3 paragraphs based on articles

DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ARAB SPRING AND ITS AFTERMATH

Kunihiko Imai and Associate Professor o f Political Science Elmira College

Aysegul Keskin Zeren Adjunct Professor Mendoza College o f Business

University o f Notre Dame

Kunihiko Imai is Associate Professor o f Political Science and International Studies at Elmira College, Elmira, New York. Building upon his experiences in Russia, Poland, and Japan, he writes on issues in both comparative politics and international relations. His articles have appeared in scholarly books, as well as professional journals such as Comparative Strategy: A n InternationalJournal, InternationalJournal on World Peace, International Interactions, International Relations and Diplomacy, and The Journal of Politics.

Aysegul Keskin Zeren is an adjunct faculty at the Mendoza College of Business, the University o f Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana. She has taught at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame and at the Center for Applied Conflict Management at Kent State University. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from Kent State University and an M.A. in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from Sabanci University. She has published articles in Mediterranean Politics, Journal o f Religion, Conflict, and Peace and Peace Policy.

This article seeks to uncover the idiosyncrasies o f democracy and democratization in the Middle East. Based on the existing literature, it utilizes variables such as internationalization o f national economies, Islam, Arab culture, subordination o f women, economic development, education, elites’ efforts at maintaining control, oil, and political institutions in its empirical investigation. This article also analyzes the new trends o f democracy in the region that began with the Arab Spring in December 2 010 and questions how this recent wave o f popular uprisings in the Middle East and its aftermath can contribute to the understanding o f democracy and democratization in the region.

INTR O D U C TIO N

Why does the Middle East lag behind the global trend o f democratization? This has been the central question that scholars and policy analysts working on the Middle East have had to tackle for decades. The so-called third wave o f democratization that began in 1970s doubled the number o f democracies in the world by the 1990s. It spread all around Latin America, East and Southeast Asia, as well as Southern, Eastern, and Central Europe. However, the Middle East was left out o f this trend.

Because authoritarianism has per­ sisted in the region, scholars have

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spilled considerable ink on the question o f why the Middle East has remained stubbornly resistant to democracy. Despite the lack o f satisfactory explanations, a huge body o f scholarship has developed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney (2005, 3) outlines how the literature on democratization can be evaluated under two main categories: “ ...the ‘prerequisites’ school, whose arguments posit economic, cultural, or institutional necessities for transitions from authoritarianism to begin; and the ‘transitions’ paradigm, which sees democratization as a contingent choice o f regime and opposi­ tion actors that can occur under a variety o f socioeconomic and cultural

B e c a u s e a u t h o r i t a r ia n is m

h a s p e r s is t e d in t h e M id d le E a s t, s c h o la r s h a v e s p ille d c o n s id e r a b le in k o n t h e q u e s t io n o f w h y it h a s r e m a in e d s t u b b o r n ly r e s is t a n t t o d e m o c r a c y .

conditions.” Since 2011 the Arab World has experienced various changes. On

December 17,2010, the young fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set him ­ self on fire to protest police harassment in the town o f Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. As the fire o f protest swept through the Middle East and N o rth Africa, some o f the authoritarian regimes in countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen were ousted. The uprisings generated some forms o f repression a n d /o r civil war in Syria and Bahrain; they also led to limited reforms in

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Jordan. It is still too early to predict whether or not these transitions will lead to democratization in the region, but it is a critical time to understand the impact o f the 2011 uprisings on the democracies o f the Middle Eastern states.

We start this inquiry to understand the idiosyncrasies o f the region and the changes in the region’s democracy after the 2011 Arab upris­ ings. Since the effects o f these uprisings were divergent across the Middle Eastern countries, this study does not propose specific conclusions for the individual countries. This paper begins with the review o f the litera­ ture on the authoritarian persistence in the region, and then, outlines the conceptualization o f democracy and explains the methodological details. Finally, it presents the empirical findings and their analysis in the last two sections.

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LITERATURE ON THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN THE M IDDLE EAST

There have been various efforts to explain the reasons behind the democracy deficit and authoritarian persistence in the Middle East, but the current scholarship has not yet provided a simple, satisfactory explanation. This section provides a review o f the existing literature on the democracy deficit in the Middle East, and questions the validity o f the arguments found in the existing literature, in light o f the 2011 uprisings.

In the late 1950s, the study o f democracy was dominated by moderniza­ tion theory and its socio-economic explanations. Lipset’s (1959) seminal piece on “requisites” o f democracy was the first empirical work that cor­ related socio-economic development and democracy. In 1960, Rostow built on Lipset’s economic development variable and theorized the necessary steps that a country must follow in order to reach to the “preconditions” that allowed economic “take-off’ and therefore, political development. As Hinnebusch (2006, 374) summarized, “ ...high-income countries were most likely to be democratic and that rising literacy, urbanization and non-agricultural employment.. .were associated with an increased propen­ sity to political participation...” Following Rostow, other scholars such as Almond and Coleman (1960), Apter (1965), and H untington (2006) continued to support the main assumption that the socio-economic indi­ cators were the key preconditions o f political and economic modernity. Modernization theory, however, has been criticized for simplifying a very complex phenomenon, and being methodologically flawed. The existence of democratic regimes with low levels o f modernization, such as India, as well as authoritarian regimes with high levels o f modernity, such as European fascist and communist regimes, led scholars to question the threshold o f modernization required for democracy, and for the end o f authoritarian­ ism (Hinnebusch 2006). Modernization theory also failed to explain the democracy deficit of high-income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries (Ibid, 375; Bolme 2015).

Modernization theory failed to explain the democracy deficit of high-income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries.

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A new vein o f scholarship emerged to explain the region’s democracy deficit by rentier-state theory (Luciani 1987). According to this theory, rentier states rely on revenue from external sources, rather than domestic sources such as production, and taxation (Brynen et al. 2012; Tilly 1992). As the states depend on oil exports or other sources o f rent instead o f taxes, the state bureaucracy strengthens (H untington 1991). States begin to dis­ tribute rentier revenues in the form o f jobs and welfare benefits. Citizens who are not being required to pay taxes become highly dependent on the state for their livelihoods; they neither get mobilized to demand representa­ tion nor place pressure on the government for their demands (Hinnebusch 2006). States remain immune from accountability (Ibid; Anderson 1995).

In a nutshell, the main assumption is that rents both promote and protect authoritarianism (Anderson 1995; H innebusch 2006; Bolme 2015). However, this theory did not explain the endurance o f authoritarianism in resource-poor countries o f the region such as Egypt, M orocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Jordan (Perlini 2015).

As Brynen et al. (2012) reviewed, by the new century, the rentier-state theory lost its popularity among most o f the Middle East scholars; after sur­ veying the literature on the Middle East, they outlined three critical counter-arguments to rentier-state

theory. First, the limits o f liberalism and the resistance o f authoritarianism in oil exporter Middle Eastern countries were not uniform; the nature o f authoritarianism and the levels o f political opposition varied in rent-depen­ dent countries o f the region such as Libya, Yemen, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The 2011 uprising and the increasing political opposition fortified this criticism. Second, the link between taxation and representation may not have been as clear as the rentier-state theory predicted because, during the bust years, private sector actors did gain political voice in some Middle Eastern countries. Third, the so-called unique characteristics o f rentier

R e n t ie r t h e o r y s a y s t h a t a s s t a t e s d e p e n d o n o il e x p o r t s o r o t h e r s o u r c e s o f r e n t in s t e a d o f t a x e s , t h e s t a t e b u r e a u c r a c y s t r e n g t h e n s a n d c it iz e n s b e c o m e h ig h ly d e p e n d e n t . H o w e v e r , t h is d id n o t e x p la in t h e e n d u r a n c e o f a u t h o r i t a r ia n is m in r e s o u r c e p o o r c o u n t r ie s o f t h e r e g io n s u c h as E g y p t , M o r o c c o , T u n is ia , S y r ia , a n d J o r d a n .

