This assignment is a take-home essay assignment of 2 questions, 2 pages each

192

Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2) 2016, pp. 192–213, ISSN 1948-9145, eISSN 2374-4383

INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFLICT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:

THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT DURING TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

ROBIN RAMCHARAN

[email protected] Webster University, Geneva

ABSTRACT. Whereas democracy has been linked to the prevalence of peaceful societies, democratic transition processes have been particularly violent. Southeast Asia is no exception. The impressive move towards democracy and the rule of law in the region over the past three decades has also witnessed much internal political conflict and violence. The risk of internal conflict remains high and long-term peace is ill-served by the perseverance of authoritarian governance. This paper, following a qualitative approach, surveys key literature from scholarly peer-reviewed sources, conflict ledgers and reputable policy think tanks in order to identify the main, interrelated factors that are root causes of internal conflict in periods of transition to democracy. It concludes that these factors are: electoral processes and non-respect for electoral integrity; a strong military role in politics; corruption; weak state in- stitutions; demands for autonomy and decentralization; and grievances over violations of economic, social and cultural rights. The paper concludes by arguing for a human rights-oriented, early warning capacity at the regional level to head-off internal conflicts. Keywords: ASEAN; democracy, human rights; ASEAN Regional Forum; conflict prevention

How to cite: Ramcharan, Robin (2016), “Internal Political Conflict in Southeast Asia: The Root Causes of Conflict during Transitions to Democracy,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations 8(2): 192–213.

Received 17 March 2016 • Received in revised form 23 June 2016 Accepted 24 June 2016 • Available online 15 July 2016

193

Introduction Democracy has been linked to prevalence of peaceful societies. The theory that democracies do not fight each other led to a major push by the inter- national community to expand democracy globally in the wake of the anti- communist struggle of the Cold War era. The United Nations (UN) peace- keeping and peacebuilding operations, for example, routinely include the development of democracy and the rule of law in post-conflict countries. Recent reviews of UN peacebuilding have pointed out however, that peace and stability may not be well served by a too rapid introduction of democracy and other such liberal policy prescriptions.1

Indeed, the nexus between democracy and peace has also been examined critically from various angles by scholars in light of internal conflict and violent unrest in states undergoing a democratic transition.2 Experts cautioned against the “dark side of democracy” and the rise of “illiberal democracy” (Mann, 1999; Zakaria 2007). During such transitions, the risk of inter-sate war may increase because emerging democracies typically go through a rocky transition period during which they become more conflict prone than states without a changing regime (Daxecker 2007; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Daxecker notes that substantial change to democracy significantly lowers the risk of conflictual foreign policy behavior. As democracy deepens and strengthens, rates of conflict initiation decrease (ibid., p. 544).

The transition to and deepening of democracy in Southeast Asia is by no means complete, and in fact is a slow, grinding process. Peou’s categorization of the 11 political regimes in Southeast Asia at the end of 2014 clearly revealed the road that democracy had to travel in the region. He classified them as: “undemocratic states” under military dominance (Myanmar, aka Burma, though this may change after the November 2016 election), one under monarchical rule (Brunei), and those with one-communist-party systems (Laos and Vietnam); “more democratic” countries such as those that maintain hegemonic-party regimes, but that are not liberal – Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia; and four out of the 11 that can be considered “unconsolidated liberal democratic” – Indonesia, Thailand (until May 2014), the Philippines, and Timor-Leste (aka East Timor) (Peou, 2014). This great variety of regimes, inclusive of dictatorial and one party States belied the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) purposive adoption of democratic governance as a regional norm in its 2007 Charter.

Southeast Asia’s multiple transitions to democracy in the last 20 years have borne out the linkage between democratic transitions and internal political conflict. It is important for ASEAN, individually and collectively, to identify and address the root causes of conflict during democratic tran- sition processes as the region works towards creating a completed security

194

community, a people-centered community and an economic community.3 The progression of liberal democracy is arguably an important aspect for the consolidation of all of these but it may well be in regression across the region, with the exception of Indonesia.

This paper4 proceeds by examining the turbulent uptake in democracy, the risks of conflict and the principal factors giving rise to violent political conflict in democratic transitions.

1. The Rocky Uptake in Democracy The region has experienced an impressive uptake of democratic governance. The Philippines’ “People Power” routing of the dictatorial Marcos regime in 1986 was followed by Thailand’s first democratic Constitution in 1997 and, a decade later, by the fall of the Suharto regime and Indonesia’s first general elections in 1999. Malaysia’s democracy also seemed to have taken a positive turn after the departure of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who was not shy of bending Constitutional rules (Majid, 2009). In Singapore, a slight opening up of political space followed the passing over of power from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong in 1990 and then to Lee Hsien Loong in 2004, though the ruling People’s Action Party is assured to win and the opposition remains weak. By 2004, Caballero-Anthony hailed the democratic moment, following elections in Malaysia (March 2004), Indonesia (April 2004), the Philippines (May 2004), and Thailand (February 2005). He noted the emer- gence of new political actors as the old guard was replaced, the first direct presidential elections in Indonesia and the return of two leaders to power in Thailand and the Philippines serving second terms after democratic elections (Caballero-Anthony, 2005).

A broad set of factors led to the uptake in democracy (Guo, 1999; Peou, 2015). Structuralists point to pre-existing overarching socio-economic and political structures that are determinant in democratic outcomes. Strategic- choice advocates emphasize the role of elites and their choices. Instituti- onalists examines how elites are shaped and constrained, how regimes are institutionalized, how civil society has participated – as in the case of Eastern Europe – and, in one strand of this approach, how “confining con- texts” constrain elite choices. Pre-existing structures, such as the impact of colonialism in Southeast Asia in its different forms (British, Dutch, French and Spanish), itself authoritarian in nature, may have determined the political evolution of postcolonial states. In this vein, the so-called “neo-imperial” age is one in which the United States and Europe are exporting democracy through structural adjustment programs and through the “liberal peace agenda” of the international community. Finally, the political-economy ap- proach privileges the impact of economic conditions on political development.

