Crime Theory discussion 150 words and two scholarly references

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ROBERT M. BOHM University of Central Florida

and

BRENDA L. VOGEL California State University, Long Beach

A Primer on Crime and Delinquency Theory

T H I R D E D I T I O N

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Critical Theories

Interactionism and Labeling Theory

Conflict Criminology

Radical Criminology

Feminist Criminology

British or Left Realism

Peacemaking Criminology

Postmodern Criminology

C ritical theories are, in part, a product of the demystification of Americansociety that began toward the end of the 1950s. Demystification is the cor- recting of misconceptions or “setting the record straight.” At that time, a small group of social scientists began to question the activities and priorities of the U.S. government and major American corporations, as well as the functionalist theory that often served as a justification. This questioning and skepticism was due to the revelation about how the American public was being misled about the “true” nature of current events, and about how the interests of the power elite were being served by those actions.1

In the political arena, the public’s eyes were being opened to McCarthyism, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, political and racial assassination, the gov- ernment’s abandonment of the civil rights movement, military intervention in Latin America and Asia, the domestic pacification objectives of the War on Pov- erty, and the destruction of communities for urban renewal. Revelations about corporate misdeeds included price-fixing conspiracies, price gouging, the sale of worthless or dangerous products, deceptive or fraudulent advertising, unsafe working conditions, and pollution and destruction of the environment. Particu- larly disturbing was evidence of the complicity of social scientists in some of those unsavory and, in some cases, illegal actions under the guise of a “value-free” social science.2 During the next decades, disclosures about secret and illegal activities of the U.S. government and major U.S. corporations became commonplace. Con- cepts like racism, sexism, capitalism, imperialism, monopoly, exploitation, and

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oppression were being employed with greater frequency to describe the social landscape. In the 1960s, the period of naive acceptance of the status quo and the belief in the purely benevolent actions of government ended for many social scientists, and the seeds of critical theory began to sprout. For critical criminolo- gists, government and corporate crimes highlight structural causes that are not readily apparent when conventional street crime is examined.3

Critical theories, for the most part, are sociological theories. However, not surprisingly, the basic assumptions of critical theories differ both from those of classical and neoclassical theories and from those of positivist theories. First, un- like classical and neoclassical theories, which assume that human beings have free will, and positivist theories, which assume that human beings are determined, either in a “hard” or “soft” way, critical theories assume that human beings are both determined and determining.4 In other words, critical theories assume that human beings are the creators of the institutions and structures that ultimately dominate and constrain them. Furthermore, as creators, they are capable of changing institutions and structures.

Second, in contrast to both classical and neoclassical and positivist theories, which assume that society is characterized fundamentally by a consensus over moral values, whether by social contract in the former or the collective con- science or the division of labor in the latter, critical theories assume that conflict is the norm, that society is characterized primarily by conflict over moral values.

Finally, unlike positivist theories that assume that social scientists, including criminologists, can be value-neutral or objective in their work, critical theories assume that such a position is impossible. Critical theorists assume that everything they do is value-laden by virtue of their being human. Many critical theorists believe that the most intellectually honest alternative to the value-neutral stance is to be honest and forthright about one’s values and let consumers of one’s work evaluate that work in light of an explicitly articulated value position.

Having said this, it is important to note that although many criminologists consider themselves critical, there actually are few critical criminologists.5 The pri- mary reason is that although most criminologists are typically critical of dissonant theoretical positions, few criminologists, including so-called critical or radical criminologists, are, in the tradition of the Greek philosopher Socrates, critical of their own positions. That is, few criminologists are reflexive or self-conscious about their own position.6 This failure of criminologists to be critical and reflexive about their own theoretical perspectives is one of criminology’s major problems.

I N T E R A C T I O N I S M A N D L A B E L I N G T H E O R Y

The focus of interactionist and labeling theory is the meaning of crime and crimi- nality.7 Attention is shifted from the positivist concern with the peculiarities of the criminal actor to the criminalization process—the way people and actions are defined as criminal.8 From this perspective, the distinguishing feature of all “criminals” is that they have been the object of a negative social reaction.9 In other words, they have been designated by the state and its agents as different and “bad.”10

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Interactionism and labeling theory have their roots in the symbolic interaction- ism of George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), whose ideas on the subject can be summarized in three propositions. First, “human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them.”11 By this, Mead meant that people often interpret the same event or behavior differently because of the unique meanings that they attach to it.12 Consider, for example, the Ford Pinto case.13

Between 1971 and 1976, Ford Motor Company executives made the deci- sion to sell Ford Pintos (and Mercury Bobcats) to the public, knowing that the placement of the gas tank made the cars susceptible to fiery explosions on rear impact at relatively slow speeds. They also knew that innocent people probably would be killed and injured as a result. Knowing this, they decided that it would be cheaper in the long run to settle the lawsuits initiated by injured drivers and passengers and the families of killed drivers and passengers than to recall the cars and install an $11 metal shield to protect the gas tank. As it turned out, the Ford executives were correct in their belief that people would die and be injured as a result of their decisions. They were wrong, however, in assuming that settling lawsuits would be cheaper than recalling the vehicles and installing the metal shield. In any event, the relevant question for this discussion is whether the Ford executives who made those decisions were guilty of any crimes. Although the courts ultimately decided that they were not, many people believe that they were. The point is that the actions of the Ford executives are interpreted differ- ently by different people, depending on the meaning the event has for them.

Mead’s second proposition is that “the meaning of things arises out of the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows.”14 By this, Mead meant that meaning resides neither in the thing itself nor exclusively in the sender or the re- ceiver. Meaning is the product of negotiations between the sender, the receiver, and relevant social others.15 Thus, for example, whether a woman forced to have sexual intercourse against her will has been raped in a legal sense depends on the act’s interpretation by police, prosecutors, judges, juries, and especially the woman herself. It may also depend on such things as the amount of resistance offered by the victim, the victim’s sexual history, and a host of other factors.

Mead’s third proposition is that “these meanings are handled in, and modi- fied through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with things he encounters.”16 In other words, in the interpretation of an event, people not only receive meaning but create it as well. Thus, people’s actions are, at least to some extent, determined by themselves.17 This proposition is the basis for the critical theory assumption that people are both determined and determining.18

For example, when then-Colonel Oliver North diverted funds to the Nicara- guan contras in defiance of the Boland Amendment prohibiting such activity, were his acts heroic or criminal? Although the public has mixed feelings about North’s actions, there can be little doubt that North himself believes his actions were heroic.

A lesson to be learned from Mead’s theory is that one must be careful not to assume that his or her interpretation of a criminal act is the correct one. Even if the interpretation seems logical to that person, the act might be interpreted very differently by the actor or another independent observer.19 That may be why

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many criminal acts are committed by people who do not define themselves as criminals.20 To truly understand a criminal act, then, it is necessary to understand the act from the perspective of the actor, that is, from the actor’s definition of self, situation, and society.21

According to Mead, self-image, or conception of self, is constructed by a person’s interpretation of the way that person believes other people see him or her.22 Mead called this self-image “the self as a social construct.” Charles Cooley (1864–1929) referred to it as “the looking-glass self.”23 Thus, for example, if a child believes that other people believe he or she is bad or delinquent, then there is a good chance that he or she will believe it too.

People define their situations by the meanings they negotiate with other people. This may explain why two people can have entirely different concep- tions of ostensibly the same environment. For one life is interpreted as rosy; for the other, as hell. This difference of interpretation may resolve the problem of overprediction (i.e., the problem of positivist theories generally accounting for too much crime, and, at the same time, not explaining exceptions well).

Finally, conceptions of society are also formed through an interpretative process. Whether people view society as wonderful and full of opportunity or horrible and oppressive depends on how they interpret society within the con- text of their social interactions. For Mead, then, human behavior is explained by the meaning people give to self, situation, and society.

Labeling theory, or the “societal reaction” approach, uses this theoretical framework to explain why people commit crimes and conceive of themselves as criminals. As Howard Becker (1928– ) relates, “Social groups create deviance [crime] by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance [crime], and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders.”24

It is important to note that labeling theorists attempt to explain only what Edwin Lemert (1912–1996) called “secondary deviance.”25 For purposes of this discussion, secondary deviance is the commission of crime after the first criminal act, with the acceptance of a criminal label. Secondary deviance begins with an initial criminal act, or what Lemert called “primary deviance.” The causes of initial criminal acts are unspecified. Nevertheless, if society, especially official agents of the state, reacts negatively to an initial criminal act, the offender will likely be stigmatized, or negatively labeled. It is possible, even likely, that an initial criminal act will not be reacted to at all, or that the offender will not accept or internalize the negative label. However, if the negative label is successfully applied to the offender, the label may produce a self-fulfilling prophecy—a concept created by Robert Merton26—in which the offender’s self-image is defined by the label. Secondary deviance is the prophecy fulfilled.

The crime prevention implication of labeling theory is simply not to label or to employ “radical nonintervention.”27 This might be accomplished through de- criminalization (the elimination of many behaviors from the scope of the crimi- nal law), diversion (removing offenders from involvement in the criminal justice process), greater due process protections (replacing discretion with the rule of law), and deinstitutionalization (a policy of reducing jail and prison populations and construction).28

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As is well known, once a person is labeled and stereotyped as a “criminal,” he or she will probably be shunned by law-abiding society, have difficulty finding a good job, lose some civil rights (if convicted of a felony), and suffer a variety of other disabilities. The criminal (and delinquent) label is conferred by all of the agen- cies of criminal justice—the police, the courts, and the correctional apparatus—as well as the media, the schools, churches, and other social institutions. The irony is that in its attempt to reduce crime and delinquency, society may be inadvertently increasing it by labeling people and producing secondary deviance.29

A provocative alternative to the nonintervention strategy is John Braithwaite’s (1951– ) “reintegrative shaming.”30 Reintegrative shaming is a form of restorative justice, an alternative to the punitive justice currently used in the United States and many other countries.31 The primary goals of restorative justice are to restore the health of the community, repair the harm done, meet victims’ needs, and require the offender to contribute to those repairs. In Braithwaite’s reintegrative shaming, disappointment is expressed for the offender’s actions, the offender is shamed and punished, but, what is more important, following the expression of disappoint- ment and shame is a concerted effort on the part of the community to forgive the offender and reintegrate him or her back into society. Throughout this process, the offender is treated respectfully and empathically as a good person, who has committed a bad act, but who deserves to remain a member of the community.32

In contrast, stigmatizing shaming, a characteristic of the current U.S. criminal justice system, occurs when the wrongdoer is treated disrespectfully, labeled a bad person, and shunned, to some degree, by society.33 Braithwaite contends that the practice of reintegrative shaming is one of the primary reasons for Japan’s relatively low crime rate.34

Since its introduction in 1989, reintegrative shaming has received a fair amount of attention from researchers.35 Overall, the results of these studies are mixed.36 The analyses often compare the outcomes of restorative justice conferences to more traditional court processing. One recent experiment was designed to evaluate the effect of such conferences on recidivism among adult, drunk-driving offenders.37 Findings suggest that offenders assigned to restor- ative justice conferences were equally likely to reoffend as those who were assigned to traditional adjudication. However, a lower rate of recidivism and more overall support for the law were discovered for those offenders who believed the conference was procedurally fair, and that they had been truly forgiven and reintegrated.38 Considerable ethnographic research suggests that the emotional dynamics between the offender and the victim are key to the success of programs based on the ideals of reintegrative shaming.39

Labeling theory has been the subject of several criticisms. First, in taking the side of the “underdog”40 or adopting what Becker called an “unconventional sentimentality,”41 labeling theorists have been accused of tending to romanticize the criminal offender as a primitive revolutionary reacting to an unjust society. A problem with such a view is that it ignores the very real harm and suffering caused by those offenders. More times than not, offenders and their victims are from the same social groups. Victimizing members of one’s own group hardly can be considered liberating.

