INTL613Wk5

Rawono1

IntelligenceFusionCentersforHomelandSecurityDrGardnerJ_1Jan_2020Complete.pdf

Home >Law homework help >INTL613Wk5

Intelligence Fusion

Centers For

Homeland Security

By Dr.Jeffrey V. Gardner, PhD January 2020

Intelligence Fusion Centers for Homeland Security

January 2020

By Dr. Jeffrey V. Gardner

This book is primarily based on the following research:

A Duty to Share: The Opportunities and Obstacles of Federal Counterterrorism

Intelligence Sharing with Nonfederal Fusion Centers

Dr. Jeffrey V. Gardner

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration, Homeland Security Policy and Coordination

Walden University

ISBN 978-1-5342-9923-8

Glasstree Academic Publishing

DOI 10.20850/9781534299238

Users are allowed to copy, distribute and transmit an article, adapt the article as long as the author is attributed and the article is not used for commercial purposes.

To view a copy of this license, visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................1

Background ................................................................................................................................1

Problem Statement .....................................................................................................................2

Purpose of Study ........................................................................................................................2

Chapter 2: Literature Review ...........................................................................................................4

Introduction ................................................................................................................................4

Internal Federal Agency Information-Sharing Failures .......................................................4

Subfederal Information-sharing Failures .............................................................................5

Domestic Security and the Role of State and Local Agencies ...................................................6

Importance of State and Local Agencies in Combatting Terrorism ....................................6

Domestic Counterterrorism Reforms .........................................................................................7

Creation of the Department of Homeland Security .............................................................8

Nonfederal Fusion Centers ........................................................................................................9

History of Fusion Centers ....................................................................................................9

Fusion Centers Evolve .......................................................................................................10

Domestic Counterterrorism Information-sharing ....................................................................12

Obstacles to Domestic Interagency Information-sharing ..................................................13

Fusion Centers and Information-sharing ...........................................................................16

Summary ..................................................................................................................................18

Chapter 3: Results ..........................................................................................................................20

Introduction ..............................................................................................................................20

Study Sample Description ........................................................................................................20

Collective Participant Responses to Federal Terrorism Intel Sharing Questions ..............21

Comparison of Leader Responses to Other Fusion Center Personnel ...............................21

Comparison of Responses by Profession: Intelligence vs Law Enforcement ....................22

Comparison of Responses by Longevity ...........................................................................23

Comparison of Responses by Type of Fusion Center ........................................................24

Findings and Enumeration .......................................................................................................25

Research Question 1: How effectively are fusion centers receiving terrorism intelligence

from federal agencies? ...........................................................................................27

Research Question 2: What are the opportunities or benefits of federal CT info/intel

sharing with fusion centers? ...................................................................................28

Research Question 3: What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing

with fusion centers? ...............................................................................................29

How federal sharing really occurs with fusion centers ......................................................32

Summary ..................................................................................................................................33

Chapter 4: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........................................................34

Introduction ..............................................................................................................................34

Interpretation of Findings ........................................................................................................34

Implications for Positive Social Change ..................................................................................36

Recommendations ....................................................................................................................37

Embed more federal representative from DHS and FBI in fusion centers ........................38

Embed more fusion center personnel in JTTFs .................................................................39

Assess the real mechanisms for intelligence sharing: Relationships .................................39

Focus fusion center directors on relationships ...................................................................40

Employ open collaborative work environments ................................................................41

Improve tailoring intelligence for state and local partners ................................................41

Mandate intelligence sharing on terrorism to state and local fusion centers .....................42

iii

Recommendations for Future Research ...................................................................................42

Implications for Positive Social Change ..................................................................................44

Summary ..................................................................................................................................45

References ......................................................................................................................................46

Chapter 1: Introduction

Background

On September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks on the United States (abbreviated “9/11”)

highlighted a number of gaps in the efforts of many different departments and agencies charged

with securing the nation, as well as a lack of effective interagency and intergovernmental

terrorism information-sharing. One of the many government reform efforts that these attacks

brought about in the United States was the collection of 22 different federal domestic security

agencies into a new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The department was specifically

tasked to prevent future terrorist attacks and to better share information on terrorism threats (U.S.

Congress, 2002, PL 107–296 § 201, 9). DHS was also charged with ensuring that state and local

officials received information from DHS as well as classified threat intelligence from other

federal security agencies (Bush, 2003).

DHS thus began supporting the establishment and growth of multi-agency intelligence

fusion centers owned and hosted by state and local officials around the country. These fusion

centers were intended to provide a framework for subfederal agencies to be able to receive

intelligence from federal agencies, and offer a mechanism to collect reports from agencies within

the jurisdiction itself (Lewandowski, Carter & Campbell, 2017). The collective assemblage of

DHS sponsored fusion centers owned by state and local agencies has evolved into an unofficial

national network.

However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was not among the 22 federal

domestic security agencies incorporated into DHS; they retained and actually greatly amplified

their preexisting role as the nation’s domestic counterterrorism agency (Department of Justice,

2005; Treverton, 2008). In increasing their domestic counterterrorism efforts, the FBI rapidly

expanded its separate network of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country. This

network has sometimes been in competition with fusion centers in disseminating information and

intelligence to state and local officials (Cordner & Scarborough, 2010; Eack, 2008). The separate

DHS and FBI information-sharing mandates and mechanisms overlap in multiple areas, which

has created a bifurcated and ineffective dual track for federal counterterrorism information-

sharing with subfederal security officials.

Problem Statement

Despite efforts by DHS and the FBI, a U.S. Government Accountability Office report

found that “effective mechanisms for sharing information—a best practice in building successful

information-sharing partnerships—had not been established” (Larence, 2009, p. 23). This is not a

new problem; many public policy scholars, such as Dawes (1996), have found that “Despite the

potential benefits, successful interagency information-sharing is difficult to achieve” (p. 379).

Even today domestic counterterrorism interorganizational information-sharing remains

suboptimal, as demonstrated by recent undetected terrorist activities like the 2009 Fort Hood

attack, the attempted 2010 Times Square attack, the 2013 Boston marathon bombings and the

March 2017 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information (Mayer, Carafano, &

Zuckerman, 2011; Reilly, 2013; McCaul & Keating, 2014; U. S. Department of Justice, 2017).

The 9/11 Commission Report stated that agencies needed to change the culture from a

“need to know” mindset to one of having a “duty to share” this terrorism threat information that

was acquired at taxpayer expense (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 417). This study explored how

federal agencies are fulfilling their duty to share terrorism information with state and local

officials through the network of state and major urban area fusion centers. However, the

literature review showed there is very little empirical research about this counterterrorism

information-sharing and none that examined federal agencies sharing their terrorism information

and intelligence with fusion centers. Thus, the problem is that the sharing of terrorist threat

information and intelligence from federal agencies to state and local fusion centers remains

suboptimal. This hampers the prevention of terrorism and presents vulnerabilities that have

allowed catastrophes such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2013 Boston bombings to succeed

(Barron, Lewis, Silberstein, & Shapiro, 2016; Kean & Hamilton, 2004; Reilly, 2013; Zamora,

2014).

Purpose of Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the opportunities and obstacles of sharing

federal counterterrorism information with state and local officials. The research identified the

prospects and barriers that the State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) model provides for federal

agency intelligence sharing with state and local partners about terrorist threats. This study

examined the subfederal SLFC model to assess its viability as a framework for

interorganizational domestic counterterrorism intelligence sharing from federal agencies to state

and local partners. The study identified some of the effective sharing practices of SLFCs as well

as the various impediments that prevent optimal intelligence sharing. This study has significant

implications for social change. Information-sharing is a critical function that the government

should be fully leveraging to improve homeland security and thus improve protection for

citizens.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

This research addressed counterterrorism intelligence and information-sharing between

federal agencies and subfederal state and local officials. Sharing terrorist threat information and

intelligence from federal agencies with state and local fusion centers remains suboptimal; this

hampers the prevention of terrorism and presents opportunities for terrorists as was seen on 9/11

and the more recent Boston Marathon bombings.

Internal Federal Agency Information-Sharing Failures

One of the government lapses that allowed the 9/11 attackers to enter the United States

and travel around unmolested was the failure of federal intelligence and law enforcement

agencies to share information with each other, the main thesis of the 9/11 Commission Report

(Kean & Hamilton, 2004). One of the most famous lapses was the CIA not informing the FBI

during the summer of 2001 about known al Qaeda terrorists not only possessing valid U.S.

entrance visas, but actually being present in the United States at the time and, “none of the 50 to

60 CIA officials who could and should have watch-listed two of the 9/11 hijackers did so”

(Zegart, 2008, para. 2). The 9/11 Commission Report stated these “fault lines in our

government—between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence” significantly contributed

to the government’s inability to “connect the dots” and see the 9/11 attacks coming (Kean &

Hamilton, 2004, p. xvii).

The failures leading to that attack were more than just not connecting dots. As Palmieri

(2005) states, “the information to prevent the September 11, 2001, attacks was available,

collected by someone, and stored somewhere; what was missing was the analysis that would

have made all this information useful to decision makers” (para. 6). However accurate this

statement may be, it assumes that this information was shared or at least available to analysts for

them to examine and make an assessment, but it was not (Sims, 2007). The main reason

information was not shared among federal agencies about al Qaeda and the hijackers being

within in the country had to do with the divisions between agencies responsible for law

enforcement and those who primarily collect and analyze intelligence.

The 9/11 Commissioners examined closely the so called ‘wall’ between law enforcement

and intelligence which had resulted from a “widespread perception that statuary barriers

restricted the flow of information” between intelligence and law enforcement agencies (Best,

2010, p. 14). This divide between these two government functions partly arose due to abuses by

federal agencies during the Cold War, but also because of an attempt to keep the information

from foreign intelligence and law enforcement separate. As Erwin (2013) wrote in a report for

Congress on intelligence, “These barriers derived from the different uses of information

collected by the two sets of agencies—foreign intelligence used for policymaking and military

operations and law enforcement information to be used in judicial proceedings in the United

States” (p. 17).

One of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report was to remove this

‘wall’ between intelligence and law enforcement that prevented the proper sharing of

information between agencies and contributed to the success of the nineteen suicide operatives

on that day in 2001 (Kean and Hamilton, 2004, pp. 78-79). Congress did remove many limits on

the sharing intelligence and law enforcement information with the USA PARTIOT Act of 2001,

but “long-established practices have not been completely overcome” (Best, 2010, p. 7).

However, we should ask ourselves what might have been the case is this information where

shared within federal agencies as well as across the Nation with state and local officials.

Subfederal Information-sharing Failures

While the FBI did not know that al Qaeda terrorists were in the United States in the

summer of 2001, a number of subfederal enforcement agencies had multiple interactions with the

9/11 hijackers. In fact three of the al Qaeda terrorists received speeding tickets, and two of those

were in violation of their immigration status and the third had an arrest warrant out for failure to

pay an earlier ticket (Bjelopera, 2011; Kean & Hamilton, 2004).

Even though no one was looking for the terrorists within the United States, multiple state

and local police had interactions with the 9/11 terrorists, which could have been significant had

they been informed of the threat they posed. As Kobach (2004) stated,

One of the most disturbing aspects of the story of the September 11 terrorists is the fact

that three of the hijackers were accosted by local police in routine law enforcement

encounters. Had the federal government possessed information regarding their possible

terrorist connections, and had that information been distributed to police officers…the

terrorist plot might have been derailed. (p. 6)

It is appropriate to call these law enforcement encounters a failure to share and

contributing factors to the 9/11 tragedy, especially since they were travelling under their true

names. If Richard Clarke or the FBI had been told by the CIA about these terrorists being in the

country, and had they taken the actions described, these might not have been routine traffic stops

(Alexander & Mors, 2007). This is what the government must strive for and it leads the literature

review to what terrorism threats there are to the homeland and how domestic counterterrorism is

addressed.

Domestic Security and the Role of State and Local Agencies

Domestic security within the United States Federal Republic is a complex and shared

responsibility that spans all levels of government. The U.S. Constitution clearly outlines that

some governmental roles are solely a national matter such as foreign policy and national defense.

However, the 10th Amendment to the Constitution basically reserves all other powers not

specified as national level for state governments to deal with at their level (Wright, 1990). For

protection of citizens and preservation of life, the federal form of government in the United

States primarily relies on local officials and first responders to provide this domestic security as a

first resort (McCreight, 2015). Within the federal government alone there are approximately 40

U.S. government executive branch departments and agencies with a domestic security or

response role, and these agencies are not coordinated with each other nor are they adequately

postured to collectively support officials at the state and local level (Wise & Nader, 2002, p. 45).

Importance of State and Local Agencies in Combatting Terrorism

The 9/11 attacks were not only a wake-up call for the federal government to do better at

countering terrorism, but it drove state and local governments to make terrorism a priority as

well. Although terrorism cases may be under the purview of the FBI, all terrorist actions start out

at as a local issue. Also, the federal government asked state and local officials after 9/11 to ramp

up security at possible terrorist targets and critical infrastructure such as bridges, nuclear power

plants, and airports. Bjelopera and Randol (2010) emphasized the importance of these

Nonfederal agencies when they wrote,

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting

is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone

wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist

organizations. Nine years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law

enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern

of policymakers. (p. 4)

In order to effectively combat terrorism, local law enforcement officers need to be aware

of signs of radicalization and realize that “terrorists are living all over the U.S. and they can be

plotting an attack against a target even while living several states away” (Ernst, 2014, para. 2).

As Congressman McCaul (2014) stated in a House Homeland Security hearing, “State and Local

police have a strong role in Counter Terrorism. They know the streets better than anybody and

they know the local threats…They must know the terror threats in their own backyards” (p. 2).

One of the key lessons of the 9/11 attacks is that many government sectors must

collaborate across the spectrum of law enforcement, security, and even first responders to

develop “strategies as a multifaceted, layered approach, understanding that no single approach

succeeds by itself” (Ellis, 2014, p. 220). Even Robert Mueller as the Director of the FBI at the

time, stated that “No one agency or department can handle these diverse challenges” (Mueller,

2010, para. 24). While there have been efforts to improve interorganizational collaboration after

9/11, this history of interagency challenges and ‘bad blood’ between these entities remains an

intergovernmental challenge when it comes to CT.

Domestic Counterterrorism Reforms

In response to the 9/11 attacks, a number of governmental reforms emerged to address

weaknesses in securing the homeland. This section will outline some of the major reforms. Most

significant to this study includes the creation of three new entities; the Department of Homeland

Security; the Director of National Intelligence; and a National Security Branch within the FBI.

Burch (2007) describes these post 9/11 reforms as,

The major change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security with an

intelligence charter. The U.S. government also adopted measures to implement

intelligence coordination and improve identified shortfalls through the creation of the

Director for National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC),

and revamping the FBI’s intelligence capability. (p. 16)

Each of these new entities have a role in preventing terrorism within the United States,

and each of them all impact on state and local fusion centers.

Creation of the Department of Homeland Security

The most significant change in the organization of the U.S. government since the

National Security Act of 1947 was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security which

incorporated almost two dozen different government agencies and around 179,000 employees

into a single agency (Perl, 2004). The government decided to consolidate into one large new

agency many domestic protection functions such as “border and transportation security, effective

response to domestic terrorism incidents, and ensuring homeland security” (Relyea, 2003, p.

617). The DHS was formed by collecting 22 different security, customs, immigration, and

disaster assistance focused agencies together into one department (King, 2009, p. 152).

Two of the main functions of DHS that relate to fusion centers deal with the

disbursement of federal funds to support state and local efforts to counter terrorism and

information and intelligence sharing. As Caruson and MacManus (2006) stated, “DHS functions

as the lead agency for the distribution of federal grant money and the locus of coordination

between federal, state, and local governments” (p. 523). A number of these grants are used by

states and major urban areas to fund their fusion centers. A completely different challenge DHS

faces has to do with providing subfederal agencies with intelligence and information for

countering terrorism.