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states, “such as having [a] bloated state sector and weak state capacities,” may apply to all developing countries.

The lack o f modernity and the reliance on rents were not the only attempted explanations for the democracy deficit. In the 1980s and the 1990s, it was common among scholars to put blame on Islam and Arab cul­ tures. The transitions following the collapse o f the Soviet Union bolstered the democratization literature and reinstituted Islam as the main roadblock o f democratization in the Middle East. The most prominent work o f this kind was H untington’s The Third Wave o f Democratization. While reaf­ firming the importance o f socio-economic indicators, Huntington (1993b, 307-308) argued that “whatever the compatibility o f Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone together.” Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind, first published in 1973, and Elie Kedourie’s Democracy and A ra b Political C ulture, published ____________________________ in 1992, were the first examples o f this essentialist approach that simply concluded, “The idea of democracy is alien to the mindset of Islam.” 1 Several qualitative and quantitative studies (Fish 2002; Donno & Russett 2004) also concluded that Islam is not com­ patible with democracy, despite their studies’ limitations, including logical and epistemological flaws. (Anderson 1995)

Several qualitative and quantitative studies concluded that Islam is not compatible w ith democracy, despite their studies' limitations, including logical and epistemological flaws.

O ther scholars, however, provided sophisticated critiques to these essentialist claims, arguing that culture is changeable, and overgeneraliza­ tions are misinformed; they tended to focus on understanding the political context in an attempt to explain political culture (Ajami 1992; Fickelman & Piscatori 2004; Hudson 1977 & 1995). Many critiques asserted that relat­ ing authoritarianism to Islam stems from orientalist bias and that Western study o f the Middle East has been characterized by the romanticization and radicalization o f “the other” (Said 1994; Bolme 2015). Beilin (2004, 141) pointed out “Catholicism and Confucianism have...been accused of incompatibility with democracy, yet these cultural endowments have not prevented countries in Latin America, southern Europe, and East Asia

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from democratizing.” Further, the culturalists’ view cannot explain the persistence o f democracy in Muslim-majority countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

Some scholars shifted their attention from Islam to Arab culture. Stepan and Robertson’s (2003, 33) empirical study on political performance of Muslim countries concluded, “A non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost 20 times more likely to be ‘electorally competitive’ than an Arab Muslim-majority country.” Hirsham Sharabi’s (1988) neo-patrimonialism has been vital to understand the Arab culture and democracy deficit con­ nection; he argued when the modernization process makes the country dependent on the West, an inherited patriarchal culture that blends the state and the family gets encouraged. Many have used neo-patrimonialism

tarianism in the region have treated culture and religion as prerequisites to democracy, and have tried to prove that there is something wrong with the Arab culture (Bolme 2015). The most vocal critic o f this approach, Lisa Anderson (1995, 90) warned, “Political culture analysis can be very seductive, particularly to policy-makers looking for short, neat explanations o f the complexities they face... If we are not careful to specify its context and limits, we not only risk analytical confusion, we set the stage for sloppy, self-indulgent, or even damaging prescription.”

The permeability o f authoritarianism in the Middle East has further been explained through the role o f external powers and domestic conflicts. Analysis o f U.S. policies has been very instrumental in explaining the lack o f democracy. The U.S. has initiated several policies to promote and sup­ port democratization in the Middle East to foster free and fair elections, reform state institutions, and support civil society (Bolme 2015, 22). However, these efforts did not end authoritarianism in the region for several

The permeability of authoritarianism in the Middle East has further been explained through the role of external powers and domestic conflicts.

to explain the lack o f necessary skills and requirements that lead to associa- tional and institutional group forma­ tions (Bill & Springborg 1990), and ultimately, the lack o f an active civil society in the Middle East (Barakat 1993). Studies th a t p u t political culture on the center stage when explaining the endurance o f authori-

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interconnected reasons. First, as Heydemann (2002,104) elucidated, U.S. policy favored stability and economic reform over political reform. Second, the U.S. concentrated on so-called democratization only when its security was at stake.2 Beilin (2004, 149) described that the authoritarian regimes maintained their relationship with the West, and continued to remain in power through protecting the US interests in the region, namely access to oil, containment o f Islamic threat, and the security o f Israel. Since the energy sources and security issues were critical for the U.S., this inter­ national patron-client relationship did not make authoritarian regimes vulnerable to external pressure (Levitsky & Way 2010, 361). However, the Arab uprisings complicated this relationship. On the one hand, the U.S. put pressure on some friendly regimes and a few o f them achieved some degree o f improvement in civil rights and allowed political participa­ tion (Dalacoura 2005) On the other h an d , the U.S. did n o t decrease its support for the second largest recipient o f U.S. bilateral aid, the Mubarak regime o f Egypt (Brynen et al. 2012). Lastly, the democrati­ zation process, under the control of the West, prioritized elections over the other dimensions o f democracy such as civil liberties (Bolme 2015). Elections have been used as a vital tool to uphold the system in the Middle East. They were not fair or free; opposition groups were allowed to compete in elections, as long as they did not risk the safety o f authoritarian governments. Despite the inability o f elections in promoting democracy in the region, they were very informa­ tive in terms o f understanding the political trends, rulers, and opposition dynamics (Brownlee 2007).

O ther than the external pressures and elections, the robust and politi­ cally tenacious coercive apparatus o f Arab authoritarian regimes has been utilized to explain the democracy deficit. Beilin (2004, 143) explained, “Democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coer­ cive apparatus remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic

Other than the external pressures and elections, the robust and politically tenacious coercive apparatus of Arab authoritarian regimes has been utilized to explain the democracy deficit.

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transition will not occur.” Hence, the ruling elites o f the authoritarian regimes tried their best to keep their security apparatus strong and loyal. Ruling elites used their resources and rents to distribute patronage; they also used both internal and external conflicts as excuses to increase their military capabilities (Ibid, 157). While the 2011 uprisings complicated the capacity o f military feature o f Beilin’s analysis, they strengthened the will o f military argument. For instance, the militaries o f Tunisia and Egypt lacked the will to crush democratic uprisings (Brynen et al. 2012). Although “Bahrain’s and Egypt’s defense expenditures as a percentage o f GDP are similar,” during the 2011 uprisings, Bahrain’s armed forces chose to suppress protestors, whereas the Egyptian army did not (Ibid, 264).

Even though democratization still seems distant in the Middle East context, the 2011 uprisings complicated the existing explanations o f the democracy deficit in the Middle East. As Bryen et al. (2 0 1 2 ,2 9 0 ) summa­ rized, “institutional and cultural strategies failed to protect many regimes

from the popular uprisings that swept across the Arab world, start­ ing in December, 2010.” Managed elections, rents, political culture variables, neo-patrimonial strategies o f co-optation, and the power of coercive agencies could not prevent the collective action against state. T he academ ic co m m u n ity and

experts missed this upsurge, but cannot afford to miss the opportunity to provide sophisticated, “multi-causal,” and “multilevel” explanations o f the endurance o f Arab authoritarianism, and o f the consequences o f the 2011 uprisings for democratization in the region (Ibid, 288).

