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THE
BASICS OF

SOCIAL RESEARCH

SEVENTH
EDITION

 CENGAGE



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Paradigms, Theory, and Research

Learning Objectives *After studying this chapter, you will be able to...*

- L01 Be able to name and explain the main social science paradigms.
- L02 Be able to explain the difference between deductive and inductive methods as they are used in social research.
- L03 Give an example to illustrate the use of deductive analysis.
- L04 Give an example to illustrate the use of inductive analysis.
- L05 Explain how theory and research methods impact each other.
- L06 Give an example of how social theory shows up in everyday life.
- L07 Give an example of how theory choices might raise issues of research ethics.

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■ INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores some specific ways theory and research work hand in hand during the adventure of inquiry into social life. We'll begin by looking at several fundamental frames of reference, called *paradigms*, that underlie social theories and inquiry. Whereas theories seek to explain, paradigms provide ways of looking. In and of themselves, paradigms don't explain anything, but they provide logical frameworks within which theories are created. As you'll see in this chapter, theories and paradigms intertwine throughout the search for meaning in social life.

Since I'll be using the term, "logic," several times in this chapter, I should clarify its meaning. The words *logic* and *rationality* are sometimes used interchangeably, but that's a mistake. Logic refers to a system of principles for determining

What do you think?



Earl Babine

Scholars such as George Herbert Mead make a powerful argument that social life is really a matter

of interactions and their residue. You and I meet each other for the first time, feel each other out, and mutually create rules for dealing with each other. The next time we meet, we'll probably fall back on these rules, which tend to stay with us. Think about your first encounters with a new professor or making a new friend. Mead suggests that all the social patterns and structures that we experience are created in this fashion.

Other scholars, such as Karl Marx, argue that social life is fundamentally a struggle among social groups. According to Marx, society is a class struggle in which the "haves" and the "have-nots" are pitted against each other in an attempt to dominate others and to avoid being dominated. He claims that, rather than being mutually created by individuals, rules for behavior grow out of the economic structure of a society.

Which of these very different views of society is true? Or does the truth lie somewhere else?

See the *What do you think? Revisited* box toward the end of the chapter.

the validity of an explanation. Thus, a set of religious beliefs can provide a theological system of explanation: for example, God rewarding or punishing good or bad behavior. Astrology provides another logic for explaining things.

paradigm A model or framework for observation and understanding which shapes both what we see and how we understand it. The conflict paradigm causes us to see social behavior one way, the interactionist paradigm causes us to see it differently.

Rationality is a logical system of explanation typically associated with science, though it is difficult to define in the space available here. Rational logic operates in the natural realm, excluding supernatural explanations. It is often described as objective, unaffected by the scientist's personal beliefs or emotions. Wherever possible, rational logic is allied with empirical observations. If we reason logically that men and women will differ in some regard, we can then make observations to see if it's true. The testing of logical expectations must include the possibility of failure as well as success.

In a sense, much of this book will illustrate the use of rational principles and practices in social research. For example, we'll see that a requirement for causal relationships is that the cause needs to happen before the effect. I'll conclude this discussion with one more important clarification. Rational social science explanations do not have to assume that human behavior itself is rational. Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't, but even nonrational or irrational human behavior can be susceptible to rational explanation.

Some restaurants in the United States are fond of conducting political polls among their customers before an upcoming election. Some people take these polls very seriously because of their uncanny history of predicting winners. By the same token, some movie theaters have achieved similar success by offering popcorn in bags picturing either donkeys or elephants. Years ago, granaries in the Midwest offered farmers a chance to indicate their political preferences through the bags of grain they selected.

Such oddities offer some interest. They all present the same pattern over time, however: They work for a while, but then they fail. Moreover, we can't predict when or why they will fail.

These unusual polling techniques point to the shortcomings of "research findings" based only on the observation of patterns. Unless we can offer logical explanations for such patterns, the regularities we've observed may be mere flukes, chance occurrences. If you flip coins long enough, you'll get ten heads in a row. Scientists could adapt a street expression to describe this situation: "Patterns happen."

Logical explanations are what theories seek to provide. Further, theory functions three ways in research. First, it prevents our being taken in by flukes. If we can't explain why Ma's Diner has predicted elections so successfully, we run the risk of supporting a fluke. If we know why it has happened, however, we can anticipate whether it will work in the future.

Second, theories make sense of observed patterns in ways that can suggest other possibilities. If we understand the reasons why broken homes produce more juvenile delinquency than do intact homes—lack of supervision, for example—we can take effective action, such as establishing after-school youth programs.

Third, theories can shape and direct research efforts, pointing toward likely discoveries through empirical observation. If you were looking for your lost keys on a dark street, you could whip your flashlight around randomly—or you could use your memory of where you had been to limit your search to more-likely areas. Theory, by analogy, directs researchers' flashlights where they will most likely observe interesting patterns of social life.

This is not to say that all social science research is tightly intertwined with social theory. Sometimes social scientists undertake investigations simply to discover the state of affairs, such as an evaluation of whether an innovative social program is working or a poll to determine which candidate is winning a political race. Similarly, descriptive ethnographies, such as anthropological accounts of preliterate societies, produce valuable information



There are many routes to understanding social life.

and insights in and of themselves. However, even studies such as these often go beyond pure description to ask, "Why?" Theory is directly relevant to "why" questions.

■ SOME SOCIAL SCIENCE PARADIGMS

There is usually more than one way to make sense of things. In daily life, for example, liberals and conservatives often explain the same phenomenon—teenagers using guns at school, for example—quite differently. So might the parents and teenagers themselves. But underlying each of these different explanations, or theories, is a paradigm—one of the fundamental models or frames of reference we use to organize our observations and reasoning.

Paradigms are often difficult to recognize as such because they are so implicit, assumed, taken for granted. They seem more like "the way things are" than like one possible point of view among many. Here's an illustration of what I mean.

Where do you stand on the issue of human rights? Do you feel that individual human beings are sacred? Are they "endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights," as asserted by the U.S. Declaration of Independence? Are there some things that no government should do to or ask of its citizens?

Consider that many other cultures today regard the Western (and particularly U.S.) commitment to the sanctity of the individual as bizarre. Historically, it is decidedly a minority viewpoint. For example, although many Asian countries now subscribe to some "rights" that belong to individuals, those are balanced against the "rights" of families, organizations, and society at large. When criticized for violating human rights, Asian leaders often point to high crime rates and social disorganization in Western societies as the cost of what they see as our radical "cult of the individual."

No matter what our beliefs, it's useful to recognize that our views and feelings in this matter are the result of the paradigm we have been socialized into. The sanctity of the individual is not an objective fact of nature; it is a point of

view, a paradigm. All of us operate within many such paradigms.

When we recognize that we are operating within a paradigm, two benefits accrue. First, we are better able to understand the seemingly bizarre views and actions of others who are operating from a different paradigm. Second, at times we can profit from stepping outside our paradigm. We can see new ways of seeing and explaining things. We can't do that as long as we mistake our paradigm for reality.

Paradigms play a fundamental role in science, just as they do in daily life. Thomas Kuhn (1970) drew attention to the role of paradigms in the history of the natural sciences. Major scientific paradigms have included such fundamental viewpoints as Copernicus's conception of the earth moving around the sun (instead of the reverse), Darwin's theory of evolution, Newton's mechanics, and Einstein's relativity. Which scientific theories "make sense" depends on which paradigm scientists maintain.

Although we sometimes think of science as developing gradually over time, marked by important discoveries and inventions, Kuhn says that, historically, one paradigm would become entrenched, resisting substantial change. Eventually, however, the shortcomings of that paradigm would become obvious in the form of observations that violated the expectations suggested by the paradigm. These are often referred to as *anomalies*, events that fall outside expected or standard patterns. For a long time in American society as elsewhere, a fundamental belief system regarding sex and gender held that only men were capable of higher learning. In that situation, every demonstrably learned woman was an anomalous challenge to the traditional view. When the old paradigm was sufficiently challenged, Kuhn suggested, a new paradigm would emerge and supplant the old one. Kuhn's classic book on this subject is titled, appropriately enough, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.

Social scientists have developed several paradigms for understanding social behavior. The fate of supplanted paradigms in the social sciences, however, differs from what Kuhn observed in the natural sciences. Natural scientists generally believe that the succession of paradigms

represents progress from false views to true ones. No modern astronomer believes that the sun revolves around the earth, for example.

In the social sciences, on the other hand, theoretical paradigms may gain or lose popularity, but they're seldom discarded. Social science paradigms represent a variety of views, each of which offers insights the others lack while ignoring aspects of social life that the others reveal.

Each of the paradigms we're about to examine offers a different way of looking at human social life. Each makes certain assumptions about the nature of social reality. Ultimately, paradigms cannot be true or false; as ways of looking, they can only be more or less useful. Rather than deciding which paradigms are true or false, try to find ways they might be useful to you. As we'll see, each can open up new understandings, suggest different kinds of theories, and inspire different kinds of research.

Macrotheory and Microtheory

Let's begin with a discussion that encompasses many of the paradigms to be discussed. Some theorists focus their attention on society at large or at least on large portions of it. **Macrotheory** deals with large, aggregate entities of society or even whole societies. Topics of study for macrotheory include the struggle among economic classes in a society, international relations, and the interrelations among major institutions in society, such as government, religion, and family.

Some scholars have taken a more intimate view of social life. **Microtheory** deals with issues of social life at the level of individuals and small groups. Dating behavior, jury deliberations, and student-faculty interactions provide apt subjects for a microtheoretical perspective. Such studies often come close to the realm of psychology, but whereas psychologists typically focus on what goes on inside humans, social scientists

macrotheory A theory aimed at understanding the "big picture" of institutions, whole societies, and the interactions among societies. Karl Marx's examination of the class struggle is an example of macrotheory.

microtheory A theory aimed at understanding social life at the level of individuals and their interactions. Explaining how the play behavior of girls differs from that of boys is an example of microtheory.

study what goes on among them. Some researchers prefer to limit *macrotheory* to the study of whole societies. In that case, the intermediate level between macro- and microtheory is called *mesotheory*: studying organizations, communities, and perhaps social categories such as gender.

