce the Japanese people and the Japanese government into surrendering.

However, at the time, it does not appear to have been an illegal act. In fact, the strategic bombing

of highly populated cities was relatively common during World War II, and civilians in Poland,

China, Britain, Germany, and Japan had already paid with their lives. Today, the idea of bombing

a city and deliberately killing civilians to break an enemy’s will may rightly be considered illegal.

However, in the historical context of that war-torn period prior to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

it had not yet been clearly outlawed according to international law. This does not necessarily mean

that the use of nuclear bombs was morally right, justified, or even the best option at the time. In addi-

tion, one might be able to argue that the nuclear bombing of cities superseded the limits on military

force established in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. However, given the lack of a clear

legal prohibition against them, these acts do not appear to contain the illegal element required for

them to constitute terrorism.

1953 CIA-Run Coup in Iran

In 1951, democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was the most powerful

man in Iran, and he was rapidly moving the country toward modernization and reform. However, one

of the central features of his political agenda was the nationalization of Iranian oil, which threatened

British and American interests and could have tilted the regional balance of power toward the Soviet

Union (Kinzer, 2008).

Seeking to oust Mossadegh, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to initiate Operation

Ajax. In charge of the mission, CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt bribed many members of the Iranian

parliament, as well as local religious leaders and media members, and got them to start spreading

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anti-Mossadegh propaganda. He also hired local policemen, soldiers, and gang leaders, ordered

them to pretend to be supporters of Mossadegh, and had them run through the streets, beating

up citizens, breaking windows, and firing their guns into mosques, in order to raise anger against

the prime minister. On August 15, 1953, CIA-financed mobs started storming government build-

ings and battling Mossadegh’s forces. Eventually, after a prolonged firefight at Mossadegh’s

home, his house was set on fire and the prime minister was forced to flee. He was captured and

imprisoned a few days later, and a general who had been approved by the United States became

the new prime minister of Iran (Kinzer, 2008).

Was this CIA operation an act of terrorism? It meets almost all of the criteria: it was clearly

premeditated, politically motivated, illegal, and violent. It was even designed to spark regime

change—one of the most common goals of terrorist campaigns (Hoffman, 2006). In addition, inno-

cent civilians were certainly targeted to raise anger against Mossadegh and ensure that his ouster was

seen as a popular social movement, instead of what it really was—a political maneuver by a foreign

government. However, the psychological strategy was seemingly not designed to cause fear or to

intimidate the Iranian people. The priority was to mislead, more than to force or coerce. The con-

fusion and anger the CIA caused was primarily a phony cover for a single strategic objective: the

removal and arrest of Mossadegh himself.

This is a subtle and debatable distinction. The CIA operatives were not attempting to intimidate

or coerce the Iranian people into getting rid of Mossadegh through a true social uprising—they sim-

ply wanted to arrange to get rid of him themselves, without being exposed. Terrorists, by contrast,

are usually quite open about their political objectives and their demands. Ultimately, in many impor-

tant ways, the CIA-run coup in Iran appears quite similar to terrorism. However, because the intent

of the violence was not to intimidate or coerce, it seems to fall short of constituting a terrorist act.

1986 U.S. Airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya

After years of tension between Libya and the United States, on April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded at

a discothèque club in Germany, killing two U.S. servicemen and injuring over 200 people. At the

time, the U.S. claimed to have irrefutable evidence that Libyan agents had carried out the attack.

Although Libya denied involvement for years, in 2004, 18 years after the bombing, the Libyan gov-

ernment agreed to pay $35 million dollars in compensation to 150 non-U.S. victims (BBC News,

2008).

Ten days after the bomb had exploded in Berlin, President Reagan ordered a retaliatory military

strike on Libya to send the message that the United States will not tolerate terrorism. Over 60

American jets dropped missiles on the Libyan naval academy, a military airport, an army barracks,

leader Muammar al-Gaddafi’s residential compound, and a number of other sites. Several military tar-

gets were destroyed, but a few civilian and diplomatic buildings, including the French embassy, were

struck as well, and Libyan officials reported that the attacks killed 41 people, including Gaddafi’s

15-month-old adopted daughter (Fox News, 2008).

