250 words and two scholarly references

camkai3

https___dftj9wb4gc6c5.cloudfront.net_Bethel_Courses_CCJ_4600_II_Unit_4_read.pdf

Home >Law homework help >Criminal homework help >250 words and two scholarly references

CHAPTER 9

The Importance of Organizational Learning

223

Opening Case: “Passing the Trash” by the Michigan Board of Education

One would expect that a teacher identified as dangerous to his or her students would no longer be allowed to teach. Of particular concern are teachers who have taken indecent liberties with students, many under the age of 18 and some of middle school age. Many cases are not consensual but are examples of sexual assault. Victims are often told not to tell the authorities because nobody would believe them. Unfortunately, in the late 1990s, a number of teachers were caught in sexual relationships with students, only to be quietly terminated from one school district and rehired at another. Some of these “mobile molesters” received glowing recommendations during their departures, a practice labeled “passing the trash” in the education field (Hendrie, 1998; Zemel & Twedt, 1999).

Landscape Survey Strategic Planning Crisis Management Organizational

Learning

The Internal Landscape

The External Landscape

Chapter 10: The Underlying Role of Ethics in Crisis Management

Chapter 9: The Importance of Organiza- tional Learning

Chapter 8: Crisis Communi- cations

Chapter 7: Crisis Management: Taking Action When Disaster Hits

Chapter 4: A Strategic Approach to Crisis Management

Chapter 6: Organiza- tional Strategy and Crises

Chapter 2: The Crisis Management Landscape

Chapter 3: Sources of Organiza- tional Crises

Chapter 5: Forming the Crisis Management Team and Writing the Plan

Crisis

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

224 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

Information asymmetry occurs when one party has information that another party does not. It occurs when the first school district has prior knowledge of a teacher’s improper behavior but does not share it with the subsequent district that hires the teacher. Under these conditions, it is virtually impossible for the next hiring school district to make an optimal hiring decision. Hiring school districts have learned, as in any industry, that checking the background of an applicant is important, particularly when the applicant is going to be working among young students. Consider the story of George Crear III, whose case was featured on an October 1999 edition of the television show, 20/20 . In 1987, Crear worked in Flint, Michigan, when two students claimed he had molested them. Because the incidents had occurred a number of years earlier, the statute of limitations had expired and Crear could not be prosecuted. The Michigan Board of Education allowed Crear to resign quietly, and the board purged his personnel file (Zemel & Twedt, 1999). To the next unsuspecting school district, no information would be shared by the Michigan Board of Education on Crear’s past behavior because his file no longer existed.

Unfortunately, Crear was later hired as the band director at Miami Palmetto High School, a public school in Dade County, Florida. During his tenure, he molested three female students, one of whom later committed suicide. After hearing about the case in Miami, another student back in Michigan alleged that Crear had sexually assaulted her while she was 13 and in middle school in 1983 and 1984 (Hendrie, 1998). Ironically, Crear was acquitted of charges he faced in Miami but was sentenced to life in prison for the assault on the 13-year-old victim in Michigan.

The “cover-up” by the Michigan Board of Education was not only an embar- rassment to that school district but also created an unnecessary crisis for the Dade County School Board, which oversees Miami Palmetto High School. The Dade County School Board would probably not have hired Crear if they had details about the Michigan case. Nonetheless, a jury awarded $720,000 to one of Crear’s victims on the grounds that the Dade County School District had created a dangerous climate in which the teacher was able to stalk young girls (Hendrie, 1998). In this case, “passing the trash” had been financially costly to the unsus- pecting school district, but even worse, had been a contributing factor in the death of a student.

Opening Case Discussion Questions

1. Victims of sexual assault are often told by their perpetrators that nobody will believe them if they tell the authorities. Unfortunately, this is often true. Why?

2. What could the Michigan Board of Education have done to alert future employers of the threat that Crear posed to students?

3. What could executives in the Dade County Board of Education do to ensure that teachers like Crear do not get in their school system?

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 225

Opening Case References

Hendrie, C. (1998). “Passing the trash” by school district frees sexual predators to hunt again. Education Week, 18 (5), 16.

Zemel, J., & Twedt, S. (1999, October 31). Dirty secrets: Why sexually abusive teachers aren’t stopped. Pittsburgh Post Gazette.com. Retrieved June 24, 2012, from http://old.post-gazette .com/regionstate/19991031newabuse1.asp.

Introduction

Although it is common to think of a crisis as a negative event, it can also be an opportunity for learning and change in the organization (Brockner & James, 2008; Wang, 2008). Put differently, a crisis should have the capacity to shock an organiza- tion out of its complacency (Veil & Sellnow, 2008). New perspectives can be devel- oped that hedge the organization against future crisis attacks. The Chinese concept of a crisis views it as both a dangerous situation and an opportunity (Borodzicz & van Haperen, 2002). Those who do not learn from a crisis bring to mind the adage that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it and thus are likely to be vis- ited by similar crises in the future (Elliott, Smith, & McGuinness, 2000).

Unfortunately, some organizations do not take even initial steps to prepare adequately for a crisis. Perhaps human nature prevents many of us from address- ing a crisis until it has arrived (Nathan, 2000). When an event does occur, learning from a crisis can be haphazard at best. The research that addresses crisis learning is limited but growing (Deverell, 2009; Lalonde, 2007). In this chapter, we examine this growing body of knowledge on learning from a crisis.

What Is Organizational Learning?

Organizational learning is the process of detecting and correcting errors (Argyris & Schön, 1978); it seeks to improve the operation of the organization by reflecting on past experiences (Sullivan & Beach, 2012). In the context of crisis management, learning should occur when the organization experiences a crisis. It should not be assumed that learning always emanates from a crisis, because some organizations do not appear to learn effectively. A distinction between single-loop and double- loop learning is germane. Barriers to organizational learning are presented at the end of this chapter.

Single-Loop Learning

Single-loop learning refers to the detection and correction of an error without changing basic underlying organizational norms (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Suppose you are driving your car in a snow storm and you suddenly loose traction. You sense your car is now veering left into oncoming traffic. To avoid hitting an oncoming

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

226 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

vehicle, you steer the car away from the center lane, but in the process you sense that you are now turning too far to the right and running the risk of going off the road. You turn your wheels again, this time to the left so that you are back on the road. You are careful not to turn your wheels too far to the left lest you head into oncoming traffic again. The process of steering to the right and then to the left is an example of single-loop learning. The corrections were made instinctively by responding to the current driving conditions in the best way possible.

Learning From a Structure Fire

Firefighting is an example of a crisis activity that involves a great deal of single- loop learning. (The first author has served as a volunteer firefighter.) For instance, in fighting a structure fire, one must determine how much water to put on the fire. The firefighter will increase or decrease the volume of water and adjust the spray pattern according to the location and size of the blaze. In addition, a minimal amount of water will be used to extinguish the fire so as not to cause excessive damage for the property owner. If possible, firefighters will enter the structure and attempt to “push” the fire out away from the building, meaning they will spray the fire with water in the direction of a window or door. This type of attack extinguishes the fire more quickly and minimizes property damage but also heightens the risk of injury to the firefighter entering a burning building. If a structure is hopelessly consumed by the fire and entry into the building is not feasible, then the fire department will launch a defensive attack, also known as “surround and drown.” In this procedure, the firefighters are positioned outside the structure and aim their hoses onto the fire and the structure. There is little attempt to save the property; only to extinguish the fire.

In this example, the principles of firefighting are the same regardless of the type of structure fire encountered. The learning that occurs is based on adjustments that are made along the way. For instance, if the firefighter thinks more water is needed, he or she will increase the volume by adjusting the nozzle of the hose. Alternately, another hose (called a line) may be utilized to supplement the volume of water on the fire. The principles of firefighting do not change in single-loop learning during a fire, only the decisions regarding items such as water volume, pressure, or the type of attack.

Single-loop learning can be illustrated using a simple diagram. Figure 9.1 illus- trates this process. In this example, an interior attack is initiated on a fire, which quickly escalates out of control despite the best efforts of the firefighters. They learn from the situation that they must exit the building and use a series of larger lines so that an increased volume of water can be distributed on the fire, thereby extinguish- ing the blaze. Note that the basic underlying assumptions of fighting the fire have not been changed; hence, it is an example of single-loop learning. In the next section, we employ another example of firefighting to illustrate double-loop learning.

