Public Health

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fint20

Intelligence and National Security

ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20

Improving ‘Five Eyes’ health security intelligence capabilities: leadership and governance challenges

Patrick F. Walsh

To cite this article: Patrick F. Walsh (2020): Improving ‘Five Eyes’ health security intelligence capabilities: leadership and governance challenges, Intelligence and National Security, DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2020.1750156

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1750156

Published online: 22 Apr 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 676

View related articles

View Crossmark data

ARTICLE

Improving ‘Five Eyes’ health security intelligence capabilities: leadership and governance challenges Patrick F. Walsh

ABSTRACT This article explores common organizational pressure points for ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities in their ability to understand, prevent and dis- rupt potential emerging bio-threats and risks. The acceleration in the development of synthetic biology and biotechnology for legitimate mar- kets (e.g. pharmaceuticals, food production and energy) is moving faster than current intelligence communities’ ability to identify and understand potential bio-threats and risks.

The article surveys several political leadership and intelligence govern- ance challenges responsible for the current sub-optimal development of health security intelligence capabilities and identifies possible policy sug- gestions to ameliorate challenges.

Introduction

For some practitioners across ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence Communities (IC) the mention of ‘health security’ and ‘intelligence’ together still seem a strange combination of words. For others in the IC even if ‘health security threats and risks’ are seen as legitimate collection and analytical priorities akin to others such as counter-terrorism and cyber–there is a reticence to invest in them. This somewhat disengaged perspective is explainable partly because there is yet no clear trajectory for bio-threats and risks. Disengagement is also arguably due–in part because historically ICs have not had a good understanding of bio-threats and risks from the Cold War up to and after the Coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Based on recent research, this article investigates how ‘Five Eyes’ partner countries can improve their health security intelligence capabilities to gain a deeper understanding of emerging bio-threats and risks. It concludes that sustained and coordinated capability improvements are largely a function of two aspects of intelligence governance: political leadership/external governance and internal IC governance issues. The article explores the significance of both factors before assessing the future outlook of health security intelligence capability over the next five years (2020-2025). Before addressing the central question of how to improve health security intelligence capability, however, it is important first to define how ‘health security intelligence’ is used in this article.

Health security intelligence

There are multiple interpretations on what constitutes ‘health security intelligence’ based largely on the diverse disciplinary backgrounds of scholars who seek to define it. In particular, the literature highlights this diversity between how public health specialists, clinicians, epidemiologists use the term compared to intelligence and security specialists. Aldis provides a useful discussion on the lack

CONTACT Patrick F. Walsh [email protected]

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1750156

2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

of agreement and understanding, particularly between developed and developing countries, on the concept of health security. He stated that the term ‘health security,’ like ‘biosecurity,’

‘sits at the intersection of several disciplines which do not share a commonmethodology (e.g., practitioners from security studies, foreign policy, IR [international relations], development theory and practice of UN agencies).’1

As in biosecurity, inconsistencies arise in how health security is defined. Bernard has referred to a ‘tribalism’ between the public health and security sectors, which has prevented both from under- standing each other and perceiving common priorities.2 Historically, this has led to different disciplines talking past each other and not seeing how their perspectives can provide potentially a more accurate and inclusive definition of health security intelligence. As a former intelligence analyst and intelligence studies scholar, my own perspectives of health security intelligence has evolved over time. In my most recent work in this area – Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism the focus is largely on biosecurity and the intentional weaponising of biology.3 However, I concluded that biosecurity should be seen as one aspect of a broader health security community–the other being public health. The human security agenda, which emerged from the international relations and security studies literature in the 1990s provides a unifying concept for understanding health security intelligence. Human security scholars sought to broaden traditional notions of security– beyond being solely about war and peace between states. Human security also emphasised the security of individuals within and between states, and included security against pandemics, poverty, access to education, and safe water amongst other basic human rights.4

In the context of a growing human security agenda, several scholars working in public health, particularly clinicians and sociologists begun to argue increasingly the response to global pandemics (HIV, SARs, H1N1, Zika and Ebola) as not just regional/global health emergencies, but also grave health security events.5 Such events not only had the potential to make many sick, but their implications globally – particularly for developing countries with fragile public sector infrastructure – had security implications for states involved. The 2014–16 Ebola outbreak in Western Africa, which killed 10,000 people illustrates how a major public health emergency not only has catastrophic health outcomes, but can also destabilise the capacities of nation-states to respond to such crises.6

Similarly, since 2018 another Ebola outbreak has occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s North Kivu and Ituri provinces. Further at the time of writing, there has been an outbreak of corona virus (COVID-19) first reported fromWuhan, China on 31 December 2019, which also underscores the fragility of even economically wealthy states’ ability to respond to regional and global health security crises.

In the case of the recent Ebola outbreak, there have been over 1900 deaths and although over 80,000 people have been immunized with a new Ebola vaccine, public health responders have been attacked by rebel militia and prevented from tracing and treating population in surrounding areas. This situation provides another example of the critical link between public health and security.7 In summary, if naturally occurring public health incidents and security are linked then it follows that intentional public health (biosecurity incidents involving bio-crimes and bio-terrorism) need to be seen not only as intelligence and security priorities, but also clearly as public health incidents. For example, the release of anthrax into a metropolitan transport hub, will require both intelligence and public health personnel coming together to assess whether the threat/risk is primarily a biosecurity or public health emergency. ‘Health security’ thus becomes a useful over-arching terminology to capture both biosecurity and public health dimensions of health incidents in order to assess the security implications of both. Clearly not all health security incidents as they unfold will rely on a similar composition of public health, intelligence and security personnel. However, both dimen- sions will remain co-dependent on each other as discussed in greater detail below.

With health security defined, the last aspect of ‘health security intelligence’ requiring clarification is ‘intelligence.’ Again depending on the context (e.g. national security, policing, military, private sector), there are many diverse perspectives on what ‘intelligence’ is and does. Leaving aside these debates, and for the objectives of this article, I argue that intelligence has at least three unique

2 P. F. WALSH

defining attributes: secrecy, surveillance and the security environment.8 All these terms are relative in the sense that in certain contexts (e.g. the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA) some intelligence collected would be considered highly secret with profound impacts on a given nation’s interests if it was shared widely – perhaps even in that nation’s intelligence community. Whereas a local policing agency could possess material on file classified as ‘secret’ or ‘protected’ (or more accurately privileged information), but the consequences of its release may be less deleterious. The point is secrecy is a relative term, but in its broadest sense most intelligence practice regardless of context cannot operate without a relative level of secrecy. The second term surveillance underscores another primary objective of all intelligence practice regardless of context. Intelligence activities can include an array of activities including research and information management. However, intelligence would not be intelligence without an ability to warn decision-makers about impending risks and threats. This requires active and sometimes passive surveillance of threat actors and risks in the security environment, which is the third defining characteristic of intelligence. The security environment again depending on the context in which intelligence is practiced is large, diverse and ever changing. It includes an open-ended list of threats such as state based military threats, terrorism, cyber, failed states and bio-threats and risks–the subject of this article.

