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9B16M171

DE BEERS CANADA: THE ATTAWAPISKAT CONTEXT1

Ron Mulholland wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com. Copyright © 2016, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2016-10-21

The De Beers’ Victor Mine was a diamond mine located 90 kilometres west of the James Bay Cree community of Attawapiskat. By May 2016, there had been a great deal of press coverage regarding the relationship between the two groups. The Victor Mine was nearing the end of its production, and De Beers was contemplating whether to operate the Tango Extension, a nearby deposit that could use the processing facilities existing at Victor Mine. De Beers had to consult the nearby First Nations communities, including Attawapiskat, to gain approval to proceed with exploration and bulk sampling. Did the history of Attawapiskat First Nation (Attawapiskat) affect the relationship with De Beers? Could past discussions with the community have been conducted differently to reduce conflict? What lessons could be applied to the discussion surrounding the Tango Extension and other future developments? THE VICTOR MINE The Victor Mine opened in 2008 following a lengthy period of exploration. It was Ontario’s first diamond mine, and although the deposit would be completely exploited within 12 years, the diamonds were of above- average value; therefore, De Beers decided to proceed with mining. Approximately CA$1 billion2 was spent on developing the open-pit mine and processing and support facilities. The projected value of the diamonds to be mined over the mine’s life was close to $3 billion.3 De Beers had signed agreements with four First Nations communities including Attawapiskat, which was closest to the mine. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) in conjunction with an exploration agreement was the first formal agreement with Attawapiskat; later, an impact benefit agreement (IBA) was signed. An IBA typically conferred monetary and other benefits to the signatory community.

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Page 2 9B16M171 ATTAWAPISKAT FIRST NATION Attawapiskat was a community of Indigenous people, located on the west shore of James Bay at the mouth of the Attawapiskat River. The community was 220 kilometres north of the small town of Moosonee and 500 kilometres north of Timmins, the nearest major centre. It was adjacent to Akimiski Island, the largest island in James Bay, located halfway up the bay’s west coast. The population was approximately 3,500, including 1,900 people who lived on the reserve.4 The community was governed by a chief and 12 councillors, elected every three years. The council supervised the community’s management and infrastructure that included health, education, social assistance, and housing. Attawapiskat had been in the press over several issues: disputes with Canada’s federal government,5 the Idle No More Protest,6 the community’s relationship with De Beers and the Victor Mine road blockades,7 and a lamentable, high rate of suicide among its youth.8 On the plus side, the IBA provided Attawapiskat with employment and business opportunities and a payment of about $2 million per year.9 Of concern to Attawapiskat was the mine’s impact on the environment and other community problems unrelated to the mine. The relationship between De Beers and Attawapiskat had been an uneasy one, with costly winter road blockades in 200910 and 2013.11 PRE-HISTORY Northern Ontario, including the area encompassing the Attawapiskat reserve, had been covered by the Laurentide Ice Sheet, which retreated from its greatest extent just south of the Great Lakes between 9,000 and 6,000 years ago.12 A record of human occupancy in the area began approximately 4,000 years ago. There was more evidence of the history of the Inuit because their historical sites were more easily discovered and accessed on the barrens. Isostatic rebound13 of up to one metre per century was changing the character of the coastline and islands.14 As a result, coastal records of northern First Nations people were at varying distances inland, making discovery difficult. It was unclear how First Nations people occupied and used the James Bay coast before European settlers arrived. They did not have hunting technology (harpoons) or seaworthy boats for travelling on the seacoasts as the Inuit did. It is possible that First Nations people did not settle in the area until the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC) established trading posts that became part of the way of life.15 HISTORY In 1610, Henry Hudson became the first European of record to visit the bay, later named after him, and its smaller bay to the south. His exploration was motivated by the search for a northwest passage to the Orient. When it became evident this route was not the way to the Orient, interest waned. James Bay was not re- visited for twenty years, at which time Thomas James and crew wintered there on Charlton Island, the largest island in the southern part of the bay.16 There was again little further interest or exploration until 1670 when the HBC was founded. In 1670, a cousin of King Charles II, Prince Rupert of the Rhine, organized financing of the “Company of Adventurers,” which became the HBC. A competent soldier, commander, admiral, and patron of the arts, Rupert was on good terms with the king, who granted to Rupert and the company propriety rights for trading on and colonizing the land encompassed by the drainage basin of Hudson Bay. This was a massive swath of property, covering almost 40 per cent of what is now Canada. To put it in perspective, this stretch of land was twenty times larger in area than the United Kingdom, over which Charles II ruled.17

