Philosophy critical eassy

Of the Original Contract David Hume 1752

XVI.DAVID HUME, OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT,

1752When we consider how nearly equal all men are in their bodily force, and even in

their mental powers and faculties, till cultivated by education; we must necessarily

allow, that nothing but their own consent could, at first, associate them together, and

subject them to any authority. The people, if we trace government to its first origin in

the woods and deserts, are the source of all power and jurisdiction, and voluntarily, for

the sake of peace and order, abandoned their native liberty, and received laws from their

equal and companion. The conditions, upon which they were willing to submit, were

either expressed, or were so clear and obvious, that it might well be esteemed

superfluous to express them. If this, then, be meant by the original contract, it cannot

be denied, that all government is, at first, founded on a contract, and that the most

ancient rude combinations of mankind were formed chiefly by that principle. In vain,

are we asked in what records this charter of our liberties is registered. It was not written

on parchment, nor yet on leaves or barks of trees. It preceded the use of writing and all

the other civilized arts of life. But we trace it plainly in the nature of man, and in the

equality, or something approaching equality, which we find in all the individuals of that

species. The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is

plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government. A

man’s natural force consists only in the vigour of his courage; which could never subject

multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of

the advantages resulting from peace and order, could have had that influence.

Yet even this consent was long very imperfect, and could not be the basis of a regular

administration. The chieftain, who had probably acquired his influence during the

continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion than command; and till he could employ

force to reduce the refractory and disobedient, the society could scarcely be said to have

attained a state of civil government. No compact or agreement, it is evident, was

expressly formed for general submission; an idea far beyond the comprehension of

savages: each exertion of authority in the chieftain must have been particular, and called

forth by the present exigencies of the case: the sensible utility, resulting from his

interposition, made these exertions become daily more frequent; and their frequency

gradually produced an habitual, and, if you please to call it so, a voluntary, and therefore

precarious, acquiescence in the people.

But philosophers, who have embraced a party, (if that be not a contradiction in terms)

are not contented with these concessions. They assert, not only that government in its

earliest infancy arose from consent, or rather the voluntary acquiescence of the people;

but also, that, even at present, when it has attained its full maturity, it rests on no other

foundation. They affirm, that all men are still born equal, and owe allegiance to no

prince or government, unless bound by the obligation and sanction of a promise. And as

no man, without some equivalent, would forego the advantages of his native liberty, and

subject himself to the will of another; this promise is always understood to be

conditional, and imposes on him no obligation, unless he meet with justice and

protection from his sovereign. These advantages the sovereign promises him in return;

and if he fail in the execution, he has broken, on his part, the articles of engagement,

and has thereby freed his subject from all obligations to allegiance. Such, according to

these philosophers, is the foundation of authority in every government; and such is the

right of resistance, possessed by every subject.

But would these reasoners look abroad into the world, they would meet with nothing

that, in the least, corresponds to their ideas, or can warrant so refined and philosophical

a system. On the contrary, we find, every where, princes, who claim their subjects as

their property, and assert their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or

succession. We find also, every where, subjects, who acknowledge this right in their

prince, and suppose themselves born under obligations of obedience to a certain

sovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to certain parents. These

connections are always conceived to be equally independent of our consent, in Persia

and China; in France and Spain; and even in Holland and England, wherever the

doctrines above mentioned have not been carefully inculcated. Obedience or subjection

becomes so familiar, that most men never make any inquiry about its origin or cause,

more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of

nature. Or if curiosity ever move them; as soon as they learn, that they themselves or

their ancestors have, for several ages, or from time immemorial, been subject to such a

form of government or such a family; they immediately acquiesce, and acknowledge

their obligation to allegiance. Were you to preach, in most parts of the world, that

political connections are founded altogether on voluntary consent or a mutual promise,

the magistrate would soon imprison you, as seditious, for loosening the ties of

obedience; if your friends did not before shut you up as delirious, for advancing such

absurdities. It is strange, that an act of the mind, which every individual is supposed to

have formed, and after he came to the use of reason too, otherwise it could have no

authority; that this act, I say, should be so much unknown to all of them, that, over the

face of the whole earth, there scarcely remain any trace or memory of it.

