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ON

ASIAN AMERICAN

CULTURAL

POLITICS

I M M I G R A N T  
A C T S

L I S A L O W E

D U K E

U N I V E R S I T Y

P R E S S

Durham and London 1996



## Immigration, Citizenship,

### Racialization: Asian

### American Critique

#### Scene 2

[...]

VI: “Event: Announcement by the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial Fund of winning design of a memorial to be placed on the Mall to honor Vietnam Veterans. . . .”

VOICE: The material used for constructing this memorial is polished black granite imported from India. Approximately 150 panels were cut into three-inch thick blocks, the shortest panel being eight inches tall, the highest ten and a half feet, the largest panel weighing three thousand pounds.

The memorial was conceived in 1981 and eventually built over the next two years, 1982 to ’84. In comparison, the Lincoln Memorial to your right took sixty years to complete. The landscape was leveled, and the apex of the wall reaches a depth of almost eleven feet. Notice the mementos left by those who visit: medals, pictures, flowers, helmets, photos of teenage boys frozen in youth, of babies never seen by their fathers.

This represents an entire war a nation meant to forget.

#### Scene 7

[...]

MAYA: It’s been mentioned—many times, in fact—the fact that me as the designer of a memorial to an Asian war was upsetting. I’m a young woman, a student. And I’m Chinese American. We’re all lumped together, us “gooks.”

—Jeannie Barroga, “Walls”

Nothing that has ever happened should be regarded as lost for history.

—Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History”

Citizens inhabit the political space of the nation, a space that is, at once, juridically legislated, territorially situated, and culturally embodied. Although the law is perhaps the discourse that most literally governs citizenship, U.S. national culture—the collectively forged images, histories, and narratives that place, displace, and replace individuals in relation to the national polity—powerfully shapes who the citizenry is, where they dwell, what they remember, and what they forget. Insofar as the legal definition and political concept of the citizen enfranchises the subject who inhabits the national public sphere, the concept of the abstract citizen—each formally equivalent, one to the other—is defined by the negation of the material conditions of work and the inequalities of the property system. In the United States, not only class but also the historically sedimented particularities of race, national origin, locality, and embodiment remain largely invisible within the political sphere. In this sense, the legal and political forms of the nation have required a national culture in the integration of the differentiated people and social spaces that make up “America,” a national culture, broadly cast yet singularly engaging, that can inspire diverse individuals to identify with the national project.

It is through the terrain of national culture that the individual subject is politically formed as the American citizen: a terrain introduced by the Statue of Liberty, discovered by the immigrant, dreamed in a common language, and defended in battle by the independent, self-made man. The heroic quest, the triumph over weakness, the promises of salvation, prosperity, and progress: this is the American feeling, the style of life, the ethos and spirit of being. It is in passing by way of this terrain of culture that the subject is immersed in the repertoire of American memories, events, and narratives and comes to articulate itself in the domain of language, social hierarchy, law, and ultimately, political representation. In being represented as citizen within the political sphere, however, the subject is “split off” from the unrepresentable histories of situated embodiment that contradict the abstract form of citizenship. Culture is the medium of the *present*—the imagined equivalences and identifications through which the individual invents lived relationship with the national collective—but it is simultaneously the site that mediates the *past*, through which history is grasped as difference, as fragments, shocks, and flashes of dis-

junction. It is through culture that the subject becomes, acts, and speaks itself as “American.” It is likewise in culture that individuals and collectivities struggle and remember and, in that difficult remembering, imagine and practice both subject and community differently.

In a manner unprecedented in the twentieth century, the Vietnam War (1959–1975) shook the stability and coherence of America’s understanding of itself. An “unpopular” war contested by social movements, the press, and the citizenry, a disabling war from which the United States could not emerge “victorious”—there is perhaps no single event in this century that has had such power to disunify the American public, disrupting traditional unities of “community,” “nation,” and “culture.”<sup>1</sup> It radically altered these unities not only because of the traumas of death, loss, and breakdown that the Vietnam War brought and has come to symbolize but also because the national understanding of the war was formed by and formative of the contemporary crises in understandings of racial groupings, class identities, and notions of masculinity and femininity. Jeannie Barroga’s play “Walls” portrays the controversy surrounding the Vietnam War Memorial, its aesthetic, the young Chinese American woman architect Maya Ying Lin who designed it, and the veterans—and veterans organizations—who argued that they were not “represented” in the abstract modernist lines of the design. The play revoices fundamental divisions instantiated by the war—between men and women, veterans and antiwar activists, Americans and Asians—by depicting their inevitable resurfacing around the national project of memorializing the war’s veterans. The play dramatizes the unspoken racial tension underpinning the artistic and political controversy surrounding the “representative” qualities of an American monument designed by a young Chinese American woman commemorating the U.S. soldiers who fought a war in Vietnam.<sup>2</sup>

Barroga’s “Walls” focuses primarily on the veterans’ protests against Lin’s modernist, nonrepresentational design as a means of objecting to Lin’s position as an Asian American woman. Through the performance of these conflicts and struggles, the play suggests that the national project of “re-membering” the Vietnam War—who its heroes were, who must be forgotten, who may mourn—is a crucial site in which the terms of “membership” in the national “body” are contested, policed, and ultimately re-

defined. In particular, by dramatizing the debate as to whether a national monument designed by an Asian American can represent the American nation, the play makes clear that the question of aesthetic representation is always also a debate about political representation. The veterans demand that a statue with soldiers and an American flag be placed next to the official monument, a black V-shaped stone horizontal to the earth etched with the names of the dead. The central antagonism between the veterans' demand for a representational monument and Lin's insistent commitment to a nonrepresentational aesthetic embodies the conflict between the nationalist desire for resolution through representational forms and the unassimilable conflicts and particularities that cannot be represented by those forms. For the nation defined by victory in U.S. wars in Asia throughout the twentieth century—in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea—and its citizenry specified for so much of the country's history by the exclusion of Asians from naturalization and citizenship, the national monument commemorating veterans of the war "lost" in Vietnam designed by the twenty-one-year-old daughter of Asian immigrants was an unresolved contradiction, a return of the repressed, a "gash that would not heal."<sup>3</sup> Barroga, a Filipina American, has written an "Asian American" play that triangulates Chinese American, Filipina American, and the descendants of the unremembered Vietnamese—all different sites in which the "Asian" interfaces with the "American."<sup>4</sup> I begin my discussion with this example in order to thematize Asian American cultural productions as countersites to U.S. national memory and national culture.<sup>5</sup>

In the last century and a half, the American *citizen* has been defined over against the Asian *immigrant*, legally, economically, and culturally.<sup>6</sup> These definitions have cast Asian immigrants both as persons and populations to be integrated into the national political sphere and as the contradictory, confusing, unintelligible elements to be marginalized and returned to their alien origins. "Asia" has been always a complex site on which the manifold anxieties of the U.S. nation-state have been figured: such anxieties have figured Asian countries as exotic, barbaric, and alien, and Asian laborers immigrating to the United States from the nineteenth century onward as a "yellow peril" threatening to displace white European immigrants.<sup>7</sup> Orientalist racializations of Asians as physically and intellectually different from "whites" predominated especially in periods in which a domestic crisis of

capital was coupled with nativist anti-Asian backlash, intersecting significantly with immigration exclusion acts and laws against naturalization of Asians in 1882, 1924, and 1934.<sup>8</sup> Exclusionist rhetoric ranged from nativist agitation, which claimed that "servile coolie" Chinese labor undercut "free white" labor, to declarations about the racial unassimilability of the Japanese, to arguments that Asian social organization threatened the integrity of American political institutions.<sup>9</sup> During the crises of national identity that occurred in periods of U.S. war in Asia—with the Philippines (1898–1910), against Japan (1941–1945), in Korea (1950–1953), and in Vietnam—American orientalism displaced U.S. expansionist interests in Asia onto racialized figurations of Asian workers within the national space. Although predictions of Asian productivity supplanting European economic dominance have gripped the European and American imaginations since the nineteenth century, in the period from World War II onward, "Asia" has emerged as a particularly complicated "double front" of threat and encroachment for the United States: on the one hand, Asian states have become prominent as external rivals in overseas imperial war and in the global economy, and on the other, Asian immigrants are still a necessary racialized labor force within the domestic national economy.<sup>10</sup> Immigration exclusion acts and naturalization laws have thus been not only means of regulating the terms of the citizen and the nation-state but also an intersection of the legal and political terms with an orientalist discourse that defined Asians as culturally and racially "other" in times when the United States was militarily and economically at war with Asia.

