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F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Terrorism—Meeting the Challenge Paul M. Maniscalco Hank T. Christen James P. Denney

• Discuss the differing definitions of terrorism.

• Describe the critical concept of local preparedness for terrorism/tactical violence response.

• List and describe the federal agencies in the national response spectrum.

• Recognize the changing history and threat evolution of terrorism.

• Discuss the capabilities and limitations of local response systems.

• List the risks to responders in the modern terrorism environment.

• Recognize the differences between advanced trauma life support protocols and casualty care in the urban combat environment.

• Outline the key concepts in a mass fatality management plan.

Objectives

1 While nothing is easier than to denounce

the evildoer, nothing is more difficult than to understand him.

— F. M. Dostoevsky

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2 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Introduction

What Is Terrorism? Why Is It Used? Terrorism is not a new phenomenon for modern soci- ety. The threat of terrorism is present across the entire geographical and societal spectrum. Terrorism knows no jurisdictional boundaries, and it poses critical and complex challenges to the contemporary emergency response organization and leadership on how to ef- fectively prevent, detect, deter, respond to, and recover from incidents. The use of terrorism as a tool ranges from individual acts of reckless destruction to property or person(s) to decidedly complicated events perpe- trated by organizations with extreme social, environ- mental, religious, economic, or political agendas. These groups are domestic or international, centralized, and well organized with access to resources and finances. They might be a loose confederation of affiliated move- ments structured as a cellular type grouping with limited immediate capacity—but nevertheless, with dangerous motivation that feeds the creativity needed to acquire the support required to implement a plan and execute an attack.

History has demonstrated that all of these organi- zational constructs can be and have been effective in launching devastating attacks throughout the world. Terrorism threats range from organizations like al-Qaeda and affiliated cells with international, regional, and transnational capabilities to domestic groups and single issue movements centered on antigovernment, antitax, environmental, hate, and other extreme ideologies to homegrown, self-radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists with militant single-issue agendas and finite capabilities.

Irrespective of the historical context and the pre- science of evolving terrorist threats, acts of terrorism are still often misunderstood and mislabeled. Subsequent to the existence of broadly deviating thoughts or opin- ions on what the proper adopted and applied defini- tion for the term terrorism should be, this confusion

contributes to obscuring a uniform, coherent grasp of the matter by policy makers and responders alike. An act of violence that is generally regarded in the United States as an act of terrorism may not be viewed the same in another country. The type of violence that distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, such as ordinary crime or a wartime military action, can still be defined in terms that might qualify as rea- sonably objective.

Hudson notes in the research conducted for the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, that:

Unable to achieve their unrealistic goals by con- ventional means, international terrorists attempt to send an ideological or religious message by terrorizing the general public. Through the choice of their targets, which are often symbolic or representative of the tar- geted nation, terrorists attempt to create a high-profile impact on the public of their targeted enemy or enemies with their act of violence, despite the limited material resources that are usually at their disposal. In doing so, they hope to demonstrate various points, such as that the targeted government(s) cannot protect its (their) own citizens, or that by assassinating a specific victim they can teach the general public a lesson about es- pousing viewpoints or policies antithetical to their own. (Hudson, 1999, p. 11)

In the end, most emergency services leaders and responders still struggle with the technical definitions associated with terrorism—opting for the idea that it’s easier to recognize the act than to define it. Yet, unquestionably, the ability to define terrorism in a somewhat uniform manner—or at least have the ability to identify the varying current definitions, why they vary, and whose definition it is—is an all-important issue for the contemporary emergency service leader and responder.

Terrorism is defined in a number of different ways using a variety of sources depending upon the need at hand. There is no single, universally accepted defini- tion of terrorism presently in use. Definitions of terror- ism created by government organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense, and the State Department are all valid and relevant for their operational environments, but the elu- sive quest to define and adopt a single universal defini- tion has been a daunting task confronting responders, military officers, intelligence and law enforcement of- ficials, and researchers and legal scholars for years. Let’s examine the definitions the Department of Defense, State Department, and the FBI use.

This chapter does not presume to present an exhaus- tive, comprehensive representation of terrorism events, groups, or methodologies; however, it does provide the learner with the opportunity to develop a fundamental analytical, biographical, historical, and theoretical un- derstanding for further research on the general subject of terrorism as well as on particular terrorism groups or individuals.

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The Department of Defense definition for terror- ism is:

The calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003, p. 531)

The State Department utilizes a definition found in federal statute. Title 22 of the U.S. Code, § 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually in- tended to influence an audience” (U.S. Department of State, 2007).

The FBI definition of terrorism is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations as “. . . the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social ob- jectives” (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.).

The FBI further describes terrorism as either domes- tic or international, depending on the origin, base, and objectives of the terrorist organization.

• Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating en- tirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

• International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal

violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by as- sassination or kidnapping. International ter- rorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or in- timidate, or the locale in which their perpetra- tors operate or seek asylum (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.).

Both the State Department and the FBI definitions of terrorism share a common theme—the use of force intended to influence or bring about a course of action that furthers a political or social objective.

Organized Terrorism In the past, what was referred to as an “international terrorist network” was attributed to the Tricontinental Congress held in Havana, Cuba, in January 1966. At that congress, 500 delegates proposed close coopera- tion among socialist countries and national liberation movements in order to forge a global strategy to counter American imperialism.

Meetings among terrorist organizations increased in the years that followed. Examples of networking include the American Black Panther leaders who toured North Korea, Vietnam, and China. In China, they had an opportunity to meet with Shirley Graham, wife of W.E.B. Du Bois, who was visiting with Zhou Enlai. The network advanced terrorism on global, national, and regional levels by providing economic support, training, specialty personnel, and advanced weaponry.

Title 22 of the U.S. Code § 2656f(d) defines certain key terms used in § 2656f(a) as: (1) The term “international terrorism” means terror- ism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country; (2) The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politi- cally motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and (3) The term “terrorist group” means any group prac- ticing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

The FBI divides terrorist-related activity into two cat- egories:

• A terrorist incident is a violent act or an act dan- gerous to human life, in violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or of any state, to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in further- ance of political or social objectives.

• Terrorism prevention is a documented instance in which a violent act by a known or suspected terrorist group or individual with the means and a proven propensity for violence is successfully interdicted through investigative activity (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.).

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For example, in 1978, Argentine terrorists received Soviet-made rockets from Palestinian terrorists, and the Baader-Meinhof group supplied three sets of American night-vision binoculars to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and American-made hand grenades to the Japanese Red Army. Terrorist training camps sprang up in Cuba, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, and South Yemen, while Syria provided sites for advanced training.

Acts of terrorism prompted the Tokyo and Montreal counterterrorism conventions of 1963 and 1971 on hijacking and sabotage of civilian aircraft. This was followed by the 1973 convention to counter crimes against diplomats and the 1979 convention, sponsored by The Hague, against hostage taking. These conven- tions established categories of international crimes that were punishable by any state regardless of the nationality of the criminal, victim, or the location of the offense.

Following President Ronald Reagan’s ordering of U.S. military forces to attack terrorist-related targets in Libya in 1986, seven Western industrial democra- cies pledged themselves to take joint action against terrorism. Those nations included the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, France, and Japan. These nations agreed to deny terrorist suspects entry into their countries, to bring about better co- operation between police and security forces in their countries, to place restrictions on diplomatic missions suspected of involvement in terrorism, and to cooper- ate in a number of other ways.

The Cold War Ends; Threat Shifting Begins The breakup of the former Soviet Union and the subse- quent economic collapse significantly altered the global security landscape. At the time of the breakup, the Soviet Union was a superpower with well-developed nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare capabilities. Unfortunately, a more sinister threat began to emerge from the former Soviet Union—a thriving interna- tional black market in arms and weapons technology. At that time, the economic collapse of the Soviet Union manifested in the nations’ inability to meet their fiscal obligations, including military and other payrolls. As a result, Russia suffered a tumultuous period with an ever-present threat of political unrest and organized crime emerging as a significant influencing factor within domestic and international affairs.

With available weapons ranging from nuclear de- vices to submarines and Mikoyan-i-Gurevich (MiG) aircraft to missiles, the former controlled threat was transformed into an uncontrolled threat market,

strongly influenced by the Russian organized crime syndicates, a market where unpaid government em- ployees attempted to sell limited amounts of fissionable materiel and other materiel that was of great value to terrorist organizations.

In addition to the black market in weapons, there also exists a potential for weapon thefts, including those weapons stored at poorly guarded chemical and biologi- cal storage facilities located throughout the former Soviet Union and its satellite nations.

A New Threat Emerges The region from the Middle East to South Asia is a central launching pad for many of the threats and challenges facing the United States in the new millennium. In the intelligence community, this collective geographic area is frequently referred to as the “Arc of Instability”— illustrative of the geospatial mapping curve that links the countries of concern and the associated activities that can be tied to terrorist activities. These regions have emerged as the primary contributor of personnel, fund- ing, training, and arms for the current terrorist move- ment. Unlike the Marxist-Leninist groups of the 1960s and 1970s, who were motivated by political and social conditions, today’s international terrorists are an amal- gam consisting of anarchist-nihilist and Middle Eastern religious-based fundamentalists who despise American hegemony and the resulting influence on world policy. Bent specifically on the destruction of American values, influence, and economy, they have targeted U.S. inter- ests worldwide.

The prevailing goals and objectives of terrorist or- ganizations vary throughout the world. They can be domestic or international in origin and they can range from those of regional, single-issue terrorists to trans- national terrorists. As a vibrant and robust democracy with significant global economic, military, and politi- cal influence, the United States is an appealing target of convenience for extremists and a desirable stage for terrorist organizations.

Dennis C. Blair, director of national intelligence, in his February 12, 2009, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, presented the annual threat assessment of the intelligence community. In this testimony, he presented two ominous observations/ findings on what he called the homegrown threat:

. . . we remain concerned about the potential for home- grown extremists inspired by al-Qa’ida’s militant ideol- ogy to plan attacks inside the United States, Europe, and elsewhere without operational direction from the group itself. In this regard, over the next year we will

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remain focused on identifying any ties between US- based individuals and extremist networks overseas. Though difficult to measure, the spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that provide religious justification for at- tacks; aggressive and violent anti-Western rhetoric; and signs that self-generating cells in the US identify with [Osama] Bin Ladin’s violent objectives all point to the likelihood that a small but violent number of cells may develop here.

Al-Qa’ida’s propaganda efforts include mes- sages in English and those aimed specifically at an American audience either in translated form or di- rectly by al-Qa’ida’s second-in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, such as with his November 2008 video message following the US Presidential elections. US- born al-Qa’ida members such as Adam Gadahn, who was indicted by a US grand jury in October 2006 on charges of treason, providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, and aiding and abetting terrorists, also participated in making these English-language propaganda messages (Blair, 2009, p. 7).

Continued threats by terrorist organizations against the United States and the West, continued in- telligence analytical reports indicating a reasonable degree of validation for the threats, along with attack plots being interdicted raise the specter of concern for repeated attempts to launch additional terrorist attacks in the United States and against allies as well as our interests abroad. Moreover, in this testimony, Blair reported that:

. . . Over the coming years, we will continue to face a substantial threat, including in the US Homeland, from terrorists attempting to acquire biological, chemi- cal, and possibly nuclear weapons and use them to conduct large-scale attacks. Conventional weapons and explosives will continue to be the most often used instruments of destruction in terrorist attacks; how- ever, terrorists who are determined to develop CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] ca- pabilities will have increasing opportunities to do so, owing to the spread of relevant technological knowledge and the ability to work with CBRN materials and de- signs in safe havens.

• Most terrorist groups that have shown some interest, intent, or capability to conduct CBRN attacks have pursued only limited, technically simple approaches that have not yet caused large numbers of casualties.

In particular, we assess the terrorist use of bio- logical agents represents a growing threat as the

barriers to obtaining many suitable starter cultures are eroding and open source technical literature and basic laboratory equipment can facilitate pro- duction. Terrorist chemical attacks also represent a substantial threat. Small-scale chemical attacks using industrial toxins have been the most frequent type of CBRN attack to date. The chlorine attacks in Iraq from October 2006 through the summer of 2007 highlighted terrorist interest in using commer- cial and easily available toxic industrial chemicals as weapons.

Al-Qa’ida is the terrorist group that historically has sought the broadest range of CBRN attack capa- bilities, and we assess that it would use any CBRN capability it acquires in an anti-US attack, preferably against the Homeland. There also is a threat of biologi- cal or chemical attacks in the US Homeland by lone individuals (Blair, 2009, p. 21).

The compelling information being disseminated regarding the threat, combined with the historical experiences of terrorist incidents both in the United States and abroad are a clarion call for EMS, fire service, law enforcement, public health, and medical and emergency management leadership to no longer view terrorism as an exotic event and start to incor- porate sustainable readiness strategies as a vital com- ponent of daily operations and standard operations procedures.

Terrorist threats vary from nonstate transnational networks with global reach capability such as al-Qaeda to terrorist cells affiliated with regional or international agendas and individual self-radicalized and unaffili- ated terrorists with single-issue agendas. Each type of network or terrorist cell has criminal intentions limited by finite capability. Terrorists exist as a threat of the United States in the U.S. homeland and in U.S. pres- ence throughout the world.

Globalization Globalization is changing the context in which terror- ists operate. Globalization is essentially a measure of the ease with which labor, ideas, capital, technology, and profits can move across borders with minimal gov- ernment interference. Dr. Khan, in his work entitled Terrorism and Globalization (2001) further presents:

The world was rapidly moving to realizing the idea of a global village as commonalities in terms of economic aspirations and technological progress were emphasized by politicians and opinion mak- ers, over differences such as religion, culture and

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ethnicity. Globalization of the world was the ulti- mate celebration of the political, economic, and social homogenization of the global populations. On (the) political front there is a consensus that democracy was not only the best but also the only legitimate way of organizing modern polities. On the economic front, the globalization of the economy was a foregone conclusion as nations scrambled to liberalize their economies in order to live up to the new standards set by the World Trade Organization (Kahn, 2001).

It is ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations si- multaneously, was facilitated by globalization and is now the biggest challenge to globalization. Global terrorism depends on the success of globalization. Technological advances provided vis-à-vis globalization such as the Internet, satellite television and radio networks, 24-hour news networks, low-cost airlines, and open borders are exploitation opportunities for malevolent individu- als and organizations bent on causing harm and so- cietal disruption. U.S. Ambassador Henry Crumpton (2006), coordinator for counterterrorism for the U.S. State Department at the 2006 RUSI Conference on Transnational Terrorism, eloquently captured the es- sence of the threat society faces:

Our global interdependence makes us stronger, but also in some aspects, more vulnerable. There is also a backlash from those who view globalization as a threat to traditional culture and their vested in- terests. Some discontented, illiberal non-state actors perceive themselves under attack and, therefore, re- sort to offensive action. This is the case with al-Qaeda and affiliated organizations. Yet, these enemies face a strategic environment featuring nation states with an overwhelming dominance in conventional military forces. This includes but is not limited to the U.S. It’s no surprise, then, that our actual and potential en- emies have taken note of our conventional superiority and acted to dislocate it. State actors, such as North Korea and Iran, seek irregular means to engage their foes. Iran uses proxies such as Hezbollah. Non-state actors like al-Qaeda have also developed asymmetric approaches that allow them to side-step conventional military power. They embrace terror as a tactic, but on such a level as to provide them strategic impact. Toward that end, they seek to acquire capabilities that can pose catastrophic threats, such as CBRNE, disruptive technologies, or a combination of these measures (Crumpton, 2006).

