Case Summary and Case Analysis 1200 words and three scholarly sources

CHAPTER 14 Police and Homeland Security

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

• Identify the four systems in which police play a major role in the context of homeland security. • Identify the elements of the mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). • Explain the term “interoperability” and why it is such a significant issue in policing today. • Identify the four primary phases of the preparedness cycle, including the police role in each phase. • Describe the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and its importance to policing today. • Explain why information sharing is so important to the police role in homeland security. • Describe intelligence-led policing and contrast it with community policing and problem-oriented

policing.

The term “homeland security” was not common or familiar at the end of the twen- tieth century. At that time, just a few years ago, most experts, as well as casual observ- ers, had no difficulty distinguishing between the military responsibility for homeland defense against our nation’s enemies and the police responsibility for protecting people and property against crime and criminals. But then the world changed. We learned that modern international terrorism represents both a military threat and a crime. Today, it is commonly accepted that the police have an important role to play in protecting both local communities and the nation against terrorism. Additionally, it has become more widely accepted that the police role extends to “all hazards.” The police role today within the context of homeland security includes important responsibilities related to crime, national defense, security, and safety.

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The Police Role in Homeland Security

The police occupy a central role in homeland security, which is comprised of four important sectors or systems (see Figure 14.1). In accordance with the traditional view of policing, the police are the gatekeepers at the front end of the criminal justice system. They try to prevent crime, respond when crime does occur, and make criminal cases against suspected offenders. For the most part, the rest of the criminal justice system depends on the police, who control the entry point to the system and largely determine which offenders will be handled by prosecutors, judges, and correctional officials.

What the new concept of homeland security has done is highlight several other systems in which the police also play important roles. Since the events of September 11, 2001, it has been recognized that the police are an important part of the anti-terrorism effort, working in cooperation with the military, intelligence agencies, and others in the national defense or national security system (see “Police and Terrorism,” Box 14.1). America’s 18,000 state, local, and special-purpose law enforcement agencies have much more intimate connections to local people and local communities than do the military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the FBI, and thus are a crucial resource for intelligence gathering and information sharing. Based on their own observations as well as information provided by the public, police can play the role of “first preventers” of ter- rorism.1 Also, should terrorist acts occur, state and local police will be the first responders, not federal law enforcement agencies or the military. The crucial role of local police in the United States was highlighted by Israeli terrorism expert Tal Hanan:

local police officers must be trained regarding the threat [of suicide attacks], in particular the identification of suspicious activities and patterns used by terror- ist cells in preparation for attacks. Police intelligence functions should include

Safety System

Security System

National Security System

Criminal Justice System

POLICE

Figure 14.1

The Central Role of Police in Homeland Security

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BOX 14.1 Police and Terrorism

It has been said that 9/11 changed everything. This is certainly true for local police agencies and

their chiefs. It is increasingly clear that federal agencies, such as the FBI and the U.S. Secret Ser-

vice, can no longer work alone in protecting the United States from further attack. Rather, they

must work in partnership with other public and private agencies, and most important, with local

police. Local police can identify potential terrorists living or operating in their jurisdictions, they can

help protect vulnerable targets, and they can coordinate the first response to terror attacks. These

are heavy new responsibilities, but they cannot be shrugged off, because elected officials and the

public will increasingly expect their police to be prepared.

Source: Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke. 2008. Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Brief 01.

training on terrorist-related intelligence gathering methods, especially the mon- itoring of “risk groups” and the components used to prepare bombs. … local police departments must ensure that every police officer is properly prepared for his or her role in combating suicide attacks, as they are the last line of defense.2

Since the experience of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, there is also greater recognition of the vital role that police play within the safety system. The key players in this system include fire protection personnel, emergency medical staff, public health, hospitals, and emergency managers. But, often, the very first responders to a serious natural or man- made emergency are police. Also, if a catastrophic situation requires mandatory evacua- tion, the police are the ones who will have to coordinate the evacuation and, if necessary, enforce it.3 Likewise, if a chemical, biological, or pandemic situation creates the need for quarantine, the police will be called upon to enforce that. In fact, through traffic safety and related functions the police have long contributed significantly to the safety system— it just has not been widely recognized or emphasized until recently.

One more system in which police play an important part is the security system. We traditionally think in terms of private security and expect to make a clear distinction vis-à- vis public police. However, private security and private policing have grown substantially in recent decades, and now often perform their duties in quasi-public places such as schools, malls, and even downtown business districts. Also, formal and informal public– private partnerships between private security and public police have become extremely common.4 This takes on great importance in the homeland security context because it is estimated that 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is privately owned.

Among these expanded police roles, perhaps the most challenging and controversial is the anti-terrorism role associated with national security. According to Larry Hoover, a new vision of American policing’s national security role and responsibility has emerged.5 He

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identifies four challenges faced by local law enforcement in participating in efforts address- ing homeland security: technological, logistical, political, and ethical. The most significant technological challenge is interoperability, which is the ability to exchange information between organizations. Interoperability, or the lack thereof, pertains to both voice and data communications. Organizations that should be able to exchange information may include not only local, state, and federal law enforcement, but also public health departments, emergency medical services (ambulances and hospitals), and fire departments.

The most problematic logistical issue is getting data off written reports and out of officers’ heads and into electronic formats that can be searched and shared. The necessity of this function is apparent but, if a majority of police officers’ time is spent collecting data and entering it into a computer, little time is left for other responsibilities. Political issues take a variety of forms that focus on finances, role expectations, secrecy, and pro- ductivity, among others. Finally, ethical challenges include the issues of profiling and open records legislation. While technological, logistical, political, and ethical challenges are not new for the police administrator, those associated with homeland security are unlike ones faced before.

MODERN POLICING BLOG Terrorism—military or police problem? January 11, 2015

There has been an ongoing debate since 2001 over whether the best response to terrorism is military or police. This column argues that the tragic events in Paris demonstrate the folly of treating terrorists as criminals. A follow-up rebuttal column argues just the opposite, that the French experience doesn’t lend any credence to the necessity of treating terrorism as war.

Source: The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner. wordpress. com/2015/01/11/terrorism-military-or-police-problem/. The hyperlink at “This column” links to https://www. lawfareblog. com/war-or-crime-figure-it-out, and the hyperlink at “rebuttal column” links to http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/01/ on-war-and-crime-a-response-to-brian-cunningham/.

Contemporary policing themes of community engagement, collaboration, globali- zation, and privatization (discussed in Chapter 15) are all associated with the expanded homeland security mission. Community engagement highlights the need to design and implement roles for the public to play other than as victims of terrorism and disasters. Collaboration and coordination among so many separate law enforcement agencies, other providers of safety and security, and multiple levels of government is a huge chal- lenge. In regard to community engagement and collaboration, the adoption of commu- nity policing since the 1980s certainly broadened the police perspective and taught the

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importance of partnerships, but the new homeland security mission and context present even greater demands and difficulties.

The effect of globalization is that, increasingly, we may be dealing with issues that originate in another country, but affect us locally. This was demonstrated most dramat- ically by 9/11, but is also evidenced on a daily basis by transnational crime, especially cybercrime, that can realistically be regarded as a threat in every community in the nation. Privatization, as noted before, is not a new trend but assumes heightened importance in the high-stakes arena of homeland security. If one considers that airlines, chemical plants, bioengineering labs, and nuclear power plants (just to name a few) are mainly privately owned in the United States, and largely protected by private security and private police, the critical nature of public–private collaboration in order to protect public safety is obvious.

Two critical events that occurred early in this twenty-first century have had a very significant impact on American society, including American policing and police adminis- tration. These two events were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Hurricane Katrina in August 2005.

September 11, 2001 On September 11, 2001, 19 hijackers commandeered four airplanes leaving from

Boston, Newark, and Washington, DC, evading airport security at every juncture.6 More than 3,000 people were killed in New York City at the World Trade Center, in Arlington, Virginia, just outside Washington, DC at the Pentagon, and in Stoney Creek Township, Pennsylvania, in an open field. Subsequently, it was learned that several of the hijackers had come to the attention of law enforcement authorities in the months and years leading up to the attack, but no one had “connected the dots.” This gave rise to considerably more emphasis on intelligence analysis and information sharing. In addition, the heroic efforts of police, firefighters, and other emergency personnel in New York and at the Pentagon were hindered by overloaded communications networks and a lack of interoperability; that is, the inability of first responders from different agencies to communicate with each other across voice radio and data systems. This gave rise to technological enhancements and, just as important, improved protocols for shared and coordinated communications in emergencies.

