philosophy homework questions
zaina
HumeonTeleologicalArgument.pptxanalogical teleological Argument
HUME’S OBJECTIONS
An analogical version
P1. The world is like one great machine with an infinite number of lesser machines.
P2. Each of these machines operates with admirable accuracy (e.g. adapting of means to ends throughout all nature).
P3. These machines, although far superior, resemble human artifacts (or human-made machines).
P4. The causes of these two kinds of machines (or the minds that are responsible for such machines) must also resemble each other, although one is obviously far superior than the other causes.
C. Therefore, the world must have a cause (i.e. God) whose mind and intelligence are somehow similar to what humans have.
FIRST OBJECTION
Natural Machines vs. Human-Made Machines: A Bad Analogy
Bad Analogy (Part 1)
P1. Dissimilarities between two entities (e.g. house and the universe) weaken the analogy between them.
P2. A house and the universe, for instance, have significant dissimilarities. As a matter of fact, there are significant dissimilarities between the universe and human artifacts.
C. Therefore, the analogy between the universe and human artifacts does not work.
Possible response to the objection
P1. The resemblance between a house and the universe, for instance, has to do with the whole adjustment of means to ends, the economy of final causes, or the order, proportion, and arrangement of every part [e.g. the design of the steps of a stair and their usefulness for human legs, or we know by experience that parts of a house (or watch) do not organize themselves into a house (or watch)].
P2. According to our experiences, the design of a human artifact originates from a mind, not from matter.
P3. Similar effects must have similar causes.
P4. The adjustment of means to ends in the universe and human artifacts (e.g. house and watch) is similar.
C. Therefore, the causes of the universe and human artifacts must have resemblance.
Bad analogy (Part 2)
P1. If there are significant dissimilarities between the universe and human-made entities, then the analogy between the two does not work.
P2. There are significant dissimilarities between the universe and human-made entities: (a) human-made entities are merely parts of the universe (a whole), (b) our observations of what happen to the parts of a whole are not necessarily the same things that we observe about the whole (e.g. hair and human body), (c) as a matter of fact, the things that happen in one particular part are not necessarily what happen in another, and (d) unlike human-made entities, there is no previous experience of the generation of the universe.
P3. So, the causal connection between the human mind and the design of its corresponding product does not necessarily lead us to suppose that the universe must have a similar cause.
C. Therefore, the analogy between the two does not work.
Second objection
Regress of Explanation
Regress of explanation
P1. Like a material world, a mental world (or universe of ideas) requires a cause.
P2. If a mental world is similar in arrangement as a material world, then it must require a similar cause.
P3. Based on our experience, a mental world is similar in arrangement as a material world (e.g. age, bodily disposition, weather, food, company, books, etc. can alter the machinery of thought).
P4. They both have their cause in some ideal world.
P5. The act of tracing the series of causes can continue to regress to infinity, considering that an ideal world can have another ideal world as its cause.
P6. There is no reason for stopping at any particular point in the series of potential causes and declaring that one has arrived at some ultimate cause.
P7. It would have been better to just settle with the material world as its own cause, considering that any other possible cause prior to it exceeds all human comprehension.
P8. So, we have no reason for treating order as more essential than other possible causes of the universe (e.g. the material world itself).
P9. Therefore, it will be wiser to limit all inquiries to the present world.
P10. But the analogical version of the teleological argument is an attempt to go beyond such limit.
C. Therefore, there’s something wrong with the analogical version of the teleological argument.
Third objection
From Finite Effect to Finite Cause
Proportionality of cause and effect
P1. The cause ought to be proportionate to the effect.
P2. As far as we know, the universe as an effect of a certain cause is not infinite.
P3. So, God as the supposed cause of the universe must not be infinite.
P4. But God is described as infinite.
C. Therefore, the method of reasoning in the analogical teleological argument does not work.
Imperfect universe
P1. There are imperfections in the universe.
P2. The cause ought to be proportionate to its effect.
C. So, one cannot claim that God must be perfect.
Plurality of deities
P1. The cause ought to be proportionate to its effect.
P2. The fact that a house, for instance, is built by many people implies that the universe could have been caused by multiple deities.
C. So, one cannot even infer the unity of God from an analogical version of teleological argument.
Fourth objection
Organic vs. Inorganic
Organic vs. inorganic
P1. If the universe has more similarities with the animal bodies and vegetables than human artifacts, then it is more probable that its cause resembles generation or vegetation than reason or design.
P2. If it is more probable that its cause resembles generation or vegetation than reason or design, then the analogical version of teleological argument does not work.
P3. The universe has more similarities with the animal bodies and vegetables than human artifacts.
C. Therefore, the analogical version of teleological argument does not work.
