Attribution Theory - Annotated Bibliography

Inter-organisational post-crisis communication

Restoring stakeholder confidence in the UK oil industry safety regime following two

helicopter incidents

Joanna McDonald and Isabella Crawford Department of Information, Communication and Media,

Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, UK

Abstract

Purpose – This paper aims to analyse the post-crisis communication response of the UK oil industry both from a management and employee perspective following two major helicopter incidents in 2009. The purpose of this paper is to develop further understanding of the merits of a cross-industry post-crisis communication strategy for certain crisis types.

Design/methodology/approach – This research is a single case study focusing on the Helicopter Task Group (HTG). Thirteen members of the HTG were interviewed and 250 questionnaires distributed to the workforce. Results were analysed against a literature review of current post-crisis communication theory.

Findings – The study demonstrates that where a crisis is deemed to genuinely cross company boundaries, an inter-organisational approach to post-crisis communications is of mutual benefit to all stakeholders, providing certain conditions for dialogue are met.

Research limitations/implications – This paper only focuses on one crisis event. Further research is required with other inter-organisational groups formed to lead a cross-industry response to a crisis.

Practical implications – This case study provides a model for cross-industry pre-crisis planning and post-crisis renewal strategy where the aim is not to attribute blame, but to respond to a wider community of concerns and issues that are deemed to cross company and institutional boundaries.

Originality/value – The research demonstrates that the process of rebuilding stakeholder relationships and renewal is possible prior to any formal attribution of blame or apology.

Keywords Crisis, Corporate communications, Relationship management, Issues management, Oil industry, Stakeholders

Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction In 2009, after two serious incidents involving North Sea helicopters the cross-industry trade association Oil & Gas UK initiated The Helicopter Task Group (HTG). It operated from April 2009 to August 2010 and brought together 23 stakeholder groups to “act as the focal point for sharing information, advice and learning across the industry and with other stakeholders” (Oil & Gas UK, 2009, p. 13). A core objective was “to improve confidence in the safety of helicopter operations” among the workforce (Oil & Gas UK, 2010a).

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/1356-3289.htm

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Received 13 June 2011 Accepted 12 December 2011

Corporate Communications: An International Journal

Vol. 17 No. 2, 2012 pp. 173-186

q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1356-3289

DOI 10.1108/13563281211220300

In October 2010, Bob Keiller, CEO of PSN Group, was honoured by the International Regulators Forum in recognition of “the great leadership Bob displayed in his role as chair of the group”. He was the first individual to receive the Global Offshore Safety award. The HTG “model of engagement” was replicated in the UK Oil Spill Prevention and Response Advisory Group (OSPRAG), a cross industry forum created to consider issues arising from the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill (International Regulators Forum, 2010; Oil & Gas UK, 2010a).

Virtually any major emergency event that incurs multiple loss of life is subject to a long period of inquiry before official findings are released and any blame attributed. The official process can leave all those impacted in “a state of limbo” (Molloy, 2010, p. 1) and “the impression can appear that there is very little activity ongoing“ (Birnie, 2010, p. 1). It took more than two years for the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) to publish its investigative reports into the accident, which even then do not “apportion blame or liability” (Air Accidents Investigations Branch, 2010). The post-crisis period is further prolonged which both the Scottish Police and Crown Office and Procurator-Fiscal Service (COPFS) consider whether any civil action is required (Herald Scotland, 2011).

The collaborative aspect of HTG, as well as its temporary existence, positions it outside the majority of post-crisis communication theory which focuses on the restoration of image, or renewal of individual entities or a community (Coombs, 2009; Jaques, 2009; Jaques, 2010; Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010; Griffin Padgett and Allison, 2010). Discourse of renewal and Restorative Rhetoric (RR), are categories of post-crisis communications which go “beyond issues of blame and responsibility” to instead “recognize opportunities and set new standards for service”. Instead of “reducing the offensiveness of the occurrence and maintaining a positive image”, they facilitate “dialogue between the pubic and crisis leaders” with the aim “of creating consensus around efforts to rebuilt, recreate and reconstitute organisation”. (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, pp. 128, 133, 134).

Since the formation of the cross-industry HTG was an unprecedented tactic in the management of post-crisis issues within the oil industry, the rationale for using this single case study was its revelatory nature. The main research question was “how effective was the HTG as an inter-organisational, post-crisis communications strategy?”.