To provide a description and analysis of the events of September 11, including preparedness and response, a 10-member commission, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Public Law 107–306) was formed. The 9/11 Commission, as it was better known, eventually produced 41 recommendations that directed the revamping of the national security apparatus to combat terrorism and defend the nation against weapons of mass destruction. Several of the commissioners subsequently tracked the implementation of the commission’s recommendations. In a status report in December 2005 (the last official status report), the government received

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only one A grade, for making “significant strides in using terrorism finance as an intelli- gence tool.”7 Categories in which the government performed most poorly included rec- ommendations related to airline passenger screening, critical infrastructure assessment, and efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction; for 15 of the 41 recommendations, the government received either a D or F grade. Later, on the tenth anniversary of the attacks (in 2011), the Bipartisan Policy Center identified nine remaining unfinished commission recommendations.8

Hurricane Katrina On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,

Florida, and Georgia, causing more than 1,300 fatalities, with additional people missing and many injured. Hurricane Katrina was the costliest hurricane ever recorded in the United States, estimated at approximately $75 billion, and the fifth deadliest. As if the hurricane itself was not enough devastation for the city of New Orleans, a breach of the levees that surrounded the city occurred and left thousands homeless. While much debate ensued about whether the federal government, Louisiana state government, or New Orleans city government was most negligent (with particular attention focused on FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, a branch of the Department of Homeland Security), one thing is certainly evident: “the country was not prepared for a disaster of this magnitude, and the ensuing lack of planning, coordination, communica- tion and response proved to be too little, too late.”9

A bipartisan congressional committee that investigated the problems that occurred during and after Hurricane Katrina devoted one of its chapters to law enforcement. They made several specific findings:

• A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in hurricane-stricken areas.

• The New Orleans Police Department was ill-prepared for continuity of operations and lost almost all effectiveness.

• Lack of a government public communications strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief.

• The Emergency Management Assistance Compact and military assistance were criti- cal for restoring law and order.

• Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to restoring law and order and coordinating activities.10

The congressional committee also found that law enforcement and public safety communications interoperability was once again, as it had been on September 11, 2001, a

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BOX 14.2 Hurricane Katrina: Breakdown in Law Enforcement

General unrest and lawlessness arose in crowded areas where people were uncertain about their

survival, or rescue, or prospects for evacuation. In some areas, the collapse or absence of law

enforcement exacerbated the level of lawlessness and violence. Several police departments lost

dispatch and communication capabilities, police vehicles, administrative functions such as book-

ing, and jails to confine arrested suspects. Tremendous additional burdens were imposed on the

police, like search and rescue operations, that took priority over normal police functions. The

extent of crime and lawlessness is difficult to determine, partly because of the loss of police record

keeping during the disaster and partly because of unsubstantiated reporting by the media.

The breakdown of law enforcement was particularly notable in New Orleans. Despite the well-

known threat from flooding, the New Orleans Police Department had not taken basic steps to

protect its resources and ensure continuity of operations. For example, communications nodes,

evidence rooms, and even emergency generators were housed in lower floors susceptible to

flooding. When the levees broke and the floodwaters overtook police headquarters and district

offices, the department lost its command and control and communications functions. Police

vehicles believed to be moved out of harm’s way were lost to the floodwaters. Hundreds of New

Orleans Police Department officers went missing—some for legitimate reasons and some not—at

a time they were needed most. This left the city unable to provide enough manpower and other

resources to maintain law and order at shelters and on the streets.

Source: Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane

Katrina. 2006. A Failure of Initiative. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 241.

serious impediment to disaster response and recovery operations. See “Hurricane Katrina: Breakdown in Law Enforcement,” Box 14.2.

Department of Homeland Security

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has come to view terrorism and its responses to terrorism differently. The acts that occurred that day were unlike any we had ever seen before. While previous incidents at the World Trade Center in 1993 and in Oklahoma City in 1995 gave us pause, we had nothing of this magnitude—which affected so many people and professions—with which to compare these events. Similarly, Hurricane Katrina gave Americans a sober lesson about the severity of natural disasters and the critical importance of a coordinated and effective government response to emer- gency situations.

The Homeland Security Bill, enacted in 2003, mandated that 22 previously existing federal agencies (with combined budgets of about $40 billion and employing 170,000 workers) be collapsed into one new cabinet-level department, with additional new

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divisions being created to fill existing gaps. This represented the most sweeping federal government reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. The FBI and the CIA, two premier intelligence-gathering agencies, remained independ- ent from the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS). However, many other agencies with law enforcement, border protection, emergency management, and intelli- gence-gathering capabilities became part of DHS.

The initial mission of the new department was to: (1) prevent terrorist attacks; (2) reduce vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) minimize the damage from attacks that do occur.11 The official mission statement was:

We will lead the unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation. We will ensure safe and secure borders, welcome legal immigrants and visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.

Four divisions were created within the department, including Border and Transportation Security; Emergency Preparedness and Response; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. Although these divisions represented the department’s primary focus, DHS included numerous other functions that are not directly related to homeland security. For example, it is responsible for marine search and rescue, immigration and naturalization, counterfeiting, and drug smuggling.

The DHS is comprised of: (1) agencies that were already in existence prior to September 11, 2001; (2) new components that were created within the DHS, such as Customs and Border Protection, comprising elements of the preexisting U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Border Patrol; and (3) totally new agencies, such as the Transportation Safety Administration. Among the existing agencies that were moved to the new Department of Homeland Security were the Air Marshals, Border Patrol, Customs Service, Coast Guard, Federal Protective Service, FEMA, and Secret Service.

Other significant developments associated with the post-9/11 period and the cre- ation of DHS were the USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism, Public Law No. 107–56), the development of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the promulgation of a number of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). To date, 25 of these HSPDs are known to have been issued (see “Homeland Security Presidential Directives,” Box 14.3). Not long after the DHS was created, a Six- Point Agenda was established to help in reaching the goals of the new federal agency. The Six-Point Agenda included the following:

1. Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events.

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2. Create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo more securely and efficiently.

3. Strengthen border security and border enforcement and reform immigration processes.

4. Enhance information sharing with our partners.

5. Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, procurement, and information technology.

6. Realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance.

BOX 14.3 Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs)

Homeland Security Presidential Directives are issued by the President on matters pertaining to

homeland security. Some are classified and not publically available. A few of the non-classified

HSPDs are listed below.

• HSPD – 1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council;

• HSPD – 4: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction;

• HSPD – 5: Management of Domestic Incidents;

• HSPD – 6: Integration and Use of Screening Information;

• HSPD – 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection;

• HSPD – 8: National Preparedness;

• HSPD – 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food;

• HSPD – 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century;

• HSPD – 11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures;

• HSPD – 12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and

Contractors;

• HSPD – 13: Maritime Security Policy;

• HSPD – 15: U.S. Strategy and Policy in the War on Terror;

• HSPD – 16: Aviation Strategy;

• HSPD – 17: Nuclear Materials Information Program;

• HSPD – 18: Medical Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass Destruction;

• HSPD – 19: Combating Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States;

• HSPD – 20: National Continuity Policy;

• HSPD – 21: Public Health and Medical Preparedness;

• HSPD – 23: National Cyber Security Initiative;

• HSPD – 24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security;

• HSPD – 25: Arctic Region Policy.

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What did the creation of the Department of Homeland Security mean for local law enforcement? Following the formation of the DHS in 2003, we have seen a tremendous increase in the demands on federal, state, and local policing in the United States. The FBI shifted its focus from more traditional law enforcement activities, primarily reacting to criminal acts such as bank robberies, missing persons, corporate fraud, and other fed- eral offenses, to focus more on domestic terrorism concerns and proactive investigations related to terrorism, transnational crime, and national security. State police agencies assumed some of the duties vacated by changing federal law enforcement priorities, and also became important components of state-level homeland security bureaus and intelli- gence fusion centers.12 As a result of these shifting priorities at the federal and state levels, local police agencies assumed greater responsibility for traditional personal and property crimes that once might have been referred for federal investigation, assumed an increased responsibility for suspicious activity reporting, and became responsible for increased duties protecting critical infrastructure, special events, and dignitaries.