195

Economic conditions and crises are held to be determinant of a state’s turn- ing away from authoritarianism. In the Southeast Asian context, Acharya has argued that the 1997 Asian financial crisis and globalization forces in par- ticular dramatically spurred on the uptake in democracy. Authoritarian regimes were blamed for the crisis and for not being able to weather the storm as effectively as the democratic regimes, such as Thailand. Asian values dis- course favoring authoritarian regimes assumed a far more humble posture (Acharya, 1999: p. 418). Whereas some scholars have placed emphasis on the role of new urban middle classes in the 1990s in pressuring for democrati- zation (Kurlanczik), Acharya has argued that “Growth did not reduce elite cohesion in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.” Instead, the crisis generated “a democratic contagion effect across the region” and dealt a blow to paternalistic “discipline over democracy” and “society over self” arguments by authoritarian elites (Acharya, p. 420).

Elites in Southeast Asia sensed the rise of popular resistance to authori- tarianism and sought to move the region, through ASEAN, towards a com- mitment to democratic governance. Majid noted that ASEAN elites sensed the “clear rumblings of a desire for greater democracy or, at least, better recognition of political and civil rights” (Majid 2010). Despite the presence of non-democratic states – Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam – the ASEAN Charter of 2007 announced a new regional norm of democratic governance, replete with the rule of law and protection of human rights. Impetus for such change had taken place in the “old” members of ASEAN – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and even Singapore (Caballero- Anthony 2004). As per Rustow, from experiences in Latin America and elsewhere, elites tended to adopt democracy because of perceived high costs of extremism from popular voices, high institutional costs of failing to provide political order, their forecasting that moderate actors may win elections and their tendency to predict their own victory in transition elections. Democracy became a formula for their own legitimation. Difficulties arose when tradi- tional elites seeking legitimacy are confronted by new or revolutionary elites that seek to gain legitimacy by forcing the old guard out of power.

This uptake in democracy has been rocky in Southeast Asia and has suf- fered setbacks over the past decade, with the exception of Indonesia following its 2014 general election. A “regression” of democracy has taken place in Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines (Kurlantczik, 2014; Pongsudirak 2015b). Thailand, once a democratic beacon, is now under the spell of a new military junta and resembles somewhat the situation in Myanmar.

Timor Leste’s transition from colonial domination to independent demo- cratic state between 1999 and 2002 is a dramatic example of the linkage between democratic transition and violent conflict. A majority of the regis- tered electorate (78.5%) opted for independence in a UN-sponsored referen-

196

dum in 1999, but major violence was orchestrated by pro-autonomy militias after announcement of the results by the UN. It led to the deaths of hundreds of people, a near-total destruction of the physical infrastructure and the dis- placement of almost two-thirds of the population. An Australian-led multi- national force, the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), to restore law and order and the subsequent establishment of a large UN state-building mission, known as the United Nations Transitional administration in East Timor (UNTAET), restored order. In the process of nation-state building and identity formation, sensitive issues such as the selection of national lan- guages and historical cultural affinities (Malay-Polynesian, Melanesian and Latin-Catholic) harbored the seeds of much disaffection beyond a common anti-Indonesian thread that provided unity until independence. International assistance was vital again by 2006, when violent riots erupted in the streets of Dili exposed deep political rivalries and social tensions. Over 30 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced in the capital. Timor Leste began to look like a “failed state.”

Malaysia’s democracy continues to experience one party dominance and attempts to sideline the opposition. The long-ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition has cracked down on dissent and has upset the emergence of and increasingly stable, two-party system. Kurlanczik has noted that the period from late 2008 and to 2013 was “the high point” of Malaysia’s democratic progression. In 2013 parliamentary elections, Anwar Ibrahim’s opposition won a majority of the popular vote, the first time that the BN had lost the popular vote. He notes already in 2011 the BN-led government “had returned to the tough tactics of repression used by previous Malaysian governments” (p. 8). Peaceful rallies in Kuala Lumpur seeking electoral reforms were met with the arrest of over 1,600 people, and police beating of demonstrators. The following year, police used excessive force on a similar demonstration in Kuala Lumpur, and the government again arrested many opposition lead- ers. The BN coalition held on to power through intimidation, electoral fraud, and gerrymandering. The government proposed new legislation designed to suppress opposition voices and entrench economic and political preferences for ethnic Malays, disempowering ethnic Indians and ethnic Chinese. The government essentially reinstated the long-hated Internal Security Act (ISA), a colonial-era law that independent Malaysian governments had retained to crack down on dissent. The law allowed Malaysia’s government to detain people without trial indefinitely, often on vague charges. Malaysia had, earlier in Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak’s time in office, gotten rid of the ISA. Yet after the 2013 elections the government passed new amendments once again allowing detention without trial. The government also prosecuted blatantly flawed criminal cases against Anwar and prominent human rights lawyer and opposition politician Karpal Singh. In March 2014, a court sen-

197

tenced Anwar to five years in jail for sodomy (sodomy is a crime in Malaysia), while that same month a Malaysian court fined Singh for sedition. Singh died in a car accident before his sentence could be reviewed; most likely, he would have been hit with further charges by the court.

The Philippines, where the oldest democracy in the region witnessed the assassination of a popular opposition leader, Benigno Aquino, and since Marcos two “People Power” revolutions sought to depose democratically elected Presidents. Democratic consolidation has remained elusive and the Philippines has been in “perpetual crisis:” attempted military coups occurred during the Aquino presidency (1986–92); allegations of corruption and cronyism led to impeachment proceedings during the short lived Estrada presidency (1998–2001) that eventually culminated in the 2001 “People Power;” attempts at “People Power III” and another coup attempt during the first Arroyo presidency (2001 to early 2004); and similar turmoil under President Arroyo who came to office 2004. During the Ramos presidency (1992–98) the country was calmer (Caballero-Anthony, 2004: p. 38). Issues affecting the credibility of the Philippine’s democracy include: the pervasive influence of political dynasties, the use of political parties for personal polit- ical ambitions of key politicians, frequent switching of parties, nepotism, vote-buying, and concerns over the verification procedures for electronic voting machines (Mendoza, 2013). Current President Benigno Aquino ignited controversy in 2014 after intimating that he may seek to amend the Con- stitution so as to serve for a second term (South China Morning Post, 2014).