With health security intelligence now defined, I now turn to a brief assessment of emerging bio- threats and risk across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Given limited space, the focus here is squarely on post 9/ 11 emerging bio-threats and risks because it is the capability of ‘Five Eyes’ countries in managing both contemporary and emerging threats and risks that is most germane to our discussion. This is not to suggest that understanding the evolution of bio-threat and risk trajectories pre-9/11 is not relevant to situating current or emerging threats. Indeed the rapid development of modern micro- biology and the industrialisation of various biological weapons in state based programs (e.g. Soviet Union, USA, UK and Canada) since 1945 – and the attempt by rogue states (particularly Iraq but also Iran, North Korea and Syria) to do the same – provides a foundation upon which more recent bio- threat and risk typologies can be understood. Additionally, the rapid development of synthetic biology and biotechnology from the 1990s to the present and the potential weaponisation of aspects of these technological advancements should also be examined against the broader historical context of bio-threats and risk from 1945, throughout the Cold War and the immediate pre 9/ 11 period. But these developments are chronicled in detail elsewhere for readers seeking this background material.9

Discussion here of contemporary and emerging bio-threats and risks starts with the Amerithrax incident of 2001. I argue Amerithrax represented a water shed moment in helping ICs and policy- makers recalibrate their understanding about future bio-threats trajectories. In September and October 2001, seven envelopes containing a dried powder form of anthrax spores were posted to several media outlets and to the US Senate offices of Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy. The letters resulted in 22 cases of anthrax–five of which led to fatal inhalational anthrax. The anthrax letters also resulted in the contamination and closure of several major US postal offices.10 The Amerithrax attack came only a week after 9/11 so the United States was already unsettled about the possibility of more terrorist attacks. The incident resulted in a 7 year long investigation, where the US Department of Justice (DOJ) determined a single spore batch created by anthrax specialist Dr Bruce E Ivins at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRID) was the parent material for the letter spores. In July 2008 Ivins committed suicide before being indicted. However, since the FBI officially closed the investigation in 2010 several biologists and chemists disagree on whether the Bureau got the right perpetrator based on the presence of silicon and tin coating on the anthrax spores. In the opinion of some experts this suggest a greater complexity of manufacturing beyond the scope of what Ivins could do in his lab. Additionally, earlier in the investigation another army research scientist Steven Hatfield was targeted, but later exonerated with the DOJ paying a 4.6 million dollar legal settlement to the scientist.11 The DOJ has not changed its position that Ivins was responsible and complex investigations such as Amerithrax underscore the difficulties in attribution of individuals involved in bio-attacks.

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 3

Amerithrax while not a major casualty attack was significant for a number of reasons. First it influenced IC assessments about how easy it would be for non-state actors such as Al Qaeda to produce and disseminate biological agents as weapons. Amerithrax showed the difficulties an anthrax scientist had in producing the spores in ideal laboratory conditions. Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups may have held an interest in developing bio-weapons, yet for the most part had limited access to similar scientific expertise or a safe laboratory setting for their development. In summary, the incident injected more subtlety and complexity into policy discussions given that during the late 1990 s and early 2000 s a dominant strand in the political discourse was that it would be relatively easily for terrorist groups to develop bio-weapons. Second, and more importantly, Amerithrax demonstrated that the terrorist may be ‘an insider’ – for example a scientist going rogue. Amerithrax therefore, ignited another arc of the debate about the most likely profile of bio-threat actors that continues to the present.

Despite the lessons contained in Amerithrax, a comprehensive understanding of contemporary bio-threats and risks remains unclear across the ‘Five Eyes’ countries and the broader scientific community. However, there are two broad threat/risk typologies: stolen biological agents and dual use research and synthetic biology, which illustrate where concerns exist for the potential malicious use of biology into the future. I will focus more on the latter as this area is currently of greatest concern by ICs and the scientific community.

Stolen biological agents Stealing a controlled biological agent appears rare due to increased bio-safety regulations and control of physical space (BSL 3 and 4 labs) that has developed since the Amerithrax incident in all ‘Five Eyes’ countries.12 Legislation and bio-safety regulations, which also include more stringent security background checks for employees working with select biological agents (such as anthrax, tularaemia, the plague) has provided greater protection. However, despite enhanced security measures in the US and to some extent the UK, there have been a number of handling and transportation safety episodes (particularly in the 2014 USD–2015), which demonstrate vulnerabil- ities in safety practices remain. Such episodes involved the US Department of Defense and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and included safety protocols not being followed fully in transporting select biological agents across the United States and internationally as well as the shipping of bio-culture equipment from BSL 3 and 4 labs to lower safety rated labs without being sufficiently decontaminated. In July 2019, safety concerns have again been highlighted when the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRID) – a key centre for the develop- ment of biological countermeasures against bioterrorism suspended operations under the authority of the Federal Select Agent Program for failing to meet federal biosafety requirements.13

Despite bio-safety lapses and given more stringent physical and personnel safety measures, it seems that this bio threat/risk typology (stolen biological agents) is likely to remain very low across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. While it is unclear if there is a criminal market for the theft of controlled bio- agents from secure labs, it would seem that organised criminal groups would have other compara- tively less risky and more immediately profitable markets to pursue such as drug trafficking. In particular, given the attribution of many controlled biological agents in BSL 3 to 4 labs can be assessed forensically, criminal interest in stealing such substances is likely to be further dissuaded.14

The other main threat scenario of a terrorist group breaking in and stealing a controlled bio-agent also seems less likely.

While 9/11 represented a sophisticated and impactful attack modality, most lethal attacks since (at least in Western countries) have been simpler using readily available materials and weapons such as improvised explosive devices, vehicles and knives. None of these require the same expertise as stealing, handling or using controlled biological substances. Nonetheless, there are two areas of potential concern in this bio-threat/risk typology (stolen biological agents), which ‘Five Eyes’ coun- tries still need to collect and assess against: intellectual property theft by an ‘insider’ and the potential for theft from some BSL 3 to 4 labs in fragile or vulnerable states.

4 P. F. WALSH

Given the exponential rise in synthetic biology, biotechnology research and commercialisation both in the public and private sector – state and non-state sponsored theft of intellectual property will likely increase. Such theft will be linked in many instances to broader cyber security and information security threats that are currently impacting on ‘Five Eyes’ economies. Again, the IC’s ability to manage the rising complexity in the broader cyber threat space remains a challenge. It is likely then that ICs will continue to confront expertise and knowledge gaps in how the bio-economy is being attacked and IP stolen by cyber-threat actors.15

The second area of concern (theft of controlled biological substances) in fragile or vulnerable states, particularly those in the Middle East and Africa (e.g. Iraq, Syria, Pakistan) is also another area where greater focus by ‘Five Eyes’ ICs is warranted. Such locations intersect hotspots for jihadist inspired instability. It is possible that bio-safety lapses in research facilities near unstable locations or radicalised individuals working within biological institutions could steal bio-agents for terrorist attacks. Legitimate biological research facilities in vulnerable states require ongoing multi-lateral global security efforts to promote bio-safety. 'Five Eyes' defence and foreign ministries have funded bio-safety initiatives in vulnerable states in the past, but there is scope for a better coordinated approach to bilateral and multilateral programs into the future.16

Dual use research and synthetic biology Dual use research is defined here as research of dangerous biological agents that might be weaponised, and the publication of that research, which theoretically could be disseminated to bio- criminals or terrorists for their own nefarious objectives.17 There are a growing number of perspec- tives of whether criminals and terrorists will exploit biotechnology and synthetic biology research developed for legitimate purposes (e.g. health care, energy and food supply) for harm or profit.18 The debates are complex and care should be exercised in not over-simplifying them, however it is possible to discern two main intellectual strands from them. These are: technological (determinism) and socio-technological perspectives. The technological determinists argue the upsurge in biotech- nological advancements will make the access, use and exploitation of relevant knowledge and skills easier and cheaper for those with malevolent intentions.19 Some of the consequences of the industrialisation of biology adds weight to their arguments about easier access and use of biotech- nology. For example, the entire human genome sequenced by 2013 took a team of scientists 13 years and 500 USD million to identify 20,500 genes. Today, the human genome can be sequenced in a day using bench top equipment costing around 1000 USD. 20