Double-Loop Learning

Double-loop learning involves the detection and correction of an error, but there is also a change in basic underlying organizational norms (Argyris & Schön, 1978). Such learning usually occurs after a process of thoughtful reflection (Kolb,

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 227

1984). This type of learning changes the organizational culture and the cognitive arrangement of the company. “Based on an inquiry or some form of crisis, the organization’s view of the world will change and, so, stimulate a shift in beliefs and precautionary norms” (Stead & Smallman, 1999, p. 5). Such a change in beliefs can cause organizational leaders to rethink the “It couldn’t happen to us” mentality whereby managers feel immune to a crisis (Elliot et al., 2000, p. 17). As Stead and Smallman point out, this evaluation–rethinking process has come to be known by different terms, including “double-loop learning” (Argyris, 1982), “un-learning” (Smith, 1993), and “cultural readjustment” (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). When these deeper learning processes are applied to crisis learning, the perception that a crisis cannot occur and that the organization is invulnerable usually diminishes.

Learning From the Hagersville Tire Fire

Double-loop learning can also take place as a crisis unfolds and escalates. The 1990 Hagersville tire fire in Ontario, Canada, illustrates how extensive double-loop learning took place not only in extinguishing the fire, but also in how used tires should be managed. Tire fires are difficult to extinguish for several reasons. First, the shape of the tire allows ample air flow that can feed the fire. Second, tires are usually stored in large mounds that may be difficult to reach with conventional fire

Figure 9.1 Single-Loop Learning in Fighting a Structure Fire

Outcomes in Chronological Order

1. Fire is not suppressed.

2. Fire is not suppressed and actually escalates.

3. Fire is suppressed partially, but not sufficiently.

4. Fire is extinguished.

Underlying Assumptions Used in Fighting a Structure Fire

• Increase or decrease volume of water.

• Adjust spray pattern of water: straight stream or fog pattern.

• Use as little water as possible to minimize property damage.

• Seek an interior attack on the fire as a first strategy.

• Use exterior (defensive) attack only if an interior attack is not possible.

Actual Strategies Used in Fighting a Particular Fire in Chronological Order

1. Firefighters use an interior attack with one hose (line).

2. Firefighters add a second line on the fire.

3. Firefighters exit the structure and utilize a larger line from outside the building to extinguish the fire.

4. Firefighters add a second line on the fire.

[In this example, single-loop learning takes place as the firefighters learn and adapt as they battle the blaze. However, no underlying assumptions are changed in the strategies used to fight the fire.]

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

228 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

equipment. Finally, burning tires produce oil, which can ignite as well, adding more heat and flames to the existing fire (Mawhinney, 1990).

Traditional assumptions on firefighting had to be adjusted for the Hagersville fire. Simply adding water to the fire was not a workable option because of the com- plex nature of the blaze. First, the tires were stacked in large mounds, which made access difficult for firefighters. Initially, the strategy was to attack the fire from the perimeter and gradually advance toward the center of the burning tire pile. This strategy continued for seven days, but because of the intense heat, firefighters were not able to advance to the core of the fire with their hose streams or equipment. It was later determined that the tires would need to be separated and extinguished in smaller batches (Mawhinney; 1990; Simon & Pauchant, 2000). Although this strategy worked, water runoff from the tires was taking oil with it and causing large puddles to form, threatening to contaminate the underground water supply. To address this situation, trenches were dug and sandbag barriers were used to direct the runoff water into ponds. The oil was skimmed off the runoff water and sent to an oil refinery. The runoff water was pumped into tanker trucks to be treated at a local water treatment plant while the oil was sent to the refinery (Mawhinney, 1990).

In addition to the fire, a deeper problem had to be addressed. Should the govern- ment regulate the management of used tires? At the time of the fire, the Ministry of Environment in Canada had not taken action except to impose an incineration ban. The local community where the fire occurred was also concerned about the envi- ronmental aspects of the fire. Smoke from the fire produces toxic fumes; the result- ing water and foam from extinguishing the fire is also dangerous because it could seep into the groundwater supply (Simon & Pauchant, 2000). Attention needed to be focused on preventing another tire fire. Here again, double-loop learning began to take place as traditional assumptions on used tire management were being chal- lenged. Figure 9.2 summarizes the discussion on the Hagersville fire and the role of double-loop learning.

Learning From Failure

Learning from failures is another way organizations have incorporated double- loop learning. In fact, some organizations thrive in environments that should be at high risk for failure and a potential loss of life (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Such organizations have been labeled high-reliability organizations (HROs) and include aircraft carrier flight decks, medical facilities, and firefighting incident command systems (Roberts & Bea, 2001). An extensive literature bases exists on HROs (Bourrier, 2011), and lessons from these organizations have permeated into indus- tries that are not considered as high a risk for catastrophic failure. This move is in the spirit of organizational learning, which seeks to improve critical activities and enhance performance based on an analysis of past events (Sullivan & Beach, 2012).

One of the hallmarks of HROs is their obsession with analyzing past failures so as to prevent future ones. For example, the 1967 accident on the USS Forrestal that killed 134 crew members has been studied extensively by the U.S. Navy so that such an accident may never occur again (Brunson, 2008). The event occurred when a rocket from a fighter jet accidently discharged into a group of other aircraft on the

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 229

flight deck. The resulting fire was a combination of burning jet fuel and detonating bombs from the remaining aircraft on deck. Much was learned from the mistakes made in the firefighting tactics on board that day. First, because not all sailors were trained for this type of accident, mistakes were made fighting the fire and proper equipment was not utilized effectively. Today, all sailors are also trained as firefight- ers. Second, foam and water were not used effectively. Foam was used to smother the fire, a typical procedure for a fuel fire, but was subsequently washed off by other firefighters using water. This action caused the fuel and the fire to spread into the bottom compartments of the ship. Moreover, crew members using the foam had to stop and read the directions on how to apply it correctly (Brunson, 2008). As a result of the USS Forrestal accident, the U.S. Navy has upgraded its firefighting capabilities and has designated the Farrier Fire Fighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. The school is named after Chief Gerald W. Farrier, who died fighting the fire on the USS Forrestal that fateful day.

Figure 9.2 Double-Loop Learning in Fighting the Hagersville Tire Fire

Outcomes in Chronological Order

1. After seven days, fire is not suppressed.

2. Fire begins to be extinguished, although the process takes several more days.

3. Water runoff from extinguishing the fire contains oil, a side effect not usually found in a structure fire but a problem in a tire fire.

Underlying Assumptions Used in Fighting a Tire Fire and Managing Used Tires

• Perimeter firefighting techniques are the norm, but have to be changed to a divide- and-conquer approach.

• Storage of tires in large mounds must be replaced by smaller piles.

• Runoff water from a fire must now be managed if it contains toxins.

• Attention must be focused on how to manage used tires in the future.

Actual Strategies Used in Fighting the Hagersville Tire Fire

1. Firefighters attempt a perimeter attack with the goal of advancing to the core of the fire.

2. Firefighters break up piles of tires into smaller mounds for easier access to water lines.

3. Water and foam are found to be effective in extinguishing the fire.

[In this example, single-and double-loop learning take place as the firefighters learn and adapt to battling the blaze. Underlying assumptions are challenged and changed in the strategies used to fight the fire and to manage the used tires.]

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

230 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

As this example illustrates, organizations need to adapt a posture whereby they learn from failure and pass these lessons on to future staff and managers. Failures are a byproduct of organizational life and part of operating in a complex and chang- ing world (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). Confronting failure gives managers the opportunity to reevaluate their assumptions on how a problem should be solved.

Building a Learning Organization

We cannot discuss the topic of organizational learning without acknowledging the work of Peter Senge and how it relates to learning in a crisis management context. Senge (2006) describes the components of the learning organization as systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learn- ing. Each of these is described next.

Systems Thinking

Everything that occurs in an organization is influenced by something else. Likewise, the events the organization initiates influence other items or systems. This interconnectedness forces managers to think conceptually: How does a decision made at one point in time affect other decisions that are made later?

As we have seen, a crisis is not merely a random event. Instead, it is caused by many other movements of systems that culminate in a trigger event that initiates the crisis. Recognizing that an organization is part of a larger flow of events helps the manager understand how crises emerge. Crisis events do not just occur; they evolve and are influenced by various systems. In the Hagersville tire example, we saw how a number of other systems were influenced by the fire. Smoke from the burning tires affected air quality in the region. Water used to fight the fire contained oil runoff, which could contaminate drinking water if it seeped into the under- ground water supply. The fire was a system, affecting other systems as well. As the strategies were planned for fighting the fire, those leading the crisis response had to consider what other systems were being affected by their actions.

