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Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific Kei Koga

Asian Perspective, Volume 47, Number 1, Winter 2023, pp. 27-48 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press DOI:

For additional information about this article

[ Access provided at 6 May 2023 22:26 GMT from University of California , Santa Barbara ]

https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2023.0001

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/881958

Institutional Dilemma:

Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

Kei Koga

How is the future of the Indo-Pacific institutional arrange- ments envisioned by the Quad and ASEAN? Are they mutu- ally exclusive or compatible? How can the institutional com- petition between the Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific be avoided? I argue that the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN can be provisionally alleviated through strategic ambiguities about the institutional division of la- bor in the Indo-Pacific. However, such strategic ambiguities do not resolve normative inconsistencies between the Quad and ASEAN, which would probably trigger institutional com- petition in the future. To resolve such difficulties, both the Quad and ASEAN need to create a mechanism that clarifies their regional institutional division of labor.

Keywords: Quad, ASEAN, international institutions, Indo- Pacific.

New miNilateralism aNd multilateralism iN the iNdo-Pacific regioN are on the rise. Since 2017, the Australia-India-Japan-US consultative group, the “Quad,” has been steadily institutionalized by routinizing regular official meetings and establishing working groups to discuss specific areas of cooperation.1 The Australia-UK-US security partner- ship, the “AUKUS,” was established to strengthen Australia’s power projection capabilities in East Asia by helping Australia acquire nuclear submarines and enhancing intra-member security cooperation in such areas as cyber security and defense technology transfer. Moreover, the United States initiated the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) to facilitate regional economic cooperation.

This rise of minilateral and multilateral frameworks has been the member states’ strategic response to the increasing assertiveness of China. In 2017, the United States developed its Indo-Pacific strategy, which was aimed at countering China. Since then, the Quad has gained strategic significance because its member states share similar concerns

Asian Perspective 47 (2023), 27–48 © 2023 Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

28 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

regarding the impact of China’s rise on the existing international order. Although the Donald Trump administration elucidated that China was one of the “revisionist powers,” this strategic posture has continued with the Joseph Biden administration. Accordingly, the United States hosted the Quad Summit in March 2021, and the Quad is increasingly consid- ered a counter-China group.

However, the Quad poses a strategic challenge for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been a pivotal partic- ipant in promoting Asian regional multilateralism and mitigating great power rivalry. In response to the rapid rise of great power rivalry and to mitigate the intensity of the US-China competition, ASEAN issued the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” (AOIP) and emphasized the “ASEAN Centrality” to lead Indo-Pacific regionalism. For their part, Quad members have also strongly supported the ASEAN Centrality and AOIP. However, given their diplomatic influence and material capabili- ties, the ongoing institutionalization of the Quad will likely marginalize ASEAN’s diplomatic and security role as it gains more influence in the region. In other words, the growing influence of US-led minilateralism would trigger institutional competition with ASEAN. Consequently, ASEAN would consider those minilaterals as strategically precarious groupings that could divide the Indo-Pacific region, including Southeast Asia, while the minilaterals regard ASEAN and ASEAN-led institutions as ineffective and neglect them.

Thus, certain questions arise in this context. First, how is the future of the Indo-Pacific institutional arrangements envisioned by the Quad and ASEAN? Second, how can the institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific be avoided? I argue that the in- stitutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN can be provision- ally alleviated through strategic ambiguities regarding the institutional division of labor in the Indo-Pacific. To mitigate ASEAN’s concerns, the Quad and ASEAN member states engage in “tactical hedging” by emphasizing its institutional importance in the region while not clearly discussing its strategic role.2 This tactic is useful in buying time to deter- mine the nature of the institutions, including their objectives, functions, principles, rules, and norms.

However, such strategic ambiguities would probably trigger institu- tional competition in the future because they do not resolve normative inconsistencies between the Quad and ASEAN. On the one hand, all the Quad member states aim to enhance a regional “rules-based order” that is founded on existing international rules and norms, such as democra- cy, human rights, and a market economy. This is largely because China has attained material capabilities and diplomatic influence to challenge

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these rules and norms. On the other hand, the ASEAN member states aim to avoid diplomatic marginalization by great powers and exces- sive intervention by external actors. Therefore, in the immediate post- Cold War era, ASEAN took advantage of a regional strategic situation in which regional great power rivalry among the United States, China, and Japan, prevented them from playing a dominant diplomatic leader- ship role. Consequently, ASEAN has proliferated regional institutions and become the core of regional multilateral institutions in East Asia. In those regional institutions, ASEAN has embedded and consolidated its institutional norms, such as “ASEAN Centrality” and “ASEAN Way,” which were not necessarily compatible with the principles and norms embraced by the Quad.