In contrast, the socio-technologists while not discounting that criminals and terrorists may exploit advances in synthetic biology and technology – argue that access to knowledge and skill is not the same as being able to adeptly exploit these in order to produce a bio-weapon. Accessing, develop- ing, manipulating or exploiting knowledge and skills still requires significant training – often in more than one of the biological sciences (e.g. microbiology, molecular biology, genetics, and medicine). Training requires not just being able to read and replicate the latest experiments but is also dependent on applying skills intuitively in a social and collaborative sense frequently working with a team of scientists. In summary, the ability of a threat actor to weaponise any dual use and synthetic biology is dependent also on the inter-play of other social, economic and psychological variables.21

Both intellectual perspectives are not sterile academic debates. They matter because they inform how policy makers, scientists and the intelligence community conceptualise how dual use research and synthetic biology might be exploited by threat actors.

Shortly, the focus will turn to a brief summary of examples of bio-threats that may arise with the exploitation of dual use research and synthetic biology. First however, in order to understand how bio- threats may manifest, it is useful to distinguish between two broad threat trajectories for dual use research and synthetic biology. The first (‘insiders’) refers to skilled scientists, researchers and techni- cians, who use knowledge and skills to create dangerous bio-agents under the veil of legitimate research. The second (‘outsiders’) refers to the exploitation of legitimate advances in biology, synthetic biology and biotechnology for dangerous and criminal ends. In the second case, it could be one or

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 5

more of the recent ‘gain of function’ (GOF) experiments, where genetic material has beenmanipulated to encourage the development of dangerous pathogens thought to be rare, absent or dormant in the general population (e.g. small pox, reconstruction of 1918 influenza virus) – or experiments that make biological agents more virulent (e.g. mouse pox, horse pox, H5N1 avian influenza transmissible between human surrogates such as ferrets).22 Such experiments are often promoted as benefiting medicine by identifying vaccines or better ones against hard to treat viruses and bacteria. The November 2018 announcement by Chinese scientist He Jiankui that he had allegedly created the word’s first genetically edited babies that could be resistant to HIV is another recent example of many scientific, ethical and security concerns raised about both GOF and gene editing experiments.23

Given both the insider and outsider threat trajectories, the critical question remains what types of specific bio-threats are evolving? There is no satisfactory answer to this question, and debates continue amongst scholars, scientists and to some extent within the ICs about where bio-threats are likely to emerge within dual use research and synthetic biology. I argue in this article and elsewhere that assessing bio-threats and risks will rely on a more strategic and comprehensive assembling of scientific evidence on how developments in biotechnology and synthetic capabilities could be exploited by threat actors. Additionally, identifying threats and risks will also rely on ICs gaining a greater understanding of the intentions of particular actors to select capabilities as weapons or for profit over other more conventional sources. Assessing intention and capability to misuse dual use research and synthetic biology remains difficult because the science is moving rapidly – which in turn makes it difficult to get a ‘fix’ on where vulnerabilities for malevolent exploitation are located. Such difficulties are also a product of some of the ongoing capability issues across ‘Five Eyes’ countries in adapting to technologically enabled threats more broadly (e.g. cyber).

Leaving aside the ongoing difficulties in assessing emerging bio-threats and risks, I summarise here three threat cluster areas where ‘Five Eyes’ countries might consider developing better knowledge of bio-threats and risks. These are: bio-unabombers, identify theft and bio-piracy. As noted earlier, biotech- nology is big business particularly in the United States and other ‘Five Eyes’ countries.24 Given the massive acceleration in biotechnology and synthetic biological sciences – probability alone suggests that there will be more individuals (some mentally unstable) with a range of grievances (e.g. personal, psychological, political and religious) working in the biological sciences and some may escalate these to acts of violence. Disgruntled insiders (scientists), who can make a synthetic organism and sidestep theft of natural organisms under lock and key in highly regulated high containment labs are uniquely placed under the disguise of a bigger legitimate scientific project to become bio-unabombers. As discussed earlier, the alleged involvement of scientist Bruce Ivins in the Amerithrax case is illustrative here.25 Secondly, ‘identify theft’ – long an enabler of crime and terrorism in other contexts is also likely to be a developing concern. The increase in DNA holdings in various government departments and the private sector provide greater opportunities to steal or manipulate DNA. For example, it is possible that individuals could assume someone’s identity by stealing their DNA, or leaving someone else’s blood and saliva at a crime scene by genetic cloning to frustrate national security (terrorist) and law enforcement investigations.26 Thirdly, bio-piracy could become a greater bio-threat and risk in ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Recent developments in drugs, vaccines andmedicines can bemanipulated. Moreover, in the last few years the development of gene editing techniques like CRISPR, Finger Nuclease and Talen could be exploited criminally.27 Though currently there is an increasing ‘hype’ over the threat significance of CRISPR–further fueled by a national assessment by the US IC during the Obama Administration, which declared that it could be a national security threat.28 But it remains difficult to know what if any threat actors, for example jihadists, ultra-nationalists, anarchists, bio-hackers, envir- onmentally motivated individuals will exploit gene editing techniques like CRISPR.

Capability gaps

As noted earlier, there remain both gaps in scientific evidence and intelligence on what may constitute emerging bio-threats and risks, particularly those arising from dual use research and

6 P. F. WALSH

synthetic biology. The acceleration of scientific discovery in biotechnology and synthetic biology make assessing threats and risks in any comprehensive way difficult and this is unlikely to change in the future. However, it is possible that some threats and risks might be ‘knowable’ – at least sufficiently to provide decision-makers with warning. However, this will rely on each ‘Five Eyes’ country’s ability to reflect on current capabilities to assess bio-threats and risks in order to identify capability gaps. With the above outline on potential bio-threat and risk trajectories in mind, this section explores what are the principle capability gaps across the ‘Five Eyes’ countries. The final section (outlook) will assess how, or indeed whether the gaps identified can be closed in the near future.

Before describing the key capability gaps within and across ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities, it is useful to clarify first how I will be using the term ‘capability.’ Based on previous research on intelligence reform issues, I argue that capability is the sum of two inter-related factors. The first I refer to as core intelligence processes and the second key enabling activities. Both factors are critical to effective intelligence capabilities at the agency and community levels.29 In simple terms, core intelligence processes include the key stages in the production process of intelligence products that hopefully will influence and support decision-maker’s policy deliberations. These stages are: tasking and coordination, collection, analysis, production and evaluation. The core intelligence processes can be thought of as the functional aspects of intelligence production. In contrast, the key enabling activities provide the structural foundation under which the core intelligence processes can operate effectively. Intelligence product is not developed in a vacuum and it is the agency and community key enabling activities (governance, ICT, human resources, legislation and research) that support the ‘intelligence production line.’30 In this section, I argue that health intelligence capability gaps include a range of issues across core intelligence processes and key enabling activities. In the remaining space, I will summarise some of the key capability gaps in both the core intelligence processes and key enabling activities.