As the 2011 uprisings obscure the existing literature, the need for a paradigm shift in the studies o f authoritarian persistence is more pressing than ever. Thus, this study aims to not only explain the idiosyncrasies o f democracy in the Middle East, but also to empirically test the role o f the Arab uprisings in understanding the predicaments o f democracy. The next sections answer how democracy is operationalized in this study, along with its determinants, and provides insights with regard to methodology and econometric measurements.

As the 2011 uprisings obscure the existing literature, the need for a paradigm shift in the studies of authoritarian persistence is more pressing than ever.

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CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

One o f the challenges in the empirical study o f democracy and democra­ tization is the operationalization o f “democracy.” Despite various efforts made by scholars to measure the concept, a universally-accepted index o f democracy has not emerged. The most fundamental problem with measuring democracy is the lack o f consensus on what democracy means. Democracy is generally understood as rule by the people. Although this notion o f the concept seems to be universally accepted, it does not render itself to any exact measurement because what constitutes rule by the people is debatable. Thus, further specifications are required. Beyond this basic, common notion, however, there is no consensus.

Most scholars rely on either a “thin” or “thick” conception o f democ­ racy.3 O n the thin side, democracy is defined as a system “for arriving at political decisions in which individ- uals acquire the power to decide by means o f a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”4 At the minimal level, if a people can choose and replace their leaders in regular, free, and fair elections, there is an elec­ toral democracy. Electoral democ­ racies, however, vary enormously in their quality. The existence o f regular and competitive elections does not ensure high levels of freedom, equality, transparency, social justice, or other values that are generally considered to be essential in a democracy

Although the notion that democracy is rule by people seems to be universally accepted, it does not render itself to any exact measurement because w h at constitutes rule by the people is debatable.

(Diamond 1999). Only when these substantial measures exist can we call a system a liberal democracy. Thus, on the thick side, a system is not a democracy unless it also ensures a range o f attributes such as substantial individual freedoms. “When a democracy meets all the institutional attri­ butes o f liberal democracy, it also satisfies ‘thick’ conceptions o f what a democracy should be” (Ibid, 10-13). These two conceptions—electoral, as opposed to liberal, democracy—are distinct, and thus, require separate indices. Furthermore, in order to have a deeper understanding o f democ­ racy, it is crucially important to utilize both conceptions o f democracy.

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Most empirical studies o f democracy use either the Polity IV or Freedom House scores to measure democracy. The strength o f Polity is the clarity o f its measurement criteria. Although it has strengths such as clear and detailed coding rules, it is limited as an index because o f its minimalist definition of the concept o f democracy, omission o f participation, and an inappropriate aggregation procedure. These shortcomings make it unfit to capture the concept o f liberal democracy (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Particularly problematic is its exclusive focus on the aspects o f electoral democracy, with no attention to the liberal aspects of democracy. With the possible exception o f freedom o f organization, it pays no heed to political freedom (Hadenius and Teorell 2005). Therefore, Polity’s primary weakness is at the concep­ tual level. If measuring the electoral aspect o f democracy is the primary interest, Polity IV would be the choice. As Plattner (2002, 9) emphasized however, democracies often refer to “genuinely liberal democracies that protect the rights o f their citizens and adhere to the rule o f law, and not merely electoral democracies that are deficient in these aspects [even though they may choose their leaders through competitive elections].” Polity IV, therefore, could hardly cover all aspects o f democracy.

The strength o f the Freedom House data set, on the other hand, is its construct validity. It covers essentially the entire range o f basic democratic criteria. Particularly important is the fact that it is the closest measure of the concept o f liberal democracy, whereas hardly any o f the other extant indices cover that aspect o f democracy. Based on their definition o f liberal democracy, which is focused on the degree to which a political system allows democratic rule and political liberties, Bollen and Paxton (2000) argued that, o f all the subjective measures, the Freedom House ratings are the most conceptually similar to the definition o f democracy, adding that other recent subjective indices do not meet the necessary criteria for accurately measuring the concept. Despite its strength, however, Freedom House has a methodological weakness due to the inadequate transparency o f its coding system. Outsiders cannot replicate the process. As a result, it is hard to conclude with confidence that Freedom House is necessarily a better all-around index o f democracy than Polity; only that it is a better index for liberal democracy.5

Based on these previous findings, this study adopts Polity as the best measure o f the “electoral” democracy, and the Freedom House data set

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as the best indicator for analyzing the impacts o f variables on the “liberal” democracy.6

DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY

Internationalization o f national economies

Many scholars believe that increased internationalization o f national econo­ mies has weakened the individual states’ control over their societies; thus, this economic globalization promotes civil liberties and, eventually, democ­ racy through socioeconomic development (Bhagwati 1994; Bollen 1979 & 1983; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Cutright 1963; Cutright & Wiley 1969; Hannan & Carroll 1981; Jackman ^ 1973; Lipset 1959; Schwartzman 1998; Thomas et al. 1997). Some scholars argue that increasing eco­ nomic integration among nations has dramatically reduced the bar­ riers between national economies, u n d e rm in in g the au to n o m y o f national governm ents and their political control over their societ­ ies (Bryant 1994; Ohmae 1993; Rodrick 1997; Slaughter 1997; Thomas & Wiley 1997). As the flows o f capital and information become too great and sudden for any state to control, and as various transnational and international actors such as multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supersede die states’ autonomy, globalization erodes their authority.

This, of course, may not mean that economic globalization automati­ cally weakens all states’ ability to control their own society. Some “national economies retain a considerable degree o f isolation from each other, and [their] national policymakers enjoy more autonomy than is assumed by most recent writings on the erosion o f national sovereignty” (Rodrik 1997,21). Moreover, the same degree o f integration into the global economic system

As the flows of capital and information become too great for any state to control, and as various transnational and international actors such as multinational corporations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supersede the states' autonomy, globalization erodes their authority.

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may have a different effect on industrialized countries than on developing countries. The governments o f developed countries may possess greater control over their capital than those o f less developed countries (LDCs), and hence are better able to deal with the impact o f global economic changes than their counterparts in LDCs. Thus, the different levels o f national income among countries need to be taken into considerations.

It is also true that “a gain in power by non-state actors does not neces­ sarily translate into a loss o f power for the state” (Slaughter 1997, 184). The extent o f the impact o f globalization may vary greatly between states, depending on their economic capabilities as well as the extent o f the inter­ nationalization o f their national economies.

The concept o f the internationalization o f national economies as one of the determinants o f democracy is captured by using several economic indi­ cators: Net Trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and Gross Domestic Product (GDP).7 In addition, the KOF Index o f Globalization, published by KOF Swiss Economic Institute, is included in this study. It is an indicator tiiat measures the three main dimensions o f globalization; 1) economic, 2) social, and 3) political. It represents an overall level o f globalization by aggregating the scores on the three dimensions, and is one o f the most comprehensive indicators o f globalization available today. It is an excellent representation of states’ overall levels o f globalization and, therefore, serves as an ideal complement to the other indicators that represent more specific aspects o f the internationalization o f national economies.

