The Media and Mind Games
LPM9
ict-lone-wolf-osint-jihad-wiskind.pdf
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LONE WOLF TERRORISM AND OPEN SOURCE JIHAD:
AN EXPLANATION AND ASSESSMENT
Claire Wiskind, (Research Assistant, ICT)
Summer 2016
* The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT).
ABSTRACT
Al Qaeda and Daesh publish English language magazines to appeal to Western
supporters and encourage them to join their cause as a fighter or as a lone wolf
terrorist. A key feature of Al Qaeda’s magazine, Inspire, is a section titled Open
Source Jihad, which provides aspiring jihadists with step-by-step instructions to carry
out lone terror attacks in the West. By examining ten attack types that have been
published over the past six years, this paper explains Open Source Jihad, presents
cases where these types of attacks have been carried out, and assesses the threat
presented by the easy access to Open Source Jihad.
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Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 3
Lone Wolf Terrorism ......................................................................................... 3
English Language Literature: Dabiq and Inspire .............................................. 7
Open Source Jihad .......................................................................................... 9
OPEN SOURCE JIHAD ATTACK INSTRUCTIONS ..................................... 12
Attacks carried out ........................................................................................... 12
Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom: The AQ Chef ........................... 12
Assassinations ............................................................................................... 15
The Hidden Airplane Bomb ......................................................................... 23
Car Bombs Inside America ........................................................................... 26
Pickup Truck Mowing Machine ................................................................... 29
Attacks not yet carried out ............................................................................... 32
Destroying Buildings .................................................................................... 32
Parcel Bomb .................................................................................................. 34
Magnetic Car Bomb ...................................................................................... 35
The Door Trap Bomb .................................................................................... 36
Causing Road Accidents ............................................................................... 37
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION ................................................................ 38
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................... 43
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INTRODUCTION
Lone Wolf Terrorism
Lone wolf terrorism is exceedingly difficult to detect and therefore prevent.
The attackers are usually citizens of the country that they are attacking, so they cannot
easily be traced or stopped at borders. They are able to carry out their attacks with
readily available materials, from purchasing a gun to creating a rather simple bomb
out of materials that can be bought at a hardware store with little suspicion. If a
country wanted to eradicate lone wolf terrorism, it would need to completely eliminate
the sale of goods such as guns, fireworks, nails, pressure cookers, lead pipes,
Christmas lights, and matches. And even then, those committed to carrying out a lone
attack would just have to get a little bit more creative or acquire the necessary
materials on the black market.
This paper focuses on radical Islamist lone wolf terror attacks, particularly
those inspired by Al Qaeda and Daesh 1 , which follow the pattern of attacks outlined in
Al Qaeda’s “Open Source Jihad” in their magazine, Inspire. One of the greatest
challenges when combatting and preventing radical Islamist lone wolf attacks is that it
is a challenge of combatting ideology rather than a force of ground troops. Western
powers fighting against radical Islamist terror organizations, can beat them back from
territory, block their funding, and imprison all of their leaders, cutting them off from
all outside communication, and still lone wolf terror attacks would occur. This is in
part due to the lack of outside demand and hierarchy characteristic of lone wolf
attacks. There is no chain of command through which to track these soldiers of
leaderless jihad. There is no cable to be intercepted telling them where, when, and
how to attack. This is self-directed terror in the name of a global ideological
movement that is nearly impossible to track or identify until they strike.
Lone wolf terrorists operate individually, without belonging to an organized
terror group or network. Their attacks are “conceived and directed by the individual
1 Also referred to as the Islamic State (IS), Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State in the Levant
(ISIL)
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without any direct command or hierarchy.” 2 While lone wolf attackers can, and often
do, identify with the ideology of a particular terror organization, they do not
collaborate on their attacks with these organizations. Similarly, a lone wolf terrorist
may have contact with members of an established terror organization but those
members do not have any influence in orchestrating the lone actor’s attack. For
example, there is evidence that Nidal Hassan, the perpetrator of the 2009 Fort Hood
shootings, had been in email correspondence with Anwar al Awlaki of Al Qaeda, but
showed no direct sign of terrorist intent in these emails. Rather it appears that this
correspondence strengthened Hassan’s opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan
and his inclination towards Al Qaeda’s ideology. 3 This case appears to follow the
common pattern of radicalization attributed to lone wolf terrorists where personal
grievances, in Hassan’s case his opposition to America’s wars abroad and forcing
Muslim soldiers to fight in them, are bolstered by a connection to online sympathizers,
Hassan’s communication with al Awlaki, that pushes someone from disaffected
individual to lone wolf terrorist. 4 Within this vein, there are also lone wolves and lone
wolf packs: lone wolves are a pair who radicalize and carry out an attack together and
a lone wolf pack is a small group of individuals who self-radicalize with the jihadist
narrative and carry out an attack. 5
Lone wolf terrorists pose a unique threat compared to established terror
organizations in that they are incredibly difficult to identify before they strike, posing
a major security threat across the globe. 6 Scholars and policy makers alike tend to
view terrorism as a collective, group activity and therefore focus on the group
dynamics and collective socialization in analyzing the planning and execution of
terror attacks. Lone wolf terrorists, on the other hand, “may identify or sympathize
with extremist movements but, by definition, do not form part of these movements”
2 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (2010): 856.
3 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (2010): 857.
4 Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization
Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies,” Report for the U.S. Department of Justice, February 2015, 2. 5 Raffaello Pantucci, “A Typology of Lone Wolves: Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist Terrorists,”
Developments in Radicalization and Political Violence, (2011): 44-45. 6 Jeffrey D. Simon, “Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding a Growing Threat,” in Lone Actors – An Emerging
Security Threat, ed. Aaron Richman and Yair Sharan (Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 2015), 3-7.
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themselves. 7 One of the major advantages in leaderless resistance is that jihadists can
seriously disrupt the functions of a community or state without having to resort to the
scale of 9/11-style attacks in order to be effective; smaller attacks have proven to still
be psychologically devastating on the population. 8
Furthermore, they are not
concerned with alienating supporters in the same way that terror organizations are. 9
Historically, lone wolves had fewer physical, financial, and intellectual
resources, so they were less capable of planning and carrying out complex attacks. 10
This means that lone wolfs tended to use firearms as their weapon of choice,
particularly in the US due to the ease of access there. 11
Financial resources are no
longer such a major constraint; as will be shown later in this paper, a terror attack can
effectively be carried out with a few thousand dollars in supplies. With the advent of
the internet, intellectual resources are readily available for the would-be terrorist to
both promote radicalized ideologies and to receive instruction on how to carry out
attacks, from advice on how to avoid detection by the authorities to step-by-step
instructions on how to build a bomb with easily available materials that will not raise
suspicion.
In 2008 the United States government launched “Operation Vigilant Eagle” in
response to “an increase in recruitment, threatening communications, and weapons
procurement” by extremist groups, white supremacists and militia/sovereign citizen
extremist groups within the US. 12
A lone wolf initiative was later added in an attempt
to identify potential lone attackers before they can act violently. The prevalence of
lone wolf terrorism is not limited to radical Islamism, but is also prominent among
white supremacists, such as Anders Breivik of Norway, and anti-abortion activists.
7 Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33 (2010):856-857.
8 Geroge Michael, Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of Leaderless Resistance, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 2012), 3. 9 Jeffrey D. Simon, “Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding a Growing Threat,” in Lone Actors – An Emerging
Security Threat, ed. Aaron Richman and Yair Sharan (Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 2015), 4. 10
Michael Becher, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 37 (2014): 962. 11
Michael Becher, “Explaining Lone Wolf Target Selection in the United States,” Studies in Conflict and
Terrorism, 37 (2014): 970 12
Gary Fields and Evan Perez, “ FBI Seeks to Target Lone Extremists,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2009,
accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124501849215613523
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Lone wolves often broadcast their intent through statements, threats, letters, and video
proclamations and can potentially be identified from these declarations. 13
The challenge that law enforcement officers face in this respect is two-fold.
First, these declarations are often made during or shortly before the attacks. Sixteen
minutes into her attack at a community center in San Bernardino, California, Tashfeen
Malik posted on Facebook “We pledge allegiance to Khalifa bu bkr al baghdadi al
quarishi”, referring to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of Daesh. 14
While this
declaration of allegiance aids authorities in investigating the motivation of this attack,
it does little to help them apprehend the assailants before they could carry out their
attack. The second challenge is a question of free speech. Merely posting on a social
media site that one agrees with Daesh or Al Qaeda’s ideologies or reading their
magazines is not enough to indict an individual in most countries. In a notable
exception, possession of Al Qaeda’s Inspire has led to prosecutions in the UK under
the Terrorism Acts. 15
Authorities tread carefully around the line between free speech
and threats of terror, producing overcrowded and therefore largely ineffective watch
lists. 16
Indeed, the US’ Terrorist Identities and Datamart Environment (TIDE) had 1.1
million people listed as of 2015. Cherif and Said Kouachi, who attacked Charlie
Hebdo in Paris in 2015, were on the American terror watch list for years, and known
to have travelled to Yemen where they may have received training from Al Qaeda. 17
No mechanism to monitor potential lone wolf terrorists can be invariably successful in
preventing attacks, but a reevaluation and restructuring of terror watch lists and
sharing of these lists among countries may be necessary to counter the threat of
increasingly mobile lone wolf terrorists. Sharing such information among law
13
Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization
Pathways to forge Prevention Strategies,” The U.S. Department of Justice, February 2015, 9. 14
Pamela Engel, “Here’s the ISIS message the female San Bernardino shooter posted on Facebook during the
attack,” Business Insider, December 17, 2015, accessed June 14, 2016. http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-
message-tashfeen-malik-posted-on-facebook-during-attack-2015-12 15
Ian Black, “Inspire magazine: the self-help manual for al-Qaida terrorists,” The Guardian, May 24, 2011,
accessed June 14, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2013/may/24/inspire-magazine-self-
help-manual-al-qaida-terrorists 16
“Questions raised about effectiveness of terror watch-list,” Homeland Security News Wire, October 25, 2007,
accessed June 14, 2016. http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/questions-raised-about-effectiveness-
terror-watch-list 17
Coleen Rowley, “Visa Waiver Program Has Sam Weak Links; Mass Surveillance and Terrorist Watchlisting
Don’t Work,” Huffington Post, December 3, 2015, accessed June 14, 2016.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/coleen-rowley/visa-waiver-program-has-t_b_8710714.html
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enforcement agencies and states is also vital when monitoring those who access and
publish jihadist materials online. While viewing these materials themselves is not
illegal, it may give authorities an indication of impending threats. This paper seeks to
explain and assess Open Source Jihad as presented by Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine
and how adherents of radical Islamist organizations, Al Qaeda and Daesh in particular,
have carried out these methods of attack. First Al Qaeda and Daesh’s English
language magazines will be explained as recruitment tools that encourage lone attacks
and the use of Open Source Jihad. Ten Open Source Jihad operations will be
explained with examples given of their execution where possible. Finally, the
measures taken by Western governments to prevent lone wolf attacks using these
methods will be discussed including an assessment of the threat presented by the easy
online availability of Open Source Jihad.