But the contract, on which the government is founded, is said to be the original

contract; and consequently may be supposed too old to fall under the knowledge of the

present generation. If the agreement, by which savage men first associated and

conjoined their force, be here meant, this is acknowledged to be real; but being so

ancient, and being obliterated by a thousand changes of government and princes, it

cannot now be supposed to retain any authority. If we would say any thing to the

purpose, we must assert, that every particular government, which is lawful, and which

imposes any duty of allegiance on the subject, was, at first, founded on consent and a

voluntary compact. But besides that this supposes the consent of the fathers to bind the

children, even to the most remote generations (which republican writers will never

allow), besides this, I say, it is not justified by history or experience, in any age or

country of the world.

Almost all the governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any

record in story, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both,

without any pretense of a fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people. When an

artful and bold man is placed at the head of an army or faction, it is often easy for him,

by employing, sometimes violence, sometimes false pretenses, to establish his dominion

over a people a hundred times more numerous than his partizans. He allows no such

open communication, that his enemies can know, with certainty, their number or force.

He gives them no leisure to assemble together in a body to oppose him. Even all those,

who are the instruments of his usurpation, may wish his fall; but their ignorance of each

other’s intention keeps them in awe, and is the sole cause of his security. By such arts as

these, many governments have been established; and this is all the original contract,

which they have to boast of.

The face of the earth is continually changing, by the increase of small kingdoms into

great empires, by the dissolution of great empires into smaller kingdoms, by the

planting of colonies, by the migration of tribes. Is there anything discoverable in all

these events, but force and violence? Where is the mutual agreement or voluntary

association so much talked of?

Even the smoothest way, by which a nation may receive a foreign master, by marriage or

a will, is not extremely honourable for the people; but supposes them to be disposed of,

like a dowry or legacy, according to the pleasure or interest of their rulers.

But where no force interposes, and election takes place; what is this election so highly

vaunted? It is either the combination of a few great men, who decide for the whole, and

will allow of no opposition: or it is the fury of a multitude, that follow a seditious

ringleader, who is not known, perhaps, to a dozen among them, and who owes his

advancement merely to his own impudence, or to the momentary caprice of his fellows.

Are these disorderly elections, which are rare too, of such mighty authority as to be the

only lawful foundation of all government and allegiance?

In reality, there is not a more terrible event, than a total dissolution of government,

which gives liberty to the multitude, and makes the determination or choice of a new

establishment depend upon a number, which nearly approaches to that of the body of

the people: for it never comes entirely to the whole body of them. Every wise man, then,

wishes to see, at the head of a powerful and obedient army, a general, who may speedily

seize the prize, and give to the people a master, which they are so unfit to choose for

themselves. So little correspondent is fact and reality to those philosophical notions.

Let not the establishment at the Revolution deceive us, or make us so much in love with

a philosophical origin to government, as to imagine all others monstrous and irregular.

Even that event was far from corresponding to these refined ideas. It was only the

succession, and that only in the regal part of the government, which was then changed:

and it was only the majority of seven hundred, who determined that change for near ten

millions. I doubt not, indeed, but the bulk of those ten millions acquiesced willingly in

the determination: but was the matter left, in the least, to their choice? Was it not justly

supposed to be, from that moment, decided, and every man punished, who refused to

submit to the new sovereign? How otherwise could the matter have ever been brought to

any issue or conclusion.

The republic of Athens was, I believe, the most extensive democracy that we read of in

history: yet if we make the requisite allowances for the women, the slaves, and the

strangers, we shall find, that that establishment was not, at first, made, nor any law ever

voted, by a tenth part of those who were bound to pay obedience to it: not to mention

the islands and foreign dominions, which the Athenians claimed as theirs by rights of

conquest. And as it is well known, that popular assemblies in that city were always full of

licence and disorder, notwithstanding the institutions and laws by which they were

checked: how much more disorderly must they prove, where they form not the

established constitution, but meet tumultuously on the dissolution of the ancient

government, in order to give rise to a new one? how chimercial must it be to talk of a

choice in such circumstances?

The Achaeans enjoyed the freest and most perfect democracy of all antiquity; yet they

employed force to oblige some cities to enter into their league, as we learn from

Polybius.

Harry IV. and Harry VII. of England, had really no title to the throne but a

parliamentary election; yet they never would acknowledge it, lest they should thereby

weaken their authority. Strange, if the only real foundation of all authority be consent

and promise?