The main limitation with DHS and intelligence has to do with the fact that it was

specifically created not to be a domestic intelligence gathering agency, but to only analyze

reports provided to it from other agencies (Randol, 2010). This has forced DHS to take a more

non-traditional approach to ‘intelligence’ and to not just seek ‘state secrets’ but to also focus on

the many thousands of routine, everyday observations and activities such as suspicious activity

reports (Chertoff, 2005). However, this means that for traditional and mainly classified

intelligence, DHS has to principally rely on the many agencies that constitute the U.S.

Intelligence Community. Another major centralization reform that came about as a reaction to

the 9/11 attacks was the creation of a Director of National Intelligence to lead this community.

Nonfederal Fusion Centers

Subfederal fusion centers at the state and local levels started well before 2001, but the

terrorist attacks of that year provided the catalyst for their rapid growth around the country.

Immediately after the 9/11 attacks the leaders of states and major urban areas received

numerous—and often non-specific—federal warnings about possible al Qaeda terrorist threats.

These subfederal leaders received only unclassified general warnings, and they also lacked the

capability to effectively analyze these reports or put them into context to be relevant to their

jurisdictions. Lacking specificity into these threats from the federal government and being

without capability to analyze the threats were the dual catalysts that spurred on the spread of

subfederal fusion centers after 9/11. Before examining the evolution of fusion centers, this

literature review will first explore their beginnings in the 1980s and their growth after 9/11.

History of Fusion Centers

During the 1980s and 1990s a number of regions within the U.S. moved toward various

forms of domestic intelligence fusion centers to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the country

(Carter and Carter, 2009).

As Canas (2012) writes in Homeland Security at the State Level,

The popularity of such fusion centers reached a crest during the so-called ‘war on drugs’

in the mid-80s. Interagency centers such as the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), the

National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), and numerous state and regional crime

Intelligence Centers were formed to facilitate the operational information needs of the

law enforcement community (p. 36).

Another inspiration for law enforcement agencies to move toward a fusion center model

was the Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) concept from the 1990s which focuses on gathering

intelligence and conducting analysis to support proactive law enforcement (Hylton, 2009;

Lambert, 2010). At their heart, fusion centers work to bring together various agencies focused on

a common problem that required information-sharing and analytical efforts. Shepard (2011),

stated that “The concept of the fusion center is quite simple: to facilitate the sharing of homeland

security related and crime-related information and intelligence within the law enforcement

community” (p. 36). According to the Department of Justice (2005),

The principal role of the fusion center is to compile, blend, analyze, and disseminate

criminal intelligence and other information (including but not limited to threat

assessment, public safety, law enforcement, public health, social service, and public

works) to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal activity.

(p. 3)

After the 9/11 attacks and the many ominous warnings of potential follow on terrorist

attacks, many governors and mayors felt they were not getting the intelligence and information

they needed about terror threats from the federal government, so state and local fusion centers

spread rapidly across the country (German & Stanley, 2007). Numerous states and major urban

centers around the nation desired to improve their sharing of criminal information and to

coordinate joint efforts. Carter and Carter (2009) described the intent of fusion centers “to

marshal the resources and expertise of multiple agencies within the region to deal with cross-

jurisdictional crime problems” (p. 1324). Fusion centers really started “as a national grassroots

initiative” pushed by the demand signal from the state and local levels leaders, but it did not take

long for the federal government to jump on board (Serrao, 2010).

Fusion Centers Evolve

[D]omestic fusion centers after 9/11 were originally intended as clearing houses for

threats and intelligence, and to ‘connect the dots’ and detect an actual terrorist plot (Apuzzo &

Goldman, 2013). However, there was little that state and local agencies could do on their own

without federal intelligence and information on terrorist threats. So fusion centers were

“developed, in part, from a joint project with the federal intelligence community, including DHS

and DOJ” (Serrao, 2010, para. 4). Although federal grant money came in from DHS for fusion

centers “it did not take long to realize that, in most cities, the threat was not enough to justify all

the manpower, money, and equipment. So in many states, the fusion center mission crept toward

something broader” (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2013, p. 162).

While the original purpose for subfederal fusion centers after 9/11 was for sharing

terrorism information, Larence (2008) wrote for the U.S. Government Accountability Office that

the “majority of the centers had scopes of operations and missions that included more than just

combating terrorism-related activities, such as a focus on all crimes or all hazards” (p. 3). As a

result, many states and major urban areas have realistically co-located their fusions center with

the functionally related Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) in order to further improve

cooperation (DHS/DOJ, 2010, p. 20).

Today there are 78 states and major urban regions that have formed their own fusion

centers “…to share information and intelligence about terrorist threats, criminal activity, and

other hazards” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 67). Rollins (2008) describes how

state and local fusion centers take their broad array of locally gathered information from law

enforcement, the public, and the private sector sources and it gets “fused with intelligence

collected and produced by the federal Intelligence Community to better understand threat and

assist in directing security resources” (pp. 5-6). The role and mission of each fusion center is

based on the particular needs of each state or major urban area that owns it. This was discussed

by the Washington DC fusion center director, Lee Wight (2015) who stated,

Each of the 78 centers is tailored uniquely to serve their particular area of

responsibility…some fusion centers are investigative such as Boston….some are very

tactical in their focus, i.e. case support for their local law enforcement agencies…we are

strategic intelligence…more akin to operational intelligence, i.e. regional trends and

patterns is what we look at. Some centers are a watch, i.e. they report events and direct

actions in the community. (Wight, 2015)

These fusion centers serve a significant function in providing a framework for agencies to

share information and intelligence with state and local officials that did not exist before 9/11. As

the Presidential Executive Order on intelligence activities says,

State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and defending the

United States from terrorism and other threats to the United States and its interests. Our

national intelligence effort should take into account the responsibilities and requirements

of State, local, and tribal governments…when undertaking the collection and

dissemination of information and intelligence to protect the United States. (Bush, 2008,

Part 1)

Domestic Counterterrorism Information-sharing

Sharing information and intelligence on terrorism for the homeland is a wicked problem

due to the complexities of the different levels of government and the many various agencies

involved (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009). Some of these challenges were mentioned in the

9/11 Commission Report, and some issues partially remedied in some new laws such as the USA

PATRIOT ACT and the IRTPA (Adams, Nordhaus, & Shellenberger, 2011). The Homeland

Security Act of 2002 made this interagency sharing of terrorism information a task for the new

DHS and codified this role as,

To disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the

Department, to other agencies of the Federal Government with responsibilities relating to

homeland security, and to agencies of State and local governments and private sector

entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention,

preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States. (U.S. Code,

2002, PL 107–296 § 201, 9)

In order to accomplish this task, the Department of Homeland Security created what is

now called the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The former DHS Under Secretary for

Intelligence and Analysis, Caryn Wagner (2010), testified to Congress about the importance of

this intelligence and information-sharing role with partners at the state and local levels saying “It

is our job to meaningfully convert what may appear to be bits of unrelated information into a

product that helps protect our communities…via a robust network of intelligence and law

enforcement agencies participating in state and local fusion centers” (p. 3). Within this support

component of DHS Headquarters is a State and Local Program Office (SLPO) and for the Office

of Intelligence and Analysis itself,

I&A has a unique mandate within the Intelligence Community and is the federal

government lead for sharing information and intelligence with state, local, tribal and

territorial governments and the private sector. It is these nonfederal partners who now

lead the Homeland Security Enterprise in preventing and responding to evolving threats

to the homeland (U.S. DHS, 2015a, para. 9).

Former Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano (2011) stated that, “DHS is intent on

helping these fusion centers to develop their core capabilities to share and analyze information

and to provide state and local law enforcement with useful, actionable information they can use

to better protect their own communities” (p. 7). Former Under Secretary Wagner (2010) also

described the establishment and importance of the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN),

providing Secret-level intelligence and information capabilities to state and local partners, at

fusion centers, and “This burgeoning network greatly expands two-way information-sharing

flows between federal and nonfederal homeland security partners” (pp. 3-4). DHS has strived to

make major improvement over the information-sharing infrastructure since virtually none existed

before 9/11. However, there is still much room for improvement.

Obstacles to Domestic Interagency Information-sharing

Although the PATRIOT Act removed many obstacles that obstructed effective sharing of

terrorism information between agencies, many other challenges remain. Some of these include

organizational cultures, information technology, and other existing statutes that prohibit or

impede effective interagency sharing (Sales, 2010). The PATRIOT Act and subsequent Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) adjustments did make it easier to share terrorism

information between and among federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence

community, but it did not change the differing cultures that remain within respective agencies

(Best, 2011). Organizational cultures and established practices remain a barrier to information-

sharing between agencies. Olson (2008) discussed that law enforcement officials reluctantly

share information among themselves let alone outsiders, “and the importance of protecting

sources and methods within the intelligence community means that there are limits on how far

any intelligence organization will go to share data” (p. 225-226).

The 9/11 Commission Report called for unity of effort in info sharing and stated, “The

biggest impediment to all-source analysis--to a greater likelihood of connecting the dots--is the

human or systematic resistance to sharing information” (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 416). As the

9/11 Commission identified these gaps in terrorism information-sharing, they found insufficient

mechanisms for effective sharing. The Commissioners also encountered traditional views that

either everyone is responsible for information-sharing; or that it is up to intelligence workers

themselves to decide whether they share information, resulting in “a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude in

sharing information” (De Bruijn, 2006, p. 270). The many different organizational cultures and

the interpersonal skills of the individuals involved remains a significant variable in interagency

relations (Waugh & Streib, 2006). The 9/11Commission Report specifically mentioned these

agency cultural and interagency procedural dysfunctions as contributing factors in the U.S.

government not preventing the 2001 terrorist attacks and they subsequently advocated for a

change from the ‘need to know’ concept to a ‘duty to share’ mentality (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).

In relation to information technology impeding information-sharing, the former director

of the Defense Intelligence Agency mentioned the difficulties of sharing when each agency

operates their own information technology systems, which generally means agencies cannot

access each other’s data (Jacoby, 2002). James Clapper, the former Director of National

Intelligence, declared during his confirmation hearing that he was “aghast at the state of

information technology across the community, wondering why there's no single major

combating-terrorism database with a robust search capacity instead of 50 some odd databases

with varying degrees of technological sophistication” (Ambinder, 2010, para 3). While there

have been great improvements in the area since 9/11, no optimal technological mechanism for

intelligence sharing has been implemented.

In effect this makes most information-sharing a process of personal interactions between

officials from different agencies. This generally requires a physical location where multiple

agencies can exchange terrorism information, such as the National Counter Terrorism Center or

NCTC was created to do (Best, 2010). Michael Leiter (2011), a former director of the NCTC,

testified to Congress that interagency terrorism information-sharing has improved but “complex

legal, policy, and technical issues as well as the implementation of appropriate privacy, civil

liberty, and security protections” still limits effective data sharing (pp. 6-7).

Other significant obstacles to effective counterterrorism include many remaining laws

that prohibits or impede terrorism information-sharing between agencies. While the PATRIOT

Act assisted in specifically allowing the sharing of information between some law enforcement

agencies and intelligence agencies, it did not remove all of the impediments to effective domestic

combating-terrorism. Significant obstacles remain for protecting citizens from determined

terrorists such as agency cultures, incompatible and firewalled information technologies, and

other laws that remain in effect. As Davis and Kayyem (2014) have written, “Often there are

antiquated and bureaucratic barriers to information-sharing that serve no purpose and hinder the

capacity of government to interpret different pieces of data from different sources” (paras. 3-5).

Some of the difficulties in sharing information among these numerous actors include the

many overlapping laws, legal authorities, and differing capabilities between all three levels of

government and the several agencies that have some role in terrorism (Imperial, 2005; Eack,

2008). Unfortunately, significant laws remain which prohibits or impedes terrorism information-

sharing between agencies. Sales (2010) described some of these remaining statutory restrictions

on information-sharing as the National Security Act of 1947 which bars the CIA from internal

security functions and could prevent the CIA from sharing with federal law enforcement

officials, the Posse Comitatus Act, which may prevent the Armed Forces from sharing

information with domestic authorities. Sales (2010) further states that the Privacy Act of 1974

which promotes individual privacy can also be a barrier since a

restrictive reading of the Act…could prevent, for example, U.S. Customs and Border

Protection (Customs) from sharing data about arriving container ships with National

Security Agency (NSA) officials who want to exploit it to screen for terrorist stowaways

(pp. 1797-1798).

Pappas (2010) conducted a study about the condition of domestic terrorism information-

sharing after 9/11 reforms, and found that agencies still fail to effectively share information and

concluded that “it is clear that the change that was expected when enacting these laws has failed

in many regards” (p. 15). A recent survey of key fusion center leaders across the country also

found that they were not very satisfied with information-sharing (Carter, Carter, Chermak, &

McGarrell, 2016). Despite the expansion of JTTFs, and the proliferation of fusion centers, “the

United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence collection effort” (Jenkins,

2011, p. 6). To find recent examples of failures in counterterrorism information-sharing within

the United States, one need look no further than the terrorist attacks at Fort Hood and Boston.

Fusion Centers and Information-sharing

An essential element of any fusion center is the ability to receive intelligence and

information. The DHS 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report states,

As focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threat-related

information between state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and the private sector,

fusion centers are uniquely situated to provide critical information and subject matter

expertise that allow federal law enforcement partners and the Intelligence Community

(IC) to more effectively “connect the dots” and protect the homeland. (DHS, 2015b, p.

iii)

It is important to note that information-sharing occurs on the top half of the vertical plane

between federal and state entities, as well as horizontal sharing between multiple states and

urban areas. These fusion centers can also become hubs for collaborative operations to “detect,

prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity” (Larence, 2008, p. 1). Sharing

also occurs on the bottom half of the vertical plane where fusion centers disseminate to

customers like state troopers, and well as receive reports from patrol officers and the public.

Clearly, “A core purpose of a fusion center is to facilitate the sharing of information across law

enforcement and other public safety and private entities. Yet, information-sharing is one of the

biggest obstacles to be overcome” (Teutsch, 2010).

The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland security baseline capabilities for

fusion centers and the annual evaluation of them address as the first critical operating capability

or COC as the receiving of information or intelligence to provide stakeholders with an accurate

threat picture, outlined in these 5 factors:

COC 1 – Receive

1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures (SOPs)

for the receipt of federally-generated threat information

2. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the receipt and handling of

National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts

3. Fusion center personnel with a need to access classified information are cleared to at

least the Secret level

4. Fusion center has access to sensitive but unclassified information systems

5. Fusion center has access to HSDN and/or FBINet (i.e. within fusion center or on-site).

(2015 Annual Assessment, 2016, p. 20).

Fusion centers have improved significantly since 9/11 when the expansion began in

earnest. DHS reported in January 2015 that the National Network of fusion centers continues to

make progress and for the first time “all fusion centers have plans, policies, or standard operating

procedures for all four Critical Operational Capabilities (COC)” (DHS, 2015b, p. iv). However,

each fusion center is unique, and as has often been stated at National Fusion Center Association

events, “if you have seen one fusion center you have seen one fusion center” (Abold, Guidetti, &

Keyer, 2012, p. 2). Since “no neat lines divide criminal and terrorist activities. This shows why

fusion centers are so vital in helping agencies gain a more comprehensive picture of the threats

they face” (Johnson, 2007, p. 29).

The problem is that these centers require information and intelligence to fuse. If agencies

do not share, they are very limited in what they can analyze and warn state and local officials on.

In early 2016 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs, the California Governors’ Homeland Security Advisor discussed

improvements in information-sharing, but also described the less than optimal present condition.

“While there exist significant improvements in collaboration and relationships among

responders, there remains an overall lack of a comprehensive ‘unity of effort’ in our information-

sharing environment” (Ghilarducci, 2016, p. 4). Further, the Business Executives for National

Security reported in March 2016 that “information-sharing initiatives are frequently sub-

optimized…MORE MUST BE DONE to institutionalize effective information-sharing programs

between federal, state, and local partners, and to formalize the real-time sharing processes”

(Barron, Lewis, Silberstein, & Shapiro, 2016, pp. 7-8).