Does this U.S. military strike qualify as terrorism? It was premeditated, politically motivated,

violent, and part of a psychological strategy geared to intimidate the Libyan government. Two ques-

tions remain: was it illegal and did it target innocent civilians?

At the time, President Reagan pointed to the Libyan murder of two U.S. soldiers in Berlin and

argued that the strike was legally justified under Article 51 of the UN charter, which protects a

nation’s right to self-defense (BBC News, 2008). British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

publicly agreed with this view and supported the legality of the airstrikes (BBC News, 2008).

However, the United Nations General Assembly voted 79 to 28 against that rationale, condemning

the U.S. attack on Libya as ‘‘a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and of international

law’’ (United Nations, 1986). Although the issue was disputed, much of the world considered the

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U.S. missile strike illegal, or at least was sufficiently concerned by the attack to vote against the

United States on this matter.

Furthermore, at the time, the United States had legally prohibited the use of assassination by any

‘‘person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government’’ (Bazan, 2002, p. 1).

Reagan himself had signed off on this executive order in 1981 (Bazan, 2002). Lacking a clear expla-

nation of the threat that Gaddafi himself personally posed to the United States, the attempt to kill him

at his home seems much more like an illegal assassination attempt than a legal act of self-defense.

When it comes to targeting innocent civilians, White House spokesman Larry Speakes insisted at

the time that ‘‘Every effort has been made to avoid hitting civilian targets’’ (BBC News, 2008).

Although the attack on Gaddafi’s residential compound killed his adopted daughter and failed to kill

Gaddafi (he was outside at that time), harming family members was certainly not the U.S. military’s

primary goal. However, clearly some of the other missiles, such as the one which hit the French

embassy, also did not hit their intended targets and caused collateral damage as well.

A key question arises: how important is the distinction between deliberately targeting innocent

civilians and killing innocent civilians by mistake? In criminal law, this question is often framed

as the difference between ‘‘dolus directus’’ and ‘‘dolus eventualis.’’ Dolus directus refers to some-

one’s direct intent when acting, whereas dolus eventualis refers to someone’s awareness of the

possible consequences from acting (Werle, 2009). Although perpetrators are certainly liable when

they directly intend to harm someone and do so, they are usually also responsible for those they

could have anticipated harming as a result of their actions. For the families of the Libyan civilians

who died, the fact that the American missiles were not specifically intended for their loved ones is

of little consolation. In turn, it is hard to believe that the U.S. military was unaware of the likely

collateral damage that would result from its airstrikes. Ultimately, this minor distinction appears to

be one of the last remaining differences between these U.S. military strikes and a clear act of

American terrorism.

2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq

In 2003, after years of thwarted weapons inspections in Iraq, the United States decided to take a

military approach. On March 19, the United States dropped four satellite-guided bunker-buster

bombs on Dora Farms, a compound outside Baghdad where Saddam Hussein was rumored to be

visiting (Woodward, 2004). The next day, the United States invaded Iraq, backed by smaller forces

from Britain, Australia, and Poland. According to President Bush’s remarks at the time, the U.S.

mission was clear: ‘‘to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support

for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people’’ (The White House, 2003b). However, during the first two

years of the conflict in Iraq, U.S. forces reportedly killed 9,270 Iraqi civilians (Iraq Body Count,

2005). Although this number may seem high, it represents just 37% of the total number of Iraqi civi- lians killed during that period (Iraq Body Count, 2005).

The merits of the decision to invade Iraq have been debated at length, but that is not the issue

here. For these purposes, the key question is does it constitute a terrorist act? The invasion was

clearly premeditated, politically motivated, and violent. However, was it illegal, did it involve a psy-

chological strategy intended to intimidate or coerce, and did it target innocent civilians?

Five months before the invasion began, it was legally authorized by the U.S. Congress (U.S.