Core intelligence processes

There are capability gap issues in three core intelligence processes: tasking and coordination, collection and analysis. The gaps in each area impact upon one another and as will be demonstrated shortly also influence how capability gaps arise in the key enabling activities. Tasking and coordina- tion include a range of activities by decision-makers and internally within ICs about how intelligence assets particularly collection and analytical resources are to be applied against various threats and risks. Given intelligence is a decision-maker’s support tool, priorities about the tasking and coordina- tion of intelligence resources are formally determined at heads of government and cabinet level in ‘Five Eyes’ countries. The identification of other collection and assessment priorities not currently tasked by senior cabinet ministers obviously are also made by ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities on a regular basis. However, some recent (albeit tentative) research on tasking and coordination against emerging bio-threats and risks suggest that both decision-makers and the intelligence communities themselves remain relatively disengaged from these threats.31 This is not to suggest some bio-threat and risk issues are not getting tasking and coordination attention both by govern- ments and as part of the routine internal mechanisms of ‘Five Eyes’ communities. There still seems to be some interest in state sponsored WMD (as it relates to bio) and bioterrorism, however this interest is limited compared to earlier periods such as Amerithrax and the faulty WMD assessments that preluded the coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003. There are any number of comparatively more ‘urgent’ threats and risks vying for the attention of ‘Five Eyes’ leaders such as conventional terrorism, cyber, the resurgence of Russia, the rise of China and North Korea’s nuclear proliferation. In comparison, emerging bio-threats and risks are akin to cyber threats – they are deeply technical, which com- pounds the difficulty by IC and decision-makers understanding them. Many are also currently assessed (rightly or wrongly) as low probability/high impact threats, which influences the amount of tasking such issues receive by both political decision-makers and from within the ‘Five Eyes’

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 7

intelligence machinery. Low levels of tasking have a knock on effect in the other two stages of the core intelligence processes: collection and analysis.

From the perspective of collection, the first capability issue is that low or ad hoc levels of tasking impact on ‘Five Eyes’ countries’ ability to develop better risk and threat methodologies that would allow more accurate assessment of emerging bio-threats and risks. Poor ability to assess bio-threats and risks circuitously results in even lower and ad hoc levels of tasking and therefore collection against these issues by both decision-makers and within ICs. This latter point also raises a broader question of whether current collection capabilities are suited ideally for gaining better calibration against emerging bio-threats and risks. As noted earlier, emerging bio-threats and risks may well arise from dual use research and synthetic biology, but given these areas are predominantly focused on legitimate research and commercial development, will traditional and more covert IC collection platforms (e.g. SIGINT, HUMINT and Geo-spatial intelligence) be best placed to ‘discover’ the illicit weaponisation of biology in these sectors? The answer to this question is not clear. Clearly threat and risk context will be important. Much will depend on the nature of the bio-threat and risk. Is it local, national or transnational and is it at the planning, operational or attack stage? Given the emerging nature of some bio-threats and risks, traditional collection platforms may be less helpful (at least initially) compared to other open source intelligence such as scientific peer reviewed sources, social media, epidemiology and microbial forensics in improving assessments of such threats and risks.32

However, current research suggests that while progress has been made in ‘Five Eyes’ countries to link into and learn from these open sources, a more systematic and strategic approach needs to be adopted to accessing bio-threat and risk related open source intelligence.33 Additionally, capability improvements are needed in many open source intelligence areas derived from the scientific community such as microbial forensics. Collection capabilities in the bio-threat and risk context are also limited by other issues impacting on broader collection efforts across all ‘Five Eyes’ com- munities. Of particular importance is the post Snowden impact of threat actors ‘going dark’ due to them becoming aware of how to reduce their exposure to traditional IC collection platforms. The increased encryption of communications via Apps and the use of the dark web present ongoing collection capability challenges – not just in the bio-threat and risk area but across the entire security environment.34

The third core intelligence process area where there are capability gaps is analysis. Similar to the collection capability issues discussed some of the gaps in analysis on bio-threats and risks are not unique to assessing these issues. They are symptomatic of broader concerns and debates across ‘Five Eyes’ countries about how one improves analytical capabilities.35

The way ICs build analytical capability is influenced by external and internal factors. As noted earlier in the discussion on tasking and coordination if political leaders do not demonstrate an appetite for reading intelligence assessments on specialised or less ‘bread and butter’ issues then the capability investment in these areas becomes depleted. While the exact headcount of analysts working on bio-threat and risk issues across all ‘Five Eyes’ countries is unclear, discussions with people with more intimate knowledge of the ICs work flows suggest that numbers within agencies can be counted with the fingers on one or two hands.36 It seems that many analysts working on bio- threat and risk issues are likely working on other accounts, including the broader suite of WMD issues (e.g. chemical and nuclear). There are pockets of excellence and specialisation for example, in the United States the FBI WMD Directorate Outreach program and in recent years within the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). However, analytical expertise in emerging bio-threats and risks generally remains shallow and fragmented within and across agencies. In summary, if decision-makers are not calling for product on bio-threats and risks, then the internal leadership within ICs are less compelled to increase the depth and breadth of analytical expertise in these areas. This in turn further reduces both the skills and repository of knowledge in bio-threat and risk areas. This phenomenon of intelligence leaders reducing the depth and breadth of analytical coverage in some areas has played out in different agencies across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. For example, CIA agency leaders have in recent years focused on getting more analysts to work flexibly across a range of areas to meet the ever

8 P. F. WALSH

increasing demand of current intelligence rather than necessarily cultivate subject matter expertise.37 Flexibility has some merits, though it can prevent a deeper more sustained investment in analysts with expertise in one specialised area, who arguably can write better current and strategic products based on a deeper knowledge of the subject matter.38

Leadership decisions about where to invest in building analytical capability leads us to the main key enabling activity related capability issue – governance. As discussed earlier, governance is only one of five key enabling activities (governance, ICT, human resources, legislation and research). In recent research, I found that there were also capability gaps in the other four key enabling activities, including in human resources and legislation.39 However, given space limitations the focus here is on governance issues as they are themost consequential for understanding capability gaps arising in other key enabling activity areas. For example, poor governance can lead to poor human resource planning as well as inadequate or not fit for purpose legislation in which to manage more effectively bio-threats and risks.

Governance

Intelligence governance is a term I have used in research on IC capability issues since 2011. From research resulting in the book Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, I developed an effective intelligence framework. The framework showed that sound and adaptable IC capability relied on how well both core intelligence processes and key enabling activities worked together to produce intelligence out- comes decision-makers needed.40 In this research governance was defined as ‘attributes and rules pertaining to strong sustainable leadership, doctrine design, evaluation, and effective coordination, cooperation and integration of intelligence processes.’41 In simple terms, governance is about effective leadership and it has an external dimension (‘the political leadership’) and an internal one (heads of IC agencies and communities). It’s logical that sound governance (in both its external and internal dimensions) should result in better intelligence capabilities. It is also follows that effective capabilities allow the creation of a working environment where higher standard products inform decision-making.