The basic distinction between macro- and microtheory cuts across the paradigms we'll examine next. Whereas some of them, such as symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, often work best at the microlevel, others, such as the conflict paradigm, can be pursued at either the micro- or the macrolevel.

Early Positivism

When the French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857) coined the term *sociologie* in 1822, he launched an intellectual adventure that is still unfolding today. Comte was arguably the first to identify society as a phenomenon that can be studied scientifically. (Initially he wanted to label his enterprise *social physics*, but another scholar preempted that term.)

Prior to Comte's time, society simply was. To the extent that people recognized different kinds of societies or changes in society over time, religious paradigms predominantly explained these differences. The state of social affairs was often seen as a reflection of God's will. Alternatively, people were challenged to create a "City of God" on earth to replace sin and godlessness.

Comte separated his inquiry from religion, replacing religious belief with scientific objectivity. His "positive philosophy" postulated three stages of history. A "theological stage" predominated throughout the world until about 1300 C.E. During the next 500 years, a "metaphysical stage" replaced God with ideas such as "nature" and "natural law." Finally, Comte felt he was launching the third stage of history, in which science would replace religion and metaphysics; knowledge would be based on observations through the five senses rather than on belief. Again, Comte felt that society could be studied and understood rationally, that sociology could be as scientific as biology or physics.

Comte's view came to form the foundation for subsequent development of the social sciences.

In his optimism for the future, he coined the term *positivism* to describe this scientific approach, believing that scientific truths could be positively verified through empirical observations, and the logical analysis of what was observed. In recent decades, the idea of positivism has come under serious challenge, as we'll see later in this discussion.

Conflict Paradigm

Karl Marx (1818–1883) suggested that social behavior could best be seen as the process of conflict: the attempt to dominate others and to avoid being dominated. Marx focused primarily on the struggle among economic classes. Specifically, he examined the way capitalism produced the oppression of workers by the owners of industry. Marx's interest in this topic did not end with analytical study: He was also ideologically committed to restructuring economic relations to end the oppression he observed.

The conflict paradigm is not limited to economic analyses. Georg Simmel (1858–1918) was particularly interested in small-scale conflict, in contrast to the class struggle that interested Marx. Simmel noted, for example, that conflicts among members of a tightly knit group tended to be more intense than those among people who did not share feelings of belonging and intimacy.

In a more recent application of the conflict paradigm, when Michel Chossudovsky's (1997) analysis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank suggested that these two international organizations were increasing global poverty rather than eradicating it, he directed his attention to the competing interests involved in the process. In theory, the chief interest being served should be that of the poor people of the world or perhaps the impoverished, Third World nations. The researcher's inquiry, however, identified many other interested parties who benefited: the commercial lending institutions who made loans in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank, and multinational corporations seeking cheap labor and markets for their goods, to name two. Chossudovsky's analysis concluded that the interests of the banks and corporations tended to take precedence over

those of the poor people, who were the intended beneficiaries. Moreover, he found that many policies were weakening national economies in developing nations, as well as undermining democratic governments.

Although applications of the conflict paradigm often focus on class, gender, and ethnic struggles, it would be appropriate to apply it whenever different groups have competing interests. For example, we could fruitfully apply it to understanding relations among different departments in an organization, fraternity and sorority rush weeks, or student–faculty–administrative relations, to name just a few.

These examples should illustrate some of the ways you might view social life if you were taking your lead from the conflict paradigm. To explore the applicability of this paradigm, you might take a minute to skim through a daily newspaper or news magazine and identify events you could interpret in terms of individuals and groups attempting to dominate each other and avoid being dominated. The theoretical concepts and premises of the conflict paradigm might help you make sense out of these events.

Symbolic Interactionism

As we have seen, whereas Marx chiefly addressed macrotheoretical issues—large institutions and whole societies in their evolution through the course of history—Georg Simmel was more interested in the ways individuals interacted with one another, or the “micro” aspects of society. He began by examining dyads (groups of two people) and triads (groups of three), for example. Similarly, he wrote about “the web of group affiliations” (WOLFF 1950).

Simmel was one of the first European sociologists to influence the development of U.S. sociology. His focus on the nature of interactions in particular influenced George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929), and others who took up the cause and developed it into a powerful paradigm for research.

Cooley, for example, introduced the idea of the “primary group,” those intimate associates with whom we share a sense of belonging, such as our family, friends, and so forth. Cooley also

wrote of the “looking-glass self” we form by looking into the reactions of people around us. If everyone treats us as beautiful, for example, we conclude that we are. See how fundamentally this paradigm differs from the society-level concerns of Marx.

Similarly, Mead emphasized the importance of our human ability to “take the role of the other,” imagining how others feel and how they might behave in certain circumstances. As we gain an idea of how people in general see things, we develop a sense of what Mead called the “generalized other.” (Strauss 1977) Mead also felt that most interactions revolved around individuals’ reaching a common understanding through language and other symbolic systems, hence the term *symbolic interactionism*.

Here’s one way you might apply this paradigm to an examination of your own life. The next time you meet someone new, watch how your knowledge of each other unfolds through the process of interaction. Notice also any attempts you make to manage the image you are creating in the other person’s mind.

Clearly this paradigm can lend insights into the nature of interactions in ordinary social life, but it can also help us understand unusual forms of interaction, as when researchers Robert Emerson, Kerry Ferris, and Carol Brooks Gardner (1998), in a study still relevant today, set out to understand the nature of “stalking.” Through interviews with numerous stalking victims, they came to identify different motivations among stalkers, stages in the development of a stalking scenario, how people can recognize if they are being stalked, and what they can do about it.

Ethnomethodology

Whereas some social science paradigms emphasize the impact of social structure (such as norms, values, and control agents) on human behavior, other paradigms do not. Harold Garfinkel (1917–2011), a contemporary sociologist, took the point of view that people are continually creating social structure through their actions and interactions—that they are, in fact, creating their realities. Thus, when you and your instructor meet to discuss your term paper, even though there are myriad expectations about how you

should act, the conversation will somewhat differ from any of those that have occurred before, and how you both act will somewhat modify your future expectations. That is, discussing your term paper will impact your future interactions with other professors and students.

Given the tentativeness of reality in this view, Garfinkel suggested that people are continuously trying to make sense of the life they experience. In a way, he suggested that everyone is acting like a social scientist: hence the term *ethnomethodology*, or “methodology of the people.”

How would you approach learning about people’s expectations and how they make sense out of their world? One technique ethnomethodologists use is to break the rules, to violate people’s expectations. If you try to talk to me about your term paper, but I keep talking about football, any expectations you had for my behavior might become apparent. We might also see how you make sense out of my behavior. (“Maybe he’s using football as an analogy for understanding social systems theory.”)

In another example of ethnomethodology, John Heritage and David Greatbatch (1992) examined the role of applause in British political speeches: How did the speakers evoke applause, and what function did it serve (for example, to complete a topic)? Research within the ethnomethodological paradigm often focuses on communication.

You can find many interesting opportunities to try the ethnomethodological paradigm. For instance, the next time you get on an elevator, don’t face the front (that’s the norm, or expected behavior). Instead, just stand quietly facing the rear of the elevator. See how others react to this behavior. Just as important, notice how you feel about it. If you do this experiment a few times, you should begin to develop a feel for the ethnomethodological paradigm.* See *Applying Concepts in Everyday Life*, “The Power of Paradigms,” for more on this topic.

We’ll return to ethnomethodology in Chapter 10, when we discuss field research. For now, let’s turn to a very different paradigm.

*I am grateful to my colleague, Bernard McGrane, for this experiment. Barney also has his students eat dinner with their hands, watch TV without turning it on, and engage in other strangely enlightening behavior (McGrane 1994).

Structural Functionalism

Structural functionalism, sometimes also known as “social systems theory,” grows out of a notion introduced by Comte and others: A social entity, such as an organization or a whole society, can be viewed as an organism. Like organisms, a social system is made up of parts, each of which contributes to the functioning of the whole.

By analogy, consider the human body. Each component—such as the heart, lungs, kidneys, skin, and brain—has a particular job to do. The body as a whole cannot survive unless each of these parts does its job, and none of the parts can survive except as a part of the whole body. Or consider an automobile, composed of tires, steering wheel, gas tank, spark plugs, and so forth. Each of the parts serves a function for the whole; taken together, that system can get us across town. None of the individual parts would be of much use to us by itself, however.

The view of society as a social system, then, looks for the “functions” served by its various components. We might consider a football team as a social system—one in which the quarterback, running backs, offensive linemen, and others have their own jobs to do for the team as a whole. Or, we could look at a symphony orchestra and examine the functions served by the conductor, the first violinist, and the other musicians.

Social scientists using the functionalist paradigm might note that the function of the police, for example, is to exercise social control—encouraging people to abide by the norms of society and bringing to justice those who do not. We could just as reasonably ask what functions criminals serve in society. Within the functionalist paradigm, we’d see that criminals serve as job security for the police. In a related observation, Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) suggested that crimes and their punishment provided an opportunity for the reaffirmation of a society’s values. By catching and punishing a thief, we reaffirm our collective respect for private property.

To get a sense of the functionalist paradigm, thumb through your college or university catalog and assemble a list of the administrators (such as president, deans, registrar, campus security,

APPLYING CONCEPTS IN EVERYDAY LIFE


The Power of Paradigms

In this chapter, we are looking at some of the social science paradigms used to organize and make sense out of social life, and we are seeing the impact those paradigms have on what is observed and how it is interpreted. The power of paradigms, however, extends well beyond the scientific realm. You can look almost anywhere in the world and see conflicts among religious, ethnic, political, and other cultural paradigms.

Consider the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Widely varied interpretations, reflecting radically different paradigms, blamed the attacks on Osama bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, Israel, the Bush administration, God, homosexuals, and feminists. Some of these explanations may strike you as bizarre, but they made perfectly good sense within the worldviews of those espousing them. That’s the power that paradigms have in all areas of life.

maintenance personnel). Figure out what each of them does. To what extent do these roles relate to the chief functions of your college or university, such as teaching or research? Suppose you were studying some other kind of organization. How many of the school administrators’ functions would also be needed in, say, an insurance company?