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Page 3 9B16M171 With the HBC established, trading posts were set up along the coast. Ancestors of present day Attawapiskat members would have participated in trade with the company. The trading post nearest to the future coastal village of Attawapiskat was the Albany River post established in 1674. This post was 100 kilometres to the southeast; it eventually became home to the Fort Albany and Kashechewan First Nations.18 Development of the north was part of Britain’s plan to establish dominance in the new colonies. The HBC posts gave the British access to the interior and west of what became Canada, effectively leapfrogging the French in the race to establish trade networks in the New World. The French, through the efforts of Samuel Champlain, had established colonies on the St. Lawrence River and trade with the Indigenous inhabitants there as early as 1603.19 There were ongoing conflicts between the French and English and their respective Aboriginal allies. The power struggle between England and France had been ongoing for 150 years, but the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) extended the conflict to all of the major European powers, involving, among other things, domain over their colonial lands. The war settled in 1763 with the Treaty of Paris, which gave the British control over France’s territory in North America.20 During this time, the British had created an “Indian Department” to organize co-operation with their Aboriginal allies. The British also realized success in the nascent country would depend on positive relations with the Aboriginal people and their continued support in military conflict. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, issued by King George III to claim Britain’s territory in North American territory, established guidelines for European settlement of Aboriginal land. The Proclamation identified “Indian Nations” and set out regulations regarding land transfers. Specifically, the Proclamation declared that Aboriginal land title would continue to be Aboriginal land until otherwise agreed by treaty. Further, only the Crown could negotiate the treaties and buy Aboriginal land, then sell it, if desired, to settlers.21 Britain’s control over the American colonies, granted in the Treaty of Paris, was challenged by the colonists themselves. Britain’s attempt to impose taxes and laws on the colonies caused a political upheaval that resulted in the American Revolution and the American colonies’ independence from Britain. After the American Revolution, the colonists who remained loyal to the Crown migrated north to settle in what remained British territory. These 30,000 United Empire Loyalists added pressure for claims to new land.22 The War of 1812 was the last British–American conflict in North America. Aboriginal warriors fought with the British and their colonists to defeat invading American forces. On the American side, support for Aboriginal land rights in the form of an Indian Territory was a “profound disappointment.” In British territory it was the end of “self-reliance and self-determination” for First Nations as the war motivated more settlers and demand for yet more settlement land. As the settlers began to outnumber the Aboriginals, political expediency shifted influence away from they who had lived on the land for hundreds of years.23 A treaty in 1836 established Manitoulin Island as a reserve for dispossessed Aboriginal people. Politically motivated, the Lieutenant Governor Sir Francis Bond Head sought “new settlement lands” by convincing the natives to give up their arable land in southern Ontario in favour of a move to Manitoulin Island.24 In 1850, the Robinson Treaties transferred more Aboriginal land to the Crown and established reserves on Lake Superior and northern Lake Huron along with rights to continue traditional practices on their former territories (subsequently Crown lands). This followed the discovery of minerals in the area. The Robinson Treaties were a template for a following series of numbered treaties in Ontario and Canada’s West.25 In 1876, the Indian Act26 was introduced, purporting to provide care and protection over First Nations people. In reality, the Act became a paternalistic tool for subjugation.27

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Page 4 9B16M171 The Swampy Cree or West Main Cree people occupied the land on the west coast of James and Hudson Bays up to what became the Ontario–Manitoba border and approximately 200 kilometres inland.28 The 2016 location of Attawapiskat was formerly a Cree summer camp for fishing and gathering. In 1894, a mission was set up there by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate, a Roman Catholic congregation originating in France. The Oblates believed that other creeds and cultures were heathen, and the Oblates’ role was to convert the “heathens” to the beliefs and structures of the Roman Catholic order.29 In 1901, the HBC established a trading post in the area.30 First Nations people began to travel to the mission or trading post to participate in religious or social events, or to trade. A permanent church and residence followed in 1912. Families lived in the wilderness along the Attawapiskat and Ekwan Rivers. As with other Aboriginal peoples in northern Ontario, the traditional territory occupied at different seasons was wide-ranging. The Attawapiskat ranged as far north as Cape Henrietta on Hudson Bay and east to the James Bay coast and Akimiski Island. Game was plentiful on the island, and families co-operated to harvest caribou. To the south, the range extended to the Kapiskau River, flowing from the southwest to enter James Bay approximately 30 kilometres south of Attawapiskat. To the west, Attawapiskat ranged to Missisa Lake, which was 200 kilometres inland from James Bay. The total area encompassed 30,000 square kilometres (see Exhibit 1).31 The Attawapiskat social structure was based on families, with the smallest unit consisting of typically two families in which the men or women were related as siblings. Up to five families travelled together as a microband with an informal leader whose status resulted from age or demonstrated wisdom. Members of a microband joined with other microbands typically related by marriage—for example, a wife’s brother or a sister’s husband—forming a group of up to fifteen families. This would be a macroband. Each macroband had a territory that was defined by a river watershed. They would be conscious of adjacent macrobands who had their own traditional territory. In spring, they would move to the coast to fish and hunt moulting ducks and northbound geese. Summers would include fishing, some hunting, gathering of edible flora, and berry picking. Fall would bring a return to the bush to hunt caribou and snare rabbits.32 TREATY NO. 9 (JAMES BAY TREATY) In 1905, Canada was growing, its population was expanding west with support from the developing railway, and mining properties were being explored. There was pressure from Jabez Williams, an HBC superintendent, and Chief Louis Espagnol, a British supporter and HBC employee from a Spanish River First Nation on Lake Huron, to negotiate land use with the First Nations. Each wanted a treaty for different reasons: Williams, perhaps to support exploration of personal mining interests; Espagnol, to control the activities of White trappers who were depleting beaver and other game populations.33 Negotiations began for Treaty No. 9 (Treaty 9), also known as the James Bay Treaty. Commissioners for Canada were Duncan Scott and Samuel Stewart; Daniel MacMartin represented Ontario. The first order of business was to come to an agreement between federal and provincial representatives, resolving the lingering conflict over liability for increases in annuities paid to First Nations under the Robinson Treaties. This was done on July 3, 1905.34 The Attawapiskat community was included in “the treaty band created at Fort Albany” with the signing in August of 1905. According to Morrison, a historical researcher, “Once [First Nations people] began to understand what the government intended the reserves to be used for, these more remote groups [Attawapiskat, for example] began to press the government for separate band and reserve status.”35 What they were getting from the government included money, help with medical and educational issues, and protection from further incursions on their land. With the arrival of the railway and White trappers, the more southern communities “had been restricted in their traditional ways already.”36