Historically and materially, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Asian Indian, and Filipino immigrants have played absolutely crucial roles in the building and the sustaining of America; and at certain times, these immigrants have been fundamental to the construction of the nation as a simulacrum of inclusiveness. Yet the project of imagining the nation as homogeneous requires the orientalist construction of cultures and geographies from which Asian immigrants come as fundamentally "foreign" origins antipathetic to the modern American society that "discovers," "welcomes," and "domesticates" them. A national memory haunts the conception of the Asian American, persisting beyond the repeal of actual laws prohibiting Asians from citizenship and sustained by the wars in Asia, in which the Asian is always seen as an immigrant, as the "foreigner-within," even when born in the

United States and the descendant of generations born here before. It is this premise that Barroga's play highlights through the veterans' objection that Maya Lin's monument cannot represent the American nation: the American soldier, who has in every way submitted to the nation, is the quintessential citizen and therefore the ideal representative of the nation, yet the American of Asian descent remains the symbolic "alien," the *metonym* for Asia who by definition cannot be imagined as sharing in America.<sup>11</sup> Narratives of immigrant inclusion—stories of the Asian immigrant's journey from foreign strangeness to assimilation and citizenship—may in turn attempt to produce cultural integration and its symbolization on the national political terrain. Yet these same narratives are driven by the repetition and return of episodes in which the Asian American, even as a citizen, continues to be located outside the cultural and racial boundaries of the nation. Rather than attesting to the absorption of cultural difference into the universality of the national political sphere as the "model minority" stereotype would dictate, the Asian immigrant—at odds with the cultural, racial, and linguistic forms of the nation—emerges in a site that defers and displaces the temporality of assimilation.<sup>12</sup> This distance from the national culture constitutes Asian American culture as an alternative formation that produces cultural expressions materially and aesthetically at odds with the resolution of the citizen in the nation. Rather than expressing a "failed" integration of Asians into the American cultural sphere, this distance preserves Asian American culture as an alternative site where the palimpsest of lost memories is reinvented, histories are fractured and retraced, and the unlike varieties of silence emerge into articulation.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the immigration of Asians to the United States has been the *locus* of meanings that are simultaneously legal, political, economic, cultural, and aesthetic. In this book I attempt to situate these meanings and to gather them into a coherent, contemporary formation that is both a record of the emergence of Asian American "culture" within a U.S. national and an international context and a comprehension of the dialectical critique generated by that emergence.

My title, *Immigrant Acts*, first invokes the history of Asian immigration to the United States since the mid-nineteenth century. It names the history

of immigration exclusion acts that restricted and regulated the possibilities of Asian American settlement and cultural expression—the exclusion of Chinese in 1882, of Asian Indians in 1917, of Koreans and Japanese in 1924, and of Philippine immigrants in 1934.<sup>14</sup> It names the series of Asian exclusion repeal acts passed between 1943 and 1952, which dramatically changed the status of immigrants of all Asian origins, from "aliens ineligible to citizenship," to that of "citizen."<sup>15</sup> It names, as well, the dramatic shifts in Asian immigration to the United States after the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished former national-origin quotas and exclusions, since which we have witnessed an enormous widening of the definitions of "Asian American."<sup>16</sup> Because of the many historical and political economic changes of which the act of 1965 is an expression, the majority of Asian Americans are at present Asian-born rather than multiple-generation, and new immigrant groups from South Vietnam, South Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, India, and Pakistan have diversified the already existing Asian American group of largely Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Filipino descent. As such, to focus on Asian Americans as "immigrants" is not to obscure the understanding that almost half of Asian Americans are U.S.-born citizens, and of that group, many date the history of their settlement in the United States back four or five generations. It is not to draw attention away from the fact that most Asian Americans are now currently naturalized or native-born citizens and that Asian American struggles for inclusion and equality have significantly advanced American democratic ideals and their extension.<sup>17</sup> It is rather to observe that the life conditions, choices, and expressions of Asian Americans have been significantly determined by the U.S. state through the apparatus of immigration laws and policies, through the enfranchisements denied or extended to immigrant individuals and communities, and through the processes of naturalization and citizenship.<sup>18</sup> It is to underscore that both in the period from 1850 to World War II and in the period after 1965, immigration has been a crucial *locus* through which U.S. interests have recruited and regulated both labor and capital from Asia. It is also to maintain that there has been an important continuity between the considerable distortion of social relations in Asian countries affected by U.S. imperialist war and occupation and the emigration of Asian labor to the United States throughout the last century.

"Immigrant acts," then, attempts to name the *contradictions* of Asian immigration, which at different moments in the last century and a half of Asian entry into the United States have placed Asians "within" the U.S. nation-state, its workplaces, and its markets, yet linguistically, culturally, and racially marked Asians as "foreign" and "outside" the national polity.<sup>19</sup> Under such contradictions, late-nineteenth-century Chinese immigrants labored in mining, agriculture, and railroad construction but were excluded from citizenship and political participation in the state.<sup>20</sup> The contradiction of immigration and citizenship took a different but consistently resonant form during World War II, when U.S.-born Japanese Americans were nominally recognized as citizens and hence recruited into the U.S. military, yet were dispossessed of freedoms and properties explicitly granted to citizens, officially condemned as "racial enemies," and interned in camps throughout the Western United States.<sup>21</sup> Philippine immigration after the period of U.S. colonization animates yet another kind of contradiction. For Filipino immigrants, modes of capitalist incorporation and acculturation into American life begin not at the moment of immigration but rather in the "homeland" already deeply affected by U.S. influences and modes of social organization.<sup>22</sup> The situations of Filipino Americans, or U.S. Filipinos, foreground the ways in which Asian Americans emigrating from previously colonized sites are not exclusively formed as racialized minorities within the United States but are simultaneously determined by colonialism and capital investment in Asia.<sup>23</sup> These different contradictions express distinct yet continuous formations in the genealogy of the racialization of Asian Americans: the Chinese as alien noncitizen, the American citizen of Japanese descent as racial enemy, and the American citizen of Filipino descent as simultaneously immigrant and colonized national.

By insisting on "immigrant acts" as contradictions and therefore as dialectical and critical, I also mean to emphasize that while immigration has been the *locus* of legal and political restriction of Asians as the "other" in America, immigration has simultaneously been the site for the emergence of critical negations of the nation-state for which those legislations are the expression. If the law is the apparatus that binds and seals the universality of the political body of the nation, then the "immigrant," produced by the law as margin and threat to that symbolic whole, is precisely a generative

site for the critique of that universality. The national institutionalization of unity becomes the measure of the nation's condition of heterogeneity.<sup>24</sup> If the nation proposes American culture as the key site for the resolution of inequalities and stratifications that cannot be resolved on the political terrain of representative democracy, then that culture performs that reconciliation by naturalizing a universality that exempts the "non-American" from its history of development or admits the "non-American" only through a "multiculturalism" that aestheticizes ethnic differences as if they could be separated from history. In contrast, the cultural productions emerging out of the contradictions of immigrant marginality displace the fiction of reconciliation, disrupt the myth of national identity by revealing its gaps and fissures, and intervene in the narrative of national development that would illegitimately locate the "immigrant" before history or exempt the "immigrant" from history.<sup>25</sup> The universals proposed by the political and cultural forms of the nation precisely generate the critical *acts* that negate those universals. "Immigrant acts" names the *agency* of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans: the *acts* of labor, resistance, memory, and survival, as well as the politicized cultural work that emerges from dislocation and disidentification. Asian immigrants and Asian Americans have not only been "subject to" immigration exclusion and restriction but have also been "subjects of" the immigration process and are agents of political change, cultural expression, and social transformation.