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Labeling theory has also been criticized for not being a theory at all but rather a “sensitizing perspective.”42 This criticism, moreover, has been acknowl- edged as valid by some of the social scientists (for example, Howard Becker) whose work is identified with the perspective.43 The criticism, however, in no way diminishes the contribution of labeling ideas.

Another criticism of labeling theory is that it does not explain primary devi- ance.44 Critics point out that the label does not create the criminal behavior in the first place. This criticism seems unfair, however, because labeling theorists are quite clear that the object of their theory is secondary and not primary deviance.

A more legitimate problem with labeling theory is that it tends to overem- phasize the importance of the official labeling process.45 On one hand, the im- pression is given that an oppressive society arbitrarily stigmatizes innocent people and that, as a result, they begin a life of crime.46 That scenario probably does not happen very often. On the other hand, the impression is given that offenders resist the criminal label and accept it only when they are no longer capable of fighting it.47 As for the latter, in some communities the label criminal, or some variation of it, is actively sought.48 In some cases, people develop criminal self- images without ever having been labeled criminal in the first place.49 Furthermore, if the delinquent label is so stigmatizing, why do most delinquents not engage in adult criminality (the problem of “maturational reform”)? For that matter, if the criminal label is so stigmatizing, why do most criminals stop their illegal activities when they reach middle age?50

Labeling theory has also been faulted for ignoring individual differences among criminal offenders. For example, critics contend that, whereas radical nonintervention or restorative justice may be appropriate for low-risk cases, it may not be appropriate for high-risk cases.51

A major problem with labeling theory is that it holds a simplistic view of the criminalization process.52 For example, as Becker maintains, “Social groups cre- ate deviance [crime] by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance [crime], and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders.”53 But what social groups create crime? What is missing in labeling theory is a coherent conception of the interrelationship of power, the state, and law creation.

Perhaps the most telling problem with labeling theory is the question whether the act of stigmatizing someone as criminal or delinquent causes more crime and delinquency than it prevents.54 To date, the answer is unknown.

C O N F L I C T C R I M I N O L O G Y

Unlike classical or neoclassical and positivist theories, which assume that society is characterized primarily by consensus, conflict theory assumes that society is based primarily on conflict between competing interest groups (for example, the rich against the poor, corporations against labor, Whites against minorities, men against women, adults against children, Protestants against Catholics, Democrats against Republicans). In many cases, competing interest groups are not equal in

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power and resources, and consequently one group is dominant and the other is subordinate.

Although they did not address crime per se, conflict criminology is based on the seminal ideas of the German sociologists Max Weber (1864–1920) and Georg Simmel (1858–1918), whose “liberal” ideas about social conflict, in large part, were a reaction to the more radical ideas of another German social thinker, Karl Marx (1818–1883). (Marx’s contribution to radical criminology is addressed in the next section.) One of the earliest theorists in the United States to apply conflict theory to the study of crime was George B. Vold (1896–1967). For Vold and other conflict theorists, such as Thorsten Sellin (1896–1994), Austin Turk (1934– ), Richard Quinney (1934– ), and William J. Chambliss (1933– ), many behaviors are defined as crimes because it is in the interests of dominant groups to do so.55 As for those behaviors that are in everyone’s interest to be defined as criminal, members of dominant groups are frequently able to violate them with impunity because of their control of the state. When they cannot escape punitive action, they usually face a civil remedy for administrative or reg- ulatory agency violations. Prison sentences are rarely imposed. They are also able to evade the most punitive penalties for their crimes by being able to hire the best attorneys. For conflict criminologists, people are only labeled as criminals when it is in the interests of dominant groups to do so; and because it is gener- ally not in the interest of dominant groups to label its own members as criminals, members of subordinate groups are more likely to be stigmatized in that way.

Dominant groups use crime and the criminal law, then, to control subordi- nates. However, the image that is projected for public consumption is quite dif- ferent. The public image is that the criminal law and the state that administers it are value-neutral institutions.56 That is, neither the law nor the state is presumed to have a vested interest in which party to a dispute “wins.” The only interest of the state and the law, at least as far as the public image is concerned, is in making sure that disputes between competing interest groups are resolved justly and, what is more important, peacefully. This public image allows dominant groups to create the impression that interests of the two groups are the same. This ploy legitimizes the authority and practices of dominant groups and allows them to surreptitiously achieve their own parochial interests, generally at the expense of other groups. Crime also serves the interests of dominant groups by deflecting the attention of subordinate group members from the exploitation they endure from dominant groups and turning that attention to other subordinate group members defined as criminal.57

All behavior, including criminal behavior, in this view, is the result of people acting in ways consistent with their social positions. Whether white-collar crime or ordinary street crime, crime is a response to a person’s social situation. The reason members of subordinate groups appear in official criminal statistics more frequently than members of dominant groups is that the latter are better able than the former to ensure that the responses of subordinate group members to their social situations will be defined and reacted to as criminal.58 For conflict theorists, the amount of crime in a society is a function of the extent of conflict generated by stratification,

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hierarchical relationships, power differentials, or the ability of some groups to dominate other groups in that society. Crime, in short, is caused by relative powerlessness.59

Conflict theory has two principal crime prevention implications. On one hand, dominant groups could cede some of their power to subordinate groups, making the latter groups more powerful and reducing conflict.60 Increasing equality in that way might be accomplished by redistributing wealth through a more progressive taxation scheme, for example. On the other hand, dominant group members could become more effective rulers and subordinate group members better subjects. To do so, dominant groups would have to do a better job of convincing subordinate groups that the current inequitable distribution of power in society is legitimate and in their mutual interests. Members of subordi- nate groups, in turn, would have to either believe it or resign themselves to their inferior status. Either way, dominant group members hope that over time subor- dinate group members will learn to follow those who dominate them.

Conflict theory has been criticized by psychologists for ignoring individual differences among criminal offenders.61 Critics charge that conflict theorists ignore the variation in how people respond to relative powerlessness and the conflict that often results. Conflict theorists fail to explain why criminal offen- ders choose particular crimes to commit. Ignored in conflict theory are such important factors as the opportunity, intelligence, and skills necessary to com- mit various crimes.62

A related problem is that people, at either the individual or group level, are rarely totally dominated or dominating.63 At the individual level, people may be dominant in one group (for example, the family) but subordinate in another (for instance, at the workplace). At the group level, people may simultaneously be members of both dominant and subordinate groups. For example, they may be members of a dominant economic or political group but, at the same time, also be members of subordinate religious, racial, or ethnic groups. Further- more, the status of groups or the status of individuals within groups, as either dominant or subordinate, may change over time.

Conflict theorists may also overestimate the extent of conflict in society over moral values, at least with regard to some types of crime. Numerous studies (albeit older ones) show that the American public, regardless of race or class, al- most universally condemns crimes involving theft and violence.64 Still, while there may be near universal condemnation of crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery, people may nonetheless differ on what they believe constitutes murder, rape, and robbery. For example, were the actions of the Ford Motor Company executives, discussed in the last section, murder? Is euthanasia murder?

Another criticism is that, like positivists, some conflict theorists delude them- selves into believing that they can be value-neutral or objective in their work—or at least be able to approximate it.65 For example, Turk writes:

Nonpartisan conflict theory and analysis assumes that the ideological bent of theorists or the political utilities of theories are irrelevant for assessing the validity of knowledge claims.… Recognizing that values can never be totally excluded from the research process, nonpartisan conflict analysts

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also recognize that approximations to value-neutral procedures and knowledge are possible.66

As noted previously, most critical criminologists believe that it is impossible for human beings (including criminologists) to be value-neutral or objective in anything, or even to approximate such a state.

Problems also arise when conflict theory is confused with radical theory, as is frequently the case. (Radical theory is presented in the next section.) The two theories are not the same.67 For example, conflict theory is less specific than radi- cal theory in the identification of causes of crime. Whereas conflict theory speci- fies stratification or relative powerlessness as criminogenic factors, radical theory focuses on the political and economic structures of society.68 In this regard, a problem with conflict theory is that it generally fails to identify the sources of power in society.69 When those sources are identified, power is usually attributed to the personal characteristics of elites (for example, they are smarter, better edu- cated, luckier, and better able to defer immediate gratification). The problem is that conflict theory ignores the social structural sources of power in society (for example, ownership of private property). Conflict theory presumes, in contrast to radical theory, that power is the basis of private property rather than vice versa.70

Another major difference between conflict and radical theories is the errone- ous assumption, held by conflict theorists, that radical theorists believe that power in society is the exclusive possession of a “capitalist ruling class.” Conflict theorists argue, instead, that different groups in society possess and exercise varying degrees of power.71 In addition, conflict theorists maintain that conflict is not historically or socially limited to a particular type of society (for instance, capitalism), as they assume radical theorists believe. Conflict theorists maintain that conflict is a fun- damental element of all societies.72 The problem is that conflict theorists funda- mentally misunderstand the radical position. First, radical theorists do not deny that conflict is a fundamental element of all societies. Second, radical theorists rec- ognize the existence of many conflicting interest groups that wield varying de- grees of power in society. However, for radical theorists, the existence of more or less powerful and oftentimes conflicting interest groups does not preclude the existence of “classes” (especially under capitalism); instead, they are considered two different phenomena. The primary difference between interest groups and classes is that usually an individual may voluntarily align him- or herself with any number of interest groups, whereas his or her class position in society is dic- tated by his or her relation to the means of production, whether or not he or she owns property, and the type of property he or she owns (see next section on radical theory).73

A final difference between conflict and radical theories, and a criticism of conflict theory, is that conflict theory is basically reformist—that is, it is not radical.74 Politically, conflict theory is liberal. Conflict theory assumes that social problems like crime can be corrected by the existing social institutions. Thus, for example, if only the agencies of criminal justice were more effective, a conflict theorist might argue, crime would be greatly reduced. However, historical evidence suggests that this may be a dubious assumption.

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R A D I C A L C R I M I N O L O G Y

Although the German social theorist Karl Marx (1818–1883) wrote very little about crime and criminal justice, radical theories of crime causation are gener- ally based on a Marxist theoretical framework that interrelates the capitalist mode of production, the state, law, crime control, and crime—as well as other relevant factors.75 Within this view, there are three competing interpretations of how the aforementioned factors are interrelated: the ruling-class determi- nist (or instrumentalist), the economic determinist (or structuralist), and the dialectical.