Moreover, there is a dilemma within both the Quad and ASEAN. On the one hand, because the legitimate consolidation of the interna- tional order requires consent and support from the international com- munity, the Quad members consider it increasingly important to attain international support for the existing rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. However, a diplomatic posture that em- phasizes those norms and rules would create tensions with those who do not fully embrace them. On the other hand, in the current great pow- er rivalry, ASEAN increasingly faces difficulty in being diplomatically neutral. This is because, for instance, whether ASEAN rejects or accepts the rules and norms endorsed by the Quad, regional powers would re- gard either position as “taking sides.” Further, because ASEAN does not have material and diplomatic resources, it is difficult to maintain ASE- AN Centrality in the geographically vast Indo-Pacific region. In order to overcome these dilemmas and avoid institutional competition, the Quad and ASEAN must create a mechanism to explicitly and implicitly clarify their regional institutional division of labor.

This article comprises four main sections. First, I discuss a con- ceptual framework of institutional coexistence and competition. Sec- ond, I examine the development of the Quad and ASEAN institutional characteristics in the context of the existing institutional arrangements in the Indo-Pacific. Third, I analyze the institutional dilemma existing between the Quad and ASEAN.

Institutional Coexistence and Competition

The strategic utility of international institutions has been frequently de- bated in international relations. However, there is a fundamental scar- city of literature on the analysis of international institutions that lack a

30 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

collective self-defense function or a military alliance. Although realists correctly point out that shared threats incentivize states to cooperate, it is inaccurate to say that those states always form a collective self-de- fense arrangement whenever they perceive security threats (e.g., Mear- sheimer 1994/95). Essentially, the state’s threat perceptions and security concepts would probably differ, and formulating collective self-defense is not always an optimal solution. Consequently, many types of secu- rity alignments exist, such as coalitions and strategic partnerships, and these variances provide states with options to meet their specific securi- ty needs (Wilkins 2012; Koga 2022a).

Because states always have a strategic option to leave those align- ments and alliances in an anarchic system, commitment problems are not necessarily addressed by these cooperative frameworks. However, formal and informal international institutions provide the function of monitoring and information sharing. In so doing, each member state could understand other members’ behavior patterns and devise an effi- cient state strategy to pursue its security interests (Keohane and Martin 2003, 82). Moreover, where possible, the member states could use the institutions as effective tools to embed their own norms and rules in the region and beyond, which could collectively prevent normative inter- ference from external actors as well as nudge regional states to comply with the rules they created (e.g., Ikenberry 2001). In addition, if great powers’ interests are congruent with those rules and norms, the institu- tions may become focal points for policy coordination to enforce them.

In order to effectively promote their rules and norms in the region, the states are likely to establish multiple institutions based on the same norms, rules, and principles, though with different functions and com- parative advantages. For example, ASEAN’s efforts to proliferate its affiliated institutions in the 1990s, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN-Plus Three (APT), produced various tools to man- age regional security and economic issues based on the same princi- ples, such as a non-interference principle and consensus decision-mak- ing, which makes their norms and rules become regional standards (e.g., Koga 2022c). Nonetheless, the proliferation of institutions does not guarantee that the member states will comply with such norms and rules. At worst, it can curtail potential cooperation because those institu- tions may have inconsistent rules and norms that the member states may strategically use to pursue their interests (Drezner 2009). Nevertheless, being well-coordinated, the institutions can standardize appropriate pat- terns of state behavior, thus creating the foundation of regional order (Bull 2012; Hall and Paul 1999; Hurrell 2007; Alagappa 2003).

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Because of conflicting interests, institutions led by different leaders would probably compete with each other, resulting in the marginaliza- tion of some institutions by the regional rules and norms created by others. This is the very basis of institutional competition. However, the competition would be mitigated if these institutions clarify their roles and division of labor, and they would be able to coexist or even com- plement each other in the same region. For instance, in the early 1990s, there were debates over the division of labor in East Asia as new group- ings emerged, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ARF. Nevertheless, regional states accepted their coexistence by defining APEC as an informal economic framework, the ARF as a secu- rity forum, and the existing US bilateral alliance network as a risk-man- agement military framework.

Such an institutional division of labor ultimately depends on the stability of the strategic environment. This is because a change in re- gional strategic balance, such as a power shift, may alter institutional functions, objectives, and principles as they reexamine the institutions’ raison d’être and strategic utilities (Koga 2017). For example, facing a strategic environmental change in the post-Cold War era, ASEAN has changed its institutional functions by creating institutions to diversify its diplomatic approaches to regional states. However, such institutions may collapse if member states conclude they are useless or harmful to their national interests. Although institutions are relatively sticky be- cause of positive feedback and sunk costs, the member states may with- draw from the institution when they consider that it hinders the pursuit of their interests. Also, if members’ withdrawal triggers a cascade of defection, the institutions may collapse (Koga and Nordin 2020). Even if they do not collapse, they may drift or decay, become less credible, and no longer serve member states’ interests—surviving only because of sunk costs (Streeck and Thelen 2005).