The period from 1850 to World War II was marked by legal exclusions, political disenfranchisement, labor exploitation, and internment for Asian-origin groups in the United States. While some of the legal and political exclusions have been lifted in the period following the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, the problems of legal definition have continued for Asian origin communities. Indeed, the McCarran-Walter Act, an expression of the cold war era, legislated strict quotas, created an area called the "Asia-Pacific triangle" based on a strategically territorial mapping, and contained language delineating the exclusion of and right to deport "any alien who has engaged or has had purpose to engage in activities 'prejudicial to the public interest' or 'subversive to national security.'"<sup>26</sup> The 1965 act has initiated not fewer but indeed more specifications and regulations for immigrants of Asian origins.<sup>27</sup> Immigration,

thus, can be understood as the most important historical and discursive site of Asian American formation through which the national and global economic, the cultural, and the legal spheres are modulated. Whether that determination is expressed through immigration “exclusion” or “inclusion,” the U.S. nation-state attempts to “produce” and regulate the Asian as a means of “resolving” economic exigencies, primarily through the *loci* of citizenship and political representation but also in ways that extend to the question of culture.<sup>28</sup> As the state legally transforms the Asian *alien* into the Asian American *citizen*, it institutionalizes the disavowal of the history of racialized labor exploitation and disenfranchisement through the promise of freedom in the political sphere. Yet the historical and continued racialization of the Asian American, as citizen, exacerbates the contradictions of the national project that promises the resolution of material inequalities through the political domain of equal representation.

In the following discussion, I place the legal regulations of the Asian as *alien* noncitizen and the Asian American as *citizen* in terms of the material contradictions that have emerged as the nation has intersected with the global economy during the last century and a half. The economic contradictions of capital and labor on the national level, and the contradictions of the political nation within the global economy, have given rise to the need, over and over again, for the nation to resolve *legally* capitalist contradiction around the definition of the Asian immigrant subject. The history of the legislation of the Asian as *alien* and the administration of the Asian American as *citizen* is at once the genealogy of this attempt at resolution and the genealogy of a distinct “racial formation” for Asian Americans, defined not primarily in terms of biological racialism but in terms of institutionalized, legal definitions of race and national origin.<sup>29</sup> Michael Omi and Howard Winant observe that for most of its history, the U.S. state’s racial policy has been one of repression and exclusion, and they read the role of the state in racial formation through a consideration of these state policies and laws. While noting the deep involvement of the state in the organization and interpretation of race, Omi and Winant also note the inadequacy of state institutions to carry out these functions. Therefore, they observe that race is “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.”<sup>30</sup>

Racialization along the legal axis of definitions of citizenship has also ascribed “gender” to the Asian American subject. Up until 1870, American citizenship was granted exclusively to white male persons; in 1870, men of African descent could become naturalized, but the bar to citizenship remained for Asian men until the repeal acts of 1943–1952. Whereas the “masculinity” of the citizen was first inseparable from his “whiteness,” as the state extended citizenship to nonwhite male persons, it formally designated these subjects as “male,” as well.<sup>31</sup> Though the history of citizenship and gender in relation to the enfranchisement of white women is distinct from the history of citizenship and race in relation to enfranchisement of nonwhite males, it is not entirely separate, for the legally defined racial formation of Chinese Americans and, later, other Asian Americans has likewise been a gendered formation. The 1943 enfranchisement of the Chinese American into citizenship, for example, constituted the Chinese immigrant subject as male; in the 1946 modification of the Magnuson Act, the Chinese wives of U.S. citizens were exempted from the permitted annual quota; as the law changed to reclassify “Chinese immigrants” as eligible for naturalization and citizenship, female immigrants were not included in this reclassification but were in effect specified only in relation to the changed status of “the Chinese immigrant,” who was legally presumed to be male. Thus, the administration of citizenship was simultaneously a “technology” of racialization and gendering.<sup>32</sup> From 1850 until the 1940s, Chinese immigrant masculinity had been socially and institutionally marked as different from that of Anglo- and Euro-American “white” citizens owing to the forms of work and community that had been historically available to Chinese men as the result of the immigration laws restricting female immigration. The Page Law of 1875 and a later ban on Chinese laborers’ spouses had effectively halted the immigration of Chinese women, preventing the formation of families and generations among Chinese immigrants; in addition, female U.S. citizens who married an “alien ineligible to citizenship” lost their own citizenship.<sup>33</sup> In conjunction with the relative absence of Chinese wives and family among immigrant “bachelor” communities and because of the concentration of Chinese men in “feminized” forms of work—such as laundry, restaurants, and other service-sector jobs—Chinese male immigrants could be said to occupy, before 1940, a “feminized” position

in relation to white male citizens and, after 1940, a “masculinity” whose racialization is the material trace of the history of this “gendering.”

Immigration regulations and the restrictions on naturalization and citizenship have thus racialized and gendered Asian Americans, and this history has situated Asian Americans, even as citizens, in a differential relationship to the political and cultural institutions of the nation-state. The racialization of Asian Americans in relation to the state locates Asian American culture as a site for the emergence of another kind of political subject, one who has a historically “alien-ated” relation to the category of citizenship. That historical alienation situates the Asian American political subject in critical apposition to the category of the citizen, as well as to the political sphere of representative democracy that the concept of the citizen subtends. The differentiation of Asian immigrants from the national citizenry is marked not only politically but culturally as well: refracted through images, memories, and narratives—submerged, fragmented, and sedimented in a historical “unconscious”—it is rearticulated in Asian American culture through the emergence of alternative identities and practices.

The economic and political contradictions that the state seeks to resolve in relation to Asia and Asian immigrants can be discussed generally in terms of two historical phases—the first taking place between 1850 and World War II, and the second, from World War II to the present—and specified by the immigration and citizenship laws that have racialized Asians. Capital deals with its systemic crisis of declining profits by seeking out cheaper factors of production, especially labor. Consequently, throughout the period from 1850 to World War II, the recruitment of Asian immigrant labor was motivated by the imperative to bring cheaper labor into the still developing capitalist economy: Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino laborers were fundamental to the building of the railroads, the agricultural economy, and the textile and service industries. In this first period, the logic of capitalist development contained an economic contradiction that could be nullified by “resolving” the contradiction that existed between capitalism and the state. As Marx observed of the United States in the 1860s, the bulk of the land was still available public property, but labor was in short supply. In this situation in which “every settler on it therefore can turn part of it into

his private property and individual means of production,” capital needed a cheap, manipulable labor force, yet a surplus of enfranchised workers could run dangerously in excess of the accumulation of capital.<sup>34</sup> Capital in the 1880s utilized racialized divisions among laborers to maximize its profits; it needed the exclusion of further Chinese immigration to prevent a superabundance of cheap labor, and the disenfranchisement of the existing Chinese immigrant labor force, to prevent capital accumulation by these wage laborers.<sup>35</sup> Theoretically, in a racially homogeneous nation, the needs of capital and the needs of the state complement each other. Yet in a racially differentiated nation such as the United States, capital and state imperatives may be contradictory: capital, with its supposed needs for “abstract labor,” is said by Marx to be unconcerned by the “origins” of its labor force, whereas the nation-state, with its need for “abstract citizens” formed by a unified culture to participate in the political sphere, is precisely concerned to maintain a national citizenry bound by race, language, and culture.<sup>36</sup> In late-nineteenth-century America, as the state sought to serve capital, this contradiction between the economic and the political spheres was *sublated* through the legal exclusion and disenfranchisement of Chinese immigrant laborers. Capital could increase profit and benefit from the presence of a racialized and tractable labor force up until the point at which the Chinese labor force grew large enough that it threatened capital accumulation by whites. At that point, by excluding and disenfranchising the Chinese in 1882, the state could constitute the “whiteness” of the citizenry and granted political concessions to “white” labor groups who were demanding immigration restrictions.<sup>37</sup> The state reconfirmed bars to citizenship and naturalization that dated back to 1790: the national citizenry and national culture were protected from “foreign” and “racial” corruptions. The state’s attempts to “resolve” the economic contradictions of capital and the political contradictions of the nation-state resulted in the successive exclusions of the Chinese in 1882, Asian Indians in 1917, Japanese in 1924, and Filipinos in 1934 and the barring of all these immigrant groups from citizenship and ownership of property. The Alien Land Laws of 1913, 1920, and 1923 prohibited Asian immigrants from owning land and other forms of property through the legal construction of nonwhites as “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”<sup>38</sup> The disenfranchisement of Asians was also supported by

laws against miscegenation that created an environment extremely hostile to Asian settlement.