In applying the functionalist paradigm to everyday life, people sometimes make the mistake of thinking that functionality, stability, and integration are necessarily good, or that the functionalist paradigm makes that assumption. However, when social researchers look for the “functions” served by poverty, racial discrimination, or the oppression of women, they are not justifying such things. Rather, they seek to understand the roles such things play in the larger society, as a way of understanding why they persist and how they could be eliminated.



Earl Babbie

The functionalist paradigm is based on the assumption that all elements of society serve some function for the operation of the whole, even “negative” elements. Crime, for example, serves the function of providing employment for police. This doesn’t justify crime, but it explains part of how crime is woven into the social whole.

Feminist Paradigms

When Ralph Linton concluded his anthropological classic, *The Study of Man* (1937: 490), by speaking of “a store of knowledge that promises to give man a better life than any he has known,” no one complained that he had left women out. Linton was using the linguistic conventions of his time; he implicitly included women in all his references to men. Or did he?

When feminists (of both genders) first began questioning the use of masculine nouns and pronouns whenever gender was ambiguous, their concerns were often viewed as petty. Many felt the issue was one of women having their feelings hurt, their egos bruised. But be honest: When you read Linton’s words, what did you picture? An amorphous, genderless human being, or a masculine persona?

In a similar way, researchers looking at the social world from a feminist paradigm have called attention to aspects of social life that other paradigms do not reveal. In fact, feminism has established important theoretical paradigms for social research. In part it focuses on gender differences and how they relate to the rest of social organization. These paradigms draw attention to the oppression of women in many societies, which in turn sheds light on oppression in general.

Feminist paradigms not only reveal the treatment of women or the experience of oppression but often point to limitations in how other aspects of social life are examined and understood. For

example, feminist perspectives are often related to a concern for the environment. As Greta Gard suggests,

The way in which women and nature have been conceptualized historically in Western intellectual tradition has resulted in devaluing whatever is associated with women, emotion, animals, nature, and the body, while simultaneously elevating in value those things associated with men, reason, humans, culture, and the mind. One task of ecofeminism has been to expose these dualisms and the ways in which feminizing nature and naturalizing or animalizing women has served as justification for the domination of women, animals and the earth. — (1993: 5)

Feminist paradigms have also challenged the prevailing notions concerning consensus in society. Most descriptions of the predominant beliefs, values, and norms of a society are written by people representing only portions of society. In the United States, for example, such analyses have typically been written by middle-class white men—and, not surprisingly, they have written about the beliefs, values, and norms they themselves share. Though George Herbert Mead spoke of the “generalized other” that each of us becomes aware of and can “take the role of,” feminist paradigms question whether such a generalized other even exists.

Mead used the example of learning to play baseball to illustrate how we learn about the generalized other. As shown here, Janet Lever’s research suggests that understanding the experience of boys may tell us little about girls.

Girls’ play and games are very different. They are mostly spontaneous, imaginative, and free of structure or rules. Turn-taking activities like jump rope may be played without setting explicit goals. Girls have far less experience with interpersonal competition. The style of their competition is indirect, rather than face to face, individual rather than team affiliated. Leadership roles are either missing or randomly filled. — (1986: 86)

Social researchers’ growing recognition of the intellectual differences between men and women led the psychologist Mary Field Belenky and her colleagues to speak of *Women’s Ways of Knowing* (1986). In-depth interviews with 45 women enabled the researchers to distinguish five perspectives on knowing that

...the view of inquiry as obvious and straightforward:

...Some women, especially early in life, feel themselves isolated from the world of knowledge, their lives largely determined by external authorities.

Personal knowledge: From this perspective, women feel themselves capable of taking on and holding knowledge originating with external authorities.

Subjective knowledge: This perspective opens up the possibility of personal, subjective knowledge, including intuition.

Procedural knowledge: Some women feel they have learned the ways of gaining knowledge through objective procedures.

Constructed knowledge: The authors describe this perspective as "a position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience themselves as creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective strategies for knowing."

— (BELENKY ET AL. 1986: 15)

"Constructed knowledge" is particularly interesting in the context of our previous discussions. The positivistic paradigm of Comte would have a place neither for "subjective knowledge" nor for the idea that truth might vary according to its context. The ethnomethodological paradigm, on the other hand, would accommodate these ideas.

Introduced by Nancy Hartsock in 1983, the term *feminist standpoint theory* refers to the idea that women have knowledge about their status and experience that is not available to men. This viewpoint has evolved over time. For example, scholars have come to recognize that there is no single female experience. Further, different kinds of women (varying by wealth, ethnicity, or age, for example) have quite different experiences of life in society, all the while sharing things in common because of their gender. This sensitivity to variations in the female experience is also a main element in *third-wave feminism*, which began in the 1990s.

To try out feminist paradigms, you might want to look into the possibility of discrimination against women at your college or university. Are the top administrative positions held equally by men and women? How about secretarial and clerical positions? Are men's and women's sports supported equally? Read through the official history of your

school; does it include men and women equally? (If you attend an all-male or all-female school, of course, some of these questions won't apply.)

As we just saw, feminist paradigms reflect not only a concern for the unequal treatment of women but also an epistemological recognition that men and women perceive and understand society differently. Social theories created solely by men, which has been the norm, run the risk of an unrecognized bias. A similar case can be made for theories created almost exclusively by white people.

Critical Race Theory

As a general rule, whenever you find the word *critical* in the name of a paradigm or theory, it will likely refer to a nontraditional view, one that may be at odds with the prevailing paradigms of an academic discipline or with the mainstream structure of society.

The roots of critical race theory are generally associated with the civil rights movement of the mid-1950s and race-related legislation of the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, with fears that the strides toward equality were beginning to bog down, civil rights activists and social scientists began the codification of a paradigm based on an awareness of race and a commitment to racial justice.

This was not the first time sociologists had paid attention to the status of nonwhites in American society. Perhaps the best-known African American sociologist in the history of the discipline was W. E. B. DuBois, who published *The Souls of Black Folk* in 1903. Among other things, DuBois pointed out that African Americans lived their lives through a "dual consciousness": as Americans and as black people. By contrast, white Americans have seldom reflected on being white. If you were American, white was simply assumed. If you were not white, you have been seen as, and made to feel like, the exception. So imagine the difference between an African American sociologist and a white sociologist creating a theory of social identity. Their theories of identity would likely differ in some fundamental ways, even if they were not limiting their analyses to their own race.

Much of the contemporary scholarship in critical race theory has to do with the role of race in politics and government, studies often undertaken by legal scholars as well as social scientists. Thus, for example, Derrick Bell (1980) critiqued

the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, which struck down the "separate but equal" system of school segregation. He suggested that the Court was motivated by the economic and political interests of the white majority, not by the objective of educational equality for African American students. In his analysis, Ball introduced the concept of *interest convergence*, suggesting that laws will only be changed to benefit African Americans if and when those changes are seen to further the interests of whites. Richard Delgado (2002) provides an excellent overview of how subsequent critical race theorists have pursued Bell's reasoning.

Rational Objectivity Reconsidered

We began with Comte's assertion that we can study society rationally and objectively. Since his time, the growth of science, the decline of superstition, and the rise of bureaucratic structures have put rationality more and more at the center of social life. As fundamental as rationality is to most of us, however, some contemporary scholars have raised questions about it.

For example, positivistic social scientists have sometimes erred in assuming that humans will always act rationally. I'm sure your own experience offers ample evidence to the contrary. Many modern economic models also assume that people will make rational choices in the economic sector: They will choose the highest-paying job, pay the lowest price, and so forth. This assumption, however, ignores the power of such matters as tradition, loyalty, and image that compete with reason in determining human behavior.

A more sophisticated positivism would assert that we can rationally understand even nonrational human behavior. Here's an example. In the famous "Asch experiment" (Asch 1958), a group of subjects is presented with a set of lines on a screen and asked to identify the two lines of equal length.

Imagine yourself a subject in such an experiment. You're sitting in the front row of a classroom among a group of six subjects. A set of lines is projected on the wall in front of you (see Figure 2-1). The experimenter asks the subjects, one at a time, to identify the line to the right

interest convergence The thesis that majority-group members will only support the interests of minorities when those actions also support the interests of the majority group.




FIGURE 2-1 The Asch Experiment. Subjects in the Asch experiment have a seemingly easy task: to determine whether A, B, or C is the same length as X. But there's more here than meets the eye.

(A, B, or C) that matches the length of line X. The correct answer (B) is obvious to you. To your surprise, you find that all the other subjects agree on a different answer!

The experimenter announces that all but one of the group has gotten the correct answer; that is, you've gotten it wrong. Then a new set of lines is presented, and you have the same experience. The obviously correct answer is wrong, and everyone but you seems to understand that.

As it turns out, of course, you're the only real subject in the experiment—all the others are working with the experimenter. The purpose is to see whether you would be swayed by public pressure and go along with the incorrect answer. In one-third of the initial experiments, Asch found that his subjects did just that.

Choosing an obviously wrong answer in a simple experiment is an example of nonrational behavior. But as Asch went on to show, experimenters can examine the circumstances that lead more or fewer subjects to go along with the incorrect answer. For example, in subsequent studies, Asch varied the size of one group and the number of "dissenters" who chose the "wrong" (that is, the correct) answer. Thus, it is possible to study nonrational behavior rationally and scientifically.

More radically, we can question whether social life abides by rational principles at all. In the physical sciences, developments such as chaos theory, fuzzy logic, and complexity have suggested that we may need to rethink fundamentally the orderliness of physical events.

The contemporary challenge to positivism, however, goes beyond the question of whether

people behave rationally. In part, the criticism of positivism challenges the idea that scientists can be as objective as the scientific ideal assumes. Most scientists would agree that personal feelings can and do influence the problems scientists choose to study, their choice of what to observe, and the conclusions they draw from their observations.

As with rationality, there is a radical critique of objectivity. Whereas scientific objectivity has long stood as an unquestionable ideal, some contemporary researchers suggest that subjectivity might actually be preferred in some situations, as we glimpsed in the discussions of feminism and ethnomethodology. Let's take a moment to return to the dialectic of subjectivity and objectivity.