Government Printing Office, 2002). But internationally, its legality has come into dispute. In

2002, the United Nations Security Council (2002) did agree with the United States that Iraq was

in violation of the ceasefire agreement that it had reached with the United States at the end of the

Persian Gulf War. According to many, including the U.S. Congress, Iraq’s violation of the ceasefire

gave America the right to recommence the same military operations that it halted in 1991 (United

Nations Security Council, 2002). However, many critics, including UN Secretary General

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Kofi Annan, have suggested that the United States needed specific UN authorization for the invasion,

and lacking that, ‘‘from the [UN] charter point of view, it was illegal’’ (BBC News, 2004).

The U.S. military did use a psychological strategy in its attempt to intimidate and coerce the

enemy. Its military doctrine, known as ‘‘rapid dominance’’ or ‘‘shock and awe,’’ was specifically

designed to break the spirit of Iraqi soldiers through an overwhelming show of force, so that they

would feel that resistance is futile and quickly lose the will to fight back (CNN, 2003a). Critics might

even suggest that the goal was to ‘‘terrorize’’ the adversary’s soldiers and government leaders into

immediately surrendering. However, defenders of this strategy could rationalize that it ultimately

saved many enemy lives that would have otherwise been lost during a more drawn-out invasion.

Furthermore, they could point out that it was seemingly not intended to intimidate or coerce the

populace itself. However, this latter distinction may be more theoretical than practical. After all, dur-

ing a full-scale military invasion, it may be impossible to ‘‘shock and awe’’ enemy soldiers and the

enemy government without having a similar intimidating effect on the local population.

Finally, did the U.S. target innocent civilians with violence? The evidence seems clear on this

point: absolutely not. U.S. officials specifically warned the Iraqi military not to hide behind civilians

as ‘‘human shields,’’ and American forces did not strike civilian targets on purpose (CNN, 2003a).

Collateral damage and genuine military mistakes were certainly terrible in their own right. But

because the United States had no intent to target innocent civilians, overall, the invasion does not

appear to qualify as an act of terrorism.

However, there were certainly individual U.S. soldiers who did intentionally attack innocent

civilians. For the most part, these acts of violence appear to qualify as crimes, not terrorism.

For instance, some soldiers committed rape and murder, but it was deemed criminal, not

political (Tilghman, 2006). However, it is impossible to completely rule out the possibility that

some American soldiers did commit acts of terrorism, on their own, apart from U.S. policy.

A case-by-case review of those individual incidents would be needed to accurately make that

assessment.

Overall, although none of the five historical U.S. acts reviewed here appear to fully constitute

terrorism, they do come quite close (see Table 2). The 1773 Boston Tea Party could be considered

a nonlethal act of terrorism if it was indeed premeditated and intended to intimidate or coerce the

British government into changing its taxation policies, as many contend. The 1945 U.S. nuclear

bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan could potentially constitute terrorism if they occurred

today, given that they were designed to terrorize the Japanese people into surrendering to Allied

forces. However, at that time, it was not necessarily illegal to drop bombs on civilian areas. The

1953 CIA-run coup in Iran is perhaps even closer to being a terrorist act. That determination appears

to depend solely on the very subjective assessment of intent: whether the CIA-orchestrated violence

was intended to intimidate and coerce the populace, or only to disorient it, and thus provide a smoke

screen for regime change. And while some scholars consider that specific criterion critical, others

dismiss its importance. In turn, the 1986 U.S. airstrikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in Libya seem to

differ from terrorism only because the dead civilians on the wrong end of those missiles were killed

as ‘‘collateral damage,’’ instead of being killed through direct intent. And similarly, the 2003 U.S.

invasion of Iraq, based in part on the terrorizing strategy of ‘‘shock and awe,’’ differs from terrorism

primarily based on this same distinction: civilians were killed, but not intentionally. Unfortunately,

this subtlety is of little consolation to those who died, or their families.