Owing to this history in which economic exigencies have been mediated through the legal apparatus that racializes and genders the subject, for Asian immigrants and Asian Americans, class struggles have cut across and been particularized in the various practices of racial and gender exclusion. When the state addressed the economic contradiction between capital and labor—through the legal measures excluding Chinese, Indians, Japanese, Koreans, and Filipinos from rights, property, and citizenship—economic class was mediated by and articulated through race, gender, and national origin. At the same time, organized racial or Asian national solidarity and challenges to legal oppressions almost always articulated protests against injustices that were due to the exploitation of gendered Asian workers under U.S. capitalism, even if such solidarities were not expressed strictly in terms of class identity. For example, in the late nineteenth century, Chinese workers protested ordinances calculated to shut down Chinese laundries, brought litigation to object to unfair taxes, struggled for access to schooling and housing, and brought suits against the state to challenge the exclusions and deportations of Chinese laborers.<sup>39</sup> Thus, the history of the racial formation of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans has always included a “class formation” and a “gender formation” that, mediated through such state apparatuses as the law, articulated a contradiction between capital and racialized, gendered labor.<sup>40</sup> The law, in this sense, must be understood as *both* an ideological and a repressive state apparatus, as both symptomatic and determining of the relations of production. Chinese community challenges to the first anti-Chinese laws; Japanese American objections to the Alien Land Laws; Filipino American agricultural labor organizing; the Asian American social movement of the 1970s with its various efforts to address racism, labor exploitation, and inequality of housing and education; and current projects organizing against the particular exploitation of Asian immigrant women’s labor—all significantly disrupted the racial order and addressed the capitalist exploitation of racialized and gendered labor. Because the legal apparatus of racialization and gendering has been so thoroughly imbricated in capitalist relations, these movements organized around racial identities have challenged the injustices of an eco-

economic order as well as those of civil society. Oppositional solidarity movements have been organized around racial identities because of social and economic oppressions that have targeted those identities, and these movements have succeeded in transforming racial meanings and the conditions of racialized peoples. Yet the limits of such transformations are reached if the struggle is confined to the question of political rights, precisely since the history of citizenship was underwritten by economic, racial, and gender inequalities. The continued exploitation of Asian and other racialized immigrants throughout and beyond the period of “enfranchisement” after 1965 makes evident that a critical interrogation of both the concept of citizenship and the state’s role as the guarantor of citizens’ rights has been and is still necessary. These concepts are in contradiction with both the racialist foundations of capitalism in the United States and U.S. development projects elsewhere.

In the period after World War II, as production began to shift to Asia and Latin America where export-oriented economies were emerging, the capital imperative came into greater contradiction with the political imperative of the U.S. nation-state. The one required economic internationalism to expand labor and capital, to secure raw materials and consumer markets, to locate areas in which to invest surplus capital, and to provide a safety valve for domestic tensions; the other required consolidation of a strong, hegemonic nation-state in order to regulate the terms of that post-war economic internationalism.<sup>41</sup> In addition, since the 1970s, as manufacturing moved internationally to make use of low-wage labor markets, the proportion of the U.S. work force engaged in manufacturing has fallen as the proportion working in services has increased; the structural transformations of the economy have produced increased demand for immigrants to fill minimum-wage, unskilled, and part-time jobs, yet these same economic processes have initiated new waves of anti-immigrant nativism and exacerbated the state’s need to legislate immigration. Several strategies were employed to meet the capital imperative: U.S. capital moved to Asian and Latin American sites of cheaper labor and production, and the 1965 act “opened” immigration, renewing domestic labor supplies. Since 1965, the profile of Asian immigration has consisted of low-wage, service-sector workers as well as “proletarianized” white-collar professionals, a

group which supplies laborers for services and manufacturing and which furnishes a technically trained labor force that serves as one form of "variable capital" investment in the U.S. economy.<sup>42</sup> If the nineteenth-century racialized and gendered formation of Chinese male immigrants as laborers *sublated* the contradictions between the imperatives of capitalism and the state, then these contradictions *reemerge* in the demographic composition of the post-1965 Asian immigrant group, a group still racialized and exploited yet complicated by class and gender stratification. Since the 1980s, the increased proletarianization of Asian immigrant women's labor in the United States is an index of new forms of contradiction and is commensurate with a new gendered international division of labor that makes use of third world and racialized immigrant women as a "flexible" work force in the restructuring of capitalism globally.<sup>43</sup> Transnational industry's use of Asian and Latina immigrant women's labor in the United States is the current site where the contradictions of the national and the international converge in an overdetermination of capitalism, anti-immigrant racism, and patriarchal gender stratification.<sup>44</sup>

Another distinguishing feature of the post-1965 Asian immigration is the predominance of immigrants from South Korea, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Cambodia, countries deeply affected by U.S. colonialism, war, and neocolonialism. Despite the usual assumption that Asians immigrate from stable, continuous, "traditional" cultures, most of the post-1965 Asian immigrants come from societies already disrupted by colonialism and distorted by the upheavals of neocolonial capitalism and war. The material legacy of the repressed history of U.S. imperialism in Asia is borne out in the "return" of Asian immigrants to the imperial center. In this sense, these Asian Americans are determined by the history of U.S. involvements in Asia *and* the historical racialization of Asians in the United States. The post-1965 Asian immigrant displacement differs from that of the earlier migrations from China and Japan, for it embodies the displacement from Asian societies in the aftermath of war and colonialism to a United States with whose sense of national identity the immigrants are in contradiction precisely because of that history. Once here, the demand that Asian immigrants identify as U.S. national subjects simultaneously produces alienations and disidentifications out of which critical subjectivities

emerge. These immigrants retain precisely the memories of imperialism that the U.S. nation seeks to forget.<sup>45</sup>

Insofar as the United States sought to address the imperatives of capital through the expansion of markets and labor supplies, it also sought hegemony internationally through foreign wars in Asia. Following the colonization of the Philippines, the foreign policy of the United States in relation to Asia, its involvements in World War II, and the wars in Korea and Vietnam must be understood in relation to a contradiction between the growing need for economic internationalism and the desire to fortify the political nation-state and cannot be simply described in terms of the containment of Communism. We can trace these two phases of contradiction in terms of American wars in Asia during the twentieth century. In the U.S. colonization of the Philippines in 1898–1946, war and occupation served national capital imperatives through expansion and the interruption of the previous conditions of the agrarian Philippines, which displaced Filipinos from previous forms of work, thus providing an exploitable labor force available for emigration to the United States.<sup>46</sup> The U.S. war against Japan during World War II, in contrast, is explicable less in terms of U.S. domestic labor needs and more in terms of the United States asserting and assuming hegemony in the world system. The United States aimed to succeed Britain and Europe as the heir to the empire that was breaking down under the pressure of anticolonial nationalist and liberation movements throughout the colonized world and, in this effort, sought to curtail Japanese expansion in Asia. The U.S. actions in World War II were directed toward creating the geopolitical basis for the postwar world order that would take place under America's "protective" aegis.

During the period of unprecedented aggregate growth of global capitalism in the 1950s and 1960s, the Western domination of Asia that had been expressed through direct colonialism was transformed into a U.S. imperialist project by way of modernization and development.<sup>47</sup> U.S. foreign policy was characterized by the contradiction between the imperatives of internationalizing the economy and the political necessity of the nation-state as a vehicle for exercising hegemony. In the struggle for leadership in the postwar global order, the United States sought to achieve the military superiority, economic supremacy, and ideological predominance nec-

essary to determine the terms of the postwar economic internationalism and to establish secure access to raw materials and markets.<sup>48</sup> In this sense, the foreign policy that framed wars in Korea and Vietnam and neocolonial domination of the Philippines was a liberal hybrid that combined economic internationalism and anti-communism, responding equally to the need to take economic supremacy and to contain the Soviet Union diplomatically. Although the U.S. wars in Korea and Vietnam reflected the general desire to incorporate the extractive economies of Asia into the industrial core, the twenty-year period in which the United States vied for power over the rimlands of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Taiwan also constituted a brutal theater in which the conquest and occupation of Asian countries were the means for the United States to perform its technological modernity and military force in relation to the Asiatic world, a process legitimated by the emergence of the Soviet Union's and China's global influences. Yet the wars in Korea and Vietnam were as much a stage for the ideological lesson that the United States could and should determine how capital could move globally as the wars also secured the material conditions for that movement.<sup>49</sup> The wars of the 1950s to the 1970s laid the groundwork for the U.S. investment and material extraction in Asia that took place only later in the 1980s with global restructuring, displacing Korean and Vietnamese populations, some of which have immigrated to the United States. By the 1990s, the United States had reached a period of "imperial overstretch," marked by the decline of its economic hegemony and the emergence of Japan and Germany; the contradictions of the U.S. capital investment and development in Asia is further expressed in the rapid growth of the newly industrializing countries in Asia—Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The emergence of successful capitalist states in Asia has necessitated global restructuring for U.S. capital, reinvigorating American anxiety about Asia, but such anxiety about the Asian is clearly not new. Throughout the twentieth century, the figure of the Asian immigrant has served as a "screen," a phantasmatic site, on which the nation projects a series of condensed, complicated anxieties regarding external and internal threats to the mutable coherence of the national body: the invading multitude, the lascivious seductress, the servile yet treacherous domestic, the automaton whose inhuman efficiency will supersede American ingenuity. Indeed, it