English Language Literature: Dabiq and Inspire
In 2004, Abu Musab al Suri, a prominent Al Qaeda strategist, published The
Call to Global Islamic Resistance, a 1,600-page manifesto that outlined his strategy
for global jihad. With the pragmatism of a military commander, al Suri explained the
three primary categories of jihad from 1963 to 2001: the school of Dynamic
Organization, the school of Open Fronts, and the school of Individual Jihad. He
deemed Dynamic Organizations, secret regional organizations that seek to topple
existing apostate governments through armed jihad, a failure. Particularly with
increased American and Western presence in the region after 9/11, Dynamic
Organization is no longer a viable option. He noted the successes of Open Front Jihad,
confronting the enemy in existing theaters of conflict, particularly in the case of
Afghanistan where an Islamic government was eventually established. He suggested
that the future of global Islamic jihad would be in combining Open Front Jihad and
Individual Jihad, which compliments Open Front Jihad by mobilizing the ummah
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(community of Muslim believers) and achieving a greater global impact. 18
Participants in Individual Jiahd, now often referred to as lone wolf terrorists, are
advised to strike wherever they can hurt the enemy the most, inflict the highest
casualties, and inspire more Muslims to join in jihad. 19
The Call for a Global Islamic
Resistance remains integral in Al Qaeda’s modern strategy, particularly concerning
mobilizing followers to join Open Front Jihad and Individual Jihad.
In June 2011, As Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media wing, published a video titled “You
are Responsible Only for Yourself” that urged Muslims in the West to take it upon
themselves to acquire weapons and target major public figures and institutions in their
home countries. 20
Adam Gadahn, an American and senior Al Qaeda operative,
implores Muslim viewers in the West to “remember that they are perfectly paced to
play an important and decisive part in the jihad against the Zionists and Crusaders” by
striking the enemy from within. 21
In this 10 minute video, Gadahn focuses on the easy
access to guns in the United States which provides a “golden opportunity and blessing”
from God that must be taken advantage of. 22
He claims that attacks within the land of
the enemy are a stronger weapon than fighting in the arenas of Open Front Jihad,
indicating a shift from al Suri’s aforementioned strategy. 23
This is conceivably due to
the considerable pool of recruits already available in the theaters of jihad to join the
fight, making lone wolfs who can strike from within the West more strategically
valuable.
18
Abu Musab al Suri, The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance, 7-9.
https://ia800409.us.archive.org/24/items/TheCallForAGlobalIslamicResistance-
EnglishTranslationOfSomeKeyPartsAbuMusabAsSuri/TheCallForAGlobalIslamicResistanceSomeKeyParts.pdf 19
Abu Musab al Suri, The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance, 12.
https://ia800409.us.archive.org/24/items/TheCallForAGlobalIslamicResistance-
EnglishTranslationOfSomeKeyPartsAbuMusabAsSuri/TheCallForAGlobalIslamicResistanceSomeKeyParts.pdf 20
Ramon Spaaij, “Lone Actors: Challenges and Opportunities for Countering Violent Extremism,” in Lone
Actors: An Emerging Threat eds. Aaron Richman and Yair Sharan, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2015), 124. 21
“Adam Gadahn American Jihadi, Al Queda Video Released June 2 2011,” MRCTV, last modified June 5, 2011. http://www.mrctv.org/videos/adam-gadahn-american-jihadi-al-queda-video-released-june-2-2011 22
“Adam Gadahn American Jihadi, Al Queda Video Released June 2 2011,” MRCTV, last modified June 5, 2011. http://www.mrctv.org/videos/adam-gadahn-american-jihadi-al-queda-video-released-june-2-2011 23
“Adam Gadahn American Jihadi, Al Queda Video Released June 2 2011,” MRCTV, last modified June 5, 2011. http://www.mrctv.org/videos/adam-gadahn-american-jihadi-al-queda-video-released-june-2-2011
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Al Qaeda and its offshoot, Daesh, use English language magazines to invite
new recruits to join the fight on the front lines as mujahideen and to carry out
independently planned attacks in the West. These organizations and their magazines
were chosen for the focus of this paper because of their growing role as motivators of
radicalized Islamist lone wolf attacks in the West and their focus on recruitment in the
United States and Europe via English language literature. Al Qaeda’s magazine,
Inspire, was first published in 2010 under the direction of Anwar al Awlaki, an
American-born Muslim preacher and member of Al Qaeda in Yemen, 24
and edited by
Samir Khan, an American national who moved to Yemen in 2009 to join Al Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. 25
Written in familiar American vernacular, Inspire, does just
as its name implies, it inspires its followers and calls its readers to join jihad on the
front lines as soldiers or to engage in jihad in the land of the enemy. It also
encourages Western readers to plan attacks and strike the kufr (disbelievers or infidels)
from within, outlining methods of attacks in a feature penned by the ‘AQ Chef’ called
“Open Source Jihad.” Similarly, Dabiq was first published in 2014 and called on
readers to “sacrifice everything precious to them for the sake of fulfilling their duty to
Allah” and to immigrate to the Daesh if possible. 26
It condemns the West for its
perceived aggression against Islam and lauds “’lone’ knights of the Khalifah” who
strike against the “crusader powers of the West.” 27
Open Source Jihad
While both magazines leave a similar impression (praising martyrs who died in
the name of Islam, encouraging attacks from within the West, inviting readers to join
the mujahideen on the front lines, quoting texts and commentary from the Quran to
empower and inspire readers, touting the organizations’ accomplishments), Al
24
Robert Wright, “Drone Strikes and the Boston Marathon Bombing,” The Atlantic, April 21, 2013, accessed
June 1, 2016. http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/drone-strikes-and-the-boston-
marathon-bombing/275164/ 25
Robbie Brown and Kim Severson, “2 nd
American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” The New York Times,
September 30, 2011, accessed June 23, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-
khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-the-american-middle-class.html 26
“Foreword,” Dabiq 13, January 2016, 3. 27
“Foreword,” Dabiq 12, November 2015, 2-3.
10
Qaeda’s Inspire has the Open Source Jihad feature. Open Source Jihad is “a resource
manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb making techniques, security
measures, guerrilla tactics, weapons training, and all other jihad related activities” that
would allow those so inclined to “train at home instead of risking dangerous travel
abroad” to join the fight on the front lines. 28
Open Source Jihad is presented as an
easier and likely more effective way to support the ummah. The various operations
and tactics are designed to avoid attracting the attention of the authorities while
preparing for the attack; it’s DIY terrorism for the average disaffected individual. 29
In
the words of al Awlaki himself: “I was a preacher of Islam involved in non-violent
Islamic activism. However, with the American invasion of Iraq and continued US
aggression against Muslims, I could not reconcile between living in the US and being
a Muslim, and I eventually came to the conclusion that jihad against America is
binding upon myself, just as it is binding on every other able Muslim.” 30
The message
is abundantly clear and repeated in every issue: if you feel the same, follow these
instructions and you too can be empowered against an oppressive enemy.
To further embolden would-be jihadists, both magazines extol the jihadists who
fight on behalf of radical Islam at home and abroad. This includes page long
obituaries praising the name and memory of those who died fighting with the
mujahideen and full articles dedicated to lone jihadists who carry out attacks abroad.
For example, Issue 11 of Inspire featured 20 pages of praise for the 2013 Boston
Marathon bombings and the perpetrators, the Tsarnaev brothers. 31
When explaining
how to become an ‘urban assassin’ in Open Source Jihad, the magazine hails Nidal
Hassan, the 2009 Fort Hood shooter, as aspirational for would-be jihadists, like a
David against the Goliath of the United States. 32
Inspire further lauds Faisal Shahzad,
who attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in 2010, and whose notable
28
“Open Source Jihad,” Inspire 1, June 2010, 32. 29
“Open Source Jihad,” Inspire 1, June 2010, 32.. 30
Anwar al Awlaki, “Shaykh Anwar’s Message to the American People and Muslims in the West,” Inspire 1,
June 2010, 57. 31
Abu Ziyad Al-Muhajir, “The Inevitable,” Inspire Issue 11, May 2013, 16-22.
Abu Abdillah Almoravid, “Who & Why,” Inspire Issue 11, March 2014, 28-33.
Muhannad J.S., “America’s Bitter Harvest,” Inspire Issue 11, March 2014, 34-35. 32
“Open Source Jihad,” Inspire 9, May 2012, 39.
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inside work within the West Al Qaeda claims led to the resignation of the director of
national intelligence at the time. 33
Although Dabiq does not contain a specific section giving instructions for
carrying out lone attacks in the West, it goes to great lengths to name and praise lone
attackers and encourages others to follow in their footsteps. This includes
commendation of Numan Haider, who stabbed two counter terrorism police officers in
Australia, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau who shot and killed a Canadian soldier in Ottowa,
Martin Couture-Rouleau, who killed a Canadian soldier in a hit-and-run, and Zale
Thompson, who attacked four policemen with a hatchet in Queens, New York. 34
They also feature a full article praising Amedy Coulibaly for his piety and attacks in
Paris in January 2015. In this article, Daesh also welcomes Coulibaly’s wife to the
khalifah, reassuring other would-be jihadists that their families would be cared for by
Daesh after their shaheed (martyrdom). 35
Dabiq further cheers Elton Simpson and
Nadir Soofi for attacking a Prophet drawing competition in Garland, Texas in 2015. 36
Dabiq also focused its praise on Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, who shot
and killed 14 people in San Bernardino, California in 2015. Notably, Dabiq
celebrated that they planned and carried out the attack as a married couple, “aiding
one another in righteousness.” 37
In both publications, they frame these attacks as the
direct result of Western, American in particular, offenses against and interference in
the Muslim world. While Inspire provides the guidance for carrying out lone wolf
attacks, Dabiq goes to great lengths to encourage them.
It should be noted that while the attacks mentioned above and those further
expanded upon in this paper may resemble those outlined in Open Source Jihad and
encouraged in the pages of Dabiq, there is no direct causal link between these
magazines and the attacks. However, these materials are freely and easily available
online. In many cases, investigators discovered these materials in the possession of
the perpetrators of these attacks or they admitted to reading them. In publishing these
33
“Open Source Jihad,” Inspire 1, June 2010, 33. 34
John Cantile, ”If I were the US President Today…,” Dabiq 5, November 2014, 37. 35
“The Good Example of Abu Basir Al- Ifriqi,” Dabiq 7, February 2015, 68-71. 36
“Foreword,” Dabiq 9, May 2015, 3. 37
“Foreword,” Dabiq 13, January 2016, 3.
