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CRS INSIGHT Prepared for Members and

Committees of Congress

INSIGHTi

The U.S. Intelligence Community: Homeland

Security Issues in the 116th Congress

Updated February 1, 2019

Intelligence support of homeland security is a primary mission of the entire Intelligence Community (IC).

In fulfilling this mission, changes to IC organization and process, since 9/11, have enabled more

integrated and effective support than witnessed or envisioned since its inception. The terrorist attacks of

9/11 revealed how barriers between intelligence and law enforcement, which originally had been created

to protect civil liberties, had become too rigid, thus preventing efficient, effective coordination against

threats. In its final report, the Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11

Commission) identified how these barriers contributed to degrading U.S. national security. The findings

resulted in Congress and the executive branch enacting legislation and providing policies and regulations

designed to enhance information sharing across the U.S. government.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) gave the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

responsibility for integrating law enforcement and intelligence information relating to terrorist threats to

the homeland. Provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 (P.L.

108-458 ) established the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as the coordinator at the federal level

for terrorism information and assessment and created the position of Director of National Intelligence

(DNI) to provide strategic management across the 17 organizational elements of the IC. New legal

authorities accompanied these organizational changes. At the federal, state, and local levels, initiatives to

improve collaboration across the federal government include the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces

(JTTFs) and, more recently, the DHS National Network of Fusion Centers (NNFC).

Within the IC, the FBI Intelligence Branch (FBI/IB), and DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis

(OIA), and the Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) enterprise, are most closely associated with homeland

security. OIA combines information collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities

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(i.e., those conducted at airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign intelligence from the IC; law

enforcement information from federal, state, local, territorial and tribal sources; and private sector data

about critical infrastructure and strategic resources. OIA analytical products focus on a wide range of

threats to the homeland to include foreign and domestic terrorism, border security, human trafficking, and

public health. OIA’s customers range from the U.S. President to border patrol agents, Coast Guard

personnel, airport screeners, and local first responders. Much of the information sharing is done through

the NNFC—with OIA providing personnel, systems, and training.

The Coast Guard Intelligence (CG-2) enterprise is the intelligence component of the United States Coast

Guard (USCG). It serves as the primary USCG interface with the IC on intelligence policy, planning,

budgeting and oversight matters related to maritime security and border protection. CG-2 has a

component Counterintelligence Service, a Cryptologic Group, and an Intelligence Coordination Center to

provide analysis and supporting products on maritime border security. CG-2 also receives support from

field operational intelligence components including the Atlantic and Pacific Area Intelligence Divisions,

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers for the Atlantic and Pacific, and intelligence staffs supporting Coast

Guard districts and sectors.

FBI/IB includes four component organizations:

 The Directorate of Intelligence has responsibility for all FBI intelligence functions, and

includes intelligence elements and personnel at FBI Headquarters in field divisions.

 The Office of Partner Engagement develops and maintains intelligence sharing

relationships across the IC, and with state, local, tribal, territorial, and international

partners.

 The Office of Private Sector conducts outreach to businesses impacted by threats to

vulnerable sectors of the economy such as critical infrastructure, the supply chain, and

financial institutions.

 Finally, the Bureau Intelligence Council provides internal to the FBI a forum for senior-

level dialogue on integrated assessments of domestic threats.

While the intelligence organizations of FBI and DHS are the only IC elements solely dedicated to

intelligence support of homeland security, all IC elements, to varying degrees, have some level of

responsibility for the overarching mission of homeland security. For example, in addition to NCTC, the

Office of the DNI (ODNI) includes the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC). It was

established in 2015 and is responsible at the federal level for providing all-source analysis of intelligence

relating to cyber threats to the United States. Much like NCTC for terrorism, CTIIC provides outreach to

other intelligence organizations across the federal government and at the state, and local levels to

facilitate intelligence sharing and provide an integrated effort for assessing and providing warning of

cyber threats to the homeland.

IC organizational developments since 9/11 underscore the importance of adhering to privacy and civil

liberties protections that many feared might be compromised by the more integrated approach to

intelligence and law enforcement. This is particularly true considering the changing nature of the threat:

The focus of intelligence support of homeland security has evolved from state-centric to increasingly

focusing on non-state actors, often individuals acting alone or as part of a group not associated with any

state. Collecting against these threats, therefore, requires strict adherence to intelligence oversight rules

and regulations, and annual training by the IC workforce for the protection of privacy and civil liberties.

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Author Information

Michael E. DeVine

Analyst in Intelligence and National Security

Disclaimer

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to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of

Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of

information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role.

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