is precisely the unfixed liminality of the Asian immigrant—geographically, linguistically, and racially at odds with the context of the "national"—that has given rise to the necessity of endlessly fixing and repeating such stereotypes.<sup>50</sup> Stereotypes that construct Asians as the threatening "yellow peril," or alternatively, that pose Asians as the domesticated "model minority," are each equally indices of these national anxieties. Yet the discursive fixing of the Asian is not exclusively a matter of stereotypical representation in the cultural sphere; as I have been arguing, it has historically been instantiated through the state's classification of racialized Asian immigrant identities. The state announces its need to fix and stabilize the identity of the immigrant through legal exclusions and inclusions, as well as through juridical classifications. "Legal" and "illegal," "citizen" and "noncitizen," and "U.S.-born" and "permanent resident" are contemporary modes through which the liberal state discriminates, surveys, and produces immigrant identities. The presence of Asia and Asian peoples that currently impinges on the national consciousness sustains the figuration of the Asian immigrant as a transgressive and corrupting "foreignness" and continues to make "Asians" an object of the law, the political sphere, as well as national culture.

Though Congress never enacted a law that specifically named "Asians" or "Orientals" as an Asiatic racial category, legal theorist Neil Gotanda has argued that the sequence of laws in 1882, 1917, 1924, and 1934 that excluded immigrants from China, Japan, India, and the Philippines, combined with the series of repeal acts overturning these exclusions, construct a common racial categorization for Asians that depended on consistently racializing each national-origin group as "nonwhite."<sup>51</sup> The classification of individual Asian-origin groups as nonwhites was legally established in case after case related to the question of citizenship. For example, the 1790 naturalization act granted all "free whites" the right to claim citizenship and barred all nonwhites until after the Civil War in 1870, when the statute was enlarged to include freemen of African nativity or descent. Yet even after the enfranchisement of men of African descent, the racial bar to naturalization of Asians was reconfirmed in the early 1920s when the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the bar in relation to Takeo Ozawa, a U.S.-educated Japanese immigrant, and Baghat Singh Thind, an Indian who was a World War I veteran.<sup>52</sup> The barrier to citizenship continued for immi-

grants from all parts of Asia until the Magnuson Act of 1943. The Magnuson Act had three significant parts: it repealed the Exclusion Act of 1882; it established a quota for Chinese immigrants; and it made Chinese eligible for citizenship, negating the 1790 racial bar. There were subsequent Asian exclusion repeal acts (1946, for Filipino and East Indian), and the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 abolished the 1917 "Asia Barred Zone" concept, replacing it with quotas of one hundred persons annually for countries within the Asia-Pacific Triangle. Gotanda observes that in these separate statutes, Chinese, Indians, Filipinos, and Guamanians were allowed to become U.S. citizens as *exceptions* to the whites-only barrier; he argues that the categorization of Asians as diverse, racialized ethnic groups, rather than as a single racialized category, supports and obscures the powerful centrality of the white racial category.<sup>53</sup> In other words, through the legal enfranchisement of specific Asian ethnic groups as *exceptions* to the whites-only classification, the status of Asians as *nonwhite* is legally restated and reestablished. Thus, the historical racialization of Asian-origin immigrants as nonwhite "aliens ineligible to citizenship" is actually rearticulated in the processes of legal enfranchisement and the ostensive lifting of legal discriminations in the 1950s.

The final abolition of Asian quotas came with the 1965 act. As the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990 attest, however, immigration legislation continues to be the site for the resurgence of contradiction between capital and the state, between economic and political imperatives, between the "push-pull" of markets and the maintenance of civil rights and is riddled with conflicts as the state attempts to control through law what is also an economically driven phenomenon. In the 1990s, recent official immigration policies and de facto immigration policies express this contradiction around the "crisis" of illegal immigration, particularly from Mexico and Latin America (though Haitian and Chinese examples have also emerged). Reminiscent of the nineteenth-century laws barring Chinese from naturalization, education, and safe working conditions, California's Proposition 187 passed in 1994, attempts to deny schooling and medical care to illegal immigrants; although the referendum does not specify immigrants from Mexico and Latin America, its execution would certainly be aimed at these groups.<sup>54</sup>

Since the 1950s, undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Latin America have provided much of the low-wage labor in agriculture, construction, hotels, restaurants, and domestic services in the western and southwestern United States. The wages and working conditions of these jobs do not attract U.S. workers: state policy will not legislate the improvement of labor conditions, but neither does it declare officially that the U.S. economy systematically produces jobs that only third world workers find attractive. The result is an officially disavowed and yet unofficially mandated, clandestine movement of illegal immigration, which addresses the economy's need for low-wage labor but whose dehumanization of migrant workers is politically contradictory. In particular, the liberal principles of American democracy are profoundly at odds with a tiered hierarchy of immigrant populations, enforced by the police functions that control and regulate immigrant and refugee flows.<sup>55</sup> Again, as before, the state, and the law as its repressive apparatus, takes up the role of "resolving" the contradictions of capitalism with political democracy. The historical racial formation of Asian immigrants before 1965 has mediated the attempt to resolve the imperatives of capital and the state around the policing of the Asian. In the period since 1965, legal regulations on immigration include Asians among a broad segment of racialized immigrants, while the policing has refocused particularly on "alien" and "illegal" Mexican and Latino workers. Asian Americans, with the history of being constituted as "aliens," have the collective "memory" to be critical of the notion of citizenship and the liberal democracy it upholds; Asian American culture is the site of "remembering," in which the recognition of Asian immigrant history in the present predicament of Mexican and Latino immigrants is possible.

The legal genealogy of the Asian immigrant constitutes what Orni and Winant have called a "racial formation": the shifting construction of racial meanings formed in the dialectic between state categorization and social challenges to those categorizations, and the sociohistorical process by which racial meanings are created, lived, and transformed. They write: "The racial order is equilibrated by the state—encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive apparatus. But the equilibrium thus achieved is unstable, for the great variety of conflicting interests encapsulated in racial meanings and identities can be no more than paci-

fied—at best—by the state.”<sup>56</sup> Extending Omi and Winant’s notion that racial formation is the changing product of the negotiations between social movements and the state, I have been arguing that the material contradictions of the national economy and the political state are expressed in the legal exclusion, disenfranchisement, and restricted enfranchisement of Asian immigrants and that culture is the material site of struggle in which active links are made between signifying practices and social structure. ( Racism is not a fixed structure; society’s notions about race are not static and immutable, nor has the state been built on an unchanging exclusion of all racialized peoples. Rather, legal institutions function as flexible apparatuses of racialization and gendering in response to the material conditions of different historical moments. Instead of understanding the law as merely a part of the “superstructure” that “reflects” social relations, I have posited that legal institutions *reproduce* the capitalist relations of production as *racialized gendered relations* and are therefore symptomatic and determining of the relations of production themselves. In other words, immigration law reproduces a racially segmented and stratified labor force for capital’s needs, inasmuch as such legal disenfranchisements or restricted enfranchisements seek to resolve such inequalities by deferring them in the promise of equality on the political terrain of representation. The state governs through the political terrain, dictating in that process the forms and sites of contestation. Where the political terrain can neither resolve nor suppress inequality, it erupts in culture. Because culture is the contemporary repository of memory, of history, it is through culture, rather than government, that alternative forms of subjectivity, collectivity, and public life are imagined. This is not to argue that cultural struggle can ever be the exclusive site for practice; it is rather to argue that if the state suppresses dissent by governing subjects through rights, citizenship, and political representation, it is only through culture that we conceive and enact new subjects and practices in antagonism to the regulatory *locus* of the citizen-subject, by way of culture that we can question those modes of government,