It is in vain to say, that all governments are or should be at first, founded on popular

consent, as much as the necessity of human affairs will admit. This favours entirely my

pretension. I maintain, that human affairs will never admit of this consent; seldom of

the appearance of it. But that conquest or usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by

dissolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almost all the new ones, which were

ever established in the world. And that in the few cases, where consent may seem to

have taken place, it was commonly so irregular, so confined, or so much intermixed

either with fraud or violence, that it cannot have any great authority.

My intention here is not to exclude the consent of the people from being one just

foundation of government where it has place. I only pretend, that it has very seldom had

place in any degree, and never almost in its full extent. And that therefore some other

foundation of government must also be admitted.

Were all men possessed of so inflexible a regard to justice, that, of themselves, they

would totally abstain from the properties of others; they had for ever remained in a state

of absolute liberty, without subjection to any magistrate of political society; but this is a

state of perfection, of which human nature is justly deemed incapable. Again, were all

men possessed of so perfect an understanding as always to know their own interests, no

form of government had ever been submitted to, but what was established on consent,

and was fully canvassed by every member of the society: but this state of perfection is

likewise much superior to human nature. Reason, history, and experience shew us, that

all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular: and were one to

choose a period of time, when the people’s consent was the least regarded in public

transactions, it would be precisely on the establishment of a new government. In a

settled constitution, their inclinations are often consulted; but during the fury of

revolutions, conquests, and public convulsions, military force or political craft usually

decides the controversy.

When a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly

dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea

of allegiance or of moral obligation. The prince is watchful and jealous, and must

carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of insurrection. Time, by degrees,

removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or

native princes, that family, which, at first, they considered as usurpers or foreign

conquerors. In order to found this opinion, they have no recourse to any notion of

voluntary consent or promise, which they know, never was, in this case, either expected

or demanded. The original establishment was formed by violence and submitted to from

necessity. The subsequent administration is also supported by power, and acquiesced in

by the people, not as a matter of choice, but of obligation. They imagine not, that their

consent gives their prince a title: but they willingly consent, because they think, that

from long possession, he has acquired a title, independent of their choice or inclination.

Should it be said, that, by living under the dominion of a prince, which one might leave,

every individual has given a tacit consent to his authority, and promised him obedience;

it may be answered, that such an implied consent can only have place, where a man

imagines, that the matter depends on his choice. But where he thinks (as all mankind do

who are born under established governments) that by his birth he owes allegiance to a

certain prince or certain form of government; it would be absurd to infer a consent or

choice, which he expressly, in this case, renounces and disclaims.

Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his

country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives, from day to day, by

the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that man by remaining in a

vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board

while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.

What if the prince forbid his subjects to quit his dominions; as in Tiberius’ time, it was

regarded as a crime in a Roman knight that he had attempted to fly to the Parthians, in

order to escape the tyranny of that emperor? Or as the ancient Muscovites prohibited all

travelling under pain of death? And did a prince observe, that many of his subjects were

seized with the frenzy of migrating to foreign countries, he would doubtless, with great

reason and justice, restrain them, in order to prevent the depopulation of his own

kingdom. Would he forfeit the allegiance of all his subjects, by so wise and reasonable a

law? Yet the freedom of their choice is surely, in that case, ravished from them.

* * * *

Did one generation of men go off the stage at once, and another succeed, as is the case

with silk worms and butterflies, the new race, if they had sense enough to chuse their

government, which surely is never the case with men, might voluntarily, and by general

consent, establish their own form of civil polity, without any regard to the laws or

precedents which prevailed among their ancestors. But as human society is in perpetual

flux, one man every hour going out of the world, another coming into it, it is necessary

in order to preserve stability in government, that the new brood should conform

themselves to the established constitution, and nearly follow the path which their

fathers, treading in the footsteps of theirs, had marked out to them. Some innovations

must necessarily have place in every human institution; and it is happy where the

enlightened genius of the age give these a direction to the side of reason, liberty, and

justice: but violent innovations no individual is entitled to make: they are even

dangerous to be attempted by the legislature: more ill than good is ever to be expected

from them: and if history affords examples to the contrary, they are not to be drawn into

precedent, and are only to be regarded as proofs, that the science of politics affords few

rules, which will not admit of some exception, and which may not sometimes be

controlled by fortune and accidents. The violent innovations in the reign of Henry VIII.

proceeded from an imperious monarch, seconded by the appearance of legislative

authority: those in the reign of Charles I. were derived from faction and fanaticism; and

both of them have proved happy in the issues: But even the former were long the source

of many disorders, and still more dangers; and if the measures of allegiance were to be

taken from the latter, a total anarchy must have place in human society, and a final

period at once be put to every government.