Now that we are more than a decade beyond 9/11, the veracity of the statement that “nothing will ever be the same again” is not quite as clear-cut as it once seemed. To be sure, local police have taken on some additional responsibilities, but on a day-to-day basis local police work is probably not much different than it was before 9/11. Intelligence gathering and information sharing are probably more significant concerns for police chiefs than they were in 2000, but most of the police executive’s job still revolves around managing the organization and leading police personnel and the community in the pursuit of crime control and other traditional police missions. The very significant threats posed by international terrorism and natural disasters still loom, however. “The world as we know it” could change again. Police executives are responsible for making sure that their organizations have the enhanced capabilities that might be needed and are well prepared for events that we hope will not occur. See “Homeland Security,” Box 14.4.

BOX 14.4 Homeland Security

Standard 46.3.1 The agency maintains liaison with other organizations for the exchange of infor-

mation relating to terrorism.

Standard 46.3.2 A written directive establishes procedures for reporting and relaying terrorism-

related intelligence/information to the proper task force or agency.

Standard 46.3.3 The agency provides terrorism awareness information within its service area.

Standard 46.3.4 The agency provides awareness level training for events involving hazardous

materials.

Source: Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies: The Standards Manual of the CALEA Law

Enforcement Agency Accreditation Program, fifth edition, as amended. 2015. Gainesville, VA:

Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc.

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The Preparedness Cycle

One of the best ways to think about the police role in homeland security is in refer- ence to the domestic preparedness cycle that includes prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Preparedness emphasizes planning, training, and exercising to increase awareness, performance, and overall capabilities in all four phases of the preparedness cycle. It includes such activities as developing intelligence-collection and informa- tion-sharing protocols, developing local response plans, training first responders, identi- fication of critical resources, and the development of mutual aid agreements both within and outside of jurisdictions.

Prevention The prevention phase of the preparedness cycle applies readily to terrorism and trans-

national crime, but it also applies to natural disasters. Because terrorism and crime are intentional acts committed by people, it is well within reason to hope to prevent some of those acts from occurring. Natural disasters, however, such as hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes, are not preventable in the same way (although it is certainly possible that future scientific developments might introduce some prevention measures). For these big natural disasters, it is more practical to think in terms of preventing or reducing harm as opposed to actually preventing the disasters from occurring. Fewer lives might be lost and less property destroyed if people take the proper precautions, if buildings are upgraded, and so forth.

In some circles, this aspect of prevention is called mitigation. Regardless of terminol- ogy, the line between real prevention and mitigation of losses is often fuzzy. For example, we might not be able to prevent heavy rain that causes rivers and streams to flood. But with floodwalls and dams we can sometimes prevent the flooding, by channeling and controlling all the extra water brought by the rain. Similarly, by discouraging building in flood-prone areas, we reduce the impact of floods when they do occur. These activities clearly prevent flooding and/or losses from flooding, even though they do not prevent heavy rain.

Another important element of “all hazards,” and one that is definitely an important target for prevention, is technological/industrial accidents.13 These kinds of accidents have the potential to cause catastrophic losses. In the transportation sector, plane crashes, railway crashes, and ship/ferry sinkings can each account for hundreds of deaths per inci- dent. Biological, chemical, and nuclear accidents have the potential for even larger-scale consequences.

The police play a secondary role in prevention or mitigation of natural disasters and technological catastrophes—engineers, scientists, air traffic controllers, airplane pilots,

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ship captains, risk managers, and government regulators play the primary role. For pre- vention of terrorism and serious crime, though, the police role is pivotal. Specific activities include border control, regulation of weapons and tools, patrol, investigation, surveil- lance, information and intelligence sharing, and community engagement. Involving the community in preventive activity is nothing new to the police. Citizens have historically provided the police with valuable information which, in some cases, has become action- able intelligence.

Additionally, in a more formal role, the intelligence community (IC) ideally aids the police with the provision of information and intelligence. The IC is primarily composed of agencies of the national government, such as the CIA, FBI, National Security Agency, and military. Historically, however, the IC has emphasized sharing information and intel- ligence horizontally (across federal agencies), not vertically with state and local agencies, and this was a major criticism of the intelligence community following September 11, 2001. The government was graded low in the intelligence category, and still has not resolved many crucial issues concerning information sharing, especially vertical sharing of information and intelligence so that state and local agencies receive the same valuable information and intelligence that federal members of the IC receive. Later in this chapter, the section on “Information Sharing” discusses this vital aspect of terrorism prevention in more detail.

Protection Protection is related to prevention but focused more on specific facilities, locations,

and systems with the intent to make them less susceptible to attack and/or damage from disasters and accidents. The federal government identified 17 critical infrastructure sectors following the events of 9/11 and has focused its efforts on improving the overall security and protection of these different sectors. This is especially evident at the state and local levels, where police agencies have been called upon during heightened security alerts to increase patrols and presence at various facilities in their communities.

Despite these efforts, according to a report by the Government Accountability Office, the nation’s critical infrastructures and key resources, including cyber and physical assets that have been designated essential to national security, national economic security, and national public health and safety, continue to be vulnerable to a wide variety of threats.14 These post-9/11 vulnerabilities were again magnified following the damage from Hurricane Katrina, when the Gulf Coast experienced damage to oil platforms, pipelines, and refineries; water mains; electrical power lines; and cellular phone towers. The chaos resulting from this infrastructure damage disrupted the function of government and business and produced cascading effects beyond the Gulf Coast.

Damage or threats to critical infrastructure can be varied in method and extensive- ness. The 9/11 attacks had a crippling effect on the airline industry. In 2004, authorities

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discovered detailed surveillance of the New York Stock Exchange and the Citigroup Center in the laptop computer of an Al Qaeda operative captured in Pakistan, part of a plan to target financial institutions in New York. The bombings of London’s public trans- portation system demonstrated how an attack on a transportation system could disrupt a city’s transportation and mobile telecommunications infrastructure. The 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, targeted popular hotels.

Due to the fact that the private sector owns approximately 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure—such as banking and financial institutions, telecommunications networks, energy production, and transmission facilities—there is greater emphasis now on public and private sectors forming effective partnerships in order to protect these criti- cal infrastructures. One new feature of infrastructure protection is a series of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISAC), which are public–private partnerships designed to provide members of specific sectors with information about physical and cyber threats and vulnerabilities in order to increase protection levels (see “Information Sharing and Analysis Centers,” Box 14.5).

Private ownership of so much critical infrastructure makes the significance of public– private partnerships readily apparent. Nowhere is this more evident than when consid- ering the protection of border states and states with coastlines. In addition to terrorist threats, these states routinely deal with immigration, drug smuggling, cargo theft, and human trafficking challenges. Seaports are particularly challenging to protect because they are typically large, vast quantities of merchandise and material pass through them, they are a combination of land and sea, there is a mix of public and private ownership of property and facilities, and there is overlapping local, state, and federal jurisdiction. Commander Stephen Flynn (U.S. Coast Guard, ret.) points to the following weaknesses of our seaports and the challenges that face federal, state, and local law enforcement:

(1) Seaports cannot be separated from the international transport system to which they belong. Ports are in essence nodes in a network where cargo is loaded on or unloaded from one mode—a ship—to or from other modes—trucks, trains, and, on occasion, planes. Therefore, seaport security must always be pur- sued against the context of transportation security. (2) Port security initiatives must be developed within a regional and interna- tional context. Unilateral efforts to tighten security within U.S. ports without commensurate efforts to improve security in the ports of our neighbors will lead shipping companies and importers to “port-shop”; i.e. to move their business to other market-entry points where their goods are cleared more quickly. Thus the result of unilateral, stepped-up security within U.S. ports could well be to erode the competitive position of important American ports while the locus of the security risk simply shifts outside of our reach to Canada, Mexico, or the Caribbean to ports such as Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, and Freeport.

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BOX 14.5 Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)

The mission of the National Council of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (National Coun-

cil of ISACs) is to advance the physical and cyber security of the critical infrastructures of North

America by establishing and maintaining a framework for valuable interaction between and among

the ISACs and with government.

National Council members include:

• Aviation;

• Communications;

• Defense Industry;

• Electric sector;

• Emergency services;

• Financial services;

• Information technology;

• Maritime;

• Multistate;

• National health;

• Nuclear;

• Oil and gas;

• Public transit;

• Real estate;

• Research and education;

• Supply chain;

• Surface transportation;

• Water.

Source: National Council of ISACs. Online at: http://www.isaccouncil.org/memberisacs.html.