Therefore, the reassessment process among the member states is critical for institutional change, and “tactical hedging” becomes useful for those willing to shape the institutions’ direction. Tactical hedging refers to “an ambiguous, temporal declaratory policy doctrine that helps an actor bide time to determine whether the status quo policy will be appropriate for ensuring its own security in the long term” (Koga 2019, 289). Consequently, a tactical hedger must inevitably take the initiative to indicate their policy preferences and institutional principles. Howev- er, no matter how vague it is, such an initiative can be sufficient if the hedger can draw reactions from other members. After assessing those reactions, the hedger attempts to gradually clarify its policy to adjust

32 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

the institution’s format, functions, or objectives. In this way, the hedger can avoid unnecessary tensions with other members by implementing a radical change (Koga 2019, 2020).

For instance, “protecting human rights” can elicit several reactions from non-democratic member states because it can be pursued in various ways, ranging from coercion to persuasion. As coercion would violate the international principle of non-interference, states may preemptively reject coercion in this context. If this is the case, the tactical hedger could respond that the protection of human rights should be accom- plished through dialogue, thereby reducing tensions with the opposing states. Moreover, in inter-institutional relations, if different institutions are willing to coexist in a specific region or domain, the communication channel created by tactical hedging would help clarify the division of labor among them.

Nevertheless, competition occurs when institutions cannot manage their differences, and this is due to two reasons. First, tactical hedging cannot be conducted for long. The hedger needs to clarify its preferenc- es at some point, which narrows the range of strategic options and thus reduces policy flexibility. Second, even if states or institutions can main- tain their ambiguities regarding principles, norms, and rules, the gap between their rhetoric and actions will probably become more visible. In this case, the institutional division of labor will become unclear, and institutional competition will ensue.

Evolution of the Existing Institutional Arrangement in the Indo-Pacific

How can we understand the current institutional arrangement in the Indo-Pacific region with the above-mentioned conceptual framework? According to conventional wisdom, two main security institutional ar- rangements maintain regional stability: the US “hub-and-spokes” bilat- eral security alliances and ASEAN-led multilateral institutions (Buzan 2003; Green and Bates 2009; Cha 2011; Kuik 2015; Yeo 2019).

The US “hub-and-spokes” system comprises the US-Australia, US-Japan, US-Philippines, US-South Korea, and US-Thailand allianc- es. During the Cold War, these alliances were established to contain communism and counter the Soviet threat. In the post-Cold War era, they altered their objectives—rather than finding immediate common threats, they attempted to manage regional security risks, such as natural disasters and maritime security (Wallander and Keohane 1999).

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This trend became more prominent in the 2000s. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States triggered more institutional adjustments to the US “hub-and-spokes” system to focus on non-traditional security issues. As these issues were essentially transborder and performed by a non-state actor, it was extremely difficult for any state to act alone and overcome them. To respond to these threats, states have to deepen international cooperation on a global scale, and for the United States, its allies were the core of this cooperation. Consequently, the United States encouraged its allies to enhance the bilateral and minilateral security ties among them. A case in point is the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission in the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami in Aus- tralia, India, Japan, and the United States.

While these cooperative missions were conducted on an ad-hoc basis, their success promoted the institutionalization of such bilateral and minilateral cooperation, resulting in the establishment of the Aus- tralia-Japan-US Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and bilateral cooperation between India and Australia, India and Japan, and India and the Unit- ed States (Koga 2021). Despite their non-traditional security focus, the United States and its allies considered the strategic utilities of these frameworks, particularly in light of China’s rise (e.g., Silove 2016). These institutions had no specific missions to counter China. However, the institutionalization of security dialogues and military cooperation laid a foundation for potential strategic cooperation among the member states.

In contrast, ASEAN-led institutions emerged in the 1990s. During the Cold War, ASEAN focused on its immediate geographical area, Southeast Asia, due to its security volatility; the five original members of ASEAN encountered diplomatic tensions because of political, reli- gious, and ethnic differences, as well as border and territorial disputes. Thus, ASEAN nurtured a regional diplomatic community in which the members could promote confidence-building measures (CBMs) while setting aside contentious issues and facilitating inter-state cooperation (Leifer 1989; Acharya 2014). ASEAN underwent a two-pronged insti- tutional change in the post-Cold War era, based on its successful experi- ences with CBMs to mitigate the tension among the member states. To secure Southeast Asia’s strategic autonomy, ASEAN aimed to incorpo- rate other non-ASEAN Southeast Asian states, namely Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. Simultaneously, ASEAN began establishing more institutions with the participation of major regional powers, such as the ARF, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and ADMM-Plus. The main functions of these ASE-

34 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

AN-led institutions are diplomatic dialogues. However, as evidenced by the ARF and ADMM-Plus, they also conduct joint military trainings and exercises that can serve as military CBMs.