To begin with, all our experiences are inescapably subjective. There is no way out. We can see only through our own eyes, and anything peculiar to our eyes will shape what we see. We can hear things only the way our particular ears and brain transmit and interpret sound waves. You and I, to some extent, hear and see different realities. And both of us experience quite different physical "realities" than do bats, for example. In what to us is total darkness, a bat "sees" things such as flying insects by emitting a sound we humans can't hear. Echolocation, or the reflection of the bat's sound, creates a "sound picture" precise enough for the bat to home in on the moving insect and snatch it up. In a similar vein, scientists on the planet Xandu might develop theories of the physical world based on a sensory apparatus that we humans can't even imagine. Maybe they have X-ray vision or hear colors.

Despite the inescapable subjectivity of our experience, we humans seem to be wired to seek an agreement on what is "really real," what is objectively so. Objectivity is a conceptual attempt to get beyond our individual views. It is ultimately a matter of communication, as you and I attempt to find a common ground in our subjective experiences. Whenever we succeed in our search, we say we are dealing with objective reality. This is the agreement reality discussed in Chapter 1.

Perhaps the most significant studies in the history of social science were conducted in the 1930s by a Turkish American social psychologist, Muzafer Sherif (1935), who slyly said he wanted to study "auto-kinetic effects." To do this, he put small groups in totally darkened rooms, save for

a single point of light in the center of the wall in front of the participants. Sherif explained that the light would soon begin to move about, and the subjects were to determine how far it was moving—a difficult task with nothing else visible as a gauge of length or distance.

Amazingly, the subjects in each group agreed on the distance the point of light moved about. Oddly, however, the groups arrived at quite different conclusions. Strangest of all—as you may have guessed—the point of light had remained stationary. If you stare at a fixed point of light long enough it will seem to move (Sherif's "auto-kinetic effect"). Notice, however, that each of the groups agreed on a specific delusion. The movement of the light was real to them, but it was a reality created out of nothing: a socially constructed reality.

Whereas our subjectivity is individual, our search for objectivity is social. This is true in all aspects of life, not just in science. While you and I prefer different foods, we must agree to some extent on what is fit to eat and what is not, or else there could be no restaurants, no grocery stores, no food industry. The same argument could be made regarding every other form of consumption. There could be no movies or television, no sports.

Social scientists as well have found benefits in the concept of objective reality. As people seek to impose order on their experience of life, they find it useful to pursue this goal as a collective venture. What are the causes and cures of prejudice? Working together, social researchers have uncovered some answers that hold up to intersubjective scrutiny. Whatever your subjective experience of things, for example, you can discover for yourself that as education increases, prejudice tends to decrease. Because each of us can discover this independently, we say it is objectively true.

From the seventeenth century through the middle of the twentieth, the belief in an objective reality—that people could see and measure ever more clearly—predominated in science. For the most part, it was held not simply as a useful paradigm but as The Truth. The term *positivism* generally represents the belief in a logically ordered, objective reality that we can come to know. This is the view challenged today by postmodernists and others who suggest that perhaps only our perceptions and experiences are real.

Some say that the ideal of objectivity conceals as much as it reveals. As we saw earlier,

much of what was regarded as scientific objectivity in years past was actually an agreement primarily among white, middle-class, European men. Experiences common to women, to ethnic minorities, or to the poor, for example, were not necessarily represented in that reality.

The early anthropologists are now criticized for often making modern, Westernized “sense” out of the beliefs and practices of nonliterate tribes around the world—sometimes portraying their subjects as superstitious savages. We often call orally transmitted beliefs about the distant past “creation myth,” whereas we speak of our own beliefs as “history.” Increasingly today, there is a demand to find the native logic by which various peoples make sense out of life.

Ultimately, we’ll never know whether there is an objective reality that we experience subjectively or whether our concepts of an objective reality are illusory. So desperate is our need to know just what is going on, however, that both the positivists and the postmodernists are sometimes drawn into the belief that their view is real and true. There is a dual irony in this. On the one hand, the positivist’s belief in the reality of the objective world must ultimately be based on faith; it cannot be proved by “objective” science, because that’s precisely what is at issue. And the postmodernists, who say nothing is objectively so, do at least feel the absence of objective reality is *really* the way things are.

Postmodernism is often portrayed as a denial of the possibility of social science, but that’s not the point I am making. This textbook makes no assumption about the existence or absence of an objective reality. At the same time, human beings demonstrate an extensive and robust ability to establish agreements as to what’s “real.” This appears in regard to rocks and trees, as well as ghosts and gods, and even more-elusive ideas such as loyalty and treason. Whether something like “prejudice” really exists, research into its nature can take place, because enough people agree that prejudice does exist, and researchers can use techniques of inquiry to study it.

Another social science paradigm, **critical realism**, suggests that we define “reality” as that which can be seen to have an effect. Since

critical realism A paradigm that holds that things are real insofar as they produce effects.

prejudice clearly has an observable effect in our lives, it must be judged “real” in terms of this point of view. This paradigm fits interestingly with the statement attributed to the early American sociologist W. I. Thomas: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (1928: 571–72).

This book will not require or even encourage you to choose among positivism, postmodernism, or any of the other paradigms discussed in this chapter. In fact, I invite you to look for value in any and all of them as you seek to understand the world that may or may not exist around you.

Similarly, as social researchers, we are not forced to align ourselves entirely with either of these approaches. Instead, we can treat them as two distinct arrows in our quiver. Each approach compensates for the weaknesses of the other by suggesting complementary perspectives that can produce useful lines of inquiry.

The renowned British physicist, Stephen Hawking, has elegantly described the appealing simplicity of the positivistic model but tempers his remarks with a recognition of the way science is practiced.

According to this way of thinking, a scientific theory is a mathematical model that describes and codifies the observations we make. A good theory will describe a large range of phenomena on the basis of a few simple postulates and will make definite predictions that can be tested. If the predictions agree with the observations, the theory survives that test, though it can never be proved to be correct. On the other hand, if the observations disagree with the predictions, one has to discard or modify the theory. (At least, that is what is supposed to happen. In practice, people often question the accuracy of the observations and the reliability and moral character of those making the observations.) — (2001: 31)

In summary, a rich variety of theoretical paradigms can be brought to bear on the study of social life. With each of these fundamental frames of reference, useful theories can be constructed. We turn now to some of the issues involved in theory construction, which are of interest and use to all social researchers, from positivists to postmodernists—and all those in between. Now let’s look at some other fundamental options for organizing social research.

■ TWO LOGICAL SYSTEMS REVISITED

In Chapter 1, I introduced deductive and inductive theory with a promise that we would return to them later. It's later.

L02

The Traditional Model of Science

Most of us have a somewhat idealized picture of "the scientific method." It is a view gained as a result of the physical-science education we've received ever since our elementary school days. Although this traditional model of science tells only a part of the story, it's helpful to understand its logic.

There are three main elements in the traditional model of science, typically presented in the order in which they are implemented: theory, operationalization, and observation. Let's look at each in turn.

Theory At this point we're already well acquainted with the idea of theory. According to the traditional model of science, scientists begin with a theory, from which they derive a hypothesis that they can test. (See the *How to Do It* box, "Framing a Hypothesis," for more.) So, for example, as social scientists we might have a theory about the causes of juvenile delinquency. Let's assume that we've arrived at the hypothesis that delinquency is inversely related to social class. That is, as social class goes up, delinquency goes down.

Operationalization To test any hypothesis, we must specify the meanings of all the variables involved in it: *social class* and *delinquency* in the present case. For example, *delinquency* might be specified as "being arrested for a crime," or "being convicted of a crime," and so forth. For this particular study, *social class* might be specified by family income.

Next, we need to specify how we'll measure the variables we have defined. *Operationalization* literally means the operations involved in measuring a variable. There are many ways we can pursue this topic, each of which allows for different ways of measuring our variables.

For simplicity, let's assume we're planning to conduct a survey of high school students.

We might operationalize *delinquency* in the form of the question "Have you ever stolen anything?" Those who answer "yes" will be classified as delinquents in our study; those who say "no" will be classified as nondelinquents. Similarly, we might operationalize *social class* by asking respondents, "What was your family's income last year?" and providing them with a set of family income categories: under \$25,000; \$25,000–\$49,999; \$50,000–\$99,999; and \$100,000 and above.

At this point someone might object that "delinquency" can mean something more or different from having stolen something at one time or another, or that social class isn't necessarily the same as family income. Some parents might think body piercing is a sign of delinquency even if their children don't steal, and to some "social class" might include an element of prestige or community standing as well as how much money a family has. For the researcher testing a hypothesis, however, the meaning of variables is exactly and only what the operational definition specifies.

In this respect, scientists are very much like Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty tells Alice, "it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."

"The question is," Alice replies, "whether you can make words mean so many different things." To which Humpty Dumpty responds, "The question is, which is to be master—that's all" ([1895] 2009: 190).

Scientists have to be "masters" of their operational definitions for the sake of precision in observation, measurement, and communication.

hypothesis A specified testable expectation about empirical reality that follows from a more general proposition; more generally, an expectation about the nature of things derived from a theory. It is a statement of something that ought to be observed in the real world if the theory is correct.

operationalization One step beyond conceptualization. Operationalization is the process of developing operational definitions, or specifying the exact operations involved in measuring a variable.

operational definition The concrete and specific definition of something in terms of the operations by which observations are to be categorized. The operational definition of "earning an A in this course" might be "correctly answering at least 90 percent of the final-exam questions."

HOW TO DO IT

Framing a Hypothesis

As we have seen, the deductive method of research typically focuses on the testing of a hypothesis. Let's take a minute to look at how to create a hypothesis for testing.

Hypotheses state an expected causal relationship between two (or more) variables. Let's suppose you're interested in student political orientations, and your review of the literature and your own reasoning suggest to you that college major will play some part in determining students' political views. Already, we have two variables: *major* and *political orientation*. Moreover, *political orientation* is the dependent variable; you believe it depends on something else: the independent variable, *major*.

Now we need to specify the attributes composing each of those variables. For simplicity's sake, let's assume two political orientations: liberal and conservative. To simplify the matter of major, let's suppose your research interests center on the presumed differences between business students and those in the social sciences.