Taking the risk of oversimplify a highly complex sharing environment, figure #2 attempts

to depict some of the many different directions and partners that fusion centers share with, both

internally and externally. This graphic depiction highlights the focus of this research by placing

sensitive intelligence sharing on terrorism from federal agencies to a hypothetical state fusion

center as bold blue arrows.

Figure 2. Sharing with and within a fusion center.

Summary

While improvements certainly have been made with interagency information-sharing,

there are many issues that still need to be studied and analyzed for improvement. As this chapter

addressed, fusion centers can and should serve a key role in domestic counterterrorism. The FBI

cannot do it alone, and the state and local agencies have significant capabilities and the

Constitutional responsibility to protect their citizens. While much has been written about fusion

centers, none have empirically researched the issue of federal agencies sharing counterterrorism

intelligence with subfederal fusion centers. All three levels of government have a true ‘duty to

share’ terrorism intelligence to contribute to the collaborative effort that is necessary to stop both

overseas terrorist groups and homegrown extremists. In order to prevent more attacks like 9/11,

Fort Hood, and Boston, it is essential to identify the key opportunities and obstacles to domestic

counterterrorism information-sharing at fusion centers.

Chart adapted from https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-joint-terrorism-task-forces

Fusion Centers vs. Joint Terrorism Task Forces

Chapter 3: Results

Introduction

The research assessed how effectively fusion centers are fulfilling their intended purpose:

to improve homeland security by receiving terrorism information and intelligence from federal

agencies. Data on federal counterterrorism information-sharing was collected through interviews

conducted at five fusion centers on the East Coast of the United States. This chapter presents the

interview data gathered from the fusion centers, research findings, and the resulting analysis.

Study Sample Description

The individuals targeted for interviews were those working in counterterrorism related

functions within the fusion centers, or secondarily those who could benefit from federal

intelligence sharing on terrorism threats. The 25 participants consisted of 11 law enforcement

professionals (44%) and 14 intelligence professionals (56%). The years of experience in their

respective career fields ranged from 1 to over 20 years, with the average being 14.4 years. See

Table 3 on Study Participant Roles below.

Table 3

Study Participants by Fusion Center Role

Site A Site B Site C Site D Site E Total

Director/deputy director 1 1 1 1 1 5

Senior Intelligence Analyst 0 0 1 1 1 3

DHS representative 1 1 1 1 1 5

FBI representative 1 0 0 1 0 2

Detective or investigator 1 0 0 1 1 3

Intelligence/criminal analyst 1 3 2 0 1 7

Collective Participant Responses to Federal Terrorism Intel Sharing Questions

This study focused on asking how well is the federal government sharing terrorism

intelligence with fusion centers, in what ways are they sharing it, what obstructs sharing, and

what could make this sharing more effective. The responses from all the participants collectively

revealed clear trends in the interview data on these benefits and barriers. However, some

questions yielded a range of answers based additional factors, such as differences between sites

based upon the specific and distinct roles of different fusion centers.

Q1-11 skipped (see full dissertation)

Q12. What have been the most useful sharing mechanisms from the federal government

for information and intelligence on terrorist threats; systems such as Homeland Security Data

Network (HSDN), FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO)/FBI Net, or embedded personnel in your

fusion center and interagency liaison meetings?

This question mainly asked the participants to not only describe what they viewed as the

most effective sharing mechanisms overall, but to also compare technological sharing with

interpersonal sharing. 24 out of 25 participants clearly identified people and interpersonal

relationships as by far the most effective sharing mechanism. Most participants were also very

emphatic on this point and made comments including the following “a hundred percent the

people” and “personal relationships” or “People, hands down” or “physical like having a

physical body in the fusion center to me is absolutely the best way to get information whether it's

coming or going I think it clears up a lot of miscommunication or inconsistencies” as well as

“The most useful sharing mechanism by far is having people co-located” and “It's really hard to

justify the bosses. It's hard to write it into budgets. But fusion centers downward and fusion

centers upward. I think they live and die on relationships.”

Comparison of Leader Responses to Other Fusion Center Personnel

Participant responses based upon being a leader or non-leadership members of fusion

centers was the first interesting trend discovered during analysis. Fusion center leaders including

upper-level leaders such as directors or deputy directors as well as supervisors in fusion centers

viewed intelligence sharing from the federal government much more positively than the non-

leadership members of the same fusion centers (those who do the daily work). Fusion center

directors often described as a positive development how often they were being “briefed” about

ongoing FBI terrorism investigations in their jurisdictions. However, non-leadership fusion

center personnel such as analysts and investigators often commented on this did not constitute

intelligence sharing in their mind since the directors left those meetings (or phone calls) with

nothing in their hands or anything they could share with the rest of their fusion center. The fusion

center non-leaders had a much less positive view of the state of terrorism intelligence sharing

since they are accessing classified government secure networks with little valuable intelligence

to do their jobs while fusion center directors are “in the know” but can’t share with them to

inform fusion center work. This finding was consistent across all five sites researched regardless

of the type of fusion center or the size of their jurisdiction, and was a very interesting discovery

not mentioned in any previous research.

Comparison of Responses by Profession: Intelligence vs Law Enforcement

There were few substantive differences between participant responses based upon only

their career field when it came to the core issues of benefits and barriers to sharing with fusion

centers. Both types of professionals shared common views overall of what was holding up

effective sharing and what would improve it. However, there were some differences when it

came to their level of intensity of their beliefs. For example, both law enforcement professionals

and intelligence professionals felt that people were the most important sharing mechanism with

systems being secondary. However, law enforcement professionals responded immediately and

were highly emphatic on this point and left no doubt as to their views about the supremacy of

personal relationship as the most important aspect of sharing. When intelligence professionals

answered the same question they also came down on the side of people as most effective for

sharing, but only after hesitation or reflection and they seemed to hold this view to a less intense

degree than law enforcement professionals.

For example, law enforcement professionals would answer the question on the most

important sharing mechanism with statements like “hands-down its people” or “people 100%”

while intelligence professionals would answer with a reply along the lines of “people are most

effective, but I still want access to the systems.” These differences are likely due to the necessity

for law enforcement professionals to reply upon people to succeed in their careers such as the use

of witness testimony and confidential informants. Intelligence analysts on the other hand

predominantly rely on written reports and second hand sources and methods that are accessible

in databases and often remove them for direct contact with the people gathering this mainly

human derived intelligence.

Comparison of Responses by Longevity

Participant responses based upon both longevity in their career field and within the fusion

center provided some interesting patterns regardless of the site researched. Those individuals

with many years of longevity in their career field were more understanding and realistic about

what can really be expected from the type of information which could or should be shared with

fusion centers. Those long serving professionals and those with the longest service within fusion

centers were aware of the extreme sensitivity of case specific information and a number knew of

instances where investigations had been compromised. Senior law enforcement officers and

analysts stated that this will probably never happen, nor were they interested in investing the

time to try to search those complex systems even if they were allowed access. These veteran law

enforcement officers and senior analysts were generally satisfied with the overall level

intelligence sharing.

However, more junior participants and those with less career experience were less

understanding and more expectant of what can or should be shared with them as far as specificity

and actionable intelligence. These less experienced individuals felt the strongest that intelligence

of a specific and actionable nature was not being shared with their fusion center. State and local

junior intelligence analysts were also the individuals most eager to have access to FBI case files

and sensitive databases on individuals under investigation.

Additionally, those with longevity in fusion centers greater than 3 years had interesting

perspectives based upon experiences with different federal agency personally being assigned to

their fusion center and evolving relationships between their fusion center and JTTFs. These long

serving professionals emphasized trust building between individuals from other agencies

(particularly with the FBI) and they saw FBI representatives to their fusion center come and go.

These professionals were very thankful for the near daily interactions with DHS representative

and critical of the fact that FBI personal were only “part time” in the fusion center (on average 2

days a week across all fusion centers visited). The strong view of the participants in this research

is that periodic participation is very inadequate and state and local participants expressed the

desire to have both DHS and FBI representatives in their fusion centers on a daily basis.

Comparison of Responses by Type of Fusion Center

While there is no standard fusion center, there were two common counter-terrorism roles

for each fusion center researched for this study. These include receiving and vetting suspicious

activity reports from both public and official sources, as well as the function of dissemination

terrorism warning information to those who need – primarily patrol officers. Beyond those two

functions there was significant variance in the fusion center roles relating to domestic terrorism.

Fusion centers focus on analysis of trends and disseminating as much unclassified information as

possible. Other fusion centers have taken on a significant out-reach and training role focusing on

getting the word out to both law enforcement agencies as well as the private sector on how to

best report on and prepare for terrorist activity.

Separate from these analytical and dissemination driven centers, some fusion centers

researched are also investigative in nature or contain an operational component with a terrorism

related mission. These fusion centers with an ‘on the ground’ role to play in terrorism had a very

close and symbiotic relationship with the JTTF (and to a lesser degree with DHS operational

agencies such as CBP and the Coast Guard). Additionally, the intelligence needs of centers with

an investigatory or operational role are different than ones that are purely analytical or have a

watch function. Analytical centers mainly received general information on terrorism from the

federal government, such as how recent attacks in the U.S. and Europe were undertaken.

Investigative and operational centers receive more specific intelligence on individual cases

within their jurisdiction. It is likely this difference is due to the need to synchronize

investigations and de-conflict potential operations.

At the outset of this research I envisioned there would be differences in the perspectives

between state fusion center and those for major urban areas. However, in the context of sharing

of federal intelligence on terrorism there was no discernable divergence based upon level of

government. In fact, there were also no notable differences in federal intelligence sharing

between large state and small states, so there were no findings based solely upon the size of a

jurisdiction for a fusion center. However, there were differences based upon the different fusion

center missions and exact role each plays in countering terrorism with regard to federal sharing

with them. For example, fusion centers that generally focus only on analysis and providing

products to their stakeholders most often only reported getting general terrorism information

from the federal government. However, fusion centers with an investigative role or an

operational component with a terrorism related mission reported receiving actionable intelligence

on specific cases and specific individuals of terrorist interest very often.

Findings and Enumeration

This section of Chapter 3 presents some of the main findings from researching

intelligence sharing at these fusion centers. The answers from the participants clearly

demonstrated the Dawes (1996) theory of interagency information-sharing provided an effective

framework to analyze the obstacles and opportunities of federal terrorism intelligence sharing

with nonfederal fusion centers. The participant answers outlined both benefits and barriers of

federal terrorism information-sharing with fusion centers.

These findings focus on the 3 research questions this study employed revolving around

the Dawes (1996) framework of interagency information-sharing. For the purposes of data

coding and analysis the 12 interview questions were individually subordinated to the most

relevant research question. This facilitated focusing the research around the Dawes model as

shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4

Interview questions subordination to research questions

RQ1: How effectively are fusion centers receiving terrorism intelligence from federal

agencies?

1. What role does your fusion center play in counterterrorism?

6. Which federal intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies share info and

intel on terrorism with your fusion center?

10. Are federal agencies “sharing the right information with the right people at the

right time”? Do you receive general threat information or actionable intelligence on

specific individuals or cases?

12. What have been the most useful sharing mechanisms from the federal government

on terrorist threats.

RQ2: Opportunities of federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers

2. How has receiving federal information and intelligence in your fusion center been

useful in countering terrorism?

3. What are the opportunities or benefits of federal Counter Terrorism (CT)

info/intel sharing with fusion centers?

8. How would fusion centers be different if they had extensive access and sharing of

federal CT info/intel?

9. Should federal security agencies share info/intel with fusion centers or should

they share with a different organization in your jurisdiction (such as a JTTF)?

RQ3: The main obstacles to intelligence sharing with fusion centers

4. What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing with fusion

centers?

5. What can or should be done to remove or mitigate these obstacles, barriers, and

risks that impede effective sharing of federal terrorism information and intelligence

sharing with state and local fusion centers?

7. How would fusion centers be different if there was no sharing of federal CT intel?

11. Are there other risks to this information-sharing?

Research Question 1: How effectively are fusion centers receiving terrorism intelligence

from federal agencies?

The first research question this study sought to answer was: how effectively are fusion

centers fulfilling their intended purpose to improve homeland security by receiving terrorism

information and intelligence from federal agencies? As mentioned above this research question

was pre-coded in NVivo by grouping the nodes of all participant responses to questions 1, 6, 10

and 12. Codes that emerged from analysis included effectiveness, limited sharing and means of

sharing.

The answer to this research question is that fusion centers can be effective sharing

mechanisms, as demonstrated in the interviews of 25 participants from five east coast fusion

centers, but the level of effectiveness depends on at least two factors. These factors are the

mission of each fusion center and the organizational and personal relationships between federal

agencies and key officials within the jurisdiction.

When it comes to the mission and role of a fusion center there was a distinct difference

between the perspectives of the effectiveness of sharing from federal agencies based upon what

that fusion center actually does as it related to counterterrorism. As discussed in Chapter 2 there

are a number of fusion centers varieties such as those which are investigatory, analytical, and

those with a watch function. The responses in this study showed if the fusion center has only an

analytical role then the respective perceptions of intelligence sharing by those in that center were

noticeably lower than those of fusion centers with a counterterrorism operational component or

investigative role. Participants in analytical only fusion centers rarely mentioned receiving

actionable intelligence or specific case information. This makes sense as why would an

analytical only center need actionable intelligence or case specific information if they have no

action to take or investigation to deconflict?

So the effectiveness of fusion centers in receiving intelligence varies depending on the

role and mission of the fusion center. Therefore the intelligence needs of each center in terms of

specificity and timeliness vary accordingly. When developing assessments for federal

intelligence sharing with state and local fusion centers these different missions and roles need to

be factored in.

Organizational and personal relationships between the fusion center and key federal

agencies was just as important, although much less tangible. It is very difficult to measure

personal relationships, but as many participants emphasized, it can be the most important factor

in how much or what kind of intelligence is shared with a fusion center. The organizational and

personal relationships with federal agencies and officials within the jurisdiction is a very

multifaceted factor since it includes many different components such as the personal

relationships between the fusion center director and senior FBI officials in the city or state, the

level of trust fusion center personnel have with their embedded federal representatives from DHS

and the FBI, as well as the quality of state and local liaisons or embeds in federal agencies such

as JTTFs.

These personal relationships are extremely hard to get right and even harder to measure,

especially for the entire national network of fusion centers. Additionally, personal relationship

are also very perishable and even good relationships may vanish when a new fusion center

director or FBI SAC is assigned. But that does not mean it should be left off fusion center

assessments as it currently is.

Research Question 2: What are the opportunities or benefits of federal CT info/intel

sharing with fusion centers?

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this research question was pre-coded in NVivo by

grouping the nodes from participant responses to questions 2, 3, 8 and 9. Two primary codes that

emerged during analysis on opportunities or benefits of sharing intelligence with fusion centers

included preventing terrorist attacks and being able to disseminate to state and local user such as

police and other first responders. Additional codes that emerged included having access to more

intelligence sources and the ability for state and local analysts to have context for national and

international events as well as terrorist trends and patterns.

The predominant benefits to sharing federal terrorism intelligence with fusion centers

immediately mentioned by participants is the ability to fuse federal intelligence with state and

local knowledge to stop terrorist attacks. If state and local officials are aware of the specific

intelligence available to federal agencies they can be on the lookout for known individuals or

search the state and local records based on this information. This was witnessed by the researcher

during a visit to a state fusion center during an east coast wide manhunt for terrorist suspect

Ahmad Khan Rahami who had just allegedly bombed multiple cities in NY and NJ wounding

over 30 people and was still at-large (U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern NY, 2016). Federal

authorities shared what they knew about Rahami with fusion centers as well as an associated

license plate. Fusion center officials in the state fusion center being visited immediately sent this

information out to all state police on patrol (and local agencies) and programmed it into the

automatic license plate readers on patrol cars and other locations in the state. Terrorist suspect

Ahmad Rahami was apprehended while the researcher was still on-site at the fusion center.

However, if Rahami was driving and had passed a license plate reader, it would have

immediately shown the benefit of federal intelligence sharing with the national network of fusion

centers.