These two systems—the US “hub-and-spokes” system and ASE- AN-led institutions—eventually developed a complementary relation- ship in the post-Cold War era. While the former functions as a deter- rence against potential threats in the region, such as North Korea, and as a consequence management mechanism, the latter provides regional states opportunities to engage diplomatically with each other and mit- igate the existing and potential tensions among them. The institutional division of labor was gradually clarified, despite the initial debates over priorities among these systems (Ashizawa 2003; Yuzawa 2007). This conceptualization prevented institutional competition, and institutional coexistence in the 1990s and 2000s was relatively stable.

This trend changed in the 2010s because China’s rise has begun to threaten the stability of the existing regional order. Under the US pri- macy in the region, this institutional division of labor functioned well. But these existing institutions have not appropriately addressed China’s assertiveness in the East and South China Seas. China’s increasing eco- nomic influence has also challenged the existing international economic order, which is well illustrated by China’s new infrastructure develop- ment practices through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (e.g., Katada 2020).

Quad in the Indo-Pacific Region: Evolving into a New Normative Institution

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have begun to institution- alize the Quad in response to the ineffectiveness of the existing regional institutional arrangements in addressing China’s challenge. Particular- ly after the Biden administration took office in 2021, the four mem- ber states declared that there would be regular meetings at the level of senior officials, foreign ministers, and summits. They also established working groups and programs in fields such as COVID-19, the cli- mate crisis, emerging and critical technologies, infrastructure, cyber- space, and maritime security (White House 2021d). By May 2022, the Quad had convened four summit meetings, expanded its agendas, and initiated concrete cooperative actions, such as the “Quad Humanitari- an and Disaster Relief Mechanism” and the “Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness” (White House 2022b). This institu-

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tionalization process has enhanced the Quad’s sustainability, and it is establishing itself as one of the strategically important institutions in the Indo-Pacific region.

However, the Quad’s developmental process was never straight- forward. Throughout the three phases of its institutional development, several member states engaged in tactical hedging to gauge the reac- tion of others (Koga 2022a). In the first phase, Japan and the United States created the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2007 in response to the growing strategic uncertainty caused by China’s rise.3 In May 2007, Japan and the United States invited Australia and India success- fully and held a senior official-level dialogue without a preset agenda. In September of that year, the United States and India conducted their bilateral Malabar military exercise and for the first time invited Japan and Australia. This rapidly formed strategic cooperation raised China’s concerns, and China sent a diplomatic demarche to clarify their strategic intentions of such cooperation. Because Australia and India were hesi- tant to institutionalize the Quad at the expense of their diplomatic and economic relationships with China, both states decided not to partici- pate again. Consequently, the Quad’s diplomatic momentum was lost.

In the second phase, the Quad was revived in 2017 by the United States. This was largely because the Trump administration explicitly raised concerns about China’s assertive behavior and considered that the Quad framework was useful to check that behavior as it incorporated the Indo-Pacific into US strategic narrative based on Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Nevertheless, because of the members’ different strategic perspectives on China, the experience of the previous failure to institutionalize the Quad lingered. Instead, they engaged in tactical hedging to determine where their strategic interests would converge. For example, no member state committed to regularizing the meetings or setting the agenda. Rather, the meetings remained ad hoc and failed to produce any joint declarations. Each member’s foreign ministry re- leased its own statement regarding the meeting’s outcome. As a result, there were differences in emphasis and use of terminologies, such as a “rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific” and a “Free, Open, and Inclusive Indo-Pacific” (e.g., MOFA 2017; MEA 2017).

The direction of the Quad was fluid in this phase. For example, the importance of ASEAN was not mentioned at the first Quad meeting in November 2017. However, the Quad began highlighting the importance of ASEAN Centrality after the second meeting in June 2018, and since November 2019, it has also emphasized the AOIP. Furthermore, even though the foreign ministers convened for the first time in September

36 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

2019, the meeting was not regularized, and they did not issue a joint statement. In terms of China, despite certain negative events, such as the border stand-off between India and China in 2017 at Doklam, the four members’ posture toward China was not congruent until the end of 2020.

The third phase began in March 2021, when the United States took the initiative to hold the summit online. The four-member states at this point expressed strategic concerns about China due to the country’s as- sertiveness despite the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the effects of COVID-19 persisted, the four members began to meet frequently. The Quad held 17 meetings between November 2017 and May 2022, with eight of them being held in 2021 and 2022.