In Thailand, since the 2006 coup against Thaksin Shinawatra, now in exile, democracy in that country has been seriously damaged. Thai constitutions have not lasted long. Increasingly serious electoral violence in 2010 and in 2014, has led to a crisis in Thai democracy that saw the army once again take power in early 2014 by overthrowing an elected government. Thai institutions have not acquitted themselves well in the midst of this contest and have become severely polarized and politicized. The integrity of the judiciary, the civil service, or other national institutions is in serious doubt. (Kurlanczik, p. 8) Moreover, harsh lèse-majesté laws, seek to prevent Thais from openly questioning the value of the monarchy are also used to counter political opposition. Constitutional proposals chaperoned by the military regime were voted down in the fall of 2015 and were designed to fail so as to keep the military in power for some time more. They envisaged weakening political parties, a largely appointed Senate and an unelected prime minister. In addition, watchdog bodies might be able to remove elected politicians (Streckfuss, 2015). Successive constitutions have taken the country back from the consolidation of democracy. Whereas the 1997 constitution was drafted by elected leaders after wide public participation, the 2007 and current drafts have stepped back from that model. The military junta offered a new draft in

198

January 2016 that has been condemned as a sham for its removal of rights and granting of the military with near absolute powers. If it rejected in a July 2016 referendum as is widely expected, the junta has indicated that it may revert to anyone of Thailand’s previous constitutions (Lefevre, 2016).

In the BCLMV5 countries, Brunei’s government has imposed stricter Sharia law since 2014, Cambodia’s Hun-Sen has consolidated his hold on power be crushing opposition forces since coming to office in 1985, Laos’ has witnessed harsh treatment of dissenting voices despite opening up to the world in the last decade and Vietnam’s Communist party has little interest in democracy and has cracked down on the internet, bloggers and civil society. Myanmar’s military junta under Thein Sein embarked on a path towards democratic governance since 2008, following decades of ethnic conflicts as most groups contested the legitimacy of the State and the junta. Despite the November 2016 elections, many problems plague the country including on- going ethnic conflicts, the exclusion of Rohingya minority from citizenship and constitutional reform that would end the military’s grasp on politics in Myanmar. While the military has so far indicated acceptance of their crush- ing defeat in the elections, the road ahead is still fraught with danger. A peaceful transition requires the new government to deliver economic growth and development and the stability necessary for the same. A sound relation- ship between the ruling NLD and the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces is imperative and thereby renders Myanmar’s transition to democracy a perilous one.

2. The Risk of Violent Political Unrest The greatest risk of instability and conflict has taken place in situations of transition to democracy. A leading conflict ledger has assessed the risk of potential conflict in 164 countries using internationally recognized method- ologies.6 The likelihood of conflict in the Southeast Asian region transition- ing to democratic governance was highest in Timor-Leste, whose risk ratio was approximately 10.1 or 10 times higher than that of the OECD. Timor Leste featured at number 25, in the top 25, with Afghanistan at number one, followed by Guinea Bissau (2), Djibouti (3), Guinea (4) and so on. Countries with the largest increases in risk of instability included Thailand and Myanmar. The former’s risk ratio increased from 0.9 (2007–2009) to 2.8 (2012–2014). Myanmar’s risk ratio increased from 4.8 to 5.8 in the same periods. Thailand, on a path to democracy since 1997, has seen setbacks to democratic governance in the last two years and is ruled by the military at present. Myanmar’s military regime has set in motion a transition to democratic governance, all the while aspiring to preserve the influence of the

199

military establishment. The overall risk ratios for the region in 2012–2014 are indicated in Table 1.

Table 1 Estimated Risk for Instability in Select Asian Countries & Southeast Asia 2012–2014

Regional Rank Risk Score 2014

Active armed conflict in 2012

2014 2012 1 1 Afghanistan 27.5 Y 2 2 Pakistan 17.6 Y 6 8 Timor

Leste 10.1

9 10 Cambodia 6.6 11 18 Myanmar 5.8 Y 14 13 Indonesia 4.1 16 15 Philippines 3.5 Y 18 17 Thailand 2.8 Y 19 19 Laos 2.2 20 20 Malaysia 1.7 28 28 Vietnam 0.6 29 29 Singapore 0.5 30 32 Japan 0.4

Source: Backer et al., 2014, p. 14 The greatest increases in risk of instability have taken place in countries that were classified as partial democracies, which “are at greater risk for instabil- ity than autocracies or full democracies (Backer et al., 2014: p. 5). Repressive tactics adopted by autocratic governments often smother the potential for significant political instability” (Backer et al., 2014: p. 10). Coherent and mature democracies, which comprised some 58% of the world’s states by 2011, compared with 12% autocracies and 30% anocracies (democratic and autocratic features) (Frantz, 2014: p. 26), “possess the capacity to address group grievances and manage the competition between groups that vie for political power and other resources” (Backer et al., 2014: p. 19). Mature democratic states, replete with the rule of law and corresponding human rights that provide access to justice and do secure redress and remedies for victims of violations, retain authority and legitimacy. In terms of commitment to liberal democratic values in Southeast Asia, Davies has labeled the countries as: “progressives,” comprising Indonesia and the Philippines who to varying degrees have embraced democratic liberal norms domestically and whose political systems are defined by political pluralism; “cautious,” comprising Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand who, whilst ensuring the rule of law, show considerably more reluctance to embrace global standards, especially of the civil and political variety, consistently; and “the recalcitrant,” comprising the BCLMV countries (Davies, 2014).

200

The risk of political unrest, notably violent conflict, is potent in situations of transitions and comes from a variety of sources.