Personal Mastery

Senge (2006) views personal mastery as a competency that can be developed. It is also an organizational skill set. At its heart is the ability to see reality in an objective manner. Without this ability, learning is not possible. Developing this ability takes time, effort, and a commitment to discovering the truth. For the crisis manager, personal mastery is a must because reality is not always attractive.

The concept of sensemaking occurs during a crisis as managers seek to assign meaning to events. There are times, however, when a crisis is so bizarre that there is a collapse of sensemaking (Weick, 1993). This collapse can be caused by the loss of a frame of reference, because nothing similar has occurred in the past. The human

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 231

response is one of fear and helplessness, the encountering of the fateful cosmol- ogy episode that has been discussed elsewhere in this book. As Weick (1993) describes it, “I have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me” (pp. 634–635). Nonetheless, decision makers in charge of responding to a crisis should acknowledge their need to regroup to see the event as objectively as possible. This mind-set can help the response to the crisis and begin to let the organization learn from the event.

Mental Models

These are the sets of assumptions and viewpoints that we have. Such models are necessary because they help us make sense of the world. Organizations also have mental models that reflect the collective assumptions of their members. Mental models can be useful when they urge us to think creatively about problems being faced. Indeed, some managers thrive on thinking “outside the box,” to quote a well- known phrase, because their minds are geared to seeing possibilities behind every problem.

Mental models can also hamper crisis response and, ultimately, organizational learning. When managers insist that a crisis “cannot happen here,” they are exhibit- ing a mental model of denial. Destructive mental models can be seen even when crisis events occur repeatedly in the same organization. For example, scapegoating is a mental model that seeks to shift the blame to some other party. Again, such a model is a form of denial—not a healthy ingredient in an environment for learning.

Building Shared Vision

This ingredient of learning involves a collective agreement by members of the organization on its mission and goals. Inherent is a passion that employees show for the projects they work on and the role their company plays in society. Thus, when a crisis occurs, the whole organization is hurt because the collective vision has been attacked. As a result, efforts at confronting the crisis and getting back to business are embraced enthusiastically. This response can explain why some communities immediately move into action when a disaster strikes. Cleanup crews hit the streets quickly, volunteers abound, and government visibility is heightened as everyone works together to overcome the crisis and return to a sense of normalcy.

In the absence of a shared vision, there is a higher vulnerability to the orga- nization when a crisis does occur. A fragmented organization will not respond cohesively and may even attack itself as the crisis unfolds. Scapegoating may occur among organizational members. Many professional sports teams experience this type of crisis from time to time. The scenario is usually predictable; the team has a bad season, the owners and coaches become confrontational, and the players frequently complain about the owner, the coach, or fellow teammates. Ultimately, some players may demand to be traded. When this type of “venting” occurs, a pub- lic relations crisis is born as well.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

232 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

Team Learning

Senge (2006) describes the familiar situation when an average group of man- agers can produce an above-average company. The opposite is also true; a group of above-average managers can produce a below-average company. Many crises originate because less-than-ideal dynamics occur among a group of otherwise competent professionals.

According to Senge (2006), the key to better performance, or team learning, is to acknowledge the presence of dialogue. Dialogue is a deeper form of discussion through which new ideas originate from the group. In the end, the team becomes the learning unit for the organization and is capable of reaching new levels of performance that a group of individual managers might not reach on their own. Dialogue is the prerequisite for double-loop learning, because new assumptions may need to be developed as old ones are discarded.

This notion of dialogue is important from a crisis management perspective. Crisis management teams (CMTs) are special units, capable of doing much more than just generating a list of potential threats and crisis plans. The crisis team is the unit that protects the organization, its mission, its values, and its reputation. Thus, the CMT is a strategic unit within the organization. Thinking of the CMT as just a committee or a staff department hampers its ability to promote true learning and long-term benefits for the organization. The status of the CMT must be elevated to a level at which it can attain strategic importance.

Learning From a Crisis

An optimal time to learn from a crisis is shortly after it has occurred. Waiting too long to extract lessons from the crisis could cause the sense of urgency for learn- ing to wane (Kovoor-Misra & Nathan, 2000). In addition, organizational learning cannot occur unless there is feedback (Carley & Harrald, 1997). After a major crisis occurs, managers should reevaluate their crisis management plans based on feedback received during the event. They must be able to determine why specific decisions were made during the crisis. Mechanisms such as debriefings, stakeholder interactions, and technology enable managers to capture and share information with members of the crisis management team. This information can be used in follow-up discussions to learn lessons and develop best practices.

In this book, we place organizational learning as the last stage in the four-stage framework. This placement is not to imply that learning does not take place in early stages. As a formal activity, it is a reflective process that must take place after the crisis has ended. Early crisis management frameworks also posit that learning takes place toward the end of the crisis management process. For example, Pearson & Mitroff (1993) place “learning” as the fifth phase in their five-stage framework. Table 9.1 offers a framework for assessing the learning areas in crisis management. If learning is to be systematic, we must examine the four major areas of the crisis management framework as well as the internal and external landscapes associated with each area.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 233

Table 9.1 After the Crisis: Potential New Learning Areas in Crisis Management

Landscape Survey

Strategic Planning

Crisis Management

Organizational Learning

The Internal Landscape

Were warning signals missed prior to the crisis occurring? Are there new vulnerabilities in our organization that we need to be aware of? Are there new methods of detection that we can use to sense an impending crisis?

Do we need to change the composition of our crisis management team? Are there aspects of the crisis management plan that need to be changed? Is there enough redundancy in the day-to-day operations of the company? Can the organization take advantage of new types of crisis training?

Were resources deployed effectively during the crisis? Did the organization’s departments work together effectively? Are any improvements needed in the crisis communications function? Is there an adequate use of paper and electronic recording during the crisis?

Are we making good use of postcrisis debriefing meetings? Are we building systems that provide feedback?

The External Landscape

Are there new threats in the external environment that can lead to a potential crisis?

Are there additional resources in our industry or government that can help us in our crisis management planning?

How can we better partner with industry and government agencies in managing a crisis?

What can we learn from the best practices of those outside of our organization who have encountered similar types of crises?

Landscape Survey

The landscape survey phase of organizational learning focuses primarily on the crisis threats that existed. The following discussion looks at the questions relating to the internal and external landscapes.

Were There Warning Signals That Were Missed Prior to the Crisis Occurring?

The internal landscape survey looks inside the organization for emerging crisis vulnerabilities. Perhaps an equipment breakdown brought on the initial crisis. Have repairs been overlooked on other equipment? Perhaps the crisis occurred when key personnel left the company and their replacements were not adequately trained,

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

234 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

leading to a production accident. In this example, at least two problems should be identified: Why the high exit of employees, and why the poor training of new employees? Problems such as these indicate that human resource issues may need to be addressed.

Are There New Vulnerabilities in Our Organization That We Need to Be Aware of?

Although not explicit in every crisis, every organizational leader should consider one internal vulnerability: the relationship between the organization and its mis- sion. In his analysis of the sexual abuse problem within the Catholic Church, Barth (2010) noted that the protection of the church became more important than its real mission, serving its members. Unfortunately, this self-preservation mentality can hide a multitude of problems. The opening case involving the Michigan Board of Education illustrates how protecting the local school district superseded a more commonsense approach to the problem, which would have been to keep George Crear III out of any school system. Instead, the Michigan Board of Education chose to protect its own school system, regardless of what might happen elsewhere.

Of course, George Crear III, not the Michigan Board of Education, is responsible for the crisis that occurred. While we do not overlook this reality, this book is about protecting organizations like the Michigan board from future crises. School boards everywhere have a responsibility to protect their students. As this case illustrates, there are hidden vulnerabilities that must be addressed lest a crisis occur.

Are There New Methods of Detection That We Can Use to Detect an Impending Crisis?

An analysis of the internal landscape may also reveal that new methods of detec- tion should be used to sense an impending crisis. Perhaps new accounting and financial controls are needed to detect potential sources of employee embezzlement and other types of fraud. As mentioned in Chapter 8, monitoring the Internet on a regular basis is a way a company can detect whether it is about to be caught in a viral crisis. Depending on the industry, a firm may identify specific ways it can use technology to help detect an impending crisis.

Are There New Threats in the External Environment That Can Lead to a Potential Crisis?