There are certain limitations. Although the Quad is often regarded as a security alliance, it is yet to constitute concrete military coopera- tion. The Malabar exercise included Japan and has become a trilateral military exercise, with Australia invited in 2021 and 2022. However, the Quad never associated military cooperation in its meetings. The mem- ber states’ tactical hedging still holds the possibility to include mili- tary cooperation into the Quad agenda. However, the Quad now focuses more on norm- and rule-building in the Indo-Pacific region. The mem- ber states, for example, agreed to cooperate on critical and emerging technologies and launched “a statement of principles on technology, along with new efforts that together will advance critical and emerging technologies shaped by [the member states’] shared democratic values and respect for universal human rights” (White House 2021d).

Moreover, the Quad members have not clarified the institutional division of labor with ASEAN, the core multilateral institution in East Asia. In fact, despite its emphasis on the importance of ASEAN Central- ity and the AOIP, the Quad neither discussed nor identified what it meant. On the contrary, the United States sent several diplomatic signals that would dilute ASEAN’s significance. For example, President Trump’s disinterest in all multilateral institutions and the need to focus on “prof- itable, successful outcomes, good deals for all of the constituents” were both indicated by the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (Nikkei Asia 2020). Moreover, in her speech in Singapore in August 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris stated that while the United States considered that multilateral institutions, particularly ASEAN, remained “central to the region’s architecture,” it would also “work with new, results-orient- ed groups, like the Quad” (White House 2021b).

As shown in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy issued in 2022, ASEAN is the important institution in Southeast Asia that the United States aims

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to empower in order for ASEAN to “deliver sustainable solutions to the region’s most pressing challenges” (White House 2022a). In this regard, ASEAN is considered one of the Indo-Pacific region’s core multilateral institutions. That said, the Quad’s rhetorical support for ASEAN can be seen as tactical hedging, seeking a certain vision on the institutional division of labor between the Quad and ASEAN, as there is no clear consensus among the four members on the role of ASEAN.

ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific: The Existing Normative Institutions

The Quad institutionalization would potentially confront ASEAN’s in- stitutional objectives, norms, and principles, namely regional autonomy and ASEAN Centrality. Regional autonomy has arguably been ASE- AN’s most essential institutional objective. Additionally, ASEAN aims to prevent external actors, particularly major regional powers, from in- truding in Southeast Asian affairs without the consent of the regional states (Koga 2017). This is well illustrated by ASEAN’s sustained em- phasis on the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality, in which it declared its desire for “regional neutrality” in order to maintain a non-interference principle and avoid being entrapped by great power politics (ASEAN Secretariat 1971). Although the concept of regional neutrality is no longer advocated strongly, the principle remains. In the post-Cold War era, to ensure regional autonomy, ASEAN has included external powers, such as the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, in its institutional frameworks, such as the ARF and APT, rather than excluding them. Given its lack of material capabilities, ASEAN aimed to establish communication channels with regional powers so that its member states could frequently convey their political messages to them.

At the same time, ASEAN is cognizant to the emergence of non-ASE- AN multilateral fora. For example, regional states, namely Australia and Japan, established APEC in 1989 to facilitate regional economic cooperation. It was quite possible that ASEAN could be diplomatical- ly marginalized because non-ASEAN member states led APEC (Koga 2017). Consequently, ASEAN member states expressed their concerns to these major powers and attempted to thwart any initiatives that could undermine ASEAN’s institutional viability in the region. In response, the major powers assured ASEAN that APEC would remain informal and would not displace ASEAN (Soesastro 1995). This also served as an institutional incentive for ASEAN to incorporate external powers within

38 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

its affiliated institutions. In so doing, this was regarded as ASEAN’s provision of a regional public good, as it would allow rival powers to meet each other in fora.

Certainly, a political risk is associated with such inclusion; regional powers could hijack the forums and use them for their own interests. Nevertheless, ASEAN has devised a new institutional principle, ASE- AN Centrality (e.g., Tan 2017) to avoid it. The ASEAN Centrality has not yet been concretely defined in official documents, but through it, ASEAN retains the chair of ASEAN-led institutions with an agenda-set- ting capacity (Koga 2017; Koga 2021). The geostrategic situation in post-Cold War Asia also helped ASEAN nurture such a vague principle because strategic tensions in East Asia between the United States, Ja- pan, and China prevented these great powers from assuming decisive political leadership in the region. Moreover, there was virtually no other multi-purposed multilateral framework where all regional states could convene to discuss political, economic, and security issues. Thus, ASE- AN has become the regional focal point. With this diplomatic advan- tage, ASEAN established several regional institutions in Asia, including the EAS and ADMM-Plus.