2. Background The total UK offshore workforce is around 43,000 (Mitchell and Braithwaite, 2008, p. 484). There are “more than 25,000 helicopter flights carrying a half million passengers each year between the oil and gas operations in the North Sea” (OilVoice.com, 2010).

On 18 February 2009, a Eurocopter EC225 Super Puma helicopter, operated by Bond Offshore Helicopters (Bond), ditched at sea enroute to the BP ETAP (Eastern Trough Area Project) platform with 18 persons onboard (Osborne, 2009). All survived; confidence in UK oil and gas industry emergency procedures was apparently high (Bates et al., 2009; Gunn, 2009).

Within six weeks however, there were two further incidents, both fatal. On 12 March a Sikorsky S92-A helicopter operated by Cougar Helicopters crashed offshore of

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Newfoundland, Canada, causing 17 fatalities; only 1 of 18 persons survived. Though the accident was in Canada, the Sikorsky S92 is also flown in the North Sea. On April 1, Flight 85N, a Eurocopter AS332 L2 Super Puma Mk 2, again operated by Bond, ditched in the North Sea while returning from BP Miller platform, resulting in 16 fatalities (Tonelli, 2009).

Between 1976 and 2006, over 50 million passengers were transported to and from UK offshore oil installations. In almost the same period, 1976-2009, there were 31 helicopter accidents, of which 12 were fatal, resulting in the loss of 118 lives (CAA, personal communication. 19 April 2011). Responsibility for regulating UK offshore health and safety and aviation safety resides with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) respectively (Health and Safety Executive, 2005).

A 2007 report describes the “long held perception” of the workforce that “offshore helicopter operations are a high risk mode of transport”, even its accident rate is “of a similar order” to car transportation (Oil & Gas UK, 2007, pp. 5, 7).

During a crisis, confidence is undermined and the efficacy of preventative measures is brought into question as the regional paper reflected:

Three major incidents in such a short time will again focus attention on safety procedures, maintenance regimes and possible equipment failures. It will hit the confidence of all who use these aerial workhorses of the North Sea (Press & Journal, 2009).

Offshore workers and contractor companies have no choice as to which operator they use. Helicopter travel is viewed “as part of the contract” (Mitchell and Braithwaite, 2008). Within two weeks of the Flight 85N accident, the pilots union BALPA was calling for a cross-industry safety summit. Regional organisers of both the Rail, Maritime and Transport union (RMT), and Unite, Britain’s largest union, who collectively represent thousands of offshore workers, were lobbying for the entire Superpuma L2 fleet to be grounded until a full explanation could be given (Bell, 2009). In the Scottish Parliament, First Minister Alex Salmond said that a public inquiry should be held (Crighton, 2009).

The 1992 Cormorant Alpha helicopter crash was described by one Union representative as a low point in terms of communication between stakeholders “because it epitomised what we all thought was wrong with the industry” (Molloy, 2010, p. 4). In 2009 there was potential for another hostile standoff. The industry however adopted a proactive stance, formed the Helicopter Task Group and opened dialogue with its stakeholders.

Literature review A literature search was conducted to build the conceptual framework of post-crisis communication and provided a reference for the methods of research and analysis (Hart, 2005). Sellnow et al. (2010, pp. 656, 660) propose that potential advantages may include: an increase in “credible reputation” through the “halo effect”, and “collaborative advantage” through combining knowledge, skills, resources and sharing risk. Heath suggests that, providing imbalances between participants can be managed, organisations can work “collectively to achieve superior operating standards

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and to foster mutually beneficial relationships with their stakeholders”, (Sellnow et al., 2010, p. 661).

Coombs (2007, p. 135) suggests that post-crisis communication is “what management says and does after a crisis” but Jaques (2009, pp. 35, 37) found little consensus on the “definition or parameters” for the concept. Heath and Millar state that post-crisis communication “demonstrates how, why and when the organization has put things right, as well as what it plans to do to prevent the recurrence of similar crises” ( Jaques, 2009, p. 36). Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, pp. 127, 128) see the post-crisis phase merging with the communication elements of “emergency management and response” as well as “risk perception and communication” because “a crisis creates high levels of uncertainty with key stakeholders” which in turn generates a high demand for information. In crisis and post-crisis stages, “representatives, leaders or spokespersons for organisations associated with a crisis are usually called on to offer explanations and accounts” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010).