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English language magazines, both Al Qaeda and Daesh aim to propagate their brand
of radical Islamism and call on readers to join in their fight, either on the front lines or
as lone jihadists who attack the Western enemy from within. In Dabiq, Daesh
prioritizes building the Khalifah and in Inspire al-Qaeda pushes lone attacks in order
to compel policy change in the West. As these materials are widespread and
compelling, it is reasonable to believe that they had some influence in the decision-
making, planning, and execution of the attacks featured in this paper while not directly
causing them.
OPEN SOURCE JIHAD ATTACK INSTRUCTIONS
Attacks carried out
Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom: The AQ Chef
Perhaps the most infamous of Inspire's Open Source Jihad articles, this 'recipe'
teaches a would-be jihadi, or anyone with internet access, how to build a bomb with
readily available ingredients that generally will not raise suspicion when purchased.
For a jihadi, these materials have the added advantage of being easily disposed of or
hidden in the case of a police search. A smaller pipe-bomb can be ready in a matter of
days and kill around ten people, or a larger bomb can be prepared in about a month
and kill dozens of people, according to the AQ Chef. The only are easily accessible or
purchasable ingredients 38
This bomb's 'recipe' is the basis for many of the other Open
Source Jihad bombs and is so straightforward it reads like a middle school science lab
manual.
This article gained international attention after the April 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings in which two brothers used a bomb recipe very similar to the one above to
kill 3 and wound at least 264 at the finish line of the Boston Marathon. The brothers,
Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, detonated two pressure cooker-bombs containing
38
"How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom," Inspire 1, June 2010, 33-40.
13
BB-like pellets and nails that were hidden in backpacks. 39
Many researchers have
studied how these two brothers, Muslim immigrants from Chechnya and American
citizens, were radicalized and driven to commit this act; however this paper is more
concerned with how they acquired the know-how to create these bombs and how they
avoided detection of their plans.
Upon search of their home, the police found copies of Inspire saved on their
computer, the article “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom” in particular.
Although the Tsarnaevs’ pressure cooker bomb largely follows the procedure outlined
above, they substituted or added extra ingredients and developed a more sophisticated
triggering mechanism using toy car remote controls. 40
Evidence suggests that
Tamerlan, the older brother, received some bomb making guidance during a trip to
Dagestan, Russia, which may explain the more advanced triggering method. 41
When
fleeing the police, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar threw homemade pipe bombs at the police
that again appear to follow this recipe from Inspire. 42
Although they were not directly affiliated with Al Qaeda, the brothers were
linked to Al Qaeda in ideology and consumed the English language materials of
Anwar al Awlaki, including Inspire and his sermons on YouTube. Inspire’s 11 th
issue praises the Tsarnaevs’ choice of Boston as the target for the attack since it was
not considered a high-risk target like New York City or Washington DC. Furthermore,
it asserts that the bombings “have exposed many hidden shortcomings of the
American security and intelligence system” 43
and showed that 1-2 lightly armed
people could disrupt a city as large as Boston. 44
Indeed, there was a nearly 2 percent
drop in the Dow Jones Industrial Average the day of the attack, 0.82 percent of which
39
“Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts,” CNN, April 8, 2015. Accessed June 2, 2016.
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/ 40
Ekaterina Stepanova, “Lone Wolves and Network Agents in Leaderless Jihad (The Case of the Boston
Marathon Bombing Cell)” in Perseverance of Terrorism: Focus on Leaders, eds. M. Milosevic and K. Rekawek
(Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2014), 56. 41
Brian Bennet, Richard A. Serrano, and Ken Dilanian, “Boston bombs showed some expertise,” Los Angeles
Times, April 24, 2013. Accessed June 2, 2016. http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/24/nation/la-na-boston-fbi-
bomber-20130425 42
“Bombs tossed at cops show to marathon bombing jury,” CBS News, March 19, 2015. Accessed June 2, 2016.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/boston-marathon-bombing-trial-jury-pipe-bombs/ 43
Abu Ziyad Al-Muhaji, “The Inevitable,” Inspire 11, May 2013, 22. 44
Abu Ziyad Al-Muhaji, “The Inevitable,” Inspire 11, May 2013, 35.
14
is attributed directly to the attacks. Terrorist attacks on this scale cause profit
expectations to go down and risk premiums to go up due to uncertainty and the
destruction of physical and intangible capital. 45
Therefore, this attack falls within Al
Qaeda’s categorization of an indirect economic target that hurts the target country’s
economy without directly damaging any economic structures, such as banks or the
New York Stock Exchange, while also showing the government’s intelligence
weaknesses and creating an atmosphere of fear and terror. 46
Al Qaeda claimed the
Tsarnaev’s as their own in Inspire after the bombings, further incentivizing readers to
also carry out attacks and achieve the same notoriety. 47
When an attack like this happens, it is inevitable to ask “could this have been
prevented?” In this case, Al Qaeda makes the point that “lone-jihad is impossible to
counter and stop, except when basic cooking ingredients and building materials
become illegal!” 48
While “impossible” might be a little extreme, this type of do-it-
yourself attack is very hard to track since the materials necessary for this bomb
(matches, a battery, nails, Christmas lights, a clock, and a pressure cooker) could very
well just be necessary for a holiday celebration. So while it may be nearly impossible
for authorities to prevent jihadists from acquiring the materials to make this type of
bomb the way they would track someone attempting to acquire an assault rifle or
fissile materials for a weapon of mass destruction, they are not completely without the
means to prevent this type of attack.
Indeed, the FBI investigated Tamerlan Tsarnaev in 2011 because the Russian
government shared their belief that he had become an Islamic radical, but the
investigation did not yield substantial evidence to support that warning. Tamerlan was
also on a database that matches names from passenger manifests with lists of
suspected extremists. He was flagged at immigration in JFK airport when he returned
from Russia in 2012, but was not pulled aside by customs agents because he wasn’t
45
Thomas Baumert, Mikel Buesa, and Timothy Lynch, “Impact of Terrorism on Stock Markets: The Boston
Bombing Experience in Comparison with Previous Terrorist Events,” Institute of Industrial and Financial
Analysis, Complutense University of Madrid, 88 (2013): 4-6. 46
“Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves & Isolating the Head,” Inspire 13, December 2014, 64. 47
Therese Postel, “The Young and the Normless: Al Qaeda’s Ideological Recruitment of Western Extremists,”
The Quarterly Journal, Fall 2013, 115. 48
Abu Ziyad Al-Muhajir, “The Inevitable,” Inspire Issue 11, May 2013, 31.
15
high enough on the list. 49
Although these mechanisms exist to apprehend violent
extremists before they are able to carry out an attack, their effectiveness is often
limited by lack of personnel to fully investigate and follow up on every potential
attacker. In this light, the Tsarnaevs’ attack exposed the vulnerabilities in the
American intelligence system and very well may inspire others; even though the
brothers were apprehended after the fact, their attack will not be seen as any less of a
success in the eyes of like-minded extremist jihadists due to the highly destructive
effects. 50
Assassinations
To instruct aspiring jihadists in how to carry out assassination operations, the
AQ Chef is replaced by the External Operation Team, emphasizing this attack as more
of an intelligence operation than previous Open Source Jihads. This adds a sense of
individual prestige and intellect not found in other Open Source Jihad articles. The
External Operation Team breaks down carrying out an assassination into five parts:
specifying the target, collecting information, generating the plan, preparing for the
operation, and executing the operation. They present assassination as a valuable tactic
that can produce great results with little cost against America in particular, who
carries out both large-scale military operations and assassinations via drones.
A target should be selected based on the strategic or tactical advantages. The
External Operation Team encourages readers to concentrate their efforts on important
personalities in the West that directly affect the outcome of the war, since the West “is
based upon intellect and individual personalities not on thought or opinion.” 51
Therefore, this Open Source Jihad focuses on strategic assassinations of specific
personalities rather than tactical assassinations, such as assassinating American
military or security personnel. The 10 th
issue of Inspire features a full page
49
Brian Bennet, Richard A. Serrano, and Ken Dilanian, “Boston bombs showed some expertise,” Los Angeles
Times, April 24, 2013. Accessed June 2, 2016. 50
Rohan Gunaratna and Cleo Haynal, “Current Emerging Threats of Homegrown Terrorism: The Case of the
Boston Bombings,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 7 (2013). Accessed June 13, 2016. 51
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 66.
16
‘advertisement’ with a “Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam” list for any
readers in need of guidance selecting a target. The list is primarily composed of
cartoonists who have depicted the Prophet. 52
Inspire also presents an expanded list of
strategic targets in its 14 th
issue, including economic personalities such as Robert
James Shiller, a Professor of Economics at Yale University, and wealthy
entrepreneurs and company owners such as Bill Gates, the chairman of Microsoft, and
Warren Buffet, the third wealthiest man in the world. 53
Dabiq, on the other hand,
urges readers to target ‘apostate’ Muslim leaders such as Ayatollah Khamenei of Iran,
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, President Erdogan of Turkey, and Muslim leaders
in the West. 54
An aspiring assassin should next consider where and when to stage their attack.
They need to collect information on where the target lives, works, and socializes. In
collecting this information, the aspiring assassin should find the answer to the
question of when; they need to keep track of when the target is at specific locations
and points of vulnerability in their routine to attack. This and additional information
can be collected through general means of communication, such as social media,
television, and magazines, or by specific means of communication through the target’s
close friend or regular contact. Information should also be collected on the targeted
building for the attack. This article focuses on assassination in the target’s
workplace. 55
Based on the information gathered, the would-be assassin must then generate a
simple plan to efficiently attain the best results. This can be achieved by exploiting
the target’s weak points where they have the least protection. The assailant must ask
himself or herself what the best technique for achieving their goals is, and if they
intend to carry out a martyrdom or assault operation. If it is an assault, a retreat plan
52
“Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam,” Inspire 10, March 2013, 15. 53
“Assassinations – Field Tactics,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 84-87. 54
“The Murtadd Brotherhood,” Dabiq 14, April 2016, 28-43. 55
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 67.
17
must also be prepared that can cover all traces of the assailant’s involvement in the
operation. 56
Preparation for the operation comes in three stages: acquiring or preparing the
weapon, training with said weapon, and psychologically and spiritually preparing for
the attack. The External Operation Team suggests using more than one weapon for
the operation, but reminds the reader to set aside time to prepare explosives at home
since they are not readily available fully serviceable. Other weapons such as knives
and firearms are readily available on short notice and therefore do not require much
preparation. This article recommends that the reader train in hand-to-hand combat
and in strength training at a gym and with firearms at a shooting range to become
comfortable with their weapon of choice. Inspire issues 4 and 5 provide guidance for
using an AK 47, including caring for the weapon and shooting stances. It also advises
the reader to practice with small amounts of their explosives before the final attack to
ensure the bomb won’t fail. Finally, before carrying out their attack an aspiring
assassin needs to isolate himself or herself in worship and remember “what Allah has
promised for the Martyr in His path” and how their actions will benefit the Khalifah. 57
An aspiring assassin should camouflage themselves in order to hide their
identity and avoid arousing suspicion as they close in on their target; they should have
a cover prepared and be able to easily answer the question, “Why are you here?” The
External Operation Team emphasizes the importance of stealth and deception when
infiltrating the workplace, concealing both one’s identity and weapon when entering
the building and bypassing security. If the aspiring assassin prefers a forceful assault
infiltration, then it is recommended that they use automatic weapons and hand
grenades. In this case, the objective is to kill a specific target while also causing as
much collateral damage and death as possible. 58
Since hand grenades are not widely
available to civilians in the West, Open Source Jihad provides a guide for making
them at home that closely follows the recipe in ‘Make a bomb in the kitchen of your
Mom’. The switches can be found in household electronic devices, such as lamps and
56
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 68. 57
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire 14, September 2015 69. 58
“Assassination Operations,” Inspire 14, September 2015 64-71.