In this context, the initial silence of the Quad member states con- cerning ASEAN’s role in the Indo-Pacific raised ASEAN’s concerns regarding the Quad’s strategic intention. Singapore was the first coun- try to publicly express its concerns about the direction of the Quad (Yong 2018). Furthermore, because the Quad could be interpreted as an anti-China democratic coalition, certain ASEAN members, includ- ing Indonesia, emphasized the importance of openness and inclusivity in regional cooperation (Suryadinata 2018). These reactions were not surprising, considering Southeast Asia is geographically located at the center of the Indo-Pacific region and has vital sea communication lines in the South China Sea, which connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Therefore, through tactical hedging, the Quad soon expressed its sup- port for the ASEAN Centrality and ASEAN-led institutions in the In- do-Pacific at the 2018 Quad senior official-level meeting (MOFA 2018; DFAT 2018; MEA 2018; US Department of State 2018).

However, two problems stand out. First, the Quad members have not yet clarified ASEAN’s strategic role in the Indo-Pacific region. Second, ASEAN has not indicated its desired role. To be sure, ASEAN issued its perspective on the Indo-Pacific through the AOIP in June 2019 (ASEAN Secretariat 2019). AOIP’s most important objective is to neutralize the intensification of the US-China great power rivalry in Southeast Asia; thus, its strategic emphasis was “openness” and “inclusivity.” However,

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this does not address how the ASEAN Centrality plays a role in the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific is a vast geostrategic region be- yond East Asia, and it is unclear how ASEAN will sustain its commit- ment to the region. In the AOIP, ASEAN clearly states that it has no intention to establish a new institution covering the Indo-Pacific region but rather cooperate with other regional mechanisms. The question then becomes how ASEAN can maintain the ASEAN Centrality by cooper- ating with other regional institutions.

This vagueness is somewhat understandable because except for In- donesia among ASEAN member states, others were reluctant to adopt the concept of the Indo-Pacific. The concept only gained diplomatic traction when major regional powers, particularly the United States, in- cluded the “Indo-Pacific” in their strategic narratives. However, China considered the term a strategic construct of the United States and Japan and avoided using it, which caused concern among ASEAN member states. In this context, Thailand, the 2019 ASEAN Chair, encouraged ASEAN to adopt its version of the Indo-Pacific vision (Chongkittavorn 2019; ERIA 2019; ISIS Thailand 2019). Consequently, this diplomatic effort resulted in the creation of the AOIP, which enabled ASEAN to use its Indo-Pacific concept narratives. Nevertheless, ASEAN has not established a detailed vision of the institutional division of labor in the region because the AOIP is ASEAN’s response to the emerging concept of the Indo-Pacific and to prevent great powers from dominating the Indo-Pacific institutional architecture.

Institutional Dilemma Between the Quad and ASEAN

Given the evolving nature of the Quad and ASEAN’s role in the In- do-Pacific, there has been no clear division of labor between them. For the time being, the Quad member states continue to reassure ASEAN that they respect the ASEAN Centrality and the AOIP and can secure ASEAN’s non-denial of the Quad. This is significant because if ASE- AN denies its existence, the Quad will lose its diplomatic legitimacy to facilitate its rules and norms in Southeast Asia, which is the center of the Indo-Pacific. ASEAN, for its part, emphasizes the importance of inclusivity and asserts that no institution should create political divi- sion. However, if the Quad continues to decouple China and engages in full-fledged power politics with China, then ASEAN’s role in the region will be significantly marginalized. These precarious elements of strate-

40 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

gic divergences between the Quad and ASEAN remain. For now, it is only the ambiguities regarding the institutional division of labor that can still prevent obvious institutional competition between the Quad and ASEAN.

Indeed, the strategic ambiguities generated by Quad member states through tactical hedging provide flexibility for institutionalizing the Quad. The Quad’s tendency to avoid pursuing concrete military coop- eration among its member states demonstrates that its members cannot agree on a military approach (e.g., Basu 2021). As a result, the Quad’s cooperation has become increasingly non-military and focused on fa- cilitating greater technical, functional cooperation and norm-building. Consequently, ASEAN does not perceive the existence of the Quad as an immediate threat.

However, this stability is unlikely to be sustained over the long term for two main reasons. First, there is an inherent institutional incompat- ibility between ASEAN and the Quad. On the one hand, ASEAN advo- cates for its centrality in regional multilateralism. The ASEAN Charter vaguely defines the ASEAN Centrality as “the primary driving force in its relations and cooperation with its external partners in a regional architecture that is open, transparent and inclusive” and “the primary driving force in regional arrangements that it initiates and maintains its centrality in regional cooperation and community building” (ASEAN Secretariat 2008). Accordingly, ASEAN considers it imperative to play a central role in nurturing regionalism in Southeast and East Asia.