In the context of Dawes (1996) model, the main benefits and opportunities are also just as

heavily focused on the organizational and political components as were the obstacles, and less on

the third factor of technology. These research findings clearly deemphasized technical barriers in

interviews with participants. However, there was an emphatic request for more embedded federal

representatives and changes to policies and procedures when it comes to sharing (which are both

organizational and political). The participants mentioned many benefits that fit the Dawes (1996)

theoretical framework such as fostering program and service coordination.

These findings also show that while there is room for improvement on the technology

side, the focus is on what can be gained through more extensive in-person contacts. Participants

emphasized that agency personnel across all three levels of government to exchange information

to better secure the American people in a collaborative manner. This falls exactly into the

premise of improved and integrated government services through interagency information-

sharing described by Dawes (1996).

Research Question 3: What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing

with fusion centers?

This final research question was pre-coded in NVivo by grouping the nodes of all

participant responses to questions 4, 5, 7 and eleven. During analysis emerging codes included

classification, interpersonal, organizational, and policies and procedures. There was also a code

created for facilities, but this was a relatively minor barrier mentioned compared to the other four

codes that emerged.

There were four major thrusts that participants outlined when it comes to identifying the

most significant barriers to effective intelligence sharing from federal agencies down to fusion

centers. These four obstacles can be listed plainly as clearance, culture, policy and personality, or

C2P2. The ‘clearance’ obstacles addresses all the issues surrounding the sharing restrictions and

excuses about sensitive sources and methods and ongoing investigations that keeps intelligence

from being shared. This “need to know” mentality was a contributing factor in 9/11 and other

terrorists attacks like Fort Hood and the Boston marathon bombing.

The culture aspect focuses on organizational perspective of entities like the FBI where

the long standing views of sharing it that it happens “to” the FBI but little comes “from” them to

partners. This organizational culture is improving according to participants, but is still a

significant barrier from the state and local perspective. This is closely linked to the ‘policy’

barrier where having a ‘duty to share’ has still not been manifested into organizational policies

and procedures to enable highly effective terrorism sharing (not just after a case is closed).

Multiple participants mentioned pre-9/11 policies of information-sharing restrictions and lack of

access to reports and data continue to hinder effecting collaboration between federal agencies

and state and local fusion centers.

The final main barrier revolves around the personality of individuals involved in sharing

federal information both within and adjacent to fusion centers. The major players for fusion

centers are the FBI Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of FBI field offices and JTTF supervisory

agents in their jurisdictions. These FBI officials hold significant sway over what will be shared

with fusion centers and they set the atmosphere for both the FBI personnel and interagency

detailees working under their organizations.

Numerous participants mentioned significant sharing differences (both positive and

negative) based solely upon a change in the FBI SAC in their jurisdiction. This also highlights

the great importance of the personal relationships between these SACs and fusion center

directors. Every upper-level fusion center leader interviewed placed significant emphasis on their

personal interactions with the FBI SAC as well as the frequency and depth of sharing. However,

personality is also the most intangible aspect of sharing and the most difficult to overcome if key

leader personalities are not in-sync between these agencies. Table 5 below lists these obstacles, a

brief description, and representative participant responses.

Table 5

Obstacles to federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers

Title Obstacle or Barrier description

Representative participant quote

Clearance Fusion centers are at the Secret

level only and many stakeholders

and ‘customers’ have no clearance

“There's information on the federal

level that's classified, it cannot be

shared down”

Culture Federal intelligence agency

cultures do not emphasize sharing

“Institutional culture sucks…trying to

get information from my federal

partners is like pulling teeth”

Policy

Personality

Policies still emphasize “need to

know” not a “duty to share”

What to share and how much to

share with fusion centers is highly

reliant on interpersonal

relationships, especially with the

FBI

“…if it goes to the JTTF we may

never hear about it…we are not

getting all the information”

“…it still tends to be personality

dependent, so if the FBI SAC is

supportive of the role of fusion

centers then you have a pretty good

relationship”

In the context of Dawes (1996) model, these barriers and obstacles are focused heavily on

the organizational and political components, and less on the third factor of technology. This is an

interesting finding since the emphasis in the literature and federal statutes surrounding sharing

with fusion centers only focuses the technical aspects, as if incompatible technologies are the

problem. However, the real barriers to sharing shown from this research are that the

organizational and political factors are the real obstacles. As a case in point, fusion centers have

access to the secure communications technology, but it is the interagency relationships and

government policies preventing that technology from carrying any meaningful and actionable

intelligence on them (such as terrorism tear lines relevant to their jurisdiction).

The research has shown that effective sharing of terrorism intelligence primarily occurs

in these five fusion centers mainly through personal contacts. Further, this research has identified

that the four most significant obstacles or barriers to effective intelligence sharing with

nonfederal fusion centers are clearance, culture, policy and personality. In the context of Dawes

theoretical framework, these four major obstacles all fall within the factors of organizational or

political barriers and none predominantly technical in nature.

How federal sharing really occurs with fusion centers

The finding of this research is that intelligence sharing is not principally focused on

technology, but is really about people. This is an important finding as the only current official

measures of sharing with state and local officials focus solely on systems to share. The fusion

center baseline capabilities by DOJ and DHS discuss the ability to receive federal information

solely based on having the computer systems in place within the fusion center, as well as making

sure it is connected to HSIN and HSDN/FBINet. In plain terms, it asks do you have the

computer, it is set up, does it turn on, and does it have connectivity? The reality is these systems

reflect only a minority of intelligence sharing, and these systems are not considered the most

important element according to every participant in this study save one. The critical operating

capabilities do reflect the much more important question about receiving federal intelligence on

terrorism, which is, do you have representatives from the DHS and FBI embedded in your center

on a near daily basis to share intelligence with you?

These federal officials embedded within a fusion center are the key to federal intelligence

sharing with state and local officials. These individuals know what is going on with their

respective agencies and they know the federal information systems and exactly how to find what

is needed for the fusion center. These federal representatives are also tied into their home

agencies and counterparts within the state and within their networks to know what is going on

(well beyond what is known in a fusion center) and are able to share what they can with at least

the fusion center director.

This research finding that information-sharing is more about personal interactions than

systems is not a new discovery by itself. The point of virtual or telephonic collaboration being

far inferior to personal contact has been empirically demonstrated many times (Kraut, Fussell,

Brennan, & Siegel, 2002). This research established twofold findings in this regard. The first

outcome to emerge is the premise of personal contact is not just for sales or business, but that it

is just as important (or even more so) in the context of federal intelligence sharing with fusion

centers. The second outcome to emerge is the finding about the great importance of embedded

federal personnel in fusion centers has not been addressed as the key to effectiveness of this

sharing dynamic. In fact, the DOJ and DHS baseline capabilities and subsequent annual

assessments ignore this point completely when requiring fusion centers have the ability to

receive information from federal partners by only addressing clearances and systems and not

addressing the more essential aspect of embedded federal personnel. Additionally, the much

more recent National Fusion Center Strategy from 2014 also has a focus on intelligence sharing

systems and does not address embedded federal representatives either.

Summary

The findings in this research shows that fusion centers can contribute to stopping terrorist

attacks if intelligence is effectively shared with them in a timely manner. The main barriers to

effective intelligence sharing according to participants are clearance, culture, policy and

personality. Fusion center leaders think the state of intelligence sharing is more effective than

those doing the work for them in the fusion centers. Importantly, federal terrorism intelligence

sharing with fusion centers is really about people, not systems or technology. In fact, every

participant but one identified personal interactions as the most effective mechanism for sharing

terrorism intelligence with fusion centers and highlighted their embedded federal representatives.

Chapter 4: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Introduction

Since 9/11, every U.S. state except Wyoming, and many major urban areas, have

established fusion centers to promote? information-sharing by bringing together intelligence

from a variety of sources and thus better protecting its citizens from terrorists and other

significant threats. One of the most important sources of intelligence for fusion centers is the

kind of sensitive intelligence on terrorist threats that can come only from federal intelligence and

law enforcement agencies. Despite this sharing imperative, research has shown providing

terrorism intelligence to fusion centers remains sub-optimal. This study sought to find out (a)

how effectively federal agencies are sharing intelligence with fusion centers, (b) the sharing

opportunities and obstacles, and (c) the best practices that might be shared.

Interpretation of Findings

Terrorists are a particularly difficult intelligence target because they organize as

clandestine networks, hide within open societies, act alone or kill without notice (Sims, 2007).

For this reason, it is important that agents of the federal government share as much as possible on

terrorists with the affected? jurisdictions and work together to stop them. By interviewing

participants from five East Coast fusion centers, I was able to identify the benefits and barriers to

intelligence sharing as well as answer the research questions on how effectively these centers are

serving their purpose as a hub of terrorism intelligence sharing.

The barriers to intelligence sharing identified here, based on Dawes theoretical

framework, are principally organizational and policy in nature; the barriers revolve around

clearance, culture, policy, and personality. The benefits of federal intelligence sharing with state

and local fusion centers is that citizens are better protected and terrorism is collaboratively

countered. Although important and useful, terrorism intelligence sharing is not principally about

access to databases or information technology. Sharing is primarily about (a) interagency

organizational relationships within a jurisdiction and (b) between key personnel from agencies

with a role in counterterrorism.

A point here can be made about the Boston bombings and information-sharing. As

mentioned in Chapter 2, the FBI agent investigating Tamerlan Tsarnaev did not discuss the

assessment with any state or local officials, including those on his squad from the Boston Police

in the JTTF. However, he did file his report in the FBI’s Guardian system, which members of the

JTTF had access to. But this is not sharing because it does not involve dissemination to those in

the JTTF or offer a mechanism to push the information out to those in the jurisdiction might

want to know. Massachusetts Congressmen William Keating wrote a letter to FBI Director James

Comey in in July 2013 about this lack of sharing within the JTTF. He wrote: “these local

officials could not search the database for something they did not know existed” (Keating, 2013,

p. 3).

The findings in this study about the critical importance of personal relationships and

embedded personnel to enable interagency intelligence sharing and collaborative

countermeasures makes the Special Operations fusion center more relevant to domestic fusion

centers than might seem obvious. The JIATF model described in Chapter 2 that worked so well

to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq in the mid to late 2000s is an important case that offers some

considerations and best practices for domestic fusion centers. As General McChrystal stated,

proximity to Washington also had costs. The Beltway culture compelled, or allowed, the

agencies to be less collaborative. Valuable information that might slide across a table

downrange had to cross miles and clear bureaucratic hurdles back in the States. In

Washington, the myriad essential but competing priorities, from bureaucracy to family

life, always slowed action. For this reason, the JIATF would bring analysts from each

agency into the same literal tent—and that tent would be on a base in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Obviously, this would enable intelligence to be analyzed downrange, close to the fight,

making the process faster and the information potentially more relevant. Less obvious but

more important, having the analysts live and operate forward, teamed with counterparts

from other agencies, decreased the gravitational pull of their headquarters back in D.C.

and dramatically increased the sense of shared mission and purpose. It was

extraordinarily powerful for analysts to share information, to brief operators on their

assessments, to hear the rotors of an assault force launching on their information, and

then to debrief together after the operation. (McChrystal, 2013)

This sense of shared purpose and mission focus, which I personally experienced in the

JIATF under General McChrystal, I also witnessed in the narratives of the embedded federal

agency representatives from all five fusion centers researched. These individuals are federal

employees reporting to supervisors in Washington (or closer by), but they became full-fledged

“teammates” with their fellow fusion center members and this is mutually beneficial for many

reasons. The embedded federal representatives (from both the FBI and DHS) has not only earned

the trust of their state and local partners, but they fully understood the intelligence needs of the

fusion center (and their stakeholders) in ways that cannot be achieved from the outside. This is

how intelligence is really shared, person to person, and this is not reflected in existing fusion

center assessments.

Interagency relationship building is very difficult with conflicting or overlapping

organizational responsibilities and cultures as well as personalities getting in the way. As

General McChrystal (2013) described,

No alliance could be as infuriating or as productive as my relationship with the CIA...

more than once, my most trusted subordinates had to stop me, in moments of utter

frustration, from severing all ties with our ‘Agency brothers,’ repeating back to me my

own guidance to preserve our relationships through specific conflicts...; ours had to be a

unified fight.

In seeking to achieve this unified fight for the homeland, we have to set the conditions to

do so and embed more federal representatives in fusion centers, which will be a key policy

recommendation of this study. This will not be easy, as even General McChrystal serving as a

high ranking commando general officer in Iraq with the President’s ear and focused on the

number one terrorist threat at the time (al Qaeda in Iraq) he had great difficulty bringing together

the necessary interagency intelligence players to join his JIATF (Henricksen, 2013). However,

this is what is needed to address the terrorism threat we face today here at home.

Implications for Positive Social Change

Overcoming the barriers to counterterrorism interagency intelligence sharing can

significantly impact major aspects of our society in ensuring a collaborative approach to

counterterrorism. This can only be achieved if it is based on a solid foundation of terrorism

intelligence sharing across all 3 levels of government. By effectively sharing terrorism

intelligence vertically and horizontally among partner agencies is the only way to stop the

complex threats the nation faces from both international terrorists and homegrown extremists

(Schmitt, 2011). We cannot go back to the way it was before 9/11 where a failure to effectively

share resulted in a massive tragedy.

A specific example where getting this sharing ‘right’ could have averted disaster is the

case of NY/NJ terrorist suspect Rahami mentioned earlier in this chapter. On the morning of

September 19th 2016 I observed a fusion center in action during an East Coast wide manhunt for

this suspect. That day counterterrorism intelligence from federal agencies was quickly

disseminated out to every state police officer on patrol (and directly to their cruisers) as well was

programmed into license plate readers. One can only imagine if this network of fusion centers

had been in place before 9/11 and federal agencies had shared what they knew about the al

Qaeda hijackers already here in America months before that fateful day.

This research contributed to the body of knowledge on fusion center with empirical

evidence and original findings on how federal intelligence is actually shared with state and local

officials, and how it can be improved. If the policies and procedures are enacted and federal

personnel are embedded full-time to enable effective terrorism intelligence sharing with

nonfederal fusion centers, then significant social change can be gained through increased

abilities to counter terrorist attacks within the homeland. This research intends to positively

influence improved national security through policies that reflect the importance of fusion center

federal manning as the crux of intelligence sharing (over systems) and the need to develop and

assess personal relationships between key individuals and organizations with leading

counterterrorism roles in protecting our citizens.

Recommendations

This research has identified a number of best practices where effective federal terrorism

intelligence sharing was reported by participants. Additionally, some specific policy

recommendations identified through conducting this research that can improve terrorism

intelligence sharing. These best practices along with specific policy recommendations are

addressed below.

Embed more federal representative from DHS and FBI in fusion centers

Participants in the study were highly appreciative of each individual federal

representative embedded in their fusion center and all emphasized how important these

individuals are for effective intelligence sharing. Most participants would rather have these

federal representative in their fusion centers than having information systems allowing them to

access federal intelligence. In fact, these federal personnel themselves were listed as the most

effective sharing mechanism for intelligence on terrorists within their jurisdiction. When asked

which federal agencies share with their center, some participants immediately personalized the

question and replied by naming the individual embeds on a first name basis. The participants

were also clear that they want more federal representatives in their center; both more

representatives and to have them for more time.

These federal representatives, such as the DHS intelligence officers, also often have some

responsibilities outside the fusion center since they often represent the entire 17 agency

consortium of the U.S. Intelligence Community to that state or locality. Multiple participants

complained that when their DHS person was out (for whatever reason), they felt significantly

hampered in their state or local mission. So most fusion centers would greatly benefit from a

having a second full time DHS person embedded in the form of an intelligence analyst—a more

junior person working under the supervision of the DHS Intelligence Officer or Senior Reports

Officer (SRO). This framework offers more depth in key federal representatives in the fusion

centers and allows the DHS representative to perform outreach or training in the jurisdiction as

well as provide total job coverage (in the event of illness, conference, or vacation, etc).