(3) Since U.S. ports are among America’s most critical infrastructure, they should not be viewed as a primary line of defense in an effort to protect the U.S. homeland. The last place we should be looking to intercept a ship or container that has been co-opted by terrorists is in a busy, congested, and commercially vital seaport.15

Protecting critical infrastructure is a responsibility that is widely shared. Police do not bear all the responsibility for this—they have an important role to play, but so do private

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companies, private security, and non-police elements of the homeland security system. This situation of shared responsibility, together with the high degree of interdependence among various sectors of the economy and government, calls for a much greater level of coordination and collaboration than in the past.16

Response Police are on duty and available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year.

Often they are the only “first responders” working, so they are charged with respond- ing to a wide variety of incidents, even those outside the realm of their regular duties. Historically, police have responded to various situations that were not necessarily law enforcement-related, but were considered part of the safety and service functions of policing. Despite being accustomed to this “jack of all trades” role, things changed dra- matically for police (and other first responders) on September 11, 2001, when airplanes full of innocent people were used to assault high-rise office buildings and high-profile government installations. The essential nature of close collaboration between public agencies, as well as public–private collaboration, became obvious. This collective effort requires much more planning and coordination and, probably most important, commu- nication, to operate effectively and safely in the post-9/11 world.

National Response Framework (NRF)

The National Response Framework is intended to work in concert with the National Incident Management System. It requires that all jurisdictions establish a comprehensive, all-hazards approach to enhance the ability of the United States to manage disastrous and catastrophic incidents. The framework, which superseded the earlier National Response Plan, incorporates best practices and procedures from incident management disciplines—homeland security, emergency management, law enforcement, firefighting, public works, public health, responder and recovery worker health and safety, emergency medical services, and the private sector—and integrates them into a unified structure.17 It forms the basis of how the federal government coor- dinates with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector during major incidents.

The NRF identifies police, fire, public health and medical, emergency management, and other personnel as responsible for incident management at the local level. The idea is that an incident should be handled at the lowest possible organizational and jurisdictional level; however, if an incident expands beyond the capacity of the local response then the NRF provides a “seamless” integration with state governments and then the federal government for a timely federal response to catastrophic incidents. These types of inci- dents are defined as high-impact, low-probability events, including natural disasters and

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terrorist attacks that result in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disrup- tion severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.

National Incident Management System

The value of the Incident Command System (ICS) is very evident to most police agencies that have ever had to deal with a hostage crisis or other life-threatening event that required a coordinated response and approach. Even before 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the importance of a coordinated and multiagency command and management system was something that fundamentally was understood at the local, state, and federal levels. The practice of Incident Command was formalized in the 1970s by a group of local, state, and federal fire agencies following the brushfire season in Southern California. This group was referred to as Firescope (firefighting resources of California), which is still in existence today. Initially, ICSs were more commonly within the purview of the fire and emergency medical services, because they respond more often to major incidents with multiple per- sonnel and multiple units. Law enforcement work more often involves just one or two officers, so the need for formalized incident command methods arises less often. One of the first documented and successful uses of formalized ICS for policing was during the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.

It was not until 1996, when Executive Order No. 26 was signed, that a National Interagency Incident Management System–Incident Command System was required at the state level and would be required to be used during emergency operations. The idea was to create a common set of terms and procedures that provided for multiagency coordination, unified command, and the identification of equipment, resources, and common protocols for the handling of events and dissemination of information regarding an incident.

In 2003, HSPD #5 called for the creation of a comprehensive national approach to incident management. This initiative was referred to as the National Incident Management System (NIMS):

a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS works hand in hand with the National Response Framework (NRF). NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management.18

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The most immediate implication for policing was the requirement to take a number of ICS courses. The first series of courses had to be completed in 2006 and included ICS- 100 (Introduction to Incident Command System) and ICS-200 (Single Resources and Initial Action Incidents). All federal, state, territorial, local, tribal, private sector, and non- governmental personnel at the entry level, first-line supervisor level, middle- management level, and command and general staff level of emergency management operations were to complete these two courses. There was also a requirement in 2006 for all personnel with a direct role in emergency preparedness, incident management, or response to com- plete IS-700 and IS-800 training. The IS-700 training is an awareness-level course that explains NIMS components, concepts, and principles, while the IS-800 course is also an awareness-level course and reviews the National Response Framework. These feder- ally-mandated training requirements were viewed as burdensome by many in the police field, although most recognized the need for better coordination of emergency responses to critical incidents (see “Overview of NIMS,” Box 14.6).

The most controversial NIMS guidance given to police agencies by the federal government was an effort to standardize the language and rules of emergency response. Historically, local and state law enforcement officials have used “10-codes” in their radio

BOX 14.6 Overview of NIMS

WHAT NIMS IS: WHAT NIMS IS NOT:

• A comprehensive, nationwide, systematic approach

to incident management, including the Incident

Command System, Multiagency Coordination

Systems, and Public Information

• A set of preparedness concepts and principles for

all hazards

• Essential principles for a common operating picture

and interoperability of communications and infor-

mation management

• Standardized resource management procedures

that enable coordination among different

jurisdictions or organizations

• Scalable, so it may be used for all incidents (from

day-to-day to large-scale)

• A dynamic system that promotes ongoing

management and maintenance

• A response plan

• Only used during large-scale

incidents

• A communications plan

• Only applicable to certain

emergency management/incident

response personnel

• Only the Incident Command

System or an organization chart

• A static system

Source: National Incident Management System. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland

Security, page 6. Online at: http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf.

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communications. The criticism of that system was that there were no standard 10-codes; even neighboring police agencies used different codes. Also, emergency responders within the same jurisdiction may not use a common 10-code system, so the police code system is different from the fire department which, in turn, uses different codes from the ambulance service. Consequently, FEMA issued a directive in 2006 with a series of new procedures, one of which was the phasing out of 10-codes (also called “brevity codes”) and replacing them with phrases like “I’m at an accident scene” and other standard lan- guage. FEMA insisted that the plain-language instructions apply for everyday use as well as national emergencies and tied federal DHS funding to compliance.

Recovery The police role in recovery from terrorism and disasters is secondary. Primary respon-

sibility for community and economic recovery falls on FEMA, the Red Cross, other chari- table organizations, insurance companies, private businesses, state and local governments, and individuals. However, as noted in “Police Role in Recovery” (Box 14.7), police may have to enforce curfews, regulate traffic, and protect facilities for weeks or even months after a major catastrophe, until other institutions and community dynamics return to some semblance of normalcy. The 9/11 and Katrina experiences illustrated how long it can take for this recovery period to progress to a point where the burden on police services eases.

A very important aspect of recovery for police departments, and a specific respon- sibility of police executives and police planners, is continuity of operations. The com- munity counts on the police to provide services and protection in the days and months following a disaster or terrorist attack—what if police headquarters is flooded, cell phone service is knocked out, or the supply of gasoline is interrupted? This also applies during

BOX 14.7 Police Role in Recovery

A large attack will place immediate demands on any police department; coping with the perma-

nent changes that follow the attack can be equally demanding. At the World Trade Center disas-

ter, police were called on for search and rescue operations. During the mitigation phase, police

directed traffic, managed roadblocks, and supervised increased security in tunnels and bridges.

Still others recorded and classified body parts recovered from the site, a job that went on for

months. The aftereffects of the attack were so substantial that they necessitated the permanent

redeployment of many police. The traffic flow in downtown Manhattan has been redesigned to

cope with cleanup, reconstruction, and sightseeing. Deployment of police to maintain surveillance

of possible targets (bridges, tunnels, subways, train stations, etc.) has changed the way the New

York Police Department operates, probably permanently.

Source: Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke. 2008. Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Brief 49.

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and following a pandemic situation, when a significant number of police personnel may be sick and quarantined.19 Police departments need to develop contingency plans and backup systems to ensure that they can continue to operate and protect the community during the post-disaster recovery period.

Technology and Training

Police activities in support of the all-hazards homeland security mission may require additional and/or enhanced equipment and training. In the first few years of the Department of Homeland Security, federal funding was made available to law enforce- ment agencies and other public safety agencies directly from Washington and through state homeland security offices to purchase specialized equipment. After making initial pur- chases of protective equipment to be used if chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) material is encountered, many police agencies began to adopt two important principles that have subsequently guided homeland security technology procurement: (1) as much as possible, items should have dual purposes—that is, they should have everyday uses as well as emergency uses; and (2) regional cooperation should guide purchasing of the most expensive and specialized equipment. This latter point recognizes that not every single police department needs to own, and can afford to purchase and maintain, the most exotic and specialized technology, as long as they can get access to it when it is needed.