Before examining the three different interpretations, however, some defi- nitions and a brief introduction to Marxist theory might prove useful. First, in Marx’s methodology for analyzing society, historical-materialism, stages of social history are distinguished by different modes of production. A mode of production refers to the means by which people produce the material goods necessary for their existence (for example, slavery, feudalism, capitalism, and socialism). An individual’s relationship to the mode or means of production determines his or her class position in society (for instance, ruling class or working class) and, ulti- mately, his or her share of social wealth. Class position is also presumably “an important determinant of such basic life events as social mobility, conscious- ness, level and types of education and income, leisure patterns, and … the like- lihood of incarceration.”76 In capitalist societies, a numerically small capitalist ruling class owns the means of production and receives a greatly disproportion- ate share of social wealth, primarily by means of rent, interest, and profit. A numerically large working class, on the other hand, labors for capitalists to earn wages and receives only a small fraction of social wealth.

Returning to the three interpretations, in the ruling-class determinist or in- strumentalist interpretation, a mostly homogeneous group of capitalists is able to manipulate the state and the law for its own parochial interests. It is able to do this through, among other things, financially controlling political campaigns, especially at the national level. In the economic determinist or structuralist interpre- tation, by contrast, the functions of the state are presumed to be determined by structures of society (for example, “the market” or “the law”) rather than by people who occupy positions of state power or by individual capitalists. In this version, the survival of the capitalist system, even at the expense of individual capitalists or their agents, is of paramount importance. Finally, the dialectical interpretation combines the other two interpretations and adds that which inter- pretation is more correct at any given time is historically contingent. In the dialectical interpretation, moreover, the state and the law are not viewed only as repressive institutions that promote the interests of the capitalist ruling class over those of all others but also as having liberating potential (for example, antidiscrimination legislation and enforcement). The Dutch socialist, Willem Bonger (1876–1940) introduced one of the earliest versions of a radical theory of crime.77 Among the first criminologists in the United States to employ one or the other versions of radical theory were Richard Quinney, William J. Chambliss, and Anthony M. Platt (1942– ).78 Also influential in the early

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development of radical criminology were British criminologists Ian Taylor (1944–2001), Paul Walton (1944– ), and Jock Young (1942– ).

In general, radical criminologists focus their attention on the social arrange- ments of society, especially on political and economic structures and institutions (the “political economy”) of capitalism. They argue that in capitalist societies, a very small percentage of people are the big winners in the individualistic and competitive struggle for material wealth, and the rest of the population are losers (relatively speaking). The winners (the really big winners are members of the ruling class) do everything in their considerable power (which they possess by virtue of their ownership of material wealth) to keep from becoming losers, in- cluding taking advantage of other people—preying on them. Losers (members of the working class and the nonworking classes), in an effort to become winners, usually do what the winners do and prey on weaker people. Radical criminolo- gists believe that the more unevenly wealth is distributed in a society, the more likely people are able to find persons weaker than themselves. In fact, “a reason- ably strong case can be made that the economic inequality in a society—that is, the gap between the richest and the poorest—has a causal impact on the level of violence in that society.”79

However, it is important to understand that, for radical criminologists, the destructive effects of capitalism, such as crime, are not caused directly by income or property inequality or poverty per se. Rather, crime is a product of the politi- cal economy that, in capitalist societies, encourages an individualistic competition among wealthy people and among poor people and between rich and poor peo- ple (the intra- and interclass struggle) and the practice of taking advantage of other people (exploitation). The class struggle and exploitation, in turn, produce crime, income or property inequality, poverty, and many of the other problems that are characteristics of a capitalist society. In short, for radical criminologists, crime in capitalist societies is often a rational response to the circumstances in which people find themselves in the individualistic and competitive struggle to acquire material wealth. Wilson and Herrnstein, though not radical criminologists themselves, sug- gest that one of the reasons that Japan has much less crime per capita than the United States, even though Japan too is a capitalist society, is the Japanese empha- sis on group achievement, as opposed to the American emphasis on individual achievement.80 The Japanese emphasis on group achievement is derived from the Confucian principle that “the individual is expected to subordinate his own identity to the interest of the group.”81

According to radical criminologists, “senseless” violent crime, which most often is committed by poor people against each other, is frequently a product of the demoralizing and brutalizing conditions under which many people are forced to live. In short, as Taylor, Walton, and Young explain, “It is not that man behaves [under capitalism] as an animal because of his ‘nature’: it is that he is not fundamentally allowed by virtue of the social arrangements of production to do otherwise.”82 Elliott Currie (1942– ) has specified seven elements of “mar- ket societies” that, in combination, are likely to breed serious violent crime. They are: (1) “the progressive destruction of livelihood” (the absence of steady well-paying work); (2) “the growth of extremes of economic inequality and

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material deprivation”; (3) “the withdrawal of public services and supports, especially for families and children”; (4) “the erosion of informal and communal networks of mutual support, supervision, and care”; (5) “the spread of a material- istic, neglectful, and ‘hard’ culture” (the exaltation of “often brutal individual competition and consumption over the values of community, contribution, and productive work”); (6) “the unregulated marketing of the technology of violence” (the absence of public regulation of firearms); and, not least, (7) “the weakening of social and political alternatives” (which inhibits people most “at risk” from defin- ing their problems in collective terms and envisioning a collective response).83

None of this means that noncapitalist societies will be crime-free. Rather noncapitalist societies should have different types of crime and much lower rates of crime (as traditionally defined) “because the less intense class struggle should reduce the forces leading to and the functions of crime.”84

It is important to emphasize that radical criminologists define the concept of crime differently than is the custom of traditional criminologists. Because they assume that criminal law is all too often manipulated to benefit particular inter- ests to the detriment of all others, radical criminologists argue that the legal defi- nition of crime is both too narrow and too broad in scope. Radical criminologists maintain that “crime” should be defined as a violation of human rights. As Platt explains:

A radical perspective defines crime as a violation of politically-defined human rights: the truly egalitarian rights to decent food and shelter, to human dignity and self-determination, rather than the so-called right to compete for an unequal share of wealth and power.85

A radical definition of crime includes “imperialism, racism, capitalism, sexism and other systems of exploitation which contribute to human misery and deprive people of their human potentiality.”86 Although many behaviors currently pro- scribed by criminal law would be included in this radical definition, other beha- viors now considered crimes would be excluded (such as victimless crimes or crimes of consumption), and some behaviors not now considered crimes would be added (such as racism, sexism, imperialism).87

Radical criminologists’ definition of crime—as a violation of human rights— is reflected in an impressive body of work yielding support for their theory. In a recent evaluation of the current status of empirical work in this area, Lynch, Schwendinger, and Schwendinger find:

Over the past fifteen years, radical criminologists have published numerous empirical studies addressing a wide range of factors including: crime and delinquency; public health and safety; violence against women; victimization; racial bias in criminal justice processes; corporate, white collar and state crime; trends in imprisonment, policing and crime; media reporting of crime; and environmental harms, crimes and justice. This research draws on literature from economics, political science, public policy, sociology, anthropology, environmental science, geography, epidemiology, and medicine.88

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One specific area of research that has garnered the attention of several radical criminologists is the unequal geographic distribution of environmental harms (e.g., exposure to hazardous waste, pesticides, and other environmental toxins) across communities.89 Exposure to environmental harms has been shown to have detrimental effects on health, including a wide variety of cancers, asthma, birth defects, learning disabilities, and IQ deficits.90 In a series of studies, Stretesky and Lynch have shown that residents in poor and minority communities are much more likely to live near hazardous waste sites and be exposed to chemi- cal accidents than those residing in more affluent or White areas.91 This pattern is consistent with respect to public schools as well. Schools with a high percentage of African-American students are more likely than majority White schools to be closer in proximity to hazardous waste sites.92 Finally, when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fined violating companies, the penalty amounts were lower for violations occurring in minority and poor areas than for those in White or wealthier communities.93 Findings such as these “indicate that the EPA does a poor job of providing equal protection to racially and economically diverse communities.”94

Among the policy implications of radical theory is to reconceptualize the definition of crime in terms of violations of human rights. Another is to demon- strate that the criminal law on which the definition of crime is currently based is “used by the state and the ruling class to secure the survival of the capitalist sys- tem, and, as capitalist society is further threatened by its own contradictions, criminal law will be increasingly used in the attempt to maintain domestic order.”95 Among the contradictions of capitalism are structured unemployment (where a 4 or 5 percent peacetime unemployment rate is generally considered “full employment”); the exportation of higher-paying manufacturing jobs to Third World countries and their replacement with lower-paying service-sector jobs (the service-sector jobs also frequently lack the health and retirement bene- fits commonly available with manufacturing jobs); inflation (which occurs when the supply of goods fails to meet the demand); recession (which is a temporary decline in business activity during a period when such activity has been generally increasing); and depression (which is a period marked by a decrease of business activity, greatly increased unemployment, falling prices and wages, and so forth).

Radical criminologists, following the lead of Marx and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), point out that criminal law serves the interests of the ruling class in at least three ways.96 First, it promotes and protects all private property, even though only a small percentage of the population, which includes the ruling class, owns most of the private property. Second, through concepts such as “jus- tice,” “the rule of law,” and “equality before the law,” criminal law gives the impression that it stands above society as an impartial arbiter of conflicts, thus hiding its origins in political and economic interests, especially those of the ruling class. As Beirne and Messerschmidt observe, “To apply law fairly and equally in a society of inequality is merely to perpetuate inequality.”97 Third, the crimi- nal law is a repressive institution, as noted earlier, able to incapacitate (by impri- soning or executing) people who threaten the capitalist system. Still other implications of radical theory are to expose the criminal justice system as a

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“state-initiated” and “state-supported” effort to rationalize social control and even- tually to replace the criminal justice system with “popular” or “socialist justice.”98

Consequently, contrary to the beliefs of many liberal criminologists, radical criminologists argue that reform of capitalist institutions, especially those of the criminal justice system, cannot legitimately be expected to eradicate the initial causes of crime for two reasons:

First, capitalism depends quite substantially on the preservation of the conditions of competition and inequality. Those conditions … will tend to lead almost inevitably to relatively pervasive criminal behavior; without those conditions, the capitalist system would scarcely work at all. Second, as many have argued, the general presence of racism in this country, though capitalists may not in fact have created it, tends to support and maintain the power of the capitalists as a class by providing cheap labor and dividing the working class.99

For nearly all radical criminologists (anarchists are exceptions100), the solution to the problem of crime is a socialist society in which human diversity would presumably be appreciated as it is not under capitalism.101 Such a transformation would in turn require the development of a political consciousness among all people who are exploited and alienated by the capitalist system. Perhaps most im- portantly for radical criminologists, only through praxis (human action based on theory) will the new socialist society be achieved. Currie believes that at present, the most promising lever of change, and at the same time the most effective means to significantly reduce serious violent crime, is “full employment at socially meaningful work at good wages, and with reasonable hours.”102 Such a policy would require “substantially expanding employment in the public and nonprofit sectors of the economy, and developing policies for worksharing and reduction of work time.”103

One objection to radical theory is that the radical definition of crime as the violation of human rights is itself too broad and vague. Although that view may be true, in a different context, legal philosopher Edmond Cahn noted that al- though it is often difficult to determine what is just, most people can easily iden- tify what is unjust.104 Perhaps in a like manner, it may be equally difficult to determine what a human right is, but radical criminologists generally assume that most people know when a human right has been violated.