This same model of a 2 person federal liaison team should be used for the FBI

representation with a full time FBI Special Agent and full time FBI Intelligence Analyst

embedded in each fusion centers. This recommendation would significantly increase manning as

the FBI generally sends only liaisons to fusion centers on a part time and as an additional or

supplementary duty to investigative or analytical work for the local FBI field office (not full-time

embedded). Several participants discussed the different pros and cons of having an FBI Agent

representing the bureau versus an FBI Intelligence Analyst, so the optimal solution is to send

both according to participants.

In sum, every recognized fusion center should have at least one DHS IO or RO and at

least one full time FBI Intelligence Analyst or Special Agent. None of the 5-fusion centers

researched had an arrangement of this kind. Based upon the fusion centers’ operational

capabilities and mission, more of these federal representatives may be required. At least one

fusion center was striving for two full time representatives from each agency for a total of four.

The optimal footprint in a fusion center would be a DHS Intelligence Officer, a DHS Intelligence

Analyst, an FBI Special Agent and an FBI Intelligence Analysts. This is the best solution to

support fusion centers, although this is a significant federal resource commitment and currently

legislatively constrained, at least for DHS according to participants.

Embed more fusion center personnel in JTTFs

Just as having more federal representative embedded in fusion centers, much can be

gained by having more state and local representatives in JTTFs. Fusion center directors

mentioned being proud of their own personnel detailed to JTTFs in their jurisdiction, and this is a

strong bond for intelligence sharing. However, multiple non-leadership participants working in

fusion centers emphasized how these detailed individuals are not allow to share intelligence

about ongoing investigations due to operational sensitivities (for the most part). It should also be

emphasized that overcoming organizational culture can be eased by sending “the right person” as

a fusion center representative who can most easily earn the trust of the FBI Agents and other law

enforcement professionals in key positions in the JTTF.

The theme of establishing or building trust was mentioned often by participants in this

study, and some investigators confessed to having bias against analysts (who do not have a badge

or carry a gun). This same bias is famous in the FBI, and a fusion center director may benefit

more in the long run by sending a detective or investigator to be their representative to a JTTF

than even their best intelligence analyst for this reason. Also, sending a police officer or

detective to the JTTF who reports to the fusion center director and where that relationship is

strong will help facilitate the JTTF to fusion center organizational relationship as well.

Assess the real mechanisms for intelligence sharing: Relationships

The fusion center baseline capabilities only assess systems and not where most

information-sharing really occurs, with embedded personnel (both within the centers and from

the center to critical nodes like JTTFs). Information systems required for sharing should not be

eliminated, but the emphasis for assessing intelligence sharing with fusion centers should be

refocused on people and organizational relationships. There is no mention in fusion center

assessments now of the all-important role of people in sharing, and this needs to be addressed

and made a priority. Not only do fusion centers need federal embeds from DHS and FBI, they

need to be increased in number and they need to be quality individuals with training and solid

relationships back to their home federal agency. Priority should be placed on who is sent from

federal agencies to the fusion centers, as a number of state and local participants complained

about being sent “the JV team” to their fusion center where (the FBI in particular) viewed fusion

center duty as a less than desirable assignment.

Focus fusion center directors on relationships

Leading a fusion center is a difficult and complex job requiring the ability to form a

cohesive team from a highly diverse conglomeration of analysts, agents, investigators and

emergency services personnel—many of whom probably do not directly work for them. Couple

this complexity with the necessity to establish and maintain very effective personal and

professional relationships with a constellation of federal (and other) agencies and you have a

glimpse of the day in the life of fusion center director. Fusion center directors discussed how

different this type of assignment is compared to traditional police work. Directors participating in

this study shared how they personally felt unprepared at the beginning of their assignment to

succeed. Some felt that after several years they had finally figured out their jobs but were only at

this point highly effective and now subject to rotation to a different job.

Two fusion center directors commented without prompting that the process to select,

train, and assign new fusion center directors is less than optimal. Although a law enforcement

professional himself, one fusion center director stated the job is so specialized and complex that

the position should probably be filled by an intelligence professional. At any rate, when selecting

and training fusion center directors, the most important aspect should be the personality

component according to this research. If people and relationships are the most effective sharing

mechanisms, then directors should be selected based on their leadership and interpersonal skills.

Fusion center directors should primarily focus on team building within the fusion center and

relationships building with the many federal partners and other stakeholders in the jurisdiction.

A recommendation for fusion center personnel is to deliberately plan unofficial and social

interactions both internally and with the key external partners. These interactions will do more to

establish personal bonds and build trust more than work interactions and meetings. I would

suggest fusion center directors prioritize getting out of the center frequently for personal and

focused engagements to build and sustain critical relationships supporting the fusion center

mission. Within the fusion center they could plan team-building events like team sports, going to

the shooting range together, and occasional outings like a fusion center barbeque. These

activities may sound trivial, but as multiple participants pointed out, it is too late to start a

relationship or begin to build trust once a crisis occurs.

Employ open collaborative work environments

In order to actually fuse diverse agencies and different types of information it requires a

collaborative working environment within a fusion center. If analysts and agents have to navigate

a labyrinth of cubicles or are constantly going up and down stairs, that serves as a physical

barrier to effective sharing and collaboration. Also, people can't collaborate well if they are stuck

behind a vault all day while analysts and investigators toil away in an unclassified pen, or worse,

their individual cubicle. Some fusion centers are set up well and others were hampered by their

physical environments. If domestic counterterrorism is important to a jurisdiction then I

recommend establishing more open architecture work spaces to enable this collaboration. Since

personal relationships as so important to sharing, there should also be multiple social spaces like

a well-stocked and aesthetic break room, an outdoor patio or gazebo to allow critical social

bonds to build.

Improve tailoring intelligence for state and local partners

Another recommendation is that federal intelligence can be better tailored to the

requirements of state and local partners. Multiple participants complained about the vast amounts

of unhelpful information available to them in the classified and unclassified federal systems.

Most fusion center participants rarely access these systems to do their jobs and some purposely

avoid it. There is very little in there that pertains to their jurisdiction. Intelligence needs to be

pushed to those who need it, not just searchable as few know what may or may not be in there

relating to them. It is not just a duty to share, but a question we often asked ourselves in the

military: who else needs to know this? When appropriate and valuable to a jurisdiction, federal

agencies should push intelligence to the fusion center.

As an example, participants mentioned that NCTC Current (a federal terrorism database)

is now available on HSDN at the Secret level, but they said very little useful intelligence is

accessible in that system. The vast majority of federal terrorism intelligence is maintained at the

top secret level and not available to fusion centers. While participants do not accuse anyone of

purposely withholding intelligence from fusion centers, there also does not seem to be a

significant effort to downgrade this vast intelligence to the Secret level for dissemination to state

and local partners either. An aspect of this recommendation is to aggressively push down to state

and local fusion centers what they need to know using a secret level ‘tear-line’ report.

Mandate intelligence sharing on terrorism to state and local fusion centers

A final recommendation to overcome sub-optimal federal intelligence sharing with

nonfederal fusion centers is to direct that this intelligence be shared. Mandating federal agencies

share intelligence on terrorist threats may be the only way to overcome many of the barriers like

personal relationships and organizational culture. Requiring that intelligence be shared with

fusion centers is like psychologists having a duty to report patients to law enforcement who are a

threat to themselves or others. Having Congress pass a law that mandates intelligence on

terrorism be disseminated to nonfederal fusion centers would move the nation literally toward a

“a duty to share” paradigm.

Recommendations for Future Research

This study was conducted as an exploratory case study “aimed at generating hypotheses

for later investigation” (Baškarada, 2014, p. 5). One proposition of this study is that personal

interactions are the most important sharing mechanism, as evidenced by participant interviews.

This was a new finding and one that calls for further research as no other study has identified this

as the primary factor with intelligence sharing and fusion centers.

Additional findings from this study can be further researched based on differing locations

and research methodologies. Replicating this study using the same methodologies and research

questions in a different region of the country can further confirm the findings or adjust them

based on other locational factors. This concept could entail repeating the qualitative case study

approach by conducting interviews in other regions of the country such as the west coast, gulf

coast, or middle America. For example, the fusion center in Chicago was not researched or

visited (as it is not on the East Coast). However, it was mentioned by a participant as a positive

example where a fusion center is housed in a secure federal facility and can access Top Secret

and compartmented government intelligence. By studying other regions of the country further

research may reveal other unknown factors or different interactions of factors that cannot be

known until studied.

Another way to expand upon this research is to employ additional research approaches. A

second potential future study concept could include conducting this same study quantitatively

across the entire country using surveys. Several existing research studies on fusion centers used

this quantitative approach, but none of them focused specifically on intelligence sharing from

federal agencies down to the state and local officials. Creating a quantitative research instrument

based upon the interview questions from this research study but employed across the nation

could generate some interesting findings. If significantly more time and resources were applied,

a mixed methods approach may also reap new or interesting findings that expand on this

qualitative exploratory case study.

However, repeating this study across the country solely by using quantitative surveys

could be much less effective than approaches which also employ in person interviews. There

were many perspectives shared that interviewees would not have been as likely to write down on

a survey and send in. Also, several participants were recruited based on establishing a level of

trust with them that is not possible with mass distribution of impersonal surveys. For example,

gaining entrance to fusion centers for this research was done by first establishing rapport and

some degree of trust with each fusion center director. Then, every individual interviewed for the

study knew my intelligence background as well as my employment teaching Homeland Security

college courses. This greatly assisted in gaining entrance and recruiting individuals to participate.

Those interviewees then advocated participation in the study to other members of their fusion

center or their own personal network of contacts at other fusion centers. Once done with their

own interview, completed participants then recommended to onsite coworkers and off-site

contacts in other fusion centers to allow me to interview them. The rapport establishment and

trust building with interviewees was passed on to others and following fusion centers which

generated momentum. It is unlikely that an impersonal survey can establish even this surface

level of trust or elicit perspectives on a sensitive topic like terrorism intelligence sharing.

Another consideration for future research could include focusing on the organizational

relationships within fusion centers and between fusion centers and other organizations. As this

study highlighted in Figure 2 Sharing With and Within a fusion center, there are many different

types and directions (both internally and externally) where sharing occurs related to fusion

centers. While this study only focused on the vertical and singular direction of federal

intelligence sharing with fusion centers, it would be interesting to learn from an in-depth study

trying to map out in detail the sharing that was depicted in figure 2 both within a fusion center

(or centers) and between fusion centers and the many key other organizations they interact with

on the outside.

Another new and interesting line of research related to this study could include adjusting

the same research questions that focused on fusion centers to instead address the role of JTTFs in

terrorism intelligence sharing. FBI JTTFs were not directly studied as a part of this research, but

their role and the importance of the relationship between fusion centers and JTTF became very

evident. JTTFs primarily serve as interagency counterterrorism investigative bodies, but they

also are advanced as a mechanism to share terrorism information and intelligence. For this

possible future study, it would make sense to start with another exploratory qualitative case study

of JTTFs on the east coast, including those who’s jurisdiction is an entire state and those focused

on a single urban region.

Implications for Positive Social Change

Overcoming the barriers to counterterrorism interagency intelligence sharing can

significantly impact major aspects of our society in ensuring a collaborative approach to

counterterrorism. This can only be achieved if it is based on a solid foundation of terrorism

intelligence sharing across all 3 levels of government. By effectively sharing terrorism

intelligence vertically and horizontally among partner agencies is the only way to stop the

complex threats the nation faces from both international terrorists and homegrown extremists.

We cannot go back to the way it was before 9/11 where a failure to effectively share resulted in a

massive tragedy.

This study contributed to the body of knowledge on fusion center with significant and

original findings on how federal intelligence is actually shared with state and local officials, and

how it can be improved. If the policies and procedures are put into enactment and federal

personnel are embedded full-time to enable effective terrorism intelligence sharing with

nonfederal fusion centers, then significant social change can be gained through increased

abilities to counter terrorist attacks within the homeland. This research intends to positively

influence improved national security through policies that reflect the importance of fusion center

federal manning as the crux of intelligence sharing (over systems) and the need to develop and

assess personal relationships between key individuals and organizations with leading

counterterrorism roles in protecting our citizens.

Summary

This exploratory case study into terrorism intelligence sharing with nonfederal fusion

centers has identified several tangible barriers preventing effective sharing such as clearance,

culture, policy and personality. The study also detailed of many of the benefits to our nation in

better protecting citizens that can be gained in overcoming these obstacles. Changing policies to

enable sharing and emphasizing the importance of personal contacts and embedded federal

personnel (over systems) is an important finding that should become reflected in both state and

local programs as well as federal fusion center funding and statutes.

Finally, this was an academic study and the researcher is aware that many of these policy

recommendations may be resource intensive or difficult to enact. However, is it important to

reflect on these recommendations now and not after the next major terrorist attack with hundreds

of American killed in another preventable catastrophe that could have been stopped if federal

agencies had only been more effective at fulfilling its duty to share the intelligence in its

possession with state and local partners.

References

Abold, J. L., Guidetti, R., & Keyer, D. (2012, June). Strengthening the Value of the National

Network of Fusion Centers by Leveraging Specialization: Defining “Centers of

Analytical Excellence.” Homeland Security Affairs 8(7). Retrieved from

https://www.hsaj.org/articles/223

Adams, N., Nordhaus, T., & Shellenberger, M. (2011). Counterterrorism since 9/11: Evaluating

the Efficacy of Controversial Tactics. Oakland, CA: The Breakthrough Institute.

Retrieved from http://thebreakthrough.org/images/pdfs/ CCT_Report_revised-3-31-

11a.pdf

Akbulut, A. Y., Kelle, P., Pawlowski, S.D., Schneider, H., & Looney, C.A. (2009). To share or

not to share? Examining the factors influencing local agency electronic information-

sharing. International Journal of Business Information Systems, 4(2), 143 - 172.

Alexander, E. R., (1995). How organizations act together: Interorganizational coordination in

Theory and Practice. Amsterdam: Gordon and Beach Publishers.

Alexander, D. C. & Mors, T. (2007). Best Practices in Identifying Terrorists During Traffic

Stops and On Calls for Service, Crime & Justice International, 23 (99), 4-12.

Alspaugh, C. (2011, September 11). Lee Hamilton reflects on 9/11 Commission work. The New

Republic. Retrieved from

http://www.therepublic.com/view/local_story/Lee_Hamilton_reflects_on_9_11__131573

7691

Apuzzo, M. & Goldman, A. (2013). Enemies Within: Inside the NYPD’s Secret Spying Unit and

the Bin Laden’s Final Plot Against America. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.

Baca, L. (2008, September 24). Testimony of Sheriff, Los Angeles County U.S. Congress, House

Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information-sharing,

and Terrorism Risk Assessment, A Report Card on Homeland Security Information-

sharing.

Baker, T. (2010, August 23). Intelligence-led policing: Leadership, strategies & tactics. What is a

law enforcement fusion center? Security Debrief. Retrieved from

http://securitydebrief.com/2010/08/23/what-is-a-law-enforcement-fusion-center/

Baker, V. (2013). Information-sharing among public safety agencies. (Order No. 3550653,

Walden University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 145. Retrieved from

http://search.proquest.com/docview/1287062257?accountid=14872.

Barron. T., Lewis, J., Silberstein, A. and Shapiro, S. (2016, March). Domestic Security

Revisited: An Update on the Progress U.S. Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies

Have Made in Confronting a Dynamic Domestic Threat Landscape. Business Executives

for National Security (BENS). Retrieved from

http://www.bens.org/file/DomesticSecurityRevisited_March2016.pdf

Baškarada, S. (2014). Qualitative Case Study Guidelines. The Qualitative Report, 19(24), 1-18.

