HLSS502week3

Informa�on Sharing

Intelligence won’t be shared when it is considered to be CLASSIFIED informa�on. And the most common way that classified informa�on is protected is to consider it “in the name of na�onal security.” Even though this is extremely frustra�ng, it does have some legi�mate applica�ons such as protec�ng sources, methods, and hard-won knowledge and to deny our adversary certain informa�on, since public disclosure or compromise of intelligence can cause adversaries to prac�ce decep�on or change their means of communica�ons or opera�ons. Further, this informa�on is distributed and maintained in mul�ple loca�ons. While this creates security in avoiding single points of failure, it also creates an issue of how analysts can become aware of informa�on and assess their need to know. As a side note, decentraliza�on is required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Revision Act.

If you look at the Department of Homeland Security, you have the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, which coordinates the intelligence received from the DHS agencies. Those agencies need to work with state and local governments as well as other federal agencies. In the past, intelligence informa�on was shared with other agencies on a “need to know" basis. What happened was that federal agencies were unwilling to work with the state and local agencies. This was unacceptable, so this mode of thinking was changed. Now, what are called fusion centers have been developed where local, state, and federal agencies in a geographical area receive and analyze localized intelligence. This concept makes sense as state and local agencies are on the front lines, so they poten�ally have numerous opportuni�es to gather informa�on of local and some�mes na�onal importance regarding terrorist threats.

In 2012, the Senate Commi�ee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a report on state and local fusion centers. Basically, the report found that the fusion centers had provided li�le, if any, value in the na�on’s counterterrorism efforts. The report did not seek to assess if the fusion centers were providing value in fields other than terrorism, such as public safety, criminal inves�ga�ons, or disaster management. From their assessment, the Subcommi�ee recommended nine ac�ons that should be taken to improve the value of fusion center support of homeland security counterterrorism efforts. Many of the recommenda�on have to do with funding and accoun�ng for the use of the funds against measures to ensure the taxpayer is ge�ng value for their investment. Addi�onally, the report made some recommenda�ons regarding personnel and opera�ons. These recommenda�ons include: (1) reforming intelligence repor�ng efforts at state and local fusion centers, (2) improve the training of intelligence reporters and (3) DHS should align its prac�ces and guidelines to protect civil liber�es, so they adhere to the

Cons�tu�on, federal law, and its statutory mission (U.S. Congress, Senate, 2012, pp. 106-107). Therefore, there may be some debate on the value and u�lity of fusion centers and a number of your readings explore this issue.