The external landscape survey can also signal emerging vulnerabilities. A recent crisis might have been weather related; in fact, droughts are common in the area where the authors reside. This situation has created water shortages and low- running wells. In a highly agricultural area like the southeastern United States, such an event is not only a crisis for many organizations but is a data point for a future crisis. To compound this crisis, an influx of new citizens is moving into this region, based on the growth of a nearby military base. Fortunately, learning is also taking place and new plans to satisfy water needs are being developed, even if droughts continue to occur in the future.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 235

Strategic Planning

Organizational learning in regards to the strategic planning process looks at changes that may be needed with the crisis management team, crisis management plan (CMP), and training requirements.

Do We Need to Change the Composition of Our Crisis Management Team?

Organizational learning in the internal landscape may necessitate changes in crisis response plans. The composition of the CMT may require revision. Some current members may not be suitable, while other employees may be excellent replacements. In addition, it may be necessary to alter the size of the team. One of its members should have social media expertise or have access to staff members who do.

Are There Aspects of the Crisis Management Plan That Need to Be Changed?

The CMP can be revised at any time. Perhaps there are new scenarios that need to be added to the plan. The suitability of the command center should also be evaluated. The team should discuss whether the communication functions were readily available and whether the meeting rooms were suitable. Even a minor detail such as cell phone access should be evaluated, because some cell phone users may not have access in certain parts of a building, such as a basement.

Is There Enough Redundancy in the Day-to-Day Operations of the Company?

There is an old saying that “repetition is the mother of learning.” The practice of redundancy in an organization’s processes helps ensure that everyone understands their jobs and that there are backup systems for computers, files, and mechani- cal devices. Having a spare tire available for that one time when there is a flat is a common personal example of redundancy. At the organizational level, information technology (IT) professionals learned quickly and early that failure to back up their information systems can lead to disaster. The same is true in any organization. While redundancy is not necessary in every function, it is essential in those areas that are difficult to replicate. The organization that is prepared with backup systems can be resilient.

The same approach is appropriate in crisis management. When a specific process does not function well or at all, managers should have an alternate process that can substitute for the original. Redundancy in crisis management can be seen in the following examples:

■ Methods of contacting the CMT in the event of a crisis should include cell phone, regular phone, and e-mail.

■ The crisis management plan should be printed in hard copy as well as made available on backup storage sites and posted on the organization’s website.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

236 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

■ The primary location of the command center should be backed up by a secondary command center, and perhaps even a third site, lest the first com- mand center become inaccessible during a crisis.

■ Selection of alternate crisis team members can be designated, in case one or more of the original members are not available.

Many examples of redundancy already exist in crisis situations. Backup genera- tors may be available when the primary power is offline. Additional counselors may be told to “be ready” after a significant event has taken place on a school campus, such as the death of a student. Battery-powered lights go on in the stairwells when the main power is unavailable. During the Y2K scare, many organizations brought in extra food, water, and sleeping mats, just in case.

Can the Organization Take Advantage of New Types of Crisis Training?

Crisis management training may also need revising. Techniques and assump- tions about managing the crisis should be reevaluated during such training. The reevaluation process is based on experience with a previous crisis. The goal is to take what has been experienced from the previous crisis, reflect on and learn from it, and then use it to plan for the next potential crisis. This facet of learning is also referred to as assessment, and more specifically, closing the loop (Martell, 2007). Striving for this stage is important because it facilitates continuous improvement in the way crisis managers can make the next crisis more manageable.

Are There Additional Resources in Our Industry or Government That Can Help Us in Our Crisis Management Planning?

The external landscape can offer additional training opportunities that can fit the specific needs of the organization. For example, many workshops offered by industry associations and government agencies address the problem of workplace violence, an area that can be a deadly occurrence for the affected organization. In other areas of crisis prevention, various agencies, colleges and universities, and con- sulting groups are useful because they offer expertise that managers in the company may not possess.

Crisis Management

The crisis management stage addresses the actual response to the acute crisis at hand. Organizational learning that takes place in this stage is intended to improve how the organization manages a crisis once it has commenced.

Were Resources Deployed Effectively During the Crisis?

Additional human and material resources may be needed to enhance the orga- nization’s capacity to respond to a crisis. In the 2007 Virginia Tech massacre crisis,

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 237

communication was a critical factor. If better communications systems had been in place, the number of fatalities might have been reduced (Reilly, 2008). Creating and implementing a communications system on a university campus is an example of a resource application. Indeed, since the Virginia Tech massacre, many colleges and universities have updated their real-time communication networks so that faculty and students can be notified of a crisis in a moment’s notice.

In another university-related crisis, the deployment of a certain material resource, pepper spray, was called into question during an Occupy Wall Street Protest at the University of California-Davis in November 2011. Campus police were called in to remove tents occupied by the protesters. During the operation, a group of students sat on a sidewalk and linked arms, refusing to stand. After repeated warnings to disperse by the police, two officers doused them with pepper spray. The event was videotaped and appeared on YouTube, causing worldwide attention and creating a public relations nightmare for Chancellor Linda P. B. Katehi. Almost immediately, calls for her resignation emerged and the campus police department was criticized for using pepper spray on a group of otherwise peaceful students (Stelter, 2011).

The pepper spray incident illustrates an ineffective use of resources, a fact that was later confirmed in a 190-page report by a campus task force. The report described campus leadership as being inadequate in handling the event, and “the pepper spraying incident that took place on November 18, 2011, should and could have been prevented” (Medina, 2012). The incident also highlights the challenges any university president or chancellor faces. Chancellors are influential leaders who must set the strategic direction of their university. They must also reach out to external stakeholders in the area of fund-raising. And yet, the skill set of a chancel- lor also includes crisis management ability. Some people will always call for a chan- cellor to resign, even if an event is not directly under his or her sphere of control. In this incident, command and control was handled by campus police department, and yet it was the chancellor who was immediately asked to resign. The extent to which the chancellor should be held responsible for events such as these—including on-the-spot judgments made by university personnel—is debatable.

Did the Organization’s Departments Work Together Effectively?

Success managing a crisis is often a function of the degree of cooperation and interdependence that exists among various departments within and across orga- nizations (Carley & Harrald, 1997). Interdependence is important in resolving resource allocation issues and developing teamwork. When a crisis occurs, there should be a unified effort to keep the organization functioning effectively.

A mold outbreak in a university building illustrates the degree of cooperation that must take place. Indeed, the authors have been at universities where this crisis has occurred. This not-too-uncommon scenario requires the redeployment of all personnel and activities from the building affected:

■ The physical plant and maintenance department must work to set up the initial cleanup of the facility. The work is often contracted to outsourced firms, but the department must oversee all work and reconstruction.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

238 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

This department also coordinates any movement of materials, office supplies, and furniture.

■ The records office identifies and assigns new classrooms. ■ Deans communicate new location information for classes and offices to the

affected students and faculty members. ■ The university’s public information department can disseminate informa-

tion to students and faculty, but its primary goal is to communicate impor- tant news about the crisis to the general public.

Are Any Improvements Needed in the Crisis Communications Function?

Effective communication and cooperation across departments is important if a crisis is to be managed successfully. If there is any consolation, it is that weaknesses in the crisis management practices are exposed and can then be corrected. At that point, learning will be somewhat easier as participants try not to repeat their mistakes.

A classic case involving the need to change communication messages in the midst of a crisis involved the company Source Perrier. This French company bottles Perrier water in the familiar green bottles and faced a significant crisis in February 1990. Ironically, the crisis was discovered by government inspectors in North Carolina who used the bottled water as a diluting agent in its testing of local water samples. As the inspectors were testing the local water supplies, they found traces of benzene in their samples, which had been diluted with Perrier water. Much to their surprise, they eventually discovered that the benzene originated not with the local water being tested, but with the Perrier water.

For Source Perrier, communicating to the general public the origin of the problem was a bit of a challenge. Two days after the initial detection, the com- pany communicated that a careless worker had used cleaner laced with benzene on a bottling line. Upon further investigation, a different reason for the problem emerged: carbon dioxide filters that were used in the bottling process had not been changed properly (Brookes, 1990). Benzene is a natural ingredient in carbon diox- ide, thereby requiring filtration. However, upon this revelation, Perrier was forced to reveal that there were actually two sources of their “naturally sparkling” water, not one. The water came from one source, while the gas originated from another. The two were combined during the bottling process. Thus, carbon dioxide was used to add an artificial boost of bubbles to a product that was inappropriately labeled “naturally sparkling.” This disclosure forced the company to admit that its product was not what it claimed—natural sparkling water. Source Perrier was later required by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to relabel its U.S.-bound bottles “natural mineral water” (“Perrier relabeled,” 1990).

Is There an Adequate Use of Paper and Electronic Recording During the Crisis?