A national survey distributed after 9/11 asked police officers and police administra- tors to identify their most critical technology needs related to the all-hazards homeland security mission. Interestingly, neither communications technology nor body armor was rated near the top of the most critical needs.20 Respondents indicated that these technol- ogies were very important, of course, but they also considered the equipment that was currently available to be satisfactory. The top five most critical technology needs accord- ing to the survey respondents were as follows:

Law Enforcement Administrators Law Enforcement Officers

CBRN detection CBRN detection

Explosives/firearms detection Biohazard protection

Crime scene/crime lab Explosives/firearms detection

In-vehicle/personal computers Emergency database integration

Personal protective equipment Vulnerability and threat assessment

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These most-critical technology needs seemed to reflect serious concerns about safety and about the new and somewhat unfamiliar threats introduced by terrorism. Pre-9/11, when the potential threat from CBRN (Chemical-Biological-Radiological-Nuclear) was primarily associated with industrial or transportation accidents, the police tended to define it as a hazardous materials (HazMat) issue that would be handled primarily by fire departments and emergency managers. When the same types of materials are introduced by terrorists, however, we call them weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and there is a greater expectation that police will need to intervene. Police now have a heightened recognition of this responsibility, and are more aware of their equipment and technology needs to carry out the mission safely and successfully.

The all-hazards homeland security mission also raises new training requirements. As part of the National Preparedness Goal, DHS established a Target Capabilities List that identifies what emergency responders and others will need to do in the event of various types of disasters and related scenarios.21 Some of these target capabilities, such as med- ical surge or public health epidemiological investigation and laboratory testing, fall well outside the police mission. Others, such as intelligence fusion and analysis, public safety and security response, and citizen protection, clearly involve the police. DHS funds the development and delivery of homeland security-related training for police and others, and has set up a training portal at www.firstrespondertraining.gov to help meet the train- ing needs of the entire nation.

A national survey administered five years after 9/11 sought to identify the most serious continuing training needs of police, other emergency responders, health workers, and general government officials related to the all-hazards homeland security mission.22 The survey concentrated on the degree to which respondents had already received training related to each of the DHS target capabilities versus those that still presented substan- tial training needs. For each of 24 of the target capabilities, more than 50 percent of responding police agencies indicated that they still needed additional training. The top five reported areas of training need for police agencies are noted below:

Percent of Agencies Indicating Continuing Training Needs:

• 77% – planning for terrorism events;

• 74% – information gathering and threat recognition;

• 74% – prevention of cyber/computer crimes;

• 73% – citizen protection: evacuation and/or in-place protection;

• 71% – intelligence/information sharing and dissemination.

Other types of training with high levels of reported need included interoperable emergency communications, critical infrastructure protection, responder safety and

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health, intelligence analysis and production, investigation of terrorism/WMD events, and citizen preparedness and participation. Clearly, the all-hazards homeland security mission has presented police with some new and complex responsibilities for which new and different types of training are needed.

Information Sharing

Effective homeland security depends heavily on information sharing. Preventing terrorism requires horizontal and vertical sharing of information and intelligence. Protection of critical infrastructure requires collaboration between public agencies and private companies, including sharing of confidential information. Emergency response to disasters, whether natural or man-made, requires coordination, including interoperable sharing of real-time information and databases. The critical importance of information sharing is difficult to overemphasize. Unfortunately, though, information and intelli- gence sharing within the law enforcement community has traditionally been inadequate, while the flow of information between law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community (military and national intelligence agencies) has been nearly nonexistent. The latter was due mainly to widely differing missions pre-9/11—police were focused mainly on domestic crime and, to a lesser extent, transnational crime, while IC agencies were focused mainly on threats to national security posed by other nations.

Local police agencies are generally predisposed to share information with each other, but several complications have historically interfered with good intentions. The biggest is simply the fragmentation of the U.S. police system—some local police departments have 100-plus other local police agencies within a one- or two-county radius, making even local information sharing very complicated. A few regional information systems have been created (ARJIS in San Diego and CLEAR in Chicago, for example), and it is common in some areas to hold monthly or quarterly regional meetings of chiefs, inves- tigators, and/or intelligence specialists. Still, in such a fragmented system, it is difficult to determine who to share your information or intelligence with (who needs it) and to determine whom to contact when in search of particular information or intelligence.

Local police have routinely shared basic information with state police, other state agencies, and some federal agencies, especially the FBI. This is because state agencies and the FBI maintain the official repositories and databases of fingerprint cards, criminal histories, wanted persons, stolen cars, and other stolen property. In addition, state police typically oversee registration systems for handgun permits and sex offenders, while state motor vehicle agencies maintain records related to driver licenses and vehicle registra- tions. Also, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system is run by the FBI, using a process that involves local agencies submitting their reports to their state police or some other state agency, which combines the information and forwards it on to the FBI.

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While local police have traditionally shared these kinds of basic information with state police and federal agencies on a routine basis, sharing of other information and intelligence has not always been routine. Local police often complain about a one-way flow of information in their relations with both state and federal agencies—they provide information, but they never get anything back. Resentment builds up, leading to less information sharing by local agencies.

In more recent years though (beginning well before 9/11), the FBI, DEA, and Secret Service all created local-area federal task forces on which local police routinely partic- ipated. These violent crime, major drugs, and electronic crimes task forces enhanced operational cooperation as well as information and intelligence sharing. Those local police agencies participating in task forces often used them as their principal channels for information sharing with federal law enforcement agencies. Also, more than 7,000 law enforcement agencies joined six regional (multistate) intelligence networks established to facilitate sharing of criminal intelligence.23 In addition, local, state, and federal agencies jointly operated 31 regional and border HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas) that emphasized drug-related information sharing and intelligence production.24

Since the events of September 11, 2001, a substantial number of reforms and other changes pertinent to intelligence and information sharing have been implemented (see “Post-9/11 Information Sharing Initiatives,” Box 14.8). Not surprisingly, these changes and reforms have not immediately solved all of the information- and intelligence-sharing problems associated with terrorism and homeland security. Local and state police have consistently complained that so-called “national” plans were too often really “federal” plans—created without state and local input, not responsive to state and local needs, often asserting federal control, and often creating new and unfunded state and local mandates.25

While obstacles and challenges remain, it is also the case that significant changes have occurred. Within one or two years after 9/11, local and state police were reporting increased responsibilities related to homeland security, increased contacts with a range of federal agencies, better relationships with federal authorities, and more open and effective information sharing.26 More Joint Terrorism Task Forces were created (increasing from 35 to 100) with more state and local participation, and federal participation within state and local intelligence fusion centers became common. The overall trend has undoubtedly been in the direction of more information sharing.

The post-9/11 focus on local police has mainly been on their role as “eyes and ears” in local communities throughout the nation. In this respect, they are seen as very important collectors of information, of raw data, that can be fed into the intelligence process in order to help analysts and others “connect the dots.” Officers have been given training and also checklists to help them identify and report suspicious behavior that might have some connection to terrorism.27 Community policing is seen as an ideal local police strategy because it helps officers get to know their communities and builds trust, making it more

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likely that residents will share important information with the police.28 But local police need to be more than just information collectors—they should also be “first preventers” who are most likely to be in a position to prevent a terrorist act, both by gathering infor- mation and by taking action, when appropriate. This first preventer role is paired with the more familiar “first responder” role to make a logical and meaningful package that demonstrates the synergy between effective crime reduction tactics and counterterrorism and encourages local police to take their counterterrorism role more seriously.29

Important “linking pins” in the new information-sharing environment are state and

BOX 14.8 Post-9/11 Information Sharing Initiatives

• Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 expanding (and/or clarifying) some law enforcement

and intelligence authorities related to counterterrorism.

• Creation of U.S. Northern Command in 2002.

• Publication of a National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2002.

• Creation of the Joint Regional Information Exchange System (JRIES) in 2002.

• Creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002 (operational in 2003).

• Publication of a National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan in 2003.

• Creation of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council in 2004.

• Creation of the Homeland Security Information Network to replace JRIES in 2004.

• Creation of the Office of Director of National Intelligence in 2004.