18
flashlights, and the AQ Chef provides guidance for removing the switches from their
original devices. Although this style of improvised explosive device (IED) is not used
in the following case studies, it could be implemented in future attacks following this
Open Source Jihad model.
This assassination guide was likely published in response to the January 2015
attack at Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine in Paris to encourage readers to carry out
similar attacks, possibly with the addition of these homemade hand grenades. Two
brothers, Cherif and Said Kouchi, attacked the French satirical magazine with
Kalashnikovs wearing black balaclavas and bulletproof vests. The gunmen forced an
employee to give them the entrance code to the building and entered the conference
room during the magazine’s weekly editorial conference. 15 staff members—
cartoonists, editors, and writers—were gathered in the room, including the editor
Stephane Charbonnier, known as Charb. After killing Charb, the gunmen
indiscriminately opened fire on the room, killing 12 in total. The attack lasted
approximately 20 minutes and the gunmen left the building, stealing a car from a man
outside, telling him “You can tell the media we’re from al-Qaida in Yemen.” 59
Police
lost track of the brothers directly after the attack; the brothers were killed two days
later after two separate hostage standoffs and police raids. 60
This attack was one in a
three-day series of attacks, including the murder of a policewoman and an armed
attack on a Jewish grocery store. 61
Al Qaeda claimed this attack by the Kouchi brothers was done in their name
and emphasized the lone jihad nature of it. 62
Charb was on Inspire’s “Wanted: Dead
or Alive for Crimes Against Islam” list; by publishing this list for lone actors to access,
these attackers had “no direct connection with the Jihadi Organization except by
59
Jon Henley and Kim Willsher, “Charlie Hebdo attacks: ‘It’s carnage, a bloodbath. Everyone is dead,” The
Guardian, January 7, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/charlie-
hebdo-shooting-paris-magazine-target-raid 60
Adam Chandler and Dashiell Bennet, “A Dramatic End to the French Hostage Standoff,” The Atlantic,
January 9, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/01/hostages-
paris-supermarket-charlie-hebdo-killers-police/384378/ 61
Michael Martinez, Dominique Debucquoy-Dodley, and Ray Sanchez, “Vignettes: More about the 17 killed in
French terror attacks,” CNN, January 11, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016,
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/10/world/france-paris-who-were-terror-victims/ 62
Sam Aboudi, “Al Qaeda claims French attack, derides Paris rally,” Reuters, January 14, 2015, accessed June
20, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-shooting-aqap-idUSKBN0KN0VO20150114
19
means of inspiring and guiding Lone Mujahideen.” 63
Inspire praises the Kouchi
brothers for their shrewd information gathering and physical and weapons training
before their operation. It notes the prudence in attacking during the weekly meeting to
also strike against those complicit in the magazine’s publication of images of the
Prophet. They claim that the operation was ordered in central leadership (in the
publication of Charb on the hit list) and carried out at the attackers’ discretion in order
to ensure secrecy. 64
It is possible that Al Qaeda published this Open Source Jihad
guide after the success of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo to inspire readers to carry out a
similar operation. Eyewitnesses described the attackers as “extremely well-trained,”
conceivably due to the AK training guides in an earlier issue. 6566
Regardless of where
they got their training, the Kouchi brothers exemplified the cool and professional air
that Inspire hopes readers will want to emulate by carrying out similar attacks.
Unlike in the United States, in France there is no protected right to bear arms
and there are strict laws on gun ownership. To legally acquire a gun, one would need
a hunting or sporting license which then needs to be repeatedly renewed and involves
a psychological evaluation. 67
Therefore, it is fair to assume that the Kouchis acquired
their Kalashnikovs illegally through the black market. A likely source is the illegal
arms market in Belgium, fed by Balkan weapons from the former Yugoslavia. 68
France’s gun laws did not fail in the sense that the guns used for this attack were not
legally purchased by people who should have been prohibited from buying guns.
Black market arms trade is by definition unregulated and therefore exceedingly
difficult to monitor.
63
Ibrahim ibn Hassan Al-A’siri, “Charlie Hebdo – A Military Analysis,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 40. 64
Ibrahim ibn Hassan Al-A’siri, “Charlie Hebdo – A Military Analysis,” Inspire 14, September 2015, 40-42. 65
“Charlie Hebdo attack: Witness accounts,” BBC, January 7, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30720706 66
See Abu Salih, “Training with the AK,” Inspire 4, January 2011, 42-43. And Abu Salih, “Training with the
AK,” Inspire 5, March 2011, 24-25. 67
Adam Taylor, “France has strict gun laws. Why didn’t that save Charlie Hebdo victims?” The Washington
Post, January 9, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/01/09/france-has-strict-gun-laws-why-didnt-that-
save-charlie-hebdo-victims/ 68
Christopher Woolf, “Where did the Paris attackers get their guns?” PRI, January 15, 2015, accessed June 20,
2016, http://www.pri.org/stories/2015-01-15/where-did-paris-attackers-get-their-guns
20
Eleven months after the attack at Charlie Hebdo and three months after the
publication of the “Assassination Operations” Open Source Jihad in Inspire, Syed
Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik carried out an attack on Farook’s workplace,
fatally shooting 14 people and injuring at least 21 others. Farook left an office
holiday party for San Bernardino Department of Public Health employees, returning
half an hour later with his wife and fired up to 150 bullets inside the party. 69
Farook
also placed a bag with a remote controlled IED on a table at the party upon entering,
although it was never detonated. 70
The couple fled in an SUV and both died during a
shootout with the police. 71
Upon inspection of Farook and Malik’s home, the police
discovered a stockpile of ammunition and a dozen homemade pipe bombs. They also
had the materials to make additional pipe bombs, indicating that the couple did not
intend for this to be a martyrdom operation and had other attacks planned. 72
Farook and Malik acted in line with much of the advice in Open Source Jihad
for carrying out an assassination. The key difference is that Farook and Malik appear
to have focused on the strategic goal of generalized terror rather than killing a specific
personality. They prepared their IEDs in advance in their home and had multiple
weapons at their disposal as per the assassination advice above. Evidence suggests
that they were planning an assault mission and had a black SUV to retreat after their
attack. They acquired their weapons, two handguns and two assault rifles, legally in
California and practiced with them at a gun range in Los Angeles, again following the
assassination advice in Open Source Jihad. 73
Since Farook was an employee of the
San Bernardino Department of Public Health, he had a reason to be at the holiday
69
Christine Hauser, “Police: 21 Wounded, 12 Pipe Bombs Discovered,” The New York Times, December 3,
2015, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/live/san-bernardino-shooting/police-21-wounded-12-
pipe-bombs-discovered/ 70
“California Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Terrorism and Being ‘Straw
Purchaser’ of Assault Rifles Ultimately Used in San Bernardino, California, attack,’ Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs, last modified December 17, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-
charged-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorism-and-being-straw 71
Jack Donal, Richard A. Serrano, Brian Bennet, Alan Zarembo, and Richard Winton, “Feds probe possible
terrorism links in San Bernardino massacre,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016,
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-san-bernardino-shooting-main-20151203-story.html 72
Jennifer Medina, Richard Perez-Pena, Michael S. Schmidt, and Laurie Goodstein, “San Bernardino Suspects
Left Trail of Clues, but no Clear Motive,” The New York Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html 73
Jennifer Medina, Richard Perez-Pena, Michael S. Schmidt, and Laurie Goodstein, “San Bernardino Suspects
Left Trail of Clues, but no Clear Motive,” The New York Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html
21
party where the attack took place and would be familiar with the layout. Farook and
Malik kept their plans of the attack just between themselves and one accomplice and
acquired all the materials necessary for their attack legally in order to avoid detection.
They appear to have followed the same five steps (specifying the target, collecting
information, planning the attack, preparing for the attack, and executing the attack)
even without having targeting an individual personality.
Farook bought the two handguns legally in California. Enrique Marquez,
Farook’s former neighbor, bought the two assault rifles used in the attack legally in
California, although it is unclear if the transfer of the assault rifles from Marquez to
Farook was legal. 74
In a December 17, 2015 affidavit, Marquez stated that Farook
introduced him to radical Islamic ideology and converted him to Islam. He also said
that he and Farook had read Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine and alleged that Farook was
interested in joining Al Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula in Yemen. Marquez purchased
the two assault rifles in 2011 as part of another plot with Farook that never came to
fruition, and was aware of Farook and Malik’s plans when he transferred the weapons
to them for their attack in 2015. In the affidavit, Marquez explained his familiarity
with using remote-controlled devices to detonate IEDs and that he and Farook got
instructions on how to make IEDs from Inspire. 75
This evidence points to Farook and
Malik acting as true lone wolves who were able to use Open Source Jihad materials to
successfully carry out a terror attack.
This attack prompted a renewed discussion in the United States about
preventing gun violence since the firearms used were purchased legally under
California law. The IEDs, while not legal to produce or possess, were built with
legally acquired materials. 1,600 additional rounds were found in their vehicle in
74
Jennifer Medina, Richard Perez-Pena, Michael S. Schmidt, and Laurie Goodstein, “San Bernardino Suspects
Left Trail of Clues, but no Clear Motive,” The New York Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html 75
“California Man Charged with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Terrorism and Being ‘Straw
Purchaser’ of Assault Rifles Ultimately Used in San Bernardino, California, attack,’ Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs, last modified December 17, 2015. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-man-
charged-conspiring-provide-material-support-terrorism-and-being-straw
22
addition to 2,900 rounds found in their home. 76
There is no limit on the amount of
ammunition that American citizens can purchase and keep in their homes. 77
Although
California law bans assault-style, semiautomatic rifles with detachable magazines, the
type used by Farook and Malik, there is a loophole. The basis of this law is
prohibiting guns that use detachable, high-capacity magazines and can fire a large
number of rounds and be reloaded quickly. However, the law does not consider an
ammunition magazine to be detachable if a ‘tool’ is required to remove the magazine
from the weapon. Gun owners can purchase an assault weapon if it has a small device
known as a ‘bullet button’ that releases the ammunition magazine by using the tip of a
bullet as a ‘tool,’ still allowing one to remove and replace a detachable ammunition
magazine quickly. 78
This attack also brought up questions of early detection of terror
attacks. Farook was born in Chicago, Illinois to Pakistani immigrant parents. Malik
was born in Pakistan and immigrated to the United States when she married Farook.