Most organizations use technology to supplement their traditional paper-based processes. Word processing, e-mail, and other applications are used to facilitate

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 239

electronic management of incidents and crises. While these have merit, they do not always lend themselves to effective real-time reporting or easy record keeping during a crisis. In the heat of a crisis, for example, it may be necessary to produce a status report on any aspect of the incident, regardless of whether it concerns people, premises, or press communications. Proper venues for recording information are necessary. The use of crisis management software can be helpful in this regard.

How Can We Better Partner With Industry and Government Agencies in Managing a Crisis?

The external environment can offer learning opportunities through better partnerships with industry and government agencies. At the community level, businesses can partner with their local emergency service providers. Training opportunities often exist through which these providers conduct simulation drills at the business location. After a major disaster, two or more cities may partner and change their emergency response structures to manage their obliga- tions more effectively. Such was the case after the 1997 Red River Flood in Grand Forks, North Dakota. Timothy Sellnow and colleagues discuss how the flood prompted reorganization of emergency services between the adjacent cities of Moorhead, Minnesota, and Fargo, North Dakota (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). On the positive side, cooperative structures between the two former rivals emerged after the crisis whereby crisis communication was centralized through Fargo’s City Hall.

Crisis learning and subsequent partnerships are taking place in the oil industry after the British Petroleum (BP) Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010. Four oil companies— ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips—formed a joint ven- ture to develop a Gulf of Mexico oil spill response and containment system. The four companies have created a $1 billion pool to fund new equipment that will help prevent a future spill like the one that occurred to BP (Pfeifer & McNulty, 2011). In addition, enhancements will be made to the oil spill response and containment systems that are used to collect spilling oil.

Organizational Learning

Within the crisis management framework, organizational learning is the fourth chronological stage in which postcrisis analysis takes place. This phase is when debriefing meetings take place and notes are formally acknowledged on how to improve the organization’s crisis management effectiveness.

Are We Making Good Use of Postcrisis Debriefing Meetings?

Within the internal landscape, the organization should learn from the crisis in a constructive manner (Lagadec, 1997). Specifically, how and what is the organi- zation learning from the event, and what changes are being implemented for the prevention and mitigation of future crisis events? Holding debriefings after the

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

240 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

crisis has ended is a constructive venue for learning. Outside parties who can help management learn objectively from the crisis should be invited. Depending on the crisis, this could include local fire, police, and emergency personnel, as well as a crisis management consultant.

Are We Building Systems That Provide Feedback?

Within the internal landscape, there is another mechanism that should be utilized: providing adequate feedback to the rest of the organization. Without feedback, learning cannot occur. The reason is that an accumulation of knowl- edge that “sits” in a compartment of the organization cannot be useful in causing a cultural adjustment; that knowledge must be fed back to other parts of the organization (Smith & Elliott, 2007). Feedback must be channeled back to the landscape survey, strategic planning, and crisis management phases. The feed- back loop brings in a separate but related concept in organizational learning: knowledge management.

Knowledge management is the process an organization uses to manage what it has learned (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). Knowledge must be routed, stored, and retrieved when necessary. Generally, there are two types of knowledge: explicit and tacit. Explicit knowledge can be codified and physically stored in databases, whereas tacit knowledge comprises the experiences and mental models of individuals. This type of knowledge is manifested in the form of specific experiences, individual expertise, and intuition. Both forms of knowledge require a feedback process whereby the

Landscape Survey Strategic Planning Crisis Management Organizational

Learning

The External Landscape

The Internal Landscape

Indicates feedback loop

Indicates sequence route

The CMT identifies the crisis threats the organization is facing.

The CMT develops the crisis management plan and leads training in crisis management.

The CMT actively manages the crisis when one occurs.

The CMT leads the postcrisis evaluation so that learning can occur.

Industries and other external organizations identify their own crisis threats.

Industries and other external organizations engage in crisis management planning.

External organizations respond to a specific crisis.

The organization and other relevant stakeholders engage in learning activities.

Figure 9.3 Feedback in the Crisis Management Framework

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 241

appropriate stakeholders can take advantage of its use when needed (Racherla & Hu, 2009). Figure 9.3 illustrates the feedback process as it is incorporated into the crisis management process.

What Can We Learn From the Best Practices of Those Outside of Our Organization Who Have Encountered Similar Types of Crises?

Managers can learn from crisis events by observing the failures and crises of other organizations (Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2007). The external landscape can yield numerous resources that can be useful to crisis managers. Books and articles on crisis management comprise one such resource. The book you are reading offers a framework for learning about crisis management, whereas articles tend to be more specialized and often highlight the best practices of specific companies. Many articles focus on lessons learned from a specific crisis. In addition to these outlets, some colleges and universities offer courses in crisis communications and crisis management.

Within the external landscape, crises related to safety problems resulting in fatalities will probably yield learning and changes on the part of government regulators. In other words, there may be collective industry learning that takes place as well. For example, the 2006 Sago Coal Mine accident in Sago, West Virginia, resulted in 12 miner fatalities after methane gas seeping from the mine walls caused an explosion. After the incident was investigated by the Mine Safety Health Administration (MSHA), a new standard was released that increased the required strength of seals used to separate active and inactive sections of coal mines (Madsen, 2009). Unfortunately, one coal mining company, Massey Energy, choose to ignore safety regulations altogether and compromise miner safety. In this example, the company deliberately chose to ignore learning that had occurred in the mining industry. The Massey example is more a violation of business ethics than a lack of organizational learning. We explore the relationship between busi- ness ethics and crises in the next chapter.

Degrees of Success in Crisis Learning

The observation that an organization can display degrees of success in crisis manage- ment outcomes was first discussed by Pearson and Clair (1998). One of the items they considered was organizational learning from a crisis. Table 9.2 depicts three levels of outcomes: failure, midrange, and success. Each outcome is further distinguished by degree of learning, future impact on the organization, and strategy posture toward crisis management. Companies that experience mostly failure outcomes in the cri- sis management process have not yet learned from past events. It is not surprising that these organizations continue to repeat their mistakes each time a similar crisis erupts. Such organizations are reactive in nature, and therefore they are unable to learn because they are always in a state of surprise or, perhaps, nonchalance. Table 9.2 conveys the idea that learning success can vary among several ranges of outcomes.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

242 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

Table 9.2 Levels of Learning Outcomes After a Crisis

Failure Outcomes

Midrange Outcomes

Success Outcomes

Degree of learning

No learning occurs.

Learning occurs, but its applications are sporadic.

Learning occurs throughout the organization.

Future impact on the organization

The organization continues to make the same mistakes when similar crises occur.

Some areas of the organization may change for the better while others remain the same.

The organization changes its policies and procedures. Learning is applied to future crisis events.

Strategy posture toward crisis management

The organization is reactive; unwilling or unable to learn.

The organization is reactive; willing to learn yet not ably equipped to learn.

The organization is proactive; willing to learn and take the knowledge to the next step for application.

Source: Adapted from Pearson and Clair (1998), p. 68.

Some companies will experience limited degrees of success in their crisis man- agement practices and thus show some capacity for learning. A degree of learning is possible, but its applications will be sporadic. Therefore, certain areas in the organization will change for the better while others might remain the same. In terms of a strategy posture, the firm is still reactive but shows some willingness and ability to learn.

The ideal, of course, is a total learning organization. Companies that experi- ence success outcomes in this area are willing and able to learn. The result is that policies and procedures are changed as needed. The hope is that in the event of future crisis events, the new learning will enable the organization to respond more effectively.

Barriers to Organizational Learning

Learning is not necessarily a natural outcome of a crisis. In fact, many companies are reluctant to learn and instead choose to return to the status quo as quickly as possible (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Roux-Dufort, 2000). There are a number of reasons why this is so. In the next section, we examine the more common reasons organizational members, particularly those in management, may resist learning. Barriers to learning are approached from two perspectives: operational consider- ations and factors related to the organization’s culture.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 243

Operational Considerations

Operational considerations focus on issues related to the day-to-day functioning of the organization. Included in this discussion are an overreliance on programmed decisions, information asymmetry, and the tendency to ignore small failures.

There Is an Overreliance on Programmed Decisions

Programmed decisions—those that are based on some type of decision rule or prearranged logic—can be useful in a number of situations. They tend to work well when management decisions are routine and repetitious, such as the reordering of inventory when levels reach a prespecified number. Programmed decisions have also been factored into certain crisis management procedures. For example, many organi- zations have a prearranged list of procedures to follow when there is a bomb threat. These are designed to methodically protect assets and people (usually by evacuating the occupants from the building) while seeking as much information as possible about the person making the threat (taking note of background noises, engaging the caller in conversation as long as possible to identify speaking patterns, etc.). Such programmed decisions are useful because they are systematic in their application.