• Creation of the National Counterterrorism Center in 2004.

• Establishment of 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country, headed by the

FBI with active participation from local and state police as well as other federal agencies, as of

2004.

• Passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act establishing an Information

Sharing Environment in 2004.

• Publication of an updated National Strategy for Homeland Security in 2007.

• Publication of a National Strategy for Information Sharing in 2007.

• Passage of the 9/11 Commission Act establishing the Interagency Threat Assessment and

Coordination Group in 2007.

• Publication of an intelligence community Information Sharing Strategy in 2008.

• Creation of 58 state and local information fusion centers as of 2008.

Source: Gary Cordner and Kathryn Scarborough. 2010. “Connecting Police Intelligence with

Military and National Intelligence.” In Keith Logan (ed.), Homeland Security and Intelligence. New

York, NY: Praeger/ABC-CLIO, pp. 174–210.

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regional fusion centers. These are designed to connect the hundreds of local agencies in each state with DHS and other federal components of the intelligence community, such as the National Counterterrorism Center and the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group. Each of these fusion centers is designed to receive, collate, and analyze intelligence from throughout its state, creating useful state-wide intelligence products when possible, and also passing important intelligence on to federal agencies when appropriate. The fusion centers also serve as points of contact for federal intelligence agencies when they need to make inquiries or disseminate information to officials within a state. Some of these fusion centers are focused exclusively on terrorism, but most have taken an “all crimes” or “all hazards” approach in order to be of greatest value to law enforcement agencies and others within their states.

Obviously, police executives have a much more complicated information-sharing environment facing them today than in the past. In order to provide the best possible protection for their communities, as well as contribute to national security, they need to make sure that their officers are properly prepared to fulfill the roles of intelligence collectors, first preventers, and first responders. Also, police executives need to build rela- tionships and maintain open channels of communication with various state and federal agencies, including fusion centers, state police, the FBI, and DHS. Various national and state systems and plans have been established since 9/11 to make this kind of information sharing more feasible but, ultimately, it depends on smart policing at the local level and a spirit of collaboration among all the parties involved in homeland security.

Intelligence-Led Policing

Police attention to terrorism and homeland security has led to the development of intelligence-led policing. Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is “a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-solving (POP).”30 The basic idea is straightforward: police activity should be guided by information and intelligence.31 Patrol assignments, for example, should be based on the latest information about crime and other problems, as opposed to simply assigning patrol officers to standardized beats and telling them to “be careful out there.” Similarly, specialized units should be deployed based on intelligence about crime, drugs, and gang activity. Most importantly, these deployments should be based on current infor- mation and intelligence, as up-to-the-minute as possible. If intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis are effective, then ILP has the capacity to help police work smarter (see “Intelligence-Led Policing,” Box 14.9).

Thus far, it seems that more U.S. police agencies are exploring intelligence-led polic- ing than actually implementing it on a wide scale. One stumbling block is that some agencies think of ILP simply in terms of terrorism and homeland security, not recognizing

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BOX 14.9 Intelligence-Led Policing

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative philosophy that starts with information, gathered at all

levels of the organization, that is analyzed to create useful intelligence and an improved under-

standing of the operational environment. This will assist leadership in making the best possible

decisions with respect to crime control strategies, allocation of resources, and tactical operations.

The adoption of ILP processes requires a concerted effort by all parties, including analysts, oper-

ators, and senior leaders. For analysts, the key components of this process include the creation

of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence products that support immediate needs, pro-

mote situational awareness, and provide the foundation for longer-term planning. For operators, it

requires becoming both better data collectors and better consumers of intelligence-related prod-

ucts. This means shifting from emphasizing post-event evidence collection to constantly gather-

ing all relevant data and ensuring it is provided for entry into appropriate databases, as well as

drawing from the intelligence analysts and relevant databases all the information that is needed

to support ongoing operations. Finally, adopting the ILP process requires senior leadership to

actively engage the analysts and the operators to ensure the leadership has a sufficient picture of

the operating environment and that it can act to distribute resources according to conclusions and

priorities drawn from this understanding.

Source: Joseph R. Fuentes. 2006. New Jersey State Police Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led

Policing. New York, NY: Manhattan Institute, p. 3. Online at: http://www.njsp.org/divorg/invest/pdf/

njsp_ilpguide.pdf.

its applicability to crime control. Also, full-scale adoption of ILP requires an effective intelligence collection system (including collection of community intelligence), a robust capacity for intelligence analysis, and a strong command and management system capa- ble of using intelligence products on a day-to-day basis to drive resource deployment and operational tactics. As this description indicates, ILP requires full integration of crime analysis and problem analysis with intelligence analysis.32 In addition, it requires a sophisticated understanding of how community engagement and problem solving fit into ILP—too often, police executives seem to think they have to choose between COP, POP, and ILP when, in reality, they should be thinking about how best to integrate these strategies into the most effective overall approach for their agency and their community.33 It will be interesting to see how these misunderstandings and challenges are sorted out over the next few years.

Balancing Safety and Liberty

The events of 9/11 demonstrated dramatically the kinds of threats and risks that we face in the modern world. Understandably, the United States reacted with several

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measures designed to reduce the chances that a similar attack could succeed again, includ- ing the USA PATRIOT Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Among other things, security measures at airports are stricter and more intrusive, intel- ligence gathering is more robust, and information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies has increased. Quite a few attempted terrorist acts have been inter- rupted before they could be completed, and a number of would-be terrorists have been captured in sting operations within the United States or killed in staging areas overseas.

The other side of the coin is the impact of these measures on citizens’ privacy and civil rights. Intelligence gathering is an inexact science and always results in information pertaining to innocent people and innocent acts being collected and stored. Similarly, more aggressive security and policing measures always result in more innocent people being stopped, questioned, searched, and sometimes detained. Moreover, even when intelligence gathering, security measures, and police actions are targeted at suspicious behaviors, they almost always affect poor people and members of minority groups the most, resulting in allegations of discrimination or, in modern parlance, “profiling.” The farther we get from the events of 9/11, the more these intrusions on people’s rights and privacy seem oppressive and unfair.

Earlier in the text we emphasized that police in a free society are always engaged in a delicate balancing act between order and liberty. They are “in the arena,” squarely where the action is, not just participants in some philosophical or academic debate. Policing to prevent and control terrorism brings these issues even more to the forefront, since the potential threats to safety are so significant. We do not have a simple equation to offer to police executives to help them navigate this difficult territory. It can only be emphasized that police chiefs and sheriffs have a very critical leadership role to play, both in leading their employees and leading the community. When times get really tough and the public and their political leaders are tempted to trade freedom for security, police executives may need to be the ones who demonstrate true grit,34 calm reassurance, and the wisdom of the ages, reminding everyone of Benjamin Franklin’s famous quote from 1759, “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”35

Summary

This chapter has outlined the modern police role in light of the events of September 11, 2001, the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security, and the devastating experience of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The federal government, police departments, and the rest of the emergency response community still have a lot of hard work to do to become more prepared and more adept at all-hazards prevention, protec- tion, response, and recovery. The new homeland security mission presents extra workload

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for police agencies, significant new responsibilities, and major challenges. The crucial significance of information sharing has come to the forefront, and a new police strat- egy, intelligence-led policing, has emerged. It is quite likely that police work and police administration will never be the same again.

D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S

1. Do you agree that the police role has changed significantly since September 11, 2001? If not, why not? If you agree, identify and describe three ways in which it has changed.

2. Why is vertical information sharing so much more challenging than horizontal information sharing in the counterterrorism/domestic security context?

3. Who (agencies, levels of government, others) do you think should have had primary responsibility for recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina?

4. Why is interoperability so important? Why do you think it hasn’t already been achieved? 5. Do you think intelligence-led policing or community policing is the best model to use to achieve homeland

security? To what degree are these two police strategies compatible or in conflict? 6. In the aftermath of 9/11, do you think we have given up too much freedom in return for greater safety? How

would you strike the balance between freedom and safety? If you were a police chief, where would you draw the lines on intelligence gathering, eavesdropping, and aggressive policing?