As explained above, the different levels o f national income need to be taken into considerations as well. They are captured by Level o f National Income,8 Further, depending on the extent to which the wealth generated by the increased internationalization o f particular national economies is shared by the general public, levels o f national income may have either a positive or negative impact on the levels o f democracy. Therefore, G IN I Index is used to control for the income inequality among the population.9

Islam

Some scholars reject the claim regarding the universal effect o f economic globalization on politics. They contend that the unique political culture o f some nations attenuates the effects o f globalization, thus leaving the states’

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control over their citizenry strong (Brown & Jones 1995; H untington 1991 & 1993a; Jones 1995; Kausikan 1993; Tarnney 1991; Zakaria 1994). Others, however, reject such claims (D upont 1996; Fukuyama 1989 & 1995; Haggard 1990; Imai 2006 & 2010; Scalapino 1989; Tai 1993). As Fukuyama (1995,25) points out, for instance, empirical evidence o f a causal link between the lack o f democratization and Confucian political culture is missing. Various economic and political indices show that many o f the Islamic states are less modernized and less democratized than the rest of the world (H unter & Malik 2005). They do not, however, provide any proof that Islam per se negatively affects democracy. In fact, as explained before, the existing literature provides various alternative explanations to such an account based solely on cultural uniqueness. Moreover, many observers o f Islam see no inherent or essential aspect o f Islam that would make it incompatible with democracy (Ahmad 2003; Ayoob 2005; Diam ond 2008; Esposito 1998; H unter & Malik 2005; Voll 2005).

An all-encompassing, cultur­ ally deterministic view is therefore faced with the contradictory evidence o f empirical studies. To this date, no research has found any evidence o f a systematic association between culture and democracy.10 Diamond (2008, 315) concluded that “there is no intrinsic economic, cultural, or religious obstacle to democracy.” Thus, based on such overwhelming evidence, this study excludes culture from its list o f possible determinants o f democracy.

One exception to this decision is Islam. It has been argued to have the largest (among all the religious categories) influence on a state’s regime type (Barro 1999). Although the causal link between democracy and Islam has been disputed, there is an important reason to include ‘Islam’ in this empirical analysis. “Many states with great mineral wealth also have large Muslim populations, not only in the Middle East but also in parts o f Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei) and Africa (Nigeria)” (Ross 2001, 339). Therefore, to separate the impact o f historical—including religious—factors from that o f resource/oil wealth, for instance, it is important to use Islam as a control variable.11

Many observers of Islam see no inherent or essential aspect of Islam that would make it incompatible with democracy.

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Arab Culture

In order to test the afore-mentioned “Arab culture” hypothesis, we use a dummy variable, Arab State. If the hypothesis is correct, Arab State should prove statistically significant even after it is controlled for the effects o f all the other independent variables included in this study.

Economic Development

Among the developing countries, their level o f economic development is generally believed to be one o f the, if not the most, important explana­ tory variables o f democracy and democratic transition (Diamond 1992; Foweraker & Landman 2004; Gasirowski 1995; Inglehart 1997; Lipset 1959 & 1994). Many scholars have examined the causal relationship between economic development and democracy and have found a consis­ tently strong, positive relationship between them (Bhagwati 1994; Boix & Stokes 2003; Bollen 1979 & 1983; Bollen & Jackman 1985; Cutright 1963; Cutright & Wiley 1969; Hannan &carroll 1981; Imai2010; Jackman 1973; Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000; Schwartzman 1998; Thomas et al. 1997). Although some scholars (Booth & Seligson 1993; Evans 1979; H untington & Nelson 1976; Milner & Kubota 2001; O ’Donnell 1973) have questioned some o f the arguments over this causal link, the basic premise that economic development generates a greater likelihood of democracy, and that “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960, 31) has never been refuted. As Fukuyama (1989, 11) argued, “political liberalism has been following economic liberalism . . . with seeming inevitability.”

Lipset (1959, 85) argued that “economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in overall wealth o f the society” is a requisite for democracy. Lerner (1968) argued that political liberalization results from urbanization because urbanization stimulates education, which in turn promotes media liberal­ ization and thus, democratic development. Vanhanen (1997) argued that advanced literacy and education rates ultimately lead to enhanced resource distribution, paving the way for democratic reforms. Thus, in this study, economic development is captured by using several indicators: a) GDP Per Capita,12 representing the overall wealth o f the society, b) Urbanization,13

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and c) Education, 14 Education is measured by using the literacy rate among the adult population, ages 15 and above.15

Elites’ efforts at maintaining control

When democracy fails to develop in a state or a new democracy fails, it is often because o f bad governance. Ruling elites do not naturally seek to restrain their own power and submit to the discipline o f transparent laws and institutions. Rather, they seek to corner and monopolize power. Once their rule is established, elites use their power “to restrict economic competition so as to generate “rents” that benefit the small minority of ruling elites over the broad bulk o f the society,” (Diamond 2008, 296) thus maintaining the existing political order. This manipulation o f resources for social control is called “rent-seeking,” which has the rentier effect to “relieve social pressures that might otherwise lead to demands for greater accountability” (Ross 2001, 332).

The rentier effect can be m easured by two indicators o f Gov’t Consumption Exp. (government consumption expenditure) and Gov’t Activities (government activities as a proportion o f GDP). Ruling elites attempt to maintain their control over society by keeping some o f their powerful clients—especially big businesses, as well as the general public— content with the status quo. They try to achieve this goal by providing all sorts o f social programs to improve, or at least maintain, the quality o f life for the target population. When the businesses and the citizens are generally content with the status quo, they put less pressure on the regime to make changes in the political and economic life o f the country, and the democratization o f the society may be delayed. This provision o f Gov’t Consumption Exp. (measured as a percentage o f GDP) on all social programs, including wages and salaries for state employees, is used to account for the countervailing effect o f ruling elites’ effort to minimize the liberalizing effect o f the internationalization o f national economies and economic development.

The other component o f the rentier effect might be called the “preven­ tion o f social group formation.” The government can use its resources and activities to “prevent the formation o f social groups that are independent from the state and hence may be inclined to demand political rights” (Ibid,

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334). As governments increase in size (relative to the overall domestic economy), they become more capable o f preventing the formation o f civil institutions and social groups that are independent from the government, and the absence o f these groups will hinder a transition to democracy (Ross 2001). This component o f the rentier effect is captured by the share o f the GDP accounted for by Gov’t Activities.16

Furthermore, as mentioned above in our literature review, some scholars emphasize the importance o f the state’s coercive apparatus, namely the mili­ tary, to explain the democracy deficit in the Middle East. Therefore, Military Expenditure, as percentage o f GDP, is also used as a control variable.

O il/R esource Wealth

The success o f the ruling elites’ effort to control the masses and impede democracy depends on the availability o f resources with which they can co-opt the important segments o f the population. The findings o f some studies suggest that “a state’s reliance on either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic” and this reliance on oil/resource wealth is not limited to any particular geographical area o f the world (Ibid, 236). In order to account for this “oil-impedes-democracy” claim (Ross 2001), therefore, an additional variable, Oil, is included in this study. “It measures the export value o f mineral-based fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal), as fractions o f GDP.” 17

Quality o f Political Institutions

O ur hypothesis is that the quality o f political institutions is one o f the important ingredients of democracy. It will be tested by using two indices o f Rule o f Law and Corruption. Rule o f Law is measured by using one o f the six dimensions o f the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), “Rule o f Law,” which is published annually by the World Bank. This index reflects perceptions o f the extent to which agents, such as the elites, have confidence in and abide by the rules o f society, and in particular the quality o f contract enforcement, property rights, and the courts, as well as the likelihood o f crime and violence. Corruption is measured by using the “ C orruption Perception Index” (CPI) published annually by the Transparency International. WGI also contains the “Control o f Corruption”

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scores, but, since it is based on the CPI data, this study goes straight to the source, CPI, to measure the concept.