This review has shown that because there is so much historical debate about the details of some of

these cases, an objective observer would have a hard time being fully certain about whether they do

or do not constitute terrorism. What is much more clear is that because there are so many different

definitions of terrorism around the world, if different criteria were used to evaluate past U.S. acts,

different conclusions could certainly be drawn. At least according to some definitions, the U.S. is

sure to have engaged in past acts of terror.

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T a b

le 2 .

D o

P as

t U

.S . A

ct s

M e e t

th e

D e fi n it io

n o f T

e rr

o ri

sm ?

P re

m e d it at

e d ?

P o lit

ic al

ly M

o ti va

te d ?

In vo

lv e d

Il le

ga l

A ct

s? V

io le

n t?

D e lib

e ra

te ly

T ar

ge te

d C

iv ili

an s?

In te

n d e d

to In

ti m

id at

e o r

C o e rc

e ?

1 7 7 3 , B o st

o n

T e a

P ar

ty N

o (d

is p u te

d )

Y e s

Y e s

(a cc

o rd

in g

to B ri

ti sh

la w

) Y

e s

Y e s

N o

(d is

p u te

d )

1 9 4 5 , U

.S . N

u cl

e ar

B o m

b in

g o f

H ir

o sh

im a

an d

N ag

as ak

i, Ja

p an

Y e s

Y e s

N o

(n o t

at th

at ti m

e ; d is

p u te

d )

Y e s

Y e s

(d is

p u te

d )

Y e s

(t o

in ti m

id at

e Ja

p an

an d

fo rc

e su

rr e n d e r)

1 9 5 3 , C

IA -r

u n

C o u p

in Ir

an Y

e s

Y e s

Y e s

(b ri

b e ry

, as

sa u lt , m

u rd

e r)

Y e s

Y e s

N o

(t o

re m

o ve

P .M

.; d is

p u te

d )

1 9 8 6 , U

.S . A

ir st

ri k e s

o n

T ri

p o li

an d

B e n gh

az i,

L ib

ya

Y e s

Y e s

Y e s

(a cc

o rd

in g

to th

e U

N ;

d is

p u te

d )

Y e s

N o

(b u t

so m

e p re

d ic

ta b le

co lla

te ra

l d am

ag e )

Y e s

(t o

se n d

a m

e ss

ag e

th at

L ib

ya m

u st

st o p

it s

te rr

o ri

sm )

2 0 0 3 ,U

.S .I

n va

si o n

o f

Ir aq

Y e s

Y e s

N o

(a cc

o rd

in g

to th

e U

.S . C

o n -

gr e ss

; d is

p u te

d )

Y e s

N o

(b u t

a lo

t o f p re

d ic

t- ab

le co

lla te

ra l d am

ag e )

Y e s

(t o

‘‘s h o ck

an d

aw e ’’

an d

fo rc

e Ir

aq i su

rr e n -

d e r;

d is

p u te

d )

427 by guest on July 10, 2012icj.sagepub.comDownloaded from

It is also important to remember that there are many controversial U.S. acts that were not

reviewed in the current article. Other cases worthy of further investigation include several allega-

tions of U.S.-led coups and assassinations in Latin America, the U.S. military’s use of Agent Orange

herbicidal warfare in Vietnam, and perhaps even the U.S.’s economic blockade of Cuba. In addition,

it should be noted that there are many smaller scaled cases that could potentially constitute terrorism,

and sometimes it may be these relatively small incidents, which cause the deaths of ‘‘only’’ a few

innocent civilians—someone’s mother, brother, sister, or daughter—which can lead to the most stri-

dent claims of U.S. terrorism and the most impassioned desires for murderous revenge. Furthermore,

it may be impossible to fully know which important cases may be missing. Many of the U.S. acts that

ought to be reviewed and questioned have been clandestine in nature. In the covert cases where the

Unites States continues to deny involvement, where victims’ allegations cannot be adequately sub-

stantiated, or where world media investigators have failed to establish an official historical record,

the truth about past U.S terrorism may be hidden forever.