Research into the governance capability issues as they relate to bio-threats and risks is ongoing so the observations here are generalised, incomplete and require further validation across each ‘Five Eyes’ country. However, based on discussions with some IC personnel and secondary literature there is evidence that there are both external and internal governance capability issues. These have a knock-on effect on how bio-threats and risks are coordinated and prioritised across each ‘Five Eyes’ country. At this stage, the evidence is strongest in the US IC, where both public health stakeholders and current and former members of IC and the broader security community have been calling in recent years for better leadership both at the political and IC agency level over managing bio-threats and risks. The United States Blue Ribbon Panel Report of 2015 is one example of concerns raised about the lack of consistent leadership of broader health security issues including the role of the IC.42 In the United States, several executive policy declarations on health security and bioterrorism have been produced by successive administrations from George W Bush to the current Trump administrations. However, what seems to bemissing is a clear articulation of how any national health security strategy will be operationalised generally and how political and IC leadership will coordinate effectively the limited resources to collect and assess against bio-threats and risks. Additionally, and less clear, is how do ICs reach out more explicitly and strategically to important stakeholders (e.g. scientists, public health specialists, clinicians) in order to improve the quality of collection and analytical efforts? In the final section below, the paper revisits the capability gaps discussed here to determine if they can be closed. It also provides an assessment of where ‘Five Eyes’ ICs capabilities might be on managing bio-threats and risks in five years’ time.

Outlook

Turning first to improving tasking and coordination processes, in the next five years this will continue to be a difficult ad hoc process across ‘Five Eyes’ countries. Care needs to be exercised in generalising

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 9

across each ‘Five Eyes’ country. Further detailed research is also required to assess how each ‘Five Eyes’ IC arranges tasking and coordination of bio-threats and risks. However, as noted earlier, research to date suggest in all five countries while cross IC and broader government coordination has improved, decisionmakers and therefore the IC leadership do not appear to routinely task on emerging bio-threat and risk issues. The recent Trump Administrations’ national biodefense strategy and the UK’s Biological Security Strategy both include rhetoric about the need of greater coordination of IC, public health and other stakeholders.43 However in each case, there is little detail about how these strategic documents will be operationalised. In the UK case, at the time of writing (August 2019) the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has commenced an inquiry into the how the strategy is addressing biosecurity and human health. The launch of the inquiry does suggest that further work is required to fully implement it across the UK government. In particular, the US and UK policy documents, do not identify a leadership position within the ICs, who could be responsible for ensuring there is regular tasking and effective coordination of efforts in the collection and assessment of bio-threats and risks. As discussed earlier, the core intelligence process of tasking and coordination is closely linked to the key enabling activity of governance. Governance is crucially about effective political and internal leadership of ICs. Hence tasking and coordination on bio-threats and risks is intricately linked to whether improvements can be made in governance over the next five years.

On the other two core intelligence processes (collection and analysis) and leaving aside the stultifying effect of a relatively low engagement in bio-threats and risks by the political leadership of ‘Five Eyes’ countries–there are opportunities to build on existing collection platforms in ways that would improve information feeds on these issues. It may not be that ICs need to build additional expensive collection platforms just for bio-threats and risks. In some cases, using existing covert and open source intelligence that are already being applied against comparatively more conventional threats and risks (terrorism and organised crime) will likely provide opportunities to collect inciden- tally against bio-threats and risks.

Governance

Whether tasking and coordination can be improved depends first on whether a renewed interest in bio-threats and risks can be garnered from the political leadership in ‘Five Eyes’ countries in the absence of an actual bio-attack. In the United States, the Trump Administration has developed an adversarial and mistrusting attitude to the US IC – making it difficult for IC leaders to discern which intelligence priorities the President is interested on a day to day basis let alone emerging bio-threat and risk issues. Additionally, effective tasking and coordination is further compounded by President Trump’s focus mainly on border security and political matters including the US Congress impeach- ment inquiry and earlier the Mueller special investigation into whether he and members of his campaign team colluded with Russia in ways that influenced the outcome of the 2016 presidential election. Combined these factors demonstrate a lack of a sustained political commitment and interest in improving tasking and coordination, collection and assessments on emerging bio- threats and risks.

Similarly in the UK, at the time of writing the government continues to be pre-occupied with securing a Brexit deal from the EU, and it remains to be seen how cabinet ministers will focus on implementing both the Biological Security Strategy and how the strategy might improve the way the UK IC tasks, coordinates, collects and assesses emerging bio-threats and risks. Australia, Canada and New Zealand all have the necessary IC and public health bureaucratic institutions in place to theoretically respond to emerging bio-threats and risks. However, there is no evidence that these governments have developed national health security strategic plans, which clearly articulate how their ICs will improve their understanding of emerging bio-threats; or better integrate their resources with important stakeholders such as scientists and the public health sector.

10 P. F. WALSH

At the time of writing, there are major reform changes underway in the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) – including the establishment in 2018 of a new Office of National Intelligence to better coordinate the Community. Other reforms include the establishment of a capability fund to help the AIC identify where future investment needs to take place.44 Though given the amount of other work ONI has to address across the Australian intelligence enterprise, it is unlikely the current reform agenda in the near term will produce a national health security strategic plan that includes reflection on how the AIC can play a role in understanding emerging bio-threats and risks.

Further, given the short electoral cycles in ‘Five Eyes’ countries and the perceived low probability and high impact nature of bio-threats and risks by many policy makers – it seems unlikely political leaders of each ‘Five Eyes’ country will address in any significant way current governance issues relating to emerging bio-threats and risks. But the rapidly changing nature of all threats and risks particularly those technologically enabled ones such as cyber, underscore the need for stronger governance that can identify and remedy IC capability gaps in understanding bio-threats and risks. As a start, better governance at the political level could be facilitated by formalised high-level coordination. For example, the establishment of a Health Security Coordination Council led pre- ferably by head of government (or the very least a senior cabinet minister) would provide a more coherent ‘whole of government’ approach to tasking and coordination of bio-threats and risks as well as identifying other capability gaps discussed in the paper. Current US and UK strategic plans outlined earlier seem to place senior bureaucrats largely in charge of national level biosecurity, biodefense committees. A senior cabinet minister (from either a health or security portfolio) is a more appropriate choice to chair such a council. The council should also contain in addition to heads of IC, other senior stakeholders including public and animal health specialists, and scientific advisors. A broad and diverse council membership is critical to ensure national health security strategies articulate a whole of government (including ICs) approach. The next ideal step in improving governance arrangements would be for each stakeholder to develop operational plans to implement government tasking priorities as well as ensuring effective coordination of resources.

For each ‘Five Eyes’ country a senior sub-cabinet level national health security intelligence officer should also be established. This appointee would have authority to identify and implement tasking and coordination, collection and analytical priorities across the entire IC. The national health security intelligence officer would liaise with other important stakeholders that are part of the health security coordination council; including public/animal health, scientists and their counter parts in other ‘Five Eyes’ countries to gain a national and international understanding of emerging bio-threats and risk as well as identifying IC capability gaps.

Closing collection capability gaps

A national health security intelligence officer sitting across the entire IC enterprise should be able to implement coherent and coordinated national collection plans for bio-threats and risks that help both collection and assessment agencies identify what role they can play in overall collection efforts. A national health security intelligence officer can consider for example, how traditional collection platforms (SIGINT, HUMINT, Geospatial Intelligence) are best applied to retrieve information about both current and emerging bio-threats. Threat and risk evolution will also be an important con- sideration in what collection capabilities need to be deployed. In other words, at what develop- mental stage is the threat? Can it be prevented, disrupted or only treated after the event? It is quite possible as noted earlier, that traditional collection platforms might be initially applied against more ‘here and now’ threats such as terrorism or organised crime – yet may also reveal in some circumstances an interest by these threat actors or their associates in bio-threats and risks. This in turn would allow a more focused application of other specialised, scientific collection tools such as microbial forensics.