Jaques (2009, p. 37) divides post-crisis communication approaches between “responsive” and “prospective”. Responsive strategies are characterised by a “post mortem” evaluation of blame, action to prevent future crises, lessons learned, return to control and closure. Typically they are “framed within the rhetorical tradition of apologia, or a discourse of defence”, as captured by Benoit which, according to Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, p. 130), remains “the most comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding post-crisis communication”. Benoit’s image-restoration strategies include: “denial, evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness of the event, corrective action and mortification“, (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 130). Benoit applied this last strategy, mortification, “to confess and beg forgiveness,” to the case study of the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Benoit, 1997, p. 181). Mortification remains the typical strategy of the oil industry because of its “negative crisis history” (Maresh and Williams, 2010, p. 297). Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, p. 132) warn however that focusing on image restoration tends to “reify a view of rhetoric as strategy and a tendency to view accusations of wrong doing as problems of image as opposed to issues of substance”, which “has the potential to contribute to the perception of public relations as spin”.

Prospective strategies prepare for “aftershocks” ( Jaques, 2009, p. 37). Jaques (2007, p. 154) argues, that while many management models “present ‘post-crisis’ and ‘recovery’ as synonymous, the risks to an organisation post-crisis can be even greater than the crisis” itself ( Jaques, 2007, p. 154). Jaques (2007, p. 155) also cites the Exxon Valdez oil spill as one example where mishandling of crisis and post-crisis communications “led directly to prolonged and high profile public issues which had an impact far beyond the original event” ( Jaques, 2009, p. 41). For Jaques (2010, p. 443) Exxon Valdez evolved through several crises:

[. . .] first an environmental crisis (a major oil spill), then a management crisis (slow and inadequate response), then a management/litigation issue (sustained legal and public review of management response), and finally an industry safety issue.

“Crisis response”, Heath (2006, p. 247) argues, is a narrative that begins with “pre-crisis conditions” and continues into the “happily ever after”. The BP Deepwater Horizon

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spill of 2010 again drew Exxon into the public sphere to comment (Reuters, 2010). In 1986 Phelps described it as “puzzling” that “so many CEO’s and leaders failed to include disaster recovery planning and post-crisis management as a major part of their overall goals” ( Jaques, 2009, p. 37).

The discourse of renewal is a prospective strategy which “extends past image restoration to post-crisis innovation and adaptation of the organisation” ( Jaques, 2009, p. 37). It focuses on “the constitutive nature of discourse and the natural tendencies of organization and communities to self organise following crisis or disaster”. It goes “beyond issues of blame and responsibility to recognize opportunities and set new standards for service”. Instead of “reducing the offensiveness of the occurrence and maintaining a positive image”, discourse of renewal and the restorative rhetoric (RR) facilitate “dialogue between the pubic and crisis leaders” with the aim “of creating consensus around efforts to rebuilt, recreate and reconstitute organisation”. (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, pp. 128, 133, 134). Whereas the rhetorical tradition applies to a wider social or political discourse, the discourse of renewal concentrates on the “rhetorical contexts of disasters and crises, usually large in scale with immediate or potential impacts on the larger community”. (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 134).

Coombs (2009, p. 246) cautions that renewal strategy is not appropriate for all organisations or crises types. He outlines four criteria for its application:

(1) a strong ethical standard for the organisation pre-crisis; (2) strong stakeholder relationships for an organisation pre-crisis; (3) a focus on life beyond the crisis rather than seeking to escape blame; and (4) engaging in effective crisis communication.

Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, pp. 139, 140) acknowledge that the “discourse of renewal may be limited to specific contexts and limited kinds of crises and disasters”. Through the discourse of renewal, a leader who can “best connect with the public, build trust and create a vision for the future” often emerges to offer comfort and guidance, while being credible, honest and committed (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 135). Northouse (2009, p. 3) considers leadership as a relationship, where “influence and authority are shared”. According to Northouse (2009, p. 3) this leadership approach has “ethical overtones” because the leader must “work with followers to achieve their mutual purposes” and in order to achieve this, be aware of the “followers’ interests, ideas, positions, attitudes and motivations.” This model of leadership has close affinity with the normative two way symmetrical model of communication proposed by Grunig and Hunt (1984). The necessity for effective and equal dialogue is also raised in RR. Griffin Padgett and Allison (2010, p. 381) state that “in order to be an effective leader during a crisis, one must be considered authentic and have the ability to influence others”. The ability to communicate with stakeholder groups is a critical trait. “Leadership virtues, including credibility, honesty and commitment” are also “associated with renewing discourse” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 135). Research conducted by Schoenberg (2005) found that communication skills built on a foundation of authenticity and personal influence were identifiable components of an effective crisis leader. “Ethical communication and value-based approaches” are fundamental to discourse of renewal (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 137).

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Griffin Padgett and Allison (2010, p. 380) offer a new category of prospective response, “Restorative Rhetoric (RR)”. Building on the discourse of renewal, it applies to community-wide disasters where “the crisis in question is not a result of an organisation’s unethical behaviour or a grave company mistake”. RR takes account of layers of societal and other contexts in the dialogue that follows a crisis. It considers the rhetoric of the leader that emerges through the crisis to “restore faith in a core set of values and beliefs, facilitate healing for victims directly affected by the crisis and wider audiences”, “create a sense of security” and “establish a vision for the future”. They propose that in this specific crisis category, restoration is achieved through a visible leader who steers the community through: “(1) initial reaction; (2) assessment of the crisis; (3) issues of blame; (4) healing and forgiveness; and (5) corrective action and rebuilding through rhetorical vision”. Within RR, only once blame is established can leadership “guide the wave of resolution toward healing and absolution” (Griffin Padgett and Allison, 2010, p. 380). Authenticity is considered important to achieve phases 4 and 5 in order to secure “buy-in for rebuilding efforts” (Griffin Padgett and Allison, 2010, p. 389).

3. Methodology Both qualitative and quantitative devices were employed to enable the triangulation of data and enhance the validity of the research findings (Damon and Holloway, 2002; Yin, 2003).

Preliminary meetings were held with persons directly involved in the 2009 helicopter accidents in UK and Canada. These were not recorded or transcribed as they were intended only to illuminate the key priorities for research.

Documents were collected from HTG, industry web sites and participant organisations. The researcher also attended the final two HTG meetings and a helicopter safety awareness course.

A short, self-administered pre-coded questionnaire containing 28 questions was used to test the effectiveness of the HTG at addressing workforce concerns. 270 questionnaires issued were issued at offshore training courses and safety event in June and July 2010. 179 (66 per cent return rate) were completed. Of the responses 44 (24.6 per cent) were invalid. The software package SPSS was used to examine relationships between variables in the 135 valid responses. No tests for statistical significance were made as the data set was too small.

Twelve qualitative semi-structured interviews were held with representatives from each stakeholder group in HTG. Each interview was based around 19 questions and lasted approximately 60 minutes. The full text of each was transcribed then distilled into tables of key quotes per theme from each interviewee in a process termed “meaning condensation” (Kvale, 2009, p. 106). A pseudonym has been used for those interviewees that asked to remain anonymous.

4. Results and discussion There were many advantages in the HTG being formed, the most strategic being that the oil industry was “seen to be addressing concerns” (Molloy, 2010, p. 1). The inclusivity of HTG avoided accusations of an “industry white wash or cover up” and

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quelled the call for an independent form of scrutiny which may not necessarily have contributed any better toward learning lessons and improving safety (Keiller, 2010a, p. 10). HTG was established as mechanism to “project manage” future issues as well as immediate ones (Cooper, 2010, p. 1). This action agrees with the recommendation by Coombs (2007, 2009) and Jaques (2007, 2009) to have a post-crisis issues management strategy in place, as well as a pre-crisis one. Jaques (2009, p. 39, 2010, p. 443) believes that incorporating issues management within crisis planning, in a “joint-relational cycle” offers a holistic approach that anticipates “longer-term post crisis events, coroners’ inquests, judicial or political inquiries, prosecution, prolonged litigation and hostile media scrutiny.”