It should also be noted that it is quite likely that similar charges of terrorist behavior can accu-

rately be made against many other nations around the world. However, terrorist organizations such

as Al Qaeda have largely singled out the United States, and they use these allegations to fuel anti-

Americanism, portray U.S. leaders as deceitful hypocrites, and justify their own terrorist attacks

against Western targets (Rubin & Rubin, 2002).

Implications for Counterterrorism Policy

The U.S. State Department identifies nations that are charged with supporting terrorism on its list

of ‘‘State Sponsors of Terrorism.’’ For several years, the United States had just five nations on this

list: Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba.

The inclusion of Iran, Syria, and Sudan basically appears legitimate. Iran’s Qods Force, a special

branch of its Revolutionary Guard, helped found the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah and

reportedly still provides weapons, training, and funds to HAMAS and other terrorists in Palestine,

Iraq, and Afghanistan (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009). In addition, there is

evidence that despite their religious differences, Iran has sometimes supported Al Qaeda’s opera-

tions against common enemies (Al-Bahri, 2007; Lankford, 2009a; National Commission on Terror-

ist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). In turn, Syria, a major ally to Iran, also seems to be a clear

state sponsor of terrorism. Syrian President Bashar al-Asad has publicly expressed support for Pales-

tinian terrorist organizations, and the nation has provided a safe haven and other means of support to

leaders from HAMAS, Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

General Command (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009). In the case of Sudan,

despite the nation’s participation in some global counterterrorism initiatives, its government contin-

ues to view members of HAMAS as legitimate ‘‘freedom fighters’’ instead of as terrorists, and ele-

ments of both HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad continue to thrive within its borders (Office of

the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009). In addition, international arrest warrants have been

issued for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who is alleged to have authorized genocide and other

violent crimes against civilian targets (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009).

However, the North Korean and Cuban designations appear to be much more questionable. In

October 2008, the United States removed North Korea from its ‘‘State Sponsors of Terrorism’’ list

after the Communist nation agreed to allow international oversight of its nuclear weapons program.

Eight months later, after talks between North Korea and the United States had broken down, Secre-

tary of State Hillary Clinton publicly threatened to put North Korea back on the terrorism blacklist,

which would severely restrict its international trade (Pleming, 2009). At the time, there was no direct

evidence that North Korea had engaged in any new terrorist activities (Pleming, 2009). In the case of

Cuba, the U.S. State Department’s own 2008 report finds ‘‘no evidence of terrorist-related money

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laundering or terrorist financing activities’’—yet the nation remained blacklisted as a state sponsor

of terrorism and restricted by sanctions (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 2009).

The North Korean and Cuban cases suggest that being defined as a ‘‘terrorist nation’’ or ‘‘state

sponsor of terrorism’’ is no longer merely determined by a country’s behavior. Instead, it is deter-

mined by politics. This assertion is backed up by a significant amount of previous research

(Broomhall, 2004; Claridge, 1996; Friedrichs, 2006; Lazar, 2002; Saul, 2005; Wilkinson, 1981).

In recent years, the definitions of ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘terrorist sponsorship’’ appear to have simply

become bargaining chips. For those who may face being labeled a terrorist organization or state

sponsor of terrorism, the threat is implicit: ‘‘Do what we say . . . or else!’’ Unfortunately, these types of political maneuvers contribute to widespread skepticism about America’s use of the word

‘‘terrorism’’ and discredit the U.S. government’s counterterrorism efforts (Friedrichs, 2006).

However, in the eyes of many, the election of President Obama renewed hopes that the United

States could make great strides in winning the hearts and minds of critics around the world. And the

President took initial steps to do so, reaching out to past enemies through diplomatic initiatives,

eliminating the administration’s use of the controversial phrase ‘‘Global War on Terror,’’ and rede-

fining torture in much stricter terms, in order to decisively ban it (Cooper & Stolberg, 2009; The

White House, 2009). Perhaps U.S. leaders are now ready to take the next step and reexamine the

definition of terrorism itself, along with the charges that past U.S. acts meet this definition.