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Page 5 9B16M171 In 1930, the Attawapiskat people, having made their case for a separate reserve, received a parcel of land on the Ekwan River, under an adhesion37 to Treaty 9. This settlement, listed as Attawapiskat 91, was located 160 kilometres northwest of the current reserve identified as Attawapiskat 91A.38 There was little negotiation, and it was not clear whether the terms of the treaty were well understood or properly conveyed to the community. There were many accounts of how the Elders interpreted the treaty and what they understood was to be received in exchange for their agreement to the terms. Elders describe the treaty as an agreement to “share” not “surrender” the land; rights to the land and of the people were not “abolished.”39 In the words of Hosea Wynne, an elder from Kashechewan First Nation, “This is Indian land . . . [W]hen they came here they said they found land. They didn’t find it. It wasn’t uninhabited. The people who owned the land were here.”40 Cultural anthropologist Cummins stated:

The signing of Treaty 9 was the final major Euro-Canadian incursion in the lives of the Attawapiskat Cree. The coming of the Church affected them religiously and culturally, the fur companies brought them into a new economic sphere, but the treaty signing would tie them forever into the government. All subsequent changes would be legitimized by government dicta.41

AFTER THE TREATY After the treaty was established, furs were harvested and traded, and people lived in their traditional manner, visiting the post (at the river’s mouth) to trade and to live there for a portion of the year. However, change was brewing. Gradually, from the 1930s to the 1960s, Attawapiskat became a permanent settlement as people left their bush camps and moved to the reserve.42 At the same time, the Oblates were organizing a residential school in Fort Albany. Residential schools were based on a late 1800s policy goal of teaching Aboriginal children farming and trades while ending “a separate Aboriginal identity and government.”43 Attendance was compulsory and enforced by a government agent under the authority of the Indian Act. The school at Fort Albany, St. Anne’s Residential School, operated from 1936 to 1964. The government (Indian Affairs, the ministry at the time) knew the system was failing to meet its goals and was expensive, and was considering closing the schools as early as the 1940s. However, the churches supported and maintained the schools, claiming the churches were “committed to assimilation of Aboriginal people and the destruction of reserves.”44 The result for children who attended the school and others like it was devastating: they lost their language, culture, and community, and for some, it resulted in death. Mortality rates in residential schools were up to ten times higher than in the average population. The registered number of deaths was 3,201; however, based on the hearings held by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Justice Murray Sinclair, the Commission chair, estimated that because of missing and unreported deaths, the total was closer to 6,000 deaths among the 150,000 students who came through the system.45 This would be equivalent to 12 deaths in a school of 400 children. In 1947, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued formal regulations for trap lines in Ontario. Territories and quotas were established that were different from the prior informal familial system managed by the First Nations. This policy likely contributed to the decline of traditional family boundaries, conservation practices, and traditional lifestyle.46