A second problem with radical theory is the failure to adequately address the question of how working and nonworking people become conscious of their class interests.105 In other words, how do people learn that they are in a class struggle? To date, the ruling class has been able to effectively undermine the ability of workers (and the unemployed) to become conscious of their class inter- ests by, among other tactics: (1) the creation of job hierarchies and structures of privileges and promotions; (2) the dispersion and disintegration of working-class communities through suburbanization, increasing homeownership (at least until recent years), and geographic mobility; and (3) the creation by the media of a fear of crime that undermines the organization and solidarity of the groups most victimized by crime and most in need of organization and solidarity to

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realize their interests.106 In a longitudinal analysis, Beckett shows that political rhetoric about crime precedes increases in citizen concerns about crime. She sug- gests that political elites manipulate public perceptions of crime and what should be done about it (“getting tough”) ostensibly for political gain.107

A related problem is the question of how people realize their class interests once they become conscious of them—that is, what is the relationship between theory and praxis?108 Presumably, class interests are realized through a synthesis of communicative interaction (knowledge) and labor (action), so that actions occasion consciousness of knowledge which in turn informs subsequent action, and so forth.109 A problem with this explanation is that it fails to account for obvious constraints on consciousness (for example, false consciousness), theo- retical knowledge, and practical choice. As Marx pointed out, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.”110

Psychologists have criticized class-based (that is, radical and some critical) theories for ignoring individual differences in the understanding of crime.111

The argument is that political economy, social structure, and culture are consid- ered constants (and not variables) in class-based theories and that they “cannot account for variation in individual conduct within particular social arrangements” (though they do “have important roles to play in establishing the fundamental contingencies that are in effect within each particular social arrangement”).112

In short, for these critics, political economy, social structure, and culture cannot adequately explain individual differences in criminality (for example, why one type of crime rather than another is committed), but they do determine what stimuli are rewarding or aversive within each particular social arrangement.113

Many sociologists, on the other hand, believe that social structures and cultures are variables and not constants.114

Other criticisms of radical theory are that its adherents are pursuing a politi- cal agenda and thus are not objective in their work; that its causal model is wrong—in other words, that social arrangements do not cause people to commit crime, as radical theorists argue, but rather that crime is committed by people who are born evil and remain evil; that it has not been tested satisfactorily; that it cannot be tested satisfactorily; and that it is utopian in its policy implications.115

The accusation of utopianism (utopia means “nowhere”) is most frequently directed at radical theory’s assumption that socialism is the solution to the crime problem in capitalist societies. At a time when many so-called socialist or commu- nist nations are racing to adopt free-market economies (capitalism), the assumption seems questionable at best. However, radical criminologists maintain that none of the nations that have claimed to be socialist or communist were or are truly so- cialist or communist, at least as Marx had originally conceived the terms. They say it is unfair to look to the totalitarian nations that were socialist or communist in name only for guidance in dealing with the crime problems of capitalist societies.

Today, it probably makes little sense to speak of capitalist and socialist socie- ties anyway, because no pure societies of either type exist. (They probably never did.) All countries now manifest elements of both capitalism and socialism. In the United States, for example, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other social programs provided by federal, state, and local governments are clearly socialistic,

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as is so-called corporate welfare, such as the many subsidies and tax loopholes for corporations. Thus, in the twenty-first century, we must recognize that all coun- tries have “mixed” economies, with elements of both capitalism and socialism. A key question, then, especially for those people who are interested in reducing the crime problem and improving the overall quality of human life, is, What is the best mix?

F E M I N I S T C R I M I N O L O G Y

Feminism refers to the doctrine—and the political movement based on it—“that women should have the same economic, social, and political rights as men.”116

Feminist theory informs many social sciences including sociology, psychology, anthropology, as well as criminology. The application of feminist theory to criminology, however, is fairly recent,117 despite the fact that gender is one of the strongest and most consistent correlates of crime.118 Feminist criminology “re- fers to that body of criminological research and theory that situates the study of crime and criminal justice within a complex understanding that the social world is systematically shaped by relations of sex and gender.”119

Recognizing that the study of crime has always been androcentric (male- centered), feminist criminologists seek a feminine perspective. Specifically, the fo- cus of feminist analyses is on women’s experiences and ways of knowing because, in the past, men’s experiences have been taken as the norm and generalized to the population. As a result, women and girls have been omitted almost entirely from general theories of crime and delinquency.

Three areas of inquiry have commanded most of feminist criminologists’ at- tention: (1) the victimization of women, (2) gender differences in criminal offend- ing, and (3) gendered justice (that is, the treatment of women and girls by the agencies and agents of the criminal justice system). Regarding gender differences in criminal offending, two questions seem to dominate: Do explanations of male criminality apply to women? Why are women less likely than men to engage in crime?

Not all feminist criminologists address these areas in the same manner. At least four different types of feminist thought have been identified: liberal, radical, Marxist, and socialist. Liberal feminism was the earliest form of feminist criminol- ogy. Liberal feminists operate within existing social structures (they are not radi- cal) to remove the obstacles to women’s full participation in social life. Liberal feminists seek equal opportunity, equal rights, and freedom of choice. As for crime, liberal feminist criminologists point to gender socialization (that is, the creation of masculine and feminine identities) as the primary culprit.120

Radical feminist criminologists, on the other hand, believe that patterns of female offending, female victimization, and the disparate treatment of women by the justice system are the result of the institution of patriarchy. Patriarchy is “a deeply entrenched system in which males exert dominance through their power (financial and, if necessary, physical) and a hegemonic culture that defines male ways of doing things as ‘normal’ and male control of women as legitimate.”121

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Radical feminists argue that patriarchal relations predate both class and private property as sources of women’s oppression. Consequently, a socialist society that has not eliminated patriarchal relations will do little to emancipate women from their subordinate position. The goal for radical feminists is the abolition of patriarchal relationships.122

Marxist feminists combine radical feminism with Marxism.123 They argue that “the root of male dominance lies in men’s ownership and control of the means of economic production [and that] patriarchy is tied to the economic structure of capitalism.”124 Consequently, for them, the solution lies in the trans- formation of capitalism to socialism. They envision a socialist society where housework and child care are socialized, marriage and other sexual relations based on ideas of private property are abolished, and working-class economic subordination is eliminated.125

Finally, socialist feminists combine the positions of radical and Marxist fem- inists by viewing gender and class relations as coequal sources of oppression that have psychological, cultural, and social roots. According to socialist feminists, women are much more at the mercy of their bodies than men, namely through menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, and nursing. This renders women depen- dent upon men for protection and survival, and lays the groundwork for male domination.126 Socialist feminists argue that to address this inequality, women must take control of their reproductive options, and patriarchal and capitalist class relations must be transformed simultaneously.127

Recently, a concerted effort has been made within all four traditions to be attentive to the intersection of race, class, sexual orientation, and gender, because of the realization that “women’s experiences of gender vary according to their po- sition in racial and class hierarchies.”128 This new focus comes in response to earlier criticisms that the feminist movement was largely about White, middle-class women who, for the most part, ignored women of color and poor women.129

Feminist criminologists have produced a considerable amount of empirical research.130 Much of this work, as noted previously, focuses on two areas: (1) the degree to which traditional, male-centered theories apply to female crime and (2) the gender ratio problem (why women are less likely than men to com- mit crime). With respect to the first concern, several studies demonstrate that the variables that explain male crime also explain crime committed by women and girls.131 Elements from differential association, control theory, anomie theory, and routine activities theory have been shown to apply to female and male crime, although the nature of the relationships often vary across gender.132 For example, direct control is more salient in reducing delinquency among boys, while indirect control is more important for girls.133

With respect to the gender ratio problem, Heimer and De Coster combine feminist theory with differential association theory in an effort to understand gen- der differences in violent, adolescent delinquency.134 In so doing, they are “gen- dering” differential association theory and exploring how its propositions apply differently to boys and girls. Their results suggest that association with delinquent peers is a significant predictor of delinquency among both boys and girls, but boys are more likely than girls to associate with delinquent peers. Furthermore, boys

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are more likely than girls to learn definitions favorable to violence because boys are subject to less familial control than girls. Girls, on the other hand, are controlled in more “subtle and covert” ways and are taught that violence is inconsistent with what it means to be feminine.135 Nonetheless, some criminologists contend that these theories do not adequately explain why boys are more likely than girls to associate with delinquent peers, or why boys have less self-control than girls.136

Feminist criminologists do not study only women, but some of them also study how gender shapes the behavior of both men (and boys) and women (and girls). In his book, Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Reconceptualization of Theory (1993), James Messerschmidt (1951– ) calls on criminologists to consider how gender is manifested in male violence. In other words, how does “being male” influence male violence and aggression against women? Although the United States is a patriarchal society, not all men are dominant in every arena. Consequently, some may seek to demonstrate their masculinity (what Messersch- midt calls “doing gender”) through crime, especially when legitimate avenues through which masculinity can be demonstrated are blocked.137

One of the principal criticisms of feminist criminology is its tendency to ele- vate gender to the critical factor in explaining crime, even though it is not the most critical factor always or in all situations. In some cases, race or class, for example, may be equally or more important.138

Another problem with feminist criminology is many feminists’ contradictory position toward the state. On one hand, several feminists call for greater use of the state and its agents to better protect women from abuse; on the other hand, some feminists concede that giving more power to the state and its agents, under present circumstances, will only lead to further discrimination and harassment of minority males and females.139 A similar contradictory position is held by many feminists toward using the law to improve gender relations. The law, after all, is almost entirely the product of White males.

B R I T I S H O R L E F T R E A L I S M

The focus of many critical criminologists has been on crimes committed by the powerful. While pursuing that area of study, however, they have tended either to ignore or to romanticize working-class crime and criminals. By the mid- 1980s, a group of social scientists in Great Britain had begun to criticize that tendency and to argue that critical criminologists needed to redirect their atten- tion to the fear and the very real victimization experienced by working-class in- dividuals.140 These “left realists” correctly observed that crimes against the working class were being perpetrated not only by the powerful but also by members of the working class. They admonished their critical colleagues to take crime seriously, especially street crime and domestic violence. One of the leading exponents of left realism, Jock Young, has identified relative deprivation as a potent, though not exclusive, cause of crime.141

Not willing to wait for the socialist revolution promised by “left idealists” and, by default, cede criminal justice policy to conservative law-and-order types,

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left realists have argued that, among other things, police power must be em- ployed to protect people living in working-class communities. Also advocated by left realists are greater community involvement and dealing with structural problems that cause offending. Examples of the latter include reducing unfair income inequities and providing good jobs with a future, neighborhoods of which residents can be proud, and community facilities that enhance a sense of cohesion and belonging.142

Left realism has been criticized for holding a contradictory position toward the state. On one hand, left realists want to give the state more power to combat crime, especially crime committed against the working class. On the other hand, they want to reduce the power of the state to intervene in citizens’ lives and make the state more accountable for its actions.143 Another criticism is that in their effort to focus attention on crimes committed against the working class, left realists have deflected attention from white-collar and government crimes.144

Left realism’s emphasis on the reform of criminal justice practice, rather than on radical change, has been criticized for being little different from traditional, mainstream criminology.145 Finally, feminists have argued that left realists, like most radical and critical criminologists, have remained “gender blind” and “gen- der biased,” failing to appreciate the “activism, research, and theory drawn from women’s experiences.”146

P E A C E M A K I N G C R I M I N O L O G Y

This perspective rejects the idea that predatory criminal violence can be reduced by repressive state violence. In this view, “wars” on crime only make matters worse. Consisting of a mixture of anarchism, humanism, socialism, and Native American and Eastern philosophies, peacemaking criminology suggests that the solution to all social problems, including crime, is the transformation of human beings, mutual dependence, reduction of hierarchical structures, creation of com- munities of caring people, and universal social justice. For peacemaking crimin- ologists, such as Hal Pepinsky (1945– ) and Richard Quinney,147 crime is suffering, and, therefore, to reduce crime, suffering must be reduced. Emphasis is placed on the transformation of human beings, on an inner rebirth or spiritual rejuvenation (inner peace) that enables individuals to experience empathy with those less fortunate and respond to other people’s needs. Peacemaking criminol- ogists also advocate “restorative justice,” which was discussed previously as a pol- icy implication of interactionism and labeling theories. In short, for peacemaking criminologists, it is necessary for people to first change themselves before they can change the world.