Suggested Reading

Connors, E. 2007. Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Murphy, G.R. and M.R. Plotkin. 2003. Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Strategies for Local Law Enforcement, Volume 1, Local–Federal Partnerships. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

Newman, G.R. and R.V. Clarke. 2008. Policing Terrorism: An Executive’s Guide. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Ratcliffe, J.H. 2008. Intelligence-Led Policing. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing. Richards, E.P., K.C. Rathbun, C.S. Brito, and A. Luna. 2006. The Role of Law Enforcement in Public Health

Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-Hazards Approach. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Notes

1 G.L. Kelling and W.J. Bratton. 2006. “Policing Terrorism.” Civic Bulletin No. 43 (September). New York, NY: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.

2 T. Hanan. 2003. “Suicide Terrorism: The Overlooked WMD.” Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International 9, no. 3: 56–61.

3 L. Bonkiewicz and R.B. Ruback. 2012. “The Role of the Police in Evacuations: Responding to the Societal Impact of a Disaster.” Police Quarterly 15, no. 2: 137–156.

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4 COPS Office. 2005. National Policy Summit: Building Private Security/Public Policing Partnerships to Prevent and Respond to Terrorism and Public Disorder. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

5 L.T. Hoover. 2002. “The Challenges to Local Police Participation in the Homeland Security Effort.” Subject to Debate 16, no. 10 (October): 1, 2, 4, 8–11.

6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. 2004. The 9/11 Commission Report. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.

7 9/11 Public Discourse Project. 2005. “Final Report on 9/11 Commission Recommendations.” Online at: www.c-span.org/video/?190186-1/911-public-discourse-project-report.

8 National Security Preparedness Group. 2011. Tenth Anniversary Report Card: The Status of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations. Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center. Online at: http:// bipartisanpolicy.org/library/tenth-anniversary-report-card-status-911-commission-recommendations/.

9 R.H. Ward, K.L. Kiernan, and D. Mabrey. 2006. Homeland Security: An Introduction. Newark, NJ: LexisNexis/Matthew Bender, p. 232.

10 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. 2006. A Failure of Initiative. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 241–266.

11 Information on DHS in this section is drawn from R. White and K. Collins (eds). 2006. The United States Department of Homeland Security: An Overview. Boston, MA: Pearson Custom Publishing.

12 C. Foster and G. Cordner. 2005. The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement: Adjusting to New Roles and Changing Conditions. Lexington, KY: Council of State Governments. Online at: www.csg.org/ pubs/Documents/Misc0506Terrorism.pdf.

13 W.M. Evan and M. Manion. 2002. Minding the Machines: Preventing Technological Disasters. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

14 Government Accounting Office. 2007. Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors, GAO-07-626T. Washington, DC: author, March 20.

15 See www.cfr.org/transnational-crime/potential-impact-homeland-security-reorganization-federal-law- enforcement-activities/p4625.

16 K.A. Brown. 2006. Critical Path: A Brief History of Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States. Fairfax, VA: Spectrum Publishing.

17 See www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 18 National Incident Management System. 2008. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, page

1. Online at: www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_core.pdf. 19 E.P. Richards, K.C. Rathbun, C.S. Brito, and A. Luna. 2006. The Role of Law Enforcement in Public

Health Emergencies: Special Considerations for an All-Hazards Approach. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, p. 5.

20 G. Cordner. 2006. Homeland Security Technology Survey Report. Washington, DC: Public Safety and Security Institute for Technology.

21 See www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-8.html. 22 G. Cordner, A. Cordner, and L. Mayberry. 2007. Assessing the Needs of Rural Emergency Responders:

National Training Needs Assessment 2006. Richmond, KY: Rural Domestic Preparedness Consortium. 23 See www.riss.net/ 24 Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2008. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas. Online at: www.

whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program. 25 Protecting Your Community from Terrorism: Improving Local-Federal Partnerships. 2003. Washington,

DC: Police Executive Research Forum; From Hometown Security to Homeland Security. 2005. Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police.

26 Foster and Cordner. 2005. The Impact of Terrorism on State Law Enforcement; Protecting Your Community

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from Terrorism: The Production and Sharing of Intelligence. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

27 J. Meyer. 2008. “LAPD Leads the Way in Local Counter-Terrorism.” Los Angeles Times (April 14); Bureau of Justice Assistance. 2008. State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program. Online at: www. slatt.org/Default.aspx.

28 Local Law Enforcement’s Role in Preventing and Responding to Terrorism. 2001. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum; M. Scheider and R. Chapman. 2003. “Community Policing and Terrorism.” Journal of Homeland Security (April).

29 Kelling and Bratton. 2006. “Policing Terrorism.” 30 M. Peterson. 2005. Intelligence-Led Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. Washington, DC: Bureau

of Justice Assistance. 31 J. Fuentes. 2006. New Jersey State Police Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing. New York, NY:

Manhattan Institute. Online at: www.njsp.org/divorg/invest/pdf/njsp_ilpguide.pdf. 32 J.H. Ratcliffe. 2007. Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management for

Law Enforcement Leaders. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 33 J.V. Lee. 2010. “Policing After 9/11: Community Policing in an Age of Homeland Security.” Police

Quarterly 13, no. 4: 347–366. 34 B.M. Jenkins. 2006. “True Grit: To Conquer Terrorism, We Must Conquer Our Own Fear.”

RAND Review 30, no. 2 (Summer): 10–19. Online at: www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/ summer2006/truegrit1.html.

35 The Quotations Page. Online at: www.quotationspage.com/quote/1381.html.

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CHAPTER 15 Contemporary Issues in Police Administration

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

• Identify several community policing activities that have become commonplace among U.S. police departments.

• Explain why inter-organizational collaboration is important for American policing. • Explain the term “transnational crime” and why it is an increasingly important consideration in

modern policing. • Explain why privatization may become a more common feature of modern policing. • Identify the most promising scenario for addressing the issue of racial profiling and racially biased

policing. • Identify several varieties of mass media that affect police and police administration. • Identify three categories of computer involvement in criminal activity. • Identify five categories of technology utilization in law enforcement. • Identify five strategic options available to police organizations today. • Explain what is meant by servant leadership.

This chapter presents information on several important themes and issues in contemporary police administration. These themes and issues attempt to capture pres- ent-day trends as well as future considerations affecting the police field. Four themes are highlighted: community engagement, collaboration, privatization, and globalization. Together, these themes emphasize the growing interdependence of modern policing— police are increasingly more connected to communities, other agencies, and even to events around the world. Four contemporary issues are then discussed: civil liberties and police legitimacy (including racial profiling and other forms of discrimination), mass media and social media, new forms of crime, and technology. These issues present serious

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challenges to police departments today and promise to remain prominent issues well into the future. Finally, we discuss several modern approaches to management as they apply to police organizations.

Four Contemporary Themes

Community Engagement It is generally accepted that many police departments had grown far too isolated

from their communities by the 1960s and 1970s. Most officers patrolled in cars and had limited informal contact with the public. Calls for service and reported crimes were handled as quickly as possible; the “just the facts” approach was preferred. Police depart- ments emphasized their crime-fighting role and advised the public to leave crime control to the police. The police expected to achieve crime control with the three-part strategy of preventive patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investigations.

Although we now realize that this model of “stranger policing” and the police-centered approach to crime control was fatally flawed, it developed for understandable reasons. Limiting police–public contact was expected to reduce police corruption and other abuses of authority. The professional model was also a method for administering the same level and quality of policing throughout the community—it showed no favorites. In addition, prior to research in the 1970s, preventive patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investigations were believed to be effective, especially in comparison to such  antiquated  techniques as the posse, the citizens’ protective association, and foot patrol.

Police began to rediscover the value of community involvement in the 1980s. The forms of community involvement that have developed vary widely, from relatively passive participation in neighborhood watch groups to more aggressive action, such as confront- ing drug dealers and prostitutes, and from individual-level efforts to more organized activities, such as citizen patrols. Community crime prevention programs have become commonplace, as has community policing. One survey conducted in 2002 found that each of the following 12 activities had been implemented by at least 75 percent of the responding police agencies:

• Citizens attend police–community meetings.

• Citizens participate in neighborhood watch.

• Citizens help police identify and resolve problems.

• Citizens serve as volunteers within the police agency.

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• Citizens attend citizen police academies.

• Police hold regularly scheduled meetings with community groups.

• Police have youth programs.

• Police have victim assistance programs.

• Agencies use fixed assignments to specific beats or areas.

• Agencies give special recognition for good community policing work by employees.

• Agencies do geographically based crime analysis.