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the capac- ity or commitment of a transnational terrorist organiza- tion, like an al-Qaeda, to create an intense level of fear in a society and inflict extensive damage/loss of life to a nation is no longer an academic argument. That attack, coupled with others such as the train attacks in Madrid, bus and train attacks in London, the Bali nightclub bombings, the Moscow theater attack, and the Beslan school attack in Russia are only a few past events illustrating that transnational terrorist groups have the resolve, capacity, and capability to plan, fund, and execute large-scale incidents to further advance their cause.

Advances in technology that have driven cost down and expanded performance capabilities of many prod- ucts have leveled the technology field for nonstate actors while concurrently enhancing their operational capabili- ties. For instance, advances with information technol- ogy have effectively terminated the ability of countries to isolate themselves. Information and communication control is difficult, if not impossible to achieve because the information revolution has resulted in a democratic access to technology. Two important results are that the terrorists’ recruiting prospect base has expanded expo- nentially and free speech and civil liberty have given them an inexpensive international medium with which to voice unfettered discontent.

The notional concept of centrally controlled inter- national terrorist networks, previously investigated and vigorously debated during the 1960s and 1970s, was deemed unlikely due to conflicting ideologies, motivat- ing factors, funding, and arming and training among global practitioners. However, networks with great geo- graphic reach are feasible especially with the advent of public access to the Internet, the ability to transfer funds and conduct banking electronically, the interna- tional arms market, encrypted digital communication technology, and the emergence of stateless terrorism. An important result is that instant global communica- tion between offensive action cells and their controllers is now possible. Controllers now have global reach and can run multiple independent cells from a single loca- tion with no interaction between the cells. They can also contract terrorism services utilizing mercenaries composed of local indigenous practitioners in a given target community.

The rapid expansion of technology also resulted in a reduced requirement for terrorist group infrastructure and has resulted in an asymmetry between cause and effect. The complexity of weapons acquisition, produc- tion, transportation, lethality, and delivery platform has been diminished.

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Networks and Organizations History documents many examples where terrorist orga- nizations possessed and employed organizational traits that resemble military or modern corporate manage- ment structures. These constructs boasted robust hier- archical structures with a definitive chain of command that managed command and control responsibilities of the group. With these types of organizations, a more defined division of labor or functional specialization in subordinate cells/units was achieved by designating subunits to handle the finance, intelligence, operations, and logistics/support aspects of the group. Within the organization, generally only the cell leader possessed the full knowledge of what other components were charged with achieving and which individuals populated those units. Moreover, only the very senior leadership of the organization possessed the ability to comprehend the unified big strategic picture for the full organization.

Presently, many terrorist groups manage their affairs and operations by progressively employing an extensive system of smaller networks, integrating them into a de- centralized network strategy. The creation of an opera- tional strategy revolving around a network of networks lowers the risk profile of the traditional larger analogue terrorist group structure by remotely interconnecting smaller, discrete units—making it increasingly difficult to detect the group unless the opportunity for authori- ties to infiltrate the trusted smaller group presents and is successfully seized. Moreover, utility of this discrete configuration provides greater redundancy opportuni- ties for the group.

Comprised in this manner, once operational goals, targeting objectives, and functional directions have been issued, terrorist groups can leverage the flexibility and independence of small affiliate groups and individual actors from a diverse member population and across geographic boundaries to conduct the designated opera- tion with lesser chances of discovery.

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in their 2001 work entitled, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, present the work of William Evan to delineate types of networks. Evan posits that funda- mentally there are three types of network topologies, which include:

• The Chain or Line Network (FIGURE 1-1)—Each cell links to the next node in the chain or line sequence.

• The Hub, Star, or Wheel Network (FIGURE 1-2)— Each cell communicates with one central con- trol element. The control element could be the leader or a designated proxy who has the del- egated authority. A moderate deviation of the hub network is a wheel (network) design where the outer nodes communicate with one or two other outer cells in addition to the hub.

• The All-Channel or Full Matrix Network (FIGURE 1-3)—All nodes connect to each other. Organizationally, the network is flat, indicat- ing there is no hierarchical command with control distributed within the network. This format is communication intensive and can pose operational security threats if the linkages are compromised, identified, and tracked.

FIGURE 1-1 The chain or line network.

FIGURE 1-2 The hub, star, or wheel network.

FIGURE 1-3 The all-channel or full matrix network.

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The terrorist network distributes key function as- signments and responsibility for planning, operations, and redundancy through the prescribed structure de- pending on the ways elements are linked to other ele- ments of the structure. Individuals and cells have no contact with each other unless that contact is critical to the coordination of a specific task or executing the at- tack. By limiting interaction and diminishing potential for discovery, the leaders enhance group operational security and insulate themselves from accusations of in- volvement via the cellular layers involved in the imple- mentation and execution phases of the attack.

Regardless of their differences, the three basic net- work types are leveraged together in hybrid organiza- tions when their synergy is needed to accomplish the operational objective. A terrorist organization could em- ploy chain networks for financing and money-laundering activities, attached to a wheel network handling logis- tics issues that is coupled with an all-channel network where leadership dictates the use of fiscal resources for operational activities of a hub network that is conducting pretargeting surveillance and reconnaissance activities for the attack.

Preparing for Threats Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

The September 11, 2001, attacks of the New York City World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and the 1993 bombing of the New York City World Trade Center, coupled with the myriad of attacks that have been interdicted clearly illustrate America’s vulnerability to terrorism—not only abroad, but to the homeland as well. These acts dem- onstrate the willingness and ability of determined ter- rorists to carry out attacks against high-impact targets. The March 1995 sarin gas incident in the Tokyo subway demonstrated the terrorists’ willingness to kill thousands

in a single event. Attacks on mass transportation sys- tems in Britain, Israel, Scotland, and Spain illustrate the continuing trend of commitment to use terrorism as a weapon against noncombatants.

Twenty-first century threat evolution requires public safety and emergency service organizations to reevalu- ate their priorities and consider their ability to address multiple new tasks. These tasks include support for new and emerging technologies; the increasing significance of establishing relationships with adjacent agencies and cooperation with specialized resources; and a better understanding of issues such as the threat environment including mass casualty terrorism, drugs, gangs, and crime. These changes, coupled with severe budgetary pressures to reduce costs and find more efficient ways to carry out their responsibilities, force these organi- zations to exercise greater care in matching available resources to priorities and to integrate political power with economic requirements.

To meet these challenges effectively, emergency ser- vice organizations must address flaws in their procedures for allocating personnel and financial resources to meet priorities and objectives, including training problems, staffing, and the inadequate integration of multifunc- tion components. Unfortunately, these tasks are made more difficult by past management reforms such as de- centralization and the devolution of decision making to lower level administrative units that have resulted in the development of new, multilevel policy systems. To summarize in the nicest way possible, local prepared- ness efforts to engender a greater level of community readiness for response to large-scale events is not solely waiting for the federal government to award a grant or send agency equipment. Enhancing community readi- ness also involves local elected officials and city/county managers investing in their public safety and health and law enforcement programs creating sustainable capac- ity that is augmented with federal program resources. Failure to do otherwise is irresponsible. Policy lacking resources is always rhetoric.

Emergency Medical Services Prehospital health care no longer consists of a sim- ple emergency transportation service. Since the early 1970s, new levels of training added to what was basi- cally a first aid and transportation system. It is now known as the emergency medical service (EMS) sys- tem. The EMS system provides a sequential process including patient problem recognition, system access, basic and advanced intervention by first responders and bystanders, and transportation to the hospital, if necessary, by ambulance. The advent of this system

The historical, organizational, operational, and behav- ioral complexities posed by terrorist organizations are numerous. Although the previous section was designed to provide minimal clarity and foundation for the back- ground material, it is only a snowflake on the tip of an iceberg. We encourage continued acquaintance with these issues by conducting in-depth research via any of the numerous comprehensive texts that were devel- oped to address these topics.

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completed the public safety management triad of law enforcement and crime prevention, fire prevention and suppression, and emergency medical care and transportation.

Prehospital health care changed significantly with the advent of specialized EMT and paramedic train- ing. Capabilities now include responding to the public need with mobile intensive care units and providing specialized advanced life-support measures when necessary.

Public safety EMS is available nationwide and is pro- vided by private and public agencies. The management and provision of the service provided by them repre- sents a sizable investment in training, human resources, supplies, and equipment. The ability to utilize various system delivery models made it possible for agencies and communities of all sizes to participate in this vital public service.

Complex Organizational Capability In the fire service, distribution of the workload is not characterized solely by volume, nor is it completely con- figuration dependent. In order for the fire service to maintain its robust capability, it vertically integrates mul- tiple competencies, and each individual resource is con- figured for multitasking. Within the fire service, where consequence management is the fundamental impera- tive, high performance is measured by organizational effectiveness in the areas of preparedness levels, com- munity loss prevention and reduction, and decreased mortality and morbidity.

Through integrated stability, the American fire ser- vice provides both high reliability and high trust to its constituency. High-reliability organizations are complex, and complexity mitigates risk. High reliability organi- zations use organizational structure to adapt and then mitigate events through processes such as risk aware- ness, decision migration, and process auditing.

As a result of budget corrections, operational adjust- ments, and technological advances beginning in the early 1990s, the 21st-century American fire service emerges as a complex, precision force that possesses the nation’s dominant body of knowledge regarding emergency ser- vice consequence management.

Complex Interface Development Interface complexities involving multiple interdepen- dent agencies, external resources, and federal assets are mitigated through the implementation of a standard, multipurpose incident management system that con- forms to the scope and type of incident and the capa- bilities of responding agencies. Although variations of

this incident management system exist, it has not been fully implemented within the inclusive public safety– emergency service amalgam.

Unrealistic Expectation Notional concepts, including the all-hazards capability, are unrealistic, unproven, and dangerous. The assump- tion that a local emergency resource is capable of man- aging an incident equivalent to that found in military warfare could potentially result in the loss of significant operational assets and personnel and place the commu- nity at catastrophic risk.

Contemporary training is invariably conducted in daylight, in good weather, and consistently results in a positive outcome. The ability to survive a given operation is not addressed, and casualties, if any, are attributed to the civilian population at risk. Training must now include an ability-to-survive-operation com- ponent and implementation measures when conven- tional practices fail.

Threat Issues

Since 1992, direct physical threats aimed at America’s EMS, police, and fire responders began to emerge with increasing frequency. These threats specifically target first responders and public safety personnel. The tactics used appear similar to those espoused in the Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla, written by Carlos Marighella in 1969, which states in part:

Thus, the armed struggle of the urban guerrilla points towards two essential objectives:

1. The physical elimination of the leaders and assistants of the armed forces and of the police;

2. The expropriation of government resources and the wealth belonging to the rich businessmen, the large landowners and the imperialists, with small expropriations used for the sustenance of the individual guerrillas and large ones for the maintenance of the revolutionary organi- zation itself.

It is clear that the armed struggle of the urban guer- rilla also has other objectives. But here we are referring to the two basic objectives, above all expropriation. It is necessary for every urban guerrilla to always keep in mind that he can only maintain his existence if he is able to kill the police and those dedicated to repression, and if he is determined—truly determined—to expro- priate the wealth of the rich businessmen, landowners and imperialists. (Marighella, 1969, p. 6)

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The threats are tactical violence and 911 target ac- quisition. These threats have four applications:

1. To control the criminal environment 2. To divert law enforcement attention 3. To kill or injure law enforcement personnel 4. To compel law enforcement–assisted suicide

Tactical Violence Since the 1992 Los Angeles civil disturbance, a disturb- ing phenomenon that directly affects emergency service providers has surfaced. The phenomenon has been iden- tified as tactical violence.

Tactical violence is primarily employed by criminals. It is defined as the predetermined use of maximum vio- lence in order to achieve one’s criminal goals, regardless of victim cooperation, level of environmental threat to the perpetrator, or the need to evade law enforcement or capture. This method also usually results in physical or psychological injury or death to the victim. The rationale for employing tactical violence is predatory control of the immediate criminal environment through the creation of chaos and the infliction of terror, trauma, and death on presenting targets.

911 Target Acquisition One tactic utilized by the criminal and extremist elements (including but not limited to militias, white supremacists, environmentalists, animal rights activists, and antiabor- tionists) is 911 target acquisition. This tactic has been employed for the following purposes:

• To divert public safety resources prior to, dur- ing, or after the commission of criminal acts

• To draw resources into an ambush situation • To draw resources into environments laced with

improvised explosive antipersonnel devices • To compel law enforcement–assisted suicide Although these threats primarily target law en-

forcement organizations (crisis managers), fire and EMS first responders (consequence managers) have the highest exposure by virtue of their response con- figuration and resource staffing levels. Recovering from these events takes up to 1 year, during which time the community’s vulnerability to all hazards is significantly increased.

Covert Intimidation Local and federal law enforcement agencies are not the same as military units and rely to some extent on the intimidation factor. The primary goal of law enforcement is crime prevention/control. There are many subtle intimidation strategies incorporated into

this function that have a psychological impact on the community, including vehicle color schemes and emer- gency lighting configuration, uniform design and color, the visible wearing of sidearms, and officer bearing and demeanor.

Overt Intimidation Law enforcement special teams include special weapons and tactics (SWAT) and hostage response teams. These units are semimilitarized and affect quasimilitary status through the wearing of military-like/special operations/ commando uniforms. They carry special weaponry and devices not seen in routine law enforcement operations. Their presence at an incident is an implied threat to targeted perpetrators and demonstrates the capacity to employ overwhelming force and special aggressive tac- tics if necessary.

Overt intimidation tactics have been adopted in other areas as well, such as the serving of high-risk war- rants or drug raids. It is common to see various law en- forcement agencies entering a suspect dwelling en masse, creating confusion, shouting commands, and displaying drawn weapons. Although intimidation plays a role in deterring terrorist activity, it will not be a factor once crisis management transitions into consequence manage- ment. Crisis management involves measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to antici- pate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Consequence management involves measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

Outcome Training Local law enforcement personnel are not trained to par- ticipate against sustained armed resistance with an op- posing force without external support.

In all cases, law enforcement personnel are trained in a manner that results in a positive outcome for them on any given incident. Although vulnerability, danger, and personal risk are discussed, they are presented in general terms suggesting that, although they exist, it is unlikely they will occur to a particular individual if training is followed.

Special aggressor teams such as SWAT and hostage response teams are trained to conduct assaults if neces- sary in order to effect closure of a particular incident. However, this training implies that an assault is both inclusive and conclusive relative to a given criminal problem. This means inclusive of all threats and con- clusive once the threat is neutralized. An example is

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to gain entry and subdue/arrest/kill perpetrators and/or rescue hostages.