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Page 6 9B16M171 In 1954, twenty-four years after signing the adhesion to the treaty, the Attawapiskat people were discontent about the location of the reserve. It was 160 kilometres inland and away from the Attawapiskat trading post located on the coast of James Bay, so it was inhabited by only those whose traditional hunting lands were proximal.47 The chief and two councillors, with the support of 200 band members, wanted to live closer to the trading post at the mouth of the river because fishing there was good, land was arable for cultivation, and there were two churches, a school, hospital, and store. In its bureaucratic way, in consideration of the location relative to the two churches and other minutiae, it took 10 years for the government to decide to establish a reserve of 325 acres—200 times smaller than the Ekwan parcel of land. In 1964, the band was formally established on what became its 2016 location, where members had been living unofficially for years. The population of Attawapiskat in 1999 was 1,260, with 650 of those being of employment age (15–65 years). The economy was based on employment with government-supported services. Families still went on the land to hunt, but this was only a part-time or periodic use of traditional activities to provide food. Approximately 300 people were employed while another 350 were on social assistance. The major employers in 1999 were the band and the province, employing two of every three workers. Specific employment numbers included the Education Authority (104), Attawapiskat First Nation Government (41), the hospital (40), the Northern Store (24), and Health Services (14). Twenty-one other businesses provided the balance of employment in the community.48 Living conditions on the reserve were less than ideal. The cost of purchase for all goods was high because of transportation expenses. Housing was in dire condition due to past flooding of homes and subsequent mould problems for those who had homes. Many did not have homes, and instead shared overcrowded space while others chose to live in tent structures that were uncomfortable in winter months. There was no school for 14 years, from 2000 to 2014, because the property was contaminated by diesel fuel. Housing and the school were underfunded by the government. There had been sewer and water problems for a number of years. Tragically, for complex reasons, the suicide rate among young people was high.49 The revenue sources for the reserve included federal funding, their own sourced funding such as that from economic development activities, and support from other levels of government.50 Managing the reserve operations and finances was a complex balancing act that required experience, skill, patience, and tact as there was never enough money to build houses for all who were in need, while also maintaining the infrastructure and services already in place. There had been several different professional and local managers of the operation.51 Clayton Kennedy, who managed the band finances from 2001–2004 and again from 2010–2012, described the money problem as not a result of illegal behaviour but of “too many trips to Timmins . . . too many workshops . . . too many staff . . . inexperienced workers . . . not capable of doing the job.”52 This was indicative of capacity issues within the band, limiting its ability to manage its own internal financial affairs. With no economic engine to replace the traditional way of living by subsistence means—a system that had worked for hundreds, if not thousands of years—unemployment rates were high in the community. Social and health problems profiled in the press flowed from lack of employment, a high cost of living, and a substandard infrastructure. At that time, the community would have welcomed any form of economic development.

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Page 7 9B16M171 DE BEERS Into the above socio-economic environment entered De Beers, a sophisticated, international mining company. It had been in operation since 1888 in over 20 different countries. In 2014, its revenues were US$7 billion.53 Exploration for pipes of kimberlite, known for potentially hosting diamonds, began in the James Bay Lowlands in the 1960s. By 1987, Monopros Limited, a De Beers subsidiary, had found kimberlites at what would become the Victor Mine.54 Advanced exploration was followed by a pre-feasibility study, a further feasibility study, and more capital-intensive stages of exploration with the goal of proving to investors and the company that the mine was an economically attractive asset. Ultimately valued at potentially CA$2.5 billion in extractable diamonds that were also of good quality, De Beers decided to proceed with mining the site.55 Canada’s Constitution Act56 recognized and affirmed Aboriginal rights, which were subsequently recognized and affirmed in Ontario’s Mining Act.57 Following these legislated requirements and De Beers’ own company policy, De Beers initiated communication with local stakeholders. This was the start of a series of information gathering, consultation, action, and feedback activities all leading to a plan for the mine that would satisfy stakeholders. Early in the process, in 1999, De Beers signed an MOU with Attawapiskat that foresaw environmental stewardship, business, training, and employment opportunities. Over six years, using different modes of communication and involving over 100 meetings with Attawapiskat representatives, information was gathered and used to develop a comprehensive environmental assessment. The 614-page report was completed in 2005 and submitted to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency.58 Further meetings regarding an IBA resulted in an agreement signed in 2006. The IBA, which had an 86 per cent approval among community members, provided a $1 million signing bonus and at least $2 million per year over the life of the mine. It was expected that the mine would close in 2018, after approximately 12 years of operation. The payments to Attawapiskat were deposited in a community trust that would receive around $30 million by the end of the life of the Victor Mine. In addition, contracts to Attawapiskat-related companies exceeded $325 million. De Beers also provided $2 million for training programs.59 All mining companies in Ontario paid a tax that was a percentage of profits. In the case of De Beers, the tax would have been 5 per cent of profits because the mine was remote.60 Additionally, De Beers was required to pay a royalty of 12 per cent of profits to Ontario. Because of the high initial cost of construction, profits were not reported in the mine’s early days. In 2015, the Ontario government (in a breach of confidentiality) reported that De Beers paid $226 in royalties for the financial year 2014.61 The community’s engagement with potential employment had been difficult because of capacity issues. There were not enough people with the required skills to fill both roles in the community (e.g., management, environmental assessment, and program evaluation) and at the mine. The community was also compromised by long-standing flooding issues, housing problems, high unemployment, substance abuse problems, and financial and management issues that preceded the arrival of De Beers. This led to frustration in the community, and in February 2009, a number of Attawapiskat people set up a blockade to prevent transport of materials over the ice road from the railhead at Moosonee to the De Beers Victor site. The blockade was significant because the mine depended on use of the winter road to transport heavy, bulky supplies into the site. Every day of a blockade reduced the amount transported, with critical materials having to be brought in with air transport. DeBeers estimated this cost the company $3.5 million.62 In 2013, a group of frustrated individuals placed another winter road blockade, claiming that the community was not receiving enough benefit from the mine.63