3. Addressing the Roots of Internal Conflict in Democratic Transitions Transitions to democracy in Southeast Asia have faced a number of chal- lenges that pose risks of internal political unrest and violent conflict. These include inexperience with electoral process or immature electoral processes (before, during, immediately after elections), the weak legitimacy of state institutions, the resiliency of authoritarianism and middle class unrest, the role of the military in politics and enduring corruption. In addition, as greater space for the expression opens up in these transitions, the airing of grievances over social, economic and cultural rights also become more pronounced. Inequality as a source of conflict is receiving much greater attention. This is especially important to keep in mind in the context of the many minority and indigenous groups in Southeast Asia. Electoral processes & enhancing respect for electoral integrity Non-respect for electoral integrity, meaning international standards for the free and fair conduct of elections, is an important driver of conflict in the transition to democracy. Elections, especially those being held for the first time, are often accompanied by political, and sometimes violent, unrest. In electoral terms, Norris notes that the region is quite diverse, comprising a Sultan who hand-picks the Legislative Council (Brunei), unstable states where competitive contests have ended in military coup d’états (Myanmar, Thailand), one party elections (Vietnam, Laos), new-born and weak state (Timor Leste) and authoritarian states dominated by hegemonic ruling parties (Singapore since 1959, Malaysia since 1957, Cambodia since 1998). (Norris 2015). Norris notes that none of the recent elections are free of integrity challenges.

The question of what drives violence in electoral situations has been under scrutiny by the Electoral Integrity Project at the University of Sydney in Australia. Its survey of research, notably on the occurrence of electoral violence in terms of factors typically associated with the onset or recurrence of civil wars, shows that these studies have emphasized:

Long-term drivers arising from ‘fixed’ social conditions such as the existence of lack of development, poverty and inequality, the resource curse, and ethnic divisions;

Medium-term factors from the design of political institutions such as the role of electoral laws, notably the use of winner-take-all electoral systems, the party system, the type of executive checks

201

and balances, and the lack of power-sharing arrangements, the role, capacity and training of security forces and electoral management bodies; the effectiveness of courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms for securing electoral justice; and

Short-term (proximate) factors include: the role of the mass media and social media in either exacerbating or else reducing conflict; the sequential timing of elections as part of state-building and re- construction; the role of the international community and observers in preventing or reducing tensions, and problems of electoral malpractices, including real or perceived fraud, corruption and patronage (Electoral Integrity Project, 2015).

In Cambodia, contested elections are routine and liberal democratic process envisaged by the 1993 Constitution have been sidelined by Prime Minister Hun Sen who has been in power since then (COMFREL, 2013). The last “elections” in 2013 were marred by violence after the results were contested by the opposition.

The importance of credible electoral processes is nowhere more evident than in Myanmar. As noted above, the stakes are high for Myanmar and the legitimacy of the process is crucial for the credibility of outcomes. The Elec- toral Commission of that country is credited with a good performance thus far but “restrictions resulting from the fighting in northern Shan state and disenfranchisement of Muslim communities in Rakhine state are likely to be clear shortcomings” (International Crisis Group 2015, p. 14).

Indonesia experienced significant violent political turmoil during its first post-Suharto democratic election in 1999. Indonesia’s transition and peaceful elections in 2004, speaks to the importance of electoral reform and the crucial role an impartial Electoral Commission accompanied by a credible disputes settlement systems. Indonesia. In 2004, Indonesia’s electoral reforms paved the way for direct elections of leaders, president and national legislature (Caballero Anthony, p. 32). An independent electoral commission and a con- stitutional court to settle disputes over the process and outcomes were key parts of the reform. Norris notes, nevertheless, that Indonesia continues to face electoral integrity issues with money politics and vote buying.

Malaysia’s one party state experiences problems with money politics, media, voter registration its electoral laws and district boundaries. The 2013 election occasioned calls for mass protests by Anwar Ibrahim.

In the Philippines, commentators have long noted the persistence and allegations of electoral fraud. Electoral results were often contested on the grounds of massive cheating and vote buying. No electoral cycle in the Philippines is immune from this charge. In the Philippines, election outcomes are accompanied by unrest and coup attempts as the results are challenged.

202

Thailand has experienced serious violent urban conflict in its last two elections as pro- and anti-Thaksin forces have clashed.

While elections may be well administered in Thailand their acceptance is derailed by partisan rancor and street violence (Norris, 2015). Whereas Thais have overwhelmingly opted for electoral democracy, a minority in the country has not.

Resolving electoral disputes has been on the agenda of the civil society organization Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). Supporting the work of ANFREL and electoral integrity CSOs is of vital importance. Founded in 1997 as a network of domestic civil society organizations from across Asia ANFREL engages in elections observation missions (EOMs), training and capacity-building programs and advocacy on a range of elections and democracy related policy issues. ANFREL’s observers, seek to apply international standards for free and fair elections, though there is concern over ANFREL’s observers’ closeness with the countries being observed. Their “uniquely Asian,” approach is characterized by ANFREL as “mediating between Asian countries and international standards by “translating the con- ventions/treaties on democracy into more practical ways” (Alpern, 2012: p. 13), Anfrel announced in March 2015 a set of indicators for the holding of free and fair democratic elections to assess the quality and integrity of elections across the region (Anfrel, 2015). A noteworthy aspect of its work is consideration of how to advance the inclusion of minorities in countries where they face challenges to full participation in political life (ANFREL, 2015b). The resiliency of authoritarianism, security sector reform and middle class unrest Resistance to authoritarian tendencies by the region’s middle classes gives rise to potentially violent political unrest. Factors that have driven this resistance include the authoritarianism of dominant elites, the continuing influence of military establishments in politics and corruption.

Thailand, for example, experienced the high-handed approach of Thaksin Shinawatra, who ran a large telecommunication company. Perhaps unaccus- tomed to the comprises required in politics his CEO-like approach was dis- liked and had important repercussions on the brewing conflict in the country’s southern provinces, which he sought to reign in by stronger military tactics. Since January 2004, violence in southern Thailand has escalated, especially between some Muslim insurgents and the army (CFR, p. 37).

Elsewhere, while a new generation of leaders is present, family ties and paternalism fuel a sense of entitlement to leadership. Opposition groups are sufficiently marginalized or held in check to preserve the new generation’s hold on power, backed by powerful military establishments. In some instances

203

polls are manipulated in favor of ruling individuals. Indonesia provides a necessary and powerful counter-example.