Unlike the military, law enforcement agencies are not prepared to conduct an assault in the face of wither- ing automatic weapons fire, rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, claymores, mortars, or other similar type weaponry. This is especially true if they incur sub- stantial casualties among their personnel. They must rely instead on special teams for this type of activity. (England discovered this during an IRA assault against Parliament, as did the Los Angeles Police Department during a North Hollywood bank robbery.) Nor are law enforcement agencies, whose primary objective is the safety of its personnel, prepared to conduct operations against a sustained, widespread, or diffuse hostile faction operating from several venues simultaneously. These groups have no acceptable loss provisions.

Acts of terrorism perpetrated against society present many problems to those charged with crisis and con- sequence management response. An act of terrorism is similar to other man-made disasters because the main characteristic is sudden onset and the resultant effect is significant human injury and/or death. Because of the nature of the incident, in many cases, there is no op- portunity for crisis management or intervention.

These incidents, by their nature, are not telegraphed in advance to the authorities, and therefore, the appro- priate response may consist solely of consequence man- agement and criminal investigation. To the consequence manager, these responses represent the greatest chal- lenge faced by an emergency agency.

To begin with, the physical impact of a conventional terrorist incident is characterized by rapid onset. Unlike a common conventional response, where initial units are dispatched and the event accelerates or expands based on the observation and assessment of first-arriving units, conventional terrorist incidents require an immediate maximal response of appropriate resources in order to optimize the survivability of victims.

This may indicate that a new standard or ad hoc response configuration is necessary for terrorism inci- dents—one that combines emergency medical care pro- viders, hazardous materials management, and search and rescue capability with conventional resources on the initial dispatch to specific types of incidents.

Federal Asset, First Responder Integration

The Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force responds to incidents involving chemical, bio- logical, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE)

hazards in support of local responders. Their mission is to deploy domestically or overseas to provide force protection and/or mitigation and to assist federal, state, and local responders in developing training programs to manage the consequences of a CBRNE event.

The National Guard originally commissioned 10 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams (CSTs), formerly known as rapid assessment and initial detection teams. A CST is composed of 22 people, 7 officers and 15 enlisted personnel, from both the army and Air National Guard, with a variety of spe- cialties. Assigned vehicles include a command vehicle, an operations van, a communications vehicle called the unified command suite (provides a broad range of com- munications capabilities including satellite communica- tions), an analytical laboratory system van (contains a full suite of analysis equipment to support the medical team, and other general-purpose vehicles). The CST normally deploys using its assigned vehicles, but it can be airlifted if required. A deployment distance of up to 250 miles can usually be covered faster by surface travel, given the time required to recall an aircrew and stage an aircraft.

There are currently 55 CSTs (one per state/territory; but two in California).

The CST is on standby 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with an advanced echelon deploying within 90 minutes of notification and the rest of the team within 3 hours. This quick response gives the CST the ability to support the incident commander (IC) with critical information rapidly. The CST commander advises the IC as to the type and level of hazard present, possible courses of action, and additional National Guard assets that are available.

The communications capability of the unified com- mand suite allows any member of the CST to contact a wide range of technical experts. It also allows the com- mander to pass information and situation reports up channel to keep the Joint Forces Headquarters, National Guard Bureau, and Northern Command apprised of the current status of events and actions.

Both of these response components integrate with local responders through implementation of the incident management system. With the establishment of a uni- fied command, a fully capable civil-federal management team oversees management and operations of combined assets in WMD and other events impacting communities in the United States.

Although these external assets, along with other federal agencies (other divisions of the Department of Defense, Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Federal

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Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Public Health Service), respond to assist after the primary im- pact, the response to the aftermath of an event remains the responsibility of local communities. It is critical that this facet is not lost in the planning process due to the reliance on federal response and capacity. Managers, chief officers, planners, and elected officials must remain cognizant of the critical factor that the arrival of these assets is time and distance limited. In many cases, de- pending on the proximity of federal resource stationing and/or the availability of aircraft with appropriate lift capacity, it can be many hours or perhaps days prior to arrival and full operational activity.

Physical Constraints It is not unusual for terrorist incidents to involve struc- tural collapse, multiple casualties, fire, and chemical release. Is there a difference between a terrorist act and a conventional incident? Aside from the possible psycho- logical factors, there is no difference to the consequence manager, who must implement operations based on the present state of the event rather than the precipitating factors. Therefore, attribution is not a consequence pri- ority. Regardless of motivation, both function as casualty generators that result in short-term resource commit- ment on a large scale. Both have the potential to cause collateral injury to responders, and, by their nature, generally do not afford an opportunity for crisis man- agement or intervention prior to the incident.

However, because terrorism is a deliberate act, these incidents present unique hazards to response personnel. For example, it is not unusual for terror- ists to plan secondary events that target emergency responders—events that are triggered once emergency operations begin and responders are most vulnerable to attack. The results of a terrorist act are different than a conventional incident; therefore, our approach to terrorism is different.

Aggressive response to these incidents must be cur- tailed. Courage, valor, honor, and integrity are not issues in these instances. Any response to suspected terrorist acts must be moderated and coupled with careful con- sideration of any potential secondary threats to respond- ers and the general public. The events at the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, taught us the hard lesson that emergency responders can and will be targeted as part of an attack.

Political Constraints Terrorism is both a federal and a state crime. However, all incidents are manifested locally, and initial reaction to them is provided by local crisis and consequence orga-

nizations. As these incidents expand, they involve mul- tiple organizations. Therefore, both at the planning and response level, local crisis and consequence managers must interact with external entities with, in some cases, broader authority over the incident and in other cases, with near equal power but radically different missions, perceptions, and value systems. They must also cooperate with political crisis managers and co-response organiza- tions from within a unified command structure.

Political, strategic, operational, and tactical direction is necessary in every case of joint or combined force operations. Political direction sets political objectives, defines basic strategy to achieve these objectives, and provides basic guidance for operations. Strategic direc- tion defines desired operational target conditions and sequencing. Operational direction will coordinate the efforts of multiple organizations to achieve a successful outcome. Tactical direction issues orders to the front- end operators actually engaged in problem resolution.

These unusual circumstances result in the conse- quence manager’s inability to manage the incident effec- tively, particularly if the responding organizations do not have a familiar working relationship. It is therefore impera- tive that all responsible organizations plan, organize, and conduct training within a single national incident manage- ment system/incident command system (NIMS/ICS) and that individual organizational roles and responsibilities are clearly defined and agreed upon prior to an event and preferably during a comprehensive planning process.

Ethical Constraints In unconventional terrorist incidents involving CBRNE, local agency limitations may preclude response into an impacted area. Therefore, the interval to intervention time increases. This is one of the more difficult concepts for emergency managers to instill in their personnel.

However, the current response capability of special- ized federal resources is limited by geographic/regional time constraints and may not be available for the better part of a day. Additionally, the medical community cur- rently has limited to no capability to effectively manage mass care for local populations, especially for extended periods of time. This is further complicated when one calculates the limitations of logistics in the medical com- munity, particularly in systems where just-in-time re- stock strategies are in place. In these scenarios, the lack of supply depth combined with an event that consumes vast quantities of resources quickly could result in an ill-equipped and -prepared medical system collapsing.

Under these circumstances, the function of emer- gency response organizations is to limit environmental expansion of the incident if possible, protect the unaf-

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fected population through supporting the implemen- tation of community shielding strategies or initiating evacuations and establishing shelters or safe havens capable of providing for basic human needs due to the magnitude of the event and the loss of infrastructure and residences.

Because of potential delays in access to unconven- tional incident sites involving CBRNE, the critical inter- val to intervention time may be protracted. Therefore, the survivability potential for victims diminishes. Prolonged waiting times increase mortality, and the consequence manager has to consider the implemen- tation of disaster mortuary plans a priority once the site becomes accessible.

Unconventional incidents involving CBRNE are likely to convert from EMS/fire/rescue incidents to body recovery, identification, and disposal operations in co- operation with criminal investigative organizations. This final fact, as observed in the Oklahoma City bombing and the September 11, 2001, events, has a tremendous psychological impact on emergency response personnel who are neither trained nor experienced in mass fatality management.

Evolution and Application of the ICS The ICS began as a firefighting system for managing California wildfires. The system has expanded into an all-hazard (all-risk) system and is employed at routine emergencies as well as natural disasters, technological disasters, and mass casualty incidents.

The ICS is designed to manage operations and co- ordinate resources. It is a functionally based system structured on the principles of common terminology, resource allocation, support functions, span of control, and chain of command. The ICS structure is based on a management staff that directs and supports four major sections. The staff is broken down into two groups—the command staff and the general staff. The command staff consists of an IC, a liaison officer, a safety officer, and a public information officer. The general staff is made of four section leaders (chiefs) breaking down the incident into operations, logistics, planning, and administration/ finance.

The ICS is very similar to the military organization of North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries. The mili- tary staff positions of intelligence, logistics, and plans/ operations closely parallel the four civilian ICS sections. The civilian system also utilizes a liaison officer and the concept of unified command to integrate with a military counterpart. This is an effective boilerplate for defense support to civil authorities and coordination during a terrorism/tactical violence incident.

The mass casualty aspect of ICS makes it effective for managing terrorism/tactical violence incidents. For mass casualties, a medical branch is assigned to the op- erations section and manages a triage unit, a treatment unit, and a transportation unit. The system stresses early triage and transport of critical patients and scene safety for the rescuers.

In the terrorism/tactical violence arena, the com- mon weapons are still automatic weapons and impro- vised explosive devices. A chemical attack is managed by an extension of the hazardous materials ICS, with emphasis on detection, personal protective equipment, and patient decontamination. A biological attack has a delayed onset and presents special problems relat- ing to recognition, pathogen identification, treatment protocols, and personal protection. The overwhelming requirement in the biological attack is for EMS, public health, hospital, and medical leadership to provide leadership and coherent management utilizing their lead agency obligations as command under ICS or a unified command dependent upon local protocol and statutory authorities.

Hospital Emergency Incident Command System The hospital emergency incident command system (HEICS) is a management tool modeled after the ICS. The core of the HEICS comprises the following two main elements: (1) an organizational chart with a clearly delineated chain of command and position function titles indicating scope of responsibility, and (2) a prioritized job action sheet (job description) that assists the designated individual in focusing upon an assignment.

The benefits of a medical facility using HEICS are seen not only in a more organized response, but also in the ability of that institution to relate to other healthcare entities and public/private organizations in the event of an emergency incident. The value of the common com- munication language in HEICS becomes apparent when mutual aid is requested from or for that facility.

The California earthquake preparedness guidelines for hospitals served as a cornerstone in the develop- ment of the HEICS. The HEICS embodied those same characteristics that make the ICS so appealing. Those attributes include the following:

1. Responsibility-oriented chain of command 2. Wide acceptance through commonality of mis-

sion and language 3. Applicability to varying types and magnitudes of

emergency events 4. Expeditious transfer of resources within a system

or between facilities

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14 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

5. Flexibility in implementation of individual sec- tions or branches of the HEICS

6. Minimal disruption to existing hospital depart- ments

The HEICS includes an organizational chart showing a chain of command, which incorporates four sections under the overall leadership of an emergency IC. Each of the four sections—logistics, planning, finance, and operations—has a chief appointed by the IC responsible for the section. The chiefs in turn designate officers for subfunctions, with managers and coordinators filling other crucial roles.

Each of the 36 roles has prioritized job action sheets describing the important assignments of each person. Each job action sheet also includes a mission statement to define the position responsibility. The end product is a management system with personnel who know what they should do, when they should do it, and who to report it to during a time of emergency.

Federal Emergency Management Agency First Responder CBRNE Training As a result of the changing nature of global politics, the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the continu- ing threat of terrorism, new information, training, and technology have emerged and continue to evolve, pro- viding responders with the latest science, technology, and tactical advances to keep us safe and our opera- tional responses sustainably effective during times of incredible demands. The ability of first responders to recognize and manage acts of terrorism has become es- sential. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/ FEMA terrorism training programs are an integral com- ponent of national preparedness. Classes were developed for and directed to emergency service first responders, law enforcement personnel, emergency management, public health workers, medical personnel, government officials, and nongovernmental organizations through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium and their training partners via funding provided by Congress through DHS—specifically fire fighters, hazardous ma- terials personnel, and EMS providers. The programs are highly effective, relevant, and free of charge. This opportunity is well worth your individual and agency participation—especially when the team comes to your agency and says, “We’re with the government, and we are here to help.” It is a genuinely honest statement and they mean it!

Metropolitan Medical Response System Most CBRNE events present a relatively limited oppor- tunity for the successful rescue of viable victims (usually

no more than 3 hours). However, the more expeditious and aggressive the actions taken in the initial stages of the event, the more victims will be recovered and de- contaminated, treated, and provided access to advanced medical interventions.

The metropolitan medical response system (MMRS) was developed to provide support for, and assistance to, local jurisdiction first responders in nuclear, biologi- cal, or chemical (NBC) terrorist incidents. The MMRS has a strong emergency medical care focus and has the capability to provide rapid and comprehensive medical intervention to casualties of NBC events.

MMRS development was based upon providing a coordinated response to CBRNE incidents in a metro- politan environment. Special emphasis is placed on the ability to identify the specific agent involved and pro- vide the earliest possible correct medical intervention for victims of these situations.

The MMRS is a specially trained and locally available CBRNE incident response team. MMRS provides the platform for rapid and efficient integration of state and federal medical resources into the local incident man- agement system. Through its established multiagency, collaborative planning framework, the MMRS program also promotes effective regional coordination of mutual aid with neighboring localities. The MMRS is organized, staffed, and equipped to provide the best possible pre- hospital and emergency medical care throughout the course of an incident, and especially while on the scene. Medical personnel are responsible for providing the ear- liest possible medical intervention for the responders and civilian victims of NBC incidents through early iden- tification of the agent type and proper administration of the appropriate antidote(s) and other pharmaceuticals as necessary.

Additional response assets that augment and support the MMRS strategy include not only traditional local, re- gional, and state emergency response organizations but response elements such as disaster medical assistance teams, disaster mortuary operational response teams, and other response assets that become federalized in time of disaster declarations such as urban search and rescue teams. These assets are staffed by local response professionals and become part of the national response architecture when they are activated by the national gov- ernment and issued a mission order.

Casualty Care in the Combat Environment Unlike the military, civil first responders are not trained with consideration for the ability to survive a given op- eration. Civil mission priority does not prospectively accept personnel losses, and no first responder orga-

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nization includes an acceptable loss ratio as part of its mission goal or planning efforts.

First responders are currently trained to manage trauma-based incidents on the principles of a standard- ized approach to trauma care. However, there are issues inherent in the training programs relative to appropri- ateness and application in the combat environment, including:

• The assumption that hospital diagnostics and therapeutics can be accessed rapidly

• No presupposition of delayed transportation • No tactical context Most trauma training programs do not take into

consideration the issues of care under fire, in complete darkness, various environmental factors, and delays to definitive care or command decisions.

Tactical care objectives include turning casualties into patients, preventing additional casualties, and pre- venting response personnel from becoming casualties. Under these circumstances, basic protocols should be considered a starting point; ad hoc protocol modification may have to occur in response to a specific situation. In tactical situations, medics must be prepared and permit- ted to adapt and improvise within their scope of practice as conditions dictate.

The following new terminology and definitions appropriate to tactical field care must be added to the trauma training programs and incorporated into the vari- ous syllabi in order to reflect the care rendered in the tactical environment:

I. Care Under Fire A. Care under fire is the care rendered by a

medic at the scene of an injury, in a hostile environment, while at risk.