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Page 8 9B16M171 Exacerbating the complex situation and lack of resources, a significant number of those hired to work at the mine moved to Timmins.64 Anecdotal evidence suggests that, having attained a good income in Timmins, they chose to live in the small city in northern Ontario to take advantage of housing and services available there.65 The environmental impact of the mine was part of the 614-page Comprehensive Study Report. The document was approved by the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Attawapiskat before the mine was constructed. Complaints and questions were raised as early as 2007 about potentially elevated mercury levels in fish as a result of mining activity although mercury existed in the James Bay Lowlands before De Beers started mining.66 Mercury levels were elevated in fish in the Attawapiskat River before De Beers arrived and in the Albany River, which was distant from the Victor Mine. There was already a limit on the type and amount of fish that should be consumed. The mercury could have been from several sources, natural and atmospheric. Burning coal was a known source of atmospheric mercury.67 Still, De Beers was accused of not properly monitoring mercury levels downstream of its mine, a charge De Beers flatly denied.68 The Tango Extension was planned as a way to extend the useful life of mining and processing at the Victor site. Since the Victor Mine was developed, Ontario had revised its Mining Act, making consultation with affected Aboriginal communities mandatory. With a $1 billion investment and a trained work force available, costs to start up and mine the nearby Extension (6.5 kilometres from the Victor site) would be reduced. De Beers planned to do exploration drilling and produce a bulk sample by 2015;69 however, community resistance caused delays and eventually that plan was put on hold in February of 2016.70 Adjacent First Nations communities such as Weenusk were divided, with some being wary of supporting the Tango Extension because of what they saw at Attawapiskat.71 THE FUTURE, TANGO, AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY A number of questions would affect De Beers’ negotiations with First Nations. Attawapiskat’s infrastructure, services, and finances were clearly in poor shape. It seemed as though the community had been shifted over time into a market economy lifestyle without the proper infrastructure, services, finances, and capacity to manage. Although employment was created for some and a few service businesses benefited, this did not seem to translate into overall benefit for the community. There was also the issue of a lack of skilled and experienced people in the community to hire. Was it reasonable to hope that conditions would improve if Attawapiskat extended its relationship with De Beers? For its part, De Beers attempted to be consultative, held many meetings to try and communicate their position and answer questions, met the requirements of the provincial mining and environment regulations, passed a successful vote on the project with the community, and thought for the most part they had fulfilled their obligations. Jonathan Fowler, a De Beers negotiator, did say if they were doing it again, they would start earlier and hire more local spokespeople to explain the concepts.72 This was recognition that the process could have been improved. When the company announced they had stopped exploration at Tango, company spokesperson Tom Ormsby indicated “lessons have been learned.”55 If corporate social responsibility included efforts to improve economic, social, and environmental conditions for a community while reducing the negative effects of mining, had De Beers lived up to its own expectations? Another puzzling question was the role of government. It seemed the government was letting companies like De Beers do the heavy lifting in negotiating with and educating communities about the potential

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Page 9 9B16M171 benefits and limitations of mining and resource development in their own community. This practice of letting companies lead the interaction with Aboriginal peoples began in 1670 with the Company of Adventurers. The HBC did much of the development work for governments when they interacted with Aboriginal communities in Rupert’s Land. This was also true for some treaty-making in pre-confederation Canada. For example, William Robinson, the commissioner for the Robinson Treaties, was the director of at least two mining companies. Finally, the role and responsibility of the community in its own development was a question. Did the capacity of the community to help itself affect the company’s ability to fulfill its corporate social responsibilities? What path would De Beers, the community, and the government follow as the future of the Tango Extension was debated by all stakeholders?

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Page 10 9B16M171

EXHIBIT 1: ATTAWAPISKAT—THE TRADITIONAL TERRITORY AND THE VICTOR SITE

Source: Created by the author from a Royal Canadian Geographical Society source map.