Middle Eastern States

Although it is not a determinant o f democracy in the strictest sense, Middle Eastern States is included in this study as one o f the explanatory variables to capture the difference between the Middle Eastern states and the rest o f the world in terms o f their levels o f democracy. It is measured by using a dummy variable, representing the Middle Eastern states.18

The Arab Spring

We are also seeking to detect any change in terms o f the levels o f democracy among the Middle Eastern countries since the 2011 Arab uprisings. For this purpose, we use a dummy variable, Arab Spring, giving the value o f 1 for all the years after 2011.

ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATIONS

Because the data on the KO FIndex is available only from 2000, the period o f this study is limited to 2000 through 2014. All independent and control variables are lagged by four years. The lag renders more confidence that the causal link between the independent and dependent variables flows in the right direction. The four-year lag also helps with analyzing factors that have an enduring impact on democracy.19 The Generalized Least-Squares method is used, with pooled time-series, and cross-national data on 116 countries.20 The choice o f countries is based on the size o f their population (greater than 100,000) and the availability o f data.

The two measures o f “political freedom” and “civil liberties” o f the Freedom House data set are combined and the resulting scale is converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Following Londregan and Poole, the two 0-10 interval scale variables, “D EM O C” and “A U TO C,” o f Polity IV data set are com­ bined into a single indicator by subtracting the autocracy measure from the democracy measure and by re-scaling the resulting -10-10 scale as a 0 -1 0 scale (Londregan & Poole 1996). The original values for Freedom House scores are inverted so that both Freedom House and Polity vary between 0 (“least democratic” ) and 10 (“most democratic” ).

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Statistical controls

Pooled time-series models require special statistical considerations. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, for example, is not automatically applicable to pooled time-series analyses because it ignores the pooled structure o f the data. OLS treats each case/observation as independent o f all others, not as part o f a set o f related observations. However, when systematic relationships among cases exist, regression analysis’ applicability remains questionable unless statistical controls are introduced.

Two particular violations are likely to accompany pooled data. First, the cases may not be independent along the time dimension within units, in which case autocorrelation would bias the statistical findings. Second, a form o f heteroscedasticity is likely to be present in pooled data. For a variety o f reasons, some units (i.e., states) are more variable than others at all times. For example, some states may show a wider range o f variations in the value o f some o f the variables than other states.

Many o f the independent variables included in the model— Trade, EDI, Gov’t Consumption Exp., Gov’t Activities, and Oil—are divided by GDP. Thus, their values are standardized across countries and time, mini­ mizing autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems. Any variations in these independent variables would be independent o f systemic, time-serial biases. The heteroscedasticity bias for the other variables is minimized by conducting their log-transformation. Their possible autocorrelational bias is minimized by introducing a set o f 14 dummy variables for years (2000 through 2014, less one) and a lagged dependent variable in the model. Moreover, to deal with these potential problems effectively, the Generalized Least Square regression is used.

Including the lagged dependent variable, Democracy(t 4), in the model serves several purposes. First, it helps capture any (historical, cultural, or otherwise) country-specific factors that may be missed by the explanatory and control variables. In other words, it works as a proxy control for other potential determinants o f democracy not included in the model. Second, it “helps turn the equation into a change model, transforming the dependent variable from regime type [democracy] to the change in a country’s regime type [degree o f democracy] over a given five-year period” (Ross 2001, 339). Third, it helps address the problem o f serial correlation, which often

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plagues pooled time-series, cross-sectional data such as the ones used in this study (Stimson 1985). Fourth, it helps to control for the possibility of “endogeneity bias; that is, causality running in the direction from democ­ racy to the explanatory variables instead ofvice versa” (Teorell 2010, 171).

EMPIRICAL FINDING S

Since the Middle Eastern states examined in this study are developing countries, we need to examine the impacts o f the explanatory variables upon LDCs in general first.21 The findings will help highlight some o f the unique characteristics o f democracy among the Middle Eastern countries.

LDCs

Internationalization o f national economies clearly helps developing coun­ tries improve their levels o f democracy. KOF Index is consistently significant for both electoral (Table la) and liberal (Table lb ) democracies, indicating a positive influence o f the internationalization o f national economies upon the levels o f democracy among LDCs. Interestingly, Net Trade shows a negative impact on the levels o f electoral democracy under models (1) and (2) in Table la, while it shows no effect on liberal democracy. These findings may reflect the fact that the initial changes toward greater basic freedoms, such as the initiation o f public elections o f legislators, may be more easily manipulated by the elites because, at the earlier stages o f economic growth, only the elites are able to reap the benefits o f increased financial resources via international trade, thus monopolizing the ability to control the outcome.

Such abilities o f the elites to stymie democracy, however, maybe lim­ ited. In fact, when controlled for Level o f National Income (models (3) and (4) in Table la), Net Trade exhibits no effect on the levels o f electoral democracy. Further, Level o f National Income shows a positive impact in Table lb , which indicates that the overall level o f wealth among the public is a key to liberal democracy and that the wealth among the public is at least as important as the internationalization o f national economies. G IN I Index, however, does not show any impact: the income inequality among the population per se does not directly affect the levels o f either electoral or liberal democracy in developing countries.

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Table la:Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Electoral) Democracy among LDCs. ( 1) (2 ) (3) (4)

Net Trade - . 0 0 0 * - .0 0 0 * - .0 0 0 -.0 0 0 FDI -.092 -.090 -.094 .091 GDP .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 KOF Index 033 *** .035 *** .033 *** .036 ***

Level of National Income -.073 -.060 GINI Index .0 0 2 .0 0 1 .0 0 2 .0 0 1

Islam - .0 0 2 -.0 0 2 -.0 0 2 - .0 0 2 Arab State -.347 -.329 -.358 -.338

GDP Per Capita -.227 -.243 -.134 -.166 Urbanization .001 - .0 0 1 .0 0 1 -.0 0 1 Education -.004 -.003 -.004 -.003

Gov’t Consumption Exp. -.024 * -.024 * -.024 * -.024 * Gov’t Activities -.017* -.017 * -.017 -.017 Military Exp. .071 * .071 * .071 * .072 *

Oil .005 .006 .006 .006

Rule of Law .203 * .2 1 2 * Corruption .2 1 0 * .216*

Middle Eastern States -.980 *** _ 9 4 4 *** - 985 *** - 946 ***

Constant 34.087 35.629 * 33.570 35.326 * Democracy,,^ 7 9 3 *** 7 9 5 *** 7 9 3 ***t 795 ***

Observations 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 States 116 116 116 116 Log Likelihood -1,718 -1,717 -1,717 -1,717

*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level. All independent and control variables are lagged by 4 years. Generalized Least Squares regressions were run; corrected for first-order autocorrelation using a panel-specific process. For the sake of parsimony of presentation, the dummy variables for years are not listed

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Table lb: Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Liberal! Democracy among LDCs. ( 1 ) (2 ) (3) (4)

Net Trade - . 0 0 0 - . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 FD1 -.040 -.033 -.034 -.027 GDP . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 KOF Index .018 *** Q2 2 *** q| y *** Q2 1 ***

Level of National Income .231 * .256 * GINI Index - . 0 0 0 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 0 - . 0 0 1

Islam - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 1 - . 0 0 1 Arab State - . 1 0 1 -.079 -.071 - . 0 2 1

GDP Per Capita - . 0 1 2 -.038 -.308 -.367 Urbanization - . 0 0 2 -.005 - . 0 0 2 -.005 Education . 0 0 1 . 0 0 2 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 2

Gov’t Consumption Exp. O (X) * -.019 * . 0 2 0 ** . 0 2 1 ** Gov’t Activities -.007 -.007 .008 .008 Military Exp. -.017 - . 0 1 2 -.018 -.014