Peacemaking criminology can be criticized for its extreme idealism and em- phasis on the transformation of individuals (as a way of transforming society) rather than the transformation of society (as a way of transforming individuals). It has also been criticized for not providing a blueprint of how such transforma- tions can be achieved.148

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P O S T M O D E R N C R I M I N O L O G Y

Postmodernism is a direction in critical theory that is difficult to both define and comprehend. It originated in the late 1960s as a rejection of the “modern” or Enlightenment belief in scientific rationality as the route to knowledge and prog- ress. Postmodernist ideas first appeared in law and criminology during the late 1980s149 and emphasize three key issues: (1) the centrality of language; (2) partial knowledge and provisional truth; and (3) deconstruction, difference, and possibility.150

First, language (written or spoken) shapes reality.151 To think of something, anything, without first placing it into words is impossible. Language is necessary to express feelings, ideas, passions, and thoughts; thus, language shapes or “speaks” our reality. Bruce Arrigo (1960– ) poses this provocative question: “If words define us, our interaction with others, and the institutions in which we work and play, what implicit values and/or hidden assumptions are contained in the language we use to convey our thoughts?”152 For postmodernists, lan- guage has tremendous power, and some discourses, that is the prevailing ways of describing the world, such as “legalese,” medical language, or “professor- speak,” are valued over others.

Second, because language structures thought in ways that are neither neutral nor complete, then “rationality, logic, and meaning (components of reality con- struction) are limited by the (dominant) language in use. Thus, not only are en- tire fields of understanding devalued or repudiated, but what we come to regard as meaningful is itself forever incomplete.… As a result, what we take to be ‘truth,’ as an articulated expression of knowledge, can, at best, be defined merely as a provisional, relational, and/or positional reality.”153

Finally, for postmodernists, because truth is not absolute, but relative to our position, experience, and language, the world is uncertain and random; there is no “real” truth “out there.”154 Deconstruction is a method used by many postmodernists to interpret this randomness. Its purpose is to “unveil the implicit assumptions and hidden values … embedded within a particular narrative” and to expose how certain discourses and ways of knowing are privileged over others.155 Postmodernists seek to identify the differences in language and to place them all in a valued and respected position. In other words, “postmodernism seeks to include the voices of those whose understand- ing of the world would otherwise remain dormant and concealed.”156 Further, with respect to criminology, specifically, “the language of possibility means that expressions of law, crime, and justice must reflect the multiple and disparate ways different people (or collectives) come to experience, know, and live reality.”157

With regard to “the Law,” postmodernist criminologists reject the idea “that there is only one true interpretation of a law or for that matter the U.S. Constitution.”158 They argue, instead, that there is a plurality of interpretations that are dependent, in part, on the particular social context in which they arise. As in other critical criminologies, the law, from a postmodernist view, always has a human author and a political agenda.159 As for crime theories, postmodernist

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criminologists typically abandon the usual notion of causation. From the post- modernist perspective:

crime is seen to be the culmination of certain processes that allow persons to believe that they are somehow not connected to other humans and society. These processes place others into categories or stereotypes and make them different or alien, denying them their humanity. These processes result in the denial of responsibility for other people and to other people.160

Postmodern criminologists would replace the formal criminal justice apparatus with informal social controls so that the current functions of criminal justice are handled by local groups and local communities.161 This strategy is consistent with the one advocated by peacemaking criminologists.

Postmodernism and deconstructionist analysis, especially the more radical versions, have been criticized “for not valuing anything, and for a belief that ‘anything goes’ … for being an anarchy of knowledge … [for their] subjectivism, plural relativism, and nihilism.”162 In short, as Einstadter and Henry ask, “If truth is not possible, how can we decide anything?”163 Some critical criminologists, most notably Stuart Henry (1949– ) and Dragan Milovanovic (1948– ), have attempted to overcome those charges and have used postmodernist thought to create a “constitutive criminology.”164

Henry and Milovanovic’s constitutive criminology, unlike skeptical versions of postmodernism, which they characterize as nihilistic, subjective, and defeatist, offers an affirmative, optimistic, and humanistic approach emphasizing recon- struction and redirection. Ultimately, Henry and Milovanovic hope their the- ory will inform social policies that produce less, rather than more harm.

Constitutive criminology assumes that human beings socially construct their world primarily through language and symbolic representation but, at the same time, are also shaped by the world they create. Two contradictions of this process are that (1) people come to reify the world they create (that is, they forget, if they ever knew, that they are producers of their social world) and (2) the institu- tions and structures people create frequently become the sources of social con- straint and domination—as do attempts to oppose them. The optimism of Henry and Milovanovic’s theory lies in the belief that, as creators, human beings are capable of changing the institutions and structures that dominate and constrain them. In constitutive criminology, people are “coproducers” of reality and their actions can be both constraining and liberating.

Thus, humans are also coproducers of crime—“the ultimate form of reification”—because of the social and organizational structures they create. Crime, in this theory, is a “socially constructed and discursively constituted category.” It is “the power to deny others,” “to create harm (pain) in any context,” or to render “others powerless to make their own difference.” Criminals are “ ‘excessive in- vestors’ in the accumulation and expression of power and control.” They are not, however, a distinct category in constitutive criminology as they are in most modernist theories. In constitutive criminology, there is continuity and in- terrelatedness between law-abiding and law-violating or between harm-reducing and harm-producing (see Matza’s theory of drift).165

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In short, constitutive criminology presumes that crime is the result of powerlessness or power differentials—the position of liberal as opposed to more radical versions of conflict theory. It also incorporates a tenet of early la- beling theory that “crime feeds off itself, expanding and consuming the energies intended to control it.” A problem with this conceptualization is that, like liberal versions of conflict theory, sources of power and power differentials in constitutive criminology are not fully explained or appreciated. By focusing on the linguistic production of reality, Henry and Milovanovic tend to downplay (but do not ignore) the relationship between power and the material conditions of production, such as the ownership of private property and wealth.

The general policy implications of constitutive criminology are twofold: (1) “crime must be deconstructed as a recurrent discursive [that is, linguistic] pro- cess,” and (2) “conscious attempts must be made at reconstruction with a view to preventing [crime’s] recurrence.” The primary way to accomplish those policies is “the development of alternative, ‘replacement discourses’ that fuel positive so- cial constructions … designed to displace crime as moments in the exercise of power as control.” “Discourses,” as noted, are the prevailing ways of describing the world. Replacement discourses, created by “cultural revolutionaries,” will deconstruct prevailing meanings and displace them with “new conceptions, dis- tinctions, words and phrases, which convey alternative meanings.”166 A classic example of replacement discourse is Sutherland’s concept of “white-collar crime,” which he successfully introduced into the criminological lexicon. Re- placement discourses will “tell different stories” about the world as experienced by historically subjugated people. Through their discursive diversity, replacement discourses celebrate “unofficial, informal, discounted and ignored knowledges.” The creation of replacement discourses is an ongoing struggle.

Henry and Milovanovic stress that replacement discourses, once created, must extend beyond the walls of academia to the public arena through such ave- nues as the news media and popular culture. A primary vehicle for accomplishing this goal is Gregg Barak’s (1948– ) “newsmaking criminology,” where criminol- ogists proactively demystify or deconstruct crime stories presented by the media and offer more authentic crime stories of their own.167 Barak’s “newsmaking criminology” has been absorbed into a broader “cultural criminology,” which integrates Mead’s symbolic interactionism and subcultural theory in an effort to deconstruct crime and crime control during late modernity or late capitalism.168

For these new cultural criminologists, “style matters,” and so, for them, their replacement discourses are animated by provocative prose and incendiary images designed to be enthralling and persuasive to a late modern audience.169

If replacement discourses are to be successful, a transformation or reorganiza- tion of the political economy is necessary. For Henry and Milovanovic, the best hope for societal-level or structural transformation is a variant of Roberto Unger’s (1947– ) “superliberalism” (that is, a practical, political philosophy that aims to max- imize diversity and minimize hegemony by creating “a society in which people are more fully empowered through the development of institutional arrangements that both diminish the gap between framework-preserving routine and framework- transforming conflict and weaken the established forms of social division and

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hierarchy”).170 Henry and Milovanovic expect that such structural transformation will meet with resistance as excessive investors use all means at their disposal (such as cooptation and subversion) to undermine it. Consequently, the societal and cul- tural transformations advocated in constitutive criminology will require continuous and relentless social struggle.

S T U D Y Q U E S T I O N S

Critical Theories

1. What are the origins of critical theory in the United States?

2. How do critical theories differ from classical/neoclassical and positivist theories?

Interactionism and Labeling Theory

3. What contribution to crime causation theory does interactionism make?

4. How would interactionist and labeling theorists explain crime?

5. How would they prevent crime?

6. What are problems with interactionist and labeling theories?

7. How do interactionist and labeling theories compare with theories de- scribed in previous chapters?

Conflict Criminology

8. How do conflict criminologists explain crime?

9. How would conflict criminologists prevent crime?

10. What are problems with conflict criminology?

11. How does conflict criminology compare with theories described previously in this book?

Radical Criminology

12. What are the three models of society for radical theorists?

13. How do radical theorists explain crime?

14. How would radical theorists prevent crime?

15. What are problems with radical theories of crime causation?

16. How does radical theory compare with theories described previously in this book?

Feminist Criminology

17. What is feminism?

18. What are the primary areas of interest for feminist criminologists?

19. Describe four different types of feminist thought.

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20. How is the work of Messerschmidt different from that of other feminist criminologists?

21. What are problems with feminist criminology?

22. How does feminist criminology compare with theories described previ- ously in this book?

British or Left Realism

23. What is the focus of British or Left Realism?

24. What are some of the policy implications of British or Left Realism?

25. What are problems with British or Left Realism?

26. How does British or Left Realism compare with theories described previ- ously in this book?

Peacemaking Criminology

27. What is crime for peacemaking criminologists?

28. What are some of the policy implications of peacemaking criminology?

29. What are problems with peacemaking criminology?

30. How does peacemaking criminology compare with theories described previously in this book?

Postmodern Criminology

31. What are three key issues in postmodern criminology?

32. How do Henry and Milovanovic explain crime?

33. What are some of the policy implications of postmodern criminology?

34. What are problems with postmodern criminology?

35. How does postmodern criminology compare with theories described pre- viously in this book?

N O T E S

1. See Mills (1970, originally published in 1956); also see Gouldner (1971); Zinn (1990); Simon (2006).

2. See Chomsky (1969); also see Gouldner (1971).

3. Lanier and Henry (1998:236).

4. See Taylor, Walton, and Young (1974:213).

5. See Bohm (1981); Howe (1997).

6. See Gouldner (1971:Chap. 13).

7. Vold and Bernard (1986:250).

8. See Vold (1979:253).

9. See Vold (1979:254).

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10. Vold (1979:254).