Even with these simplifications, you would need to specify more concretely how you'll recognize a liberal or a conservative when you

come across them in your study. This process of specification will be discussed at length in Chapter 5. For now, let's assume you'll ask student-subjects whether they consider themselves liberals or conservatives, letting the students decide on what the terms mean to them. (As we'll see later, this simple dichotomy is unlikely to work in practice, as some students want to identify themselves as Independents, other students as something else.)

Identifying students' majors isn't as straightforward as you might think. For example, what disciplines make up the social sciences in your study? Also, must students have declared their majors already, or can they just be planning to major in one of the relevant fields?

Once these issues have been settled, you're ready to state your hypothesis. For example, it might be "Students majoring in the social sciences will be more likely to identify themselves as liberals than will those majoring in business."

In addition to this basic expectation, you may wish to specify "more likely" in terms of how *much* more likely. Chapter 14 will provide some options in this regard.

Otherwise, we would never know whether a study that contradicted ours did so only because it used a different set of procedures to measure one of the variables and thus changed the meaning of the hypothesis being tested. Of course, this also means that to evaluate a study's conclusions about juvenile delinquency and social class, or any other variables, we need to know how those variables were operationalized.

The way we have operationalized the variables in our imaginary study could be open to other problems, however. Perhaps some respondents will lie about having stolen anything, in which case we'll misclassify them as nondelinquent. Some respondents will not know their family incomes and will give mistaken answers; others may be embarrassed and lie. We'll consider such issues in detail in Part 2.

Our operationalized hypothesis now is that the highest incidence of delinquents will be found among respondents who select the lowest family income category (under \$25,000), a lower percentage of delinquents will be found in the \$25,000–\$49,999 category, still fewer delinquents will be found in the \$50,000–\$99,999 category, and the lowest percentage of delinquents will be found in the \$100,000 and above category.

Observation The final step in the traditional model of science involves actual observation, looking at the world and making measurements of what is seen. Having developed theoretical clarity and expectations and having created a strategy for looking, all that remains is to look at the way things actually appear.

Let's suppose our survey produced the following data:

	Percent Delinquent
Under \$25,000	20
\$25,000-\$49,999	15
\$50,000-\$99,999	10
\$100,000 and above	5

Observations producing such data would confirm our hypothesis. But suppose our findings were as follows:

	Percent Delinquent
Under \$25,000	15
\$25,000-\$49,999	15
\$50,000-\$99,999	15
\$100,000 and above	15

These findings would disconfirm our hypothesis regarding family income and delinquency. Disconfirmability or the possibility of falsification is an essential quality in any hypothesis. In other words, if there is no chance that our hypothesis will be disconfirmed, it hasn't said anything meaningful. You can't test whether a hypothesis is true unless your test contains the possibility of deciding it's false.

For example, the hypothesis that "juvenile delinquents" commit more crimes than do "nondelinquents" cannot possibly be disconfirmed, because criminal behavior is intrinsic to the notion of delinquency. Even if we recognize that some young people commit crimes without being caught and labeled as delinquents, they couldn't threaten our hypothesis, because our observations would lead us to conclude they were law-abiding nondelinquents.

Figure 2-2 provides a schematic diagram of the traditional model of scientific inquiry. In it we see the researcher beginning with an interest in a phenomenon (such as juvenile delinquency). Next comes the development of a theoretical understanding, in this case that a single concept (such as social class) might explain others. The theoretical considerations result in an expectation about what should be observed if the theory is correct. The notation $Y = f(X)$ is a conventional way of saying that

Y (for example, *delinquency*) is a function of (depends on) X (for example, *social class*). At that level, however, X and Y still have rather general meanings that could give rise to quite different observations and measurements. Operationalization specifies the procedures that will be used to measure the variables. The lowercase y in Figure 2-2, for example, is a precisely measurable indicator of capital Y . This operationalization process results in the formation of a testable hypothesis: For example, self-reported theft is a function of family income. Observations aimed at finding out whether this statement accurately describes reality are part of what is typically called *hypothesis testing*. (See the *Issues and Insights* box, "Hints for Stating Hypotheses," for more on the process of formulating hypotheses.)

This operationalization process results in the formation of a testable hypothesis: For example, increasing family income reduces self-reported theft. Observations aimed at finding out whether this is true are part of what is typically called hypothesis testing.




FIGURE 2-2 **The Traditional Model of Science.** The deductive model of scientific inquiry begins with a sometimes vague or general question, which is subjected to a process of specification, resulting in hypotheses that can be tested through empirical observations.

ISSUES AND INSIGHTS

Hints for Stating Hypotheses*by Riley E. Dunlap*

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A hypothesis is the basic statement that is tested in research. Typically a hypothesis states a relationship between two variables. (Although it is possible to use more than two variables, you should stick to two for now.) Because a hypothesis makes a prediction about the relationship between the two variables, it must be testable so you can determine if the prediction is right or wrong when you examine the results obtained in your study. A hypothesis must be stated in an unambiguous manner to be clearly testable. What follows are suggestions for developing testable hypotheses.

Assume you have an interest in trying to predict some phenomenon, such as "attitudes toward women's liberation," and that you can measure such attitudes on a continuum ranging from "opposed to women's liberation" to "neutral" to "supportive of women's liberation." Also assume that, lacking a theory, you'll rely on "hunches" to come up with variables that might be related to attitudes toward women's liberation.

In a sense, you can think of hypothesis construction as a case of filling in the blank: "_____ is related to attitudes toward women's liberation." Your job is to think of a variable that might plausibly be related to such

attitudes, and then to word a hypothesis that states a relationship between the two variables (the one that fills in the "blank" and "attitudes toward women's liberation"). You need to do so in a precise manner so that you can determine clearly whether the hypothesis is supported or not when you examine the results (in this case, most likely the results of a survey).

The key is to word the hypothesis carefully so that the prediction it makes is quite clear to you as well as to others. If you use age, note that saying "Age is related to attitudes toward women's liberation" does not say precisely how you think the two are related. (In fact, the only way this hypothesis could be falsified is if you fail to find a statistically significant relationship of any type between age and attitudes toward women's liberation). In this case a couple of steps are necessary. You have two options:

1. "Age is related to attitudes toward women's liberation, with younger adults being more supportive than older adults." (Or, you could state the opposite, if you believed older people are likely to be more supportive.)
2. "Age is negatively related to support for women's liberation." Note here that I specify "support" for women's liberation (SWL) and then predict a negative relationship—that is, as age goes up, I predict that SWL will go down.

Deduction and Induction Compared

The traditional model of science uses deductive logic (see Chapter 1). In this section, we're going to see how deductive logic fits into social science research and contrast it with inductive logic. W. I. B. Beveridge, a philosopher of science, describes these two systems of logic as follows:

Logicians distinguish between inductive reasoning (from particular instances to general principles, from facts to theories) and deductive reasoning (from the general to the particular,

applying a theory to a particular case). In induction one starts from observed data and develops a generalization which explains the relationships between the objects observed. On the other hand, in deductive reasoning one starts from some general law and applies it to a particular instance. — (1950: 113)

The classical illustration of deductive logic is the familiar syllogism "All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." This syllogism presents a theory and its operationalization. To prove it, you might then

In this hypothesis, note that both of the variables (*age*, the independent variable or likely “cause,” and *SWL*, the dependent variable or likely “effect”) range from low to high. This feature of the two variables is what allows you to use “negatively” (or “positively”) to describe the relationship.

Notice what happens if you hypothesize a relationship between *gender* and *SWL*. Because gender is a nominal variable (as you’ll learn in Chapter 5) it does not range from low to high—people are either male or female (the two attributes of the variable *gender*). Consequently, you must be careful in stating the hypothesis unambiguously:

1. “Gender is positively (or negatively) related to *SWL*” is not an adequate hypothesis, because it doesn’t specify how you expect gender to be related to *SWL*—that is, whether you think men or women will be more supportive of women’s liberation.
2. It is tempting to say something like “Women are positively related to *SWL*,” but this really doesn’t work because female is only an attribute, not a full variable (*gender* is the variable).
3. “Gender is related to *SWL*, with women being more supportive than men” would be my recommendation. Or, you could say, “with men being less supportive than women,” which makes the identical

prediction. (Of course, you could also make the opposite prediction, that men are more supportive than women are, if you wished.)

4. Equally legitimate would be “Women are more likely to support women’s liberation than are men.” (Note the need for the second “are,” or you could be construed as hypothesizing that women support women’s liberation more than they support men—not quite the same idea.)

The above examples hypothesized relationships between a “characteristic” (age or gender) and an “orientation” (attitudes toward women’s liberation). Because the causal order is pretty clear (obviously age and gender come before attitudes, and are less alterable), we could state the hypotheses as I’ve done, and everyone would assume that we were stating causal hypotheses.

Finally, you may run across references to the **null hypothesis**, especially in statistics. Such a hypothesis predicts no relationship (technically, no statistically significant relationship) between the two variables, and it is always implicit in testing hypotheses. Basically, if you have hypothesized a positive (or negative) relationship, you are hoping that the results will allow you to reject the null hypothesis and verify your hypothesized relationship.

perform an empirical test of Socrates’ mortality. That is essentially the approach discussed as the traditional model.

Using inductive logic, you might begin by noting that Socrates is mortal—and by observing—several other men as well. You might then note that all the observed men were mortals, thereby arriving at the tentative conclusion that all men are mortal.

Let’s consider an actual research project as a vehicle for comparing the roles of deductive and inductive logic in theory and research.

A Case Illustration Years ago, Charles Glock, Benjamin Ringer, and I (1967) set out to discover what caused differing levels of church involvement among U.S. Episcopalians. Several theoretical or quasi-theoretical positions suggested possible answers. I’ll focus on only one here—what we came to call the “Comfort hypothesis.”

null hypothesis In connection with hypothesis testing and tests of statistical significance, that hypothesis that suggests there is no relationship among the variables under study. You may conclude that the variables are related after having statistically rejected the null hypothesis.