Arguably though with many bio-threats and risks, there are likely to be an even larger volume of relevant information accessible to the IC from non-security stakeholders on the prevention,

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 11

disruption and treatment of bio-threats and risks. While ‘Five Eyes’ ICs have in the past reached out to some stakeholders, a more strategic and explicit approach to building trusted external expert networks would improve collection efforts, particularly in areas such as dual use research of concern and synthetic biology. The potential lists of relevant stakeholders is almost endless. They can be found at the multi-lateral, bilateral, national, regional and local levels.45 At a multi-lateral level, historically important security measures such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will continue to provide ICs with information, albeit not always reliable about states’ adherence to the Convention. Other recent multilateral biosafety and biosecurity initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda established by the Obama Administration could provide opportunities for ‘Five Eyes’ ICs to increase awareness of potential bio-threats and risks in addition of course to their public health capacity-building effects.46

In each ‘Five Eyes’ country, albeit some with more capacity (e.g. US and UK) defence departments or their allied defence research divisions there are biodefence research capabilities which the ICs could tap into more regularly. In the case of the United States, other government research bodies such as the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) also sponsor biodefense research that is directly relevant to how ICs may participate in the future in the identification and prevention of weaponised dual use research and synthetic biology. For example, in July 2017, IARPA commissioned the Project Felix program to fund research that can detect signals of bio-engineering including types of changes, location and possibly in the future where changes were made. Such work could be used in cases where suspicious circumstances suggest the malicious exploitation of bio- engineered material is occurring.47 Leaving aside what the defence, security and intelligence research groups offer the IC in this area, it’s clear that the medical community (epidemiology and public health) are also naturally indispensable partners for the ICs. Medical, public health and epidemiological knowledge provides the ICs with a common understanding of how to identify natural and intentional disease outbreaks and in some cases can inform attribution about what threat actors may be responsible. Finally, first responders have critical knowledge about the physical environment(s), where an attack occurs as well as forensic evidence, which can help inform tactical and operational intelligence collection and analysis.

Analysis

In any intelligence agency, an effective operation of all core intelligence processes requires an almost symbiotic relationship between collection and analysis. Uncoordinated and insufficient strategic and operational collection planning will reduce the ability of analysts to improve the reliability and validity of their products. There are no ‘off the shelf’ solutions to current analytical capability gaps discussed earlier. Evaluating whether the analytical workforce is ‘fit for purpose’ as far as assessing bio-threats and risks is really a sub-set of a bigger issue about whether ‘Five Eyes’ ICs have the right mix of subject matter expert vs generalist analysts – against a whole range of current and emerging threats. Significant investment has gone into training and education of analysts across ‘Five Eyes’ countries in the military, national security and to lesser degree the law enforcement community.48

But debates continue within ICs and amongst teachers and scholars what skills, knowledge and competencies entry level analysts need to deal with the fast paced changes in the security environ- ment. Less consideration is currently given to how to deploy subject matter experts in specialised areas such as bio-threats and risks. Do ‘Five Eyes’ ICs try to develop specialised expertise in this subject internally or should this work be out-sourced to trusted, security cleared outsiders who might be scientists?

I argue that it shouldn’t be an either/or decision given that all ‘Five Eyes’ ICs need to maintain corporate repositories of knowledge in specialised areas – yet at the same time it would be impossible for those few individuals responsible for interpreting bio-threats and risks across the entire IC to be experts in all bio-threat matters. Given resources are limited, another aspect of workforce analytical training of staff on bio-threat and risk issues is that heads of agencies and ICs

12 P. F. WALSH

need to also think carefully about what role subject matter experts may play. Logically some should be deployed in prevention roles that can provide strategic early warning of potential bio- threat and risk trajectories. Others would need to focus on disruption of evolving bio-threats and risk in operational settings; whilst others would be useful in assessing the treatment of threats and risks.

Further evidence is required, but IC leaders currently do not appear to be planning in any systematic way the future bio-threat and risk analytical workforce. As part of work force planning, it is unclear whether IC leaders are considering in any strategic way what analytical capability gaps are best met by external stakeholders (scientists, clinicians, and public health officials)–and how to integrate more seamlessly this knowledge into the closed working environment within ICs. Finally, with respect to sub-optimal analytical capabilities, further reflection by IC leaders needs to be given on how potentially a diverse and voluminous amount of information collected across health security sector (clinicians, epidemiologists, scientists, military, national security, law enforcement, animal and agricultural health) can best be interrogated rapidly by analysts. Again the ability to quickly makes sense of large data sets and intelligence is obviously a problem writ large for ICs not just an issue to be resolved in the bio-threat and risk context.

In summary, this article argues it is unlikely that each ‘Five Eyes’ country will improve dramatically their IC capabilities for managing bio-threats and risks in the next five years (2020–25). Barring a catastrophic bio-attack by a terrorist group or other health security crisis resulting in high mortality rates, bio-threats and risks will continue to be seen as low probability-high impact threats for political decision-makers. This translates within the ICs as at best a watching brief of bio-threats and risks and at worse them being largely ignored. At this time, bio-threats and risks only get ad-hoc attention by the ‘Five Eyes’ ICs. For example, ICs may focus periodically on them as part of broader WMD threat assessments ahead of hosting a major international event.

In addition to low levels of political tasking and coordination, systematic and proactive approaches to managing bio-threats and risks at the IC level are not likely without stronger IC governance by its leaders. This includes a national health security intelligence officer, who can champion the threat and risk area and help agencies close capability gaps. In some ‘Five Eyes’ countries there has been some capability improvements since 9/11, however, based on available evidence, I assess no substantial move towards a greater strategic approach to health security intelligence across ‘the Five Eyes’ countries during the next five years. There is no available public knowledge that there are any impending substantive bio-threats and risks, particularly emanating from dual use research and synthetic biology. Nonetheless the rise in the cyber threat trajectory and the struggle by ICs to understand it provides a good lesson that building capability takes time. It is now time to invest in capability to better manage potential and emerging bio-threats and risks. Hopefully the COVID-19 pandemic might provide a catalyst to build the kinds of capabilities in ICs discussed throughout the article.

Notes

1. Aldis, “Health Security as a Public Health Concept,” 370. 2. Bernard, “Health and National Security,” 157. 3. Walsh, Intelligence Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. 4. The Human Security Centre, The Human Security Centre. 5. See for example, Elbe, “Pandemic Security,” 163–173. 6. Heymann, “Global Health Security: the Wider Lessons from the West WHO.” “Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa –

The First Nine Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections,” 1481–1495; “Global Health Security: the Wider Lessons from the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic,” 1884–1901; Marston, “Ebola Response Impact on Public Health Programs, West Africa 2014–2017”; WHO, “Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa – The First Nine Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections,” 1481–1495.

7. Soucheray, “With New Cases, Katwa Remains Epicenter of Ebola Outbreak.” 8. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 29–32.

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 13

9. Alibek, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World; Balmer, Britain and Biological Warfare. Expert Advice and Science Policy; Christopher, et al., “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective,” 412–417; Geissler, & Ellis van Courtland Moon, (Eds.). Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945; Koblentz, Living Weapons; and Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism.

10. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 30–31. 11. Broad and Shane, “Scientist’s Analysis Disputes FBI Closing of Anthrax Case.” 12. In BSL-3 to 4 rated labs, scientists work on pathogens that can cause serious or potentially lethal disease.

Generally, the most lethal agents, where there is no vaccine or an unknown risk of transmission are worked on in BSL-4 labs.