11. Blumer (1969:2).

12. See Vold (1979:255–256).

13. See Dowie (1977).

14. Blumer (1969:2).

15. See Vold (1979:256).

16. Blumer (1969:2).

17. See Vold (1979:256).

18. See Vold (1979:256).

19. Vold (1979:258).

20. Vold and Bernard (1986:253–254).

21. See Vold (1979:256–257).

22. Vold (1979:257); Taylor et al. (1974:142).

23. Cooley (1964); also see Vold (1979:257).

24. Becker (1963:9). Lanier and Henry (1998:167) observe that whereas social control theories view clear moral labeling of behavior as important, labeling theory views such labeling as the problem.

25. Lemert (1951).

26. Martin, Mutchnick, and Austin (1990:216).

27. Schur (1973).

28. Lilly, Cullen, and Ball (1989:131–135).

29. Vold and Bernard (1986:255); National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delin- quency Prevention (1977:136); Taylor et al. (1974:140–141).

30. Braithwaite (1989).

31. Another form of restorative justice is “participatory justice,” see Stephens (1987).

32. Braithwaite, Ahmed, and Braithwaite (2006:402).

33. Braithwaite et al. (2006).

34. Braithwaite (1989:61–65).

35. Braithwaite et al. (2006).

36. Bergseth and Bouffard (2007).

37. Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, and Woods (2007).

38. Tyler et al. (2007).

39. Braithwaite et al. (2006).

40. See Davis (1975:165).

41. Becker (1963).

42. Martin et al. (1990:371).

43. Martin et al. (1990:372).

44. See Taylor et al. (1974:153–155).

45. Vold and Bernard (1986:256); also see Akers (1967).

46. Vold and Bernard (1986:256).

47. Vold and Bernard (1986:256).

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48. Vold and Bernard (1986:256).

49. Vold and Bernard (1986:256).

50. Martin et al. (1990:369).

51. Andrews and Bonta (1994:197); Hudson (1997).

52. See Davis (1975:179).

53. Becker (1963:9).

54. See Vold (1979:266).

55. Vold (1958); Sellin (1938); Turk (1969); Quinney (1970); Chambliss and Seidman (1971). Sellin’s is a theory of culture conflict and not the conflict of competing interest groups. Sellin has been criticized for overemphasizing the extent of cul- ture conflict in society (see Kornhauser, 1978:182–186). Quinney and Chambliss were considered conflict theorists before they became identified with radical the- ory. Quinney has since moved on to peacemaking criminology (which is pre- sented in a later section of this chapter).

56. See Davis (1975:193).

57. See Vold and Bernard (1986:293).

58. Vold and Bernard (1986:294).

59. Vold and Bernard (1986:294).

60. See Vold and Bernard (1986:295–296).

61. Andrews and Bonta (1994:95–96).

62. Tittle (1995:7).

63. See Dahrendorf (1959:171); Messerschmidt (1997:71).

64. Skogan (1990:5).

65. Bohm (1981).

66. Turk (1979:464).

67. The two theories are sometimes distinguished as “pluralistic-conflict theory” and “class-conflict theory.” The former refers to the conflict theory presented in this section; the latter refers to the radical theory presented in the next section.

68. See Bohm (1982).

69. See Bohm (1982).

70. See Bohm (1982).

71. See Bohm (1982).

72. See Bohm (1982).

73. See Bohm (1982).

74. See Bohm (1982).

75. Much of the following discussion is from Bohm (1982); also see Lynch and Groves (1989).

76. Beirne and Messerschmidt (2000:102).

77. See Bonger (1916).

78. See note 55.

79. Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould (2010:106).

80. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985:455–456).

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81. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985:455–456).

82. Taylor, Walton, and Young (1975:23).

83. Currie (1997a); also see Currie (1997b).

84. Chambliss (1976:9).

85. Platt (1975:103).

86. Platt (1975:103); also see Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1975) for a similar definition.

87. Although racism and sexism are not explicitly illegal, hate-crime legislation has been enacted that enhances the penalties for crimes that are motivated by an of- fender’s bias against a race, a religion, an ethnic/national origin group, or a sexual- orientation group. See Jacobs (1998).

88. Lynch, Schwendinger, and Schwendinger (2006:193–194).

89. Lynch et al. (2006).

90. Lynch and Stretesky (2001); Lanphear, Vorhees, and Bellinger (2005).

91. Stretesky and Lynch (1999a, 1999b, 2003).

92. Stretesky and Lynch (2003).

93. Lynch, Stretesky, and Burns (2004).

94. Lynch et al. (2006:200).

95. Quinney (1974:16).

96. See Beirne and Messerschmidt (2000:105).

97. Beirne and Messerschmidt (2000:105).

98. Quinney (1977:10, 22–23).

99. D. Gordon (1976:206).

100. For a description of “anarchist criminology,” see Ferrell (1997, 1999).

101. Taylor et al. (1974:282).

102. Currie (1997a:168).

103. Currie (1997a:168).

104. Cahn (1966).

105. Bohm (1981).

106. Regarding the first two tactics, see Wright (1978:100–101). Regarding the third tactic, see Beckett (1997).

107. Beckett (1997).

108. See Bohm (1981).

109. See Gouldner (1976).

110. Marx and Engels (1970:64).

111. Andrews and Bonta (1994:95–96); also see Tittle (1995:7).

112. Andrews and Bonta (1994:113–114).

113. See criticisms of learning theories.

114. See, for example, Kornhauser (1978:Chap. 1).

115. See Lynch and Groves (1989) for a discussion of those criticisms; also see Einstadter and Henry (1995:253–257).

116. Feminism (n.d.).

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117. For excellent reviews and examples, see Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988); Simpson (1989); Daly and Maher (1998); Chesney-Lind and Bloom (1997); also see Williams and McShane (1994:230–240) and Beirne and Messerschmidt (2000:202–209).

118. Bernard et al. (2010).

119. Miller and Mullins (2006).

120. For an example of liberal feminist theory, see Simon (1975).

121. Cullen and Agnew (2006:348).

122. For an example of radical feminist theory, see Stanko (1985).

123. Bernard et al. (2010).

124. Bernard et al. (2010:290).

125. For examples of Marxist feminist theory, see Balkan, Berger, and Schmidt (1980) and Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1983).

126. Bernard et al. (2010).

127. For examples of socialist feminist theory, see Messerschmidt (1986); Jurik (1999).

128. Miller (2003:15).

129. Einstadter and Henry (1995:275).

130. Miller and Mullins (2006).

131. Cullen and Agnew (2006).

132. Hubbard and Pratt (2002); Lanctot and Le Blanc (2002).

133. Costello and Mederer (2003); Heimer and De Coster (2006).

134. Heimer and De Coster (2006).

135. Heimer and De Coster (2006:381).

136. Miller and Mullins (2006); Lanctot and Le Blanc (2002).

137. Messerschmidt (1993).

138. Messerschmidt (1997:70–71).

139. Einstadter and Henry (1995:275).

140. See, for example, Lea and Young (1984); Kinsey, Lea, and Young (1986); Matthews and Young (1986); also see Schwartz and DeKeseredy (1991) for a review and critique of this position.

141. Young (1997:30).

142. Young (1997:30, 35).

143. Einstadter and Henry (1995:256).

144. Einstadter and Henry (1995:256); Michalowski (1990).

145. Einstadter and Henry (1995:257); Michalowski (1990).

146. Cited in Einstadter and Henry (1995:257).

147. See Pepinsky and Quinney (1991, 1997); Pepinsky (1999); Sullivan (1980).

148. Beirne and Messerschmidt (2000:237).

149. Einstadter and Henry (1995:278).

150. This discussion is taken largely from Arrigo (2003).

151. Arrigo (2003).

152. Arrigo (2003:45).

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153. Arrigo (2003:46).

154. Arrigo (2003).

155. Arrigo (2003:48).

156. Arrigo (2003:49).

157. Arrigo (2003:49).

158. Cited in Einstadter and Henry (1995:287).

159. Arrigo and Young (1997:77).

160. Einstadter and Henry (1995:291).

161. Einstadter and Henry (1995:294).

162. Einstadter and Henry (1995:280).

163. Einstadter and Henry (1995:280).

164. Henry and Milovanovic (1991, 1996); also see Barak, Henry, and Milovanovic (1997).

165. Matza (1964).

166. Also see Arrigo and Young (1997:81–82).

167. Barak (1988, 1994).

168. Ferrell, Hayward, and Young (2008).

169. Ferrell et al. (2008).

170. Unger (1987).

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ROBERT M. BOHM University of Central Florida

and

BRENDA L. VOGEL California State University, Long Beach

A Primer on Crime and Delinquency Theory

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Conclusion: Integrated

Theories, Developmental

Theories, and Beyond

Integrated Theories

Developmental Theories

Problems with Integrated and Developmental Theories

Conclusion

B ecause theories of crime and delinquency have been produced by scholarsrepresenting several different academic disciplines, the review of theories in this book is reminiscent of the story about the blind people and the elephant. The story goes something like this: Several blind people encountered an elephant. Attempting to describe it, each of the blind people felt a different part. One person felt the elephant’s tail and described the elephant as long and hairy. Another felt the elephant’s ear and described the elephant as rough and leath- ery. Still another blind person felt the elephant’s tusk and described the elephant as smooth and long. Get the idea? Each of the blind people felt only a part of the elephant and believed that what they felt described the elephant as a whole. However, none of the blind people actually described the elephant accurately. In an analogous way, scholars trying to understand criminality and delinquency generally have examined only a part of the phenomenon and only from the vantage of their particular discipline. None of them probably has explained the phenomenon completely, which would be an imposing task even if they could agree on what the phenomenon they are trying to explain really is.

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The multidisciplinary nature of crime theory production is both a benefit and a curse. The benefit stems from the many different perspectives and bodies of knowledge that are applied to the subject matter. The causes of crime proba- bly have been analyzed with a greater disciplinary breadth than most other aca- demic subject matters. The curse, as already noted, is that analyses of the causes of crime generally have not been interdisciplinary. The questions that have been asked and the answers that have been given, for the most part, have remained within the province of a particular academic discipline. The result has been bio- logical reductionism, psychological reductionism, sociological reductionism, and so forth. In this context, reductionism is the discipline-specific use of concepts that are considered to cause criminal or delinquent behavior.1

Charles Tittle (1939– ) calls the resulting theories “simple theories,” which he characterizes as consisting of “one or two explanatory principles involving only a few variables that are assumed to apply to all instances of the particular form of deviance [crime] being explained.”2 Most of the theories of crime and delinquency presented in Chapters 1 to 8 are simple theories, according to Tittle. The problem with simple theories, observes Tittle, is that they may seem reason- able, have some (but never compelling) empirical support, and have attracted followers, but none of them has much explanatory power (see the discussion in Chapter 1). Thus, to increase explanatory power, overcome charges of reduction- ism, and for other reasons (such as reducing the number of competing theories), “integrated” theories of crime causation have been created. Of course, if a single factor, such as low IQ, lack of self-control, or economic inequality, causes crime and that factor is present at birth or acquired early in life and remains with a person throughout his or her life, then theoretical integration is unnecessary. Such single- factor theories are sometimes referred to as latent trait theories in which opportunity is generally the key to whether or not a person actually commits crime.3

What Tittle calls simple theories are, for the most part, really simple integrated theories because, as he defines them, they are typically comprised of at least two explanatory principles and a few variables. As noted in Chapter 3, early positivists long ago advocated and employed multifactor approaches; some even recognized the need for theorists to integrate biological, psychological, and sociological influ- ences. Many recent positivists and some critical theorists have followed this trend. What distinguishes simple integrated theories from more elaborate integrated the- ories are the number of concepts (and variables) employed, the degree of specifi- cation of how those concepts are combined or interact, and, oftentimes, the range of crime types to be explained.