In part, we took our lead from the Christian injunction to care for “the halt, the lame, and the blind” and those who are “weary and heavy laden.” At the same time, ironically, we noted the Marxist assertion that religion is “the opium for the people.” Given both, it made sense to expect the following, which was our hypothesis: “Parishioners whose life situations most deprive them of satisfaction and fulfillment in the secular society turn to the church for comfort and substitute rewards” (GLOCK, RINGER, AND BABBIE 1967: 107–8).

Having framed this general hypothesis, we set about testing it. Were those deprived of satisfaction in the secular society in fact more religious than those who received more satisfaction from the secular society? To answer this, we needed to distinguish who was deprived. Our questionnaire included items that intended to indicate whether parishioners were relatively deprived or gratified in secular society.

To start, we reasoned that men enjoy more status than do women in our generally male-dominated society. It followed that, if our hypothesis were correct, women should appear more religious than men. Once the survey data had been collected and analyzed, our expectation about gender and religion was clearly confirmed. On three separate measures of religious involvement—ritual (for example, church attendance), organizational (for example, belonging to church organizations), and intellectual (for example, reading church publications)—women were more religious than men. On our overall measure, women scored 50 percent higher than men.

In another test of the Comfort hypothesis, we reasoned that in a youth-oriented society, old people would be more deprived of secular gratification than the young would be. Once again, the data confirmed our expectation. The oldest parishioners were more religious than were the middle-aged, who were more religious than were the young adults.

Social class—measured by education and income—afforded another test, which was successful. Those with low social status were more involved in the church than were those with high social status.

The hypothesis was even confirmed in a test that went against everyone’s commonsense expectations. Despite church posters showing

worshipful young families and bearing the slogan “The Family That Prays Together Stays Together,” the Comfort hypothesis suggested that parishioners who were married and had children—the clear U.S. ideal at that time—would enjoy secular gratification in that regard. As a consequence, they should be less religious than those who lacked one or both family components. Thus, we hypothesized that parishioners who were both single and childless should be the most religious; those with either spouse or child should be somewhat less religious; and those married with children—representing the ideal pictured on all those posters—should be least religious of all. That’s exactly what we found.

Finally, the Comfort hypothesis suggested that the various kinds of secular deprivation should be cumulative: Those with all the characteristics associated with deprivation should be the most religious; those with none should be the least. When we combined the four individual measures of deprivation into a composite measure (see Chapter 6 for methods of doing this), the theoretical expectation was exactly confirmed. Comparing the two extremes, we found that single, childless, old, lower-class, female parishioners scored more than three times as high on the measure of church involvement than did young, married, upper-class fathers.

This research example clearly illustrates the logic of the deductive model. Beginning with general, theoretical expectations about the impact of social deprivation on church involvement, we derived concrete hypotheses linking specific measurable variables, such as *age* and *church attendance*. We then analyzed the actual empirical data to determine whether empirical reality supported the deductive expectations. Sounds good, right?

Alas, I’ve been fibbing a little bit just now. To tell the truth, although we began with an interest in discovering what caused variations in church involvement among Episcopalians, we didn’t actually begin with a Comfort hypothesis, or any other hypothesis for that matter. (In the interest of further honesty, Glock and Ringer initiated the study, and I joined it years after the data had been collected.)

A questionnaire was designed to collect information from parishioners that might shed a bit of light on why some participated in the church

more than others, but questionnaire construction was not guided by any precise, deductive theory. Once the data were collected, the task of explaining differences in religiosity began with an analysis of variables that have a wide impact on people's lives, including *gender*, *age*, *social class*, and *family status*. Each of these four variables was found to relate strongly to church involvement in the ways already described. Rather than being good news, this presented a dilemma.

Glock recalls discussing his findings with colleagues over lunch at the Columbia faculty club. Once he had displayed the tables illustrating the impact of the variables and their cumulative effect, a colleague asked, "What does it all mean, Charlie?" Glock was at a loss. Why were those variables so strongly related to church involvement?

That question launched a process of reasoning about what the several variables had in common, aside from their impact on religiosity. (The composite index was originally labeled "Predisposition to Church Involvement.") Eventually we saw that each of the four variables also reflected differential status in the secular society, and then we had the thought that perhaps the issue of comfort was involved. Thus, the inductive process had moved from concrete observations to a general theoretical explanation. See the *Applying Concepts in Everyday Life* box, "Church Involvement," for more on the Glock study.

A Graphic Contrast As the preceding case illustration shows, theory and research can be accomplished both inductively and deductively. Figure 2-3 shows a graphic comparison of the deductive and inductive methods. In both cases, we are interested in the relationship between the number of hours spent studying for an exam and the grade earned on that exam. Using the deductive method, we would begin by examining the matter logically. Doing well on an exam reflects a student's ability to recall and manipulate information. Both of these abilities should be increased by exposure to the information before the exam. In this fashion, we would arrive at a hypothesis suggesting a positive relationship between the number of hours spent studying and the grade earned on the exam. That is, we expect grades to increase as the hours of studying increase. If increased hours produced decreased

APPLYING CONCEPTS IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Church Involvement

Although many church leaders believe that the function of churches is to shape members' behavior in the community, the Glock study suggests that church involvement primarily reflects a need for comfort by those who are denied gratification in the secular society. How might churches apply these research results?

On the one hand, churches might adjust their programs to the needs that were drawing their members to participation. They might study members' needs for gratification and develop more programs to satisfy them.

On the other hand, churches could seek to remind members that the purpose of participation is to learn and practice proper behavior. Following that strategy would probably change participation patterns, attracting new participants to the church while driving away others.

grades, we would call it a negative relationship. The hypothesis is represented by the line in part 1a of Figure 2-3.

Our next step would be to make observations relevant to testing our hypothesis. The shaded area in part 1b of the figure represents perhaps hundreds of observations of different students, noting how many hours they studied and what grades they got. Finally, in part 1c, we compare the hypothesis and the observations. Because observations in the real world seldom if ever match our expectations perfectly, we must decide whether the match is close enough to confirm the hypothesis. In other words, can we conclude that the hypothesis describes the general pattern that exists, granting some variations in real life?

Now let's address the same research question by using the inductive method. We would begin—as in part 2a of the figure—with a set of observations. Curious about the relationship between hours spent studying and grades earned, we might simply arrange to collect some relevant data. Then we'd look for a pattern that




FIGURE 2-3 Deductive and Inductive Methods. Both deduction and induction are legitimate and valuable approaches to understanding. Deduction begins with an expected pattern that is tested against observations, whereas induction begins with observations and seeks to find a pattern within them.

best represented or summarized our observations. In part 2b of the figure, the pattern is shown as a curved line running through the center of the curving mass of points.

The pattern found among the points in this case suggests that with 1 to 15 hours of studying, each additional hour generally produces a higher grade on the exam. With 15 to about 25 hours, however, more study seems to lower the grade slightly. Studying more than 25 hours, on the other hand, results in a return to the initial pattern: More hours produce higher grades.

Using the inductive method, then, we end up with a tentative conclusion about the pattern of the relationship between the two variables. The conclusion is tentative because the observations we've made cannot be taken as a test of the pattern—those observations are the source of the pattern we've created.

In actual practice, theory and research interact through a never-ending alternation of deduction and induction. Walter Wallace (1971) represents this process as a circle, which is presented in a modified form in Figure 2-4.




FIGURE 2-4 The Wheel of Science. The theory and research cycle can be compared to a relay race; although all participants do not necessarily start or stop at the same point, they share a common goal—to examine all levels of social life.

Source: Adapted from Walter Wallace, *The Logic of Science in Sociology* (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, 1971).

When Emile Durkheim ([1897] 1951) pored over table after table of official statistics on suicide rates in different areas, he was struck by the fact that Protestant countries consistently had higher suicide rates than did Catholic ones. Why should that be the case? His initial observations led him to create a theory of religion, social integration, anomie, and suicide. His theoretical explanations led to further hypotheses and further observations.

In summary, the scientific norm of logical reasoning provides a two-way bridge between theory and research. Scientific inquiry in practice typically involves an alternation between deduction and induction. During the deductive phase, we reason toward observations; during the inductive phase, we reason from observations. Both deduction and induction offer routes to the construction of social theories, and both logic and observation are essential.

Although both inductive and deductive methods are valid in scientific inquiry, individuals may feel more comfortable with one approach than the other. Consider this exchange in Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's "A Scandal in Bohemia," as Sherlock Holmes answers Dr. Watson's inquiry:

"What do you imagine that it means?"

"I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorise before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts." — (DOYLE [1891] 1892: 13)

Some social scientists would rally behind this inductive position (see especially the discussion of grounded theory in Chapter 10), whereas others would take a deductive stance. Most, however, concede the legitimacy of both. With this understanding of the deductive and inductive links between theory and research, let's delve a little more deeply into how theories are constructed using these two different approaches.

DEDUCTIVE THEORY CONSTRUCTION

To see what is involved in deductive theory construction and hypothesis testing, let's imagine that you're going to construct a deductive theory. How would you go about it?

L03

Getting Started

The first step in deductive theory construction is to pick a topic that interests you. It can be broad, such as "What's the structure of society?" or narrower, as in "Why do people support or oppose a woman's right to an abortion?" Whatever the topic, it should be something you're interested in understanding and explaining.

Once you've picked your topic, you then undertake an inventory of what is known or thought about it. In part, this means writing down your own observations and ideas about it. Beyond that, you need to learn what other scholars have said about it. You can do this by talking to other people and by reading what others have written about it. Appendix A provides guidelines for using the library—you'll probably spend a lot of time there.

Your preliminary research will probably uncover consistent patterns discovered by prior scholars. For example, religious and political variables will stand out as important determinants of attitudes about abortion. Findings such as these will be quite useful to you in creating your own theory. We'll return to techniques of literature review as the book continues.

Throughout this process, introspection is helpful. If you can look at your own personal processes—including reactions, fears, and prejudices you aren't especially proud of—you may be able to gain important insights into human behavior in general.

Constructing Your Theory

Although theory construction is not a lockstep affair, the following list of elements in theory construction should organize the activity for you.

1. Specify the topic.
2. Specify the range of phenomena your theory addresses. Will your theory apply to all of human social life, will it apply only to U.S. citizens, only to young people, or what?
3. Identify and specify your major concepts and variables.
4. Find out what is known (or what propositions have been demonstrated) about the relationships among those variables.
5. Reason logically from those propositions to the specific topic you're examining.