13. Lizotte, “Research Halted at USAMRID Over Biosecurity Issues,” CDC, Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax; CDC, 90 Day Internal Review of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins; Dennis Brady and Lena Sun, ‘FDA Found More than Smallpox Vials in Storage Room.’ Washington Post. 16 July 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national/health-science/fda-found-more-than-smallpox-vials-in-storage-room/2014/07/16/850d4b12-0d22- 11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.html?utm_term=.978241b9d1f8.

14. Walsh, “Managing Intelligence and Responding to Emerging Threats,” 837–57; Walsh, “Managing Emerging Health Security Threats Since 9/11: The Role of Intelligence,” 341–67.

15. Koblentz and Mazanec, “Viral Warfare: The Security Implications of Cyber and Biological Weapons,” 418–34; and Murch, “Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy.”

16. For a brief discussion on some of the bilateral and multi-lateral biosafety programs that ‘Five Eyes’ countries have been active in see, Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 179–231.

17. Ibid., 179–231. 18. Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use and Security; Suk et al., “Dual Use Research and Technological Diffusion.

Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum,” 1–3; Gerstein, Bioterror in the 21st Century: Emerging Threats in a New Global Environment; National Academy of Sciences, Human Genome Editing. Science Ethics and Governance; Arnason, “Synthetic Biology between Self-Regulation and Public Discourse,” 246–56.

19. Chyba, “Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control,” 11–17; Carlson, “The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies,” 203–14; Petro and Carus, “Biological Threat Characterisation Research,” 295–308.

20. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 44. 21. Kathleen Vogel’s work on the non-technical aspects of bio-threats provide a good background to all the non-

technical variables that should be considered in assessing bio-threats and risks. See, Vogel, “Biodefense,” 227–55; “Intelligent Assessment: Putting Emerging Biotechnology Threats in Context,” 45–54; “Necessary Interventions. Expertise and Experiments in Bioweapons Intelligence Assessments,” 61–88; and, Phantom Menace or Looming Danger?.

22. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 41–51. 23. Kolata, “Chinese Scientist Claims to Use Crispr to Make First Edited Babies”. 24. In the US, easily over 2 million people are employed with over 73,000 businesses working across range of

biosciences (medicine, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, research). Similarly in Australia, around 48,000 Australians are employed in the biotechnology sector with the sector estimated to obtain a 4.4% annual growth reaching 8.67 billion AUD in revenues by 2021. See, Battelle. Battelle/Bio State Bioscience, Jobs, Investments and Innovation; Ausbiotech, Australia’s Biotechnology Organisation (website), 2018. https://www.ausbiotech.org/biotechnol ogy-industry/fast-facts.

25. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 51. 26. Ibid., 41. 27. Willingham, “A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?”; National Academy of Sciences. Human

Genome Editing. Science Ethics and Governance; Revill, “Could Gene Editing Tools Such as CRISPR be Used as a Biological Weapon.”

28. Willingham, “A Fresh Threat”; Clapper, Statement for the Record. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community.

29. A more detailed discussion of these factors and how they relate to theorising about effective intelligence frameworks can be found in Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 131–147; Walsh, “Building Better Intelligence Frameworks Through Effective Governance,” 123–42.

30. Ibid. 31. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 59–89. 32. Ibid., 89–121. 33. Ibid. 34. Walsh and “Rethinking “Five Eyes” Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden,” 345–68;

Chertoff, “A public policy perspective of the Dark Web,” 26–38; and Chen, Bioterrorism and Knowledge Mapping Dark Web Exploring and Data Mining the Dark Side of the Web, 335–67.

35. Walsh, & Ratcliffe, “Strategic Criminal Intelligence Education: A Collaborative Approach,” 152–66. Walsh, “Teaching intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for curriculum design,”

14 P. F. WALSH

1005–1021; Harrison, & Et al., “Tradecraft to Standards – Moving Criminal Intelligence Practice to a Profession through the Development of Criminal Intelligence Training and Development Continuum,” 1–13.

36. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 127–128. 37. Gentry and Gordon, Strategic Warning Intelligence, 223. 38. Ibid., 218. 39. Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. 40. Walsh, Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis, 31–152. 41. Ibid., 149. 42. Blue Ribbon Study Panel, Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership

and Major Reform Needed to Optimise Efforts; Blue Ribbon Study Panel, Biodefense Indicators One Year Later. Events Outpacing Federal Efforts to Defend the Nation.

43. White House, National Biodefense Strategy; HMG. UK Biological Security Strategy. 44. For a discussion of the main aspects of the reform agenda currently underway in the AIC, see my ISA Paper:

“Transforming the Australian Intelligence Community: Mapping Change, Impact and Governance Challenges,” paper given at the 60th International Studies Association Conference, 27 August 2019.

45. For a detailed discussion of what non-security stakeholders can bring to the IC see: Walsh, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, 179–231.

46. Ibid., 192–3. 47. Ibid., 183. 48. Walsh, “Teaching intelligence in the twenty-first century,” 1005–21.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Patrick F. Walsh, PhD, is a former intelligence analyst, and has worked in Australia’s national security and law enforcement environments. He is an associate professor in Intelligence and Security Studies, Charles Sturt University, Australia. He is also a consultant to government agencies on intelligence reform and capability issues. His research grants and publications focus on a range of areas related to intelligence capability; including but not limited to: governance, leadership, intelligence and ethics, biosecurity and cyber. His last book, Intelligence, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), examined the challenges for ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence communities in understanding and managing emerging bio-threats and risks.

Bibliography

Aldis, W. “Health Security as A Public Health Concept: A Critical Analysis.” Health Policy and Planning 23, no. 6 (2008): 369–375. doi:10.1093/heapol/czn030.

Alibek, K. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World- Told from the inside by the Man Who Ran It. New York: Random House, 1999.

Arnason, G. “Synthetic Biology between Self-Regulation and Public Discourse: Ethical Issues and the Many Roles of the Ethicist.” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26, no. 2 (2017): 246–256. doi:10.1017/S0963180116000840.

Ausbiotech. 2018. Australia’s Biotechnology Organisation (Website). https://www.ausbiotech.org/biotechnology-industry /fast-facts.

Balmer, B. B., and B. Warfare. Expert Advice and Science Policy, 1930-65. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. Battelle. Battelle/Bio State Bioscience, Jobs, Investments and Innovation. Columbus, OH: Battelle, 2014. Bernard, K. “Health and National Security: A Contemporary Collision of Cultures.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense

Strategy, Practice, and Science 11, no. 2 (2013): 157–162. doi:10.1089/bsp.2013.8522. Blue Ribbon Study Panel. Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense. A National Blueprint for Biodefense: Leadership and Major

Reform Needed to Optimise Efforts. Washington, D.C: Hudson Institute for Policy Studies, 2015. Blue Ribbon Study Panel. Biodefense Indicators One Year Later. Events Outpacing Federal Efforts to Defend the Nation.

Arlington, VA.: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2016. Brady, D., and L. Sun. 2014. “FDA Found More than Smallpox Vials in Storage Room.” Washington Post, July 16. https://

www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/fda-found-more-than-smallpox-vials-in-storage-room/2014/07/ 16/850d4b12-0d22-11e4-8341-b8072b1e7348_story.html?utm_term=.978241b9d1f8.

Broad, W., and S. Shane. 2011. “Scientist’s Analysis Disputes FBI Closing of Anthrax Case.” The New York Times, October 9. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/science/10anthrax.html?_r=1&hp.

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 15

Carlson, R. “The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies.” Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 1, no. 3 (2004): 203–214. doi:10.1089/153871303769201851.