That said, if ASEAN attempts to dominate the Indo-Pacific institu- tional arrangement through ASEAN Centrality, the Quad member states are unlikely to accept such a stance. The Quad was revived in 2017 in response to the growing ineffectiveness of current institutional ar- rangements, including ASEAN-led institutions, as perceived by Quad member states. Therefore, reinventing the same structure in a different geographic area is not favorable for the Quad member states. Moreover, if the Quad begins to play a dominant institutional role in the region, ASEAN will probably lose its strategic importance. The ASEAN mem- ber states have been concerned about diplomatic marginalization and the loss of regional agency. Hence, without certain compromises, ASE- AN and the Quad are incompatible in the Indo-Pacific region.

Second, it is likely that institutional competition will emerge as room for tactical hedging narrows over time. Indeed, as the institution- alization of the Quad continues without clarifying the division of labor, there will be tension between these two institutions. Quad’s emerging functionalities well illustrate this in the Indo-Pacific. By May 2022,

Kei Koga 41

the Quad had expanded its focus on functional cooperation to include infrastructure, education, cybersecurity, space, and maritime security. Functional cooperation in and of itself does not contradict ASEAN’s role; however, these frameworks are increasingly linked to liberal in- ternational values, or the “fundamental values,” such as democracy and human rights. This is well-illustrated in the 2021 “Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance and Use,” which em- phasizes the importance of linking the technology ecosystem to uni- versal values, such as “respect for freedom of expression and privacy” (White House 2021e). Given the Quad’s continuous advocacy for re- storing Myanmar’s democracy, this value-based diplomacy would fur- ther divide the Quad and ASEAN (White House 2021a; White House 2021c; US Department of State 2022).

Indeed, this diplomatic schism gradually manifested itself in the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, affecting ASEAN’s convening power. As shown in the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on March 2, 2022, which condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demand- ed its immediate withdrawal, only five states, namely Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Syria, and Russia, opposed it (UN 2022). However, the Quad and ASEAN members took fundamentally different approaches to tackle the problem. While the United States and its Western allies tend to impose economic sanctions and boycott international meetings, the ASEAN member states tend to engage with Russia and pursue a peaceful resolution of the issue through dialogue. Accordingly, Cambo- dia, Indonesia, and Thailand, the chairs of ASEAN, G-20, and APEC in 2022, stated in May 2022 that no member would be excluded from in- ternational meetings (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of In- donesia 2022). On the contrary, some Western member states, including the United States and Australia, have previously boycotted meetings, such as the G-20 financial ministerial meeting and the ADMM-Plus Ex- perts Working Group meeting (Lawder and Burns 2022; Myanmar Now 2022a, 2022b). Although these actions do not always translate into the Quad institutional action because of the diverging perspectives among the member states, particularly India, these actions considerably limit ASEAN’s comparative advantage and convening power.

Moreover, such institutional competition would not be limited to the Quad and ASEAN. In May 2022, the United States established a new institutional economic framework, the IPEF, which comprises all the Quad members, seven ASEAN member states, and other regional states, such as South Korea, New Zealand, and Fiji. While the IPEF has not yet produced any substantial political-economic cooperation, it has

42 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

obtained convening power for rule-making dialogues. Additionally, the IPEF has already driven a wedge among ASEAN members by inviting seven member states, and leaving out Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar for expressing concerns about IPEF’s disrespect for the ASEAN Cen- trality (Sam 2022). Forcible facilitation of Quad members’ value sys- tem through the Quad and IPEF would probably result in ASEAN being further divided, while great regional powers, including China, would have more opportunities to pursue a “divide and conquer” strategy, and Southeast Asia will become a diplomatic theatre for great power politics.

Avoiding unnecessary conflict and buying time to plan the optimal institutional division of labor between ASEAN and the Quad can be ac- complished through the use of tactical hedging. However, if differences persist for a long time, there will be inevitable institutional competition.

Conclusion: Institutional Division of Labor in the Indo-Pacific

How can a potential competition between ASEAN and the Quad be pos- sibly resolved? Due to their fundamental incompatibility and the rapid institutionalization of the Quad, it will be difficult to avoid such future competition. Moreover, ASEAN could become strategically paralyzed in playing the central role in the region because its members are current- ly divided on regional strategic issues, such as the South China Sea and Myanmar. If ASEAN collapses, the Quad will have more maneuverabil- ity, but this is not ideal for the Quad members and Southeast Asia as the communication channels that ASEAN has provided as regional public goods will no longer function well. In this scenario, the Indo-Pacific region would become a full-fledged strategic theater for competition.

