Operational Excellence

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1 The “Ravell” CoRpoRaTion

Introduction

Launching into an explanation of information technology (IT), organizational learning, and the practical relationship into which I propose to bring them is a challenging topic to undertake. I choose, therefore, to begin this discussion by presenting an actual case study that exemplifies many key issues pertaining to organizational learn- ing, and how it can be used to improve the performance of an IT department. Specifically, this chapter summarizes a case study of the IT department at the Ravell Corporation (a pseudonym) in New York City. I was retained as a consultant at the company to improve the performance of the department and to solve a mounting politi- cal problem involving IT and its relation to other departments. The case offers an example of how the growth of a company as a “learn- ing organization”—one in which employees are constantly learning during the normal workday (Argyris, 1993; Watkins & Marsick, 1993)— utilized reflective practices to help it achieve the practical stra- tegic goals it sought. Individuals in learning organizations integrate processes of learning into their work. Therefore, a learning organiza- tion must advocate a system that allows its employees to interact, ask questions, and provide insight to the business. The learning organiza- tion will ultimately promote systematic thinking, and the building of organizational memory (Watkins & Marsick, 1993). A learning organization (discussed more fully in Chapter 4) is a component of the larger topic of organizational learning.

The Ravell Corporation is a firm with over 500 employees who, over the years, had become dependent on the use of technology to run its business. Its IT department, like that of many other compa- nies, was isolated from the rest of the business and was regarded as a peripheral entity whose purpose was simply to provide technical support. This was accompanied by actual physical isolation—IT was

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placed in a contained and secure location away from mainstream operations. As a result, IT staff rarely engaged in active discourse with other staff members unless specific meetings were called relat- ing to a particular project. The Ravell IT department, therefore, was not part of the community of organizational learning—it did not have the opportunity to learn along with the rest of the organiza- tion, and it was never asked to provide guidance in matters of gen- eral relevance to the business as a whole. This marginalized status resulted in an us-versus-them attitude on the part of IT and non-IT personnel alike.

Much has been written about the negative impact of marginal- ization on individuals who are part of communities. Schlossberg (1989) researched adults in various settings and how marginal- ization affected their work and self-efficacy. Her theory on mar- ginalization and mattering is applied to this case study because of its relevance and similarity to her prior research. For example, IT represents similar characteristics to a separate group on a college campus or in a workplace environment. Its physical isolation can also be related to how marginalized groups move away from the majority population and function without contact. The IT direc- tor, in particular, had cultivated an adversarial relationship with his peers. The director had shaped a department that fueled his view of separation. This had the effect of further marginalizing the posi- tion of IT within the organization. Hand in hand with this form of separatism came a sense of actual dislike on the part of IT personnel for other employees. IT staff members were quick to point fingers at others and were often noncommunicative with members of other departments within the organization. As a result of this kind of behavior, many departments lost confidence in the ability of IT to provide support; indeed, the quality of support that IT furnished had begun to deteriorate. Many departments at Ravell began to hire their own IT support personnel and were determined to create their own information systems subdepartments. This situation eventually became unacceptable to management, and the IT director was ter- minated. An initiative was begun to refocus the department and its position within the organization. I was retained to bring about this change and to act as the IT director until a structural transforma- tion of the department was complete.

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A New Approach

My mandate at Ravell was initially unclear—I was to “fix” the problem; the specific solution was left up to me to design and imple- ment. My goal became one of finding a way to integrate IT fully into the organizational culture at Ravell. Without such integration, IT would remain isolated, and no amount of “fixing” around this issue would address the persistence of what was, as well, a cultural prob- lem. Unless IT became a true part of the organization as a whole, the entire IT staff could be replaced without any real change having occurred from the organization’s perspective. That is, just replacing the entire IT staff was an acceptable solution to senior management. The fact that this was acceptable suggested to me that the knowledge and value contained in the IT department did not exist or was mis- understood by the senior management of the firm. In my opinion, just eliminating a marginalized group was not a solution because I expected that such knowledge and value did exist, and that it needed to be investigated properly. Thus, I rejected management’s option and began to formulate a plan to better understand the contributions that could be made by the IT department. The challenge was threefold: to improve the work quality of the IT department (a matter of perfor- mance), to help the department begin to feel itself a part of the orga- nization as a whole and vice versa (a matter of cultural assimilation), and to persuade the rest of the organization to accept the IT staff as equals who could contribute to the overall direction and growth of the organization (a fundamental matter of strategic integration).

My first step was to gather information. On my assignment to the position of IT director, I quickly arranged a meeting with the IT department to determine the status and attitudes of its personnel. The IT staff meeting included the chief financial officer (CFO), to whom IT reported. At this meeting, I explained the reasons behind the changes occurring in IT management. Few questions were asked; as a result, I immediately began scheduling individual meetings with each of the IT employees. These employees varied in terms of their position within the corporate hierarchy, in terms of salary, and in terms of technical expertise. The purpose of the private meetings was to allow IT staff members to speak openly, and to enable me to hear their concerns. I drew on the principles of action science, pioneered

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by Argyris and Schö n (1996), designed to promote individual self- reflection regarding behavior patterns, and to encourage a produc- tive exchange among individuals. Action science encompasses a range of methods to help individuals learn how to be reflective about their actions. By reflecting, individuals can better understand the outcomes of their actions and, especially, how they are seen by others. This was an important approach because I felt learning had to start at the indi- vidual level as opposed to attempting group learning activities. It was my hope that the discussions I orchestrated would lead the IT staff to a better understanding than they had previously shown, not only of the learning process itself, but also of the significance of that process. I pursued these objectives by guiding them to detect problem areas in their work and to undertake a joint effort to correct them (Argyris, 1993; Arnett, 1992).

Important components of reflective learning are single-loop and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning requires individuals to reflect on a prior action or habit that needs to be changed in the future but does not require individuals to change their operational proce- dures with regard to values and norms. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, does require both change in behavior and change in oper- ational procedures. For example, people who engage in double-loop learning may need to adjust how they perform their job, as opposed to just the way they communicate with others, or, as Argyris and Schö n (1996, p. 22) state, “the correction of error requires inquiry through which organizational values and norms themselves are modified.”

Despite my efforts and intentions, not all of the exchanges were destined to be successful. Many of the IT staff members felt that the IT director had been forced out, and that there was consequently no support for the IT function in the organization. There was also clear evidence of internal political division within the IT department; members openly criticized each other. Still other interviews resulted in little communication. This initial response from IT staff was disap- pointing, and I must admit I began to doubt whether these learning methods would be an antidote for the department. Replacing people began to seem more attractive, and I now understood why many man- agers prefer to replace staff, as opposed to investing in their transfor- mation. However, I also knew that learning is a gradual process and that it would take time and trust to see results.

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I realized that the task ahead called for nothing short of a total cul- tural transformation of the IT organization at Ravell. Members of the IT staff had to become flexible and open if they were to become more trusting of one another and more reflective as a group (Garvin, 2000; Schein, 1992). Furthermore, they had to have an awareness of their history, and they had to be willing to institute a vision of partnering with the user community. An important part of the process for me was to accept the fact that the IT staff were not habitually inclined to be reflective. My goal then was to create an environment that would foster reflective learning, which would in turn enable a change in individual and organizational values and norms (Senge, 1990).

The Blueprint for Integration

Based on information drawn from the interviews, I developed a pre- liminary plan to begin to integrate IT into the day-to-day operations at Ravell, and to bring IT personnel into regular contact with other staff members. According to Senge (1990), the most productive learn- ing occurs when skills are combined in the activities of advocacy and inquiry. My hope was to encourage both among the staff at Ravell. The plan for integration and assimilation involved assigning IT resources to each department; that is, following the logic of the self-dissemina- tion of technology, each department would have its own dedicated IT person to support it. However, just assigning a person was not enough, so I added the commitment to actually relocate an IT person into each physical area. This way, rather than clustering together in an area of their own, IT people would be embedded throughout the organiza- tion, getting first-hand exposure to what other departments did, and learning how to make an immediate contribution to the productiv- ity of these departments. The on-site IT person in each department would have the opportunity to observe problems when they arose— and hence, to seek ways to prevent them—and, significantly, to share in the sense of accomplishment when things went well. To reinforce their commitment to their respective areas, I specified that IT person- nel were to report not only to me but also to the line manager in their respective departments. In addition, these line managers were to have input on the evaluation of IT staff. I saw that making IT staff offi- cially accountable to the departments they worked with was a tangible

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way to raise their level of commitment to the organization. I hoped that putting line managers in a supervisory position, would help build a sense of teamwork between IT and non-IT personnel. Ultimately, the focus of this approach was to foster the creation of a tolerant and supportive cultural climate for IT within the various departments; an important corollary goal here was also to allow reflective reviews of performance to flourish (Garvin, 1993).