Neither had a criminal record or was being monitored by the police. Malik travelled
on a Pakistani passport and Farook visited Saudi Arabia twice, once for Hajj and once
for meeting Malik before bringing her to the United States, but this was not enough to
raise any security red flags. 79
Shortly before the attack, Malik pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
the leader of Daesh; 80
Daesh hailed the attackers as ‘supporters’ of their group and
encouraged others to follow in their footsteps, but did not claim direct responsibility
for their attack. Daesh further praises Farook and Malik for carrying out the attack as
a married couple and “thereby aiding one another in righteousness” and martyrdom,
76
Christine Hauser, “Police: 21 Wounded, 12 Pipe Bombs Discovered,” The New York Times, December 3, 2015,
accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/live/san-bernardino-shooting/police-21-wounded-12-pipe-
bombs-discovered/ 77
Sari Horwitz, “Guns used in San Bernardino were purchased legally from dealers,” The Washington Post,
December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/suspects-
in-san-bernadino-shooting-had-a-small-arsenal/2015/12/03/9b5d7b52-99db-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html 78
Sari Horwitz, “Guns used in San Bernardino were purchased legally from dealers,” The Washington Post,
December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/suspects-
in-san-bernadino-shooting-had-a-small-arsenal/2015/12/03/9b5d7b52-99db-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html 79
Jennifer Medina, Richard Perez-Pena, Michael S. Schmidt, and Laurie Goodstein, “San Bernardino Suspects
Left Trail of Clues, but no Clear Motive,” The New York Times, December 3, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/san-bernardino-shooting.html 80
Peter Bergen, “What explains the biggest U.S. terror attack since 9/11?” CNN, December 5, 2015, accessed
June 21, 2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/04/opinions/bergen-san-bernardino-terror-attack-
explain/index.html
23
emphasizing Malik’s virtue in engaging in jihad even though it was not required of
her the same way the Khalifah demands it of her husband. 81
They cite Quranic verses
saying that Allah promises to care for those left behind by martyrs, referring to Farook
and Malik’s infant daughter, and that family ties and children should not prevent one
from joining jihad. This two page article at the beginning of the thirteenth issue of
Dabiq strives to embolden readers to carry out attacks of this nature on their own in
America, Europe, and Australia. 82
The Hidden Airplane Bomb
In 2009 Umar Farok Abdulmutallab, known as Umar al-Farouq in Inspire,
attempted to detonate a bomb on an airplane using a plastic explosive hidden in his
underwear. Four years later, the AQ Chef presented an updated version of the
chemistry focused recipe for other aspiring jihadists. It features hydrogen peroxide,
found in most pharmacies, and the AQ Chef instructs readers on how to increase its
concentration from 6% to 30%. They recommend finding acetone, another main
ingredient, in nail polish remover, but warn that some formulas mix the acetone with
other materials making it inoperable for this recipe and offer an alternative method for
producing acetone using eggshells and vinegar. Sulfuric acid, also known as clear
battery acid, is widely available and there is no need to concentrate it as the dilute
form is used for this recipe. The AQ chef provides step-by-step instructions for safely
combining these materials into the detonator, complete with guiding photographs and
warnings to only use plastic or glass utensils, not metal. To avoid detection, the AQ
Chef instructs readers to apply silicone to the surface of the bottle and cover the
ignitor with a plastic bag sealed with scotch tape. Then cover the entire bomb with
silicone to further seal it in order to avoid detection by biological and non-biological
detectors in airports. 83
This is one of the AQ Chef’s most complex Open Source Jihad
81
“Foreword,” Dabiq 13, January 2016, 3. 82
“Foreword,” Dabiq 13, January 2016, 4. 83
“Making the Hidden Bomb,” Inspire 13, December 2014, 72-99.
24
recipes to date, but the modified form used by Abdulmutallab in 2009 demonstrated
that it could be destructive.
In the same article, the AQ Chef explains ways to breach airport security to
further encourage readers to carry out this type of attack. They cover four types of
security commonly found at airports: metal detectors, scent detectors, frisking, and
imaging machines. To breach metal detectors, both walk-through machines and hand
metal detectors, use non-metallic materials to construct the bomb, as described above.
To bypass biological scent detectors [i.e. trained dogs,] be sure to cover the explosive
in a non-porous material, silicone in the case outlined in this article. Imaging
machines can detect the bomb presented in this recipe, but the AQ Chef emphasizes
that these machines are not found in all airports, particularly in smaller local
airports. 84
This recipe notably deviates from reports about Adulmutallab’s bomb in that it
does not use pentaerythitol tetranitrate (PETN), a highly volatile substance that served
as the incendiary in Abdulmutallab’s bomb. 85
On December 25 th
, 2009,
Abdulmutallab boarded a flight from Lagos to Detroit via Amsterdam with a PETN
based explosive device sewn into his underwear. He passed through airport
screenings in Lagos and Amsterdam with this bomb undetected. According to
testimony from other passengers on the flights, Abdulmutallab spent about 20 minutes
in the bathroom as the plane approached Detroit and covered himself with a blanket
upon returning to his seat. They heard a popping noise “like firecrackers” and smelled
a “foul odor,” then noticed that Abdulmutallab’s trouser leg and the wall of the plane
next to him were on fire. 86
He was sitting in a window seat with the bomb attached to
the leg that was against the wall of the aircraft, indicating that he wanted to blow a
84
“Breaching Security Barriers,” Inspire 13, December 2014, 70-71. 85
Guy Adams, “Bomber warns: there are more like me in Yemen,” Independent, December 29, 2009, accessed
June 22, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bomber-warns-there-are-more-like-me-in-
yemen-1852092.html 86
Kevin Krolicki and Jeremy Pelofsky, “Nigerian charged for trying to blow up U.S. airliner,” Reuters,
December 26, 2009, accessed June 22, 2016,
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFLDE5BP03M20091226
25
hole in the side of the aircraft at a high altitude. 87
If the PETN had detonated as
intended, he likely would have achieved that aim instead of suffering burns on his
body and being neutralized by other passengers on the plane until he could be handed
over to the authorities in Detroit upon landing. 88
PETN is relatively stable and can be
detonated either by heat or a shockwave; it appears that Abdulmutallab used a syringe
filled with nitroglycerin as the detonator. 89
Abdulmutallab was decidedly not a lone wolf actor, but a lone attacker: Al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claimed the attack and said that they armed
Abdulmutallab with the bomb in retaliation for increased crackdowns on the group.
Indeed, Abdulmutallab claimed to have spent a month in Yemen where he received
lessons on how to detonate the device and evade airport security screenings by putting
the bomb in his underpants. In publishing this Open Source Jihad recipe, Al Qaeda
likely wanted to promote Abdultallab as an icon who “managed to penetrate all
devices and modern advanced technology and security checkpoints in international
airports,” defied “the large myth of American and international intelligence,” and
exposed the West’s vulnerability. 90
Although this attack was a failure in the sense that
the bomb did not detonate as designed, it did achieve Al Qaeda’s objective of
heightening public fear and burdening airports, and therefore Western governments,
“with expensive and time-consuming security procedures.” 91
Abdulmutallab was on a British security list after the applied for a student visa
for a fictitious degree at University College London, but not on a terror-related list
87
Ian Sample, “PETN – hard to detect and just 100g can destroy a car,” The Guardian, December 27, 2009,
accessed June 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/27/petn-pentaerythritol-trinitrate-
explosive 88
Guy Adams, “Bomber warns: there are more like me in Yemen,” Independent, December 29, 2009, accessed
June 22, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bomber-warns-there-are-more-like-me-in-
yemen-1852092.html 89
Ian Sample, “PETN – hard to detect and just 100g can destroy a car,” The Guardian, December 27, 2009,
accessed June 22, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/27/petn-pentaerythritol-trinitrate-
explosive 90
Guy Adams, “Bomber warns: there are more like me in Yemen,” Independent, December 29, 2009, accessed
June 22, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bomber-warns-there-are-more-like-me-in-
yemen-1852092.html 91
“Underwear bomber Abdulmutallab sentenced to life,” BBC, February 16, 2012, accessed June 22, 2016
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-17065130
26
that would have had his details passed around the international security community. 92
From November 2009, he was on a third tier watch list on Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment (TIDE) in the United States, a list with approximately 550,000
names on it at the time. 93
His father also contacted the American embassy in Nigeria
to warn them that he was concerned that his son may have become radicalized. 94
The
less easily accessible materials necessary for this attack, such as the medical syringe,
drip needle, and tubing can be found in hospitals and medical clinics. Although this
specific Open Source Jihad operation has not been carried out to date, this information
combined with Abdulmutallab’s attempted attack demonstrates the potential viability
of this operation, or at least the possibility for emboldened reproduction. The greater
threat from this Open Source Jihad is not the potential destruction of this style of
bomb, for it has not been successfully implemented, but the methods for bypassing
security.
Car Bombs Inside America
To the Muslim youth seeking empowerment through strength, power, and
intelligence, the AQ Chef has a message: “using car bombs gives you all that.” 95
This
installment of Open Source Jihad has a distinctive feature: “OSJ Specialist
Consultancy”. The AQ Chef offers the reader “field data” comprised of both general
and specific targets in the United States, United Kingdom, and France as well as
particular times one should plan to strike. They prioritize the United States and
crowded places, such as sports events, election campaigns, or festivals, and emphasize
targeting people rather than buildings with this bomb. In the United States, the AQ
Chef highlights targeting Washington DC and New York, Northern Virginia where
92
“Bomb suspect Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on UK watch-list,” December 29, 2009, accessed June 22, 2016
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8432180.stm 93
Kim Sengupta and David Usborne, “Nigerian in aircraft attack linked to London mosque,” Independent,
December 28, 2009, accessed June 22, 2016 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/nigerian-in-aircraft-
attack-linked-to-london-mosque-1851452.html 94
Guy Adams, “Bomber warns: there are more like me in Yemen,” Independent, December 29, 2009, accessed
June 22, 2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bomber-warns-there-are-more-like-me-in-
yemen-1852092.html 95
“Car Bombs in America,” Inspire 12, March 2014, 64.
27
there is a strong military and federal agency presence, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
They single out the US Open tennis tournament and restaurants on M street in
Washington DC as places that attract high-profile personalities and are therefore
valuable targets. In the United Kingdom, the AQ Chef identifies crowded football
matches, tennis tournaments, and horse races as prime targets. Specifically, they
propose detonating the bomb at the end of the sporting event as people are leaving the
stadium in order to elicit the highest casualties and most panic. They also mention the
Savoy Hotel in central London as a place that attracts businessmen and high profile
targets in the evenings. In France, train stations, the French League Cup, the Louvre,
and French Riviera are named as prime targets. The effects of this attack could also
be magnified by carrying it out on Christmas or New Year’s Eve, during election
season in the United States, or during the Bastille Day Military Parade in Paris. 96
In 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb composed of
propane and gasoline tanks, fireworks, fertilizer, and a clock and battery detonator.