There can be a problem, however, when there is too much reliance on programmed decisions: “The more programmed decisions are utilized by an organization, the more resistant to change it becomes” (Lester & Parnell, 2007, p. 177). This kind of situation can occur in companies where programmed decisions are used to promote efficiency. Because this mode of operation is usually effective, management may become com- placent and not seek new approaches to running the operation. This complacency can carry over into the area of crisis management, especially when crisis planning is either not addressed or is left to top management (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984).

At the employee level, programmed decision making can lead to a work routine in which the worker becomes a “mindless expert,” meaning they concentrate on the end result instead of the process of the task (Langer, 1989, p. 20). The end result can be a workplace accident or missing the cue for a crisis altogether.

There Is Information Asymmetry

Information asymmetry can occur when similar incidents involving the same technology transpire over a wide geographic area (Boin, Lagadec, Michel-Kerjan, & Overdijk, 2003). For example, information asymmetry can exist when the manu- facturer of a product has information that customers do not possess. Furthermore, different customers may have access to different information as well. The Therac-25 incidents from 1985 to 1987 illustrate this (Leveson & Turner, 1993).

Therac-25 was a computer-controlled radiation machine that administered prespecified doses of radiation to cancerous tumors. The machines were offered by Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) and were introduced in 1982. The machines operated flawlessly until a time period between June 1985 and January 1987. During this period, six incidents occurred when patients received massive overdoses of radiation while undergoing treatment. Several of these patients later

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

244 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

died (Leveson & Turner, 1993). What made the crisis especially perplexing was the lack of information transfer that took place among the six medical centers using the Therac-25. Instead, each medical center reported the machine failure directly to the manufacturer, unaware that other medical centers were also experiencing problems. Figure 9.4 illustrates the information asymmetry that existed.

The figure shows four different medical centers that were affected by overdoses of radiation caused by the Therac-25 machines. The incident that started the Therac-25 crisis occurred at Kennestone Regional Oncology Center in June 1985. The second incident occurred at Ontario Cancer Foundation in July 1985. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital experienced incidents in December 1985 and in January 1987. East Texas Cancer Center experienced incidents in both March and April 1986. The radiation overdoses resulted in three fatalities and three other patients who suffered serious physical injuries (Fauchart, 2006).

As Fauchart reports in his analysis of the case, communication took place between each medical center and the manufacturer, but not among the four medi- cal centers. Thus, the manufacturer, AECL, had complete information but the four medical centers did not. Thus, potential learning opportunities at each of the four medical centers were not possible. Fauchart (2006) maintains that this information asymmetry could have been avoided:

The manufacturer should have informed all the users that a number of acci- dents had occurred, but he did not do so. Instead, he told every user who asked for information about other possible incidents that he was not aware of any. He thus used the information asymmetry to pretend that each accident was a one-off fluke. This clearly delayed the instauration of a learning process aimed at fixing the problem and preventing other accidents from occurring. (p. 101)

Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital

Yakima, Washington December 1985 January 1987

East Texas Cancer Center

Tyler, Texas March 1986 April 1986

Ontario Cancer Foundation

Hamilton, Canada July 1985

Kennestone Regional Oncology Center Marietta, Georgia

June 1985

Atomic Energy Canada Limited

(AECL—the manufacturer of Therac-25)

Actual communication flows

Potential communication flows not utilized

Figure 9.4 The Problem of Information Asymmetry During the Therac-25 Crisis Source: Fauchert (2006).

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 245

Small Failures Are Routinely Ignored

A reoccurring theme in crisis research is that small incidents that are ignored can lead to more substantial incidents or crises (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005; Smith, 1993; Veil, 2011). Such small incidents can be interpreted as warning signals of a larger crisis on the horizon. These early warning signals can be likened to an incubation stage when the crisis is growing, largely unnoticed by organizational members (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003; Veil, 2011). The term “smoldering cri- sis” has also been used to describe a situation where management largely ignores a series of smaller events, only to have them erupt into a larger calamity later on down the road (Institute for Crisis Management, 2011). The BP oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico that resulted in the deaths of 11 workers was an example of a series of smaller problems that were routinely ignored. According to the Institute for Crisis Management:

Some will argue that the explosion on the BP oil rig Deepwater Horizon was a sudden crisis—an explosion that killed eleven and triggered a major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. ICM maintains there is ample evidence there were a series of human errors and ignored problems, that had they dealt with when they first occurred, could have prevented the disaster that cost BP so much money and additional damage to its reputation. (2011, p. 2)

Organizational Cultural Considerations

The belief systems within an organization can stifle progress in attempting to learn from a crisis. As we will see in the discussion below, a track record of success, a culture of scapegoating, a status quo culture, and the painful process of looking at failures are deterrents to the learning process.

There Is a Solid Track Record of “Success” in the Organization

It may seem ironic, but success can ultimately lead to failure (Parnell, Lado, & Wright, 1992). When an organization enjoys success, the result can be an attitude of feeling invincible against crisis events. Success can be defined in a number of ways, such as consistent revenues, accident-free workdays, or a wealth of positive public- ity. Sitkin (1996) noted that some level of failure is needed to encourage organiza- tions to learn. After all, where is the incentive to learn if one does not experience a setback from time to time? A track record of success implies that there is nothing new to learn (Veil, 2011).

The organizational culture at NASA has long been recognized as having a cul- ture of success that has overlooked the potential for failure (Barton, 2008; Gilpin & Murphy, 2008; Tompkins, 2005). Despite the fact that the organization has had incredible success in its space program, there have also been setbacks that have proved fatal on three separate occasions.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

246 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

There Is a Culture of Scapegoating

Scapegoating hinders an organization from learning from a crisis (Elliott et al., 2000). It blames the crisis on another party, thus deflecting attention away from the core source of the problem. There are a number of pitfalls with scapegoating that ultimately prevent learning in the organization. First, the organization is likely to become even more failure prone because key issues and warnings are not raised and addressed (Elliott et al., 2000). This scenario is likely because putting the blame on a scapegoat diverts attention away from the issue that needs attention. For example, manufacturers often blame their suppliers when a product is found defective. While this may be true, it still begs the question of why that supplier was used in the first place. The example mentioned in Chapter 6 of toys manufactured in China that were decorated with lead paint and sold in the United States illustrates this supplier dilemma. The fact that there have been a number of recalls, even as this book was being written, indicates that toymakers are still learning about the pitfalls of out- sourcing operations overseas.

Another problem with scapegoating is that it indicates a company’s lack of ethics in running the business (Elliott et al., 2000). Scapegoating requires that blame be shifted, even if the company is at fault. Such an ethical stance is a form of denial, which is hardly a healthy atmosphere for organizational learning. The hindrance to learning is that the company’s core belief system cannot be changed for the better if managers are in denial as to what went wrong at the outset. Instead of displacing the blame to other parties, the organization needs to develop a culture of learning (Argyris & Schön, 1996). This organizational culture shift to learning enables man- agement to make changes that can prevent future crises (Veil, 2011). However, this shift is difficult if there is a status quo–seeking culture in the organization.

There Is a Status Quo–Seeking Culture

A company’s core beliefs are the foundation of its organizational culture. If the culture is entrenched in an unwillingness to change from the status quo, then orga- nizational learning will be virtually impossible (Roux-Dufort, 2000). This type of belief system begins with the attitude that a crisis “cannot happen here” or “it can’t happen to us” syndrome. When denial is present, there is a high likelihood that the organization can become crisis prone (Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). When a crisis does occur, the organization must either learn from it and move on, or transfer the blame to another party, thereby entering a state of denial.

Christophe Roux-Dufort studied a 1992 crisis involving a French airliner that crashed into the Saint Odile Mountain while making its final approach for land- ing. He interviewed a vice president for the airline and was surprised to learn that the executive did not consider the event a crisis. His reasoning was that the day after the accident, reservations for other flights with the airline had not changed (Roux-Dufort, 2000). The problem with this mind-set is that the crisis is written off as just another event—something that happens when you conduct business— and nothing more. Deep learning and attempts to change the organization’s cul- ture are difficult to achieve when a company is in such denial; indeed, analyzing failure is painful.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 247

Analyzing Failure Is Painful

Finally, analyzing a crisis that was the result of a failure of some human error is difficult for those involved. Negative emotions usually result when individuals examine their shortcomings, and this can result in a painful loss of self-confidence and self-esteem. Likewise, managers may find it difficult to focus attention on orga- nizational failures because these failures are an extension of their abilities to govern effectively (Cannon & Edmondson, 2005). After all, if anyone is supposed to exert control in the organization, it is the manager. When a crisis occurs due to the failure of the organization, it is ultimately the manager’s responsibility.