Reinforcing the momentum towards democracy requires sustained efforts to assert civilian control of military establishments. The election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in Indonesia in 2014 was a significant victory against the military establishment, represented by Jokowi’s opponent, Prabowo Subianto, a former army general and the son-in-law of late president Suharto. Pongsudhirak notes that Jokowi is Indonesia’s first leader “without any per- sonal connection to its authoritarian past” (Pongsudhirak, 2015b). The election was free, with 70 per cent voter participation. This is a further setback to the Indonesian military’s influence. A decade earlier, a senior adviser to President Habibie had noted that, “The [Indonesian] military saw the coming of democracy to Asia and Indonesia, and are preparing for that.” The chief of socio-political affairs of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) has likened events in Indonesia to past developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He acknowledged that ABRI for some time has studied other recent cases of transition from military to civilian rule so as to prepare itself for such an eventuality. In his view, ABRI was following a pattern familiar across East Asia in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand (Acharya, p. 427). The peaceful 2004 election was a key moment in the transformation of Indonesian society towards a real democracy. Other important reforms included the series of pivotal military reforms introduced starting from the Habibie period which essentially brought the Indonesian military, TNI (Tentera Nasional Indonesia), which had ruled the country for more than 35 years, under civilian control. “The restructuring of the TNI’s dwfungsi (dual function) doctrine and the subsequent adoption of the New Paradigm doctrine paved the way for civilian rule. Under this new doctrine, measures were adopted to remove the military’s role and involvement in domestic politics. Incremental reforms began with the reduction of military-appointed seats in the now defunct People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the phasing out of TNI representation in parliament by 2004. The TNI reforms also prohibited active military officers from being elected and/or appointed to government positions, as well as the adoption of the principle of neutrality in politics as reflected in the military severing its formal links with Golkar. These military reforms were further consolidated during Abdulrrahman Wahid’s and Megawati Sukarnoputri’s presidencies when the military was separated from the police in 1999, and a civilian was appointed as the minister of defence, a post traditionally held by a military general” (Acharya, 1999: pp. 31–32).

When compared with its neighbors, Thailand’s democratization process had a similar trajectory to Indonesia’s with military regimes giving way to democratic systems. The constitution of 1997 put in place several measures designed to improve the country’s political system, remove the military from

204

politics, and institutionalize democracy (Caballero, pp. 34–35). However, the military coup in May 2014, allegedly to re-establish security as anti- and pro-Thaksin forces clashed, does not bode well for the consolidation of democracy in Thailand. Under Article 44 of an interim constitution Prime Minister General Prayut Chan-ocha has assumed absolute power. Though martial law has ended, expert commentator on Thai politics, Thitinan Pong- sudirak, has noted that, under Article 44, “the prime minister alone will govern the country backed by a military regime” (Pongsudhirak, 2015a). Thailand’s democracy has been seriously set back and may be damaged for a long time. Proposals by the ruling junta for a new constitution, the 20th charter since 1932, are aimed at preventing “parliamentary dictatorship” and preventing a return of Thaksin. A 36-member Constitution Drafting Com- mittee (CDC) appointed by the coup-makers had proposed a draft constitution, ultimately rejected, that would have seen only 77 of 200 senators being elected. A proposed Amnesty covering the coup in May 2014 bore the poten- tial to incite violence. In 2013, the then ruling party, had proposed a similar bill to forgive most political-related offences committed in the wake of the last coup in 2006 and this triggered months of mass protests and eventually, a military takeover (Aukarrapon, 2015). It seems that the military is proposing unacceptable drafts for consideration with the objective of remaining in power as long as the transition to a new monarch is not completed. There appear to be rifts within the military that may threaten overall stability as senior, old guards loyal to the King face competition for power from a newer and “semi-autonomous” elite unit “at the Service of Queen Sirikit.” General Prayuth Chan-Ocha was commander of the Queen’s Guard, the 21st Infantry regiment, founded after the Korean War to protect the queen. The very influ- ential old guard is allegedly led by former Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, appointed by the King in the 1980s. The succession of the ailing King is creating rifts with each faction favoring different candidates. Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn was favored by the old guard. General Prayuth, allegedly facing pressure from the Prem faction, has placed more of the Queen’s Guard in positions of power, notably his brother, at one point tipped to become the next army chief (Chachavaipongpun, 2015).

The military’s role in Myanmar politics is still controversial. One quarter of the seats in each legislature are reserved for military representatives appointed by the commander-in-chief. The elections were for the other three quarters. It initiated the transition as a way of diversify its foreign policy interests and, despite efforts to prevent an NLD majority, must now contend with the outright majority of the NLD, which was also backed by non- Burman ethnic groups. The military has supported the elections and pledged to ensure they are not undermined. It has indicated that it is not adverse to a decreasing role in politics (International Crisis Group 2014; Myoe 2011).

205

Nudging this along will require a good working relationship between the Commander in Chief of the Armed forces, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, who has a constitutional mandate over the defense forces, police and border guards and who appoints ministers in these three areas. Gradual security sector reform that involves changing rules on amending the constitution requires 20% of parliamentarians to put forward a proposal, “more than” 75 percent of parliament to approve the amendment and a public referendum (Bingham Centre, 2010).

Corruption and money politics weaken state institutions and generate unrest. In the Philippines, “as political families and personalities compete fiercely for votes, money politics becomes almost the order of the day” (Caballero Anthony, 2005: p. 40). Corruption fuels middle-class resentment. Malaysia’s current corruption scandal involving the Prime Minister is a case in point. Amnesty International has reported serious government crack-down on civil society and opposition forces government officials,’ including PM Najib (son of a former Malaysian PM), alleged siphoning off of some hundreds of millions of dollars from state-owned development company 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB). Mass demonstrations, known as Bersih, were scheduled for the end of August 2015 to protest government corruption (Amnesty International, 2015). While seemingly cleared by the Malaysian anti-corruption commission (MACC), the latter nevertheless revealed that $US700m in accounts held by the prime minister had come from donors (Guardian, 2015). Serious allegations emerging from various sources, notably the Wall Street Journal, reported that the money held by Najib were linked to the government’s 1MDB (Guardian, 2015).

Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party, in power since 1959, has achieved great respect for its measures to combat corruption. Ministers and civil servants are paid high salaries to dis-incentivize corrupt practices. Singapore, by all accounts, has succeeded. Its affluent middle classes, despite occasional minor rumblings against the paternalism of its leaders, have per- ceived the State as non-corrupt.