Enlisting Support

Support for this plan had to be mustered quickly if I was to create an environment of trust. I had to reestablish the need for the IT func- tion within the company, show that it was critical for the company’s business operations, and show that its integration posed a unique challenge to the company. However, it was not enough just for me to claim this. I also had to enlist key managers to claim it. Indeed, employees will cooperate only if they believe that self-assessment and critical thinking are valued by management (Garvin, 2000). I decided to embark on a process of arranging meetings with specific line man- agers in the organization. I selected individuals who would represent the day-to-day management of the key departments. If I could get their commitment to work with IT, I felt it could provide the stimulus we needed. Some line managers were initially suspicious of the effort because of their prior experiences with IT. However, they generally liked the idea of integration and assimilation that was presented to them, and agreed to support it, at least on a trial basis.

Predictably, the IT staff were less enthusiastic about the idea. Many of them felt threatened, fearing that they were about to lose their independence or lose the mutual support that comes from being in a cohesive group. I had hoped that holding a series of meetings would help me gain support for the restructuring concept. I had to be care- ful to ensure that the staff members would feel that they also had an opportunity to develop a plan, that they were confident would work. During a number of group sessions, we discussed various scenarios of how such a plan might work. I emphasized the concepts of integra- tion and assimilation, and that a program of their implementation would be experimental. Without realizing it, I had engaged IT staff members in a process of self-governance. Thus, I empowered them

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to feel comfortable with voicing new ideas, without being concerned that they might be openly criticized by me if I did not agree. This pro- cess also encouraged individuals to begin thinking more as a group. Indeed, by directing the practice of constructive criticism among the IT staff, I had hoped to elicit a higher degree of reflective action among the group and to show them that they had the ability to learn from one another as well as the ability to design their own roles in the organization (Argyris, 1993). Their acceptance of physical integration and, hence, cultural assimilation became a necessary condition for the ability of the IT group, to engage in greater reflective behavior (Argyris & Schö n, 1996).

Assessing Progress

The next issue concerned individual feedback. How was I to let each person know how he or she was doing? I decided first, to get feedback from the larger organizational community. This was accomplished by meeting with the line managers and obtaining whatever feed- back was available from them. I was surprised at the large quantity of information they were willing to offer. The line managers were not shy about participating, and their input allowed me to complete two objectives: (1) to understand how the IT staff was being perceived in its new assignment and (2) to create a social and reflective relation- ship between IT individuals and the line managers. The latter objec- tive was significant, for if we were to be successful, the line managers would have to assist us in the effort to integrate and assimilate IT functions within their community.

After the discussions with managers were completed, individual meetings were held with each IT staff member to discuss the feedback. I chose not to attribute the feedback to specific line managers but rather to address particular issues by conveying the general consensus about them. Mixed feelings were also disclosed by the IT staff. After convey- ing the information, I listened attentively to the responses of IT staff members. Not surprisingly, many of them responded to the feedback negatively and defensively. Some, for example, felt that many technology users were unreasonable in their expectations of IT. It was important for me as facilitator not to find blame among them, particularly if I was to be a participant in the learning organization (Argyris & Schö n, 1996).

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Resistance in the Ranks

Any major organizational transformation is bound to elicit resistance from some employees. The initiative at Ravell proved to be no excep- tion. Employees are not always sincere, and some individuals will engage in political behavior that can be detrimental to any organiza- tional learning effort. Simply put, they are not interested in partici- pating, or, as Marsick (1998) states, “It would be naï ve to expect that everyone is willing to play on an even field (i.e., fairly).” Early in the process, the IT department became concerned that its members spent much of their time trying to figure out how best to position themselves for the future instead of attending to matters at hand. I heard from other employees that the IT staff felt that they would live through my tenure; that is, just survive until a permanent IT director was hired. It became difficult at times to elicit the truth from some members of the IT staff. These individuals would skirt around issues and deny making statements that were reported by other employees rather than con- front problems head on. Some IT staff members would criticize me in front of other groups and use the criticism as proof that the plan for a general integration was bound to fail. I realized in a most tangible sense that pursuing change through reflective practice does not come without resistance, and that this resistance needs to be factored into the planning of any such organizationally transformative initiative.

Line Management to the Rescue

At the time that we were still working through the resistance within IT, the plan to establish a relationship with line management began to work. A number of events occurred that allowed me to be directly involved in helping certain groups solve their IT problems. Word spread quickly that there was a new direction in IT that could be trusted. Line management support is critical for success in such trans- formational situations. First, line management is typically comprised of people from the ranks of supervisors and middle managers, who are responsible for the daily operations of their department. Assuming they do their jobs, senior management will cater to their needs and listen to their feedback. The line management of any organiza- tion, necessarily engaged to some degree in the process of learning

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(a “learning organization”), is key to its staff. Specifically, line manag- ers are responsible for operations personnel; at the same time, they must answer to senior management. Thus, they understand both exec- utive and operations perspectives of the business (Garvin, 2000). They are often former staff members themselves and usually have a high level of technical knowledge. Upper management, while important for financial support, has little effect at the day-to-day level, yet this is the level at which the critical work of integration and the building of a single learning community must be done.

Interestingly, the line management organization had previously had no shortage of IT-related problems. Many of these line managers had been committed to developing their own IT staffs; however, they quickly realized that the exercise was beyond their expertise, and that they needed guidance and leadership. Their participation in IT staff meetings had begun to foster a new trust in the IT department, and they began to see the possibilities of working closely with IT to solve their problems. Their support began to turn toward what Watkins and Marsick (1993, p. 117) call “creating alignment by placing the vision in the hands of autonomous, cross-functional synergetic teams.” The combination of IT and non-IT teams began to foster a synergy among the communities, which established new ideas about how best to use technology.

IT Begins to Reflect

Although it was initially difficult for some staff members to accept, they soon realized that providing feedback opened the door to the process of self-reflection within IT. We undertook a number of exer- cises, to help IT personnel understand how non-IT personnel per- ceived them, and how their own behavior may have contributed to these perceptions. To foster self-reflection, I adopted a technique developed by Argyris called “the left-hand column.” In this technique, individuals use the right-hand column of a piece of paper to transcribe dialogues that they felt had not resulted in effective communication. In the left-hand column of the same page, participants are to write what they were really thinking at the time of the dialogue but did not say. This exercise is designed to reveal underlying assumptions that speakers may not be aware of during their exchanges and that may be

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impeding their communication with others by giving others a wrong impression. The exercise was extremely useful in helping IT personnel understand how others in the organization perceived them.

Most important, the development of reflective skills, according to Schö n (1983), starts with an individual’s ability to recognize “leaps of abstraction”—the unconscious and often inaccurate generalizations people make about others based on incomplete information. In the case of Ravell, such generalizations were deeply entrenched among its various personnel sectors. Managers tended to assume that IT staffers were “ just techies,” and that they therefore held fundamentally differ- ent values and had little interest in the organization as a whole. For their part, the IT personnel were quick to assume that non-IT people did not understand or appreciate the work they did. Exposing these “leaps of abstraction” was key to removing the roadblocks that pre- vented Ravell from functioning as an integrated learning organization.

Defining an Identity for Information Technology

It was now time to start the process of publicly defining the identity of IT. Who were we, and what was our purpose? Prior to this time, IT had no explicit mission. Instead, its members had worked on an ad hoc basis, putting out fires and never fully feeling that their work had contributed to the growth or development of the organization as a whole. This sense of isolation made it difficult for IT members to begin to reflect on what their mission should or could be. I organized a series of meetings to begin exploring the question of a mission, and I offered support by sharing exemplary IT mission statements that were being implemented in other organizations. The focus of the meetings was not on convincing them to accept any particular idea but rather to facilitate a reflective exercise with a group that was undertaking such a task for the first time (Senge, 1990).