The Quad and ASEAN must gradually clarify their labor division to avert such a scenario. Thus, ASEAN and the Quad need to make strate- gic compromises, which is their geographic focus. ASEAN could func- tion as a CBM because it still has a comparative advantage regarding convening power. However, given the limited diplomatic resources, it would be counterproductive for ASEAN to play the same central role covering the entire Indo-Pacific. For its part, the Quad must respect Southeast Asia’s regional autonomy. Since 2021, the Quad has become a norm-building institution rather than a military alignment. However, if such norms and principles are imposed in the Indo-Pacific region, the Quad would likely face strong diplomatic pushback from both ASEAN and regional states. In this sense, it is more productive for ASEAN and

Kei Koga 43

the Quad to gradually clarify their respective geographical and func- tional focus. At the same time, ASEAN reemphasizes its commitment to East Asia with the ASEAN Centrality, the Quad highlights its com- mitment to geographical and functional areas that ASEAN cannot effec- tively manage.

Creating an informal communication channel between the Quad and ASEAN, possibly by utilizing the “Quad-Plus” formula, is one way to minimize institutional competition and clarify the institutional division of work in this context. Using this informal formula, the Quad member states convene meetings with non-member states or other international institutions in specific fields. It has been used on multiple occasions, such as at the COVID-19 meeting with New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam in March 2020.

This communication mechanism could identify the geographical scope of sub-regions in the Indo-Pacific to which the ASEAN Centrality principle can be applied, allowing for institutional cooperation with the Quad and other sub-regional organizations, such as the IPEF. Rather than rhetorically repeating the importance of the ASEAN Centrality and AOIP, the Quad and ASEAN must discuss the norm-building process in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on how member states would facilitate certain democratic ideals in the region. Indeed, ASEAN member states also embrace those values as outlined in the ASEAN Political-Securi- ty Community’s principles, albeit aspirationally (ASEAN Secretariat 2016). Thus, the communication would provide ASEAN and the Quad with a clue to find the degree of cooperation they may pursue.

Another idea is to limit communication between ASEAN and the Quad to the senior official level with co-chairpersonship, which is less intrusive and less provocative for those suspicious of inter-institution- al cooperation. With clear communication at the operational level, the Quad would send a clear diplomatic signal that it respects ASEAN-led regional multilateralism and seeks an institutional division of labor. ASEAN could further facilitate functional cooperation with them. How- ever, misinterpretation and misunderstanding would likely occur with- out it, resulting in unnecessary diplomatic tension. This is particularly true when the regional strategic environment is uncertain. The current Indo-Pacific strategic environment is comparable to this situation be- cause many regional states view the traditional security mechanisms as ineffective in addressing rising great power competition. Thus, ASEAN and the Quad need to clarify their institutional division of labor.

In the rapidly evolving Indo-Pacific strategic environment, it has become more challenging to determine the optimal division of labor

44 Institutional Dilemma: Quad and ASEAN in the Indo-Pacific

between ASEAN and the Quad. In the 1990s, the US “hub-and-spokes” system and ASEAN discovered a complementary institutional division of labor under the stable US unipolar system. However, in the 2020s, the strategic environment has become much more volatile due to Chi- na’s rapid rise, triggering the intense US-China rivalry. In response, the emergence of new institutional frameworks has begun. The Quad mem- bers’ tactical hedging has prevented unnecessary provocation and con- flicts with ASEAN, but its utility has already begun to diminish. Thus, the Quad and ASEAN must engage in direct communication to achieve a stable institutional division of labor in the Indo-Pacific region.

Notes

Kei Koga is Associate Professor at the Public Policy and Global Affairs Programme, School of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Concurrent- ly, he is a non-resident fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). His research focuses on international security, international institutions (particu- larly regional security institutions), East Asian/Indo-Pacific security, Japanese for- eign policy, and ASEAN. Previously, he was Japan Scholar at the Wilson Center in 2022; visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2017; a Japan-US Partnership Fellow at the Research Institute for Peace and Secu- rity (RIPS), Tokyo, in 2012–2014; Postdoctoral Fellow in the International Studies Program, The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, in 2012–2013; and a Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS in 2009–2010. He has published on topics that include East Asian security, US and Japanese foreign policies, the US-Japan alliance, and ASEAN. He is author of Reinventing Regional Security Institutions: Power Shifts, Ideas, and Institutional Change in Asia and Af- rica (Routledge, 2017) and Managing Great Power Politics: ASEAN, Institutional Strategy, and South China Sea (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022). He can be reached at [email protected].

1. “Institutionalization” here refers to “the regularization or routinization of cooperative activities among any member states.” This is different from “formaliza- tion” that is the “creation of organization with a defined set of principles, rules, and norms” (Koga 2022b, 27).

2. Tactical hedging refers to “a declaratory policy doctrine that aims to utilize temporal strategic ambiguity to understand and determine whether any long-term strategy shift is necessary or possible” (Koga 2019, 289).

3. It is noted that the QSD is not the official name. Also, the current “Quad” should not be called the QSD as it is no longer dialogue only.

Kei Koga 45

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