Bazeley, P. (2012). NVivo 10 Reference Guide, Research Support. Retrieved from

http://www.researchsupport.com.au/NV_10_notes.pdf

Bazeley, P. & Jackson, K. (Eds). (2013). Qualitative Data Analysis with NVivo (2nd ed.),

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Bender, B. (2013, April 25). FBI did not alert state’s anti-terror unit to its probe of suspected

bomber in 2011. The Boston Globe. Retrieved from

http://www.boston.com/politicalintelligence/2013/04/25/fbi-did-not-alert-state-anti-

terror-unit-its-probe-suspected-bomber/RLHZM6GHRotZ6ciIYxmiKP/story.html

Berkeley, A. R., Bush, W., Heasley, P.G., Nicholson, J.B., Reid, J.A., and Wallace, M.J. (2012,

January). Intelligence Information-sharing Final Report and Recommendations, National

Infrastructure Advisory Council, Retrieved from

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac-intelligence-information-sharing-final-

report-01102012.pdf

Best, R. A. Jr. (2007, February 13). Sharing Law Enforcement and Intelligence Information: The

Congressional Role. Congressional Research Service Report to Congress (Report #

RL33873). Retrieved from http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33873_20070213.pdf

Best, R. A. Jr. (2010, July 9). Intelligence issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service.

Report RL33539. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-

bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA525366

Best, R. A. Jr. (2011, December). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)—

Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns. Congressional Research Service.

Report RL41022. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41022.pdf

Biello, D. (2011, September 9,). The Next Attack? Terrorists' Attempts to Hijack Technology.

Scientific American. Retrieved from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/terrorist-

attack-possibilities/

Bigdeli, A.Z., Kamal, M., and Cesare, S. (2013). Information-sharing through inter-

organisational systems in local government, Transforming Government: People, Process

and Policy, 7(2), 148 – 176.

Bimfort, M. T. (1995). A Definition of Intelligence. Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central

Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-

intelligence/kent-csi/vol2no4/html/v02i4a08p_0001.htm

Bjelopera, J. P. (2011). Terrorism Information-sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity

Report Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report R40901. Retrieved

from http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/166837.pdf

Bjelopera, J. P. (2012). The Domestic Terrorist Threat: Background and Issues for Congress,

R42536, Congressional Research Service.

Bjelopera, J. P. & Randol, M. A. (2010). American jihadist terrorism: Combating a complex

threat. Congressional Research Service. Report R 41416. Retrieved from

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41416_20101207.pdf

Bodden, V. (2014). The Boston Marathon Bombing. Minneapolis, MN: ABDO Publishing.

Bumgarner, J. (2006). Federal agents: The growth of federal law enforcement in America. Santa

Barbara, CA: Greenwood.

Bruce, G. (2013). Definition of Terrorism Social and Political Effects. Journal of Military &

Veterans' Health, 21(2), 26-30.

Budinger, Z. B. & Smith, J. H. (2011). Ten Years After 9/11: A Status Report on Information-

sharing. Statements before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and

Governmental Affairs.

Burch, J. (2007, June), A Domestic Intelligence Agency for the United States? A Comparative

Analysis of Domestic Intelligence Agencies and Their Implications for Homeland

Security. Homeland Security Affairs, 3(21). Retrieved from

http://www.hsaj.org/?article=3.2.2

Bush, G. W. (2003). Memorandum on Strengthening the Ability of the Department of Justice to

Meet Challenges to the Security of the Nation. Retrieved from http://georgewbush-

whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/06/text/20050629-1.html

Bush, G. W. (2003, July 29). Executive Order 13311, Homeland Security Information-sharing,

Federal Register/ Vol. 68, No. 147. Retrieved from http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-

2003-07-31/pdf/03-19675.pdf

Bush, G. W. (2008). Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities. Retrieved

from https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html

Bush, G. W. (2010). Decision Points. New York, NY: Crown Publishers.

Canas, D. (2012). Homeland Security at the State Level: A Primer on State Homeland Security

Programs. Anchor House. Bloomington: IN.

Cardillo, R. (2010). Intelligence community reform. Studies in Intelligence 54(3), 1-7. Retrieved

from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of intelligence/csi-publications/csi-

studies/studies/vol.-54-no.-3/pdfs/ExtractCardillo%20IC%20Reform-

Cultural%20Evolution.pdf

Carter, D. L. (2004). Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law

Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Department of Justice. Retrieved from

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536.pdf

Carter, D. L., and Carter, J. G. (2009). The intelligence fusion process for state, local, and tribal

law enforcement. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(12), 1323-1339.

Carter, J., & Chermak. S. (2012). Evidence-based intelligence practices: Examining the role of

fusion centers as a critical source of information. Evidence-based Counterterrorism

Policy 3: 65–88.

Carter, J. G., Carter, D. L., Chermak, S., and McGarrell, E. (2016, May). Law Enforcement

Fusion Centers: Cultivating an Information-sharing Environment while Safeguarding

Privacy. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. pp 1-17. doi 10.1007/s11896-016-

9199-4.

Caruson, K., & MacManus, S. A. (2006). Mandates and management challenges in the trenches:

An intergovernmental perspective on homeland security. Public Administration Review,

66(4), 522-536.

Chen, Y. R. (2009). Tell Me What I Need to Know: What Mayors and Governors Want from

Their Fusion Center. Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4570

Chertoff, M. (2005, July 13). Secretary of Homeland Security. U.S. DHS Second Stage Review

Remarks. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0255.shtm

Cilluffo, F. J., Clark, J. R., & Downing, M. P. (2011, September). Counterterrorism intelligence:

Law enforcement perspectives. The George Washington University Homeland Security

Policy Institute. Retrieved from

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/HSPI%20Research%20Brief%20-

%20Counterterrorism%20Intelligence.pdf

Clarke, R. A. (2004, March 24). Testimony to the 9/11 Commission. Retrieved from

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive/hearing8/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-03-

24.pdf

Coffey, A. (2015, October). Evaluating Intelligence and Information-sharing Networks:

Examples from a Study of the National Network of Fusion Centers. George Washington

University Issue Brief # 2015-04. Retrieved from

https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/CoffeyFusionCenterPaper-

CCHS.pdf

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536.pdf

Comiskey, J. G. (2010, March). Effective State, Local, and Tribal Police Intelligence: The New

York City Police Department's Intelligence Enterprise-A Smart Practice. Naval

Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5460

Cordner, G., & Scarborough, K. (2010). Information-sharing: Exploring the intersection of

policing with national and military intelligence. Homeland Security Affairs, 6(1).

Retrieved from https://www.hsaj.org/articles/92

Cresswell, A.M., Pardo, T. A., Canestraro, D.S., Dawes, S.S., (2005). Why Assess Information-

sharing Capability? Center for Technology in Government, Retrieved from

http://www.ctg.albany.edu/publications/guides/why_assess/why_assess.pdf

Creswell, J. W. (2007). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five

approaches (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Cumming, A. (2005, August 16). Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of

Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report

RL33033. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33033.pdf

Davis, P. (2010). Connecting the Dots at the Local Level: Fusion centers Make Homeland

Security a State, City and County Affair. Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland

Security International 16(3), 8-10. International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference

Center.

Davis, E. & Kayyem, J. (2014, April 15). Would better data have helped? The Boston Globe,

Retrieved from http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/04/15/better-data-

management-can-solve-crime-and-other-

problem/hqshiNwRO9Fqs7FFTCUC8K/story.html

Dawes, S. S. (1996). Interagency information-sharing: Expected benefits, manageable risks.

Journal of Policy Analysis & Management, 15(3), 377-394.

Dawes, S. S., Cresswell, A. M., & Pardo, T. A. (2009). From 'Need to Know' to 'Need to Share':

Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public Sector

Knowledge Networks. Public Administration Review, (3). 391.

De Bruijn, H. (2006). One fight, one team: the 9/11 commission report on intelligence,

fragmentation and information. Public Administration, 84(2), 267-287.

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9299.2006.00002.x

Desai, S. B. (2005, February 1). Solving the Interagency Puzzle. Policy Review (129). 57-72.

Domash, S. F. (2004, September). How to work with the feds. Police Magazine. Retrieved from

http://www.policemag.com/Channel/Patrol/Articles/Print/ Story/2004/09/How-to-Work-

with-the-Feds.aspx

Drake, D.B., Steckler, N.A., & Koch, M.J. (2004). Information-sharing in and Across

Government Agencies. Social Science Computer Review 22(1), 67-84. doi:

10.1177/0894439303259889.

Eack, K. D. (2008). State and local fusion centers: Emerging trends and issues. Homeland

Security Affairs, Supplement 2. Retrieved from http://www.hsaj.org/?special:

fullarticle=supplement.2.3

Eisinger, P. (2006). Imperfect federalism: The intergovernmental partnership for homeland

security. Public Administration Review, 66(4), 537-545.

Ernst, M. (2014, March 20). How local and state cops fit into counterterrorism. P1 (Police One)

First Person. Retrieved from

https://www.policeone.com/counterterrorism/articles/6994276-How-local-and-state-cops-

fit-into-counterterrorism/

Erwin, M. C. (2013). Intelligence Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service.

Retrieved from http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33539.pdf

Etzioni, A. (2013, May 29). The Danger of Overcorrecting on Terror, The National Interest.

Retrieved from http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-danger-overcorrecting-terror-

8525

Evans, R. (2013). Policy implementation in homeland security: Implementing open source

intelligence policies within state run fusion centers. (Order No. 3552221, Walden

University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 149. Retrieved from

http://search.proquest.com/docview/1294161960?accountid=14872.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (2005), Terrorism 2002-2005, Retrieved from

http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). (2009, November 11). Investigation continues into Fort

Hood shooting. FBI National Press Office. Retrieved from

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/investigation-continues-into-fort-hood-

shooting

Fenske, D. (2008). All enemies, foreign and domestic: Erasing the distinction between foreign

and domestic intelligence gathering under the fourth amendment. Northwestern

University Law Review, 102(1), 343-381.

Filler, J. (2010, February 15). The disconnect between DHS and the homeland security mission.

Emergency Management. Retrieved from http://www.emergencymgmt.com/emergency-

blogs/homeland/The-Disconnect-between-DHS.html

Filler, J. (2010, March 23). Analysis: Collecting and Sharing Information Is Not Enough.

Emergency Management. Retrieved from

http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Collecting-Sharing-Information.html

Forsyth, W. A. (2005, September). State and Local Intelligence Fusion Centers: An Evaluative

Approach in Modeling a State Fusion Center. Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis.

Retrieved from https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/2044

Fresenko, V. L. (2010, December). Social Media Integration into State-Operated Fusion Centers

and Local Law Enforcement: Potential Uses and Challenges. Naval Postgraduate School

Masters Thesis. Retrieved from http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4996

Fries, T. (2013, March). Fusion Center and Federalism: Erosion or Enhancement. Naval

Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10945/32821

Fuller, G. (2008). Joint Terrorism Task Forces: Protecting DOD from Terrorist Attacks. The

Guardian, 10(1). Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=486223

Fussell, C., Hough, T., & Pederson, M. D. (2009, December). What makes Fusion Cells

effective? Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4438

Garicano, L., & Posner, R. (2005). Intelligence reform since 9/11: An organizational economics

perspective. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(4). Retrieved from

http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134960

Gellman, B. (2011, May). Is the FBI up to the job 10 years after 9/11? Time Magazine 177(18)

Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2068082,00.html

German, M. and Stanley J. (2007, December). What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? American

Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved from https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/

privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf

Ghilarducci, M. (2016, February 2). Frontline Response to Terrorism in America. Testimony to

the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Retrieved

from http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/testimony-ghilarducci-2016-02-02.

Gil-Garcia, J.R., Guler, A., Pardo, T.A. and Burke, G.B. (2010), “Trust in government cross-

boundary information-sharing initiatives: identifying the determinants”, System Sciences

HICSS 2010 43rd Hawaii International Conference on 5-8 January, IEEE Computer

Society, p. 1.

Gorman, S. (2003, August 1). FBI, CIA remain worlds apart. National Journal. Retrieved from

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080103nj1.htm

Graphia, R. D. (2010). An exploratory study of the perceived utility and effectiveness of state

fusion centers. PhD Dissertation Rutgers University; Graduate School – Newark.

Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.7282/T3BG2P4V

Graham, B. and Talent, J. (2008). World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the

Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism. Retrieved from

http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc123525/m2/1/high_res_d/10942265.pdf

Gutjahr, M. H. (2005). The Intelligence Archipelago: The Community’s Struggle to Reform in

the Globalized Era. National Intelligence University. Retrieved from http://ni-

u.edu/ni_press/pdf/The_Intelligence_Archipelago.pdf

Harper, J. L. (2009, December). Fusion center privacy policies: does one size fit all? Naval

Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4431

Hatter, H. B. (2011, March 7). The tech that makes anti-terrorism tip lines effective. GCN

Magazine. Retrieved from http://gcn.com/articles/2011/03/07/feature-3-fusion-center-

main.aspx

Henriksen, T. (2013, July). Eyes, Ears, and Daggers: Special Operations Forces and the Central

Intelligence Agency in America’s Security. Joint Special Operations University.

Retrieved from http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/SOF-

CIA%20Roles%20by%20Henriksen.pdf

Hewitt, C. (2014). Law Enforcement Tactics and Their Effectiveness in Dealing with American

Terrorism: Organizations, Autonomous Cells, and Lone Wolves. Terrorism and Political

Violence, 1(26), 58-68.

Hitz, F. P. (2012). U.S. intelligence in the wake of September 11: The rise of the spy commando

and reorganized operational capabilities. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 35(1).

Retrieved from

http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/hjlpp35&div=19&id=&pa

ge=

Hoffman, B., Meese, E. and Roemer, T. J. (2015, March). The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in

the 21st Century: Report of the Congressionally-directed 9/11 Review Commission to the

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved from

https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-

century

Homeland Security Intelligence Council (2011). Intelligence to protect the homeland: …taking

stock ten years later and looking ahead. Intelligence and National Security Alliance.

Retrieved from http://images.magnetmail.net/images/ clients/INSA/attach/INSA_

Homeland_Security_Intelligence.pdf

House Homeland Security Committee. U.S. Congress. (2016, January). Terror Snapshot.

Retrieved from https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/HSC-Terror-

Threat-Snapshot.pdf

Huang, M. P. (2007). After reorganization: a leadership journey. The Public Manager, 36(1), 67-

69.

Hylton, H. (2009, March 9). Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information? Time.

Retrieved from http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html

Imperial, M. T. (2005). Using collaboration as a governance strategy: Lessons from six

watershed management programs. Administration and Society, 37(3), 281–320.

Inspector Generals of the Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of

Justice, and Department of Homeland Security (2014, April 10). Unclassified Summary

of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon

Bombings. Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/ reports/ 2014/s1404.pdf

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Public Law 108–458, 118 STAT.

3639, codified as amended at 50 USC 401 note. Retrieved from

http://www.nctc.gov/docs/irtpa.pdf

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group. (2011, March). Intelligence Guide for

First Responders. 2nd Ed. Retrieved from http://ise.gov/sites/default/

files/ITACG_Guide_2ed.pdf

Jackson, B. A. (ed). (2009). The challenge of domestic intelligence in a free society: A

Multidisciplinary Look at the creation of a U.S. domestic counterterrorism intelligence

Agency. RAND. Retrieved from

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG804.pdf

Jeffreys-Jones, R. (2007). The FBI: A history. Binghamton, NY: Vail-Ballou.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, October 22). Joint Publication 2-0: Joint Intelligence.

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2009, November 13). Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism.

Johnson, B. R. (2007). A Look at Fusion Centers: Working Together to Protect America. FBI

Law Enforcement Bulletin, 76(12), pp. 28-32. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-

services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/2007-pdfs/dec07leb.pdf

Joyal, R. G. (2010). Are fusion centers achieving their intended purposes? findings from a

qualitative study on the internal efficacy of state fusion centers. IALEIA Journal, 19(1),

54-76.

Joyal, R. G., (2012, December). How far have we come? Information-sharing, interagency

collaboration, and trust within the law enforcement community. Criminal Justice Studies,

25(4), 357–370.

http://ise.gov/sites/default/files/ITACG_Guide_2ed.pdf

Kahn, L. H. (2009, June 9). The problems with the Department of Homeland Security. Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from http://www.thebulletin.org/web-

edition/columnists/laura-h-kahn/the-problems-the-department-of-homeland-security

Kaplan, E. (2007, February 22). Backgrounder: Fusion centers. The Council on Foreign

Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/intelligence/fusion-centers/p12689

Kean, T.H., & Hamilton, L.H., & et al. (2004, July 22). The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved

from http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf

Keating, W. H. (2013, July 31). Letter to FBI Director James Comey. Retrieved from

http://heavy.com/news/2013/07/bill-keating-letter-fbi-boston-bombings/

Keegan, J. (2003). Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda.