We've already discussed items (1) through (3), so let's focus now on (4) and (5). As you identify the relevant concepts and discover what has already been learned about them, you can begin to create a propositional structure that explains the topic under study. For the most part, social scientists have not created formal, propositional theories. Still, looking at a well-reasoned example is useful. Let's look now at an example of how these building blocks fit together in actual deductive theory construction and empirical research.

An Example of Deductive Theory: Distributive Justice

A topic of central interest to scholars is the concept of distributive justice, people's perception of whether they're being treated fairly by life, whether they're getting "their share." Guillermina Jasso describes the theory of distributive justice more formally, as follows:

The theory provides a mathematical description of the process whereby individuals, reflecting on their holdings of the goods they value (such as beauty, intelligence, or wealth), compare themselves to others, experiencing a fundamental instantaneous magnitude of the justice evaluation (J), which captures their sense of being fairly or unfairly treated in the distributions of natural and social goods. — (1988: 11)

Notice that Jasso has assigned a letter to her key variable: J will stand for distributive

justice. She does this to support her intention of stating her theory in mathematical formulas. Though theories are often expressed mathematically, we'll not delve too deeply into that practice here.

Jasso indicates that there are three kinds of postulates in her theory. "The first makes explicit the fundamental axiom which represents the substantive point of departure for the theory." She elaborates as follows:

The theory begins with the received Axiom of Comparison, which formalizes the long-held view that a wide class of phenomena, including happiness, self-esteem, and the sense of distributive justice, may be understood as the product of a comparison process. — (1988: 11)

Thus, our sense of whether we are receiving a "fair" share of the good things of life comes from comparing ourselves with others. If this seems obvious to you, that's good. Remember, axioms are the taken-for-granted beginnings of theory.

Jasso continues to do the groundwork for her theory. First, she indicates that our sense of distributive justice is a function of "Actual Holdings (A)" and "Comparison Holdings (C)" of some good. Let's consider money. My sense of justice in this regard is a function of how much I actually have, compared with how much others have. By specifying the two components of the comparison, Jasso can use them as variables in her theory.

Jasso then offers a "measurement rule" that further specifies how the two variables, A and C , will be conceptualized. This step is needed because some of the goods to be examined are concrete and commonly measured (such as money), whereas others are less tangible (such as respect). The former kind, she says, will be measured conventionally, whereas the latter will be measured "by the individual's relative rank within a specially selected comparison group." The theory will provide a formula for making that measurement (Jasso 1988: 13).

Jasso continues in this fashion to introduce additional elements, weaving them into mathematical formulas for deriving predictions about the workings of distributive justice in a variety of social settings. Here is a sampling of where her theorizing takes her (1988: 14–15).

- Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider.
- The preference to steal from a fellow group member is more pronounced in poor groups than in rich groups.
- In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thief's group.
- Persons who arrive a week late at summer camp or for the freshman year of college are more likely to become friends of persons who play games of chance than of persons who play games of skill.
- A society becomes more vulnerable to deficit spending as its wealth increases.
- Societies in which population growth is welcomed must be societies in which the set of valued goods includes at least one quantity-good, such as wealth.

Jasso's theory leads to many other propositions, but this sampling should provide a good sense of where deductive theorizing can take you. To get a feeling for how she reasons her way to these propositions, let's look briefly at the logic involved in two of the propositions that relate to theft within and outside one's group.

- Other things [being] the same, a person will prefer to steal from a fellow group member rather than from an outsider.

Beginning with the assumption that thieves want to maximize their relative wealth, ask yourself whether that goal would be best served by stealing from those you compare yourself with or from outsiders. In each case, stealing will increase your Actual Holdings, but what about your Comparison Holdings?

A moment's thought should suggest that stealing from people in your comparison group will lower their holdings, further increasing your relative wealth. To simplify, imagine there are only two people in your comparison group: you and I. Suppose we each have \$100. If you steal \$50 from someone outside our group, you will have increased your relative wealth by 50 percent compared with me: \$150 versus \$100. But if you steal \$50 from me, you will have increased your relative wealth 200 percent: \$150 to my \$50. Your goal is best served by stealing from within the comparison group.

- In the case of theft, informants arise only in cross-group theft, in which case they are members of the thief's group.

Can you see why it would make sense for informants (1) to arise only in the case of cross-group theft and (2) to come from the thief's comparison group? This proposition again depends on the fundamental assumption that everyone wants to increase his or her relative standing. Suppose you and I are in the same comparison group, but this time the group contains additional people. If you steal from someone else within our comparison group, my relative standing in the group does not change. Although your wealth has increased, the average wealth in the group remains the same (because someone else's wealth has decreased by the same amount). I have no incentive to inform on you.

If you steal from someone outside our comparison group, your nefarious income increases the total wealth in our group, so my own wealth relative to that total is diminished. Because my relative wealth has suffered, I'm more likely to bring an end to your stealing.

This last deduction also begins to explain why informants are more likely to arrive from within the thief's comparison group. We've just seen how my relative standing was decreased by your theft. How about other members of the other group? Each of them would actually profit from the theft, because you would have reduced the total with which they compare themselves. Hence, the theory of distributive justice predicts that informants arise from the thief's comparison group.

This brief and selective peek into Jasso's derivations should give you some sense of the enterprise of deductive theory. Realize, of course, that the theory guarantees none of the given predictions. The role of research is to test each of them empirically to determine whether what makes sense (logic) occurs in practice (observation).

There are two important elements in science, then: logical integrity and empirical verification. Both are essential to scientific inquiry and discovery. Logic alone is not enough, but on the other hand, the mere observation and collection of empirical facts does not provide understanding—the telephone directory, for

example, is not a scientific conclusion. Observation, however, can be the springboard for the construction of a social science theory, as we shall now see in the case of inductive theory.

■ INDUCTIVE THEORY CONSTRUCTION

Quite often, social scientists begin constructing a theory through the inductive method by first observing aspects of social life and then seeking to discover patterns that may point to relatively universal principles. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967) coined the term *grounded theory* in reference to this method.

L04

Field research—the direct observation of events in progress—is frequently used to develop theories through observation (see Chapter 10). A long and rich anthropological tradition has seen this method used to good advantage.

Among social scientists of the twentieth century, no one was more adept at seeing the patterns of human behavior through observation than Erving Goffman:

A game such as chess generates a habitable universe for those who can follow it, a plane of being, a cast of characters with a seemingly unlimited number of different situations and acts through which to realize their natures and destinies. Yet much of this is reducible to a small set of interdependent rules and practices. If the meaningfulness of everyday activity is similarly dependent on a closed, finite set of rules, then explication of them would give one a powerful means of analyzing social life. — (1974: 5)

In a variety of research efforts, Goffman uncovered the rules of such diverse behaviors as living in a mental institution (1961) and managing the “spoiled identity” of disfiguration (1963). In each case, Goffman observed the phenomenon in depth and teased out the rules governing behavior. Goffman’s research provides an excellent example of qualitative field research as a source of grounded theory.

Our earlier discussion of the Comfort hypothesis and church involvement shows that qualitative field research is not the only method of observation appropriate to the development of inductive theory. Here’s another detailed example

to illustrate further the construction of inductive theory using quantitative methods.

An Example of Inductive Theory: Why Do People Smoke Marijuana?

During the 1960s and 1970s, marijuana use on U.S. college campuses was a subject of considerable discussion in the popular press. Some people were troubled by marijuana’s popularity; others welcomed it. What interests us here is why some students smoked marijuana and others didn’t. A survey of students at the University of Hawaii (Takeuchi 1974) provided data to answer that question. While the reasons and practices regarding pot may have changed, the subtle redefinition of what needed explaining is still instructive.

At the time of the study, people were offering numerous explanations for drug use. Those who opposed drug use, for example, often suggested that marijuana smokers were academic failures trying to avoid the rigors of college life. Those in favor of marijuana, on the other hand, often spoke of the search for new values: Marijuana smokers, they said, were people who had seen through the hypocrisy of middle-class values.

David Takeuchi’s 1974 analysis of the data gathered from University of Hawaii students, however, did not support any of the explanations being offered. Those who reported smoking marijuana had essentially the same academic records as those who didn’t smoke it, and both groups were equally involved in traditional “school spirit” activities. Both groups seemed to feel equally well integrated into campus life.

There were differences, however:

1. Women were less likely than men to smoke marijuana.
2. Asian students (a large proportion of the student body) were less likely than non-Asians to smoke marijuana.
3. Students living at home were less likely to smoke marijuana than were those living in their own apartments.

As in the case of religiosity, the three variables independently affected the likelihood of a student’s smoking marijuana. About 10 percent

of the Asian women living at home had smoked marijuana, compared with about 80 percent of the non-Asian men living in apartments. And, as in the religiosity study, the researchers discovered a powerful pattern of drug use before they had an explanation for that pattern.

In this instance, the explanation took a peculiar turn. Instead of explaining why some students smoked marijuana, the researchers explained why some didn't. Assuming that all students had some motivation for trying drugs, the researchers suggested that students differed in the degree of "social constraints" preventing them from following through on that motivation.

U.S. society is, on the whole, more permissive with men than with women when it comes to deviant behavior. Consider, for example, a group of men getting drunk and boisterous. We tend to dismiss such behavior with references to "camaraderie" and "having a good time," whereas a group of women behaving similarly would probably be regarded with at least some disapproval. We have an idiom, "Boys will be boys," but no comparable idiom for girls. The researchers reasoned, therefore, that women would have more to lose by smoking marijuana than would men. Being female, then, provided a constraint against smoking marijuana.

Students living at home had obvious constraints against smoking marijuana, compared with students living on their own. Quite aside from differences in opportunity, those living at home were seen as being more dependent on their parents—hence more vulnerable to additional punishment for breaking the law.

Finally, the Asian subculture in Hawaii has traditionally placed a higher premium on obedience to the law than have other subcultures. As such, Asian students would have more to lose if they were caught violating the law by smoking marijuana.