The identity that emerged for the IT department at Ravell was dif- ferent from the one implicit in their past role. Our new mission would be to provide technical support and technical direction to the organi- zation. Of necessity, IT personnel would remain specialists, but they were to be specialists who could provide guidance to other depart- ments in addition to helping them solve and prevent problems. As they became more intimately familiar with what different departments

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did—and how these departments contributed to the organization as a whole—IT professionals would be able to make better informed rec- ommendations. The vision was that IT people would grow from being staff who fixed things into team members who offered their expertise to help shape the strategic direction of the organization and, in the process, participate fully in organizational growth and learning.

To begin to bring this vision to life, I invited line managers to attend our meetings. I had several goals in mind with this invita- tion. Of course, I wanted to increase contact between IT and non-IT people; beyond this, I wanted to give IT staff an incentive to change by making them feel a part of the organization as a whole. I also got a commitment from IT staff that we would not cover up our prob- lems during the sessions, but would deal with all issues with trust and honesty. I also believed that the line managers would reciprocate and allow us to attend their staff meetings. A number of IT indi- viduals were concerned that my approach would only further expose our problems with regard to quality performance, but the group as a whole felt compelled to stick with the beliefs that honesty would always prevail over politics. Having gained insight into how the rest of the organization perceived them, IT staff members had to learn how to deal with disagreement and how to build consensus to move an agenda forward. Only then could reflection and action be intimately intertwined so that after-the-fact reviews could be replaced with peri- ods of learning and doing (Garvin, 2000).

The meetings were constructive, not only in terms of content issues handled in the discussions, but also in terms of the number of line managers who attended them. Their attendance sent a strong message that the IT function was important to them, and that they under- stood that they also had to participate in the new direction that IT was taking. The sessions also served as a vehicle to demonstrate how IT could become socially assimilated within all the functions of the community while maintaining its own identity.

The meetings were also designed as a venue for group members to be critical of themselves. The initial meetings were not successful in this regard; at first, IT staff members spent more time blaming oth- ers than reflecting on their own behaviors and attitudes. These ses- sions were difficult in that I would have to raise unpopular questions and ask whether the staff had truly “looked in the mirror” concerning

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some of the problems at hand. For example, one IT employee found it difficult to understand why a manager from another department was angry about the time it took to get a problem resolved with his computer. The problem had been identified and fixed within an hour, a time frame that most IT professionals would consider very respon- sive. As we looked into the reasons why the manager could have been justified in his anger, it emerged that the manager had a tight deadline to meet. In this situation, being without his computer for an hour was a serious problem.

Although under normal circumstances a response time of one hour is good, the IT employee had failed to ask about the manager’s par- ticular circumstance. On reflection, the IT employee realized that putting himself in the position of the people he was trying to support would enable him to do his job better. In this particular instance, had the IT employee only understood the position of the manager, there were alternative ways of resolving the problem that could have been implemented much more quickly.

Implementing the Integration: A Move toward Trust and Reflection

As communication became more open, a certain synergy began to develop in the IT organization. Specifically, there was a palpable rise in the level of cooperation and agreement, with regard to the over- all goals set during these meetings. This is not to suggest that there were no disagreements but rather that discussions tended to be more constructive in helping the group realize its objective of providing outstanding technology support to the organization. The IT staff also felt freer to be self-reflective by openly discussing their ideas and their mistakes. The involvement of the departmental line manag- ers also gave IT staff members the support they needed to carry out the change. Slowly, there developed a shift in behavior in which the objectives of the group sharpened its focus on the transformation of the department, on its acknowledgment of successes and failures, and on acquiring new knowledge, to advance the integration of IT into the core business units.

Around this time, an event presented itself that I felt would allow the IT department to establish its new credibility and authority to the other departments: the physical move of the organization to a

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new location. The move was to be a major event, not only because it represented the relocation of over 500 people and the technologi- cal infrastructure they used on a day-to-day basis, but also because the move was to include the transition of the media communications systems of the company, to digital technology. The move required tremendous technological work, and the organization decided to perform a “technology acceleration,” meaning that new technology would be introduced more quickly because of the opportunity pre- sented by the move. The entire moving process was to take a year, and I was immediately summoned to work with the other departments in determining the best plan to accomplish the transition.

For me, the move became an emblematic event for the IT group at Ravell. It would provide the means by which to test the creation of, and the transitioning into, a learning organization. It was also to pro- vide a catalyst for the complete integration and assimilation of IT into the organization as a whole. The move represented the introduction of unfamiliar processes in which “conscious reflection is … necessary if lessons are to be learned” (Garvin, 2000, p. 100). I temporarily reorganized IT employees into “SWAT” teams (subgroups formed to deal with defined problems in high-pressure environments), so that they could be eminently consumed in the needs of their com- munity partners. Dealing with many crisis situations helped the IT department change the existing culture by showing users how to bet- ter deal with technology issues in their everyday work environment. Indeed, because of the importance of technology in the new location, the core business had an opportunity to embrace our knowledge and to learn from us.

The move presented new challenges every day, and demanded openness and flexibility from everyone. Some problems required that IT listen intently to understand and meet the needs of its commu- nity partners. Other situations put IT in the role of teaching; assess- ing needs and explaining to other departments what was technically possible, and then helping them to work out compromises based on technical limitations. Suggestions for IT improvement began to come from all parts of the organization. Ideas from others were embraced by IT, demonstrating that employees throughout the organization were learning together. IT staff behaved assertively and without fear of failure, suggesting that, perhaps for the first time, their role had

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extended beyond that of fixing what was broken to one of helping to guide the organization forward into the future. Indeed, the move established the kind of “special problem” that provided an opportunity for growth in personal awareness through reflection (Moon, 1999).

The move had proved an ideal laboratory for implementing the IT integration and assimilation plan. It provided real and important opportunities for IT to work hand in hand with other departments— all focusing on shared goals. The move fostered tremendous cama- raderie within the organization and became an excellent catalyst for teaching reflective behavior. It was, if you will, an ideal project in which to show how reflection in action can allow an entire organiza- tion to share in the successful attainment of a common goal. Because it was a unique event, everyone—IT and non-IT personnel alike— made mistakes, but this time, there was virtually no finger-pointing. People accepted responsibility collectively and cooperated in finding solutions. When the company recommenced operations from its new location—on time and according to schedule—no single group could claim credit for the success; it was universally recognized that success had been the result of an integrated effort.

Key Lessons

The experience of the reorganization of the IT department at Ravell can teach us some key lessons with respect to the cultural transforma- tion and change of marginalized technical departments, generally.

Defining Reflection and Learning for an Organization

IT personnel tend to view learning as a vocational event. They gener- ally look to increase their own “technical” knowledge by attending special training sessions and programs. However, as Kegan (1998) reminds us, there must be more: “Training is really insufficient as a sole diet of education—it is, in reality a subset of education.” True education involves transformation, and transformation, according to Kegan, is the willingness to take risks, to “get out of the bedroom of our comfortable world.” In my work at Ravell, I tried to augment this “diet” by embarking on a project that delivered both vocational train- ing and education through reflection. Each IT staff person was given

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one week of technical training per year to provide vocational develop- ment. But beyond this, I instituted weekly learning sessions in which IT personnel would meet without me and produce a weekly memo of “reflection.” The goal of this practice was to promote dialogue, in the hope that IT would develop a way to deal with its fears and mistakes on its own. Without knowing it, I had begun the process of creating a discursive community in which social interactions could act as insti- gators of reflective behavior leading to change.

Working toward a Clear Goal

The presence of clearly defined, measurable, short-term objectives can greatly accelerate the process of developing a “learning organiza- tion” through reflective practice. At Ravell, the move into new physi- cal quarters provided a common organizational goal toward which all participants could work. This goal fostered cooperation among IT and non-IT employees and provided an incentive for everyone to work and, consequently, learn together. Like an athletic team before an important game, or even an army before battle, the IT staff at Ravell rallied around a cause and were able to use reflective practices to help meet their goals. The move also represented what has been termed an “eye-opening event,” one that can trigger a better understanding of a culture whose differences challenge one’s presuppositions (Mezirow, 1990). It is important to note, though, that while the move accelerated the development of the learning organization as such, the move itself would not have been enough to guarantee the successes that followed it. Simply setting a deadline is no substitute for undergoing the kind of transformation necessary for a consummately reflective process. Only as the culmination of a process of analysis, socialization, and trust building, can an event like this speed the growth of a learning organization.