The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s brought together Asian American struggles with those of African Americans, Native Americans, and Chicano-Latinos in a concerted demand for racial equality and social

justice. These movements challenged institutionalized racial segregation and disenfranchisement through direct action and grassroots mobilization; through incursions into the political terrain (electoral projects from voter registration to community organizing to building alternative institutions); and through the development of “resistance cultures.”<sup>58</sup> At that historical juncture, the extended set of social movements had a variety of targets and agendas, from the battle for educational space in universities to protests against the U.S. war in Vietnam, from community controls over housing to the transformation in the conditions of racialized laborers.<sup>59</sup> But precisely because *racialization* had been the site of the contradiction between the promise of political emancipation and the conditions of economic exploitation, the Civil Rights movement emerged as the organizing center for a cross-race mobilization of Asians, Blacks, Native Americans, and Chicanos simultaneously allied with the third world liberation struggles.<sup>60</sup> Because civil rights highlighted racialization as the site of this contradiction, its struggles were met as forcefully by state violence as by state attempts at political co-optation. Yet at the same time, civil rights struggles for racial equality could not but find themselves constrained precisely by the constitutive contradiction of liberal democracy: in a political system constituted by the historical exclusion and labor of racialized groups, the promise of inclusion through citizenship and rights cannot resolve the material inequalities of racialized exploitation. In focusing the struggle in the political domain, the civil rights project extended the opportunities of some segments of minority communities and made substantial gains; by demanding that the state extend its promise of freedom and opportunity to Black auto industry workers, Japanese American internees, and Chicano agricultural laborers, it focused attention on the fundamental condition that the American nation has been built on the exploitation and political exclusion of these populations. The demand for civil rights for racialized people heightened the contradictions inherent in the promise of universal equality; it addressed civil society and the state in terms of that promise, as if it actually embodied those principles of universal distribution of opportunity, property, and livelihood. Yet the civil rights project confronts its limits where the pursuit of enfranchisement coincides with a refortification of the state as the guarantor of rights and precludes the necessary critique of the state

as the protector of liberal capitalism, steadily dividing the racialized labor forces it continues to exclude from those rights. The persistence of racial inequality that exists in the United States in our present moment derives not from a failure of strategy or a lack of will on the part of the movements for civil rights but from the continuation of a system of property that profits through racialization. Civil rights struggles deepen the contradiction of liberal democracy and throw into relief the unabated and new forms of racialized subordination, thereby converging with the ongoing struggles calling for radical transformations of U.S. society for the redistribution of resources for all people.

The historical necessity, gains, and limits of the civil rights project offer us an important analysis of citizenship as a site of contradiction for racialized Americans. The formation of Asian Americans, in particular, with a specific genealogy of racialization in relation to citizenship, gives us access to a critique of both the liberal theory of democratic society and the Marxist criticism of that liberal theory. The liberal political understanding of citizenship emerged in the late eighteenth century in the wake of the French and American Revolutions that overturned older feudal arrangements, and the concept of citizenship as political emancipation was established to secure the "rights of man" in civil society. The *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* (1793) enumerates the rights of man to include equality, liberty, security, and property; in this last regard, the Constitution of the United States states: "The right of property is that which belongs to every citizen of enjoying and disposing as he will of his goods and revenues, of the fruits of his work and industry." The state is the political form that protects and secures those rights and freedoms. Article 2 of the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen* of 1791 reads: "The end of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man." Article 1 of the Declaration of 1793 states: "Government is instituted in order to guarantee man's enjoyment of his natural and imprescriptible rights." As Marx points out in "On the Jewish Question," in liberal capitalist societies, it is the property system that underlies the concept of "rights" in the civil society for which the political state is the abstract guarantor.

The most powerful contradiction of liberal democracy arises from the

condition that each individual man's right to property violates the rights of others. Liberal political theory embodied in the Constitution establishes that the right to liberty in civil society ceases to be a right when it conflicts with political life, yet if political life is that which guarantees the rights of the individual man to property, then the political sphere becomes no more than a guarantor of capitalist relations of exploitation. Marx defines *man* as the subject of civil society (which is "the sphere of human needs, labour, private interests and civil law"), whereas the *citizen* is the abstract subject of the political state guaranteeing that civil society and the capitalist relations therein; the abstraction of the *citizen* is always in distinction to the particularity of *man's* material condition. In this context, for Marx, "political emancipation" of the *citizen* is the process of relegating to the domain of the private all "nonpolitical" particulars of religion, social rank, education, occupation, and so on in exchange for representation on the political terrain of the state where "man is the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual life, and infused with an unreal universality."<sup>61</sup> For Marx, "political emancipation" of the *citizen* permits the reproduction of capitalist social relations and the relations of production. Marx's critique unmasks the political state as the apotheosis of the property system in capitalist nations and points to the need for a critique of citizenship and "rights" defined as the right to property or, in effect, the right of the capitalist to exploit.

The specific history of the United States and the crucial role of racialized immigrant labor, however, reveal the limits of Marx's analysis of the state and civil society. To the extent that Marx adopts the abstract and universalist propositions of the economic and political spheres, his classic critique of citizenship cannot account for the particular racialized relations of production on which this nation has been founded. Despite its trenchant indictment of liberal democracy as the protector of capitalist relations, Marx's theory cannot account for the historical conditions through which U.S. capital profited precisely from racializing Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino immigrant labor in distinction to white labor and excluding those racialized laborers from citizenship. Furthermore, it cannot account for the current global restructuring of capitalism in which U.S. capital maximizes its profits through strategies of "mixed production" and "flexible accumu-

lation" that cross national boundaries, erode national political institutions such as citizenship, and make use of racialized female immigrant labor.<sup>62</sup> Asian immigrant and Asian American communities can be one site for generating such a critique, for rather than exemplifying the assimilation of private "particularities" into the abstract universality of the national political sphere, Asian Americans formed through a history of racialized immigrant labor exploitation remain in contradiction with that universality or, indeed, inhabit the contradictions of that universality. Marx describes the dissolution of economic difference in its displacement onto the political terrain of representation in liberal democratic states; yet the historical exclusion that racializes Asian immigrant labor and the "formation" of the Asian American that rearticulates that racialization, even as citizen, reveal *race* to be that material evidence that cannot be dissolved into political representation. Therefore, it was on racial equality that the Civil Rights movement focused its energies and through *race* that a coalition of Blacks, Chicanos, and Asians could form. Yet these struggles have revealed that the granting of rights does not abolish the economic system that profits from racism.<sup>63</sup> In our present moment, it is an understanding of *race* not as a fixed singular essence, but as the *locus* in which economic, gender, sex, and race contradictions converge, that organizes current struggles for immigrant rights, prisoner's rights, affirmative action, racialized women's labor, and AIDS and HIV patients in communities of color. Both the "successes" and the "failures" of struggles over the last thirty years demonstrate the degree to which *race* remains, after citizenship, the material trace of history and thus the site of struggle through which contradictions are heightened and brought into relief.

According to liberal political theory and the Marxist critique, citizenship requires that the subject deny its particular private interests to become the "abstract citizen" of the political state. Rousseau described the exchange of the insecurities of nature for equal, civil freedom that is protected by the "social contract."<sup>64</sup> Marx described the negation of "private" individual particulars of the subject who becomes the "abstract citizen" of the political state. But for Asians within the history of the United States—as for African Americans, Native Americans, or Chicanos—"political emancipation" through citizenship is never an operation confined to the negation of indi-

vidual "private" particulars; it requires the negation of a history of social relations that publicly racialized groups and successively constituted those groups as "nonwhites ineligible for citizenship." For Asian immigrants from Vietnam, Korea, or the Philippines, this negation involves "forgetting" the history of war in Asia and adopting the national historical narrative that disavows the existence of an American imperial project. It requires acceding to a political fiction of equal rights that is generated through the denial of history, a denial that reproduces the omission of history as the ontology of the nation. In contradistinction to liberal theories and Marxist critiques that abstractly propose the universal granting of citizenship to all members as the foundational moment of civil society and the state, the U.S. nation was founded exactly by establishing citizenship as a legal and political category for white male persons that historically excluded nonwhites and women and that guaranteed the rights of those white male citizens over nonwhites and women.<sup>65</sup> While the nation proposes immigrant "naturalization" as a narrative of "political emancipation" that is meant to resolve in American liberal democracy as a terrain to which all citizens have equal access and in which all are equally represented, it is a narrative that denies the establishment of citizenship out of unequal relationships between dominant white citizens and subordinated racialized noncitizens and women.