The administration has four primary options for how to deal with the specter of American terror-

ism. First, it can continue the approach of the previous administration, which was to define terrorism

in self-serving terms, and thereby dismiss charges of U.S. acts of terrorism as technically impossible.

Second, it could admit that the United States has engaged in terrorist-like behavior in the past, but

condemn such actions as unfortunate mistakes and pledge that they will not be repeated. Third, it

could take a more nuanced but potentially dangerous position: admit that past U.S. acts may have

constituted terrorism, but defend these acts as nevertheless justified, given the circumstances. Or

fourth, it could ignore the issue altogether.

The first approach would be based on the contention that no past U.S. acts have constituted ter-

rorism. If the administration chooses to reject the possibility of American terrorism, despite the

evidence to the contrary, it would most likely do so by continuing to define terrorism as an act

that the United States is simply incapable of committing. For instance, if the United States requires

acts to be illegal for them to constitute terrorism, but it retains the sole privilege of determining the

legality of its own actions, then it also has the power to ensure that it never commits this crime. In

other words, since governments can simultaneously write their own laws and determine who has

and has not violated them, defining terrorism as something composed of criminal or unlawful acts

gives them the power to use the terms ‘‘terrorist’’ or ‘‘terrorism’’ in completely self-serving ways.

As Townshend (2002, p. 5) explains, it has long been believed that ‘‘In the state’s view, only the

state has the right to use force.’’

If the current administration takes this approach and continues to deny the possibility of U.S. ter-

rorism, it is not likely to make much new progress in the war of ideas. Critics will continue to charge

that there are separate standards for the West and the rest, and indeed, they would be correct. If, in

respective incidents, a U.S. soldier or CIA operative does almost the exact same thing as an

Al Qaeda operative, but only the latter’s behavior is condemned as terrorism, then the definition

is clearly biased, and U.S. complaints about terrorism would certainly appear hypocritical. A simi-

larly hostile reaction resulted from the infamous words of former U.S. President Richard Nixon, who

was tainted by the Watergate scandal and resigned from office. In a 1977 television interview with

journalist David Frost, Nixon defined ‘‘illegality’’ in a similarly self-serving way:

FROST: So what in a sense you’re saying is that there are certain situations . . . where the pres- ident can decide that it’s in the best interests of the nation or something, and do something illegal.

NIXON: Well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal.

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FROST: By definition?

NIXON: Exactly. Exactly (Hirschfield, 1982, p. 179).

Here, Nixon essentially claims that it is impossible for a president to commit an ‘‘illegal’’ act,

because it is his government that defines which acts are criminal or unlawful. If the U.S. govern-

ment were to continue to take a similar approach to its definition of terrorism—even in the defense

of past American acts—it would remain a major blow against the U.S.’s credibility on the inter-

national stage.

The second option would be for the administration to publicly admit past mistakes and acknowl-

edge that the United States has occasionally engaged in terrorist-like behavior. In doing so, the

United States would send a powerful message that its definition of terrorism is indeed objective and

impartial—and that it applies to a certain set of actions, regardless of the nationality or status of the

actor. Winston Churchill famously remarked that ‘‘History is written by the victors.’’ But to be vic-

torious—particularly in the current global war of ideas—it is important that the United States be

honest and self-critical. It appears that the domestic, military, and CIA operations reviewed here

do not quite constitute terrorism, at least according to U.S. definitions. However, several do come

very close, which may be one reason why Al Qaeda has had such success exploiting anti-

Americanism and gaining new supporters and sympathizers around the world.

This approach would be based on the belief that the best way for the United States to win the war

of ideas is not for its leaders to try to run or hide from past mistakes—instead, they must address

them. To a large extent, these statements could parallel Obama’s public admission and condemna-

tion of recent U.S. acts of torture. On that subject, the President did not get into specific details.

Instead, he stuck to generalities, insisted that ‘‘We should be looking forward and not backwards,’’

and indicated that his priority was to come clean about the past and restore the nation’s reputation,

not to malign the American tradition or prosecute its former leaders (Klaidman, 2009). The same

approach could be taken to addressing the U.S.’s past terrorist-like actions. It is likely that these

admissions would be extraordinarily valuable as a symbolic gesture to critics around the world.