B. Available medical equipment and supplies are limited to those carried by the individ- ual medic.

C. Aseptic technique is not a consideration. D. Control of hemorrhage is the top priority

because exsanguination (severe blood loss) from extremity wounds is the number one cause of preventable death in the combat environment.

E. Patient extraction is delayed due to the threat potential.

II. Tactical Field Care A. Tactical field care is the care rendered by a

medic at the scene of an injury, in a hostile environment, when not at risk.

B. Available medical equipment and supplies are limited to those carried in the field.

C. There is more time to render care.

D. Care is rendered under nonsterile condi- tions.

E. Patient extraction is possible.

Mass Fatality Management When planning for CBRNE incidents or other acts of terrorism, the plan must include provisions for the man- agement of mass fatalities. Evolving terrorist capabili- ties, coupled with the availability of CBRNE materiel, lead to consideration of the potential for mass fatalities. Many chemical agents result in fatal injuries to those ex- posed within a short period of time. In a similar manner, large, improvised explosive devices placed strategically within a high-rise building, apartment, or other large public gathering place can result in hundreds, if not thousands of deaths. Unlike the military, civil authority rarely finds itself in the position of managing, process- ing, and disposing of contaminated human remains. But events such as the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Oklahoma City bombing unfortunately illustrate the need for such plans and capabilities.

A mass fatality management plan providing or- ganization, mobilization, and coordination of all pro- vider agencies for emergency mortuary services is an imperative. It is important to delineate the authority, responsibility, functions, and operations of providers by agreement prior to an event of magnitude.

Mass fatality plans should be regional and come un- der the auspices and management of the local coroner or medical examiner. The operational concept of the mass fatality management system is exclusive of cultural, religious, and ethnic beliefs and practices but may be modified as conditions permit. It is a utility system based on the following three levels of response:

• Level I—A minor to moderate incident wherein local resources appear to be adequate and available. A local emergency may or may not be proclaimed and fatalities may range from 50 to 100.

• Level II—A moderate to severe incident wherein local resources are not adequate and assistance is requested from other jurisdictions or regions. A local emergency declaration is im- minent. Fatalities may exceed 100.

• Level III—A major incident wherein resources in or near the impacted area are overwhelmed and extensive state and/or federal resources are required. A local and state emergency is pro- claimed and a principal declaration of an emer- gency or major disaster is requested. Fatalities may be in the thousands.

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Mass Casualty Target Management Many population centers include high-rise building complexes that commonly have transient censuses ex- ceeding 10,000 people. The complexities involved in planning a response to these edifices are a daunting task. These buildings exist globally, and because of their accessibility, they represent attractive targets to terrorists.

For example, the New York City World Trade Center represented a target of colossal proportions and an unprecedented opportunity to strike at the symbol of Western international commerce. In a single act of terrorism in 1993, over 150,000 individuals were placed at risk when an improvised explosive device detonated in a subterranean parking complex. With the 2001 attack, that same size population was placed at risk again. In the aftermath of the attack and the collapse of the tow- ers, almost 3,000 were killed. At the Pentagon attack, almost 200 were killed.

Fortunately, high reliability organizations such as EMS, fire, and law enforcement agencies use organiza- tional structure to adapt to, and then mitigate the uncom- mon yet catastrophic event. This emergency was mitigated by a diverse public safety system, a convergent volunteer effort, and a systematic approach to disaster service opera- tions. The adherence to an ICS provided the impetus for a unified command structure and an unprecedented level of cooperation between local and regional resources and state and federal assets. Through the application of this management process, a catastrophe was averted.

Mitigation of Individual Performance Degradation in Terrorism Domestic CBRNE terrorist events are rare and cata- strophic events. The unknowns are when and where these events will occur. The type and material used are also unknown.

The basis of system function is performance of the individual, yet how citizens and first responders will perform is unknown. Algorithms developed to assist in responding are based on a reductionist approach that most problems can be identified, separated from the larger response, and prepared for. Algorithms for re- sponse are best guesses in a totally unknown arena where human and environmental pathology merge.

Latent system error, human performance error— slips and mistakes as well as shortcomings caused by limitations of normal human physiology—interfere with well-planned algorithms, policies, and procedures. Organizational structure and decision-making methods for emergency events that mitigate performance degrada- tion already exist. Use of high-reliability organizational

techniques and decision-making methodology adapted from the military can mitigate CBRNE terrorist events in real time as an event evolves.

Latent error occurs when the system sets up the er- ror, but the individual commits the act. On later review, a long train of events tied together by ineffective policies and procedures can be identified as the actual cause of the error. Though latent error is sometimes identified or prevented by review of the system as a whole, the more deeply enmeshed latent errors cannot. They appear only when the system is strained under the conditions of a catastrophe. The perceptions and actions of individu- als help to identify and mitigate latent error early in the period of disorder or dysfunction.

Error is a part of human performance, despite a commonly held view that error cannot exist without negligence. Some consider complications as errors, when they are actually expected but unwanted results of inter- ventions. Errors can be unconscious slips or conscious mistakes. Slips are rule-based or skill-based errors that easily occur when an incident evolves in unexpected ways or human performance cannot or does not match environmental demands. Mistakes are more complex, knowledge-based errors where the decision-making process is at fault. Interference with effective decision making comes from a number of heuristics and biases such as representativeness, availability, confirmation bias, reversion under stress, or coning of attention.

Fear, as fight or flight, is a well-known, expected, and natural physiologic response to life threats. Less well known is how these responses present themselves dur- ing the threat. Fight manifests itself as anger, particularly when focused on an individual or tool. It is made plausible by the presentation that an individual’s performance is inadequate, causing the anger, when, in actuality, it is the angry individual’s response that leads to performance decrements. Flight manifests as avoidance and is made plausible by redirection of attention to a seemingly more important but safer task. Freeze is an often-unrecognized fear response mediated by cortisol and leads to confusion, inaction, or even paralysis (as in paralysis by analysis).

Decision-making techniques modified from the military, such as the closed-loop decision cycles, allow individuals to learn what works through action. They permit response when the nature of the threat is fuzzy and ill defined or ill identified. In fact, closed-loop cycles allow identification of the structure of the threat and success of the response. They provide a margin of safety by self-monitoring responses to actions for early warn- ing of dangers created by actions of the response team. They are rapid and adaptable to those situations where unintended or unexpected outcomes occur.

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Roberts and Libuser’s high reliability theory, also developed from military studies, states that complexity will mitigate rare but catastrophic events. This apparent paradox occurs because disasters and terrorist events are nonlinear systems. Linear, reductionist approaches such as response algorithms and prearranged ICSs do not apply. High-reliability organizations can learn and have a culture of both safety and reliability. They allow decision migration and diminish authority gradients that will permit the necessary free flow of information during the terrorist event. They allow effective action before implementation of algorithms, policies, and procedures can be instituted in a rapidly evolving terrorist threat. These organizations will respond to a catastrophic event in the same manner they respond to routine events.

Chapter Summary

The complexities posed by the multiple challenges created by planning for, responding to, operating at,

and recovering from a terrorist attack are numerous. The ability to respond effectively in the safest possible manner is dependent upon coherently understanding the response system framework and players at the na- tional, state, territorial, state, tribal, and local com- munity level.

Identification of vulnerabilities prior to an inci- dent and working to fill those planning and opera- tional gaps is integral to possessing response readiness. Accomplishing this daunting, and sometimes lofty, ex- pectation requires that the contemporary leader recog- nize the historical trending of terrorist incidents as well as the evolving tactics being employed by the actors. Additionally, implementing strategies that work toward mitigating risks to responders to the lowest possible lev- els when managing the modern terrorism environment cannot be overstated. Such strategies include but are not limited to the identification training gaps and provision of the requisite training, education, and equipment to satisfy these requirements.

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Wrap Up Chapter Questions

1. List and discuss the definitions of terrorism from the Department of Defense, FBI, and State Department.

2. List and describe the three types of terrorist group networks.

3. List and discuss at least three major response agen- cies at the local level. What are the limitations of these agencies in terrorism response?

4. Discuss the evolving threats of 911 target acquisi- tion and tactical violence.

5. What are the basic functions of the following spe- cial units?

U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological – Incident Response Force National Guard Civilian Support Teams – (CSTs) Metropolitan Medical Response System – (MMRS)

6. Discuss how mass casualty care in the combat en- vironment differs from standard advanced trauma life support protocols.

7. Outline the major elements in a mass fatality man- agement plan.

Chapter Projects

• Identify and discuss the various definitions of terrorism, examining the rationale used to ob- tain each definition by the adopting agency.

• Discuss the components of the MMRS and how the various elements fit into the MMRS system. Further examine the mechanisms for requesting and integrating these resources into an emer- gency response strategy in your community.

Vital Vocabulary

Globalization A measure of the ease with which labor, ideas, capital, technology, and profits can move across borders with minimal government interference.

Tactical violence The predetermined use of maximum violence to achieve one’s criminal goals, regardless of victim cooperation, level of environmental threat to the perpetrator, or the need to evade law enforcement or capture.

Terrorism Individual act(s) of reckless destruction to property or person(s) or decidedly complicated events perpetrated by organizations with extreme social, envi- ronmental, religious, economic, or political agendas.

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National Incident Management System Hank T. Christen Paul M. Maniscalco

• Describe the evolution of the 1970s incident command system (ICS) to the modern national incident management system (NIMS).

• Diagram and define the key positions in the command staff.

• Compare and contrast incident command (IC) with unified command (UC).

• Define the key principles of ICS.

• Define the five key functions in ICS.

• Diagram the general staff and command staff in ICS.

• List and define the components in the NIMS structure that complement ICS.

Objectives

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20 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Introduction

The national incident management system (NIMS) is the template for preparedness, planning, and response to emergency incidents and is an all-hazard incident management system, meaning that it is a framework for responding to all types of incidents including ter- rorism and tactical violence events. NIMS is the model for all government levels beginning at the local level and expanding to state and federal levels as well as tribal governments and private-sector entities. The emphasis is on the local level because all incidents begin with a local response. The system is scalable to all types of responses. All disciplines including law enforcement, fire/rescue departments, emergency medical services (EMS), public works, emergency management, and public health are mandated to use the NIMS as a plan- ning and response model. This includes the Department of Defense when military agencies act to support inci- dents within the United States or its territories. NIMS is significant because response and support agencies at all levels and disciplines now have a common template for the first time in history.

The authorization for the establishment of a NIMS is found within Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), which was issued on February 28, 2003. This directive establishes that the Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop and administer a NIMS. Specifically, HSPD-5 states:

This system will provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local governments to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among Federal, State, and local capabilities, the NIMS will include a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multiagency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection,

tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources (Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, 15).

The focus of this is chapter is the incident command system (ICS) in NIMS because ICS is the overarching tac- tical and strategic framework for terrorism response. Other components of NIMS include preparedness, resource management, communications and information man- agement, supporting technologies, and ongoing manage- ment and maintenance. These components are critical support entities and are discussed as an overview.

Incident Command History

In the 1970s, a series of catastrophic wildland fires in California destroyed thousands of structures. Large num- bers of local and state fire agencies responded, but their efforts often lacked coordination. Effective incident re- sponse and management were plagued by incompatible radio frequencies, lack of priority resource allocation, and poor coordination/control among a myriad of fed- eral, state, and local agencies. California’s FIRESCOPE (Fire Fighting Resources of Southern California Organized Against Potential Emergency) program was developed to respond to IC issues. Key agencies and planners agreed on several objectives. They agreed to establish the following:

1. A system of command, where a single individual (or UC team) is responsible for the ultimate out- come of the incident.

2. A system of common terminology to allow all agencies to understand each other.

3. A system of coordination between diversified dis- ciplines.

4. A communications system with shared frequen- cies and common language.

5. A system for resource allocation including typing, prioritizing, and tracking.

6. A system that applies to all hazards and disci- plines.

A functionally based national ICS evolved based on the functions of command, operations, logistics, plans, and administration. The initial ICS was ori- ented to wildland firefighting (FIGURE 2-1) and eventu- ally modified for all hazard incident management. ICS further evolved into models for EMS, law enforcement, public works, emergency management, and hospital management.

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, HSPD-5 became the impetus for NIMS, based on the initial ICS template and developed by the Secretary of

NIMS is scalable to all types of responses and all dis- ciplines including law enforcement, fire/rescue de- partments, emergency medical services, public works, emergency management, and public health.

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CHAPTER 2: National Incident Management System 21

Homeland Security. NIMS has been best described as “ICS on steroids” because NIMS expands the original ICS model to include support components. These components ensure that NIMS is a flexible and scalable framework ap- plicable to all disciplines and levels of government.

The Incident Command System

The ICS is defined and diagrammed in the command and management component of NIMS. ICS specifies the operating characteristics, interactive management com- ponents, and structure of incident management and emer- gency response organizations engaged throughout the life cycle of an incident. ICS is used routinely by all response disciplines throughout the country to manage incidents as simple as a minor traffic accident or as complex as a

terrorist attack or hurricane. ICS is designed using proven management principles such as command and control, unity of command, chain of command, span of control, resource management, accountability, and planning. ICS is also a functionality-based system rather than a hierarchy or rank structure. This means that the ICS template is framed by a series of functions rather than a top-to-bottom rank system. The five major functions of ICS are IC/UC, opera- tions, logistics, planning/intelligence, and administration/ finance. In incidents involving national security, the intel- ligence function may be separated from planning and be assigned as a sixth function (FIGURE 2-2).

Command and Unified Command The principle of command means that a single person or UC team is responsible for the management of every incident regardless of size or scale. Command begins with the first unit to arrive on a scene by an individual formally assuming command and notifying the dispatch center that he or she has command. This position is called the incident commander (IC or Command). The IC becomes immediately responsible for all functions related to the incident. As an incident escalates, command is formally transferred to other individuals as appropriate. Every transfer of command is announced by radio to keep all units and entities aware of the command structure.

Many incidents involve the overlap of jurisdictional authority due to functional areas, legal authority, geog- raphy, or other factors. This realization is addressed by the development of the UC concept. UC should be used in incidents involving multiple jurisdictions, a single jurisdiction with multiagency involvement, or multiple jurisdictions with multiagency involvement. Terrorism

FIGURE 2-1 Brea, Calif. November 15, 2008. Devastating California wild- land fires of the 1970s, much like this fast-moving wildfire of 2008, trig- gered the development of FIRESCOPE, which eventually evolved into ICS.

FIGURE 2-2 During an incident where there is a need for tactical or classified intelligence, the information and intel- ligence function can be organized as follows: A. a branch within the Operations Section; B. a unit within the Planning Section; and C. a separate General Staff Section. The type of organization used depends on the nature of the incident and the operational scope.

Unified Command

Planning Section

Group Group Unit

Unit

Operations Section Information and

Intelligence Section

Information and Intelligence Branch

Information and Intelligence Unit

A B

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22 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

incidents meet one or more of these criteria. For ex- ample, a terrorist attack may involve local, state, and federal agencies, along with multiple disciplines such as EMS, fire/rescue, law enforcement, and public works. The strength of UC is that it allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and respon- sibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility, or account- ability. The effective use of UC depends on its routine use, training, formal planning, and an established relationship between personnel likely to assume UC roles.