Research in the area of organizational behavior has revealed how managers may displace the blame for their failures. Attribution error is a concept that has emerged in studies on leadership and attempts to explain how managers attribute blame or success when certain organizational outcomes occur. When a manager achieves success, she may attribute that success to her own personal traits as a leader. However, if that same manager encounters failure, she may attribute that failure to external causes; in other words, it is not her fault. This type of rationale is known as a self-serving bias, or “the tendency to make external attributions (blame the situation) for one’s own failures yet make internal attributions (take credit) for one’s successes” (Hughes, Ginnett, & Curphy, 2012, p. 51). Hence, managers do not want to experience a crisis based on some fault of their own, and they certainly do not want to talk about it afterward.

Summary

Organizational learning involves the process of detecting problems and then correcting them. There are two types of learning that can take place. Single-loop learning is the detection and correction of an error without changing the basic underlying organizational norms. Double-loop learning is the detection and cor- rection of an error, but with the changing of organizational norms. Such learning usually occurs after a process of thoughtful reflection. Peter Senge (2006) contrib- uted to our understanding of this process through the concepts of systems think- ing, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learning.

Organizational learning from a crisis should involve evaluating each of the four stages of the crisis management framework. In evaluating the organization’s response, management should seek improvements in each stage: landscape survey, strategic planning, crisis management, and organizational learning. Barriers to learning should also be examined both from an operational and a cultural perspective.

Questions for Discussion

1. Define organizational learning within the context of crisis management.

2. What is the difference between single-loop and double-loop learning?

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

248 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

3. How do Peter Senge’s concepts of systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision, and team learning apply to crisis management learning?

4. How can learning take place within the four areas of the crisis management framework? Specifically, how does it occur in the landscape survey, strate- gic planning, crisis management, and organizational learning phases?

5. What examples of organizational learning have you seen where you work? Were any of these examples brought on by a crisis event? If so, explain how the crisis initiated the learning process.

6. What examples of barriers to learning have you seen where you work? How could these barriers be overcome?

Chapter Exercise

You have just been asked to lead the next meeting of the crisis management team of a medium-sized manufacturing facility located in a growing suburb of a large city. In your meeting you are going to discuss an incident that occurred last week in which an armed man entered the production building and threatened to kill his ex-girlfriend. The man in question came in through a back door in the kitchen and entered the employee cafeteria. He was agitated, verbally abusive, and had appar- ently been drinking. Two security guards restrained the man until police arrived. An unloaded gun was found in his backpack.

The company has a newly formed crisis management team, and it genuinely wants to improve the safety of the workplace. You have been asked to facilitate the next meeting of the CMT. During the meeting, you want to help the new CMT learn from this event as well as position itself to become an effective learning unit. As you plan the meeting, you are thinking of how to address the following questions:

1. What can be learned specifically from this event involving the gunman?

2. How can the CMT address learning within the larger context of the land- scape survey, strategic planning, crisis management, and organizational learning phases?

3. What barriers to learning should the CMT be made aware of?

Mini-Case: Stage Collapse at the Indiana State Fair

On August 13, 2011, a thunderstorm with high winds descended on the Indiana State Fair in Indianapolis. In the concert area, a crowd was assembled to watch the coun- try music act, Sugarland, which was scheduled to perform that night. While those

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 249

attending the concert were probably not surprised to see a summer thunderstorm on the horizon, the calamity that occurred at the stage was another issue. At 8:46 P.M., with high winds and rain signaling the advancement of the storm, the concert stage suddenly collapsed, to the horror of the crowd. The canopy roof and a maze of steel beams fell and crushed people who were either on or near the front of the stage. The accident would eventually claim the lives of seven people and injure another 58 (Young, 2012).

The crisis that ensued was fraught with confusion as to who was in charge of the concert, as well as how temporary staging should be monitored for safety. A review of the events of the evening indicated that confusion existed as to who was in charge of allowing the concert to proceed. In his Wall Street Journal article, Jack Nicas (2012b) reviews the sequence of events that transpired:

8:15 P.M.: Officials at the state fair are informed a severe storm is approaching the concert area. The concert is scheduled to begin at 8:45 P.M . If the storm proceeds as forecasted, it will arrive 30 minutes after the concert is scheduled to start.

8:20 P.M.: Officials ask the manager of the band to delay the concert. The man- ager says Sugarland is not able to delay the start of the concert.

8:30 P.M.: Captain Brad Weaver from the Indiana State Police advises Cynthia Hoye, executive director of the state fair, to either delay or cancel the concert. Meanwhile, up to 12,000 fans are now in the stands awaiting the start of the performance.

8:39 P.M.: The National Weather Service issues a severe storm warning with winds up to 60 miles per hour (mph) possible. Although the warning has been issued, it does not get communicated to the state fair and concert officials.

8:40 P.M.: Cynthia Hoye, unaware that a threatening storm is now close at hand, directs the concert to perform as scheduled.

8:45 P.M.: Captain Weaver intervenes and informs Hoye that the crowd must be evacuated from the stands due to the approaching storm.

8:46 P.M.: The stage collapses.

The collapse was recorded by a number of fans at the concert, and video was soon available on YouTube.

The winds that caused the stage to succumb were in excess of 60–70 mph (Young, 2012). Mid-American Sound, the company that erected the elaborate tem- porary stage, said it was built to withstand winds of 40 mph. A spokesperson for the company said that over the years it had provided the stage, it informed the State Fair Commission not to use the stage if winds exceeded 25 mph (Nicas, 2012a).

At the heart of the safety issue is the question, Who actually inspects and regu- lates these temporary structures? The answer, unfortunately, is not consistent across the United States. Industry standards for determining how much wind a structure can withstand are voluntary. That means the enforcement of any standards must occur at the municipal and state government levels (Kilman & Merrick, 2011). In the case of the stage at the Indiana State Fair, it turns out that an official inspection

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

250 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

of the structure was not even required. Temporary structures such as scaffolding and entertainment stages do not fall under any governing body in the state of Indiana (Knopper, 2011).

After the accident, officials at the Indiana State Fair hired Thornton Tomasetti, an international engineering firm, to determine the cause of the collapse. The New York–based firm had also been enlisted to investigate the September 11, 2001, collapse of the World Trade Center and the 2007 Interstate 35 bridge collapse in Minnesota that caused 13 fatalities (Merrick, 2011). In regard to the stage at the state fair, the firm concluded that the structure was improperly designed, built, and inspected, leaving it inadequate to withstand winds in excess of 43 mph (Nicas, 2012b).

On February 8, 2012, the Indiana Department of Labor issued fines to the State Fair Commission, a stagehands union, and Mid-American Sound Corporation. The Fair Commission was fined $6,300 for failing to take into account the severe weather conditions and their potential impact on the safety of the concert fans (Young, 2012). Their lack of foresight resulted in the fairgrounds not being evacuated before the arrival of the storm. Local 30 of the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees (IATSE) was fined $11,500 for failing to provide suffi- cient harnessing and netting for four spotlight operators (one of whom died in the collapse), and for not testing the soil that provides support for the stage structure (Nicas, 2012a). Mid-American Sound Corporation was fined $63,000 and received most of the blame for the accident. According to Labor Commissioner Lori Torres, “The evidence demonstrated that the Mid-American Sound Corporation was aware of appropriate requirements and demonstrated a plain indifference to com- plying with those requirements” (Young, 2012, p. 44).

Mini-Case Questions

1. In this case, which stakeholder should be in charge of the start of a concert—state fair officials, the band Sugarland, or the state police? Why?

2. Should a temporary stage be built so it can withstand winds of more than 70 mph? Aside from the obvious advantages of such a stage, are there dis- advantages as well?

3. How can weather information be communicated so it reaches the officials in charge of an outdoor concert?

Mini-Case References

Kilman, S., & Merrick, A. (2011, August 16). Scrutiny shifts to outdoor stages—Experts cite a lack of uniform inspections for portable structures, concerns about how organizers handled bad weather. Wall Street Journal, p. A3.

Knopper, S. (2011, September 15). Who’s to blame in deadly stage collapse tragedies? Rolling Stone, 13–16.