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Page 11 9B16M171 ENDNOTES

1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of De Beers or any of its employees. 2 All figures are in CA$ unless otherwise stated; CA$1 = US$0.777 on May 16, 2016. 3 Marilyn Scales, “Tango Extension to Lengthen Life of De Beers’ Victor Diamond Mine,” Canadian Mining Journal, February 1, 2014, accessed February 24, 2016, www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/tango-extension-to-lengthen-life-of-de-beers-victor-diamond-mine; Marilyn Scales, “The Real Value of Victor Project,” Canadian Mining Journal, January 1, 2007, accessed February 24, 2016, www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/the-real-value-of-victor-project/. 4 “Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada: Registered Population, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, January 23, 2015, accessed December 16, 2016, http://pse5-esd5.ainc-inac.gc.ca/FNP/Main/Search/FNRegPopulation.aspx?BAND_NUMBER=143&lang=eng. 5 Jacques Bourbeau, “Attawapiskat First Nation Must Repay $1.8 Million, Government Says,” Global News, November 28, 2014, accessed December 16, 2016, http://globalnews.ca/news/1698524/Attawapiskat-first-nation-must-repay-1-8-million-government-says. 6 CBC, “Idle No More Co-Founder Uneasy with Media Portrayal of Chief Spence,” Huffington Post Politics Canada, January 14, 2013, accessed December 16, 2016, www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/01/14/what-is-idle-no-more-sylvia-mcadam_n_2476507.html. 7 Jody Porter, “First Nations Must ‘Learn From’ De Beers Deal: Documents Show Attawapiskat Gets 0.5% Share of Annual Diamond Revenues,” CBC News: Thunder Bay, February 13, 2013, accessed December 16, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/thunder-bay/first-nations-must-learn-from-de-beers-deal-1.1327592. 8 The Canadian Press and Globe Staff, “Attawapiskat: Four Things to Help Understand the Suicide Crisis,” The Globe and Mail, last updated July 8, 2016, accessed April 14, 2016, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/Attawapiskat-four-things-to-help- understand-the-suicidecrisis/article29583059. 9 Genesee Keevil, “In Attawapiskat, Deep-Rooted Problems Won’t Disappear in an Instant,” The Globe and Mail, December 9, 2011, accessed March 3, 2016, www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/in-Attawapiskat-deep-rooted-problems-wont- disappear-in-an-instant/article4201581. 10 Marc Choyt, “Attawapiskat and De Beers Victor Mine Blockades,” Fair Jewellery Action, updated April 18, 2016, accessed April 18, 2016, www.fairjewelry.org/Attawapiskat-and-de-beers-victor-mine-blockades. 11 Jonathan Kay, “Jonathan Kay: Attawapiskat Protesters Hurting First Nations with Lawless Blockade of De Beers Mine,” National Post, February 21, 2013, accessed February 24, 2016, http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/jonathan-kay-natives-hurting- themselves-with-lawless-blockade-of-de-beers-mine. 12 David Ullman, "The Retreat Chronology of the Laurentide Ice Sheet During the Last 10,000 Years and Implications for Deglacial Sea-Level Rise," Vignettes: Key Concepts in Geomorphology, May 29, 2012, accessed February 24, 2016, http://serc.carleton.edu/59463. 13 The vertical upward rebound of the earth after the weight of the glacier melts away. 14 Leonard J. S. Tsuji, Natalya Gomez, Jerry X. Mitrovica, and Roblyn Kendall, “Post-Glacial Isostatic Adjustment and Global Warming in Subarctic Canada: Implications for Islands of the James Bay Region,” Arctic 62, no. 4 (2009): 458–467. 15 D. B. Stewart and W. L. Lockhart, “Human Occupation” in An Overview of the Hudson Bay Marine Ecosystem, Canadian Technical Report of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 2586 (Winnipeg, MB: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2005) 11: 5–6, accessed July 11, 2016, www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/Library/314704.htm. 16 James H. Marsh, “Thomas James,” Historica Canada, December 14, 2013, accessed December 16, 2015, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/thomas-james. 17 Shirlee Anne Smith, “Rupert’s Land,” Historica Canada, March 4, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ruperts-land. 18 “Our History: Places: Forts & Posts: Fort Albany,” Hudson’s Bay Company, accessed December 16, 2015, www.hbcheritage.ca/hbcheritage/history/places/forts/fort-albany. 19 Glyndwr Williams, “Exploration,” Historica Canada, May 21, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/exploration. 20 “Treaties and Change: The Royal Proclamation of 1763,” Canada’s First Peoples, accessed December 16, 2015, http://firstpeoplesofcanada.com/fp_treaties/fp_treaties_brconquest_proc1763.html. 21 Ibid. 22 Ann Mackenzie, A Short History of the United Empire Loyalists (Toronto, ON: United Empire Loyalists’ Association of Canada, 1998), accessed July 11, 2016, www.uelac.org/PDF/loyalist.pdf; Bruce G. Wilson, “Loyalists,” Historica Canada, March 4, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/loyalists. 23 James H. Marsh, “First Nations and Métis Peoples in the War of 1812,” Historica Canada, July 23, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/first-nations-in-the-war-of-1812. 24 Robert Surtees, “Treaty Research Report: Manitoulin Island Treaties,” Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986, accessed October 1, 2016, http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/ainc-inac/R32-268- 1986-eng.pdf. 25 Robert Surtees, “Manitoulin Island Treaties,” Canada: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, September 15, 2010, accessed February 24, 2016, www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028959/1100100028961. 26 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians, S. C. 1876, c. 18. 27 Bob Joseph, “21 things you may not know about the Indian Act,” CBC News, April 13, 2016, accessed October 1, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/21-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-indian-act-1.3533613. 28 Richard J. Preston, “Cree,” Historica Canada, May 26, 2015, accessed December 16, 2015, www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/cree.