For example, consider a bombing at a crowded shop- ping mall. The first due engine officer formally assumes the IC role. Command is later formally transferred to the fire battalion chief. It becomes apparent that this is a mass casualty incident with firefighting and rescue challenges. It is also a major crime scene. The IC transfers the com- mand role to a UC team that includes a law enforcement chief, a fire chief, and an EMS chief. Later, state and federal law enforcement officials become part of the UC team.

The Command Staff

The IC or UC is supported by the command staff (FIGURE 2-3). The positions on the command staff are safety of- ficer (SO), the public information officer (PIO), and the liaison officer. The IC or UC assumes the roles of any command staff position that is not delegated.

Public Information Officer The public information officer (PIO) is responsible for providing understandable and clear information to the public and media. The PIO routinely provides information to or collects information from other agencies with inci- dent-related information (such as casualty status informa- tion from hospitals or transportation information related to the incident and its impact on the local community). The PIO develops accurate and complete information on the incident’s cause, size, and current situation, the re- sources committed, and other matters of general interest for both internal and external use. The PIO also drafts key messages related to information about the impact of the incident on the community and educating the community about the event as it relates to mitigation and recovery activities. In addition to providing information, the PIO also serves as a valuable tool for monitoring the media’s coverage of an incident. In today’s age of immediate access to satellite imagery, it is not unusual for local and national news sources to have information that is not available to the incident management team. This function requires the on-scene PIO to closely monitor media information.

Whether the command structure is single or unified, only one official incident PIO should be designated. PIOs from other agencies or departments may be available to assist the incident PIO or disseminate information specific to their agencies. For example, a fire department PIO may defer to a police department PIO for comments

FIGURE 2-3 Complex ICS structure with command staff.

Unified Command

Agency Representative

Safety

Operations

GroupGroup Branch Unit

Unit

Plans Logistics

Branches

Finance Administration

Unit

Liaison PIO

Unit

Group

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CHAPTER 2: National Incident Management System 23

about police bomb squad operations. The IC/UC must approve the release of all incident-related information. Following major incidents, the on-scene PIO is part of the joint information system and must coordinate with other public information entities that may be located in various locations. Based on the type of incident, public information may be reviewed by the intelligence person- nel within the joint information center to ensure that sensitive information is not inadvertently released.

Safety Officer The safety officer (SO) monitors incident operations and advises the IC/UC on all matters relating to opera- tional safety, including the health and safety of emergency responder personnel. The SO also has the authority to terminate any operation that threatens the safety of re- sponders, victims, or bystanders. SO responsibilities include establishing ongoing assessments of hazardous environments. It is important to remember that responsi- bility for incident safety is clearly assigned to the IC/UC and supervisors at all levels of incident management. This is done in cooperation with environmental manage- ment agencies and hazardous materials specialists. The SO is also responsible for coordinating multi- agency safety efforts through the use of deputies who are qualified to assess specific activities in various dis- ciplines. Special units such as special weapons and tactics (SWAT) units, hazardous materials teams, or bomb squads will also have an SO. Additionally, high- risk operations may require deputies with detailed technical knowledge associated with the operation (e.g., heavy equipment operations, law enforcement tac- tical operations, etc.). The responsibilities of the SO also extend to victims and bystanders in the incident area.

In order to ensure that safety is a key component of incident operations, the SO, operations section chief, and planning section chief must coordinate closely regarding operational safety and emergency responder health and safety issues. The SO also must ensure the coordination of safety management functions and issues across jurisdic- tions, across functional agencies, and with private sec- tor and nongovernment organizations. It is important to note that the agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions con- tributing to joint safety management efforts do not lose their individual identities or responsibility for their own programs, policies, and personnel. Rather, each entity contributes to the overall effort to protect all responder personnel involved in incident operations.

Liaison Officer The liaison officer is the point of contact for repre- sentatives of other government agencies, nongovern- ment organizations, and/or private entities. In an IC/

UC structure, representatives from assisting or cooper- ating agencies and organizations (defined as those not represented in the UC group) coordinate through the liaison officer. The liaison provides a conduit to the IC/ UC from these supporting organizations. This structure eliminates confusion because support and service agency representatives are not at the command post. In essence, organizations not represented in the IC/UC access the IC/UC through the liaison.

A key functional component of the liaison concept is that agency and/or organizational representatives as- signed to an incident must have the authority to speak for their parent agencies and/or organizations on all matters, following appropriate consultations with their agency leadership. Assistants and personnel from other agencies or organizations (public or private) involved in incident management activities may be assigned to the liaison to facilitate coordination.

ICS Management Principles

The foundation of ICS is sound management principles from business, military, and emergency response are- nas. These principles include chain of command, unity of command, span of control, resource management, planning, and accountability.

Chain of command means that there is a clear line of authority within the structure of the ICS organization. Operations reports to command, the medical branch reports to operations, and the triage group reports to the medical branch. Each supervisory member of the ICS organization clearly understands who provides them with their tactical objectives and who they supervise. Chain of command does not imply that information flows downward only. It is explicit in ICS that informa- tion also flows upward and laterally.

Unity of command means that every individual, unit, function, or entity has only one supervisor at the scene of the incident. Every player and manager un- derstands his or her relationship to his or her superior, peers, and subordinates.

Span of control is a key concept within the structure of the ICS. Span of control means that each ICS supervi- sor or manager has a limit as to how many personnel he or she can effectively manage. Based on general business management concepts, this number has been set at five to seven direct subordinates to one manager. A span of control of three or four is appropriate for emergency opera- tions (FIGURE 2-4). The expansion of the ICS allows IC/UC to maintain these numbers throughout the organization. Although this number is generally accepted, each situation is unique, and a specific supervisor may be responsible for

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24 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

a greater number of individuals when similar resources are performing similar functions (e.g., police officers manag- ing the perimeter of a large crime scene). It is important to remember that in ICS, span of control is flexible and adjusts to the specific type of incident, the nature of the task, hazards, and safety factors. All of these factors sub- stantially influence span-of-control considerations.

Resource management is a comprehensive sys- tem for prioritizing and managing personnel, vehicles, equipment, supplies, and facilities that are available or potentially available for assignment to support of IC and response activities. A comprehensive plan to prioritize resource allocation is important because most major in- cidents quickly deplete response resources and create a resource-scarce environment. During on-scene opera- tions, the ICS logistics section chief is responsible for re- source management functions. The logistics section chief also utilizes processes for requesting, staging, deploying, demobilizing, and accounting for incident resources. These activities often require coordination with a multi- agency coordination system (MACS), which is a system of off-scene resource processes and entities. The purpose of the MACS is to organize and operate a full-scale logistics system to support the resource requirements of single or multiple incidents in a local area or region. Entities in the MACS include government agencies, nongovernment agencies, volunteer organizations, and private-sector re- sources. The MACS is usually located in a local or regional emergency operations center, because these centers have the staff and communications capability to support MACS efforts. Remember that a MACS is a system of coordinated entities, not a specific location.

An incident action plan (IAP) is an oral or written plan containing general objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident. IAPs provide a coherent means of communicating the overall incident objectives for operational and support activities. In the early stages of a dynamic incident, the IC quickly develops a verbal IAP. As the incident escalates, the ICS expands with the addition of a planning section chief. The IAP becomes a written plan

that is presented to incident managers via periodic briefing cycles. The IAP is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Accountability is the process of tracking and ac- counting for personnel and equipment resources on the incident scene. Incident safety depends on the use of an effective personnel and resource accountability system. In order to achieve and implement an accountability system, several key components and processes are incorporated into the ICS. First, resources are checked in when they arrive in the staging area and deployed only after they are assigned to a specific function. Second, resources are deployed in coordination with specific tactical objectives or tasks associated with the IAP. To ensure unity of com- mand, each resource is assigned to a specific supervisor. Personnel or units must know to whom they report. In addition, resources must be deployed within a span of control that allows supervisory personnel to maintain knowledge of resource location and operations.

ICS Operations

The operations function in ICS is managed by the operations section chief (operations chief) who reports directly to the IC/UC (FIGURE 2-5). The operations chief is responsible for accomplishing the incident objec- tives established by the IC/UC in the IAP. The opera- tions chief is an individual with technical knowledge and experience related to the tactical problems at the incident. In major terrorism incidents, the operations section may expand to a unified operations section en- compassing specialists from several agencies or disci- plines. Operations units are the most visible entities on an incident scene and include multiple disciplines such as EMS, fire/rescue, law enforcement, public health, and public works. Terrorism incidents require multiple op- erations disciplines. To ensure adherence to ICS manage- ment principles, the operations section is divided into branches for each operational discipline. A branch is managed by a branch director (example, law enforcement

FIGURE 2-4 Ineffective versus effective span of control.

Ineffective Effective

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CHAPTER 2: National Incident Management System 25

branch director) who uses an ICS template for an attack with casualties that requires law enforcement, fire/rescue, and EMS branches.

The branching tools in the ICS provide management tools that accommodate air and water operations. Complex terrorism incidents, transportation accidents, fires, and natural disasters may require an air operations branch and/ or a water operations branch. The most common type of air operations involves law enforcement aircraft or heli- copters operating in the same airspace with medical he- licopters. Air operations require special communications along with the establishment of medical helicopter land- ing zones. Water operations provide similar challenges. Coordination with marine units require marine radio fre- quencies and appropriate communications protocols.

Groups and Divisions Divisions are used to divide an incident geographically. The manager of a division is designated as a division supervisor. The geographical division of the incident scene is usually determined by the needs of the incident, natural geographic barriers (e.g., rivers, mountains, lakes, shorelines, valleys), or man-made obstacles (e.g., build- ings, roadways, walls). When geographic features are used to determine boundaries, the size of the division should correspond to appropriate span-of-control guidelines.

The most common method for identifying or label- ing divisions is by using letters (A, B, C, etc.). Other identifiers (“city park,” “west city,” etc.) may be used as long as the division identifier is known to all assigned responders. The important thing to remember about ICS divisions is they are established to divide the incident into geographic areas of operation.

Groups are used to describe functional areas of an operation. Like divisions, the individual assigned to be in charge of each group is designated as a group supervi- sor. The type of groups established is determined by the needs caused by the incident. Groups are usually labeled according to the job that they are assigned (e.g., decon- tamination group, traffic control group, etc.). Groups work within the incident wherever their assigned task is needed and are not limited by geographic boundaries.

Task Forces and Strike Teams Task forces are any combination of resources assembled by operations to accomplish a specific mission and are usually operations units. Task forces have a designated task force leader and operate with common communi- cations between units. Combining resources into task forces allows several key resource units to be managed under one individual’s supervision, thus aiding in span of control. When the mission is completed, the task force is assigned a new mission or demobilized. Examples of task forces are as follows:

• Law enforcement task force—bomb unit and three patrol units

• Fire/rescue task force—three engines, two lad- der trucks, and a rescue unit

• EMS task force—three ambulances and a mass casualty bus unit

• Public works task force—three dump trucks and two front loaders

Strike teams are a set number of resources of the same kind and type operating under a designated strike team leader with common communications between units. Strike teams represent known capabilities and are highly effective operations teams. Examples of strike teams are as follows:

• Law enforcement strike team—four patrol units • Fire/rescue strike team—five engines • EMS strike team—three ambulances • Public works strike team—four front loaders

Logistics

The logistics section is responsible for all support re- quirements needed to facilitate effective and efficient incident management, including ordering resources from a MACS. The logistics section provides facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment maintenance and fuel, food services, communications, and information technology support.

The logistics section supports the incident by or- dering resources through appropriate procurement au- thorities from outside locations. The logistics section also provides facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment maintenance and fueling, food service, communications, and medical services for incident personnel.

The logistics section is led by the logistics section chief. A deputy may also be assigned to logistics on ma- jor incidents. In terrorism attacks or natural disasters requiring a number of facilities and large numbers of equipment, the logistics section is divided into support and service branches to maintain a narrow span of con- trol (FIGURE 2-6).FIGURE 2-5 Dividing an incident geographically.

Operations Sections

Division A (Geographic Area A)

Division B (Geographic Area B)

Division C (Geographic Area C)

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26 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Unified Logistics The concept of unified logistics is similar to UC. Unified logistics is the utilization and coordination of two or more agencies or jurisdictions in the logistics section.

Unified logistics applies to high-impact, long-duration incidents where several diverse agencies have special- ized logistics requirements. In these cases, a single logis- tics section chief may not have the skills and proficiency to support multiple agencies with differing support needs. Consider the Oklahoma City bombing, the Pentagon attack, major hurricanes, and earthquakes. In each case, fire, law enforcement, and medical agencies have de- manding but diverse logistics requirements. Fire fighters need air cylinders, chemical suits, and respirators. EMS personnel need medications, oxygen, and cardiac moni- tors. Law enforcement agencies need barricades, body ar- mor, and evidence-collection kits. It is unlikely that a single logistics chief can support such a diverse shopping list.

Unified logistics is implemented by assigning two or more logistics specialists from different agencies or jurisdictions to a unified logistics section. Private sector logistics managers also may be assigned. For example, fire, law enforcement, and private provider EMS logistics officers may be assigned to manage a unified logistics section in a terrorist attack.

Unified logistics is also accomplished by assigning ap- propriate specialists to units within the logistics section. For example, an EMS specialist might be assigned to the sup- ply unit to manage orders for medications and specialized medical devices or equipment, or fire maintenance person- nel and public works maintenance personnel might be as- signed to the ground support unit. Because of the flexibility of the ICS, a unified logistics section can be implemented in a number of different ways. The desired end state is a logistics section that supports a wide range of supplies, tools, vehicles, equipment, and personnel needs.

Support Branch The support branch provides services that assist inci- dent operations by providing supplies, facilities, trans-

port, and equipment maintenance. The support branch consists of the supply unit, the facilities unit, and the ground support unit.

Supply Unit The supply unit orders, receives, stores, and processes all incident resources. Once established, the supply unit orders all resources, including tactical and support re- sources, personnel, and expendable and nonexpendable supplies required for incident support. Tactical resources include tools, helicopters, fire units, ambulances, and equipment such as chain saws or generators. Support resources include fuel, tents, water, and food. Personnel resources include fire fighters, paramedics, police of- ficers, special teams, and medical teams. Expendable supplies are materials that are consumed and cannot be reused and include oxygen, medications, bandages, and water. Nonexpendable supplies can be reused. Nonexpendable supplies include backboards, fire hoses, and body armor.

The supply unit provides the support required to receive, process, store, and distribute all supply orders. The supply unit also handles equipment operations, which includes storing, disbursing, and servicing all tools and portable, nonexpendable equipment.

Facilities Unit The facilities unit establishes, maintains, and demobi- lizes all facilities used in support of incident operations. The unit also provides facility maintenance and security services required to support incident operations. The facilities unit sets up area commands, the command post, incident base, and camps, as well as trailers and/ or other forms of shelter for use in and around the in- cident area. The incident base and camps often may be established in areas having existing structures, which may be used in their entirety or in part. The facili- ties unit also provides and sets up necessary personnel support facilities, including areas for food and water services, sleeping, sanitation, and showers. This unit also orders, through the supply unit, additional sup- port items such as portable toilets, shower facilities, and lighting units.