Skeptics might point out that initially, these admissions would complicate the cognitive

picture—they would add shades of gray to a conflict the United States has tried to portray as a

black-and-white battle of good versus evil (Lazar, 2002). However, most people already recognize

these shades. Furthermore, those who cannot or will not—those who cling to the notion that the

United States is entirely evil and that Al Qaeda is totally good, or vice versa—are not going to

be influenced anyway.

The third option is for the administration to admit that past U.S. acts may have constituted terror-

ism, but to defend these acts as nevertheless justified, given the circumstances. From a purely logical

perspective, this assertion could be accurate. The fact that some past U.S. acts may have constituted

terrorism does not necessarily mean, a priori, that they were wrong. As mentioned earlier, the

nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki does not appear to meet U.S. definitions of terrorism

because it was not necessarily illegal at that time. However, legality and morality have never been a

single measure. Even if that bombing had been illegal, there are many who would have considered it

morally justified, based on the argument that it brought World War II to an end and may have ulti-

mately saved lives, when compared with the costs of a full-scale Allied invasion of Japan. Similarly,

the U.S. military’s more recent ‘‘shock and awe’’ strategy is generally not considered illegal or

immoral, because it was specifically designed to reduce the size and scope of military conflicts, and

thus save lives. However, at its core, ‘‘shock and awe’’ is a psychological tactic intended to intimi-

date and coerce, much like terrorism. It is thus at least conceivable that in rare circumstances, there

really is such a thing as justified terrorism (Wilkinson, 1981).

It would be possible for the administration to admit to past U.S. acts of terror and defend them as

justified, using a similar approach to the one Obama took when he accepted the 2009 Nobel Peace

Prize. During that speech, the President specifically referenced just war theory in defense of U.S.

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wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He spoke of the rare circumstances of last resort or self-defense, where

proportional violence is justified as long as civilians are spared from harm, at least whenever pos-

sible (CNN, 2009). And he spoke of how hard it is to maintain these ideals, given the risks endured

by civilians and the likelihood of tragic collateral damage, even during just wars (CNN, 2009). The

administration could similarly use the criteria from just-war theory to defend past U.S. acts that

appear to constitute terrorism. In doing so, the United States would be redefining terrorism as some-

thing that can be good or bad, right or wrong, depending on the context.

However, recent U.S. leaders have completely rejected the possibility of justified terrorism, and it

may be best that the administration continues to do the same. Following 9/11, terrorism itself—the

tactic, completely devoid of context or rationale—became the primary target. For instance, the first

National Strategy on Combating Terrorism (The White House, 2003a) explicitly states that ‘‘No

cause justifies terrorism’’ and that ‘‘The enemy is terrorism.’’ On their surface, these claims might

seem overstated, but their intention was to classify terrorism as another type of war crime or crime

against humanity, and thus remove it from the list of acceptable combat options. Although there may

be some logical inconsistencies in the stance that war can be justified but terrorism cannot, it seems

like a safer position than the alternative, which would give more credence to Al Qaeda’s arguments

that their attacks could be warranted. It is simply not worth it for the U.S. government to defend past

acts of American terrorism, if doing so creates a substantial amount of new problems for the present

and the future.

The fourth option, which is to ignore the issue altogether, should not be summarily dismissed.

Given the skill and sophistication with which Al Qaeda and its subsidiaries manipulate media mes-

sages (Guadagno, Lankford, Muscanell, Okdie, & McCallum, 2010), there is some risk that any

admission the United States makes would be used to its enemies’ advantage. Sound bites and Inter-

net clips based on distortions of American leaders’ statements about past mistakes would be likely,

at least on extremist websites. However, that kind of propaganda already exists, and ignoring the

issue while continuing to try and rally global support for counterterrorism efforts may be a self-

defeating strategy. Given the aforementioned fact that in 2009, 86% of those surveyed in Palestine opposed the U.S.-led efforts to fight terrorism, along with 79% in Jordan, 73% in Egypt, 58% in Lebanon, 56% in Pakistan, and 55% in Turkey (Pew Research Center, 2009b), one could certainly make the case that the status quo is not satisfactory. However, the administration might be able to

ignore charges of American terrorism and still make some degree of progress in other ways.