Commitment to Quality

Apart from the social challenges it faced in merging into the core business, the IT group also had problems with the quality of its out- put. Often, work was not performed in a professional manner. IT organizations often suffer from an inability to deliver on schedule,

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and Ravell was no exception. The first step in addressing the qual- ity problem, was to develop IT’s awareness of the importance of the problem, not only in my estimation but in that of the entire company. The IT staff needed to understand how technology affected the day- to-day operations of the entire company. One way to start the dia- logue on quality is to first initiate one about failures. If something was late, for instance, I asked why. Rather than addressing the problems from a destructive perspective (Argyris & Schö n, 1996; Schein, 1992; Senge, 1990), the focus was on encouraging IT personnel to under- stand the impact of their actions—or lack of action—on the company. Through self-reflection and recognition of their important role in the organization, the IT staff became more motivated than before to per- form higher quality work.

Teaching Staff “Not to Know”

One of the most important factors that developed out of the process of integrating IT was the willingness of the IT staff “not to know.” The phenomenology of “not knowing” or “knowing less” became the facilitator of listening; that is, by listening, we as individuals are better able to reflect. This sense of not knowing also “allows the individual to learn an important lesson: the acceptance of what is, without our attempts to control, manipulate, or judge” (Halifax, 1999, p. 177). The IT staff improved their learning abilities by suggesting and adopting new solutions to problems. An example of this was the creation of a two-shift help desk that provided user support during both day and evening. The learning process allowed IT to contribute new ideas to the community. More important, their contributions did not dramat- ically change the community; instead, they created gradual adjust- ments that led to the growth of a new hybrid culture. The key to this new culture was its ability to share ideas, accept error as a reality (Marsick, 1998), and admit to knowing less (Halifax, 1999).

Transformation of Culture

Cultural changes are often slow to develop, and they occur in small intervals. Furthermore, small cultural changes may even go unnoticed or may be attributed to factors other than their actual causes. This

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raises the issue of the importance of cultural awareness and our ability to measure individual and group performance. The history of the IT problems at Ravell made it easy for me to make management aware of what we were newly attempting to accomplish and of our reasons for creating dialogues about our successes and failures. Measurement and evaluation of IT performance are challenging because of the intrica- cies involved in determining what represents success. I feel that one form of measurement can be found in the behavioral patterns of an organization. When it came time for employee evaluations, reviews were held with each IT staff member. Discussions at evaluation reviews focused on the individuals’ perceptions of their role, and how they felt about their job as a whole. The feedback from these review meetings suggested that the IT staff had become more devoted, and more willing to reflect on their role in the organization, and, gen- erally, seemed happier at their jobs than ever before. Interestingly, and significantly, they also appeared to be having fun at their jobs. This happiness propagated into the community and influenced other supporting departments to create similar infrastructures that could reproduce our type of successes. This interest was made evident by frequent inquiries I received from other departments about how the transformation of IT was accomplished, and how it might be trans- lated to create similar changes in staff behavior elsewhere in the com- pany. I also noticed that there were fewer complaints and a renewed ability for the staff to work with our consultants.

Alignment with Administrative Departments

Ravell provided an excellent lesson about the penalties of not align- ing properly with other strategic and operational partners in a firm. Sometimes, we become insistent on forcing change, especially when placed in positions that afford a manager power—the power to get results quickly and through force. The example of Ravell teaches us that an approach of power will not ultimately accomplish transforma- tion of the organization. While senior management can authorize and mandate change, change usually occurs much more slowly than they wish, if it occurs at all. The management ranks can still push back and cause problems, if not sooner, then later. While I aligned with the line units, I failed to align with important operational partners,

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particularly human resources (HR). HR in my mind at that time was impeding my ability to accomplish change. I was frustrated and determined to get things done by pushing my agenda. This approach worked early on, but I later discovered that the HR management was bitter and devoted to stopping my efforts. The problems I encountered at Ravell are not unusual for IT organizations. The historical issues that affect the relationship between HR and IT are as follows:

• IT has unusual staff roles and job descriptions that can be inconsistent with the rest of the organization.

• IT tends to have complex working hours and needs. • IT has unique career paths that do not “fit” with HR standards. • IT salary structures shift more dynamically and are very sen-

sitive to market conditions. • IT tends to operate in silos.

The challenge, then, to overcome these impediments requires IT to

• reduce silos and IT staff marginalization • achieve better organization-wide alignment • develop shared leadership • define and create an HR/IT governance model

The success of IT/HR alignment should follow practices similar to those I instituted with the line managers at Ravell, specifically the following:

• Successful HR/IT integration requires organizational learn- ing techniques.

• Alignment requires an understanding of the relationship between IT investments and business strategy.

• An integration of IT can create new organizational cultures and structures.

• HR/IT alignment will likely continue to be dynamic in nature, and evolve at an accelerated pace.

The oversight of not integrating better with HR cost IT dearly at Ravell. HR became an undisclosed enemy—that is, a negative force against the entire integration. I discovered this problem only later, and was never able to bring the HR department into the fold. Without HR being part of the learning organization, IT staff continued to

19the “r Avell” Corp or AtIon

struggle with aligning their professional positions with those of the other departments. Fortunately, within two years the HR vice presi- dent retired, which inevitably opened the doors for a new start.

In large IT organizations, it is not unusual to have an HR member assigned to focus specifically on IT needs. Typically, it is a joint position in which the HR individual in essence works for the IT executive. This is an effective alternative in that the HR person becomes versed in IT needs and can properly represent IT in the area of head count needs and specific titles. Furthermore, the unique aspect of IT organizations is in the hybrid nature of their staff. Typically, a number of IT staff members are consultants, a situation that presents problems similar to the one I encountered at Ravell—that is, the resentment of not really being part of the organization. Another issue is that many IT staff members are outsourced across the globe, a situation that brings its own set of chal- lenges. In addition, the role of HR usually involves ensuring compliance with various regulations. For example, in many organizations, a con- sultant is permitted to work on site for only one year before U.S. gov- ernment regulations force the company to hire them as employees. The HR function must work closely with IT to enforce these regulations. Yet another important component of IT and HR collaboration is talent management. That is, HR must work closely with IT to understand new roles and responsibilities as they develop in the organization. Another challenge is the integration of technology into the day-to-day business of a company, and the question of where IT talent should be dispersed throughout the organization. Given this complex set of challenges, IT alone cannot facilitate or properly represent itself, unless it aligns with the HR departments. This becomes further complex with the prolifera- tion of IT virtual teams across the globe that create complex structures that often have different HR ramifications, both legally and culturally. Virtual team management is discussed further in the book.

Conclusion

This case study shows that strategic integration of technical resources into core business units can be accomplished, by using those aspects of organizational learning that promote reflection in action. This kind of integration also requires something of a concomitant form of assimila- tion, on the cultural level (see Chapter 3). Reflective thinking fosters the

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development of a learning organization, which in turn allows for the integration of the “other” in its various organizational manifestations. The experience of this case study also shows that the success of organi- zational learning will depend on the degree of cross fertilization achiev- able in terms of individual values and on the ability of the community to combine new concepts and beliefs, to form a hybrid culture. Such a new culture prospers with the use of organizational learning strategies to enable it to share ideas, accept mistakes, and learn to know less as a regular part their discourse and practice in their day-to-day operations.

Another important conclusion from the Ravell experience is that time is an important factor to the success of organizational learning approaches. One way of dealing with the problem of time is with patience—something that many organizations do not have. Another element of success came in the acceleration of events (such as the relo- cation at Ravell), which can foster a quicker learning cycle and helps us see results faster. Unfortunately, impatience with using organiza- tional learning methods is not an acceptable approach because it will not render results that change individual and organizational behavior. Indeed, I almost changed my approach when I did not get the results I had hoped for early in the Ravell engagement. Nevertheless, my per- sistence paid off. Finally, the belief that replacing the staff, as opposed to investing in its knowledge, results from a faulty generalization. I found that most of the IT staff had much to contribute to the orga- nization and, ultimately, to help transform the culture. Subsequent chapters of this book build on the Ravell experience and discuss spe- cific methods for integrating organizational learning and IT in ways that can improve competitive advantage.