Arguably Bond and BP benefitted most as they were not left to deal with media and stakeholder questions alone. Because of the circumstances of the accident however, “nobody in their right mind was pointing the finger at BP saying this is your problem, your issue”. Although both aircraft were chartered by BP and operated by Bond, they were full of contractors from companies across the industry meaning it was “almost instantaneously” an industry, rather than a company event (Keiller, 2010a, p. 6). The UK oil industry recognised that “the enormity of the accident and its impact meant that the industry ought to be seen to be doing something collectively“ (Allen, 2010, p. 1). Collective action was also motivated in part by the relationship between the industry and helicopter transportation:

Our workforce don’t have a choice whether they want to fly if they want to stay in the industry and we want skilled people to stay in the industry, so as an industry it’s in our interest, our common interest to manage our response collectively (Cooper, 2010, p. 1).

HTG provided a central forum to exchange learning, identify and deal with issues, raise questions, and highlight and address concerns. Each participant could report confidently and with insider knowledge to their own organisations, the media, or any other external party on the status of different agenda items, as well as defend the decision to not include certain items: “people could speak powerfully about what was happening in a way where it was obvious that there was trust and mutual respect,“ (Cooper, 2010, p. 9). Transparent dialogue resulted in consistent messages coming from HTG despite its very diverse membership. The press would “not only speak with . . . Oil & Gas UK, they would be going to . . . [the Union] for a quote and . . . it was very rare that there was anything between the two of them” (Thompson, 2010, p. 12). There were “no dissenting voices with respect to what the outcomes were” because all had been involved in making the decisions (Munro, 2010, p. 12). It became difficult for organisations to refuse implement proposed changes because “you were saying no, potentially very publically, to your peers . . . against the backdrop of 16 people having lost their lives” (Keiller, 2010a, p. 12).

For some, such as the unions and safety representatives, the opportunity to “be equals with a permanent seat at the table” and to contribute fully toward each decision was new (Keiller, 2010a, p. 8). “We’d been on the sidelines shouting for years so to have the opportunity to actually be in the group and getting actively involved and hopefully exerting some influence, no brainer” (Molloy, 2010, p.8). One safety representative

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described feeling “equal” at the table and senior industry figures “really wanting to hear” what he had to say (Patrick, 2010, p. 9).

The heightened level of trust and co-operation is perhaps best exemplified in the relationship between the unions and Bond:

... The unions were extremely pragmatic and extremely supportive to the point they were commenting at times about the fact that the helicopter operators had done absolutely everything that they could have done (Munro, 2010, p. 10).

This comment was mirrored by a union representative who felt: “we had to get across to our members that everything our helicopter operators were doing was in accordance with the regulations as they stood” (Molloy, 2010, p. 15).

Anticipated long-term benefits include enhanced trust, co-operation and a greater willingness to work openly toward consensus. HTG improved mutual understanding of respective “roles and functions and positions” (Molloy, 2010, p. 18). This aspect was perhaps particularly true for agencies that interface with, but are external to, the oil industry, who find that instead of “several big companies,” those traditionally being “your Shells and BPs and Cheverons etc, we now have a multitude of companies” to work with across a “much more fragmented structure” (Birnie, 2010, p. 18; Thompson, 2010, p. 2).

HTG started with the immediate issues of co-ordinating relative response; providing a consistent voice to the workforce and media and sharing lessons learned, but moved on to create a programme of work to improve helicopter safety. All representatives strived to avoid it being a “lip service” committee (Patrick, 2010, p. 9). There was a “genuine desire to get to a different place” following a major tragedy that left senior management, the workforce and the wider community asking questions (Stephen, 2010, p. 10). “Rather than a lot of time being put on spin, time was put into getting everybody to contribute” (Taylor, 2010, p. 12). It was made “very clear right from the outset that we weren’t going to investigate the incident technically” (Allen, 2010, p. 10), but HTG did have a clear agenda to improve helicopter safety. This unifying purpose marries with the discourse of renewal which often is a “very explicit call to learn from the mistakes of the past and make something positive from the pain and loss” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, pp. 137, 389) and stands in contrast to the mortification strategy typically adopted by the oil industry.