I N T E G R A T E D T H E O R I E S

For discussion purposes, it may prove useful to consider three different types of integrated theories. First are theories that integrate or synthesize concepts from different theories within the same discipline, for example, some combination of concepts from the following sociological theories: social disorganization theory, anomie theories, learning theories, and social control theories. An example of

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this type of theory is Delbert Elliott (1933– ) and his colleagues’ theory of delin- quency and illegal drug use. In Explaining Delinquency and Drug Use (1985), the authors contend that social disorganization, strain, and inadequate socialization combine to weaken conventional bonding and strengthen delinquent bonding. Specifically, they define two major pathways to delinquency. First, among those who are subject to low levels of social control, the likelihood of their association with delinquent peers is high, which increases their likelihood of delinquency.4

Second, when individuals who are subjected to high levels of social control experience strain, their level of social control is reduced, which consequently in- creases their likelihood of association with delinquent peers.5 Association with delinquent peers increases the likelihood of delinquency and drug use. In fact, in a subsequent study, Elliott et al. found that association with delinquent peers was the best predictor of later delinquency, especially among those with weak social control.6 The social control components of the theory are emphasized over the social learning components.7

A second type of integrated theories combines theories or concepts from dif- ferent disciplines within the same paradigm, for instance, the integration of theories or concepts from biological positivism, psychological positivism, and sociological positivism. This type of integration usually requires the synthesis of theories or con- cepts at different levels of analysis, for example, the integration of concepts from biological and psychological theories (individual level of analysis) with concepts from sociological theories (aggregate, group, or societal level of analysis). Many of these theories were described in earlier chapters, for example, Akers (1998); Cloward and Ohlin (1960); Cohen (1955); Glueck and Glueck (1930, 1934, 1950, 1967); Goring (1913); Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990); Halleck (1967); Henry and Milovanovic (1996); Hirschi and Gottfredson (1987, 1989); Lombroso (1968); Maslow (1970); Merton (1938); and Wilson and Hernnstein (1985).

An example of this type of integration is Tittle’s control balance theory, which integrates elements from several positivist theories.8 According to Tittle, the prob- ability that a person will commit delinquency, including specific types of delin- quency (his theory is about deviance, which includes crime and delinquency), is primarily a result of the interplay of deviant motivation and control. Control, or the limiting of behavioral options, refers to both the amount of control that a person can exercise and the amount of control to which a person is exposed and that is likely to be exercised (that is, the “control ratio”). For Tittle, delinquency is a means by which “people escape deficits and extend surpluses of control.”9

Four factors are key to Tittle’s theory.10 First is the predisposition toward delinquent motivation, which varies from person to person and from situation to situation. This predisposition is a function of a desire for autonomy, basic bi- ological and psychological needs, and an unbalanced control ratio.11 A desire for autonomy refers to “escaping control over oneself and exercising more control over the social and physical world than one experiences.”12 Because nearly ev- eryone has a desire for autonomy, as well as basic biological and psychological needs, an imbalance in the control ratio is of paramount importance.13 The second key factor in the theory is provocation or the situational stimulant of delinquent motivation. Provocations are contextual features and include such

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things as verbal insults, challenges, or displays of weaknesses.14 The third and fourth factors are the opportunity to commit delinquency, which is most important in explaining specific types of delinquency, and constraint, which refers to the likelihood that a delinquent behavior will activate restraining responses by others. When these four factors converge in a certain way, delinquency is likely. In general, the greater the control ratio imbalance, the greater the likelihood of delinquency. Differences in the magnitude of control imbalances determine the seriousness of specific types of delinquent behavior. When the amount of control exercised relative to the amount of control experienced is balanced—and the other factors are benign—people are likely to conform.

Among problems with Tittle’s control balance theory is the calculation of the control ratio, which varies according to the number and types of relation- ships. So, for example, a father may have a control surplus in relation to a child, but a control deficit in relation to his employer. Depending on the time or situ- ation a husband and wife, for example, may experience either a control surplus or a control deficit. The problem is how to determine the net control ratio from all of an individual’s different relationships. Because (1) the number of a person’s relationships is almost limitless, (2) some relationships are more influential than others, and (3) the control ratio in any relationship may vary by time and situa- tion, calculating the net control ratio may turn out to be impossible.

Despite the problem of calculating the net control ratio, several researchers have examined the applicability of control balance theory to various types of criminal and deviant behavior.15 Generally, results have been supportive of vari- ous parts of the theory. For example, some results suggest that both control balance deficits and surpluses are related to serious theft,16 assault,17 drug use,18

deviant sexual practices,19 and cheating.20 Other results indicate that only control deficits are related to deviance,21 while still other results show that only control surpluses are significantly related to exploitative corporate crime.22

A third type of integrated theories are theories that attempt to integrate con- cepts from different paradigms or to combine all of the different types of integra- tion, for example, theories that attempt to synthesize classical, positivist, or critical theories or concepts.23 Some of these theories are quite elaborate. For example, Bryan Vila (1947– ) has created a holistic theory comprised of ecologi- cal, micro-level, and macro-level factors which, he argues, interact and influence a wide range of criminal behaviors depending on individual developmental factors over the life course and across generations.24 He also maintains that a statistical model based on mathematical nonlinear chaos theory rather than on more traditional statistical analytic models may be a more useful and accurate way to test his integrated theory. Taking a different tack, Gregg Barak (1948– ) has proposed a “post-postmodern synthesis.”25 Barak advocates combining, in a truly interdisciplinary approach, the different types of knowledges that have something to say about crime and criminality. He lists knowledges from “eco- nomics, philosophy, anthropology, biochemistry, psychology, law, sociology, cultural studies, ethnic studies, gender studies, media studies, political economy, and social history” as prime candidates for this type of integration.26 At the same time, Barak also doubts whether different theories and concepts can ever be

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successfully integrated,27 so it remains to be seen what is to be integrated from the different knowledges if not theories and concepts.

D E V E L O P M E N T A L T H E O R I E S

Developmental or life-course theories are different from the integrated theories described earlier because of their emphasis on individual development. Develop- mental theories posit that different factors (sometimes from different disciplines and different levels of analysis) affect people’s propensity for crime at different times in their lives. So, for example, during childhood, the family may be the most impor- tant influence in determining whether a child engages in delinquency; during adolescence, peer group influences may be most important; and during adulthood, marital and occupational relations may predominate. Any factor that is influential at one point in a person’s life may be irrelevant at another time.

Several criminologists have examined crime from a developmental, or life- course, perspective.28 One example is Robert Sampson (1956– ) and John Laub’s (1953– ) age-graded theory of informal social control.29 Like Hirschi and other social control theorists, Sampson and Laub argue that crime and delinquency are likely to occur when an individual’s bond to society is weakened or broken. What is unique about their theory is that the important elements of the social bond change over the life course. Specifically, Sampson and Laub contend that a wide variety of individual and social structural factors (such as socioeconomic disadvantage, broken homes, family disruption, parental criminality, household crowding, large family size, residential mobility, and mother’s employment) af- fect both informal social controls and social capital, which, in turn, affect crime and delinquency. Social capital refers to social relationships (for example, parent– child, teacher–student, or employer–employee) that can become social and psychological resources that can reduce the chances of criminal or delinquent behavior. Thus, for Sampson and Laub, adolescent delinquency is often the product of individual and social structural factors mediated by little social capital and weak- ened social controls (inadequate family socialization and school attachment and the influence of delinquent siblings and peers). Adult deviance and criminality are some- times, but not always, a function of antisocial and delinquent behavior in childhood. The critical factors in adult crime and deviance are again the social bond and social capital. Strong social bonds (for example, strong social ties to jobs and family) and social capital reduce the likelihood of crime and deviance; conversely, weak social bonds and little social capital increase the likelihood of crime and deviance.

In explaining crime over the life course, developmental theorists examine a number of stages and characteristics of criminal development. First, onset refers to the initial entry into crime or delinquency. Most developmental theorists contend that criminal behavior, especially serious criminal behavior begins in child- hood as any number of “conduct problems” such as bullying, lying, and cheating.30

Second, an individual’s pathway through life can be characterized by continu- ity, in which his or her behavior patterns (either criminal or not) are relatively stable. For example, according to some developmental theorists, individuals

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with particular traits (such as low self-control or neuropsychological deficits) will display a continuous, high rate of offending throughout their lives.31 Develop- mental theorists frequently refer to people who persistently commit crime over their life course as career criminals. Only a very small percentage of all offenders are believed to be career criminals. For most offenders, criminal behavior can begin or end anytime during their lives, though, for most offenders, it is likely to end by the time they reach their late thirties or early forties.

Third, an individual’s life can be marked by change or turning points in which behavior on a particular pathway changes and heads in a different direction.32

For example, many developmental theorists examine the “age–crime curve” in an attempt to explain why crime peaks in adolescence and decreases in the mid-twenties. The answer to this question varies, but can include peer pressure, mimicry, increased opportunity, or changes in social bonds.33

Finally, some developmental theorists also examine desistance or the process through which an offender stops offending. In an update of their earlier work on age-graded theory, Laub and Sampson examined how adult, persistent offenders de- sist from crime.34 They found that “social controls, structured routine activities, and purposeful human agency are the causal elements in explaining persistent offending and desistance from crime in adulthood.”35 Generally, desistance occurs though a series of life-changing events.36 For example, a persistent offender may experience a significant, structural turning point (such as marriage, birth of a child, or military service), then is placed under increased social controls (for instance, a wife, the re- sponsibility of a new job, childcare), then experiences a change in routine activities (e.g., spends less time out with the guys and more time at home with his wife and children) and finally, almost by “default,” is committed to a new life.37 This com- mitment to a new life, a noncriminal pathway, is dependent upon the former offender’s willingness to exercise what Laub and Sampson call human agency. Human agency refers to choice exercised within the context of given circumstances.