Merrick, A. (2011). Engineers to probe Indiana fair’s stage collapse. Wall Street Journal, p. A3.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 251

Nicas, J. (2012a, February 9). Fines set in Indiana collapse. Wall Street Journal, p. A2. Nicas, J. (2012b, April 13). Faulty planning, stage cited in fair collapse. Wall Street

Journal, p. A2. Young, C. (2012). Fines fly for Sugarland stage roof collapse. Pro Sound News, 34 (2), 44, 58.

References

Alavi, M., & Leidner, D. (2001). Review—Knowledge management and knowledge man- agement systems: Conceptual foundation and research issues. MIS Quarterly, 25 (1), 107–136.

Argyris, C. (1982). Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organizational. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1978). Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Argyris, C., & Schön, D. (1996). Organizational learning II: Theory, method and practice. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

Barth, T. (2010). Crisis management in the Catholic Church: Lessons for public administra- tors. Public Administration Review, 70 (5), 780–791.

Barton, L. (2008). Crisis leadership now: A real-world guide to preparing for threat, disaster, sabotage, and scandal. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Boin, A., Lagadec, P., Michel-Kerjan, E., & Overdijk, W. (2003). Critical infrastructures under threat: Learning from the anthrax scare. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 11 (3), 99–104.

Borodzicz, E., & van Haperen, K. (2002). Individual and group learning in crisis simulations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 10 (3), 139–147.

Bourrier, M. (2011). The legacy of the High Reliability Organization project. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 19 (1), 9–13.

Brockner, J., & James, E. (2008). Toward an understanding of when executives see opportu- nity in crisis. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 44 (7), 94–115.

Brookes, W. (1990, April 30). The wasteful pursuit of zero risk. Forbes, 160–172. Brunson, R. (2008, July). Farrier firefighting: A legacy of training. All Hands, Issue 1096, 12–17. Cannon, M., & Edmondson, A. (2005). Failing to learn and learning to fail (intelligently):

How great organizations put failure to work to innovate and improve. Long Range Planning, 38, 299–319.

Carley, K., & Harrald, J. (1997). Organizational learning under fire: Theory and practice. American Behavioral Scientist, 40 (3), 310–332.

Deverell, E. (2009). Crises as learning triggers: Exploring a conceptual framework of crisis-induced learning. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17 (3), 179–188.

Elliott, D., Smith, D., & McGuinness, M. (2000, Fall). Exploring the failure to learn: Crises and the barriers to learning. Review of Business, 17–24.

Fauchart, E. (2006). Moral hazard and the role of users in learning from accidents. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 14 (2), 97–106.

Gilpin, D., & Murphy, P. (2008). Crisis management in a complex world. New York: Oxford University Press.

Hughes, R., Ginnett, R. & Curphy, C. (2012). Leadership: Enhancing the lessons of experience (7th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.

Institute for Crisis Management. (2011). Annual ICM crisis report: News coverage of busi- ness crises during 2010. Retrieved April 8, 2012, from http://crisisconsultant.com/ images/2010CrisisReportICM.pdf.

Kolb, D. (1984). Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Kovoor-Misra, S., & Nathan, M. (2000, Fall). Timing is everything: The optimal time to learn from crises. Review of Business, 31–36.

Lagadec, P. (1997). Learning processes for crisis management in complex organizations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5 (1), 24–31.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

252 CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW STRATEGY LANDSCAPE

Lalonde, C. (2007). Crisis management and organizational development: Towards the con- ception of a learning model in crisis management. Organizational Development Journal, 25 (1), 17–26.

Langer, E. (1989). Mindfulness. Cambridge, MA: Perseus. Lester, D., & Parnell, J. (2007). Organizational theory: A strategic perspective. Cincinnati:

Atomic Dog Publishing. Leveson, N., & Turner, C. (1993). An investigation of the Therac-25 accidents. IEEE

Computer, 26 (7), 18–41. Madsen, P. (2009). These lives will not be lost in vain: Organizational learning from disaster

in U.S. coal mining. Organization Science, 20 (5), 861–875. Martell, K. (2007). Assessing student learning: Are business schools making the grade?

Journal of Education for Business, 82 (4), 189–195. Mawhinney, J. (1990). The Hagersville Tire Fire—February 12 to 28, 1990. Internal Report

No. 593. National Research Council Canada. Institute for Research in Construction. Medina, J. (2012, April 12). Campus task force criticizes pepper spraying of protestors. New

York Times, p. 20. Nathan, M. (2000, Fall). The paradoxical nature of crisis. Review of Business, 12–16. Nystrom, P., & Starbuck, W. (1984). To avoid organizational crises, unlearn. Organizational

Dynamics, 12 (4), 53–65. Parnell, J. A., Lado, A., & Wright, P. (1992). Why good things never seem to last: A dia-

lectic perspective of long-term competitive advantage. Journal of Business Strategies, 9 (1), 62–68.

Pearson, C., & Clair, J. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of Management Review, 23 (1), 59–76.

Pearson, C., & Mitroff, I. (1993). From crisis prone to crisis prepared: A framework for crisis management. Academy of Management Executive, 7 (1), 48–59.

Perrier relabeled. (1990). FDA Consumer, 24 (6), 2. Pfeifer, S., & McNulty, S. (2011, April 18). Event that changed an industry. Financial

Times, p. 19. Racherla, P., & Hu, C. (2009). A framework for knowledge-based crisis management in the

hospitality and tourism industry. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 50 (4), 561–577. Reilly, A. (2008). The role of human resource development competencies in facilitating effec-

tive crisis communication. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10 (3), 331–351. Roberts, K., & Bea, R. (2001). Must accidents happen? Lessons from high-reliability organi-

zations. Academy of Management Executive, 15 (3), 70–78. Roux-Dufort, C. (2000, Fall). Why organizations don’t learn from crises: The perverse power

of normalization. Review of Business, 25–30. Seeger, M., Sellnow, T., & Ulmer, R. (2003). Communication and organizational crisis .

Westport, CT: Praeger. Sellnow, T., Seeger, M., & Ulmer, R. (2002). Chaos theory, informational needs, and natural

disasters. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 30 (4), 269–292. Senge, P. (2006). The fifth discipline handbook: The art and practice of the learning organiza-

tion. New York: Currency Doubleday. Simon, L., & Pauchant, T. (2000, Fall). Developing the three levels of learning in crisis man-

agement: A case study of the Hagersville tire fire. Review of Business, 6–11. Sitkin, S. (1996). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. In M. D. Cohen &

L. S. Sproull (Eds.), Organizational learning (pp. 541–578). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Smith, D. (1993). Crisis management in the public sector: Lessons from the prison service. In

J. Wilson & P. Hinton (Eds.), Public service and the 1990s: Issues in public service finance and management (pp. 141–170). London: Tudor Press.

Smith, D., & Elliott, D. (2007). Exploring the barriers to learning from crisis: Organizational learning and crisis. Management Learning, 38 (5), 519–538.

Stead, E., & Smallman, C. (1999). Understanding business failure: Learning and un-learning lessons from industrial crises. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 7 (1), 1–18.

Stelter, B. (2011, November 21). California University puts officers who used pepper spray on leave. New York Times, p. 13.

Sullivan, J., & Beach, R. (2012). Making organizational learning work: Lessons from a high reliability organization. International Journal of Business Intelligence Research, 3(3), 54-61.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S

Chapter 9. The Importance of Organizational Learning 253

Tompkins, P. (2005). Apollo, Challenger, Columbia: The decline of the space program. Los Angeles: Roxbury.

Turner, B., & Pidgeon, N. (1997). Man-made disasters (2nd ed.). London: Butterworth- Heinemann.

Ulmer, R., Sellnow, T., & Seeger, M. (2007). Effective crisis communication: Moving from crisis to opportunity. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Veil, S. (2011). Mindful learning in crisis management. Journal of Business Communication, 48 (2), 116–147.

Veil, S., & Sellnow, T. (2008). Organizational learning in a high-risk environment: Responding to the anthrax outbreak. Journal of Applied Communications, 92, 75–93.

Wang, J. (2008). Developing organizational learning capacity in crisis management. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10 (3), 425–445.

Weick, K. (1993). The collapse of sensemaking in organizations: The Mann Gulch disaster. Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, 628–652.

Weick, K., & Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the unexpected. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

FOR THE USE OF SAVANT LEARNING STUDENTS AND FACULTY ONLY. NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION, SALE, OR REPRINTING.

F O S T E R , C E D R I C 1 6 9 2 T S