According to Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, p.137), a renewal leader is one that can “best connect with the public, build trust and create a vision for the future”. The HTG took on the role of the listening, visionary leader for the UK oil industry and its wider community. One regulator described the UK oil industry as “the listening industry”, adding, “There’s a lot to be learned from the oil industry” (Civil Aviation Authority, 2010). While HTG “generated a huge amount of trust”, it recognised it also “uncovered a lot of difficulties to be overcome” (Munro, 2010, p. 18).

Many interviewees emphasised the significance of Keiller as Chairman. His dynamism, credibility, commitment and “aura” prevented power imbalances within the group and connected him and HTG with wider audiences (Patrick, 2010, p. 7). He met with families of victims and personally added names and signed 1,400 letters that were posted direct to people’s homes. He also wrote a two page letter which was

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distributed to all offshore staff within his own company and sent to all industry MDs for them to modify and cascade in their own organisations. He described this effort as “the only time I have taken this ‘direct’ approach” (Keiller, 2010b). His personal endeavour is in direct alignment with the discourse of renewal which is based in “ethical communication grounded in core values”, and fulfils “the traditional role of the leader or CEO as a comforting and guiding figure” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, pp. 135, 136).

The benefits of HTG membership agree with the proposals by Sellnow et al. (2010, p. 661) of “collaborative advantage” and achievement of “superior operating standards”, as well as fostering “mutually beneficial relationships” with stakeholders. It is also true that another benefit of “credible reputation” was achieved but image restoration was collateral advantage, not a primary motive. Many participants were personally very close to the event. Seeger and Griffin Padgett (2010, pp. 134, 137) suggest that “renewal emerges from a more natural instinct to rebuild or reconstitute order following loss” and a “form of natural cooperation and healing emerges that is not primarily concerned with strategic portrayals of causation and blame”. As one interviewee described: “there’s always that feeling whenever there is a crisis of what have we missed, where did it go wrong... I would expect in any major crisis that people would ask those questions” (Civil Aviation Authority, 2010). The collaborative aspect to HTG enabled every member organisation to unite and reconnect “with a core set of values and beliefs”, in this case, helicopter safety (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 133). As a representative from the emergency services observed: “they’re all in competition in a very competitive market for all the different contracts and so on, but in that quite tight area of safety they were all working very closely together” (Thompson, 2010, p. 18). The clear benefit of establishing and participating in the HTG was to collectively restate and demonstrate that industry level commitment and present a unified voice to its closest constituency, the workforce. The questionnaire results bore this out: 94.1 per cent (127) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, “with regard to helicopter travel, ‘the UK has a high safety standard and all is done to make things as safe as possible’”. HTG also achieved its primary objective “to improve confidence in the safety of helicopter operations” (Oil & Gas UK, 2010a) as 75.4 per cent (66) of respondent agreed or strongly agreed that they feel better informed about safety issues surrounding helicopters at the time of the questionnaire, than prior to the accident of flight 85N.

5. Conclusion Coombs noted that “strong ethical standards” and “strong stakeholder relationships” must already be established in pre-crisis relations if renewal strategy is to be successfully applied. Additionally, the post-crisis strategy must “focus on life beyond the crisis” and engage “in effective crisis communication” (Coombs, 2009, p. 246). The UK oil industry has consistently invested in its safety culture; exchanging best practice through Step Change for Safety and building stakeholder relationships via Oil & Gas UK (Offshoretechnology.com, 2005). These existing regimes provided a basis of credibility and trust within the workforce that HTG was able to use in order to “learn

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from the mistakes of the past and make something positive from the pain and loss” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 137).

HTG focused on tangible deliverables rather than spin and reputation management in order to develop “new standards of service” (Seeger and Griffin Padgett, 2010, p. 128) in helicopter safety. In building credibility and authority through wide inclusion and open decision making, HTG ultimately was successful in imposing change on the industry through peer pressure at leadership level and largely silence the “the thousand armchair” and “talking head” experts who may otherwise have helped to stir a second crisis in the “aftermath” (Taylor, 2010, p. 19; Thompson, 2010, p. 11).

Those interviewed suggested that the maturity of the UK oil industry, its small size, relatively strong resources, proximity to its community and importantly, its pre-crisis inter-organisational communication and networking structures between different stakeholders, including the very existence of Oil and Gas UK, a trade association that represents both operators and contractors, were factors which created the context for the formation of HTG (Oil & Gas UK, 2010b). These pre-existing factors marry with Jaques (2007, 2009) proposal of a melded pre and post crisis joint relational cycle.