Random House. New York: NY.

Kincaid, J., & Cole, R. (2002, September). Issues of federalism in response to terrorism. Public

Administration Review, 62. 181-193.

King, C. B. III. (2009). The Department of Homeland Security: An organization in transition.

Joint Forces Quarterly, 55. Retrieved from

https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/ndupress&CISOPT

R=39478&REC=5

Klem, N. (2014, December). The national network of fusion centers: Perception and reality.

Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis. Retrieved from

https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/44598

Kobach, K. W. (2004, June). State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: A Unified

Approach for Stopping Terrorists, The Center for Immigration Studies Backgrounder.

Retrieved from http://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2004/back604.pdf

Kranish, M., Bender, B., Murphy, S. P., & Bierman, N. (2013, April 25). Data-sharing troubles

raise questions in Marathon case: 2 separate watch lists named Boston suspect. The

Boston Globe. Retrieved from

https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/04/24/government-terrorism-

information-sharing-program-rated-high-risk-despite-years-effort-

since/3ImcHIZOaPKfeeBYTAXRHN/story.html

Kraut, R. E., Fussell, S. R., Brennan, S. E. and Siegel, J. (2002). Understanding Effects of

Proximity on Collaboration: Implications for Technologies to Support Remote

Collaborative Work. In P. Hinds, and S. Kiesler, (Eds.), Distributed work (137-158).

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kumar, R. (2013). Lessons from Boston bombing: need for strategic creativity in counter-

terrorism. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Retrieved from

http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18872

Kumar, K. & Van Dissel, H. G. (1996). Sustainable collaboration: Managing conflict and

cooperation in interorganizational systems. MIS Quarterly, 20(3), 279-300.

Lamb, C. J. & Munsing, E. (2011, March). Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an

Organizational Innovation. National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic

Studies, Perspectives #4. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/cgi-

bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA540046

Ladner, R. D. (2010, December). A Trusted National Fusion Center Network: Are Baseline

Capabilities and Accreditation Needed? Naval Postgraduate School Masters Thesis.

Retrieved from http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5215

Lahneman, W. J. (2004). Knowledge sharing in the intelligence community after 9/11.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 17(4), 614-633. doi:

10.1080/08850600490496425

Lambert, D. (2010, December). Intelligence-Led Policing in a Fusion Center. FBI Law

Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved from http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-

enforcement-bulletin/Dec2010/intelligence_feature

Landsbergen, D. Jr & Wolken, G. Jr (2001), Realizing the promise: government information

systems and the fourth generation of information technology. Public Administration

Review, 61(2), 206-220.

Laub, Z. (2015, November 16). The Islamic State. CFR Backgrounder. The Council on Foreign

Relations. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/iraq/islamic-state/p14811

Lawrence, E. (2008a). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some

Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers. Government Accounting Office

Report GAO-08-636T. Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08636t.pdf

Larence, E. (2008b, April 17). Homeland security: Federal efforts are helping to address some

challenges faced by state and local fusion centers. United States Government

Accountability Office, Report GAO-08-636T. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/119734.pdf

Larence, E. (2009, December). Information-sharing: Federal agencies are sharing border and

terrorism information with local and tribal law enforcement agencies, but additional

efforts are needed. GAO-10-41. Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1041.pdf

Larence, E. (2010, September). Information-sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion

Centers Build and Sustain Capabilities and Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure

Results. GAO-10-972. Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/310268.pdf

Larence, E. (2011). Information-sharing: Progress made and challenges remaining in sharing

terrorism-related information. GAO-12-144A. Government Accountability Office.

Retrieved from http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d12144t.pdf

Larence, E. (2013). Information-sharing: Additional Actions Could Help Ensure That Efforts to

Share Terrorism-Related Suspicious Activity Reports Are Effective. GAO-13-233.

Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652995.pdf

Larence, E. (2014). Information-sharing: DHS Is Assessing Fusion Center Capabilities and

Results, but Needs to More Accurately Account for Federal Funding Provided to Centers.

GAO-15-155: Government Accountability Office. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/666760.pdfLeavell, R. (2007, March). Evolution of

Regional Counterterrorism Centers within a National Counterterrorism Network. Naval

Postgraduate School Thesis. Retrieved from

https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3010/07Mar_Leavell.pdf

Lehrer, E. (2004, Summer). The homeland security bureaucracy. The Public Interest. 156, 71-92

Lewandowski, C., Carter J. G., and Campbell, W. L. (2017) The role of people in information-

sharing: perceptions from an analytic unit of a regional fusion center, Police Practice and

Research, 18:2, 174-193, doi: 10.1080/15614263.2016.1250631

Lerner, C. S. (2003) The USA PATRIOT Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign

Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 George Mason Law Review, 493, pp.

524–26

Leuschner, K. J. (2008). Should the United States Establish a Dedicated Domestic Intelligence

Agency for Counterterrorism? RAND Research Brief. Retrieved from

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2008/RAND_RB9369.pdf

Levin, C. and Coburn, T. (2012, October 2). Federal support for and involvement in state and

local fusion centers. Majority and Minority Staffs Report of the U. S. Senate Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations. Retrieved from

https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=49139e81-1dd7-4788-a3bb-d6e7d97dde04

Logan, G. (ed). (2010). Homeland Security and Intelligence. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger

Publications.

Mandoli, G. R. (2006, September). The sandbox strategy: The why and how of federal law

enforcement integration. Naval Post-Graduate School unpublished Master’s Thesis.

Retrieved from

http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2006/Sep/06Sep_Mandoli.pdf

Marks, D. E., & Sun, I. Y. (2007). The impact of 9/11 on organizational development among

state and local law enforcement agencies. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice,

23(2), 159-173. doi: 10.1177/1043986207301364

Maurer, D. C. (2012, April 16). FBI Counterterrorism: Vacancies Have Declined, but FBI Has

Not Assessed the Long-Term Sustainability of Its Strategy for Addressing Vacancies.

Government Accountability Office Report GAO-12-533. Retrieved from

http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590147.pdf

Maxwell, J. A. (2012). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach. Sage: Thousand

Oaks, CA.

Mayer, M. A., Carafano, J. J., and Zuckerman, J. (2011). Homeland Security 4.0: Overcoming

Centralization, Complacency, and Politics, The Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/homeland-security-4-0-overcoming-

centralization-complacency-and-politics

Mayer. M. A. (2016, March). Consolidate Domestic Intelligence Entities Under the FBI.

American Enterprise institute. Retrieved from https://www.aei.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/03/Fusion-Center.pdf

McCaul, M. (2014), U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security Hearing,

The Boston Marathon Bombings, One Year On: A Look Back to Look Forward. Retrieved

from http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov /files/documents/04-09-

14%20McCaul%20Open.pdf

McCaul, M. (2015, November 2). Department of Homeland Security Support to Fusion Centers

Act of 2015. U.S. House of Representatives. Retrieved from

https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/hrpt322/CRPT-114hrpt322.pdf

McCaul, M. and Keating, B. (2014, March 27), How did Tsarnaev go off FBI radar? The Boston

Globe, Retrieved from http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/03/27/missed-

opportunities-lessons-learned-year-after-marathon-

bombings/ztVLvM1SFyzaVtf1oI6AyN/story.html

McCaul, M. and King, P. (2013, March), Majority Staff Report on the National Network of

Fusion Centers. U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee Report.

Retrieved from https://www.archives.gov/files/isoo/oversight-groups/sltps-pac/staff-

report-on-fusion-networks-2013.pdf

McCaul, M. and King, P. (2014, March), The Road to Boston: Counterterrorism Challenges and

Lessons from the Marathon Bombings. U.S. House of Representative Homeland Security

Committee Report. Retrieved from https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/Boston-

Bombings-Report.pdf

McConnell, M. (2007). Overhauling intelligence. Foreign Affairs 86(4), 49 – 58.

McCreight, R. (2015). Constitutional Authority in Crisis: Examining a State Governor’s

Emergency Powers. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 12(1),

pp. 23-42. doi:10.1515/jhsem-2014-0095

MacGregor, D. S. (2010). Fusion 2.0: the next generation of fusion in California: aligning state

and regional fusion centers. Naval Postgraduate School Maters Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5396

McNeill, J. B., Carafano, J. J. and Zuckerman, J. (2011). 39 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11:

Examining Counterterrorism’s Success Stories. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

#2556 on Terrorism. Retrieved from

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/39-terror-plots-foiled-since-911-

examining-counterterrorisms-success-stories#_ftnref57

McQuade, B. (2016, July 19). The Puzzle of Intelligence Expertise: Spaces of Intelligence

Analysis and the Production of “Political” Knowledge. Qualitative Sociology, pp 1-19.

Middlemiss, A. D. & Gupta, N. (2007). U.S. interagency law enforcement cooperation since

September 11, 2001: Improvements and results. Journal of Financial Crime, 14(2), 138.

Mitchiner, C. C. (2013). Department of Homeland Security and Fusion Centers, an Unfused

Network. Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College. Retrieved from

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589473.pdf

Monahan, T. (2009) The murky world of 'Fusion Centers'', Criminal Justice Matters 75(1), 20 –

21. Retrieved from http://www.scribd.com/doc/21970772/Murky-World-of-Fusion-

Centers-2009

Monahan, T. & Palmer N.A. (2009). The Emerging Politics of DHS Fusion Centers. Security

Dialogue, 40(6), 617-636. doi: 10.1177/0967010609350314

Morton, J. F. (2012). Next-Generation Homeland Security: Network Federalism and the Course

to National Preparedness. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

Mueller, R. S. (2010, October 6). Countering the Terrorism Threat. Director of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, speech to the Preparedness Group Conference

https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/countering-the-terrorism-threat

Mushkatel, A. H., & Weschler, L. F. (1985). Emergency management and the intergovernmental

system. Public Administration Review, 45, 49-56.

Napolitano, J. (2011, February 11). Testimony Before the United States House of

Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, “Understanding the Homeland Threat

Landscape – Considerations for the 112th Congress”. Retrieved from

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72212/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg72212.pdf

National Security Council (2007). National Strategy for Information-sharing: Successes and

Challenges in Improving Terrorism-related Information. Washington, DC: The

Whitehouse. Retrieved from: http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/

nsc/infosharing/NSIS_book.pdf

National Security Council (2012). National Strategy for Information-sharing and Safeguarding.

Washington, DC: The Whitehouse. Retrieved from

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf

Negroponte, J. D.; Wittenstein, E. M. (2009). Urgency, Opportunity, and Frustration:

Implementing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Yale Law

& Policy Review. 28(2). Pp. 379-417.

Nelson, R. and Bodurian, B. (2010, March). A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing

“Homegrown” Extremism in the United States. Center for Strategic and International

Studies. Retrieved from

http://csis.org/files/publication/100304_Nelson_GrowingTerroristThreat_Web.pdf

Newbill, R. (2008, June). Intelligence Sharing, Fusion Centers, and Homeland Security. U.S.A.F

Institute of Technology, Retrieved from handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA488163

Newkirk, A. B. (2010) The Rise of the Fusion-Intelligence Complex: A critique of political

surveillance after 9/11. Surveillance & Society, 8(1), 43-60. Retrieved from

http://surveillance-and-society.org/ojs/index.php/journal/article/view/fusion/fusion

O'Connor, T. R. (2006). Intelligence Led Policing and Transnational Justice. Journal of the

Institute of Justice and International Studies. (6), 233-239. ISSN 1538-7909

Olson, W. (2008). Interagency coordination: The normal accident or the essence of indecision.

U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB896.pdf

Palmieri, L. M. (2005, June). Information vs. Intelligence: What Police Executives Need to

Know. The Police Chief Magazine, 72(6).Pappas, M. J. (2010). Department of Homeland

Security and Information-sharing: Is it Working. Unpublished U.S. Army War College

Masters Thesis. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-

bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA520018&Location= U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Patel, D. M. and Olson, S. (2012). Information-sharing and Collaboration: Applications to

Biosurveillence. The National Academies Press. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from

http://biosurveillance.typepad.com/files/iom-nbic-reports.pdf

Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks,

CA: Sage Publications.

Paul, K. (2015). 2015 ISE Annual Report to Congress. Information-sharing Environment.

Retrieved from

https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/FINAL_ISE_Annual_Report_2015_FOR_WEB_0.

pdf

Perl, R. (2004). The Department of Homeland Security: Background and challenges. In

Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S - Russian Workshop

Proceedings (pp. 176-184). Washington, DC: The National Academies Press.

Perrow, C. (2006, April). The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and the

Intelligence Reorganization. Homeland Security Affairs 1(2). Retrieved from

https://www.hsaj.org/articles/174

Plecas, D., McCormick, A. V., Levine, J., Neal, P., and Cohen, I. M. (2011). Evidence-based

solution to information-sharing between law enforcement agencies, Policing: An

International Journal of Police Strategies & Management, 34(1), pp.120- 134.

Posner, R. A. (2011). Remaking domestic intelligence. Hoover Press. CA: Stanford.

Randol, M. A. (2009a). Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and

Approaches. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL33616_20090114.pdf

Randol, M. A. (2009b). The department of homeland security intelligence enterprise:

Operational overview and oversight challenges for Congress. Congressional Research

Service Report #R40602. Retrieved from

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40602_20100319.pdf

Randol, M. A. (2010). The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise:

Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress. Congressional Research

Service. Retrieved from http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40602_ 20100319.pdf

Rascoff, S. J. (2009). Domesticating Intelligence. Southern California Law Review, 83, pp. 575-

648.

Rascoff, S. J. (2010). The Law of Homegrown (Counter) Terrorism (2010). Texas Law Review,

88. pp. 1715-1749.

Riebling, M. (2002). Wedge: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11: How the secret war between the FBI

and CIA has endangered national security. New York: New York, NY: Simon &

Schuster.

Regan, P. and Monahan, T. (2013). Beyond counterterrorism: Data sharing, privacy and

organizational histories of DHS Fusion Centers. International Journal of E-Politics 4 (3):

1–14. DOI: 10.4018/jep.2013070101.

Regan, P. and Monahan, T (2014). Fusion center accountability and intergovernmental

information-sharing. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 44(3): 475–498.

Regan, P., Monahan, T, and Craven, K. (2015). Constructing the suspicious: Data production,

circulation, and interpretation by DHS fusion centers. Administration and Society 47(6):

740–762. DOI: 10.1177/0095399713513141.

http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=OT4U11l06poC&oi=fnd&pg=PR5&dq=obstacles+to+domestic+intelligence+and+information+sharing&ots=zs2V9o9S_B&sig=D6dtLfA8FSgN9xOdWS-CfJQgjVs

Relyea, H. C. (2004). Homeland security and information-sharing: Federal policy considerations.

Government Information Quarterly, 21(4), 420-438.

Reilly, S. (2013, April 29). Boston bombing renews focus on gaps in information-sharing.

Federal Times 49(7), 4-4. Retrieved from

http://archive.federaltimes.com/article/20130426/DEPARTMENTS03/304260002/Boston

-bombing-renews-focus-gaps-information-sharing

Richelson, J. T. (2012, July 19). Documenting the FBI: Declassified Documents Provide New

Detail on Confronting the Terrorist Threat – from al-Qaeda to Skinheads. National

Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 386. Retrieved from

http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB386/

Ridge, T. (2009). The test of our times: America under siege and how we can be safe again. New

York, N.Y: St. Martin’s Press.

Riegle, R. (2009, April 1). The Future of Fusion Centers: Potential Promise and Dangers,

Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland Security. Retrieved from

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony _1238597287040.shtm

Rineheart, J. (2010). Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency. Perspectives On Terrorism, 4(5).

Retrieved from http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/249

Roberts, P. (2008, Summer). Dispersed federalism as a new regional governance for homeland

security. Publius, 38(3), 416-444.