Shahzad drove a Nissan Pathfinder with the car bomb to Times Square in New York
City. He remotely detonated the device, but there was no explosion. A nearby tee
shirt vendor saw smoke coming out of the rear vents of the vehicle, and noting that the
engine was running and the hazard lights were on he called the police. 97
In the car’s
gun locker, police discovered a pressure cooker-type metal pot containing wires and
M-88 firecrackers. 98
No one was seen fleeing the vehicle in person or on camera, and
the windows were strongly tinted obscuring Shahzad’s identity. Shahzad was only
connected to the attack because the key to his Connecticut home was found in the
Pathfinder and traced back to him. 99
In line with Open Source Jihad’s emphasis on
avoiding detection in planning the operation, it appears Shahzad deliberately
purchased weak bomb ingredients in an effort to avoid drawing the authorities’
96
“Car-bomb: Field Data,” Inspire 12, March 2014, 70-71. 97
Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, “Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square,” The New York Times, May 1,
2010, accessed June 22, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/nyregion/02timessquare.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 98
CNN Wire Staff, “Police examining video from Times Square,” CNN, May 3, 2010, accessed June 22, 2016.
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/02/times.square.closure/index.html 99
Andrew P. Pachtman deposition and charges against Faisal Shahzad, presented before Honorable Kevin
Nathaniel Fox, United States Magistrate Judge, Southern District of New York, May 4, 2010.
http://s3.amazonaws.com/nytdocs/docs/333/333.pdf
28
attention. In particular, law enforcement officials tried to make it more difficult to
buy volatile ammonium-nitrate-grade fertilizer after the Oklahoma City bombings,
leading Shahzad to purchase non-explosive fertilizer that likely prevented his car
bomb from properly detonating. 100
Additionally, the license plate on the Pathfinder
was from a Ford truck and Shahzad had removed the vehicle identification number
from the passenger compartment. Shahzad was identified as the owner of the car by a
duplicate vehicle identification number found on the engine block. 101
Shahzad claimed that he drew inspiration from the teachings of Anwar al
Awlaki. It does not appear that he had direct contact with al Awlaki, but said that he
did read al Awlaki’s English language writings. Shahzad, who was born in Pakistan,
said he got the bomb-making techniques from the Pakistani Taliban during a five-
month trip to Pakistan’s tribal areas; the group claimed responsibility for the attack.
However, federal investigators believed that Shahzad was the sole plotter inside the
United States and only received basic know-how from other militants. 102
Shahzad is
celebrated in Inspire for his unsuccessful attack as an example of a steadfast believer
who struck back against the belligerent West and readers are called upon to follow in
his footsteps. 103
Although this attack could not have been carried out following the instructions
in Open Source Jihad since it was published after Shahzad’s arrest, it demonstrates
vulnerabilities to car bombing attacks and follows a similar recipe as that in Inspire.
If detonated properly, police believed that this bomb could have caused mass
casualties due to the high pedestrian traffic in the area and the fireball it likely would
have created. 104
Again, this is not the type of attack that could be prevented by
100
Anahad O’Connor, “Weak Times Sq. Car Bomb Is Called Intentional,” The New York Times, July 21, 2010,
accessed June 22, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/nyregion/21bomb.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FTimes%20Squa
re%20Bomb%20Attempt%20(May%201%2C%202010) 101
Scott Shane, “Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane,” The New York Times, May 4, 2010, accessed June
22, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05plane.html 102
Yochi J. Dreazen and Evan Perez, “Suspect Cites Radical Imam’s Writings,” The Wall Street Journal, May 6,
2010, accessed June 22, 2016.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704370704575228150116907566 103
“Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom,” Inspire 1, June 2010, 33-40. 104
CNN Wire Staff, “Police examining video from Times Square,” CNN, May 3, 2010, accessed June 22, 2016.
http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/02/times.square.closure/index.html
29
restricting access to the materials used to make the bomb. Shahzad attempted to flee
to Dubai and was apprehended by authorities on the plane minutes before takeoff.
This reflects lapses in security. Shahzad was added to the no-fly list the morning of
his intended departure, yet the airline he was flying, Emirates, did not check the
updated list and allowed him to make a reservation and pay for the ticket in cash hours
before departure. The Transportation Security Administration now checks passenger
manifests against the no-fly list instead of airlines. 105
Despite heightened security
measures to apprehend lone terrorists once identified, it is still exceedingly difficult to
detect a lone wolf car bomber before they execute their attack due to the
inconspicuous nature of the materials required to build the bomb.
Pickup Truck Mowing Machine
Not every terrorist attack needs to involve an explosion or mass shooting.
According to Louise Richardson, terrorism is “politically motivated violence directed
against non-combatant or symbolic targets which is designed to communicate a
message to a broader audience” with the goal of bringing about political change. 106
For the would-be jihadi who may think the IED has been overused, Open Source Jihad
presents the option of “the ultimate mowing machine.” This attack is designed to “use
a pickup truck as a mowing machine, not to mow grass but to mow down the enemies
of Allah.” 107
That means using a truck with steel blades attached to the front to run
over as many people as possible and to have a backup weapon to further attack
bystanders when the truck is inevitably stopped. This mission “should be considered
a martyrdom operation” as an attacker is likely to be without an escape route. 108
Open
Source Jihad also recommends hitting a random, crowded restaurant in Washington
DC during a lunch hour in order to have the added benefit of targeting government
employees and garnering greater media attention. This article further outlines the
105
Scott Shane, “Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane,” The New York Times, May 4, 2010, accessed June
22, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/nyregion/05plane.html 106
Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” Terrorism and Political Violence, 11 (1999): 209. 107
Yahya Ibrahim, “The ultimate mowing machine,” Inspire 2, October 2010, 54. 108
Yahya Ibrahim, “The ultimate mowing machine,” Inspire 2, October 2010, 54
30
advantages of this particular attack as it does not involve other people, so there is a
lower risk of federal agencies becoming aware of the plans. It also requires very little
preparation: at its most basic just the acquisition of a weapon with ammunition and a
truck. If a would-be jihadist would really like to go above and beyond in terrorizing
the kufr, it is also suggested to set off a pressure cooker bomb first, causing the
victims to flee in a certain direction and mowing them down in a more concentrated
crowd. 109
This type of attack has great appeal for aspiring jihadists with limited access to
weapons or explosives. According to the American Department of Homeland
Security, indicators of a potential ramming attack include: unusual modifications to
vehicles such as homemade attempts to reinforce the front; the purchase, rental, or
theft of heavy duty vehicles and equipment especially when paying in cash; attempts
to infiltrate places that are closed off to traffic, like festivals or farmers markets; and
the vehicle operator’s apparent unfamiliarity with operating the vehicle or
equipment. 110
While states already regulate who can legally operate private and
commercial vehicles through licensing requirements, there are not policy measures in
place that are specifically aimed at preventing this kind of attack because it
weaponized something common in everyday life.
On July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej Boulel, a French national of Tunisian
birth, ran a 19-ton cargo truck through a promenade in Nice, France, as nearly 30,000
people were gathered to watch Bastille Day fireworks. It appears that he entered the
Promenade des Anglais by ramming through a barrier by a children’s hospital and
drove 2km down the promenade, deliberately swerving to hit as many people as
possible on the pedestrian street; at the end of this attack, 84 were dead and 202
injured. 111,112
Bouhlel began shooting from the truck with a 7.65mm handgun, aiming
109
Yahya Ibrahim, “The ultimate mowing machine,” Inspire 2, October 2010, 56-57. 110
“Terrorist Use of Vehicle Ramming Tactics,” Roll Call Release published by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security in collaboration with the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group, December 13,
2010. https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-TerroristRamming.pdf 111
Tom Morgan, David Chazan, Camilla Turner, Lydia Willgress, James Rothwell, Saphora Smith, Martin
Evans, Peter Allen, and Jannat Jalil, “Nice terror attack: ‘soldier of Islam’ Bouhlel ‘took drugs and used dating
sites to pick up men and women,’ The Telegraph, July 17, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-blocking-promenade-withdrawn-
hour1/
31
primarily at the police, before he was killed by police firing on the truck. 113
France’s
state of emergency, which was set to expire on July 26 th
, was extended for another
three months in response to this attack, 10,000 additional soldiers were sent to help
police with patrols, and reserve forces were mobilized and sent to France’s borders. 114
French security services refuted speculation that they had relaxed precautions after the
end of the Euro 2016 football tournament that had just ended. 115
Daesh claimed Bouhlel as a “soldier of Islam” and reports stated that he
shouted “Allahu Akbar” as he drove down the promenade. 116
He had a criminal record
of assault, domestic violence, and robbery but was not on any terror watch lists and
only began attending mosque in April 2016 according to his wife. 117,118
There was no
evidence as of July 16th that Bouhlel was radicalized via Daesh propaganda or that he
received training or orders from the group. 119
However, he also sent £84,000 to his
family in Tunisia days before the attack, possibly suggesting that a terror group
compensated the out of work delivery driver. 120
112
Barbara Surk, “Everything we know about the Nice Bastille Day attack,” Politico, July 15, 2016, accessed
July 18, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/everything-we-know-about-the-nice-bastille-day-attack-france-
terrorist/ 113
“Nice attack: At least 84 dead as lorry rams into crowd,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/france-truck-plows-crowd-nice-bastille-day-160714214536526.html 114
Barbara Surk, “Everything we know about the Nice Bastille Day attack,” Politico, July 15, 2016, accessed
July 18, 2016, http://www.politico.eu/article/everything-we-know-about-the-nice-bastille-day-attack-france-
terrorist/ 115
“Nice attack: Lorry driver confirmed as Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel,” BBC, July 15, 2016, accessed July 18,
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36808020 116
Tom Morgan, David Chazan, Camilla Turner, Lydia Willgress, James Rothwell, Saphora Smith, Martin
Evans, Peter Allen, and Jannat Jalil, “Nice terror attack: ‘soldier of Islam’ Bouhlel ‘took drugs and used dating
sites to pick up men and women,’ The Telegraph, July 17, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-blocking-promenade-withdrawn-
hour1/ 117
Henry Samuel and Tom Morgan, “Who is the Nice terror attack suspect? Everything we know so far about
Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel,” The Telegraph, July 18, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/15/who-is-the-nice-terror-attacker-everything-we-know-so-far/ 118
Tom Morgan, David Chazan, Camilla Turner, Lydia Willgress, James Rothwell, Saphora Smith, Martin
Evans, Peter Allen, and Jannat Jalil, “Nice terror attack: ‘soldier of Islam’ Bouhlel ‘took drugs and used dating
sites to pick up men and women,’ The Telegraph, July 17, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/17/nice-terror-attack-police-vans-blocking-promenade-withdrawn-
hour1/ 119
Alissa J. and Aurelein Breeden, “ISIS Claims Truck Attacker in France Was Its ‘Soldier’,” The New York
Times, July 16, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/world/europe/isis-nice-
france-attack.html?_r=0 120
David Chazan, Tom Morgan, and Camilla Turner, “Bastille Day terrorist was radicalised within months and
sent £84,000 to his Tunisian family days before attack,” The Telegraph, July 17, 2016, accessed July 18, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/16/bastille-day-terrorist-was-radicalised-within-months-and-sent-84/
32
At the time of writing police were still carrying out investigations on his home
and property and there is no publicly available evidence that Bouhlel consumed Dabiq
or Inspire. However, his attack follows the advice in Open Source Jihad for the
“ultimate mowing machine” including being familiar with the location of the planned
attack and having a backup weapon. Although he did not attach steel blades to the
front of the truck, he targeted a very crowded pedestrian area; CCTV footage shows
Bouhlel scrutinizing the Promenade des Anglais on two separate occasions in the days
before the attack, likely preparing to best execute the attack. Furthermore, in issue 12
of Inspire, the Open Source Jihad article on using car bombs names Bastille Day
festivities and the French Riviera as ideal targets for aspiring jihadists. 121
Although at
the time of writing there is no proof that Bouhlel was inspired by either Dabiq or
Inspire, this attack further demonstrates the potential threat of Open Source Jihad
attacks.