Another recent perception, which I discuss further in Chapter 4, is the commitment to “complete” integration. Simply put, IT cannot select which departments to work with, or choose to participate only with line managers; as they say, it is “all or nothing at all.” Furthermore, as Friedman (2007, p. 8) states “The world is flat.” Certainly, part of the “flattening” of the world has been initiated by technology, but it has also created overwhelming challenges for seamless integration of technology within all operations. The flattening of the world has cre- ated yet another opportunity for IT to better integrate itself into what is now an everyday challenge for all organizations.

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2 The iT Dilemma

Introduction

We have seen much discussion in recent writing about how informa- tion technology has become an increasingly significant component of corporate business strategy and organizational structure (Bradley & Nolan, 1998; Levine et al., 2000; Siebel, 1999). But, do we know about the ways in which this significance takes shape? Specifically, what are the perceptions and realities regarding the importance of technology from organization leaders, business managers, and core operations personnel? Furthermore, what forms of participation should IT assume within the rest of the organization?

The isolation of IT professionals within their companies often pre- vents them from becoming active participants in the organization. Technology personnel have long been criticized for their inability to function as part of the business and are often seen as a group falling outside business cultural norms (Schein, 1992). They are frequently stereotyped as “techies” and segregated into areas of the business where they become marginalized and isolated from the rest of the organization. It is my experience, based on case studies such as the one reviewed in Chapter 1 (the Ravell Corporation), that if an orga- nization wishes to absorb its IT department into its core culture, and if it wishes to do so successfully, the company as a whole must be pre- pared to consider structural changes and to seriously consider using organizational learning approaches.

The assimilation of technical people into an organization presents a special challenge in the development of true organizational learning practices (developed more fully in Chapter 3). This challenge stems from the historical separation of a special group that is seen as stand- ing outside the everyday concerns of the business. IT is generally acknowledged as having a key support function in the organization as a whole. However, empirical studies have shown that it is a challenging

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endeavor to successfully integrate IT personnel into the learning fold and to do so in such a way that they not only are accepted, but also understood to be an important part of the social and cultural struc- ture of the business (Allen & Morton, 1994; Cassidy, 1998; Langer, 2007; Schein, 1992; Yourdon, 1998).

In his book In Over Our Heads, Kegan (1994) discusses the chal- lenges of dealing with individual difference. IT personnel have been consistently regarded as “different” fixtures; as outsiders who do not quite fit easily into the mainstream organization. Perhaps, because of their technical practices, which may at times seem “foreign,” or because of perceived differences in their values, IT personnel can become marginalized; imagined as outside the core social structures of business. As in any social structure, marginalization can result in the withdrawal of the individual from the community (Schlossberg, 1989). As a result, many organizations are choosing to outsource their IT services rather than confront and address the issues of cultural absorption and organizational learning. The outsourcing alternative tends to further distance the IT function from the core organiza- tion, thus increasing the effects of marginalization. Not only does the outsourcing of IT personnel separate them further from their peers, but it also invariably robs the organization of a potentially important contributor to the social growth and organizational learning of the business. For example, technology personnel should be able to offer insight into how technology can support further growth and learning within the organization. In addition, IT personnel are usually trained to take a logical approach to problem solving; as a result, they should be able to offer a complementary focus on learning. Hence, the inte- gration of IT staff members into the larger business culture can offer significant benefits to an organization in terms of learning and orga- nizational growth.

Some organizations have attempted to improve communications between IT and non-IT personnel through the use of an intermedi- ary who can communicate easily with both groups. This intermediary is known in many organizations as the business analyst. Typically, the business analyst will take responsibility for the interface between IT and the larger business community. Although a business analyst may help facilitate communication between IT and non-IT personnel, this arrangement cannot help but carry the implication that different

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“languages” are spoken by these two groups and, by extension, that direct communication is not possible. Therefore, the use of such an intermediary suffers the danger of failing to promote integration between IT and the rest of the organization; in fact, it may serve to keep the two camps separate. True integration, in the form of direct contact between IT and non-IT personnel, represents a greater chal- lenge for an organization than this remedy would suggest.

Recent Background

Since the 1990s, IT has been seen as a kind of variable that possesses the great potential to reinvent business. Aspects of this promise affected many of the core business rules used by successful chief executives and business managers. While organizations have used IT for the process- ing of information, decision-support processing, and order processing, the impact of the Internet and e-commerce systems has initiated revolutionary responses in every business sector. This economic phe- nomenon became especially self-evident with the formation of dot-coms in the mid- and late 1990s. The advent of this phenomenon stressed the need to challenge fundamental business concepts. Many financial wizards surmised that new technologies were indeed changing the very infrastructure of business, affecting how businesses would operate and compete in the new millennium. Much of this hoopla seemed justified by the extraordinary potential that technology offered, particularly with respect to the revolutionizing of old-line marketing principles, for it was technology that came to violate what was previously thought to be protected market conditions and sectors. Technology came to reinvent these business markets and to allow new competitors to cross market in sectors they otherwise could not have entered.

With this new excitement also came fear— fear that fostered unnat- ural and accelerated entry into technology because any delay might sacrifice important new market opportunities. Violating some of their traditional principles, many firms invested in creating new organi- zations that would “incubate” and eventually, capture large market segments using the Internet as the delivery vehicle. By 2000, many of these dot-coms were in trouble, and it became clear that their notion of new business models based on the Internet contained significant flaws and shortfalls. As a result of this crisis, the role and valuation

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of IT is again going through a transformation and once more we are skeptical about the value IT can provide a business and about the way to measure the contributions of IT.

IT in the Organizational Context

Technology not only plays a significant role in workplace operations, but also continues to increase its relevance among other traditional components of any business, such as operations, accounting, and marketing (Earl, 1996b; Langer, 2001a; Schein, 1992). Given this increasing relevance, IT gains significance in relation to

1. The impact it bears on organizational structure 2. The role it can assume in business strategy 3. The ways in which it can be evaluated 4. The extent to which chief executives feel the need to manage

operational knowledge and thus to manage IT effectively

IT and Organizational Structure

Sampler’s (1996) research explores the relationship between IT and organizational structure. His study indicated that there is no clear-cut relationship that has been established between the two. However, he concluded that there are five principal positions that IT can take in this relationship:

1. IT can lead to centralization of organizational control. 2. Conversely, IT can lead to decentralization of organizational

control. 3. IT can bear no impact on organizational control, its signifi-

cance being based on other factors. 4. Organizations and IT can interact in an unpredictable

manner. 5. IT can enable new organizational arrangements, such as net-

worked or virtual organizations.

According to Sampler (1996), the pursuit of explanatory models for the relationship between IT and organizational structure continues to be a challenge, especially since IT plays dual roles. On the one

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hand, it enhances and constrains the capabilities of workers within the organization, and because of this, it also possesses the ability to create a unique cultural component. While both roles are active, their impact on the organization cannot be predicted; instead, they evolve as unique social norms within the organization. Because IT has changed so dramatically over the past decades, it continues to be difficult to compare prior research on the relationship between IT and organizational structure.

Earl (1996a) studied the effects of applying business process reen- gineering (BPR) to organizations. BPR is a process that organizations undertake to determine how best to use technology, to improve busi- ness performance. Earl concludes that BPR is “an unfortunate title: it does not reflect the complex nature of either the distinctive underpin- ning concept of BPR [i.e., to reevaluate methods and rules of business operations] or the essential practical challenges to make it happen [i.e., the reality of how one goes about doing that]” (p. 54).

In my 2001 study of the Ravell Corporation (“Fixing Bad Habits,” Langer, 2001b), I found that BPR efforts require buy-in from business line managers, and that such efforts inevitably require the adaptation by individuals of different cultural norms and practices.

Schein (1992) recognizes that IT culture represents a subculture in collision with many others within an organization. He concludes that if organizations are to be successful in using new technologies in a global context, they must cope with ceaseless flows of information to ensure organizational health and effectiveness. His research indicates that chief executive officers (CEOs) have been reluctant to implement a new sys- tem of technology unless their organizations felt comfortable with it and were ready to use it. While many CEOs were aware of cost and effi- ciency implications in using IT, few were aware of the potential impact on organizational structure that could result from “adopting an IT view of their organizations” (p. 293). Such results suggest that CEOs need to be more active and more cognizant than they have been of potential shifts in organizational structure when adopting IT opportunities.