For Marx, the dissolution of economic inequality into political equality takes place to the extent that it is the tendency of capital to use "abstract labor," or labor as "use value" unencumbered by specific human qualities. In the *Grundrisse*, Marx describes abstract labor "as the use value which confronts money posited as capital, labour is not this or another labour, but *labour pure and simple*, abstract labour; absolutely indifferent to the particular substance of which a given capital consists; but since capital *as such* is indifferent to every particularity of its substance, and exists not only as the totality of the same but also as the abstraction from all its particularities, the labour which confronts it likewise subjectively has the same totality and abstraction itself."<sup>66</sup> According to Marx, abstract labor in the economic sphere underwrites abstract citizenship in the political sphere. Abstract labor, subject to capitalist rationalization and the logic of equivalence through wages, is the adjunct of the formal political equality granted through rights and representation by the state. Yet in the history of the

United States, capital has maximized its profits not through rendering labor “abstract” but precisely through the social productions of “difference,” of restrictive particularity and illegitimacy marked by race, nation, geographical origins, and gender. The law of value has operated, instead, by creating, preserving, and reproducing the specifically racialized and gendered character of labor power. These processes of differentiation have provided the means for capital to exploit through the fracturing and segmentation of different sectors of the labor force. In his critical analysis of the economic and political spheres as they have been posited by liberal theory, Marx remains committed to Enlightenment universalisms through which we can neither account for the specificity of racialized Asian immigrant labor within the U.S. economy nor for the role of colonialism and imperialism in the emergence of the political nation. Moreover, the argument that capital accumulates through universal homogenization rather than through differentiation is contradicted, particularly, by the current global restructuring of capitalism in which operations of “flexible” capital accumulation and “mixed production” permit transnational corporations to maximize profit precisely by fragmenting production and moving parts of the assembly and manufacturing to sites in which manipulable, differentiated immigrant or third world labor can be most effectively employed. Asian immigrants and Asian Americans have been neither “abstract labor” nor “abstract citizens,” but have been historically formed in contradiction to both the economic and the political spheres. Thus, this contradictory formation locates the Asian American in antagonism to the resolution of the citizen to the nation in a manner which is in contradiction to liberal ideologies and institutions, yet which cannot be fully captured by the Marxist critique: Asian American particularity returns a differently located dialectical critique of the universality proposed by both the economic and the political spheres.

Asian American critique proceeds immanently by inhabiting the historical formation of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans in contradiction with the economic and political spheres. Yet this critique extends to more than rearticulating itself as the negative residue of the nonuniversal. The dialectic of Asian American critique begins in the moment of negation that is the refusal to be the “margin” that speaks itself in the dominant forms of political, historical, or literary representation. This transforms the “mi-

nority” position from being the only form of inclusion within the universal postulates of the nation to a critique of liberal pluralism and its multicultural terrain. For, as the consideration of Asian American cultural forms in subsequent chapters demonstrates, the demand that the immigrant subject “develop” into an identification with the dominant forms of the nation gives rise to contradictory articulations that interrupt the demands for identity and identification, that voice antagonisms to the universalizing narratives of both pluralism and development, and that open Asian American culture as an alternative site to the American economic, political, and national cultural spheres. This dialectic not only addresses the dominant culture and the political state it represents but also reaches back into the reservoir of memory out of which the distinct forms and practices of Asian American culture itself emerge. The “past” that is grasped as memory is, however, not a naturalized, factual past, for the relation to that past is always broken by war, occupation, and displacement. Asian American culture “re-members” the past in and through the fragmentation, loss, and dispersal that constitutes that past. Asian American culture is the site of more than critical negation of the U.S. nation; it is a site that shifts and marks alternatives to the national terrain by occupying other spaces, imagining different narratives and critical historiographies, and enacting practices that give rise to new forms of subjectivity and new ways of questioning the government of human life by the national state.

American national culture takes up the role of resolving the history of inequalities left unresolved in the economic and political domains; where the state is unable to accommodate differences, it has fallen to the terrain of national culture to do so. Unlike English and European cultures that have traditionally sought, since the eighteenth century, an identity of culture, language, race, and nation, the material history of immigration and settlement in the U.S. has not allowed such fictions of cultural homogeneity. Owing to this different history, by the early twentieth century the American nation proposed a plurality of cultural origins that “melted” into the uniformity of American culture. By the 1960s, in light of civil rights struggles that forced into visibility the conditions of segregation beneath the promise of assimilation, the liberal vision of the “melting pot” was revised into

“multiculturalism,” a new “universalism” designed to accommodate the irreducible diversity of American society. This official “multiculturalism” is evidently quite different from the grassroots cross-racial coalitions that have worked for large-scale transformations of society, for the redistribution resources and opportunities, and for the retrieval of lost histories. “Multiculturalism” supplements abstract political citizenship where the unrealizability of the political claims to equality become apparent: it is the national cultural form that seeks to unify the diversity of the United States through the integration of differences as *cultural* equivalents abstracted from the histories of racial inequality unresolved in the economic and political domains. In Chapter 4, “Imagining Los Angeles in the Production of Multiculturalism,” I discuss the “multicultural” aestheticization and commodification of racialized ethnic cultures and observe that, in general, aestheticization can take place only through “forgetting” the material histories of racialization, segregation, and economic violence. In the particular instance of Asian Americans, the consequences of such “forgettings” are very specific: Asian immigrants have been incorporated primarily through the economic sphere as labor and, since 1965, as labor and capital; yet, simultaneously, historical exclusion along racial and citizenship lines has explicitly distanced Asians, even as enfranchised Asian Americans, from the terrain of national culture. The contradictions of multicultural inclusion for Asian Americans are acute in ways that emerge from both a history of racial and political exclusion and a history of being “foreign” to the national cultural terrain.

In light of the importance of American national culture and its institutions in the education of subjects as citizens of the nation, the contradictory history of Asian Americans produces cultural forms that are materially and aesthetically at odds with the resolution of the citizen to the nation. This “difference” is not a matter of mere technical innovation that we might find in aestheticist texts that are critical of traditional forms and of mass culture but resides in racial formation as the material trace of history. The aesthetic theories of the Frankfurt school held that within conditions of mass culture, older traditional forms of human activity have been instrumentally reorganized according to capitalist rationality; for Adorno, Horkheimer, and others who theorized the increasingly universalized reification

of culture, the last site of “cultural negativity” inhered in “high” modernist art.<sup>67</sup> Yet a quite different critique of universality emerges out of Asian American culture, situated differently in the material contradictions of history rather than in the marginalizations of autonomous “high” culture.<sup>68</sup> Contrary to what Adorno would term the “cultural negativity” of “high” art that might lie in the residual resistance of an abstract subject outside instrumentalized culture, Asian American “cultural negativity” inheres in the concrete particulars unassimilable to modern institutions, particulars that refuse both integration into dominant forms and the logic of exchange. The emergence of a racially differentiated U.S. society that cannot be captured adequately by the antinomy of mass and traditional culture obliges us to respecify historically what other sources of contradiction might exist aside from valorized modernist art. Asian American cultural forms neither seek to reconcile constituencies to idealized forms of community or subjectivity, nor propose those forms as “art” that resides in an autonomous domain outside of mass society and popular practices. Unlike either American national culture or “high” art, forms of Asian American culture and other racialized minority cultures emerge differently from those of traditionally conceived aesthetic projects.<sup>69</sup> Literary critic Sau-ling Wong has observed: “Asian American authors are not, as a mechanical analogy with universalistic Western ludic discourse would suggest, promoting a rarefied aestheticism. Instead, they are formulating an ‘interested disinterestedness’ appropriate to their condition as minority artists with responsibilities to their community.”<sup>70</sup>