Overall, then, a "social constraints" theory was offered as the explanation for observed differences in the likelihood of smoking marijuana. The more constraints a student had, the less likely he or she would be to smoke marijuana. It bears repeating that the researchers had no thoughts about such a theory when their research began. The theory came from an examination of the data.

■ THE LINKS BETWEEN THEORY AND RESEARCH

Throughout this chapter, we have seen various aspects of the links between theory and research in social science inquiry. In the deductive model, research is used to test theories. In the inductive model, theories are developed from the analysis of research data. This section looks more closely into the ways theory and research are related in actual social science inquiry. L05

Although we have discussed two idealized logical models for linking theory and research, social science inquiries have developed a great many variations on these themes. Sometimes theoretical issues are introduced merely as a background for empirical analyses. Other studies cite selected empirical data to bolster theoretical arguments. In neither case do theory and research really interact for the purpose of developing new explanations. Some studies make no use of theory at all, aiming specifically, for example, at an ethnographic description of a particular social situation, such as an anthropological account of food and dress in a particular society.

As you read social research reports, however, you'll often find that the authors are conscious of the implications of their research for social theories and vice versa. Here are a few examples to illustrate this point.

When W. Lawrence Neuman (1998) set out to examine the problem of monopolies (the "trust problem") in U.S. history, he saw the relevance of theories about how social movements transform society ("state transformation"). He became convinced, however, that existing theories were inadequate for the task before him:

State transformation theory links social movements to state policy formation processes by focusing on the role of cultural meaning in organized political struggles. Despite a resemblance among concepts and concerns, constructionist ideas found in the social problems, social movements, and symbolic politics literatures have not been incorporated into the theory. In this paper, I draw on these three literatures to enhance state transformation theory. — (1998: 315)

Having thus modified state transformation theory, Neuman had a theoretical tool that could guide his inquiry and analysis into the

political maneuverings related to monopolies beginning in the 1880s and continuing until World War I. Thus, theory served as a resource for research and at the same time was modified by it.

In a somewhat similar study, Alemseghed Kebede and J. David Knottnerus (1998) set out to investigate the rise of Rastafarianism in the Caribbean. However, they felt that recent theories on social movements had become too positivistic in focusing on the mobilization of resources. Resource mobilization theory, they felt, downplays

the motivation, perceptions, and behavior of movement participants . . . and concentrates instead on the whys and hows of mobilization. Typically theoretical and research problems include: How do emerging movement organizations seek to mobilize and routinize the flow of resources and how does the existing political apparatus affect the organization of resources? — (1998: 500)

To study Rastafarianism more appropriately, the researchers felt the need to include several concepts from contemporary social psychology. In particular, they sought models to use in dealing with problems of meaning and collective thought.

Frederika Schmitt and Patricia Yancey Martin (1999) were particularly interested in discovering what produced successful rape crisis centers and how such centers dealt with the organizational and political environments within which they operated. The researchers found theoretical constructs appropriate to their inquiry:

This case study of unobtrusive mobilizing by [the] Southern California Rape Crisis Center uses archival, observational, and interview data to explore how a feminist organization worked to change police, schools, prosecutor[s], and some state and national organizations from 1974 to 1994. Mansbridge's concept of street theory and Katzenstein's concepts of unobtrusive mobilization and discursive politics guide the analysis. — (1999: 364)

In summary, there is no simple recipe for conducting social science research. It is far more open-ended than the traditional view of science suggests. Ultimately, science depends on two

categories of activity: logic and observation. As you'll see throughout this book, they can be fit together in many patterns.

■ THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY IN THE "REAL WORLD"

At this point you may be saying, "Sure, theory and research are OK, but what do they have to do with the real world?" As we'll see later in this book, there are many practical applications of social research, from psychology to social reform. Think, for instance, how someone could make use of David Takeuchi's research on marijuana use.

But how does theory work in such applications? In some minds, theoretical and practical matters are virtual opposites. Social scientists committed to the use of science know differently, however.

Lester Ward, the first president of the American Sociological Association, was committed to the application of social research in practice, or the use of that research toward specific ends. Ward distinguished pure and applied sociology as follows:

Just as pure sociology aims to answer the questions What, Why, and How, so applied sociology aims to answer the question What for. The former deals with facts, causes, and principles, the latter with the object, end, or purpose. — (1906: 5)

No matter how practical and/or idealistic your aims, a theoretical understanding of the terrain may spell the difference between success and failure. As Ward saw it, "Reform may be defined as the desirable alteration of social structures. Any attempt to do this must be based on a full knowledge of the nature of such structures, otherwise its failure is certain" (1906: 4).

Suppose you were concerned about poverty in the United States. The sociologist Herbert Gans (1971) suggests that understanding the functions that poverty serves for people who are not poor is vital. For example, the persistence of poverty means there will always be people willing to do the jobs no one else wants to do—and they'll work for very little money. The availability of cheap labor provides many affordable comforts for the nonpoor.

By the same token, poverty provides many job opportunities for social workers, unemployment office workers, police, and so forth. If poverty were to disappear, what would happen to social work colleges, for example?

I don't mean to suggest that people conspire to keep the poor in their place or that social workers secretly hope for poverty to persist. Nor do I want to suggest that the dark cloud of poverty has a silver lining. I merely want you to understand the point made by Ward, Gans, and many other sociologists: If you want to change society, you need to understand how it operates. As William White (1997) argues, "Theory helps create questions, shapes our research designs, helps us anticipate outcomes, helps us design interventions."

RESEARCH ETHICS AND THEORY

In this chapter, we've seen how the paradigms and theories that guide research inevitably impact what is observed and how it is interpreted. Choosing a particular paradigm or theory does not guarantee a particular research conclusion, but it will affect what you look for and what you ignore. Whether you choose a functionalist or a conflict paradigm to organize your research on police–community relations will make a big difference.

This choice can produce certain ethical issues. Choosing a theoretical orientation for the purpose of encouraging a particular conclusion, for example, would generally be regarded as unethical. However, when researchers intend to bring about social change through their work, they usually choose a theoretical orientation appropriate to that intention. Let's say you're concerned about the treatment of homeless people by the police in your community. You might very well organize your research in terms of interactionist or conflict paradigms and theories that would reveal any instances of mistreatment that may occur. The danger lies in the bias this might cause in your research.

Two factors counter this potential bias. First, as we'll see in the remainder of the book, social science research techniques—the various methods of observation and analysis—place a damper on our simply seeing what we expect. Even if you

What do you think ?

REVISITED

As we've seen, many different paradigms have been suggested for the study of society. The opening *What do you think?* box asked which one was true. You should see by now that the answer is "None of the above." However, none of the paradigms is false, either.

By their nature, paradigms are neither true nor false. They are merely different ways of looking and of seeking explanations. Thus, they may be judged as useful or not useful in a particular situation, but not true or false.

Imagine that you and some friends are in a totally darkened room. Each of you has a flashlight. When you turn on your own flashlight, you create a partial picture of what's in the room, whereby some things are revealed but others remain concealed. Now imagine your friends taking turns turning on their flashlights. Every person's flashlight presents a different picture of what's in the room, revealing part, but not all, of it.

Paradigms are like the flashlights in this gripping tale. Each offers a particular point of view that may or may not be useful in a given circumstance. None reveals the full picture, or the "truth."

expect to find the police mistreating the homeless and use theories and methods that will reveal such mistreatment, you will not observe that which isn't there—if you apply those theories and methods appropriately.

Second, the collective nature of social research offers further protection. As we'll discuss more in Chapter 15, *peer review*, in which researchers evaluate each other's efforts, will point to instances of shoddy or biased research. Moreover, with several researchers studying the same phenomenon, perhaps using different paradigms, theories, and methods, the risk of biased research findings is further reduced.

■ Main Points

Introduction

- Theories seek to provide logical explanations.

Some Social Science Paradigms

- A paradigm is a fundamental model or scheme that organizes our view of something.
- Social scientists use a variety of paradigms to organize how they understand and inquire into social life.
- A distinction between types of theories that cut across various paradigms is macrotheory (theories about large-scale features of society) versus microtheory (theories about smaller units or features of society).
- The positivistic paradigm assumes we can scientifically discover the rules governing social life.
- The conflict paradigm focuses on the attempt of one person or group to dominate others and to avoid being dominated.
- The symbolic interactionist paradigm examines how shared meanings and social patterns are developed in the course of social interactions.
- Ethnomethodology focuses on the ways people make sense out of life in the process of living it, as though each were a researcher engaged in an inquiry.
- The structural functionalist (or social systems) paradigm seeks to discover what functions the many elements of society perform for the whole system—for example, the functions of mothers, labor unions, and radio talk shows.
- Feminist paradigms, in addition to drawing attention to the oppression of women in most societies, highlight how previous images of social reality have often come from and reinforced the experiences of men.
- Like feminist paradigms, critical race theory both examines the disadvantaged position of a social group (African Americans) and offers a different vantage point from which to view and understand society.
- Some contemporary theorists and researchers have challenged the long-standing belief

in an objective reality that abides by rational rules. They point out that it is possible to agree on an “intersubjective” reality.

Two Logical Systems Revisited

- In the traditional model of science, scientists proceed from theory to operationalization to observation. But this image is not an accurate picture of how scientific research is actually done.
- Social science theory and research are linked through two logical methods: Deduction involves the derivation of expectations or hypotheses from theories. Induction involves the development of generalizations from specific observations.
- Science is a process involving an alternation of deduction and induction.

Deductive Theory Construction

- Guillermina Jasso’s theory of distributive justice illustrates how formal reasoning can lead to a variety of theoretical expectations that can be tested by observation.

Inductive Theory Construction

- David Takeuchi’s study of factors influencing marijuana smoking among University of Hawaii students illustrates how collecting observations can lead to generalizations and an explanatory theory.

The Links between Theory and Research

- In practice, there are many possible links between theory and research and many ways of going about social inquiry.
- Using theories to understand how society works is key to offering practical solutions to society’s problems.

The Importance of Theory in the “Real World”

- No matter what a researcher’s aims are in conducting social research, a theoretical understanding of his or her subject may spell the difference between success and failure.
- If one wants to change society, one needs to understand the logic of how it operates.