w6 : drugs and crimes

6/5/2021 Illicit Drug Trade

https://myclassroom.apus.edu/d2l/le/enhancedSequenceViewer/34763?url=https%3A%2F%2Ff54cbe36-23a9-4505-85fe-e251f80ec34d.sequences.a… 1/1

Since the early 2000s, Mexico has been “in the midst of a ba�le between warring organized crime fac�ons” (Simser, 2011, p. 267) commonly referred to as cartels that exploit corrup�on, subversion, penetra�on, extreme violence, assassina�ons, kidnappings, and other violent methods intended to promote their interests. Moreover, cartels have been warring not only with the government but also among themselves, striving to establish dominance and control over key plazas that are portals for the smuggling of illicit drugs into the United States (Simser, 2011). Some researchers and policymakers even claim that Mexican cartels should be defined as insurgent groups that have a real chance of seizing power in the country should their further evolu�onary pace remain on the exis�ng track (Blaine, 2012). This opinion complies with a similar viewpoint accredited to the Drug Enforcement Administra�on that there has occurred “a transi�on from the gangsterism of tradi�onal narco hitmen to paramilitary terrorism with guerilla tac�cs” (Turbiville, 2010, p. 123). Therefore, this evolu�on of cartels calls for the development and implementa�on of new an�-drug measures and combat strategies. Although the Mexican government, especially under the rule of President Calderon, has a�empted to implement new amendments since 2006, they have proved to be only par�ally successful (Turbiville, 2010). Understandably, violence is an integral part of the illicit drug trade irrespec�ve of the par�cular drug and country, yet the level of violence in Mexico is truly alarming (Bei�el, 2012). As of 2006, there were four main cartels: (a) the Tijuana/Arellano Felix organiza�on, (b) the Gulf cartel, (c) the Sinaloa cartel, and (d) the Juarez/Vicente Carillo Fuentes organiza�on (Bei�el, 2012). The government’s steps, in par�cular, the involvement of the military in the fight with cartels, enhanced intelligence gathering, coopera�on with the United States, and other measures, have resulted in extreme fragmenta�on of the organiza�ons (Bei�el, 2012). Hence, as of 2015, there are now nine cartels along with the four previously men�oned; the five new cartels are (a) Los Zetas, (b) Beltran Leyva Organiza�on, (c) La Familia Michoacana, (d) Knights Templar, and (e) Cartel Jalisco-New Genera�on (Bei�el, 2015). These cartels have managed to func�on with li�le problems despite the fact the government has either captured or killed the kingpins of all of these cartels, for instance, the capture of Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman from the Sinaloa in 2014 and the arrest of Hector Beltran Leyva from the Beltran Leyva Organiza�on in 2014 (Bei�el, 2015). Furthermore, the violence remains an actual problem, irrespec�ve of some successes in bringing down the homicide rate as cartels have intensified ac�vi�es related to kidnappings, extor�ons, and threats (Bei�el, 2015).