Asian American cultural forms emphasize instead that because of the complex history of racialization, sites of minority cultural production are at different distances from the canonical nationalist project of resolution, whether posed in either national modern or postmodern multiculturalist versions. In Chapter 2, “Canon, Institutionalization, Identity,” a discussion of the university as a contradictory site for Asian American formation, I consider the ways in which Asian American literature may produce effects of dissonance, fragmentation, and irresolution even and especially when that literature appears to be performing a canonical function.<sup>71</sup> The kind and degree of contradiction that exists between the historical specificities of immigrant displacement and racialization and canonized forms of

national culture generates formal deviations whose significances are misread if simply assimilated as modernist or postmodernist aesthetic modes. Asian American work is not properly or adequately explained by the notion of postmodernism as an aesthetic critique of high modernism, for Asian American work emerges out of very different contradictions of modernity: out of the specific conditions of racialization in relation to modern institutions of state government, bourgeois society's separate spheres, and the liberal citizen-subject. In Chapter 5, "Decolonization, Displacement, Disidentification," I differentiate European and American postmodern challenges to representation from the "decolonizing" writing that emerges from third world, diaspora, and racialized U.S. American sites. The effects of these works are more radically grasped in terms of their constant interrogation of the discrepancies between national modern forms and what Walter Benjamin would term the material "catastrophes" those forms obscure.<sup>72</sup> Just as the previous discussion highlighted the contradiction between racialized Asian immigrant subjectivity and the abstract citizen proposed by the political sphere of representation, in the following chapters I argue that the subject that emerges out of Asian American cultural forms is one in excess of and in contradiction with the subjectivities proposed by national modern and postmodern modes of aesthetic representation.<sup>73</sup> The discussion of Asian American culture in the chapters that follow begins as "immanent critique" and considers the cultural dynamics of Asian American work as revealing the contradiction between American claims to universality and the particularities erased by those claims, but then dialectically replaces the work in the context of social determinations that generate the work's inner contradictions. Asian American critique proceeds immanently but enacts the shifting position of dialectical criticism; it can neither immerse itself in the object in the manner of idealizing, redemptive criticism nor take a stand entirely outside culture to criticize the totality as reified.<sup>74</sup>

The contradictions that produce these particulars demand a different notion of the aesthetics of Asian immigrant work, which I elaborate in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, "Unfaithful to the Original," as an aesthetic of "disidentification" and "infidelity." This aesthetic is as critical of representational modes such as realism or naturalism as it is critical of a conception of autonomous art separated from material conditions. With regard to the dis-

ussion of aesthetics, the notion of "immigrant acts" attempts to locate in the works the "performativity" of immigration, that is, the aesthetics of disidentification and the practices of resignification that the "outsider-within" condition of Asians in America enables.<sup>75</sup> For example, in Chapter 6, I discuss the Korean immigrant's disidentification with the U.S. nation as being legible in Theresa Hak Kyung Cha's critique of the core values of aesthetic realism—correspondence, mimesis, and equivalence—which her text *Dic-tée* treats as contradictions. Through an aesthetic of fragmented recitation and episodic nonidentity, repetition is taken to its parodic extreme and disengaged as the privileged mode of imitation and realism. This aesthetic characterizes works that are the sites for the emergence of a new subject.

The contemporary social formation emerges out of a mode of production that conjoins distinct national economies with transnational forms of industry that rely on mixed production, flexible accumulation, and the mobility of capital. Hence, at the present moment, forms of the "modern" U.S. state—citizenship, law, police, military—conjoin with the "postmodern" movements and forces of the global economy, and the political subject that emerges out of this conjunction cannot be strictly captured by the terms of the national political sphere. Thus, "becoming a national citizen" cannot be the exclusive narrative of emancipation for the Asian American subject. Rather, the current social formation entails a subject less narrated by the modern discourse of citizenship and more narrated by the histories of wars in Asia, immigration, and the dynamics of the current global economy.<sup>76</sup> These new conditions displace a former conception of culture and the formation of the citizen it upheld, generating the need for an alternative understanding of cultural production. These discussions consider Asian American culture as one terrain on which the subject formerly narrated by the discourse of citizenship is superseded by a differently located political subject. I argue in Chapter 7, "Work, Immigration, Gender," that this subject comes into a political formation that is not that of an Asian American claim to citizenship within the nation but one that inhabits a new conjunction and its contradictions, radically challenging nationalist institutions and the simultaneous global economic exploitation of immigrant and third world labor, particularly women.

In keeping with the thesis that a new political subject allegorized by the “immigrant” is articulated simultaneously within both U.S. national and global frameworks, I move from a discussion of Asian American cultural production within a U.S. national context (Chapters 2–4) to one that places the question of Asian American and Asian immigrant culture within an international context (Chapters 5–7). The contradictions of the “nation” are never exclusively bounded in the “local”; rather, local particularisms implicate and are implicated in global movements and forces. This imbrication of the national formation of racialized groups within the global political economy is as relevant for Chicano/Latino culture and Anglo-American Black cultures as it is for Asian American culture. As José David Saldívar has argued in *The Dialectics of Our America*, “Local metanarratives never tell the whole story . . . and perhaps we are condemned to oscillate between two metanarratives—one of totalization, the other of emergence.”<sup>77</sup> Likewise, in *The Black Atlantic*, Paul Gilroy described the Black “countercultures of modernity” that emerge in the space between nationalistic thinking and “the rhizomorphic, fractal structure of the transcultural, international formation” that is nationalism’s antithesis.<sup>78</sup>

In Chapter 3, “Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity,” the material heterogeneities of Asian Americans, of class, gender, and national origin, are discussed in relation to both the modern U.S. nationalist and the oppositional Asian American “cultural nationalist” impulses toward identity. The argument I advance in the move from the contradictions of “the national” to the those of “the national-within-the-international” is that the “cultural nationalist” formation of some Asian American work is motivated by a desire to represent, to make visible the erased and evacuated histories in realist and naturalist modes, and to regard representation of the racialized ethnic group through the aesthetic work as the political function of culture within both an Asian American cultural nationalist and a U.S. national framework. In contrast, contemporaneous work that dialectically engages with the national formation of Asian Americans from the perspective of an international history and location is critical of the representational project and is antagonistic to the “modern” in both aesthetic and political senses. These cultural projects offer alternatives to realist narratives of resolution to the nation, working against the notion of the subject as representative

of the nation or group in order to generate conceptions of collectivity that are neither regulated by notions of identity nor prescribed by aesthetic, psychoanalytic, and political modes of identification.

In the former project, the immigrant is fixed and taken as the *symbol* of Asian Americans; as a figure, the immigrant conveys an “ideal type” who represents the generalized condition of the group. In such symbolic figurations, there is a persistent belief in a knowable social totality of which the representative figure is a reflection and in terms of which that figure can be recognized. In the latter project, however, the immigrant is at once both *symbol* and *allegory* for Asian Americans. The immigrant is located in social relations and dialectically placed within historical process and struggle, but the concept of allegory presumes that social and historical processes are not transparent, taking place through what Benjamin calls “correspondences” rather than through figures that represent or reflect a given totality.<sup>79</sup> Such correspondences are neither resemblances nor analogies, but displaced, mediated connections in which the “seizing” of the relation depends not only on a formal analysis of the social and historical conditions but also on the simultaneous comprehension of a displacement, a break, or even an absence—all signaling the impossibility of totality.

The latter project proposes immigration as the *locus* for the encounter of the national border and its “outsides” as the site of both the law and the “crossing of the borders” that is its negative critique. Immigration as both *symbol* and *allegory* does not metaphorize the experiences of “real” immigrants but finds in the located contradictions of immigration both the critical intervention in the national paradigm at the point of its conjunction with the international and the theoretical nexus that challenges the global economic from the standpoint of the locality. In addition, the allegory of immigration does not isolate a singular instance of one immigrant formation, but cuts across individualized racial formations and widens the possibility of thinking and practice across racial and national distinctions. The specific history of Asian immigration in relation to U.S. citizenship is different from the histories of other migrant or racialized groups, such as African Americans, Native Americans, and Chicanos/Latinos, yet the Asian American critique of citizenship generated by its specific history opens the space for such cross-race and cross-national possibilities. One of the im-

portant *acts* that the immigrant performs is breaking the dyadic, vertical determination that situates the subject in relation to the state, building instead horizontal community with and between others who are in different locations subject to and subject of the state. Asian American culture is thus situated to generate what Dipesh Chakrabarty has termed “other narratives of self and community that do not look to the state/citizen bind as the ultimate construction of sociality.”<sup>80</sup>