Oil . 015 *** - 015 *** -.016 *** - 015 ***

Rule of Law 422 *** 415 *** Corruption 41 j *** 39Q ***

Middle Eastern States -.381 -.293 -.364 -.283

Constant 84.461 *** 87.924 *** 86.124 *** 89.252 *** Democracy^, .780 *** .810 *** 7 9 9 *** .809 ***

Observations 1,052 1,052 1,052 1,052 States 116 116 116 116 Log Likelihood -1,515 -1,517 -1.513 -1,514

*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level. All independent and control variables are lagged by 4 years. Generalized Least Squares regressions were run; corrected for first-order autocorrelation using a panel-specific process. For the sake of parsimony of presentation, the dummy variables for years are not listed

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Unlike the findings and arguments fotmd in the literature, neither Islam nor Arab State exhibits any statistically significant effect on democracy: the empirical results shown here clearly illustrate that, when controlled for the effects o f the other explanatory variables included in this study, neither the religion o f Islam22 nor the “Arab culture” affects the levels o f either electoral or liberal democracy. The deterministic argument o f some scholars about the negative influence o f the religion o f Islam on democracy and the so-called “neo-patrimonialism” explanation o f the democracy deficit in the Middle East are clearly contradicted by the empirical evidence.

None o f the indicators o f economic development ( GDP Per Capita, Urbanization, or Education) shows any effect on electoral, or liberal, democracy. This is interesting because many published works conclude that GDP per capita is one o f the most important determinants o f democracy. Given the fact that those works did not include Rule o f Law or Corruption in their analyses, and that, as explained below, both these indicators turned out statistically significant for electoral and liberal democracies, it seems that the quality o f political institutions matters more than economic factors such as economic development.

Elites’ efforts at maintaining control over the society show mixed results. Their efforts through Gov’t Consumption expenditure are effec­ tive in slowing the development o f democracy. It shows a statistically significant, negative effect on both electoral and liberal democracies. Although Gov’t Activities shows no effect on the levels o f democracy, these results indicate that the elites in developing countries are clearly capable o f impeding democracy by utilizing such tools o f manipulation. The statistically significant, positive effect o f M ilitary Expenditure, shown in Table la , may suggest that, when they feel more secure about their control over the society due to the increased military, the elites become more comfortable with allowing greater levels o f electoral freedom. As its null findings on liberal democracy in Table l b show, however, M ilitary Expenditure does n o t make the elites comfortable enough to allow true political liberalization.

As expected, Oil proves to be a negative factor for liberal democracy. All ofits coefficients in Tables lb are significant at the .001 level. For elec­ toral democracy, however, Oil does not make any difference. None o f its coefficients in Table la is significant. For most developing countries, elites’

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ability to control the finances seems to make a critical difference only in the advancement o f liberal democracy.

As the statistically significant, negative coefficients o f Middle Eastern States in Tables la and l b illustrate, the Middle Eastern countries are clearly behind other developing countries in terms o f their levels o f both electoral and liberal democracies. Also noticeable is the difference in the size ofits coefficients between Table la (-.980***, -.944***, -.985***, and -.946***) and Table lb (-.381*, -.293, -.364*, and -.283). This difference signifies that the Middle Eastern states are behind the rest o f the world in terms o f their levels o f electoral democracy but not as much in liberal democracy. Given the commonly-shared perception that the Middle Eastern countries are behind the rest o f the world at all levels o f democracy, this finding is noteworthy: when all the major explanatory variables are held constant, the Middle Eastern states are not as much behind the rest o f the world in their levels of liberal democracy as in electoral democracy.

This last finding seems to have much to do with the quality o f political institutions. The importance of providing effective Rule o f Law and reducing Corruption for improving the levels o f both electoral and liberal democracies is clearly demonstrated in these Tables. In addition, what is equally noteworthy is the fact that the quality o f political institutions brings a stronger impact to bear upon liberal democracy than it does upon electoral democracy. Ride o f Law exhibits stronger impacts in Table l b (.422*** and .391***) than in Table la (.203* and .212*). Similarly, Corruption shows stronger impacts on liberal democracy than upon electoral democracy.

Middle Eastern States

The main question o f this study is whether there is anything unique to the Middle Eastern states in terms o f democracy. The empirical findings shown in Table 2 delineate some important characteristics.

M i d d l e E a s t e r n s t a t e s a r e

b e h i n d t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d

in t e r m s o f t h e i r l e v e l s

o f e l e c t o r a l d e m o c r a c y

b u t n o t a s m u c h in l i b e r a l

d e m o c r a c y .

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Table 2: Generalized Least Squares Regression on (Electoral and Liberal) Democracy among Middle Eastern States. Variable (Electoral) (Liberal)

Net Trade . 0 0 0 ** . 0 0 0 ** . 0 0 0 - . 0 0 0 FDI .389 .397 -.131 -.146 GDP - ooo *** . ooo *** . 0 0 0 ** . 0 0 0 ** KOF Index .067 .104* .083 * .086 **

Level ofNational Income -.375 -.422 -.527 -.582 GINI Index .315 ** .329 ** .014 .032

Islam 4 7 3 *** 4 3 4 *** .092 .066

GDP Per Capita 3.148 4.195 .803 1.446 Urbanization JQJ *** - 182 *** -.042 -.049 Education .044 ** .039 * -.008 -.007

Gov’t Consumption Exp .027 -.031 .138 .148 Gov’t Activities -.051 - . 1 0 2 .093 .077 Military Exp -.091 -.239 .071 .045

Oil -.096 *** -.116*** .014 .0 1 1

Rule o f Law 1.557 * .474 Corruption -.196 .272

Arab Spring .906 .901 -.579 -.597

Constant 503.337 ** 628.946 *** 143.142 169.471 Democracy,tJl) -.281 ** -.270 ** .030 .046

Observations 48 48 48 48 States 8 8 8 8 Log Likelihood -26 -29 -14 -14

*significant at the .05 level; ** significant at the .01 level; *** significant at the .001 level. All independent and control variables are lagged by 4 years. Generalized Least Squares regressions were run; corrected for first-order autocorrelation using a panel-specific process. For the sake o f parsimony o f presentation, the dummy variables for years are not listed

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As above, internationalization o f national economies shows a sign of positively influencing the levels o f democracy. KOF Index is significant for both electoral (.104*) and liberal (.083* and .086**) democracies. This time, however, Net Trade shows a positive effect on the levels o f electoral democracy: the greater the volume o f Net Trade, the greater the levels o f electoral democracy among the Middle Eastern states. In addition, GDP exhibits a negative effect on electoral democracy (-.000*** and -.000***) while showing a positive effect on liberal democracy (.000** and .000**). This may appear to suggest that, the greater the size o f the economy ( GDP), the less electoral freedoms the Middle Eastern states allow, while, at the same time, promoting liberal democracy. A more accurate interpretation, however, is that, these results signify the ability, as well as the limitation, o f the elites to impede democracy. It seems the elites in the Middle East are less able to stymie liberal democracy than electoral democracy when the country’s economy starts expanding.

Also noticeable is the “positive” coefficients for G IN I Index (.315** and . 329 * *, for electoral democracy). They appear to imply that the greater the income inequality among the public, the greater the level o f electoral democracy in the Middle Eastern societies. As counter-intuitive as these findings may be, they actually underscore the above explanation on the elites’ ability to impede the progress o f electoral democracy. In fact, the findings on Urbanization (-.191*** and -.182***) and Oil (-.096*** and - .116***) support this assertion as well. They indicate that the greater extent o f urbanization and dependence on oil help the elites in the Middle East impede electoral democracy. While Urbanization may eventually help promote electoral democracy when it leads to improved education among the public, it seems to give the Middle Eastern elites more opportunities to maintain political control due to the public’s increased dependence on the state for various services.