Robinson, N. & Disley, E. (2010). Incentives and Challenges for Information-sharing in the

Context of Network and Information Security. European Network and Information

Security Agency. Retrieved from

http://www.rand.org/pubs/external_publications/EP201200167.html

Roebuck, R. (2009, June 18). ICE, DEA vow to cooperate in efforts against drug trafficking:

Federal agencies often caught in border turf wars, studies show. The Monitor. Retrieved

from http://www.themonitor.com/articles/ice-27790-drug-agencies.html

Rollins, J. (2008, January 18). Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress. Congressional

Research Service Report for Congress (Report #RL34070). Retrieved from

http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34070_20080118.pdf

Rosenbach, E. (2008). The incisive fight: recommendations for improving counterterrorism

intelligence. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

618(1), 133-147. doi:10.1177/0002716208316947

Saari, S. C. (2010, December). Fusion centers securing America's heartland from threats. Naval

Postgraduate School Thesis. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5053

Sales, N. A. (2010a, February) Share and Share Alike: Intelligence Agencies and Information-

sharing, The George Washington Law Review, 78(2), 279-352. Retrieved from

http://groups.law.gwu.edu/lr/articlepdf/78-2-sales.pdf

Sales, N. A. (2010b). Mending walls: Information-sharing after the USA Patriot Act. Texas Law

Review, 88, 1795-1854.

Schmitt, E. (2011, February 10). Lawmakers hear of threat by domestic terrorists. The New York

Times, Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/us/ politics/10terror.html

Schnedar, C. A. (2011). Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice Statement before

the U.S. House of Representatives concerning “Oversight of Department of Justice and

Department of Commerce,” February 9, 2011. Retrieved from

http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t1102.pdf

Scott, E. F. (2014, November). Integrating Fusion Centers and Law Enforcement in Utilization

of the Intelligence Cycle. Masters Thesis, American Public University. Retrieved from

http://digitalcommons.apus.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1093&context=theses

Shultz, R. (2016, May). Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization—A Case

Study of Task Force 714 in Iraq, Joint Special Operations University, Report 16-6.

Retrieved from jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/MilitaryInCVM29Apr16.pdf

Sims, J. (2007). Intelligence to counter terror: The importance of all-source fusion. Intelligence

& National Security, 22(1), 38-56. doi:10.1080/02684520701200772

Seamon, R. H. and Gardner, W. D. (2005) The PATRIOT Act and the Wall Between Foreign

Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, pp. 458–63.

Serrao, S. (2010, August 23). What is a Law Enforcement Fusion Center? Security Debrief.

Retrieved from http://securitydebrief.com/2010/08/23/what-is-a-law-enforcement-fusion-

center/

Shedd, D. (2016, August 25). Facing the New Reality of Homegrown Terrorism. The Cipher

Brief. Retrieved from https://www.thecipherbrief.com/column/strategic-view/facing-new-

reality-homegrown-terrorism-1089

Shane, S. & Johnston, D. (2009, November 12). Questions, not alarms, met exchanges with

cleric. The New York Times. Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/us/12inquire.html

Sheehan, M.A. (2009, September 26), “The Hatfields and McCoys of Counterterrorism,” The

New York Times, Retrieved from

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/opinion/27sheehan.html

Shepherd, D. (2011, January). The role of the private sector in fusion centers. Security, 48(1), 36-

39.

Shiffman, G. M., Sciara-Rippeon, N., and Gee, M. (2010, February). Managing the Dots: The

Challenges of Intelligence Sharing for the Homeland Security Enterprise, Center for

Peace and Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www1.georgetown.

edu/sfs/cpass/center/research/publications/ManagingtheDots_1.pdf

Shepherd, D. (2011, January). The role of the private sector in fusion centers. Security, 48(1), 36-

39.

Shultz, R. H. (2004, January 26). Showstoppers: Nine reasons why we never sent our Special

Operations Forces after al Qaeda before 9/11. The Weekly Standard. Retrieved from

http://www.weeklystandard.com/showstoppers/article/4846

Silber, M. D. (2012, June). Who Will Defend the Defenders? Commentary Magazine. Retrieved

from http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/who-will-defend-the-defenders/

Silber, M. and Frey, A. (2013, November). Detect, Disrupt, and Detain: Local Law

Enforcement’s Critical Role in Combatting Homegrown Extremism and the Evolving

Terrorist Threat. Fordham Urban Law Journal. 41(1), 217-176.

Silberman, L. H., and Robb, C. S. (2005 March 31), Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities

of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (The WMD Commission),

Report to the President of the United States. Retrieved from

http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf.

Skahill, T. M. (2010, December). Striking the Right Balance Fusion Centers and Privacy. Naval

Postgraduate School Masters thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5243

Stake, R. E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. Sage: Thousand Oaks, CA

Steiner, J. E. (2010). Improving homeland security at the state level--Needed: State-level,

integrated intelligence enterprises. Studies in Intelligence, 53(3). Retrieved from

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-

studies/studies/vol.-53-no.-3/improving-homeland-security-at-the-state-level.html

Steiner, J. E. (2015). Homeland Security and Intelligence. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Publications.

Stewart, C. (2016, September 9). Combating terrorism: Five things to know about a fusion

center. http://www.mydaytondailynews.com/news/news/local/five-things-to-know-about-

a-fusion-center/nsTpP/

Stokes, R. L. (2013). Employing the intelligence cycle process model within the Homeland

Security Enterprise. Naval Postgraduate School Thesis. Retrieved from

http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/bitstream/handle/10945/39018/13Dec_Stokes

_Roger.pdf?sequence=1

Stone, K. E. (2014). Creating an information-sharing and analysis center: A case study of the

North Central Texas Fusion Center. The University of Texas at Dallas PhD Dissertation.

UMI Dissertations Publishing. Retrieved from

http://search.proquest.com/docview/1548325736

Taylor, R. W., & Russel, A. L. (2012). The Failure of Police ‘Fusion’ Centers and the Concept of

a National Intelligence Sharing Plan. Police Practice & Research, 13(2), 184-200. doi:

10.1080/15614263.2011.581448.

Teutsch, K. (2010, May). Addressing National Security Concerns in an All-Hazards Threat

Environment. Homeland Security Journal. Retrieved from

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/BrowseArticles.aspx?catid=1

Thompson, F. J. (2002). Homeland security: The state and local crucible. Public Administration

Review, 62, 18-20.

Treverton, G. F. (2002). Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Homeland Security. The Century

Foundation. Retrieved from http://tcf.org/publications/2002/ 8/pb278/get_pdf

Treverton, G. F. (2008). Reorganizing Domestic U.S. Intelligence. RAND Corporation.

Retrieved from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/

pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG767.pdf

Tromblay, D. E. (2016). The U.S. Domestic Intelligence Enterprise: History, Development, and

Operations. CRC Press: New York.

United States Army Asymmetric Warfare Group. (2009, December). Interagency Teaming to

Counter Irregular Threats. Fort Meade, MD Retrieved from

https://info.publicintelligence.net/APL-InteragencyTeaming.pdf

U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern New York. (2016, November 16). Ahmad Khan Rahimi

Indicted In Manhattan Federal Court On Terrorism Charges. Retrieved from

https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ahmad-khan-rahimi-indicted-manhattan-federal-

court-terrorism-charges

United States Code, Title 28, Section .85 (2009). Organization of the Department of Justice.

Retrieved from http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2009/julqtr/28cfr0.85.htm

United States Code, (2002). The Homeland Security Act of 2002. Public Law 107–296 107th

Congress. Retrieved from https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf

United States Congress. (2002). Homeland Security Act. Public Law 107–296. Retrieved from

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf

United States Congress. (2004, December 17). Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention

Act of 2004. PUBLIC LAW 108–458—DEC. 17, 2004. Retrieved from

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf

United States Congress. (2007). Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of

2007. Retrieved from http://intelligence.senate.gov/ laws/pl11053.pdf

United Stated Congress (2011). Hearing on The DHS Intelligence Enterprise- Past, Present, and

Future. Retrieved from http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-dhs-intelligence-

enterprise-past-present-and-future

United States Congress. (2012). U.S. Code Title 22, Foreign Relations and Intercourse. Retrieved

from http://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title22

United States Congress. (2015). H.R.3503 - Department of Homeland Security Support to Fusion

Centers Act of 2015; 114th Congress (2015-2016). Retrieved from

https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3503/text

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2008, December). Department of Homeland

Security Concept of Operations for Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers.

Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/conops.pdf

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2010, February 1). Quadrennial Homeland

Security Review Report. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/

xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2015a, July). Office of Intelligence and

Analysis Mission. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis-

mission

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2015b, January). 2014 National Network of

Fusion Centers Final Report. Retrieved from

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014%20National%20Network%20of

%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report_1.pdf

United States Department of Homeland Security. (2016, April). 2015 National Network of

Fusion Centers Final Report. Retrieved from

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2015%20Final%20Report%20Sectio

n%20508%20Compliant.pdf

United States Department of Homeland Security / Department of Justice DHS/DOJ. (2010,

May). Considerations for Fusion Center and emergency operations center coordination;

Comprehensive preparedness guide 502. Retrieved from http://www.

fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/cpg_502_eoc-fusion_final_7_20_2010.pdf

United States Department of Justice. (1996, September). Criminal Justice in Indian Country

Audit Report. Office of the Inspector General. Retrieved from

https://oig.justice.gov/reports/plus/a9616/

United States Department of Justice (2008). Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities. Retrieved from

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/d/fusion_center_guidelines.pdf

http://homeland.house.gov/hearing/hearing-dhs-intelligence-enterprise-past-present-and-future

United States Department of Justice (2004). A Review of the FBI's Handling's of Intelligence

Information Related to the September 11 Attacks. Office of the Inspector General.

Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0506/final.pdf

United States Department of Justice (2005a, June). The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task

Forces. Office of the Inspector General Report # I-2005-007

Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e0507/final.pdf

United States Department of Justice. (2005b, July). Fusion center guidelines: Developing and

sharing information and intelligence in a new world. Retrieved from

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf

United States Department of Justice. (2006, August). Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and

Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era. Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Retrieved from http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents /fusion_center_guidelines.pdf

United States Department of Justice (2004, November). A Review of the FBI's Handling of

Intelligence Information Related to the September 11 Attacks. Retrieved from

http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0506/final.pdf

United States Department of Justice. (2009). Navigating Your Agency’s Path to Intelligence-Led

Policing. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Retrieved from

http://www.it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1082

United States Department of Justice. (2017, March). Review of Domestic Sharing of

Counterterrorism Information, Office of the Inspector General Audit Division Report 17-

21. Retrieved from https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/a1721.pdf

United States Senate. (1976). Church Committee Reports. Book II: Intelligence Activities and the

Rights of Americans, Retrieved from http://www.aarclibrary.org/ publib/contents/

church/contents_church_reports_book2.htm

United States Senate Report. (2011, February). A ticking time bomb: Counterterrorism lessons

from the U.S. Government’s failure to prevent the Fort Hood Attack. Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Retrieved from

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf

Verton, D. (2011, October 24). Government Data Centers Under Fire. BreakingGov. Retrieved

from http://breakinggov.com/2011/10/24/government-data-centers-under-fire/

Vicinanzo, A. (2015, March 3). Gaps In Info Sharing Continue To Hinder Counterterrorism

Efforts. Homeland Security Today. Retrieved from

http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/gaps-in-info-sharing-

continue-to-hinder-counterterrorism-efforts/b365f132d73fa2a44e1966dfbee3340a.html

Viser. M. (2013, May 9). Tensions emerge over lack of Tsarnaev information shared between

FBI, local authorities. The Boston Globe. Retrieved from

http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0506/final.pdf

http://archive.boston.com/politicalintelligence/2013/05/09/tensions-emerge-over-lack-

tsarnaev-information-shared-between-fbi-local-

authorities/c0JqORZNBkQJomxbODmwVK/story.html

Vizzard, W. J. (2008). The FBI, A hundred‐year retrospective. Public Administration Review,

68(6), 1079-1086. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00956

Wagner, C. (2010, March 4). Statement to the U.S. Congress, House Committee on

Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, DHS Intelligence Programs and

the Effectiveness of State and local Fusion Centers. Retrieved from

http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/Caryn_Wagner-3-4-10.pdf

Wagner, C. (2011, June 1). Statement to the U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland

Security, The DHS Intelligence Enterprise- Past, Present, and Future. Retrieved from

http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov /files/Testimony%20Wagner.pdf

Waugh, W. L. Jr, & Streib, G. (2006). Collaboration and leadership for effective emergency

management. Public Administration Review, 66, 131-139.

Webster, W. (2012, July). Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on the FBI,

Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5,

2009. Retrieved from https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/final-report-of-

the-william-h.-webster-commission

White House, (2011, June). National Strategy for Counterterrorism. Retrieved from

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf

Wight, L. (2015, December 3). Securing the Homeland: Information-sharing and the Role of

Law Enforcement. Presentation to the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Retrieved

from http://www.potomacinstitute.org/featured-news/1870-law-enforcement-seminar

Wilson, J. Q., & DiIulio, J.J., Jr. (1995). American Government Institutions and Policies.

Washington, DC: Heath and Company, p. A-49 as quoted in Boyd, E. (1997) American

Federalism, 1776 to 1997: Significant Events. Retrieved from

http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/gov/federal.htm#1

Wise, C. R., & Nader, R., (2002, September). Organizing the Federal System for Homeland

Security: Problems, Issues, and Dilemmas. Public Administration Review, 62, 44-58.

Wise, C. R. (2006). Organizing for homeland security after Katrina: Is adaptive management

what's missing? Public Administration Review, 66(3), 302-318.

Wright, D. S. (1990). Federalism, intergovernmental relations, and intergovernmental

management: Historical reflections and conceptual comparisons. Public Administration

Review, 50 (2), 168-178.

http://proquest.umi.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/pqdweb?index=104&did=156494541&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&CSD=339275&RQT=590&VName=PQD&TS=1272201031&clientId=70192

javascript:void(0);

http://proquest.umi.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=28898&pcid=2157501&SrchMode=3

http://proquest.umi.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=28898&TS=1272201031&clientId=70192&VInst=PROD&VName=PQD&VType=PQD

http://proquest.umi.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/pqdweb?index=104&did=156494541&SrchMode=1&sid=7&Fmt=3&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&CSD=339275&RQT=590&VName=PQD&TS=1272201031&clientId=70192

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=publadmirevi

Wyllie, D. (2011, September 11). 10 years after 9/11: Police counterterrorism, then and now.

PoliceOne.com News. Retrieved from

https://www.policeone.com/terrorism/articles/4348766-10-years-after-9-11-Police-

counterterrorism-then-and-now/

Yin, R.K. (2002). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:

Sage Publications.

Young, E. A. (2015, March 3). Federalism as a Constitutional Principle. University of Cincinnati

Law Review, Forthcoming. Retrieved from

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2573338_code86281.pdf?abstractid=

2573338&mirid=1&type=2

Zalkind, S. (2014, April 4). Five myths about the Boston Marathon bombing. The Washington

Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-the-

boston-marathon-bombing/2014/04/04/0d0c8470-b9b2-11e3-9a05-

c739f29ccb08_story.html

Zamora, M. F. (2014). Intelligence Failures: Matters of Homeland and National Security.

Journal of Homeland and National Security Perspectives, 1 (1), 49-65.

Zegart, A. (2005). September 11 and the adaptation failure of U.S. Intelligence agencies.

International Security, 29(4), 78-111. doi:10.1162/isec.2005.29.4.78

Zegart, A. (2008, May). CIA Chronicles. Foreign Affairs, 87(3). Retrieved from

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2008-05-03/cia-chronicles

Zegart, A. (2009). Spying blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the origins of 9/11. Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press.

Zegart, A. (2015). Insider Threats and Organizational Root Causes: The 2009 Fort Hood

Terrorist Attack. Parameters 45(2), 35-46.

Zhang, J., Dawes, S. S., & Sarkis, J. (2005). Exploring stakeholders' expectations of the benefits

and barriers of e-government knowledge sharing. Journal of Enterprise Information

Management, 18(5), 548-567.