The new middle classes in Southeast Asia have come out, elsewhere, strongly against authoritarianism and related corruption by rule of elites. Non-corrupt paternalism may still be acceptable but the rampant cronyism and corruption of yesteryear is no longer tolerated. People power in the Philippines and the Indonesian example are powerful demonstrations of the “rumblings” of peoples of ASEAN for greater participation in governance. The ousting of Suharto and the military from Indonesian political life and mass protests by Thais in Bangkok are clear signs of middle class unrest with authoritarian rule. Even as Thailand experiences military rule once again, civilian-military relations have changed significantly over the past two decades, towards less tolerance for army intervention in political life.

206

Pongsudirak has warned that “it is difficult to imagine that the Thailand of the 21st century, which has spent the past four decades opposing military dictatorship, will accept absolute power. More rumblings of dissent are being expressed, not least from the vibrant civil society segments and the Thai media that originally favoured the coup” (Pongsudhirak, 2015a). Weak State Institutions and Strengthening of the Civil Service Sector Weak institutions and political legitimacy are perennial problems in the region (Caballero Anthony, p. 40). The linkage between weak state institutions that are perceived to be illegitimate and violent conflict is nowhere more evident than in Myanmar. The military has been the main institution seeking to enforce the authority of the State over multiple minority groups. Most of the latter have been at war with the State for the last six decades. While a new, democratic constitutional arrangement was ushered in 2010, paving the way for the first real democratic elections in 26 years, the continuing influence of the military establishment on the electoral process, notably preventing the most popular leader from competing, threatens to leave a bad stain on the elections.

Thai state institutions have been weakened considerably in the partisanship that has taken place in the last two elections. Successive leaders and political parties have used state institutions to advance partisan goals, thereby seri- ously diminishing state institutions such as parliament and the constitutional court. The 1997 constitution had led to the establishment of independent agencies and courts to enhance democracy and promote transparency and accountability, namely: the Election Commission, the National Commission on Human Rights, the Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission, and the State Audit Commission (Caballero, 33–34). These have all been seriously damaged in the ongoing partisan bickering and the military is suspicious of the ability of politicians and civil service to secure long-lasting stability. It is noteworthy that the National Commission on Human Rights is being decimated by the current government.

Timor Leste, the newest and weakest state in the region, has similar dilemmas with its new state institutions. Its attempts to decentralize power are so far unsuccessful as traditional, local institutions face redundancy from new, electoral processes and institutions. Demands for Autonomy and the Effective Management of Decentralization Demands for autonomy within States must be addressed as part of the tran- sition process. Local grievances and claims for greater self-determination have

207

existed throughout the history of Southeast Asia. Democratic transitions bring these claims more sharply to the fore. Decentralization can take place through de-concentration (transfer of services, not authority), delegation (transfer of decision-making accountable to the centre) or devolution (trans- fer or authority to local administration). However, decentralization must be mindful of the “resilience of customary forms of political legitimacy.”

The Indonesia, the Philippines and Timor Leste have all embarked on decentralization processes. The Philippines program began in 1991, when the government adopted the Local Government Code to devolve power to the country’s provinces and empower local government units once under the central control of the national government. The most significant achieve- ments in this regard were the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras. This Code was a point of reference for Indonesia when it was formulating its own decentralization program. Indonesia underwent a significant transfer of power to local authorities. Timor Leste’s Independence successive plans for decentralization are on- going but have met with serious challenges.

The latter case harbors lessons about the perils of decentralization. Among the variety of possible reasons for this failure thus far is “a conflict between socio-political legitimacy in terms of the established patterns of authority and democratic legitimacy in a substantive sense” (Sahin, 2014). The introduction of an electoral system for the popular choice of xefe suku and other local civilian authorities has touched upon previously established forms of equi- librium, and in particular on the role of liurais, formerly considered sacred and unchangeable. There is an acknowledge gulf between “structural tenets of Timorese traditional societies and the requirements of modern democratic principles based on the claims of citizens to a status of equality” (ibid.). A de-romanticization of traditional, pristine traditional life is required. Em- powering local communities cannot be seen simply as accepting local customary practices. At the same time, grafting elections onto local forms of authority may not be successful. A just medium, blending modern electoral practices with traditional customary political mechanisms, may be necessary.

Federalism is much discussed in relation to Myanmar and is the likely path forward. The State resists such moves, preferring the term “Union” but the 2008 Constitution has laid some ground work, albeit imperfect, which explicitly divides the exercise of state power between different branches of government, and lists the Union, Regions, States and Self-Administered Areas as subjects sharing these powers. In the long run, the demand of ethnic minorities for decentralization of authority is pulling Myanmar in that direc- tion. For example, in peace talks between the State and ethnic groups, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), which included most rebel groups, announced in December 2014 their intention to create a so-called

208

Federal Union Army, to bolster defense cooperation and to lay the seeds of a future single federal army for Myanmar in the future (Irrawaddy Times, 2014). Ethnic groups, such as the Shak and Karen, demand a “real federalism.” The major ethnic groups are not seeking independence but “now mostly endorse a federalist policy, with autonomy for the ethnic states within a federal union” (Brand, 2014: pp. 27–28).

Decentralization across the region is a means of addressing deeper his- torical, economic, social and political grievances in Southeast Asian societies that have generated much internal conflict since independence. Grievances over Human Rights Violations and Early Warning Measures Grievances over human rights violations obviously surface dramatically in more democratic societies. Human rights protection systems are critical for peace in such a context but they are weak at present across the region. Assessing the risks of violence from grievances over rights violations is critical in the absence strong protection mechanisms. It is vital in a region that comprises hundreds of minority groups and large indigenous populations that seek their rightful place in society.