One interesting twist is that the findings on Oil appear to be the exact opposite o f Tables la & lb . Oil shows a negative effect on electoral, but not liberal, democracy. It was argued before that Oil does not make a dif­ ference in the levels o f electoral democracy while it makes a statistically significant, negative impact on the progress o f liberal democracy. The seemingly contradictory results found here seem to provide yet additional evidence o f the limitation o f the elites, rather than their ability, to impede

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democracy. The elites in the Middle East seem to be capable o f hindering the progress o f electoral democracy by utilizing Oil, but they seem to be less capable o f thwarting liberal democracy.

These findings on GDP, G IN IIndex, Urbanization, and Ot7all demon­ strate the elites ability to stymie the progress o f electoral democracy, while they show no impact on the levels o f liberal democracy, except for GDP. In fact, the statistically significant, positive coefficients o f GDP actually further support the argument. Although the three indicators o f the elites efforts at maintaining their control— Gov’t Consumption Expenditure, Gov’t Activities, and Military Expenditure—show no effect on either electoral or liberal democracy, the findings on these four indicators clearly dem on­ strate the Middle Eastern elites’ ability to take advantage o f the growing economy to maintain control over the society and frustrate the progress o f electoral democracy.

Further, these findings show that the elites in the Middle Eastern states have a g reater ability to do so than those in other LDCs. Conversely, they seem to be quite limited in their ability to thwart the progress o f liberal democracy. None o f the tools o f manipulation the elites use exhibits any impact on liberal democracy. In fact, only GDP and KOF Index show a statistically significant effect on liberal democ­

racy. This indicates that, in order to hamper the growth o f democracy, the elites in die Middle Eastern countries have to rely more heavily on economic resources than their counterparts in other developing countries.

The positive effect o f Islam (A73*** and .434*** on electoral democ­ racy) indicates that the demographic homogeneity, based on the religion of Islam, helps improve the levels o f electoral democracy in the Middle East, though it shows no effect on liberal democracy. It also provides evidence that the religion o f Islam perse does not impede the progress o f democracy. These findings are consistent with those demonstrated in Tables la and lb .

Education’s positive influence on democracy is also demonstrated

T h e f in d in g s o n t h e s e f o u r in d ic a t o r s c le a r ly d e m o n s t r a t e t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n e li t e s ' a b i l i t y t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h e g r o w in g e c o n o m y t o m a in t a in c o n t r o l o v e r t h e s o c ie t y a n d f r u s t r a t e t h e p r o g r e s s o f e le c t o r a l d e m o c r a c y .

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(.044** and .039*). Although it fails to show any statistical significance for liberal democracy, improved education among the public clearly helps improve the levels o f electoral democracy, which unveils another idiosyn- cracy o f the Middle Eastern countries. Previously, we found that Education had no direct impact on either electoral or liberal democracy among developing countries in general. Among the Middle Eastern countries, however, Education proved to be an important contributing factor for electoral democracy.

One o f the indicators o f the quality o f political institutions, Rule of Law, does make a difference in the levels o f electoral democracy (1.557*) among the Middle Eastern states. When the elites abide by the rules o f law, electoral democracy is more likely to make headway. Rule o f Law, however, does not show any effect on liberal democracy, demonstrating that it does not help explain the variations in the levels o f liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states.' This may be because there is little difference among these countries in the extent to which they provide well-established, functioning rules o f law. After all, hardly any o f the Middle Eastern states can be classi­ fied as a secular state—at least not based on the way Rule o f Law is defined and operationalized. So, the extent o f their law enforcement may not be enough to secure a tangible improvement o f liberal democracy.

Corruption, further, proves to have no effect on either electoral or liberal democracy either. This, by itself, does not make sense. Corruption and democracy do not go together. A greater degree o f Corruption means a lesser degree o f guarantee for the tenets o f democracy. However, if you take into considerations the fact that many o f these autocratic leaders have recendy learned how to manipulate the “coordination goods,” such as media and other means o f communication, to stay in power, this phenomenon becomes more explicable.

One o f the lessons that many successful autocratic rulers have learned in recent years is that, as long as they control the “coordination goods,” they

O n e o f t h e in d ic a t o r s o f t h e q u a lit y o f p o lit ic a l in s t it u t io n s , R u le o f L a w , d o e s m a k e a d if f e r e n c e in t h e le v e ls o f e le c t o r a l d e m o c r a c y a m o n g t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n s t a t e s .

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can safely provide various public goods and allow certain degrees o f political freedom, without jeopardizing their political survival.23 This phenomenon, together with the fact that Rule o f Law does not show any effect on the levels o f liberal democracy in the Middle Eastern states signify the extent to which the Middle Eastern elites rely on the control o f the coordination goods in their efforts to prevent the advancement o f liberal democracy. For the advancement o f their electoral form o f democracy, the quality of political institutions seems to make a difference. For the growth o f their liberal democracy, however, the questionable enforcement o f Rule o f Law and the tight control o f the coordination goods appear to be the critical impediments. The null-findings on Arab Spring seem to provide support to this assertion. The so-called Arab Spring seems to have jump-started some movements toward democracy but it has not led to a true political liberalization o f the Middle Eastern societies.

DISCUSSION The internationalization o f national economies proved to be an important determinant for democracy in developing countries. KO FIndex turned out statistically significant for both electoral and liberal democracies in LDCs. As for the Middle East, the authoritarian regimes seem to have to rely more heavily on economic resources to stay in power than their counterparts in other developing countries. That is especially true for preventing the spread o f liberal democracy. As the above findings show, the indicators of the internationalization o f national economies— GDP and KOF Index—are the only ones that demonstrate a statistically significant impact. In other words, the elites in the Middle East are quite limited in their ability to hin­ der liberal democracy. They are more successful in impeding the progress o f electoral democracy through the use o f rent-seeking activities, but the empirical evidence indicates that such tools o f manipulation are not useful for thwarting liberal democracy.

At the same time, however, our findings also suggest that the Middle Eastern elites have quickly learned to manipulate “coordination goods” to impede democracy and stay in power. Despite the general impression that there has been some improvements o f the levels o f democracy since the 2011 Arab uprisings, the null-findings on Arab Spring make evident

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that there has been no detectable improvement of either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern societies.

Various scholars have sought to explain the democracy deficit and the persistence o f authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. None o f them, however, has fully succeeded in providing a satisfactory explanation. One of the reasons for this lies in the difficulty with defining and operationalizing the concept o f democracy in a universally acceptable manner. By utilizing the POLITY and Freedom House data sets to represent the electoral and liberal democracies respectively, this study has shown a more sensible way to operationalize democracy than the traditional approach taken by most scholars, which relies on one indicator to measure the entire concept of democracy. The resultant empirical findings have allowed us to conduct deeper analyses of the impacts o f the presumed determinants o f democracy. Consequently, we are now able to make more nuanced critiques o f the explanations on the Middle Eastern democracy deficit.

Take the “rentier-state” theory, for example. It was criticized for its failure to account for the endurance o f authoritarianism in the resource- poor countries o f the region. The findings o f this study have helped us realize that, if we focus on the electoral aspects o f democracy, the “rentier-state” theory is remarkably accurate. We have also realized that some o f the critiques o f the theory make more sense if we focus our atten­ tion on liberal democracy. In other words, we have discovered that the “rentier-state” theory is not without merit: thus, dismissing its arguments would be a mistake.