The Role of IT in Business Strategy

While many chief executives recognize the importance of IT in the day-to-day operations of their business, their experience with

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attempting to utilize IT as a strategic business tool, has been frustrat- ing. Typical executive complaints about IT, according to Bensaou and Earl (1998), fall into five problem areas:

1. A lack of correspondence between IT investments and busi- ness strategy

2. Inadequate payoff from IT investments 3. The perception of too much “technology for technology’s

sake” 4. Poor relations between IT specialists and users 5. The creation of system designs that fail to incorporate users’

preferences and work habits

McFarlan created a strategic grid (as presented in Applegate et al., 2003) designed to assess the impact of IT on operations and strategy. The grid shows that IT has maximum value when it affects both oper- ations and core business objectives. Based on McFarlan’s hypothesis, Applegate et al. established five key questions about IT that may be used by executives to guide strategic decision making:

1. Can IT be used to reengineer core value activities, and change the basis of competition?

2. Can IT change the nature of the relationship, and the balance of power, between buyers and sellers?

3. Can IT build or reduce barriers to entry? 4. Can IT increase or decrease switching costs? 5. Can IT add value to existing products and services, or create

new ones?

The research and analysis conducted by McFarlan and Applegate, respectively, suggest that when operational strategy and its results are maximized, IT is given its highest valuation as a tool that can transform the organization. It then receives the maximum focus from senior management and board members. However, Applegate et al. (2003) also focus on the risks of using technology. These risks increase when executives have a poor understanding of competitive dynamics, when they fail to understand the long-term implications of a strategic system that they have launched, or when they fail to account for the time, effort, and cost required to ensure user adop- tion, assimilation, and effective utilization. Applegate’s conclusion

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underscores the need for IT management to educate senior man- agement, so that the latter will understand the appropriate indi- cators for what can maximize or minimize their investments in technology.

Szulanski and Amin (2000) claim that while emerging technologies shrink the window in which any given strategy can be implemented, if the strategy is well thought out, it can remain viable. Mintzberg’s (1987) research suggests that it would be useful to think of strategy as an art, not a science. This perspective is especially true in situations of uncertainty. The rapidly changing pace of emerging technologies, we know, puts a strain on established approaches to strategy— that is to say, it becomes increasingly difficult to find comfortable implemen- tation of technological strategies in such times of fast-moving envi- ronments, requiring sophisticated organizational infrastructure and capabilities.

Ways of Evaluating IT

Firms have been challenged to find a way to best evaluate IT, particularly using traditional return on investment (ROI) approaches. Unfortunately, in this regard, many components of IT do not generate direct returns. Cost allocations based on overhead formulas (e.g., costs of IT as a percentage of revenues) are not applicable to most IT spend- ing needs. Lucas (1999) established nonmonetary methods for evalu- ating IT. His concept of conversion effectiveness places value on the ability of IT to complete its projects on time and within its budgets. This alone is a sufficient factor for providing ROI, assuming that the project was approved for valid business reasons. He called this overall process for evaluation the “garbage can” model. It allows organizations to present IT needs through a funneling pipeline of conversion effec- tiveness that filters out poor technology plans and that can determine which projects will render direct and indirect benefits to the organiza- tion. Indirect returns, according to Lucas, are those that do not pro- vide directly measurable monetary returns but do provide significant value that can be measured using his IT investment opportunities matrix. Utilizing statistical probabilities of returns, the opportunities matrix provides an effective tool for evaluating the impact of indirect returns.

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Executive Knowledge and Management of IT

While much literature and research have been produced on how IT needs to participate in and bring value to an organization, there has been relatively little analysis conducted on what non-IT chief execu- tives need to know about technology. Applegate et al. (2003) suggest that non-IT executives need to understand how to differentiate new technologies from older ones, and how to gauge the expected impact of these technologies on the businesses, in which the firm competes for market share. This is to say that technology can change the rela- tionship between customer and vendor, and thus, should be examined as a potential for providing competitive advantage. The authors state that non-IT business executives must become more comfortable with technology by actively participating in technology decisions rather than delegating them to others. They need to question experts as they would in the financial areas of their businesses. Lou Gerstner, former CEO of IBM , is a good example of a non-IT chief executive who acquired sufficient knowledge and understanding of a technology firm. He was then able to form a team of executives who better understood how to develop the products, services, and overall business strategy of the firm.

Allen and Percival (2000) also investigate the importance of non- IT executive knowledge and participation with IT: “If the firm lacks the necessary vision, insights, skills, or core competencies, it may be unwise to invest in the hottest [IT] growth market” (p. 295). The authors point out that success in using emerging technologies is dif- ferent from success in other traditional areas of business. They con- cluded that non-IT managers need to carefully consider expected synergies to determine whether an IT investment can be realized and, especially, whether it is efficient to earn cost of capital.

Recent studies have focused on four important components in the linking of technology and business: its relationship to organizational structure, its role in business strategy, the means of its evaluation, and the extent of non-IT executive knowledge in technology. The chal- lenge in determining the best organizational structure for IT is posed by the accelerating technological advances since the 1970s and by the difficulty in comparing organizational models to consistent business cases. Consequently, there is no single organizational structure that has been adopted by businesses.

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While most chief executives understand the importance of using technology as part of their business strategy, they express frustra- tion in determining how to effectively implement a technology-based strategic approach. This frustration results from difficulties in under- standing how IT investments relate to other strategic business issues, from difficulty in assessing payoff and performance of IT generally and from perceived poor relations between IT and other departments.

Because most IT projects do not render direct monetary returns, exec- utives find themselves challenged to understand technology investments. They have difficulty measuring value since traditional ROI formulas are not applicable. Thus, executives would do better to focus on valuing tech- nology investments by using methods that can determine payback based on a matrix of indirect returns, which do not always include monetary sources. There is a lack of research on the question of what general knowl- edge non-IT executives need to have to effectively manage the strategic use of technology within their firms. Non-IT chief executives are often not engaged in day-to-day IT activities, and they often delegate dealing with strategic technology issues to other managers. The remainder of this chapter examines the issues raised by the IT dilemma in its various guises especially as they become relevant to, and are confronted from, the top management or chief executive point of view.

IT: A View from the Top

To investigate further the critical issues facing IT, I conducted a study in which I personally interviewed over 40 chief executives in vari- ous industries, including finance/investment, publishing, insurance, wholesale/retail, and hotel management. Executives interviewed were either the CEO or president of their respective corporations. I canvassed a population of New York-based midsize corporations for this interview study. Midsize firms, in our case, comprise businesses of between 200 and 500 employees. Face-to-face interviews were conducted, to allow participants the opportunity to articulate their responses, in contrast to answering printed survey questions; execu- tives were therefore allowed to expand, and clarify, their responses to questions. An interview guide (see questions in Tables 2.1 through 2.3) was designed to raise issues relevant to the challenges of using technology, as reported in the recent research literature, and to

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consider significant phenomena, that could affect changes in the uses of technology, such as the Internet. The interview discussions focused on three sections: (1) chief executive perception of the role of IT, (2) management and strategic issues, and (3) measuring IT performance and activities. The results of the interviews are summarized next.

Table 2.1 Perception and Role of IT

QUESTION ANALYSIS

1. How do you define the role and the mission of IT in your firm?

Fifty-seven percent responded that their IT organizations were reactive and did not really have a mission. Twenty-eight percent had an IT mission that was market driven; that is, their IT departments were responsible for actively participating in marketing and strategic processes.

2. What impact has the Internet had on your business strategy?

Twenty-eight percent felt the impact was insignificant, while 24% felt it was critical. The remaining 48% felt that the impact of the Internet was significant to daily transactions.

3. Does the firm have its own internal software development activity? Do you develop your own in-house software or use software packages?

Seventy-six percent had an internal development organization. Eighty-one percent had internally developed software.

4. What is your opinion of outsourcing? Do you have the need to outsource technology? If so, how is this accomplished?

Sixty-two percent had outsourced certain aspects of their technology needs.

5. Do you use consultants to help formulate the role of IT? If yes, what specific roles do they play? If not, why?

Sixty-two percent of the participants used consultants to assist them in formulating the role of IT.

6. Do you feel that IT will become more important to the strategy of the business? If yes, why?

Eighty-five percent felt that IT had recently become more important to the strategic planning of the business.

7. How is the IT department viewed by other departments? Is the IT department liked, or is it marginalized?

Twenty-nine percent felt that IT was still marginalized. Another 29% felt it was not very integrated. Thirty-eight percent felt IT was sufficiently integrated within the organization, but only one chief executive felt that IT was very integrated with the culture of his firm.