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Page 12 9B16M171 29 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Canada’s Residential Schools: The History, Part 1, Origins to 1939, vol.1 (Montreal, QC: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), 28. 30 Kathryn Molohon, “Notes on a Contemporary Cree Community” in Actes du Quatorzième Congrès des Algonquinistes, eds. William Cowan and José Mailhot, (Ottawa, ON: Carleton University, 1983). 31 Bryan D. Cummins, Attawapiskat Cree Land Tenure and Use, 1901–1989, philosophical doctorate degree dissertation, (Hamilton, ON: McMaster University, 1992). 32 Ibid., 61. 33 James Morrison, “Treaty Research Report: Treaty No. 9 (1905–1906),” Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1986, accessed July 11, 2016, www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte- text/tre9_1100100028860_eng.pdf. 34 Ibid., 26. 35 Ibid., 47. 36 Jacqueline Hookimaw-Witt, Keenebonanoh Keemoshominook Kaeshe Peemishikhik Odaskiwakh (We Stand on the Graves of Our Ancestors): Native Interpretations of Treaty No. 9 with Attawapiskat Elders, master’s degree thesis (Peterborough, ON: Trent University, 1998), accessed July 11, 2016, www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0016/MQ30219.pdf. 37 An adhesion to an existing treaty confers the same rights and responsibilities as those who already adhere to the treaty. 38 “Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada: Reserves, Settlements, and Villages,” Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, January 23, 2015, accessed February 24, 2016, http://pse5-esd5.ainc-inac.gc.ca/FNP/Main/Search/FNReserves.aspx ?BAND_NUMBER=143&lang=eng. 39 Hookimaw-Witt, op. cit., 64. 40 John Long, Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905 (Montreal, QC: McGill- Queen's Press, 2010), 378. 41 Bryan D. Cummins and John L. Steckley, “Only God Can Own the Land: The Attawapiskat Cree,” vol. 1 of Canadian Ethnographic Series (Toronto, ON: Pearson-Prentice Hall, 2004). 42 Norbert W. Witt, Opening the Healing Path: The Cultural Basis for a Solvent Abusers Treatment Program for the Attawapiskat First Nation, philosophical doctorate degree dissertation (Toronto, ON: Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1998), 15. 43 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, op. cit., 153. 44 Ibid., 4. 45 Joanna Smith, “Canada’s Residential Schools Cultural Genocide, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Says,” Toronto Star, June 2, 2015, accessed February 22, 2016, www.thestar.com/news/canada/2015/06/02/canadas-residential-schools-cultural- genocide-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-says.html. 46 Cummins and Steckley, “Only God Can Own the Land,” op. cit., 140. 47 Cummins, “Attawapiskat Cree Land Tenure and Use,” op. cit., 281. 48 Wakenagun Community Futures Development Corporation, Attawapiskat First Nation: Community Profile, 1999, accessed February 20, 2016, www.wakenagun.ca/PDF/Attawapiskat%20Profile.pdf. 49 Jorge Barrera, “Jean Chrétien, St. Anne’s and the ‘Straight Highway’ to Attawapiskat’s Suicide Crisis,” APTN News, April 20, 2016, accessed April 26, 2016, http://aptn.ca/news/2016/04/20/jean-chretien-st-annes-and-the-straight-highway-to- Attawapiskats-suicide-crisis. 50 Daniel Schwartz, “How Does Native Funding Work?,” CBC News, February 6, 2013, accessed February 24, 2015, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/how-does-native-funding-work-1.1301120. 51 Jorge Barrera, “Attawapiskat Chief Spence’s ‘Life Partner’ Challenges Department to Launch Forensic Audit, Says Band Has Nothing to Hide,” APTN News, January 8, 2013, accessed February 24, 2016, http://aptn.ca/news/2013/01/08/Attawapiskat-chief- spences-life-partner-challenges-department-to-launch-forensic-audit-says-band-has-nothing-to-hide. 52 Keevil, op. cit. 53 “Preliminary Results 2014,” De Beers U.K. Limited, February 13, 2015, accessed February 19, 2016, www.debeersgroup.com/en/news/financial-results-centre/results-centre.html. 54 J. M. Kong, D. R. Boucher, and B. H. Scott Smith, “Exploration and Geology of the Attawapiskat Kimberlites, James Bay Lowland, Northern Ontario, Canada” (paper presented at Seventh International Kimberlite Conference, Cape Town, 1998). 55 Jonathan Fowler, “Case History for De Beers Canada Inc.: Experiences with Diamond Exploration and the Victor Project, Ontario” (paper presented at the annual convention of the Prospectors and Developers Association Canada, Toronto, 2006), accessed February 24, 2016, www.pdac.ca/docs/default-source/public-affairs/de-beers-canada-inc.pdf. 56 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 57 Mining Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.14. 58 De Beers Canada, “Victor Diamond Project: Comprehensive Study Report” (report submitted to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, August 2, 2013), accessed February 25, 2016, www.ceaa.gc.ca/80C30413-docs/report_e.pdf. 59 Keevil, op. cit. 60 “Ontario Mining Tax,” Ontario Ministry of Finance, April 9, 2014, accessed April 13, 2016, www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/tax/mining. 61 Rita Celli, “Diamond Royalties a Closely Guarded Secret in Ontario,” CBC News, May 12, 2015, accessed April 13, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/business/diamond-royalties-a-closely-guarded-secret-in-ontario-1.3062006. 62 De Beers Canada, “Attawapiskat Impact Benefit Agreement Update: As of January 2011” (report presented to Sustainable Development Strategies Group, June 2011), accessed February 24, 2016, www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Outline- DeBeersAttawapiskatIBA.pdf. 63 “Attawapiskat Blockade May Force De Beers to Close Mine,” February 19, 2013, accessed February 24, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/attawapiskat-blockade-may-force-de-beers-to-close-mine-1.1306365.