This study has also rendered credence to the critiques o f the essential- ists’ arguments that Islam and democracy are not compatible, and that the idea o f democracy is alien to the mindset o f Muslims. The empirical evidence has clearly refuted these claims. It shows that the greater the Muslim population among the Middle Eastern states, the greater their levels o f electoral democracy.

The focus on Arab culture to explain the democracy deficit in the

The null-findings on Arab Spring make evident that there has been no detectable improvement of either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern societies.

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Middle East—particularly the “neo-patrimonialism” argument by Sharabi and others—seems to miss the mark as well. After all, the same line of argument was used by some other scholars to try to explain the democracy deficit among the Confucian states, and it has already been refuted by many scholars, including the findings o f some empirical studies. This study has shown that, when it is controlled for the effects o f all the other variables, Arab State shows no direct effect on either electoral or liberal democracy. This demonstrates a serious under-specification o f the model by past stud­ ies, and refutes their conclusion on the influence o f Arab culture upon democracy.24 The “neo-patrimonialism” argument not only lacks the vigor o f logical soundness but it is also contradicted by the empirical evidence as well. Further, it fails to explain the variations in the levels o f democracy among the Middle Eastern states that are all Arab states.25

The argument that focused on the coercive apparatus o f the authori­ tarian regimes of the Middle East boils down to the debate between the “will” and the “capacity” explanations. This study has shown that the “capacity” per se does not help explain the variations in the levels o f either electoral or liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states. While the argument focused on the “will” o f the elites to use the coercive apparatus to prevent democracy requires further research, this study has allowed us to fine tune the focus o f inquiry, specifically upon the “will,” much more than past studies.

Finally, the “modernization” theory has also been criticized by many scholars for failing to account for the democracy deficit among the high- income, oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. Our findings have shown that, in looking at the levels o f liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern states, the theory’s explanation is actually accurate. As we have discovered, the only variable that helps explain the variations in the levels o f liberal democracy among the Middle Eastern countries is the internationalization o f their national economies. Given the fact that its two indicators— GDP and KOF Index—are the only indicators that proved statistically significant for liberal democracy, it seems that the “modernization” theory is quite valid after all for the Middle Eastern states.

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N otes

1. For more information about the literature on political culture please see Brynen et al., Beyond Arab Spring, pp. 96-104.

2. Democratization efforts began in the mid-1980s with the rise of radical Islamic movements and gained impetus after 9 /1 1 . Bolrne (2015, 22); Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (2000, 3).

3. See Diamond (2008). 4. See Schumpeter (1947, 269). 5. Another problem is that the checklist o f civil liberties was partly changed

in 1989. To maintain a constant measure o f democracy, therefore, one may have to choose to limit the date to either before 1989 or after 1990. We chose the latter.

6. Inglehart and Welzel (2009) argued that the essence o f democracy lies in its empowerment o f ordinary citizens and that, whether a democracy is effective or not depends not only on the extent to which civil and political rights exist on paper, but also the degree to which elected officials actually respect these rights. The existence of such rights on paper is measured by Freedom House’s annual country ratings. As the “effectiveness” o f a country’s democratic institutions is not measured by Freedom House, they suggested the use o f the World Bank’s gov­ ernance scores, in conjunction with the Freedom House scores, so that a “rough index of effective democracy can be obtained by multiplying these two scores.” (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 44) Teorell and Hadenius (2006), however, had explained their three lines of criticism o f this alternative index proposed by Welzel and Inglehart in 2006, pointing out a serious problem with its construct validity. Hadenius and Teorell (2005) also found a systematic tendency o f the Freedom House scores to underestimate the level of democracy, whereas the Polity scores have a systematic tendency to overestimate the level o f democracy. Consequently, they recommended an alternative index o f democracy by taking the average o f the Freedom House and the Polity scores to minimize measurement bias. This last approach, however, represents yet another effort to produce a global index that would cover all aspects of democracy. As we have explained, such an approach is misguided, if not misleading. Hence, such an index is not appropriate either.

7. The concept of the internationalization of national economies requires multiple measures to capture it adequately. Several economic indicators - trade, finance, and production, - allow us to capture the totality o f the concept (Sachs 1998). Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton ( Global Transformations) also used these three areas of international economic activities to measure the extent and depth o f global economic interconnectedness. Net Trade is used as one o f the measures to gauge the extent of the internationalization of national economies. It is indexed by the state’s net trade, measured as percentage o f its GDP to standardize

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data for the cross-national variations. FDI measures the net inflows of investment acquiring a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor, and it is another ideal measure o f a country’s degree o f economic internationalization. The data on FDI is based on balance o f payments data reported by the IMF, supple­ mented by data on net FDI reported by the OECD and official national sources. The production aspect of a country’s economic internationalization is captured by using the GDP(Gross Domestic Product). (Sachs, “International Economics,” Held, et al., Global Transformations)

8. This variable is measured by the per capita GNI (Gross National Income). The data are obtained from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

9. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016, supplemented by the C IA World Factbook (1990 - 2015).

10. Ross (2001) found a statistically significant, negative impact o f “Islam” on democracy. Unlike this study, however, his model failed to control Islam for Economic Development and Internationalization o f n a tional Economies-, thus, fall­ ing short o f the statistical specifications oflater studies by Imai (2006 and 2010).

11. Islam is measured as the percentage o f Muslims within the total popula­ tion in each state. The data are from the CL4 World Factbook (1990 ~ 2015).

12. It is measured by GDP per capita, log transformed. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

13. An increase in the urban population may not necessarily represent an increase in the overall wealth for the society unless if is controlled for the quality of life among the urban residents. Urbanization is therefore calculated by multi­ plying the “proportion of urban, as percentage of the total, population” and the “percentage o f urban population with access to improved water source.” The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016.

14. Democracy is stable in affluent countries. One possible explanation for this may be found in education. More highly educated people are more likely to embrace democratic values. Przeworski et al. argued that education increases the probability of survival of democracy at each level of income. Feng and Zak argued that democratic transitions are more likely to take place in nations where, ceteris paribus, the citizens are better educated.

15. The data are from the World Development Indicators, 2016 (World Bank), supplemented by the C IA World Factbook (1990 - 2 0 1 5 ) .

16. The data are from the Penn World Tables. 17. Ross (2001, 338). The data are from the World Development Indicators,

2016. 18. The Middle Eastern states included in this study are: Egypt, Iran, Jordan,

Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. The choice o f the countries were

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dictated by the availability of a sufficient amount of data. 19. Imai (2006) found that such an enduring impact is detected by lagging

independent variables by three to five years, beyond which the statistical significance of the variables begins to diminish rapidly.

20. The 116 countries included in this study are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botsuwana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, G abon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

21. Although Kuwait and United Arab Emirate are categorized by the world bank as high income countries based on their per capita income, their societal characteristics are unmistakably those o f developing countries.

22. We ran separate regression analyses by measuring Islam as a) the percent­ age of Muslims within the total population in each state and b) a dummy variable for Muslim-majority states. The results were exactly the same between the two in terms o f their statistical significance, or lack thereof.

23. See “Development and Democracy” by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs (2005) for details.

24. For the detailed discussion on the under-specifications o f a statistical model, see Cranmer and Desmarais; Diehl & Wright; and Poast.

25. Due to the lack o f data on some of the variables and the country’s high- income status, Israel is not included in this analysis.

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