8. Do you feel there is too much “ hype” about the importance and role of technology?

Fifty-three percent felt that there was no hype. However, 32% felt that there were levels of hype attributed to the role of technology; 10% felt it was “ all hype.”

9. Have the role and the uses of technology in the firm significantly changed over the last 5 years? If so, what are the salient changes?

Fourteen percent felt little had changed, whereas 43% stated that there were moderate changes. Thirty-eight percent stated there was significant change.

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Table 2.2 Management and Strategic Issues

QUESTION ANALYSIS

1. What is the most senior title held by someone in IT? Where does this person rank on the organization hierarchy?

Sixty-six percent called the highest position chief information officer (CIO). Ten percent used managing director, while 24% used director as the highest title.

2. Does IT management ultimately report to you?

Fifty percent of IT leaders reported directly to the chief executive (CEO). The other half reported to either the chief financial officer (CFO) or the chief operating officer (COO).

3. How active are you in working with IT issues?

Fifty-seven percent stated that they are very active— on a weekly basis. Thirty-eight percent were less active or inconsistently involved, usually stepping in when an issue becomes problematic.

4. Do you discuss IT strategy with your peers from other firms?

Eighty-one percent did not communicate with peers at all. Only 10% actively engaged in peer-to-peer communication about IT strategy.

5. Do IT issues get raised at board, marketing, and/or strategy meetings?

Eighty-six percent confirmed that IT issues were regularly discussed at board meetings. However, only 57% acknowledged IT discussion during marketing meetings, and only 38% confirmed like discussions at strategic sessions.

6. How critical is IT to the day-to-day business?

Eighty-two percent of the chief executives felt it was very significant or critical to the business.

Table 2.3 Measuring IT Performance and Activities

QUESTION ANALYSIS 1. Do you have any view of how IT

should be measured and accounted for?

Sixty-two percent stated that they had a view on measurement; however, there was significant variation in how executives defined measurement.

2. Are you satisfied with IT performance in the firm?

There was significant variation in IT satisfaction. Only 19% were very satisfied. Thirty-three percent were satisfied, another 33% were less satisfied, and 14% were dissatisfied.

3. How do you budget IT costs? Is it based on a percentage of gross revenues?

Fifty-seven percent stated that they did not use gross revenues in their budgeting methodologies.

4. To what extent do you perceive technology as a means of increasing marketing or productivity or both?

Seventy-one percent felt that technology was a significant means of increasing both marketing and productivity in their firms.

5. Are Internet/Web marketing activities part of the IT function?

Only 24% stated that Internet/Web marketing efforts reported directly to the IT organization.

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Section 1: Chief Executive Perception of the Role of IT

This section of the interview focuses on chief executive perceptions of the role of IT within the firm. For the first question, about the role and mission of IT, over half of the interviewees responded in ways that suggested their IT organizations were reactive, without a strate- gic mission. One executive admitted, “IT is not really defined. I guess its mission is to meet our strategic goals and increase profitability.” Another response betrays a narrowly construed understanding of its potential: “The mission is that things must work— zero tolerance for failure.” These two responses typify the vague and generalized percep- tion that IT “has no explicit mission” except to advance the important overall mission of the business itself. Little over a quarter of respon- dents could confirm a market-driven role for IT; that is, actively par- ticipating in marketing and strategic processes. Question 2, regarding the impact of the Internet on business strategy, drew mixed responses. Some of these revealed the deeply reflective challenges posed by the Internet: “I feel the Internet forces us to take a longer-term view and a sharper focus to our business.” Others emphasized its transformative potential: “The Internet is key to decentralization of our offices and business strategy.”

Questions 3 and 4 focused on the extent to which firms have their own software development staffs, whether they use internally developed or packaged software, and whether they outsource IT services. Control over internal development of systems and applications remained important to the majority of chief executives: “I do not like outsourcing— surrender control, and it’s hard to bring back.” Almost two-thirds of the partici- pants employed consultants to assist them in formulating the role of IT within their firms but not always without reservation: “Whenever we have a significant design issue we bring in consultants to help us— but not to do actual development work.” Only a few were downright skepti- cal: “I try to avoid consultants— what is their motivation?” The percep- tion of outsourcing is still low in midsize firms, as compared to the recent increase in IT outsourcing abroad. The lower use could be related to the initial costs and management overheads that are required to properly implement outsource operations in foreign countries.

A great majority of chief executives recognized some form of the strategic importance of IT to business planning: “More of our business

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is related to technology and therefore I believe IT is more important to strategic planning.” Still, this sense of importance remained some- what intuitive: “I cannot quantify how IT will become more strategic to the business planning— but I sense that job functions will be dra- matically altered.” In terms of how IT is viewed by other departments within the firm, responses were varied. A little over a third of respon- dents felt IT was reasonably integrated within the organization: “The IT department is vitally important— but rarely noticed.” The major- ity of respondents, however, recognized a need for greater integra- tion: “IT was marginalized— but it is changing. While IT drives the system— it needs to drive more of the business.” Some articulated clearly the perceived problems: “IT needs to be more proactive— they do not seem to have good interpersonal skills and do not understand corporate politics.” A few expressed a sense of misgiving (“IT people are strange— personality is an issue”) and even a sense of hopeless- ness: “People hate IT— particularly over the sensitivity of the data. IT sometimes is viewed as misfits and incompetent.”

Question eight asked participants whether they felt there was too much “hype” attributed to the importance of technology in business. Over half responded in the negative, although not without reserva- tion: “I do not think there is too much hype— but I am disappointed. I had hoped that technology at this point would have reduced paper, decreased cost— it just has not happened.” Others felt that there is indeed some degree of sensationalism: “I definitely think there is too much hype— everyone wants the latest and greatest.” Hype in many cases can be related to a function of evaluation, as in this exclama- tion: “The hype with IT relates more to when will we actually see the value!” The last question in this section asks whether the uses of technology within the firm had significantly changed over the last five years. A majority agreed that it had: “The role of IT has changed significantly in the last five years—we need to stay up-to-date because we want to carry the image that we are ‘ on the ball’.” Many of these stressed the importance of informational flows: “I find the ‘ I’ [infor- mation] part to be more and more important and the ‘ T’ [technol- ogy] to be diminishing in importance.” Some actively downplayed the significance: “I believe in minimizing the amount of technology we use—people get carried away.”

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Section 2: Management and Strategic Issues

This section focuses on questions pertaining to executive and man- agement organizational concerns. The first and second questions asked executives about the most senior title held by an IT officer and about the reporting structure for IT. Two-thirds of the par- ticipants ranked their top IT officer as a chief information officer (CIO). In terms of organizational hierarchy, half of the IT leaders were at the second tier, reporting directly to the CEO or presi- dent, while the other half were at the third tier, reporting either to the chief financial officer (CFO) or to the chief operating offi- cer (COO). As one CEO stated, “Most of my activity with IT is through the COO. We have a monthly meeting, and IT is always on the agenda.”

The third question asked executives to consider their level of involvement with IT matters. Over half claimed a highly active rela- tionship, engaging on a weekly basis: “I like to have IT people close and in one-on-one interactions. It is not good to have artificial barri- ers.” For some, levels of involvement may be limited: “I am active with IT issues in the sense of setting goals.” A third of participants claimed less activity, usually becoming active when difficulties arose. Question four asked whether executives spoke to their peers at other firms about technology issues. A high majority managed to skip this potential for communication with their peers. Only one in 10 actively pursued this matter of engagement.

Question 5 asked about the extent to which IT issues were discussed at board meetings, marketing meetings, and business strategy sessions. Here, a great majority confirmed that there was regular discussion regarding IT concerns, especially at board meet- ings. A smaller majority attested to IT discussions during market- ing meetings. Over a third reported that IT issues maintained a presence at strategic sessions. The higher incidence at board meet- ings may still be attributable to the effects of Year 2000 (Y2K) preparations. The final question in this section concerned the level of criticality for IT in the day-to-day operations of the business. A high majority of executives responded affirmatively in this regard: “IT is critical to our survival, and its impact on economies of scale is significant.”