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Page 13 9B16M171 64 Heather Scofield, “Faced with Extreme Poverty, Harsh Climate, Attawapiskat Reserve Cries for Help,” Global News, November 30, 2011, accessed October 1, 2016, http://globalnews.ca/news/183842/faced-with-extreme-poverty-harsh- climate-attawapiskat-reserve-cries-out-for-help/ 65 Cecilia Jamasmie, “Victor Mine,” Mining.com, January 1, 2009, accessed March 16, 2016, www.mining.com/victor-mine. 66 Katie Harries, “Mercury Mystery,” Now Toronto, May 13, 2010, accessed March 16, 2016, https://nowtoronto.com/news/mercury-mystery/. 67 William James Goacher, “Peat as an Archive of Remote Mercury Deposition in the Hudson Bay Lowlands, Ontario, Canada” master’s degree thesis (London, ON: University of Western Ontario, 2014). 68 “Nothing to See Here. . . . Failures of Self-Monitoring and Reporting of Mercury at the De Beers Victor Diamond Mine in Canada,” Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS) Wildlands League, December 2015, accessed April 24, 2016, http://wildlandsleague.org/media/REPORT-WL-20151220-FINAL-Special-Report-Victor-Mine.pdf; “After the Last River, Film About Attawapiskat,” CBC News: Sudbury, December 2, 2015, accessed April 24, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/after- the-last-river-attawapiskat-movie-1.3346841; Marilyn Scales, “Diamonds: CPAWS Very Wrong About Victor Mine,” Canadian Mining Journal, December 22, 2015, accessed April 24, 2016, www.canadianminingjournal.com/news/diamonds-cpaws-very- wrong-about-victor-mine. 69 Marilyn Scales, “Tango Extension to Lengthen Life of De Beers’ Victor Diamond Mine,” Canadian Mining Journal, February 1, 2014, accessed April 24, 2016, www.canadianminingjournal.com/features/tango-extension-to-lengthen-life-of-de-beers-victor- diamond-mine. 70 “De Beers Halts Exploration of Diamond Mine near Attawapiskat, Ontario,” CBC News, February 8, 2016, accessed April 24, 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/sudbury/de-beers-attawapiskat-1.3438333. 71 Tanya Talaga, “De Beers Seeks First Nation Exploration Support,” Toronto Star, November 17, 2015, accessed April 24, 2016, www.thestar.com/business/2015/11/17/de-beers-seeks-first-nation-exploration-support.html. 72 Fowler, op. cit., 26.

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