There is “increasing evidence” that violations of economic, social and cul- tural rights are causes, consequences and often predictors of social or civil unrest, violence and even violent conflict (OHCHR, 2015: p. 3). A discussion paper on “Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Social Unrest, Conflict and Early Warning,” prepared for an expert seminar on this topic organized by the OHCHR in July 2015, noted that violations of ESCRs are causes, con- sequences and often predictors of social or civil unrest, violence and even violent conflict (ibid.). Analysis on the causes of the conflict between the Philippine State and the Moros, a Muslim minority, has pointed to “the failure of the government to provide public goods; its control over rich resources; a dysfunctional legal system in the Moro community; the fact that the Moro people suffer from the highest levels of poverty in the Philippines; and discrimination by the Christian majority towards Muslims. Inequality seems to be a key determinant of the Moro conflict…” (OHCHR, 2015: p. 6). Furthermore, “economic and financial issues, unemployment and inequal- ities inside society have increased social tensions” (ibid.). Demonstrations, riots and other manifestations of social discontent were seen as rooted in violations and denial of ESCRs. They were often accompanied by lack of access to justice, accountability and political participation. Research has also pointed to gender inequality as a risk factor, from “evidence that States characterized by gender inequality that is rooted in discrimination and struc- tural violence are more tolerant of violence as a means of resolving griev-

209

ances, and thus significantly more likely to experience internal conflict” (ibid., p. 9).

Some quantitative academic literature has emerged on human rights and early warning has generated correlations between abuses and the level of democracy, economic development, population size, past repression and in- volvement in international and civil war (Poe et al., 2006: 486). Democracy was associated with the least amounts of repression. Economic scarcity on the other hand was associated with increased tensions and likely repression. Early warning models were developed for inter-state conflicts, refugee move- ments, genocide and politicide, to predict ethnic conflict in terms of which groups were most at risk (ibid., 487–488). Bhavnani has examined griev- ances and violent conflicts in urban settings, which is highly appropriate in today’s world in which over half of humanity lives in urban areas (Bhavnani, 2014). Inequality has been correlated as a causal factor of civil war in situations of horizontal inequality (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2013).

Given the linkages between human rights violations and internal conflict, in the context of Southeast Asia’s weak human rights protection mechanisms, the development of early warning systems and risk assessment (EW/RA) should be undertaken by academic institutions and the international commu- nity. National and regional protection mechanisms in Southeast Asia should also develop EW/RA capacities. The ASEAN Regional Forum, a conflict prevention mechanism, could usefully incentivize national and regional mechanisms to enhance their protection capacities by engaging in human rights based EW/RA that seeks to prevent internal conflicts. Most of the international conflicts of the post-Second World War era have started within states (see Ramcharan, 2016).

Conclusion: The Need for Enhanced Human Rights Protection Mechanism Democratic transitions in Southeast Asia have witnessed much political unrest and the risk of internal violence remains significant in the region. A number of factors that lead to violence in democratic transitions have been identified and treated above.

Addressing these factors requires, inter alia, the crafting of a credible human rights protection systems. At present they are weak across the region and need assistance. Assessing the risks of violence from grievances over rights violations is critical in the absence strong protection mechanisms. The development of early warning systems and risk assessment should be under- taken by national and regional protection mechanisms in Southeast Asia, including the ASEAN Regional Forum.

210

NOTES

1. “Geneva Peacebuilding Platform,” White Paper, 2015. Accessed on 23 June 2016. http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/White%20Paper%20on%20Peace- building.pdf

2. See generally, Charney, Craig (1999), “Civil Society, Political Violence, and Democratic Transitions: Business and the Peace Process in South Africa, 1990 to 1994,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 41(1): 182–206; Clare, Joe (2007), “Democratization and International Conflict: The Impact of Institutional Legacies,” Journal of Peace Research 44(3): 259–276; Cervellati, Matteo, Piergiuseppe For- tunato, and Uwe Sunde (2011), “Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of Violence During the Transition,” IZA DP No. 5555, March, http://ftp.iza.org/dp 5555.pdf; Goldsmith, Arthur A. (2010), “Mixed Regimes and Political Violence in Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 48(3): 413–433; Haggard, Stephen, and Robert Kaufman (2012), “Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transi- tions and Stability of Democratic Rule,” American Political Science Review 106(2): 495–516; Goldsmith, Benjamin (2014), “Domestic Political Institutions and the Initiation of International Conflict in East Asia: Some Evidence for an Asian Democratic Peace,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 14(1): 59–90; Jawad, Pamela (2006), “Democracy, Diversity and Conflict: Divisive Conflict and State Failure: Chances and Challenges for Democratic Consolidation in Georgia after the Revolution,” December, Cornell University Peace Studies Program; Regan, Patrick M., and Sam R. Bell (2010), “Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?” Political Research Quarterly 63(4): 747– 759; United States Institute of Peace (2007), Political Violence and Democratic Uncertainty in Ethiopia, Special report 192, August; and UN University (2000), “The Coherence of Democratic Peacebuilding,” Research Paper No. 147.

3. See the “ASEAN Community Blueprint,” accessible at http://asean.org/wp- content/uploads/archive/5187-18.pdf

4. An earlier, shorter version, “Democratic Transitions and Internal Political Conflict in Southeast Asia,” was published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in December 2014.

5. Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam 6. The Peace and Conflict Instability Ledger represents a synthesis of leading

research on conceptualizing, explaining and forecasting political instability (Backer et al., 2014, p. 1). The Ledger presents each country’s likelihood of future instability as a risk ratio, which is the relative risk of instability in a country compared to the average estimated likelihood of instability for the 28 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), who are widely held to be the most stable countries. The estimated probability of the average OECD country experiencing instability in the period 2012–2014 is 0.007 (ibid., p. 6). The new rankings were scheduled for publication in May 2016 and were not available to the author at the time of writing.

211

REFERENCES Alpern, Vanessa Johanson (2012), “Promoting Electoral Integrity in Southeast Asia:

ANFREL and ASEAN,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. International Idea.

ANFREL (2015a), “Indicators for Free and Fair Elections,” E-Bulletin 2(2): 10–11. ANFREL (2015b), “Asian Electoral Stakeholder Forum Draws Much Needed Atten-

tion to Electoral Challenges in Asia.” Press release, March 19. http://anfrel.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Conclusion-of-the-2015-AES-Forum.pdf

Acharya, Amitav (1999), “Southeast Asia’s Democratic Moment,” Asian Survey 39(3): 418–432.