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Section 3: Measuring IT Performance and Activities

This section is concerned with how chief executives measured IT per- formance and activities within their firms. The first question of this section asked whether executives had a view about how IT performance should be measured. Almost two-thirds affirmed having some formal or informal way of measuring performance: “We have no formal pro- cess of measuring IT other than predefined goals, cost constraints, and deadlines.” Their responses demonstrated great variation, sometimes leaning on cynicism: “I measure IT by the number of complaints I get.” Many were still grappling with this challenge: “Measuring IT is unqualified at this time. I have learned that hours worked is not the way to measure IT— it needs to be more goal- oriented.” Most chief execu- tives expressed some degree of quandary: “We do not feel we know enough about how IT should be measured.” Question two asked execu- tives to rate their satisfaction with IT performance. Here, also, there was significant variation. A little more than half expressed some degree of satisfaction: “Since 9/11 IT has gained a lot of credibility because of the support that was needed during a difficult time.” Slightly fewer than half revealed a degree of dissatisfaction: “We had to overhaul our IT department to make it more customer-service oriented.”

Question three concerned budgeting; that is, whether or not chief executives budgeted IT costs as a percentage of gross revenues. Over half denied using gross revenues in their budgeting method: “When handling IT projects we look at it on a request-by-request basis.”

The last two questions asked chief executives to assess the impact of technology on marketing and productivity. Almost three quarters of the participants felt that technology represented a significant means of enhancing both marketing and productivity. Some maintained a cer- tainty of objective: “We try to get IT closer to the customer— having them understand the business better.” Still, many had a less-defined sense of direction: “I have a fear of being left behind, so I do think IT will become more important to the business.” And others remained caught in uncertainty: “I do not fully understand how to use technol- ogy in marketing— but I believe it’s there.” Chief executive certainty, in this matter, also found expression in the opposite direction: “IT will become less important— it will be assumed as a capability and a service that companies provide to their customers.” Of the Internet/

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Web marketing initiatives, only one quarter of these reported directly to the IT organization: “IT does not drive the Web activities because they do not understand the business.” Often, these two were seen as separate or competing entities of technology: “Having Web develop- ment report to IT would hinder the Internet business’s growth poten- tial.” Yet, some might be willing to explore a synergistic potential: “We are still in the early stages of understanding how the Internet relates to our business strategy and how it will affect our product line.”

General Results

Section 1 revealed that the matter of defining a mission for the IT organization remains as unresolved as finding a way to reckon with the potential impact of IT on business strategy. Executives still seemed to be at a loss on the question of how to integrate IT into the workplace— a human resource as well as a strategic issue. There was uncertainty regard- ing the dependability of the technology information received. Most agreed, however, in their need for software development departments to support their internally developed software, in their need to outsource certain parts of technology, and in their use of outside consultants to help them formulate the future activities of their IT departments.

Section 2 showed that while the amount of time that executives spent on IT issues varied, there was a positive correlation between a structure in which IT managers reported directly to the chief executive and the degree of activity that executives stated they had with IT matters. Section 3 showed that chief executives understood the potential value that technol- ogy can bring to the marketing and productivity of their firms. They did not believe, however, that technology can go unmeasured; there needs to be some rationale for allotting a spending figure in the budget. For most of the firms in this study, the use of the Internet as a technological vehicle for future business was not determined by IT. This suggests that IT does not manage the marketing aspects of technology, and that it has not achieved significant integration in strategic planning.

Defining the IT Dilemma

The variations found in this study in terms of where IT reports, how it is measured, and how its mission is defined were consistent with

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existing research. But, the wide-ranging inconsistencies and uncer- tainties among executives described here left many of them wonder- ing whether they should be using IT as part of their business strategy and operations. While this quandary does not in itself suggest an inadequacy, it does point to an absence of a “best practices” guideline for using technology strategically. Hence, most businesses lacked a clear plan on how to evolve IT contributions toward business develop- ment. Although a majority of respondents felt that IT was critical to the survival of their businesses, the degree of IT assimilation within the core culture of organizations still varied. This suggests that the effects of cultural assimilation lag behind the actual involvement of IT in the strategic direction of the company.

While Sampler (1996) attributes many operational inconsistencies to the changing landscape of technology, the findings of this study suggest that there is also a lack in professional procedures, rules, and established governance, that could support the creation of best practices for the profession. Bensaou and Earl (1998), on the one hand, have addressed this concern by taking a pro-Japanese perspective in extrapolating from five “Western” problems five “general” principles, presumably not cul- ture bound, and thence a set of “best principles” for managing IT. But, Earl et al. (1995), on the other hand, have sidestepped any attempt to incorporate Earl’s own inductive approach discussed here; instead, they favor a market management approach, based on a supply-and-demand model to “balance” IT management. Of course, best practices already embody the implicit notion of best principles; however, the problems confronting executives— the need for practical guidelines— remain. For instance, this study shows that IT performance is measured in many different ways. It is this type of practical inconsistency that leaves chief executives with the difficult challenge of understanding how technol- ogy decisions can be managed.

On a follow-up call related to this study, for example, a CEO informed me of a practical yet significant difference she had instituted since our interview. She stated:

The change in reporting has allowed IT to become part of the main- stream vision of the business. It now is a fundamental component of all discussions with human resources, sales and marketing, and accounting. The change in reporting has allowed for the creation of a critical system,

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which has generated significant direct revenues for the business. I attri- bute this to my decision to move the reporting of technology directly to me and to my active participation in the uses of technology in our business.

This is an example of an executive whom Schein (1994) would call a “change agent”— someone who employs “cognitive redefinition through scanning,” in this case to elicit the strategic potential of IT. We might also call this activity reflective thinking (Langer, 2001b). Schein’s change agents, however, go on to “acknowledge that future generations of CEOs will have been educated much more thoroughly in the possibilities of the computer and IT, thus enabling them to take a hands-on adopter stance” (p. 343). This insight implies a distanc- ing (“future”) of present learning responsibilities among current chief executives. The nearer future of this insight may instead be seen in the development of organizational learning.* These are two areas of contemporary research that begin to offer useful models in the pursuit of a best practices approach to the understanding and managing of IT.

If the focus of this latter study was geared toward the evaluation of IT based on the view of the chief executive, it was, indeed, because their views necessarily shape the very direction for the organizations that they manage. Subsequent chapters of this book examine how the various dilemmas surrounding IT that I have discussed here are affecting organizations and how organizational learning practices can help answer many of the issues of today as raised by executives, man- agers, and operations personnel.

Recent Developments in Operational Excellence

The decline in financial markets in 2009, and the continued increase in mergers and acquisitions due to global competition have created an interesting opportunity for IT that reinforces the need for integration via organizational learning. During difficult economic periods, IT has traditionally been viewed as a cost center and had its operations

* My case study “Fixing Bad Habits” (Langer, 2001b) has shown that integrating the practices of reflective thinking, to support the development of organizational learning, has greatly enhanced the adaptation of new technologies, their strategic valuation to the firm, and their assimilation into the social norms of the business.

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reduced (I discuss this further in Chapter 3, in which I introduce the concept of drivers and supporters). However, with the growth in the role of technology, IT management has now been asked to help improve efficiency through the use of technology across departments. That is, IT is emerging as an agent for business transformation in a much stronger capacity than ever before. This phenomenon has placed tremendous pressure on the technology executive to align with his or her fellow executives in other departments and to get them to partici- pate in cost reductions by implementing more technology. Naturally, using technology to facilitate cuts to the workforce is often unpopular, and there has been much bitter fallout from such cross-department reductions. Technology executives thus face the challenge of position- ing themselves as the agents of a necessary change. However, opera- tional excellence is broader than just cutting costs and changing the way things operate; it is about doing things efficiently and with qual- ity measures across corporate operations. Now that technology affects every aspect of operations, it makes sense to charge technology execu- tives with a major responsibility to get it accomplished.

The assimilation of technology as a core part of the entire orga- nization is now paramount for survival, and the technology execu- tive of today and certainly tomorrow will be one who understands that operational excellence through efficiency must be accomplished by educating business units in self-managing the process. The IT executive, then, supports the activity as a leader, not as a cost cut- ter who invades the business. The two approaches are very different, and adopting the former can result in significant long-term results in strategic alignment.

My interviews with CEOs supported this notion: The CEO does not want to be the negotiator; change must be evolutionary within the business units themselves. While taking this kind of role in organiza- tional change presents a new dilemma for IT, it can also be an oppor- tunity for IT to position itself successfully within the organization.