Suppose, that an usurper, after having banished his lawful prince and royal family,

should establish his dominion for ten or a dozen years in any country, and should

preserve so exact a discipline in his troops, and so regular a disposition in his garrisons,

that no insurrection had ever been raised, or even murmur heard, against his

administration: can it be asserted, that the people, who in their hearts abhor his treason,

have tacitly consented to his authority, and promised him allegiance, merely because,

from necessity, they live under his dominion? Suppose again their native prince

restored, by means of an army, which he levies in foreign countries: they receive him

with joy and exultation, and show plainly with what reluctance they had submitted to

any other yoke. I may now ask, upon what foundation the prince’s title stands? Not on

popular consent surely: for though the people willingly acquiesce in his authority, they

never imagine, that their consent made him sovereign. They consent; because they

apprehend him to be already, by birth, their lawful sovereign. And as to that tacit

consent, which may now be inferred from their living under his dominion, this is no

more than what they formerly gave to the tyrant and usurper.

But would we have a more regular, at least a more philosophical, refutation of this

principle of an original contract, or popular consent; perhaps the following observations

may suffice.

All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. I. Those to which men are impelled by a

natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all

ideas of obligation, and of all views, either to public or private utility. Of this nature are,

love of children, gratitude to benefactors, pity to the unfortunate. When we reflect on

the advantage which results to society from such humane instincts, we pay them the just

tribute of moral approbation and esteem: but the person, actuated by them, feels their

power and influence, antecedent to any such reflection.

II. The kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of

nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation, when we consider the

necessities of human society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were

neglected. It is thus justice, or a regard to the property of others, fidelity, or the

observance of promises, become obligatory, and acquire an authority over mankind. For

as it is evident that every man loves himself better than any other person, he is naturally

impelled to extend his acquisitions as much as possible; and nothing can restrain him in

this propensity, but reflection and experience, by which he learns the pernicious effects

of that licence and the total dissolution of society which must ensue from it. His original

inclination, therefore, or instinct, is here checked and restrained by a subsequent

judgment or observation.

The case is precisely the same with the political or civil duty of allegiance, as with the

natural duties of justice and fidelity. Our primary instincts lead us, either to indulge

ourselves in unlimited freedom, or to seek dominion over others: and it is reflection only

which engages us to sacrifice such strong passions to the interests of peace and public

order. A small degree of experience and observation suffices to teach us, that society

cannot possibly be maintained without the authority of magistrates, and that this

authority must soon fall into contempt, where exact obedience is not paid to it. The

observation of these general and obvious interests is the source of all allegiance and of

that moral obligation which we attribute to it.

* * * *

We shall only observe, before we conclude, that though an appeal to general opinion

may justly, in the speculative sciences of metaphysics, natural philosophy, or astronomy,

be deemed unfair and inconclusive, yet in all questions with regard to morals, as well as

criticism, there is really no other standard, by which any controversy can ever be

decided. And nothing is a clearer proof, that a theory of this kind is erroneous, than to

find, that it leads to paradoxes repugnant to the common sentiments of mankind, and to

the practice and opinion of all nations and all ages. The doctrine which founds all lawful

government on an original contract, or consent of the people, is plainly of this kind; nor

has the most noted of its partizans, in prosecution of it, scrupled to affirm, that absolute

monarchy is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government

at all; 38 and that the supreme power in a state cannot take from any man, by taxes

and impositions, any part of his property, without his own consent or that of his

representatives. What authority any moral reasoning can have, which leads into

opinions so wide of the general practice of mankind, in every place but this single

kingdom, it is easy to determine.

The only passage I meet with in antiquity, where the obligation of obedience to

government is ascribed to a promise, is in Plato’s Crito: where Socrates refuses to escape

from prison, because he had tacitly promised to obey the laws. Thus he builds a

Toryconsequence of passive obedience on a Whig foundation of the original contract.

New discoveries are not to be expected in these matters. If scarce any man, till very

lately, ever imagined that government was founded on compact, it is certain, that it

cannot in general, have any such foundation.