Amnesty International (2015), “Malaysia: End ‘Far-reaching’ Crackdown in Wake of Corruption Scandal,” August 4.

Backer, David, Paul Huth, and Jonathan Wikenfield (2014), Peace and Conflict 2014. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Backer, David, Ravi Bhavnani, and Paul Hut (2016), Peace and Conflict 2016. New York: Routledge.

Bermeo, Nancy (1997), “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions,” Comparative Politics 29(3) (Transitions to Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow): 305–322.

Bingham Centre for The Rule of Law (2010), Constitutional Reform in Myanmar: Priorities and Prospects for Amendment, January. Bingham Centre WP 01.

Brand, Marcus (2014), “‘Towards ‘Genuine Federalism’? – Myanmar’s Inexorable Path towards Constitutional Devolution and Decentralized Governance,” Draft paper for Conference on Constitutionalism and Legal Change in Myanmar Work- shop, February 13–14, Singapore. Accessed through Academia.edu.

Caballero-Anthony, Mely (2005), “Political Transitions in Southeast Asia,” South- east Asian Affairs (Singapore: ISEAS), 24–44.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Halvard Buhaug (2013), Inequality, Grievances and Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chachavalpongpun, Pavin (2015), “A Thai House Divided,” The New York Times, July 20, p. 9.

Davies, Mathew (2014), “An Agreement to Disagree: The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33(3): 107–129.

Daxecker, Ursula (2007), “Perilous Polities? An Assessment of the Democratiza- tion–Conflict Linkage,” European Journal of International Relations 13(4): 527– 554.

Economist Intelligence Unit (2013), “World Democracy Index 2012,” online: <http:// pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf> (November 3, 2014).

Electoral Integrity Project (2015), “Why Elections Fail and What We Can Do about It,” University of Sydney.

Feijó, Rui Graça (2015), “Timor-Leste: The Adventurous Tribulations of Local Gov- ernance after Independence,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34(1): 85–114.

212

Freedom House (2014), Freedom in the World 2014, online: <www.freedomhouse. org/sites/default/files/Country%20Status%20%26%20Ratings%20Overview%2 C%201973-2014.pdf> (November 3, 2014).

Gomez, James, and Robin Ramcharan (2014), “Introduction: Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33(3): 3– 17.

Guo, Sujian (1999), “Democratic Transitions,” Research Note, Issues and Studies, 35(4): 133–148. http://online.sfsu.edu/sguo/Renmin/June%2029_transition/ Democratic%20Transition_Sujian%20Guo.pdf

International IDEA (2006), Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Pursuing Peace in the 21st Century. Stockholm: Idea International.

International Crisis Group (2014), “Myanmar Military: Back to the Barracks?” Asia Briefing 143, Yangon/Brussels, April 22.

International Crisis Group (2015), “The Myanmar Elections: Results and Implica- tions,” Asia Briefing 147, December 9.

Norris, Pippa (2016), “Electoral Integrity in Asia,” in Tunjen Cheng and Yunhan Chu (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Democratization in East Asia. New York: Routledge. Forthcoming

Naing, Saw Yan (2014), “Ethnic Alliance Ponders Future Federalism, Creates ‘Fed- eral Union Army,’” The Irrawaddy, December 9. http://www.irrawaddy.org/ burma/ethnic-alliance-ponders-future-federalism-creates-federal-union-army.html

Lamb, Kate (2015), “Malaysian Prime Minister Had $700m of ‘Donations’ in Bank Account – Watchdog,” The Guardian, August 4.

Lefevre, Amy S. (2016), “Thai Junta Could Opt for a Previous Constitution if Draft Rejected, Panel Official Says,” Reuters, February 9, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ uk-thailand-politics-idUKKCN0VI0P2

Mendoza, Amado (2013), “10 Things We Should Know about Philippine Elections,” ABC/CBN News (Philippines), July 3.

Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder (1995), “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20(1): 5–38.

Mansfield, Edward, and Jack Snyder (1995), “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs 74(3): 79–98.

Mann, Michael (1999), “The Dark Side of Democracy: The Modern Tradition of Ethnic and Political Cleansing,” New Left Review 1(235): 18–46.

Myoe, Maung A. (2011), “The Soldier and the State: the Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar since 2011,” Southeast Asia Research 22(2): 1–17

Niyomyat, Aukkarapon (2015), “Draft Thai Constitution Complete, but Strife Seen ahead,” Reuters, April 17. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/17/us- thailand-politics-constitution-idUSKBN0N81RP20150417

Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio (ed.) (2014), In 100 Years. Leading Economists Predict the Future. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Peou, Sorpong (2014), “The Limits and Potential of Liberal Democratisation in Southeast Asia,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33(3): 19–47.

Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2015a), “Thai Junta Goes from Martial Law to Absolute Power,” East Asia Forum. June 6. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/06/06/ thai-junta-goes-from-martial-law-to-absolute-power/

213

Pongsudhirak, Thitinan (2015b), “Jokowi Saves Indonesia’s Democracy (and Maybe Southeast Asia’s Too,” East Asia Forum. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014 /07/28/jokowi-saves-indonesias-democracy-and-maybe-southeast-asias-too/

Ramcharan, Robin (2016), “Human Rights and Conflict Prevention in South-East Asia: The Protection Gap,” Routledge Handbook of Human Rights in Asia. New York: Routledge. Forthcoming

Sahin, Selver B. (2014), “Timor-Leste’s Foreign Policy: Securing State Identity in the Post-Independence Period,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33(2): 3–25.

South China Morning Post (2014), “Benigno Aquino Says He May Try to Change Constitution So He Can Run Again,” August 14, http://www.scmp.com/news /asia/article/1573823/benigno-aquino-says-he-may-try-change-constitution-so- he-can-run-again

Streckfuss, David (2015), “The Contrecoup in Thailand,” International New York Times, June 17, p. 7.

The Guardian (2015), “Malaysian Prime Minister Had $700m of ‘Donations’ in Bank Account – Watchdog,” August 4, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015 /aug/04/malaysia-corruption-watchdog-najib-razak-donations-1mdb

Zakaria, Fareed (2007), The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W. W. Norton.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.