Attacks not yet carried out
Destroying Buildings
In an Open Source Jihad article, the AQ Chef sets forth for the reader how to demolish
a building using a chemical or mechanical explosion. The article emphasizes the
necessity of three components for either type of explosion: oxygen, fuel, and ignition.
To ignite the gas, simply use the triggering mechanism described in “Make a bomb in
the kitchen of your Mom” involving a Christmas light, a
battery, matchstick heads, and a clock. To employ this
tactic in destroying a building, the AQ Chef seeks to
exploit a building’s center of gravity by striking at the
corners to bring the building down. The image to the left
from Inspire highlights the “soft spots” of a structure
where aspiring jihadists should focus their explosion. 122
121
“Car-bomb: Field Data,” Inspire 12, March 2014, 71. 122
“Destroying Buildings,” Inspire 4, January 2011, 39.
Source: “Destroying Buildings,” Inspire 4, January 2011, 39.
33
In a later issue of Inspire, the AQ Chef points to a 2014 gas explosion in East
Harlem, New York as an example of the feasibility and effectiveness of this type of
attack without claiming this incident as an attack by Al Qaeda. 123
Rather, this
particular explosion that killed eight people was likely caused by a gas leak due to
improperly welded gas pipes that allowed leakage. 124
However, the scope of this
explosion reveals how destructive the intentional attack described above could be.
This explosion resulted in 8 deaths, over 50 people injured, 100 families displaced,
and the suspension of the Metro-North Railroad service. It also cost Consolidated
Edison Company of New York, the gas company ultimately held responsible, $1.9
million in equipment damages, emergency response activities, remediation, and
replacement. 125
Assuming similar results, an intentional attack of this nature by a lone
wolf would achieve Al Qaeda’s and Daesh’s terror aims by inflicting great economic
costs, showing government intelligence weakness by allowing the planning of this
attack to go undetected, and creating a general atmosphere of fear and terror. 126
And again the inevitable question is “can we do something to prevent this type
of attack?” Directly, no. We cannot eliminate gas as an energy source for buildings,
we cannot ban or require background checks for buying propane canisters, and we
cannot bar someone who may have extremist leanings, even someone on a terror
watch list, from renting an apartment. This attack would likely have little appeal to
Inspire’s readers compared to other Open Source Jihad attacks because it does not
offer the same prestige and glory as a martyrdom operation or handling firearms and
making bombs. However, if an aspiring jihadist wants to cause mass destruction
without risking a martyrdom operation, this attack when executed correctly would
allow the perpetrator to collapse an entire building and survive free of personal
implication to carry it out again.
123
“Exclusive Interview with the AQ-Chef,” Inspire 13, December 2014, 19-20. 124
Patrick McGeehan, “Con Edison and New York City are Faulted in East Harlem Explosion,” The New York
Times, June 9, 2015, accessed June 15, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/nyregion/consolidated-
edison-is-largely-liable-in-deadly-east-harlem-explosion-regulators-find.html?_r=0 125
National Transportation and Safety Board Accident Report, “Natural Gas-Fueled Building Explosion and
Resulting Fire,” accident date March 12, 2014, report date June 9, 2015.
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/PAR1501.aspx 126
“Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves & Isolating the Head,” Inspire 13, December 2014,64.
34
Source: "OSJ: Home Assassinations - Parcel Bomb," Inspire 15, May 2016, 76.
This style of attack may be relatively effective if carried out on a massive scale
throughout the target country. It follows both Al Qaeda and Daesh’s urgings that
readers execute the attacks on their own if possible with simple materials in order to
avoid detection. 127
Road crashes cost the United States approximately $231 billion
each year without, to public knowledge, an organization systematically intentionally
causing additional crashes. 128
If carried out regularly by Al Qaeda and Daesh’s
adherents, this style of attack could have severe economic impacts on the target
country. If they publicized their execution of attacks to cause road accidents in the
name of these extremist organizations, it would further their cause by spreading fear
and distrust of the government for not preventing these attacks.
Parcel Bomb
In later installments of Open Source Jihad, the AQ Chef proposes the three
following methods for assassination, constructing a parcel bomb, a magnetic car bomb,
and a door bomb. Using the hand pipe bomb method explained in the “Assassination
Operations” Open Source Jihad in Inspire 14, the parcel bomb attack involves
preparing a bomb in a parcel, such as a box or a book, that will detonate when opened.
Unlike many of the other bomb recipes from the AQ Chef, this one specifically
requires a push switch, found on many electronic lamps, so that the circuit does not
connect when one first pushes and holds the switch, but connects upon release. They
127
“Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq 4, October 2014, 44 128
“Road Crash Statistics,” Association for Safe International Road Travel, accessed June 28, 2016
http://asirt.org/initiatives/informing-road-users/road-safety-facts/road-crash-statistics
35
advise putting the bomb in a book and cutting out the pages to create a cavity for the
bomb and using a wooden block to create a small platform for the push switch trigger
so that the bomb will detonate when the book is opened. The bomb composition and
circuitry is the same as described in many other bomb recipes, so a regular reader of
Inspire would be familiar with it. The AQ Chef insists that readers test the circuit
with a lamp before attaching the bomb and ensuring that the light only turns on when
the book is opened, not closed, for the sake of the jihadist’s safety. Once the parcel
bomb is prepared, it is sent to the target in the mail or placed in where it is known that
the target will open it in order to decrease the risk of the bomb being detected in mail
screenings. 129
Notably, parcels are usually only screened for illicit or dangerous
substances when they are coming from abroad, not when they are sent within the same
country. 130
On the individual level, one can possibly recognize a parcel bomb by several
indicators, including: an unknown sender, no return address, the package appearing
excessively secured, an unprofessionally wrapped parcel endorsed “Fragile – Handle
with Care” or “Rush Delivery,” and if the package appears to be wrapped to ensure
the sender’s anonymity with homemade labels or cut-and-paste lettering. 131
This
operation could appeal to readers since it is not a martyrdom operation and doesn’t
require the attacker to be present at the time of detonation, protecting their anonymity.
Although this method is designed first and foremost to be used in assassination
operations, it has the added effect of creating public fear and mistrust of a government
service.
Magnetic Car Bomb
This bomb also follows the familiar pipe bomb recipe favored by the AQ Chef,
but with a triggering mechanism activated by a car’s forward motion. This is done by
129
“OSJ: Home Assassinations – Parcel Bomb,” Inspire 15, May 2016, 74-79. 130
“The Journey of Your Mail,” An Post, accessed June 28, 2016
http://www.anpost.ie/anpost/schoolbag/primary/our+people/the+journey+of+your+mail/ 131
“Suspicious packages, Letters or Substances: Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition,” Caltech Security,
accessed June 28, 2016 https://security.caltech.edu/Threats/Letter_and_Parcel_Bomb_Recognition
36
creating a detonator such that the wind generated by the car’s forward motion would
force two pieces of metal together and complete the electrical circuit. This ‘wind
switch’ will serve as the detonator. The ignitor is the same type used for the airplane
bomb outlined in issue 13, made from a Christmas light. The AQ Chef instructs
readers to insert the detonator into a bomb like the airplane bomb constructed in issue
13. The bomb should have a large magnet attached to it so that it can be affixed under
the car of the target; when the car moves forward the wind created will push the two
pieces of metal of the detonator together, closing the circuit and detonating the
bomb. 132
As this is meant to be used in assassination operations, the key to success is
access to the target’s car and guarantee that they will be in it next time it is driven. It
is reasonable to assume that the most of the high profile personalities that Inspire and
Dabiq have on their hit lists would have security measures in place that would restrict
unauthorized access to their vehicles. Alternatively, this method could be used
against random civilians’ cars that would not have these security measures, but that
would not produce the mass casualties and widespread terror that terrorists aim to
incite. Due to the relatively complex construction requirements and inability to cause
mass casualties, this is unlikely to be a preferred method.
The Door Trap Bomb
As part of the series on carrying out assassinations, the AQ Chef includes a
recipe for a bomb that will be detonated upon a door being opened. While the bomb
itself is the same as the pipe bomb outlined in issue 14 in the Open Source Jihad
“Assassination Operations” article, the triggering mechanism is modified. The
detonation circuit is created with a battery, on/off toggle switch, decorative lamp
ignitor, and a ‘trap breaker.’ In this recipe, the trap breaker is the two wires necessary
to complete the circuit; one is shaped into a loop, the other into a hook so that when
the hook wire is pulled it will catch on the loop and complete the circuit. It is
132
“OSJ: Home Assassinations – Magnetic Car Bomb,” Inspire 15, May 2015, 80-85.
37
designed such that when the door is opened, the hooked wire will catch the looped
wire, completing the circuit and triggering the explosion. The AQ Chef reiterates the
importance of using a test lamp first to ensure that the electrical circuit is set up
appropriately and that the bomb will successfully detonate. 133
The success of this operation relies on having uninterrupted lone access to the
target’s home or office and assumes that the target will be the first to open the door
once the bomb is set. Such unpredictable factors make this assassination method
difficult to carry out, especially on high profile targets. One of the main
disadvantages is the uncertainty that the desired target will be the one to open the door
first. This style of bomb also seems to have a higher risk of accidentally being
triggered as it is put in place. If the attack fails in killing the target, perhaps because
the detonation is unsuccessful or someone else opens the door first, then the target will
be on high alert and add security measures, making another attempt that much more
difficult. The same security precautions that are already in place to prevent home
break-ins and robberies should be sufficient to prevent an attacker from breaking in,
planting this bomb, and fleeing the scene.