CDC. Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 2014. CDC. 90 Day Internal Review of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins. Atlanta, GA: CDC, 2015. Chen, H. Bioterrorism and Knowledge Mapping Dark Web Exploring and Data Mining the Dark Side of the Web. New York,

N.Y.: Springer, 2011. Chertoff, M. “A Public Policy Perspective of the Dark Web.” Journal of Cyber Policy 2, no. 1 (2017): 26–38. doi:10.1080/

23738871.2017.1298643. Christopher, G. W., T. J. Cieslak, and E. M. Eitzen Jr. “Biological Warfare: A Historical Perspective.” Journal of the American

Medical Association 278, no. 5 (1997): 412–417. doi:10.1001/jama.1997.03550050074036. Chyba, C. “Biotechnology and the Challenge to Arms Control.” Arms Control Today 36 (2016): 11–17. Clapper, J. Statement for the Record. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Armed Services

Committee, 2016. Washington,DC. Elbe, S. “Pandemic Security.” In The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, edited by J. Peter Burgess, 163–173.

Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010. Elbe, S. “Pandemic Security.” In The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies, edited by J. Peter Burgess, 163–173.

Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2010. Geissler, E., and J. E. van Courtland Moon, eds. Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the

Middle Ages to 1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Gentry, J., and J. Gordon. Strategic Warning Intelligence. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. Gerstein, D. Bioterror in the 21st Century: Emerging Threats in a New Global Environment. New York: Naval Institute Press, 2010. Harrison, M., P. F. Walsh, S. Lysons-Smith, D. Truong, C. Horan, and R. Jabbour. “Tradecraft to Standards– Moving

Criminal Intelligence Practice to a Profession through the Development of Criminal Intelligence Training and Development Continuum.” Policing (2018): 1–13.

Heymann, D. et al. Global Health Security: The Wider Lessons from the West WHO.” “Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa - the First Nine Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections. The New England Journal of Medicine 371 (2015): 1481–1495.

Heymann, D., L. Chen, K. Takemi, D. P. Fidler, J. W. Tappero, M. J. Thomas, T. A. Kenyon. “Global Health Security: the Wider Lessons from the West African Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic.” The Lancet, no. 9980 (2015): 1884–1901. doi:10.1016/ S0140-6736(15)60858-3

HMG. UK Biological Security Strategy. London: HMG, 2018. The Human Security Centre. The Human Security Centre: Human Security Report. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,

2005. Koblentz, G. Living Weapons. New York: Cornell University Press, 2009. Koblentz, G., and B. Mazanec. “Viral Warfare: The Security Implications of Cyber and Biological Weapons.” Comparative

Strategy 32, no. 5 (2013): 418–434. doi:10.1080/01495933.2013.821845. Kolata, G., S. Wee, P. Belluck. 2018. “Chinese Scientist Claims to Use Crispr to Make First Edited Babies.” The New York

Times, November 26. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/26/health/gene-editing-babies-china.html. Lizotte, S. 2019. “Research Halted at USAMRID over Biosecurity Issues.” Global Biodefense, August 5. https://globalbio

defense.com/2019/08/05/research-halted-at-usamriid-over-biosafety-issues/CDC, Report on the Potential Exposure to Anthrax.

Marston, B., E. Kainne Dokubo, A. van Steelandt, L. Martel, D. Williams, S. Hersey, A. Jambai, S. Keita, T. G. Nyenswah, J. Redd. “Ebola Response Impact on Public Health Programs, West Africa 2014-2017” Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal 28, no. Supplement (2017): 25–31.

Murch, R., W. So, W. Buchholz, S. Raman, J. Peccoud. “Emerging New Discipline to Help Safeguard the Bioeconomy.” Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology 6, no. 39 (2018): 1–6. doi:10.3389/fbioe.2018.00039.

National Academy of Sciences. Human Genome Editing. Science Ethics and Governance. Washington, D.C: National Academies Press, 2017.

Petro, J., and S. Carus. “Biological Threat Characterisation Research: A Critical Component of National Biodefense, Biosecurity, and Bioterrorism.” Biodefense Strategy, Practice and Science 3 (2005): 295–308.

Revill, J. 2017. “Could Gene Editing Tools Such as CRISPR Be Used as a Biological Weapon.” The Conversation, August 31. https://theconversation.com/could-gene-editing-tools-such-as-crispr-be-used-as-a-biological-weapon-82187?utm_ source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton.

Soucheray, S. 2019. “With New Cases, Katwa Remains Epicenter of Ebola Outbreak.” CIDRAP News, February 18. http:// www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-perspective/2019/02/new-cases-katwa-remains-epicenter-ebola-outbreak

Suk, J., A. Zmorzynska, I. Hunger, W. Biederbick, J. Sasse, H. Maidhof, and J. Semenza. “Dual Use Research and Technological Diffusion. Reconsidering the Bioterrorism Threat Spectrum.” PLOS Pathogens 7, no. 1 (2011): 1–3. doi:10.1371/journal.ppat.1001253.

Tucker, J., Ed. Innovation, Dual Use and Security. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012. Vogel, K. “Biodefense.” In Biosecurity Interventions, edited by A. Lakoff and S. Collier, 227–255. New York: Columbia

University, 2008.

16 P. F. WALSH

Vogel, K. “Intelligent Assessment: Putting Emerging Biotechnology Threats in Context.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 35, no. 1 (2013): 45–54.

Vogel, K. “Necessary Interventions. Expertise and Experiments in Bioweapons Intelligence Assessments.” Science, Technology and Innovation Studies 9, no. 2 (2013): 61–88.

Vogel, K. Phantom Menace or Looming Danger? Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013. Walsh, P. F. Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011. Walsh, P. F. “Managing Intelligence and Responding to Emerging Threats: The Case of Biosecurity.” In The Handbook of

Security, edited by M. Gill, 837–857. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Walsh, P. F. “Building Better Intelligence Frameworks Through Effective Governance.” International Journal of Intelligence

and Counterintelligence 28, no. 1 (2015): 123–142. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.924816. Walsh, P. F. “Managing Emerging Health Security Threats since 9/11: The Role of Intelligence.” International Journal of

Intelligence and Counterintelligence 29, no. 2 (2016): 341–367. doi:10.1080/08850607.2016.1121048. Walsh, P. F. “Teaching Intelligence in the Twenty-first Century: Towards an Evidence-based Approach for Curriculum

Design.” Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 7 (2017): 1005–1021. Walsh, P. F. Intelligence Biosecurity and Bioterrorism. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Walsh, P. F. 2019. “Transforming the Australian Intelligence Community: Mapping Change, Impact and Governance

Challenges.” Paper given at the 60th International Studies Association Conference, August 27. Toronto, Canada. Walsh, P. F., and S. Miller. “Rethinking ‘Five Eyes’ Security Intelligence Collection Policies and Practice Post Snowden.”

Intelligence and National Security 31, no. 3 (2016): 345–368. doi:10.1080/02684527.2014.998436. Walsh, P. F., and J. Ratcliffe. “Strategic Criminal Intelligence Education: A Collaborative Approach.” IALEIA Journal 16

(2005): 152–166. White House. National Biodefense Strategy. Washington DC: White House, 2018. WHO. “Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa - the First Nine Months of the Epidemic and Forward Projections.” The New

England Journal of Medicine 371 (2015): 1481–1495. Willingham, D. “A Fresh Threat: Will CAS9 Lead to CRISPR Bioweapons?” Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense

Law 9, no. 1 (2018). doi:10.1515/jbbbl-2018-0010.

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 17