Ground Support Unit The ground support unit maintains and repairs pri- mary tactical equipment, vehicles, and mobile ground support equipment; records usage time for all ground equipment assigned to the incident; supplies fuel for all mobile equipment; provides transportation in support of incident operations (except aircraft); and develops and implements the incident traffic plan. The incident traffic plan specifies traffic routes and procedures for vehicles

FIGURE 2-6 Logistics section branch organization.

Logistics Section

Supply Unit

Ground Support Unit

Facilities Unit

Food Unit

Communications Unit

Medical Unit

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CHAPTER 2: National Incident Management System 27

entering and departing an incident site, command post, or support area.

In addition to its primary functions of maintain- ing and servicing vehicles and mobile equipment, the ground support unit also maintains a transportation pool for major incidents. This pool consists of vehicles that are suitable for transporting personnel. A vehicle pool may require coordination with mass transit authorities, school transportation services, or contracted transporta- tion companies. The ground support unit also provides up-to-date information on the location and status of transportation vehicles to the resources unit.

Service Branch The service branch provides communications, food, water, and medical services. The service branch con- sists of the communications unit, food unit, and a medical unit.

Communications Unit The communications unit develops the communica- tions plan (ICS form 205) to ensure effective use of the communications equipment and facilities assigned to the incident, installs and tests all communications equip- ment, supervises and operates the incident communica- tions center, distributes and recovers communications equipment assigned to incident personnel, and main- tains and repairs communications equipment on site. The communications unit must coordinate with dispatch centers, department operations centers, and the emer- gency operations center during major incidents.

The communications unit’s major responsibility is effective communications planning for the ICS, espe- cially in a multiagency incident. Planning is critical for determining required radio nets, establishing interagency frequency assignments, and ensuring the interoperabil- ity and the optimal use of all assigned communications capabilities. A radio net is a network of like functions or units assigned to a specific radio frequency for co- ordination purposes. For example, all units in the EMS transport sector are assigned to communicate on the Med 8 frequency.

The communications unit leader should attend all incident planning meetings to ensure that the commu- nications systems available for the incident can support the tactical operations planned for the next operational period. Incident communications are managed through the use of a common communications plan and an inci- dent-based communications center established solely for the use of tactical and support resources assigned to the incident. Advance planning is required to ensure that an appropriate communications system is available to sup-

port incident operations requirements. This element is critical for interoperability and is often lacking in many communities. This planning includes the development of frequency inventories, frequency-use agreements, and interagency radio caches.

Complex incidents require an incident communica- tions plan. The communications unit is responsible for planning the use of radio frequencies; establishing net- works for command, tactical, support, and air units; set- ting up on-site telephone and public address equipment; and providing any required off-incident communication links. Codes should not be used for radio communica- tion; a clear spoken message based on common terminol- ogy that avoids misunderstanding in complex and noisy situations reduces the chances for error. Radio networks for large incidents include command, tactical, support, ground-to-air, air-to-air, and marine networks.

Command Net

The command net links together command staff, sec- tion chiefs, branch directors, and division and group supervisors. The command net must be interoperable with Department of Defense and other federal agencies. Federal Communications Commission requirements prohibit local and state agencies from installing and us- ing federal radio frequencies.

Tactical Nets

Several tactical nets may be established to connect agencies, departments, geographical areas, or specific functional units. The determination of how nets are set up should be a joint planning, operations, and logistics function. The communications unit leader will develop the overall plan.

Support Net

A support net may be established to track changes in resource status and process logistical requests and other nontactical functions. This net is a key coordination ele- ment between the supply unit and the resource status unit (planning section).

Ground-to-Air Net

The ground-to-air net is utilized for communications and coordination between ground and aviation units. To coordinate ground-to-air traffic, either a specific tacti- cal frequency may be designated or regular tactical nets may be used.

Air-to-Air Nets

Air-to-air nets will normally be planned and assigned for use at the incident. Aircraft crews use approved Federal Aviation Administration frequencies. These nets become more complex when coordinating civilian and military aviation assets due to incompatible military and civilian frequencies.

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28 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Marine Nets

Many incidents occur in coastal areas where federal and local marine units have operational assignments. Marine nets are used for communications between marine patrol/ rescue boats and land-based agencies. Land-based com- mand posts need marine frequencies to ensure coordina- tion between marine and land units.

Planning

In an on-scene ICS structure, the planning section has the responsibility of incident planning and is managed by the planning section chief (plans). The planning section includes four functional entities called the re- source unit, situation unit, documentation unit, and the demobilization unit (FIGURE 2-7). Comprehensive terror- ism and disaster planning, beyond on-scene activities, is addressed in Chapter 5.

The planning section collects, evaluates, and dis- seminates incident situation information and intelli- gence to the IC/UC and incident management personnel, prepares status reports, displays situation information, maintains the status of resources assigned to the inci- dent, and develops and documents the IAP based on guidance from the IC/UC.

Unified planning is the utilization of two or more planners from different disciplines functioning in a coor- dinated planning environment. It is unlikely that a single individual has the skills to develop an effective plan when multiple disciplines are functioning at a complex event. An example is an EMS, law enforcement, and fire

planner managing a unified planning section in a terror- ist attack. Other major incidents may require planning expertise from public works, utilities, transportation, or public health agencies.

The Planning Section Chief The planning section chief (plans) oversees all incident- related data gathering and analysis regarding incident operations and assigned resources, develops alternatives for tactical operations, conducts planning meetings, and prepares the IAP for each operational period. This in- dividual will normally come from the jurisdiction with primary incident responsibility and may have one or more deputies from other participating jurisdictions. Chapter 5 includes a detailed discussion of the elements in an effective IAP.

It is critical for plans to stay in constant contact with the IC/UC and the operations section. ICs should consider the appointment of the planning section chief as a critical priority. Events involving multiple agencies and/or jurisdictions can quickly overwhelm a single planning section chief because of the com- plexities inherent in crafting strategic and tactical IAP objectives.

Plans developed by a unified IAP with the assistance of personnel from organizations represented in the UC as well as other personnel whose skills and/or knowl- edge are utilized to achieve the tactical objectives of the incident during the next operational period. This unified approach also extends to units within the planning sec- tion, especially the resource unit and the situation status unit. The intelligence unit is an optional component. It can be established within the planning section or as a separate intelligence section.

Resources Unit The resources unit ensures that all assigned personnel and other resources have checked in or been checked in at the incident. Physical resources consist of personnel, teams, facilities, supplies, and major items of equipment available for assignment to or employment during in- cidents. This unit has a system for keeping track of the incident location and status of all assigned resources and maintains a master list of all resources committed to incident operations.

Each resource must be categorized by capability and capacity across disciplines with continuous status tracking for the resources unit to effectively manage and deploy resources. Resource status is categorized as available resources, assigned resources, or out-of-service resources. Tracking the status condition of each resource FIGURE 2-7 ICS planning section.

Resources Unit

Situation Unit

Demobilization Unit

Documentation Unit

Technical Specialist (s)

Planning Section

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CHAPTER 2: National Incident Management System 29

is essential for maintaining an up-to-date and accurate picture of resource utilization.

Situation Unit The situation unit collects, processes, and organizes on- going situation information including weather reports, prepares situation summaries, and develops projections and forecasts of future incident events. The situation unit also prepares maps and gathers and disseminates information and intelligence for use in the IAP.

Documentation Unit The documentation unit maintains accurate and com- plete incident files, including a complete record of the major steps taken to resolve the incident, provides du- plication services to incident personnel, and stores in- cident files for legal, analytical, and historical purposes. Documentation is part of the planning section primar- ily because this unit writes the IAP and maintains files and records developed as part of the IAP and planning function.

Demobilization Unit The demobilization unit develops an incident demo- bilization plan that includes specific instructions for all personnel and resources that will require demobiliza- tion. This unit begins its work early in the incident by creating rosters of personnel and resources and obtains missing information as check-in proceeds.

Technical Specialists Because the ICS functions effectively for all hazards, technical specialists with a myriad of skills are often needed to assist the planning section. Technical spe- cialists can serve any function in the ICS organization; however, they are critical to the planning section, es- pecially during the development of the tactical objec- tives in the IAP. Technical specialists are frequently maintained on resource lists by response organizations and are activated when needed to address specific situ- ations. Examples of technical specialties needed during terrorism attacks are explosives experts, meteorologists, structural engineers, radiation physicists, legal counsel, toxicologists, industrial hygienists, safety engineers, and epidemiologists.

Administration/Finance

The administration/finance section is managed by the administration/finance section chief. This section is responsible for monitoring costs and expenditures,

procurement, compensation/claims, and employee time keeping. Finance and administration is important because cost recovery is a critical fiscal issue, especially for financially stressed local and state governments. Proper financial tracking and record keeping can result in millions of dollars being reimbursed to local and state agencies by the federal government. In essence, poor documentation often means low reimbursement. There are also important legal considerations related to the documentation of workmen’s compensation issues and employee compensation. On routine incidents, agencies and jurisdictions perform administration and finance functions at facilities separate from the incident scene. An administration/finance section may be established at an emergency operations center on long-term incidents. An administration/finance section is commonly estab- lished on an incident scene. FIGURE 2-8 shows a diagram of the administration/finance section. An in-depth dis- cussion of administrative and financial responsibilities is not within the scope of this text.

Other Components of NIMS

The focus of this chapter has been the ICS, which is part of the command and management component of NIMS. It important to note that NIMS consists of five additional components (FIGURE 2-9) that support IC and complement the entire spectrum of terrorism response, preparedness, and planning; NIMS is not just IC.

Preparedness Effective incident management begins with a host of preparedness activities conducted on a steady- state basis, well in advance of any potential incident. Preparedness involves an integrated combination of planning, training, exercises, personnel qualification and certification standards, equipment acquisition and certification standards, mutual aid, and publication management.

FIGURE 2-8 The administration/finance section.

Finance/Administration Section

Compensation/ Claims Unit

Cost Unit

Procurement Unit

Time Unit

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30 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Resource Management The NIMS defines standardized mechanisms and estab- lishes requirements for processes to describe, inventory, mobilize, dispatch, track, and recover resources over the life cycle of an incident. Recently, the Department of Homeland Security has released, through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the resource classification tables for 120 different resource types. This tool enables incident management personnel to request the specific, defined resources they require in a manner that allows agencies in different parts of the country to provide the exact resources requested.

Communications and Information Management The NIMS provides a standardized framework for com- munications, information management (collection, anal- ysis, and dissemination), and information sharing at all levels of incident management. Developing technologies such as incident management software and communica- tions like cross-band repeating that interconnect differ- ent radio systems are examples of technology currently being used by many ICS teams to improve incident management.

Supporting Technologies Technology and technological systems provide sup- port capabilities essential to implementing and refining NIMS. This includes voice and data systems, information management systems, and data display systems. Special technologies that facilitate terrorism response actions and incident management are included. An example of supporting technologies is chemical plume modeling software such as CAMEO.

Ongoing Management and Maintenance The management and maintenance component of NIMS establishes the capability to provide strategic direction and oversight of NIMS, supporting both routine review and the continuous refinement of the system and its components. Organizations must continually update

and refine their internal NIMS-related processes. As threats change or new technology evolves, agencies and disciplines must review current plans and processes to ensure they are still appropriate. Implementing NIMS is not a one-time event but a commitment to ongoing development, review, and refinement.

Training It is notable that HSPD-5 requires that all local, tribal, state, and federal response agencies that receive federal funding are trained and proficient in NIMS. It is im- perative that response agencies and disciplines become proficient in using NIMS in all aspects of terrorism pre- paredness, planning, and response. Policy officials and support agencies require basic NIMS familiarization, whereas emergency response professionals require ad- vanced training and experience verified by task books to attain and maintain NIMS certification in their area of expertise.

The NIMS integration center has developed the Five- Year NIMS Training Plan that is available as a PDF file at http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training. shtm. There is a multitude of NIMS courses available online. ICS 100 and 200 are basic courses. IS 700-level courses are also available online and include courses such as public information, resource management, communications and information management, pre- paredness, mutual aid, and resource typing. The online NIMS courses are available at https://training.fema.gov/ IS/NIMS.asp. ICS 300 and 400 are advanced courses and available in a classroom setting as well as online.

Chapter Summary

The NIMS is an all-hazard and comprehensive incident management template developed by the Department of Homeland Security as mandated by HSPD-5. The six key components of NIMS are command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications

FIGURE 2-9 The central components of NIMS.

NIMS

Command and

Management

Resource Management

Communications and

Information Management

Supporting Technologies

Ongoing Management

and Maintenance

Preparedness

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and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management and maintenance. The ICS is part of the NIMS command and management component and is a functionally based system for IC at terrorism and disaster incidents.

The ICS model was initially designed to effectively manage catastrophic wildfires in California, but it has evolved into an all-hazards response template for all emergency response and support disciplines. The key planners of ICS designed the system to meet agreed- upon objectives including a system of command, common terminology, coordination between diversi- fied agencies, shared communications with a common language, and a system of resource prioritizing and allocation.

The foundation of ICS is proven management prin- ciples such as chain of command, unity of command, span of control, resource management, incident man- agement planning, and accountability. The five key functions in ICS are IC/UC, operations, logistics, plan- ning, and administration/finance. An intelligence sec- tion is added to the planning section or established as

a separate function when appropriate. Each section in ICS is managed by a section chief. The operations sec- tion includes branches for operational disciplines such as law enforcement, EMS, fire/rescue, public works, and public health.

The logistics section is responsible for allocating and tracking resources needed to accomplish incident objectives. The logistics section includes supply, fa- cilities, ground support, communications, food, and medical units. The planning section is responsible for developing the IAP and includes resource, situa- tion, documentation, and demobilization units. The administration/finance section is responsible for fis- cal and administrative functions and includes claims/ compensation, cost, procurement, and time units.

It is imperative that response and support agencies develop a proactive and continuous NIMS training pro- gram. Key ICS positions must be staffed by managers who are experienced and proficient in IC procedures. Support agencies and managers should at least have NIMS and ICS familiarization through online training courses.

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Wrap Up Chapter Questions

1. What are the six components of NIMS? 2. How does ICS differ from NIMS? 3. List the key management principles in ICS. 4. Diagram ICS including the command staff and

the key functional sections. 5. Define divisions, groups, task forces, and strike

teams. 6. List and describe the units in the logistics sec-

tion. 7. Define the IAP. What factors determine if a verbal

or formal IAP is appropriate?

Chapter Project I

Develop an outline for a comprehensive 5-year NIMS training program for the key response agencies in your community or jurisdiction. Consider which nongovern- ment and private-sector organizations should receive familiarization training.

Chapter Project II

Analyze after-action reports from a significant incident in your jurisdiction or region. Determine what ICS prin- ciples and functions were effectively utilized and what principles or functions were missing or ineffectively implemented.

Vital Vocabulary

Accountability The process of tracking and accounting for personnel and equipment resources on the incident scene.

Air-to-air nets Communications networks between aviation units using aviation radio frequencies.

All hazards A system that addresses a wide spectrum of threats including man-made hazards, natural disasters, and terrorist attacks.

Branch The ICS organizational level having functional, geographical, or jurisdictional branches that are respon- sible for major parts of incident operations. Branches

are an effective tool for maintaining a narrow span of control.

Chain of command A clear line of authority within the structure of the ICS organization progressing from the command or unified command level to units or single resources.