Conclusion

The United States is engaged in a war of ideas with terrorists, terrorist supporters, and terrorist sym-

pathizers around the globe, and perhaps the most dangerous weapon in the enemy’s arsenal is the

charge that the United States itself carries out terrorism. This article has evaluated this charge and

determined that although the five historical U.S. acts reviewed here do not appear to fully constitute

terrorism, if different definitions of terrorism were used, or if different historical interpretations of dis-

puted facts were made, it seems almost certain that past U.S. acts would indeed qualify as terrorism. In

addition, there are many controversial cases that were not reviewed in the current article.

The administration has at least four options for how it can respond to these charges. It seems

likely that the best approach would be for leaders to admit that the United States has engaged in

terrorist-like behavior in the past, but condemn such actions as unfortunate and vow that they will

not be repeated. Although this option would not be a miracle cure for anti-Americanism around the

globe, it appears to be the one that Obama would personally be the most comfortable with, and could

be similar to his public statements in regard to past acts of U.S. torture (The White House, 2009).

Beyond these points, the administration should emphasize that, despite its past mistakes, the U.S.

differs from terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda in very significant ways. For instance, Al Qaeda

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deliberately kills large numbers of civilians as the prime feature of their combat strategy (Gunaratna,

2002). If the World Trade Center Towers had immediately collapsed on 9/11, more than 50,000 peo-

ple could have been killed (Fox News, 2004). And bin Laden has specifically said that he hopes to

acquire and use weapons of mass destruction in the future (Leung, 2004). By contrast, the U.S. mil-

itary bends over backwards to keep civilian casualties as low as possible, even in the context of war

(Rhem, 2003). Smart bombs and laser-guided missiles are much more expensive than conventional

weapons, but the U.S. spends billions of dollars on them specifically to minimize collateral damage

(Rhem, 2003). The fact that the United States has nuclear weapons but no longer uses them signifies

an important quality of restraint which seems to be completely absent for Al Qaeda.

Furthermore, the United States observes wartime rules of engagement, which Al Qaeda blatantly

ignores. For instance, U.S. ground soldiers in civilian areas have often been expressly prohibited

from firing on nonuniformed personnel until they are fired upon (CNN, 2003b). In fact, this is one

of the reasons Iraqi insurgents have successfully killed so many U.S. soldiers in recent years: deter-

mined to avoid killing innocents, American soldiers have often let possible threats get far too close

without shooting, unable to discern friend from foe until it is too late (CNN, 2003b). By contrast,

Al Qaeda terrorists deliberately use civilians as human shields and intentionally disguise themselves

as civilians, violating international law and increasing the chances that future innocents may be shot

by mistake (CNN, 2003b).

It is no surprise that in the years following 9/11, the international community was unable to agree

on a single definition of terrorism, and that the controversy about who is terrorizing whom still rages

on. Initial attempts to steer these debates have been too simplistic, too politicized, and too self-

serving (Broomhall, 2004; Friedrichs, 2006; Lazar, 2002; Saul, 2005). If U.S. leaders want the coun-

try’s critics to change course and support its counterterrorism efforts, they must be willing to change

as well.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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Bio

Adam Lankford is an assistant professor of criminal justice at The University of Alabama and the author of

Human Killing Machines: Systematic Indoctrination in Iran, Nazi Germany, Al Qaeda, and Abu Ghraib. From

2003 to 2008, he helped coordinate senior executive antiterrorism forums for high-ranking foreign military and

security personnel in conjunction with the U.S. State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. During

this period, ATA hosted delegations from India, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Uzbekistan, Colombia, Georgia, Armenia, Tunisia, and Morocco. He has published on a range of topics related

to aggression, violence, counterterrorism, and international security.

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