HTG differed from RR and discourse of renewal on a number of points. First, HTG was a collaborative, inter-organisational group and not the group that experienced the crisis. Second, the renewal process was not of an organisation, but rather with a “core set of values and beliefs” about the importance in which the oil industry held helicopter safety in the industry. Third, the AAIB investigative reports were not published for either incident through the lifespan of HTG and even when they were, AAIB does not “apportion blame or liability” (Air Accidents Investigations Branch, 2010). Griffin Padgett and Allison (2010, p. 380) propose that RR follows similar stages to that of crisis management, that is:

(1) initial reaction;

(2) assessment of the crisis;

(3) issues of blame;

(4) healing and forgiveness; and

(5) corrective action and rebuilding through rhetorical vision.

HTG was able to achieve leadership and authenticity through a group rather than an individual, thus and progress towards “healing” before issues of accountability and responsibility were resolved.

The research found that very little guidance and literature exists for organisations who face dealing with the post-crisis “limbo” between crisis event and attribution of blame and responsibility and who therefore must manage issues that arise in the crisis “aftermath” (Molloy, 2010, p. 21). RR focuses on the rhetoric role of individual leaders, but not on providing a framework across an industry or community, though in this case study, HTG was taken to be the “leader”.

HTG proved to be a very effective inter-organisational post-crisis communications strategy in response to tragic events that impacted a wide community. Further research is required to develop the discourse of renewal and RR into a holistic,

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non-linear model of post-crisis communications that includes strategies for pre and post crisis issues management and collaborative, inter-organisational leadership toward community renewal.

RR is very limited in its application by requiring that “issues of blame” be resolved before progress can be made. HTG demonstrated that it is possible to make very practical steps toward renewal and the creation of “a sense of security” long before any formal findings of causation or responsibility are found and without compromising the integrity of official investigations (Griffin Padgett and Allison, 2010, p. 381).

6. Recommendations The clear evidence of HTG is that where a crisis scenario genuinely spans company boundaries, and where the aim is not to attribute blame but instead to provide an response to a wider community of concerns, post-crisis communications planning should be incorporated into any major event planning, preferably at a cross-industry level. The boundary spanning issue would include any crisis to a critical business component that the industry is dependent on, but is out with their control or manufacture. The recommendations that this research into HTG offer are:

. The “limbo” between a major crisis event and the official findings of any investigation should be anticipated and planned for.

. That inter-organisational collaboration brings many advantages where a crisis is deemed to genuinely span company boundaries.

. The success of an inter-organisational post-crisis response will depend at least in part on an existing dialogue of trust and co-operation and that this should be ongoing pre and post crisis (Figure 1).

. The perspective of “the wider community” should be heard and properly understood.

. Early leadership that engages in open dialogue is required.

. Pre and post-crisis communication planning should be melded together within a response and recovery plan.

Figure 1. Model of

inter-organisational relationships for pre and

post crisis planning in boundary spanning issues

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References

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Bell, G. (2009), “Pilots demand safety summit in clamour to ground Super Puma”, The Press and Journal, available at: www.pressandjournal.co.uk/Article.aspx/1167352 (accessed 22 September 2010).

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Birnie, I. (2010), interview, 28 July, Aberdeen.

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About the authors Joanna McDonald works as a freelance communications consultant. She has a background in maritime emergency response and worked as a search and rescue professional for over ten years, which included providing training to support the UK oil and gas industry. As CEO of the Ugandan NGO National Lake Rescue Institute she was responsible for relationship and stakeholder management activities with beneficiary communities, donors, corporate partners and government. Joanna McDonald is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected]

Isabella Crawford is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Communication, Marketing and Media and her main areas of teaching and research are public relations and corporate communication. Isabella worked in the communications industry for 11 years and joined RGU in July 2005. Her primary research interests include the design, practice and impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies within developed economies. She is also interested in the changing role and perceptions of public relations within the NHS following the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act. In 2007/2008 she was the Principal Investigator for an externally funded research project examining the CSR strategy for a major oil and gas company. This research revealed a gap between academic and public perceptions of CSR. It also introduced a new analytical model for testing the value of different CSR strategies against core criteria.

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