Causing Road Accidents
Occasionally the AQ Chef strays away from recipes for bombs and suggests an
unconventional route for terrorizing the kufr. One such route is to cause auto-
accidents, either with lubricative oil or bursting tires. The lubricative oil attack recipe
is the simplest one proposed in Open Source Jihad: the idea is that the slippery surface
will cause a vehicle to slide out of control or flip over. As usual, the AQ Chef
reminds their readers to avoid executing this plan in any area with CCTV cameras or
witnesses. The second method for causing road accidents is to build a ‘tire burster’
with sharp nails to damage a car’s tires.
Although this type of attack does not have the same shock and panic that terror
attacks with bombs or guns often inspire, the AQ Chef points out that “the Kuffar and
133
“OSJ: Home Assassinations – The Door Trap Bomb,” Inspire 15, May 2016, 86-89.
38
their insurance companies will be so sick of the terror caused and money wasted by
these simple operations that they will press their government to stop the tyranny
against Muslims.” 134
This is also the kind of attack that would appeal to someone
who is only considering joining the jihad and is not ready to fully commit. There is a
degree of depersonalization since both methods take very little preparation, can be set
up on the roads in minutes, and allows the terrorist to be far away when the actual
accident occurs. Additionally, the materials necessary would arouse no suspicion
when purchased, and even if they were seen in the attacker’s home they would not
reveal the attacker’s intent. Causing road accidents in this manner allows one to feel a
part of jihad without getting blood directly on their hands or doing something that
connotes a terrorist act in the way that planting a bomb or carrying out a mass
shooting does.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Conventional law enforcement focuses on apprehending the perpetrator after a
crime is committed; this approach is not adequate for dealing with lone wolf terrorists
whose only focus is causing as much death and destruction as possible without regard
for their own survival. 135
Modern tactics for combatting homegrown lone wolf
terrorism focus on “attempting to prevent radicalization of susceptible individuals, …
electronically and physically surveilling suspected terrorists, denying would-be
terrorist the means to carry out attacks, engaging with community leaders, and
providing physical security for vulnerable locations.” 136
An emphasis here should be
placed on denying would-be terrorists the means to carry out their attacks, specifically
denying access to weapons and specialized knowledge, including bomb-making skills,
operational and weapons training, and information about targets. 137
There is usually a
134
“Causing Road Accidents,” Inspire 10, March 2013, 52-55. 135
Brian Michael Jenkins, “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist
Terrorism in the United States snice 9/11,” RAND Corporation Occasional Paper, (2011): vii. 136
Beau D. Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution
Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Boston University Law Review, 92 (2013), 1634. 137
Beau D. Barnes, “Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement and Prosecution
Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism,” Boston University Law Review, 92 (2013), 1638-1639.
39
sizeable gap between a would-be terrorist’s intent and capabilities that Open Source
Jihad tries to close, with mixed results.
Reading and possessing Dabiq and Inspire or any other jihadi materials is not
enough to characterize someone as a terrorist. Most Western governments ensure
legal protection of individual beliefs and free speech; only when these beliefs and
speech manifest intent to engage in violence can there be a case for legal
intervention. 138
Law enforcement agents try to monitor potential threats via watch
lists composed of people who have expressed, through word, action, or association,
possible inclination to carry out a terror attack. However, officials face the challenge
of having too much intelligence and too many people on these lists; they have taken
the steps to monitor potential terrorists, but don’t have the ability to keep track of
inconsistencies in their activities that would indicate an impending attack. Penal
codes are based on proving that an individual has taken steps to carry out a specific
act, not just talking or thinking about it. 139
Counter terrorism officials draw the line
between freedom of expression and terror related offenses where free speech becomes
an incitement of violence; when voicing grievances or an ideology turns to calling for
violence in the name of that grievance or ideology, it is no longer a protected free
speech.
A common radicalization model is: development of personal and/or political
grievances, finding an affinity with online sympathizers, identifying an enabler,
broadcasting intent, and a triggering event that brings about an attack. 140
Technologies such as internet chatrooms, websites, and social media have bolstered
lone wolf terrorism in the 21 st century by giving lone wolves greater access to
138
Brian Michael Jenkins, “Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist
Terrorism in the United States snice 9/11,” RAND Corporation Occasional Paper, (2011): vii. 139
Rukmini Callimachi, “How Do You Stop a Future Terrorist When the Only Evidence is Thought?” The New
York Times, June 21, 2016, accessed June 23, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/europe/france-
orlando-isis-terrorism-
investigation.html?action=click&contentCollection=U.S.&module=Trending&version=Full®ion=Marginalia
&pgtype=article&_r=0 140
Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaij, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization
Pathways to forge Prevention Strategies,” The U.S. Department of Justice, February 2015, 2.
40
sympathizers and enablers 141
and giving them access to guidance for carrying out their
attacks including bomb making guides in addition to advice for avoiding detection.
These online materials, particularly jihadist publications, seek to inspire recruits to
fight against the West on the frontlines and as lone attackers by providing motivation
and instruction to carry out terror attacks. While these publications tout the successes
of lone attackers—even when they are not successful in carrying out their primary
objective, as was the case with Faisal Shahzad and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab—
they disregard the overwhelming number of fruitless attacks. For example, in 2009 an
Al Qaeda operative who pioneered the underwear bomb later used by Abdulmutallab
placed the same style of bomb in his anal cavity and attempted to assassinate Price
Mohammed bin Nayef of Saudi Arabia in a suicide bombing. The bomb detonated
prematurely, only killing the suicide bomber. 142
Al Qaeda’s recruitment is based on
offering unremarkable individuals the opportunity to be part of a huge movement and
the chance to achieve international fame. It has been argued that governments and the
media unwittingly help terrorist groups recruit when speaking of the brilliance and
danger posed by these groups. Perhaps if media and government reports focused on
the futility of these attacks, such as a PETN bomb in the anal cavity, then fewer
people would find inspiration in these attacks to join Al Qaeda or Daesh. 143
A report
on this attack by the US private intelligence services firm STRATFOR labeled this
attack as “tactical shift,” described suicide bombers as “creative when it comes to
hiding their devices,” and that this method is “ideal for assassination.” 144
This gives
too much credit to a failed assassin who only killed himself. Daniel Freedman of
Forbes magazine makes the point that if the government and media response had
instead been to ridicule the attacker and mock Al Qaeda for “sending an idiot, it’s
highly unlikely that his example would have inspired anyone to join Al Qaeda. If
141
Mark Hamm and Ramon Spaaj, “Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization
Pathways to forge Prevention Strategies,” The U.S. Department of Justice, February 2015, 11. 142
Daniel Freedman, “Al Qaeda’s Dumbest Terrorists,” Forbes, September 26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfreedman/2011/09/26/al-qaedas-dumbest-terrorists/#18a3a2edcc62 143
Daniel Freedman, “Al Qaeda’s Dumbest Terrorists,” Forbes, September 26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfreedman/2011/09/26/al-qaedas-dumbest-terrorists/#18a3a2edcc62 144
“Saudi suicide bomber hid IED in his anal cavity,” Homeland Security News Wire, September 9, 2009,
accessed June 26, 2016, http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/saudi-suicide-bomber-hid-ied-his-anal-
cavity
41
anything, potential recruits might have had second thoughts.” 145
The likelihood of
failure, both in assassinating the target and in achieving martyrdom, and death or life
in prison coupled with international ridicule is far from appealing. 146
So while
governments try with limited success to prevent radicalization and limit access to the
materials necessary to carry out these attacks, they could also work to prevent
recruitment of lone wolves by publicizing their low chances of success and
unreliability of the recipes available online.
However, radical Islamist groups no longer rely on conventional media
coverage the way that they once did. Terrorist attacks are meant to send a political
message to a wider audience; this message is spread through conventional media
coverage that benefits from selling stories of violence. Terror groups now have social
media and their own websites and publications to spread their political message and
propagate their narrative of an attack. Dabiq repeatedly promotes its attacks or
attacks done in its name in the West “to take revenge for any aggression against [the
Khalifah]’s religion and people, sooner rather than later [and] let the arrogant know
that the skies and the lands are Allah’s.” 147
Dabiq praises the “brave knights” who
carried out the October 2015 downing of a Russian commercial jet and November
2015 attacks in Paris as retaliation for Russia and France joining airstrikes against
Daesh. It emphasizes the nobility of martyred “lone” knights of the Khalifah who
struck against the West and would “not let [the Khalifah]’s enemies enjoy rest until
enemy blood is spilled in revenge for the religion [of Islam] and the Ummah.” 148
Contemporary reporting on terror attacks, which overwhelmingly focuses on
successful attacks, is not the sole aid for terror groups in recruiting since they have
their own publications and means of reaching their target-audience. Although
conventional media coverage is not vital to jihadi groups’ recruitment as it once was,
it does have an impact on public opinion and therefore the government targeted by the
attack.
145
Daniel Freedman, “Al Qaeda’s Dumbest Terrorists,” Forbes, September 26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfreedman/2011/09/26/al-qaedas-dumbest-terrorists/#18a3a2edcc62 146
Daniel Freedman, “Al Qaeda’s Dumbest Terrorists,” Forbes, September 26, 2011, accessed June 26, 2016,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfreedman/2011/09/26/al-qaedas-dumbest-terrorists/#18a3a2edcc62 147
“Foreword,” Dabiq 12, November 2015, 2-3. 148
“Foreword,” Dabiq 12, November 2015, 2-3.
42
The real question is: does Open Source Jihad actually provide aspiring jihadists
with the knowledge and capabilities to carry out viable and damaging terror attacks?
The evidence indicates that the answer is: probably not. With the most notable
exception being the Boston Marathon Bombing, none of the resources provided in
Open Source Jihad have materially and definitively facilitated the successful
execution of a terror attack. While the assassination procedures are similar to the
attacks on Charlie Hebdo and in San Bernardino, the corresponding Open Source
Jihad article provides mostly common sense guidance. The airplane bomb and car
bomb were both unsuccessful in their original execution and there is no evidence that
the updated recipes published in Inspire are any more likely to be successfully carried
out. The proposal to use gas explosions to blow up buildings as a mechanism of terror
is rather basic in design. Although the ultimate mowing machine is equally basic, the
events in Nice show that it can be devastatingly effective. It would not be difficult to
come up with these types of attacks without having read Open Source Jihad. The
proposals to cause road accidents are a watered down version of terrorism that is
unlikely to appeal to aspiring jihadists or be carried out often enough to have a real
terror impact. “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom” pressure cooker
bomb and other bomb making manuals and idea pages, including how to make a
magnetic bomb, parcel bomb, door bomb, and grenades for assassinations, are the
only point of real concern because the Boston Marathon Bombings demonstrate the
efficacy of the pressure cooker bomb and its variations. Intelligence and security
agencies could benefit from paying close attention to suggested targets in these
articles as areas to enhance security. While these articles may motivate and inspire
likeminded readers to carry out their own jihadist attacks, they largely do not provide
original, capacity-raising information that increases the likelihood or lethality of a
given attack.
43
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