Command net A communications network between the incident commander, command staff, and general staff.

Communications unit A unit in the logistics section responsible for the effective use and maintenance of communications equipment during an incident.

Demobilization unit A unit in the planning section responsible for the planning and execution of procedures for the release and return of incident resources.

Divisions An organizational level responsible for activi- ties within a specified geographical area.

Documentation unit A unit in the planning section re- sponsible for maintaining, administrating, and archiving all incident documents.

Facilities unit A unit in the logistics section respon- sible for the setup, maintenance, and demobilization of incident facilities.

Ground support unit A unit in the logistics section responsible for the maintenance, support, and fueling for vehicles and mobile equipment. This unit also provides transportation vehicles and support.

Ground-to-air net A communications network between ground functions and aviation units.

Groups An organizational tool in ICS used to divide the incident into functional areas of operation.

Incident action plan (IAP) A plan that contains objec- tives that reflect the incident strategy and specific control actions for the current or next operational period. An IAP is verbal in the early stages of an incident.

Incident command system (ICS) The combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and com- munications under a standard organizational structure organized so as to manage assigned resources and effec- tively accomplish stated objectives for an incident.

Incident commander (IC or Command) Individual responsible for incident activities and functions includ- ing safety and the establishment of incident objectives and incident management.

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Liaison officer The position within the incident com- mand system that establishes a point of contact with the outside agency representatives.

Logistics section The section within the incident com- mend system responsible for providing facilities, ser- vices, and materials for the incident.

Marine nets A communications system for marine units using maritime radio frequencies.

National incident management system (NIMS) A consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, tribal, and local governments to effectively and efficiently pre- pare for, respond to, and recover from domestic inci- dents, regardless of the cause.

Operations section chief (operations chief) The gen- eral staff position responsible for managing all operations activities. It is usually assigned with complex incidents that involve more than 20 single resources or when com- mand staff cannot be involved in all details of the tactical operation.

Planning section The section within the incident com- mand system responsible for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of tactical information related to the incident and for preparation and documentation of in- cident management plans.

Planning section chief (plans) The general staff posi- tion responsible for planning functions and for tracking and logging resources. It is assigned when command staff members need assistance in managing information.

Public information officer (PIO) The position within the incident command system responsible for providing information about the incident. The PIO functions as a point of contact for the media.

Resource management The coordination and man- agement of assets that provide incident managers with timely and appropriate mechanisms to accomplish op- erational objectives during an incident.

Resources unit A unit in the logistics section respon- sible for the check-in and tracking of personnel, equip- ment, and major items on the incident site.

Safety officer (SO) The position responsible for moni- toring incident operations and advising the IC/UC on

all matters relating to operational safety, including the health and safety of emergency responder personnel.

Service branch A branch in the logistics section re- sponsible for communications, food, and basic medi- cal services. This branch contains the communications, food, and medical units.

Situation unit A unit in the planning section that col- lects, organizes, and presents ongoing information and intelligence about the incident for use in the IAP.

Span of control The ratio of subordinates to a single manager or supervisor. The span of control should vary from three to seven subordinates per manager. A low span of control is recommended for dynamic/high-stakes incidents.

Strike teams A group of like units managed by a strike team leader.

Supply unit A unit in the planning section responsible for ordering, supplying, and processing all incident resources.

Support branch A branch in the logistics section re- sponsible for transport, maintenance, facilities, and sup- plies for the incident. This branch consists of the supply, facilities, and ground support units.

Support net A communications network for logistics support units or entities.

Tactical nets A communications network for tactical functions with the operations section.

Task forces A combination of unlike units directed by a task force leader.

Technical specialists A team of responders who serve as an information-gathering unit and referral point for both the incident commander and the assistant safety officer.

Unified planning A coordinated planning effort be- tween multiple jurisdictions, agencies, and/or disciplines within the planning section.

Unity of command Situation in which every individual, unit, function, or entity in the ICS has only one supervi- sor at the incident scene.

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National Response Framework Hank T. Christen Paul M. Maniscalco

• Classify the key elements in the National Response Framework (NRF).

• Summarize the philosophy of the NRF.

• Compare the NRF with the national incident management system (NIMS).

• Interpret the unified command principles within the NRF.

• Recognize and interpret the fifteen emergency support functions (ESFs) within the NRF.

• Recall and explain the eight key scenario sets that are linked with fifteen national planning scenarios.

Objectives

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36 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

Introduction

The former national response plan (NRP) is now super- seded by the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF is a document outlining a coherent strategic framework—not a series of functional plans—for se- nior emergency response chiefs, emergency management practitioners, and senior executives in the private sector. The foundation of the NRF is its scalability, flexibility, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities for national emergency response and planning efforts. It articulates best practices and specific authorities for managing incidents ranging from locally controlled events to the largest of disasters.

Scalability means that the framework can be con- tracted or expanded according to the scope (or size) of the incident. For example, incidents as small as a pipe bomb in a rural community or as widespread as those of the anthrax attacks that concurrently impacted several states and multiple jurisdictions (federal, state, county, and local) and numerous agencies can be supported appropriately within the scalability context of the NRF (CP FIGURE 3-1).

The NRF adaptability, by design, establishes a re- sponsive strategic framework to support response efforts for local responder requirements to any type of hazard or attack. This means that any responses, especially those that present large and complex issues such as a chemical leak, a terrorist attack, or a pandemic are all addressable within the adaptable NRF.

Flexible coordinating structures are incident man- agement templates that provide a common language and organization for agencies and disciplines to inte- grate effectively. The integrated flexibility provides for the framework to align with all communities and dis- ciplines. It is not a framework of rigid rules and struc- tures. A small volunteer fire department, a suburban EMS agency, or an urban police department can apply the NRF to its mission.

Response is defined as immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs. This definition is broadened in the NRF to include the execution of emergency plans and operations or actions that support short-term recovery. The emphasis of the NRF is multiagency engagement through a tiered response. This intentionally reflects the widely agreed-upon belief that all disasters are local— that the response begins at the local emergency response level and then expands through regional, state, and fed- eral tiers (or layers) of government. The overarching philosophy of the NRF is a unified effort, a quick surge capability, and a readiness to act.

A readiness to act posture reflects the NRF de- sign intention to enable a rapid and timely response capacity to an attack or disaster. This readiness phi- losophy commences and progressively advances from the individual citizen, household, and community level upward through county, state, tribal, and federal gov- ernments. This concept is described in the NRF as a forward-leaning posture because many incidents have the capability of rapidly expanding in size, severity, or complexity.

When the response mode is initiated, all activities are governed by the NIMS. The NIMS structure (review Chapter 2) ensures a unified command structure and a cohesive operational system to ensure safety for all entities engaged in the incident. The NRF and NIMS are also designed to enhance clear and concise communica- tions between multiple agencies, disciplines, and levels. Public information management and distribution during attacks and disasters, along with pre-event citizen and community education, are other communication facets of the NRF and NIMS partnership.

The NRF is divided into five major chapters as follows:

• Chapter I—Roles and Responsibility • Chapter II—Response Actions • Chapter III—Response Organization • Chapter IV—Planning: A Critical Element of

Effective Response • Chapter V—Additional Resources The NRF organization centers on a core document

with the following annexes: • Emergency support function annexes—

Federal resources and capabilities grouped into functional areas that are most frequently needed in a national response (e.g., transporta- tion, firefighting, mass care).

• Support annexes—Essential supporting aspects that are common to all incidents (e.g., financial management, volunteer and donations management, private-sector coordination).

• Incident annexes—Description of the response aspects for broad incident categories (e.g., biological, nuclear/radiological, cyber, mass evacuation).

The NRF is a complex document and operational concept that cannot be addressed in a single text chap- ter, especially for individuals who are just becoming oriented to the framework. Our discussion of the NRF here is a review of the key points and concepts in the framework. Practitioners and other interested par- ties are encouraged to continue their research and

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CHAPTER 3: National Response Framework 37

inspection of the NRF, especially the varying roles agen- cies and personnel will be called upon to institute. The complete NRF and related annexes are available as elec- tronic documents from the NRF resource center at http:// www.fema.gov/NRF.

History

Federal planning efforts began with the 1992 federal response plan (FRP). The nascent FRP was severely tested when Hurricane Andrew devastated the Miami/ Homestead, Florida, area. Many federal agencies were unfamiliar with the FRP, resulting in ineffective fed- eral coordination in the Hurricane Andrew response effort. The FRP’s foremost deficiency was the intense focus on federal roles instead of local, state, and federal coordination.

In 2004, the NRP replaced the FRP. The NRP ad- dressed all levels of government (not just federal) into an all-encompassing response plan. After Hurricane Katrina, the NRP was modified to include the lessons learned from the 2005 hurricane season. The NRP also addressed the presidential directives such as Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5—Management of Domestic Incidents and Home- land Security Presidential Directive 8—National Preparedness, which emerged from shortfalls identified during the 2001 World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks. However, many local and state entities voiced a concern that the NRP was still based on a national-level mindset that failed to incorporate local and regional response issues.

The evolution of the NRF closely parallels the pro- gression of the incident command system (ICS) evolving into NIMS. As a result, there is now a close relationship between the two systems. The principles of command, logistics, operations, planning, and administration/fi- nance in NIMS provide a unified command and opera- tional structure for agencies of all sizes and disciplines to function effectively within the overall NRF. In essence, the NRF and NIMS are closely aligned and complement each other.

The NRF attempts to address many of the concerns and shortcomings that prevailed in the FRP and NRP. The NRF is not a plan; it is a framework. This means the NRF document is a template for shared levels and responsibilities between governments, the private sector, and individual citizens. The foundation of this structure begins at the local level and progresses through regional, state, and federal levels as dictated by the needs of the incident.

NRF Strategy

The NRF is a key component in the homeland security strategy of the United States. This strategy incorporates threat analysis, lessons learned from attacks and disas- ters, and findings from exercises. The broad strategy of homeland security is focused on four goals:

1. Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks. 2. Protect the American people and our critical in-

frastructure and key resources. 3. Respond to and recover from incidents that do

occur. 4. Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure

our long-term success. The NRF, in alignment with NIMS, centers on the

third broad strategy goal of response and recovery from attacks or disaster incidents. Response must be fast, ef- fective, and coordinated with local efforts. The com- munity recovery process must ensure a planned and sustainable rebuilding of affected communities and infrastructures. Other strategies are supported by the NRF including the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the National Strategy for Aviation Security.

The Preparedness Cycle

The NRF addresses the three phases of emergency re- sponse: preparedness, response, and recovery. The preparedness cycle (FIGURE 3-1) includes planning,

FIGURE 3-1 The preparedness cycle.

Plan ning

Ev al

ua tin

Organizing

Tr ai

ni ng

Equipping

Exercising

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38 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

organizing, training, equipping, exercising, and evaluat- ing for improvement. This cycle readily integrates with traditional emergency response training and exercising objectives.

Planning Planning is the all-encompassing process of managing the entire cycle of emergency response beginning with intelligence and threat analysis, policy and procedure development, mutual aid, and strategies. These plans are written and formal. During response and recovery operations, comprehensive plans evolve into dynamic incident action plans that are developed as needs dictate to guide operational periods.

Organization, Training, and Equipment NIMS provides a common organization structure of all agencies and entities in the emergency response con- tinuum. NIMS is the template for a common manage- ment system with common terminology for use by all agencies and disciplines. For example, a federal law en- forcement agency can effectively coordinate with a local bomb squad, a wildland fire logistics section, and a state aviation unit at a single incident.

NIMS also provides an efficient resource manage- ment system. Resources are categorized by kind and type and deployed, tracked, assigned, supported, and demobilized based on NIMS logistics organization and principles. The ESFs within the NRF align with the NIMS resource management structure to ensure effective sup- port from federal agencies. Many states also use a hy- brid of the NRF support functions as a template in their statewide emergency management plans.

Exercising and Training Training for teams and organizations must be systematic and ongoing to ensure professionalism, qualifications, certification, and compliance with national standards. The primary purpose of exercises is to test plans and evaluate training. It is essential that exercises be realis- tically evaluated to identify strengths and weaknesses in planning and training. These findings should lead

to revisions in emergency planning and training pro- grams. If lessons learned from exercises are not applied, the time and expense of exercise programs become a wasted effort.

Exercises should be interdisciplinary and inter- jurisdictional to ensure that plans are tested in regional and interagency venues. The Department of Homeland Security has a national exercise program with a 5-year national exercise plan that encompasses participation with local and state agencies.

Evaluation and Improvement Response is based on key actions that deploy personnel and resources to save lives and property and protect the environment. The key response actions are:

1. Gain and maintain situational awareness. 2. Activate and deploy key resources. 3. Coordinate response actions. 4. Demobilize when appropriate.

Emergency response agencies must recognize that response actions occur within an interagency scope of operations. This is especially important when consider- ing situational awareness. Situational awareness is an all-inclusive emergency response focus and must in- clude emergency management, fire/rescue, law enforce- ment, emergency medical, public health, and public works considerations. Interagency situational awareness integrates with a common operational picture of the incident and shared information by all response agen- cies (FIGURE 3-2).

Resource activation and deployment are routinely done at the local level on a minute-by-minute basis every day. Resource management gets complicated in major in- cidents because resources are deployed for an extended time period over long distances from regional and/or

FIGURE 3-2 Situational awareness is an all-inclusive emergency response focus.

It is important that entities at all levels develop, main- tain, evaluate, and update comprehensive emergency response plans that address all hazards. These plans should include nongovernment organizations and rel- evant private-sector organizations.

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state facilities. Federal resources may be deployed from distances exceeding 1,000 miles for periods of weeks or months.

Response actions must be coordinated through a formal process. Assistance may come from communi- ties within a region, from the state, from another state, or the federal government. The process begins with a local disaster declaration to the state government. States can initiate a disaster declaration that triggers federal assistance. At the federal level, a presidential disaster declaration allows the federal government to support states under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. It is notable that federal agencies can provide immedi- ate assistance to local and state governments without a presidential disaster declaration when there is an im- mediate threat to life.

Demobilization is the safe and orderly return of re- sources to their original status and location. Resources must be tracked and documented to ensure effective financial reimbursement.

Recovery is a shift in operational tempo from imme- diate lifesaving and property conservation to assistance for individuals, households, critical infrastructures, and businesses (FIGURE 3-3). Short-term recovery is a period that immediately follows response activities. Long-term recovery may take several years and is not within the NRF template.

NRF Roles and Responsibilities

The NRF prescribes key roles and responsibilities for all partners at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels.

It is significant that the framework also delineates roles for nongovernmental organizations and private-sector entities.

Local Roles At the local level, elected or appointed officials are re- sponsible for the welfare and safety of the community. These officials include mayors, city/county managers, and chief executives. These officials are not involved in tactical decisions, but they are responsible for laws, policies, and budgets that are the foundation of pre- paredness efforts. These officials must work with their respective community and local businesses to ensure effective decisions are made.

The emergency manager is usually the key ap- pointed official responsible for implementing the planning and preparedness policies of senior officials. The emergency manager is responsible for developing and maintaining the local comprehensive emergency plan, maintaining a close relationship with response agencies, and conducting training and exercises that complement and support the community’s emergency plan. Developing effective mutual aid and assistance agreements and conducting public education and awareness programs are additional duties (FIGURE 3-4). During emergency operations, the emergency manager serves as the commander of the local emergency op- erations center. Local agency directors are responsible for maintaining their agency capabilities at a high level of readiness and training to ensure effective response and interagency coordination within the emergency management structure.