Since their emergence in the early 1990s, developmental theories have gar- nered considerable attention from researchers.38 Because developmental theories focus on changes across the life course, much of this research is based on the analysis of longitudinal data. With respect to Sampson and Laub’s original work39 and their more recent revisions,40 evidence is supportive: “A growing body of empirical evidence supports the empirical propositions of the age- graded theory of informal social control. These results support the theoretical explanation of the onset of delinquency as well as the dual concern of the theory with continuity and change in behavior over the life course.”41

P R O B L E M S W I T H I N T E G R A T E D A N D

D E V E L O P M E N T A L T H E O R I E S

Despite empirical support, integrated and developmental theories are not with- out their detractors.42 Some critics argue that, at the extreme, theory integration is sometimes little more than an exercise in throwing into a statistical model

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everything including the kitchen sink to explain more of the variation in the dependent variable crime.43 Although combining factors such as gender, race, age, place of residence, IQ, aggressiveness, level of self-control, conditions of childhood training, prior offenses, peer relationships, and social bonds, allows a researcher to predict criminal behavior with a fair degree of accuracy, it does not begin to answer the questions of why or how those factors are related either to each other or, more importantly, to criminal behavior.44 It is also impossible to determine whether or not the relationships in such models are spurious. Such statistical modeling, then, is really not theory integration at all.

Two methodological problems with some attempts at theory integration are (1) the failure to specify the sequencing or the temporal ordering of factors, and (2) the failure to consider reciprocal effects or interactions among concepts.45 So, for example, does a bad family life determine whether a child drops out of school and, as a result, engages in delinquency? Or does delinquency cause a child to drop out of school and, consequently, have a bad family life? Or does dropping out of school reduce the quality of family life, which causes delinquency? And so forth. Research suggests that in all cases the relationships are probably reciprocal or interactive. In other words, dropping out of school, a bad family life, and delinquency may each be cause and effect of the other (but not necessarily for all people and at all times during the life course). In short, there may not be any correct ordering of factors. Thus, in this example, it is probably inaccurate to argue that either dropping out of school or a bad family life necessarily precedes delinquency in time. On this point, Barak argues that “in all likelihood, crimin- ologists will never be able to definitely ascertain the correct ordering of all the complex variables and how, over time, these influence each other.”46 However, rather than abandon efforts at integration, Barak calls for a different type of inte- gration, which, as noted previously, he calls a “post-postmodern synthesis.”

Some critics contend that the combining of certain concepts or assumptions produces logical inconsistencies. They ask, for example, how is it possible “that crime is caused by successful and unsuccessful socialization, control and lack of control, individualistic and group goals, social and nonsocial reinforcement, and contact with deviant and conventional others?”47 They also wonder how crimi- nal behavior can be both freewilled and determined at the same time, or how both consensus and conflict over moral values can simultaneously characterize society.48 This is especially true of integrations that attempt to bridge different paradigms (for example, integrating anomie and radical theories). For that matter and more broadly, they wonder whether crime is the response of an abnormal individual to a normal environment, or whether crime is the response of a nor- mal individual to an abnormal environment. How could it be both? Critics, in short, argue that the integration of some theories has been accomplished only by ignoring philosophical assumptions or misrepresenting or distorting the theories or concepts to be combined.

These presumed logical inconsistencies, moreover, are crucial when it comes to policy. For example, if crime is the response of a freewilled or abnormal indi- vidual to a normal environment, then it makes sense to focus crime control pol- icy on individuals (for example, deterrence or rehabilitation). On the other hand,

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if crime is the response of a determined or normal individual to an abnormal environment, then it makes sense to direct crime control policy to changing the environment (for instance, providing opportunity or strengthening commu- nities). It makes little sense to do both.

The charge of logical inconsistency, however, only applies to positivist or clas- sical/neoclassical syntheses, in which the conceptual or philosophical dichotomies or categories are presumed to accurately represent phenomena in the real world. To the critical theorist, conceptual or philosophical dichotomies or categories are at best heuristic devices that necessarily distort reality. They are false dichotomies. For the critical theorist, human beings are neither freewilled nor determined but are both freewilled and determined. In other words, human beings are free to choose within biological, psychological, and sociological constraints. Human beings not only shape the world, but are also shaped by it. Likewise, for critical theorists, society is characterized by neither consensus nor conflict over moral values but is instead a reflection of both consensus and conflict over moral values (though conflict is likely to predominate). Finally, neither individuals nor societies are normal or abnormal. To the extent that the two concepts have any meaning at all, individuals and societies manifest both normal and abnormal qualities along a continuum. In short, for critical theorists, there is always a dialectical relationship between invented categories of individuals or societies.

As for policy implications, if the dialectic more accurately describes the re- lationships between individuals and the societies in which they live, then the choice of policies may depend primarily on utility. In other words, since policies can be directed toward individuals, social institutions, or both, one of three choices must prevail if anything is going to be done at all. First, policies could be directed toward individuals. Such a choice would require the changing of individuals—in many cases, one person at a time—which seems like an incredi- bly inefficient way of producing change. Second, policies could be directed toward changing social institutions which seems like a less intrusive and much more efficient strategy for changing large numbers of people. Such a policy, however, would have to be sensitive to individual differences and undoubtedly would allow some individuals to “fall through the cracks.” Third, policies could be directed toward changing individuals and social institutions simultaneously. However, this policy seems less efficient than the second one and is likely to squander scarce resources if the ultimate goal is to change the behavior of large numbers of people.

C O N C L U S I O N

Probably the best way to make sense of the various theories examined in this book is to begin with a consideration of their philosophical assumptions. As mentioned in Chapter 1, whether a theory is accepted or rejected often depends on whether one believes in a theory’s philosophical assumptions rather than on the scientific support (or lack of support) for the theory. A principal reason for

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this state of affairs, as noted in Chapter 1, is that scientific research into the causes of crime almost never offers a critical test that supports one competing theory over another.

As for philosophical assumptions, do you believe that human beings are free- willed and completely responsible for their behavior? Do you believe that they are motivated by pleasure–pain, risk–reward, or cost–benefit rationality? Do you believe that society is based on a social contract? If your answer to those three questions is yes, then you probably find classical theory most compelling. Even if you believe that human beings are not completely freewilled and responsible for their behavior, but you still believe in hedonistic or other calculating kind of rationality as the basis of human motivation and social contract as the basis of society, then you probably find the neoclassical revision most compelling.

On the other hand, if you believe that human beings are determined (either in a “hard” or “soft” way) and that society is based primarily on a consensus (by either the collective conscience or division of labor, but not a social contract), then you probably find one of the positivist theories most compelling. If so, then you can narrow your choice or choices of theories by critically assessing the problems associated with each of the theories. Ask yourself, Are any of the problems critical enough to disqualify the theory? If your answer is yes, then reject the theory. If any theory survives this exercise, then it must be compelling to you. Note that this is more than a counting exercise. Just because one theory has been criticized more than another theory, it does not necessarily follow that the the- ory with the fewest criticisms is the better theory. Not all criticisms are equally con- demning; some criticisms are more telling than others. Some theories may be criticized more than other theories simply because they have commanded more in- terest than other theories. If more than one theory survives the exercise, ask yourself which theory has greater explanatory power, generalizability, or scope. The theory with the greater explanatory power, generalizability, or scope probably is the better theory. If you cannot make a choice between two or more compelling theories, then you might consider theory integration. Determine whether the integrated the- ory is more compelling than any of the theories that were combined taken by itself.

Finally, if you believe that human beings are both determined and determin- ing and that society is characterized fundamentally by conflict rather than by consensus, then you probably find critical theories more compelling. If this is the case, then ask yourself which model of society (the conflict model or the radical model) is the more accurate one. Consider theory integration. Decide what contributions, if any, from left realism, peacemaking criminology, feminist criminology, and postmodern criminology would enhance your theory. Ponder the question of whether classical/neoclassical, positivist, and critical theories can be successfully integrated.

By engaging in these exercises, you may be able to draw some informed conclusions about the causes of crime and delinquency. Remember, however, that theories must be evaluated in relation to other theories. As noted in Chapter 1, theories are more or less compelling, convincing, or believable in relation to other theories. It is not correct to say that theories are good or bad or right or wrong, in and of themselves.

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S T U D Y Q U E S T I O N S

1. Why have integrated theories been produced?

2. What are some different types of integrated theory?

3. Why have developmental theories been produced?

4. To what stages and characteristics of offending do developmental theorists focus?

5. What are problems with integrated and developmental theories?

6. What are some of the policy implications of integrated and developmental theories?

7. How do integrated and developmental or life-course theories compare with theories described in previous chapters?

8. What is a useful method for evaluating theories?

N O T E S

1. See Babbie (1992:97).

2. Tittle (1995:1). Tittle’s book is about deviance, which includes crime and delinquency.

3. See Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990).

4. Cullen and Agnew (2006).

5. Cullen and Agnew (2006).

6. Elliott, Huizinga, and Menard (1989).

7. Elliott, Huizinga, and Ageton (1985). Also see Elliott, Ageton, and Cantor (1979); Elliott et al. (1989); and Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982) for other examples of this type of theory.

8. Tittle (1995).

9. Tittle (1995:142).

10. Tittle (1995:142).

11. Tittle (1995:147–148).

12. Tittle (1995:145).

13. Tittle (1995:148).

14. Tittle (1995:163).

15. Baron and Forde (2007).

16. Baron and Forde (2007).

17. Piquero and Hickman (1999, 2003).

18. Curry and Piquero (2003).

19. Piquero and Hickman (1999).

20. Curry (2005).

21. Hickman, Piquero, Lawton, and Greene (2001).

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22. Piquero and Piquero (2006).

23. Examples include Colvin and Pauly (1983); Pearson and Weiner (1985); Vold and Bernard (1986); Groves and Sampson (1987); Braithwaite (1989); Hagan (1989); and Messner and Rosenfeld (2001).

24. Vila (1994).

25. Barak (1998).

26. Barak (1998:231–232).

27. Barak (1998:212).

28. See Farrington (2006) for an excellent overview.

29. Sampson and Laub (1992, 1993); other examples are Thornberry (1987); Patterson, DeBaryshe, and Ramsey (1989); and McCord (1991).

30. Cullen and Agnew (2006).

31. See Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990); Moffitt (1993).

32. Cullen and Agnew (2006).

33. See Moffitt (1993); Sampson and Laub (1993); Cullen and Agnew (2006).

34. Laub and Sampson (2003).

35. Laub, Sampson, and Sweeten (2006).

36. Laub and Sampson (2003).

37. Cullen and Agnew (2006:522).

38. Cullen and Agnew (2006); Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould (2010).

39. Sampson and Laub (1993).

40. Laub and Sampson (2003).

41. Laub et al. (2006:320–321).

42. See Barak (1998:Chap. 9); Einstadter and Henry (1995:301–310); Tittle (1995:89– 123); Gibbons (1994); Bohm (1987); Hirschi (1979); Kornhauser (1978:46–50).

43. See Tittle (1995:90).

44. Tittle (1995:93).

45. See Hirschi (1979); Tittle (1995).

46. Barak (1998:212).

47. Costello (1997:424); also see Hirschi (1979).

48. See Hirschi (1979).

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bohm07508_0495807508_02.08_chapter08

Chapter 8: Critical Theories

Interactionism And Labeling Theory
Conflict Criminology
Radical Criminology
Feminist Criminology
British Or Left Realism
Peacemaking Criminology
Postmodern Criminology
Study Questions
Notes

bohm07508_0495807508_02.09_chapter09

Chapter 9: Conclusion: Integrated Theories, Developmental Theories, and Beyond

Integrated Theories
Developmental Theories
Problems With Integrated And Developmental Theories
Conclusion
Study Questions
Notes