Individuals and households have a shared re- sponsibility for emergency preparedness that must

FIGURE 3-3 Arcadia, Fla., September 24, 2004. FEMA Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer Todd Davidson (standing), speaks to citizens of De Soto County at a town hall meeting to discuss recovery from Hurricane Charley.

FIGURE 3-4 Keeping the public aware of the local emergency plan is one of the key components to ensuring the welfare and safety of the community.

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complement emergency response efforts. Households should partner with public officials as follows:

1. Remove hazards within homes and surrounding property.

2. Maintain a home emergency kit and critical supplies.

3. Monitor communications related to public emer- gencies.

4. Serve in volunteer support entities. 5. Participate in citizen emergency response training.

State, Tribal, and Territorial Responsibilities State, tribal, and territorial entities are responsible for supporting local response and recovery activities. The key state official is the governor, who is responsible for the general welfare and safety of the local governments and citizens within a state. The governor commands the National Guard and assigns missions for disaster operations. Governors have a coordination role with other states and the federal government for allocating resources and are responsible for filing a federal disaster declaration to obtain financial assistance. The director of the state emergency management agency works directly with the governor to ensure coordination among state agencies and effective allocation of response resources to local governments needing assistance.

Federal Roles The president leads the federal response effort. The secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, appointed by the president, is responsible for federal response efforts and is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. The NRF provides spe- cific and clear definitions for federal roles and entities as described in the following sections.

Unified Coordination Group and Staff

The unified coordination group and staff provide coordination in accordance with the NIMS concept of unified command (FIGURE 3-5).

Incident Management Teams

Incident management teams are special response teams that are interagency and regionally based to pro- vide a rapid federal response. In addition, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides ini- tial response teams including a hurricane liaison team, urban search and rescue task forces, and mobile emer- gency response support.

Principal Federal Official

The principal federal official is representative of the secretary of DHS and is responsible for coordination of domestic incidents requiring a federal response.

Federal Coordinating Officer

The federal coordinating officer is a focal point of co- ordination in the unified coordination group for Stafford Act incidents, ensuring integration of federal emergency management activities.

Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official

The senior federal law enforcement official is ap- pointed by the attorney general to coordinate law en- forcement operations related to the incident.

Joint Task Force Commander

The joint task force commander is designated by the Department of Defense to command federal military ac- tivities to support an incident.

Joint Field Office

The joint field office (JFO) is a temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordina- tion of response and recovery activities of federal, state, tribal, and local governments. The JFO is structured and operated using NIMS and ICS as a management tem- plate. The JFO does not manage on-scene activities.

National Response Doctrine

The national response doctrine includes five key principles that support national response operations as follows:

1. Engaged partnerships. 2. Tiered response. 3. Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational ca-

pabilities. 4. Unity of effort through unified command. 5. Readiness to act.

FIGURE 3-5 A unified command involves many agencies directly involved in the decision-making process for a large incident.

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Engaged Partnerships The term engaged partnership implies that local, state, tribal, and federal governments plan and respond to- gether. This form of incident coordination includes on- going communication and shared situational awareness. Engaged partnerships begin during the preparedness phase and progress through initial recovery efforts.

Tiered Response In a tiered response, incidents are managed at the low- est possible level. This concept means that all incidents begin locally and expand through higher levels of gov- ernment as needed. Only a small number of incidents progress to the federal level.

Scalable, Flexible, and Adaptable Operational Capabilities Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities are based on three important points. First, the system is scaled up or down to meet the needs of the response effort. Second, the system is flexible; it is a fluid system that changes with each specific incident. Third, the sys- tem adapts to all hazards or types of incidents.

Unity of Effort through Unified Command Unified command is a structure in which diverse agen- cies and those that delineate from them share respon- sibilities. All major incidents and many moderate-level incidents require diverse agencies from overlapping jurisdictions. Coordination must be accomplished via a unified structure to ensure an effective effort. Unified command is especially important when military and ci- vilian agencies share operational responsibilities.

Readiness to Act Readiness to act is based upon the simple concept that effective day-to-day operational readiness supports the ability to always be ready. The doctrinal concept is not just for local, state, tribal, and federal partners, but most importantly about the community’s role in being a pre- pared community.

National Response Structure

The NRF is a template for federal structures that sup- port local response actions. The National Operations Center (NOC) is the primary national hub for situ- ational awareness and operations coordination across the federal government for incident management. It provides the secretary of the DHS and other principals with information necessary to make critical national- level incident management decisions.

The NOC is a multiagency operations center that operates on a continuous 24-hour basis. Information related to hazards and threats from throughout the United States and foreign countries is monitored and analyzed by the staff and appropriate agency and private-sector representatives. These centers are dis- cussed next.

National Response Coordination Center The National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) is FEMA’s primary operations manage- ment center, as well as the focal point for national resource coordination. As a 24/7 operations center, the Coordination Center monitors potential or develop- ing incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field components.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center The National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) monitors the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis. During an incident, the NICC provides a coordinating forum to share infor- mation across infrastructure and key resources sectors through appropriate information-sharing entities such as the information sharing and analysis centers and the sector coordinating councils.

Supporting federal operations centers maintain situ- ational awareness within their areas of responsibility and provide relevant and timely information to the NOC. Examples of these centers follow.

National Military Command Center

The National Military Command Center is the nation’s focal point for continuous monitoring and coordination of worldwide military operations.

National Counterterrorism Center

The National Counterterrorism Center serves as the primary federal organization for integrating and analyz- ing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterter- rorism and for conducting strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments of national power.

Strategic Information and Operations Center

The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) Strategic Information and Operations Center is the focal point and operational control center for all federal intelligence, law enforcement, and investigative law enforcement ac- tivities related to domestic terrorist incidents or credible threats, including leading attribution investigations.

Department of Homeland Security Operations Centers

Depending upon the type of incident (e.g., national special security events), the operations centers of

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42 Homeland Security: Principles and Practice of Terrorism Response

other DHS operating components may serve as the pri- mary operations management center in support of the secretary. These are the U.S. Coast Guard, Transporta- tion Security Administration, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection operations centers.

Emergency Support Functions

The NRF divides federal support responsibilities into fifteen emergency support functions (ESFs). Each ESF has a lead federal agency, support agencies, and a defined set of actions and responsibilities. Many state and local governments have adopted ESFs as part of their emergency operations plan (not an NRF requirement).

The federal ESFs as specified in the NRF are: ESF No. 1—Transportation: Department of

Transportation. ESF No. 2—Communications: Department of

Homeland Security (National Communications System).

ESF No. 3—Public Works and Engineering: Department of Defense (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).

ESF No. 4—Firefighting: Department of Agri- culture (U.S. Forest Service).

ESF No. 5—Emergency Management: Depart- ment of Homeland Security (FEMA).

ESF No. 6—Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services: Department of Homeland Security (FEMA).

ESF No. 7—Logistics Management and Resource Support: General Services Administration and DHS (FEMA).

ESF No. 8—Public Health and Medical Services: Department of Health and Human Services.

ESF No. 9—Search and Rescue: DHS (FEMA). ESF No. 10—Oil and Hazardous Materials

Response: Environmental Protection Agency. ESF No. 11—Agriculture and Natural Resources:

Department of Agriculture. ESF No. 12—Energy: Department of Energy. ESF No. 13—Public Safety and Security: Depart-

ment of Justice. ESF No. 14—Long-Term Community Recovery:

DHS (FEMA). ESF No. 15—External Affairs: Department of

Homeland Security.

Emergency Management Local, county, and state emergency management func- tions are guided by ESF No. 5 (Emergency Management). This function coordinates incident management and re- sponse operations, resource management, incident ac- tion planning, and financial management. Emergency management manages emergency operations centers at local, county, and state levels in coordination with federal entities.

Firefighting Firefighting and rescue functions are guided by ESF No. 4. These functions include rural, urban, and wildland firefighting and search/rescue operations assisted and supported by federal entities. Operations are managed by incident or area commanders that are supported by local, county, and state operations centers.

Law Enforcement Local, regional, and state law enforcement functions are guided by ESF No. 13 (Public Safety and Security). The major law enforcement functions in ESF No. 13 include facility and resource security, resource planning and technical resource assistance, public safety and se- curity support, and support for incident access, traffic, and crowd control.

At the local level, ESF No. 13 is usually under the command of the county sheriff or municipal police chief. At the state level, ESF No. 13 is usually commanded by the state attorney general. The command and manage- ment responsibilities for ESF No. 13 are dictated by the local and state statutes, not the federal NRF.

Public Health and Medical Services Health and medical services are guided by ESF No. 8 (Public Health and Medical Services). The primary agency assigned responsibility for ESF No. 8 is the Department of Health and Human Services. Key func- tions include an incredible collection of tasks includ- ing providing potable water, sanitation, food safety, veterinary services, vector control, emergency medical treatment and transport, and medical support for op- erations personnel, as well as managing public health, mental health, and mass fatalities. EMS agencies are the key emergency responders at the local and regional levels.

Many in the medical community and EMS response operations world have advocated for an independent ESF that is solely for addressing EMS and critical care responsibilities due to the unique and com- plex response requirements that these individuals

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face and the time-sensitive functions they perform. To date, the federal government has not acted upon this need.

Public Works Public works and engineering functions are guided by ESF No. 3 (Public Works and Engineering). These func- tions include debris clearing, infrastructure restoration, emergency repairs, and engineering services. Local agen- cies, private contractors, military units, and state road departments are the key public works organizations.

Scenario Sets and Planning Scenarios

The NRF includes sets of key incident scenarios that are linked with national planning scenarios (TABLE 3-1).

Chapter Summary

The NRF replaces the national response plan and is a response template for the coordinated effort of federal,

state, tribal, and local governments, along with the private sector. The NRF complements the principles in NIMS, such as unified command and ICS. The emer- gency response phases of preparedness, response, and recovery are addressed in the NRF document. The key doctrine in the NRF is utilizing engaged partnerships, tiered response, scalable/flexible operational capabili- ties, unity of effort through unified command, and a readiness to act.

This framework defines fifteen emergency support functions and specifies a lead federal agency for each support function. The NRF includes key scenario sets and fifteen national planning scenarios.

The national response doctrine has key elements that include engaged partnerships, tiered response, scal- able, flexible, and adaptable operations, unity of effort through unified command, and a readiness to act. The roles and responsibilities outlined in the framework be- gin at the individual and household level and progress through local, tribal, and state levels to the federal level. Roles for nongovernment agencies and the private sector are also defined in the NRF.

TABLE 3-1 National Planning and Key Scenario Sets

Key scenario sets National planning scenarios

1. Explosives attack Scenario 12: Explosives attack—improvised devices

2. Nuclear attack Scenario 1: Nuclear detonation—improvised devices

3. Radiological attack Scenario 11: Radiological attack—dispersal devices

4. Biological attack Scenario 2: Biological attack—aerosol anthrax Scenario 4: Biological attack—plague Scenario 13: Biological attack—food contamination Scenario 14: Biological attack—foreign animal disease

5. Chemical attack Scenario 5: Chemical attack—blister agent Scenario 6: Chemical attack—toxic industrial chemicals Scenario 7: Chemical attack—nerve agent Scenario 8: Chemical attack—chlorine tank explosion

6. Natural disaster Scenario 9: Natural disaster—major earthquake Scenario 10: Natural disaster—major hurricane

7. Cyber attack Scenario 15: Cyber attack

8. Pandemic influenza Scenario 3: Biological disease outbreak—influenza

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Wrap Up Chapter Questions

1. List the four goals in the NRF strategy. 2. Describe the relationship of the NRF and

NIMS. 3. List and discuss at least three elements in the

preparedness cycle. 4. List three response agencies in your community

or jurisdiction and describe their roles in the NRF.

5. Select a major local disaster or attack and list five or more emergency support functions and describe their functions in the event.

Chapter Project

Develop an outline of a local preparedness plan based on the NRF preparedness cycle.

Vital Vocabulary

Emergency support function annexes Areas in the NRF that explain and outline emergency support functions.

Emergency support functions (ESFs) A defined set of actions and responsibilities for fifteen federal disaster support functions including lead federal agencies and secondary support agencies for each function.

Federal coordinating officer The focal point of coor- dination in the unified coordination group for Stafford Act incidents, ensuring integration of federal emergency management activities.

Forward-leaning posture A preparedness and response philosophy that advances from citizens/households up- ward through governments to the federal level because incidents can rapidly expand and escalate.

Incident annexes The description of the response aspects for broad incident categories (e.g., biological, nuclear/ radiological, cyber, mass evacuation).

Incident management teams The incident command organizations composed of the command and general staff members with appropriate functional units of an incident command system organized as regionally based interagency special response teams.

Joint field office ( JFO) A temporary federal facility that provides a central location for the coordination of response and recovery activities of federal, state, tribal, and local governments. The JFO is structured and oper- ated using NIMS and ICS as a management template. The JFO does not manage on-scene activities.

Joint task force commander Person designated by the Department of Defense to command federal military ac- tivities to support an incident.

National Counterterrorism Center The primary fed- eral organization for integrating and analyzing all in- telligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism and for conducting strategic operational planning by integrating all instruments of national power.

National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) Center that monitors the nation’s critical infrastruc- ture and key resources on an ongoing basis and provides a coordinating forum to share information across infrastructure and key resources sectors through appropriate information-sharing entities such as the information sharing and analysis centers and the sector coordinating councils.

National Military Command Center The nation’s fo- cal point for continuous monitoring and coordination of worldwide military operations.

National Operations Center (NOC) The primary national hub for situational awareness and operations coordination across the federal government for incident management.

National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) A 24/7 operations center that monitors potential or devel- oping incidents and supports the efforts of regional and field components.

National response doctrine The five key principles that support national response operations that are en- gaged partnerships, tiered response, scalable/flexible/ adaptable capabilities, unity of effort through unified command, and readiness to act.

National Response Framework A document outlining a coherent strategic framework for senior emergency response chiefs, emergency management practitioners, and senior executives in the private sector.

Preparedness cycle The cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, and evaluating for im-

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provement that integrates with traditional emergency response training and exercising objectives.

Principal federal official The representative of the secretary of Homeland Security and responsible for coordination of domestic incidents requiring a federal response.

Readiness to act posture The NRF design intention enabling a rapid and timely response capacity to an at- tack or disaster.

Recovery The period of short and/or long-term assis- tance for individuals, households, critical infrastructures, and businesses for restoration and rehabilitation from the effects of a disaster.

Response The immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs, including the execution of emergency plans

and operations or actions that support short-term recovery.

Senior federal law enforcement official The official appointed by the attorney general to coordinate law en- forcement operations related to the incident.

Strategic information and operations center FBI fo- cal point and operational control center for all federal intelligence, law enforcement, and investigative law enforcement activities related to domestic terrorist in- cidents or credible threats, including leading attribution investigations.

Support annexes Essential supporting aspects that are common to all incidents.

Unified coordination group and staff Group that pro- vides coordination in accordance with the NIMS concept of unified command.

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Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3

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