• Agencies use permanent neighborhood-based offices or stations.1

More important than any particular programs, however, has been a fundamental change in policing philosophy and strategy. Individual police departments may or may not support foot patrol, citizens on patrol, or citizen review boards, but it is now uni- versally recognized that police and citizens need to work together to be successful. Both police chiefs and beat patrol officers recognize this.

Community engagement in policing and crime control takes many forms at several different levels. For example, the Seattle Police Department conducted a community-wide survey in 2003 to identify “friction points” between the police department and the community.2 The department then worked with the community to address the issues of greatest concern to Seattle’s citizens. This is an example of seeking community-wide input in order to improve police–community relations.

Many police agencies today utilize some form of civilian review of complaints against the police.3 Appointed citizens may simply review the police department’s internal investigations and decisions, they may serve as an appeals body, or they may even serve as the actual decision makers in meting out discipline to police officers. Many agencies also utilize community representatives on interview boards in the police officer hiring and promotion processes. These are examples of community involvement in the actual administration of the police agency.

Direct citizen participation in policing has also become more common. Some cities, such as Ft Worth, Texas, have extensive citizen patrol programs.4 Many jurisdictions also utilize police auxiliaries or reserves—these are generally citizens who have other jobs but who donate some of their spare time to the police or sheriff’s department. In some places, these reserves are sworn and armed and perform regular police duties; in others they are non-sworn and assist in traffic control, youth programs, school programs, and similar supporting roles. These are examples of community involvement in police field operations.

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Citizen participation in crime prevention activities is also quite common today. Perhaps the most powerful trend in this respect is toward community-based problem solving. When police officers and neighborhood residents work together to identify, analyze, and resolve persistent crime and disorder problems, stunning improvements are possible.5 Clearly, citizens are in the best position to identify the chronic problems that really affect their lives—police are often surprised that abandoned cars and rowdy kids are of greater concern to neighborhood residents than burglaries and thefts. Engaging citizens in the problem-solving stages beyond problem identification (i.e., analysis and response) is more challenging but very rewarding.6 This is the ultimate form of com- munity involvement because it engages ordinary citizens in tackling the most serious problems in the neighborhoods where they live and work.

The importance of citizen involvement and community engagement for public safety has been reinforced in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001. Police, fire- fighters, and emergency medical service (EMS) personnel were assisted in their response to the World Trade Center by numerous citizen volunteers. Subsequently, law enforce- ment officials have recognized that they need the public’s help in identifying suspicious activity that might be connected to terrorism.

The principle underlying all this is that ours is supposed to be a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Because “we the people” are very busy these days, there are limits on our willingness and ability to participate in policing, crime prevention, and homeland security. Then too, we have professionals who are trained and paid to perform much of the work associated with public safety. It should also not be forgotten that our history teaches us that citizens will sometimes go too far and want to take the law into their own hands,7 and that volunteers and reserves should be limited to duties for which they are properly trained and authorized.8 Thus, there must be limits on

MODERN POLICING BLOG Working with neighborhoods December 10, 2014

This story describes a variety of neighborhood-level crime prevention projects around the country coor- dinated by LISC (Local Initiatives Support Coalition). The projects incorporate community policing and problem-oriented policing principles but the police aren’t always in the lead. The overall strategy is “taking a proactive approach to planning and designing neighborhood development with community safety in mind.”

Source: The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner.wordpress. com/2014/12/10/working-with-neighborhoods/. The hyperlink at “This story” links to http://www.popcitymedia.com/features/ communitypolicing120814.aspx.

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the public’s role in policing, and we must be careful to strike the proper balance between the roles of paid professionals and volunteer citizens. Nevertheless, what we have learned is that it is essential for effective policing, and for the control of crime and disorder, that the police truly engage the community as partners. It is important that this fundamental principle not be forgotten.

Collaboration The importance and necessity of collaboration has similarly become evident in recent

years. Just as police departments are more effective when they work closely with the community, so too are they more effective when they collaborate with other public and private organizations.

Inter-organizational collaboration is particularly crucial for American policing because of the extreme fragmentation of government resources and authority. Within a typical local community, the police department and fire department are separate agencies, and the ambulance service may also be a separate entity. Emergency communications (the 911 center) may be operated by the county or by a regional board. The county sheriff’s department is a separate agency that usually has jurisdiction within the local community, as do the state police. Probation and parole may be one agency or two and may be oper- ated by the county or the state. The same is true of juvenile services. Prosecutors may be employed locally, although it is more common for them to be county or state officials. Then there is the entire additional layer of federal law enforcement, federal probation, and U.S. attorneys arrayed on top of the local and state systems. In times of serious emergency, the National Guard and the military may also be deployed.

Because of the existence of all of these local, state, and federal public safety and criminal justice agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, coordination and cooperation are essential to avoid waste, interference, and conflict. The need goes even further today. Actual collaboration—working together to be more successful—is necessary. This involves sharing resources, expertise, and authority. Evidence of collaboration can often be found in everyday investigations and problem solving, in the formation of multijuris- dictional task forces, and in joint training exercises.

Good examples of collaboration can be found today in the investigation of computer crime. Few departments have the necessary in-house expertise to address cybercrime, so it is often provided by state or federal agencies or by a multiagency task force. If a local agency becomes aware of a computer crime or seizes computing equipment that might contain digital evidence, it may request assistance from one of these sources or just “hand off” the case to an agency that is better equipped to deal with the case.

Some effective problem-solving collaboration has recently begun to take place between police and probation, parole, and juvenile services agencies.9 For too long, many police departments and individual police officers did not work closely with these agencies.

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Police have found, however, that adult and juvenile probation officers, for example, have detailed information about their clients, as well as authority over them that, in many instances, exceeds police authority. Thus, police and probation officers working together may be able to address a gang problem, an after-hours nightclub problem, or a drug house problem more effectively than either group working alone.

An excellent example of collaboration to improve police and public safety response was implemented in a 40-county region in Eastern Kentucky.10 More than 100 local law enforcement agencies, plus the state police and other state law enforcement agen- cies, worked together to implement a wireless data and voice communication system. Fire, ambulance, and other public safety agencies were also added to the system in later phases.

This project is designed to address what is referred to as the “interoperability” problem, caused by different agencies having separate communications and data sys- tems that cannot “talk” to each other. Lack of communications interoperability among public safety agencies was demonstrated most dramatically in New York and at the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, when responding agencies could not communicate effectively with each other. Lack of data interoperability was uncovered in the subse- quent investigation into how the terrorists were able to enter the United States to plan and  carry  out  their  attacks—different federal agencies had pieces of information, but no one had the whole picture. It is now obvious that communications and data inter- operability are essential prerequisites to effective collaboration to combat both crime and terrorism.

This discussion has centered on collaboration among police, public safety, and criminal justice agencies, but of course the police also need to collaborate with many other public and private agencies in order to address crime and disorder problems. Police departments have demonstrated the value of collaboration with schools, social services, mental health agencies, private security, and a wide variety of other activ- ities  over  the  past  two  decades. The 2002 survey cited earlier in this chapter found that  more than 75 percent of agencies had implemented three specific forms of collaboration:

• Police have interagency involvement in problem solving.

• Police use regulatory codes in problem solving.

• Police work with building code enforcement.11

Similarly, a study of problem solving by individual patrol officers in San Diego found that it was common for officers to draw on resources from outside the depart- ment when responding to specific problems. Also, the types of collaborations that were developed varied substantially from one problem to another, as they should, because

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problem-oriented policing aims to apply tailor-made responses to each particular prob- lem. The figures below indicate how often officers reported using different resources in the 227 problem-solving projects that were identified:

• 26% private sector;

• 18% other city agencies;

• 17% code compliance;

• 6% other police including federal;

• 6% county, state, or federal agencies (non-police);

• 4% social services.12

It makes good sense for police agencies to engage in widespread collaboration with other public and private organizations.13 Collaboration can help the police be more effective in addressing crime and disorder problems. It can also contribute greatly to efficiency, through coordination of effort and elimination of redundancy and duplica- tion. Collaboration is particularly crucial in a situation as fragmented as the American governmental system, and in an economic climate in which local and state governments simply cannot afford inefficiencies or redundancies.

Privatization The maxim to “do more with less” is not particularly new. Government agencies,

including police departments, have faced regular cycles of budget belt-tightening over the past few decades. In some states, such as California, Oregon, and Florida, tax limitation ballot initiatives and state laws added extra pressure to the normal level of fiscal conserva- tism in America beginning as early as 1978. Nationally, however, the recession that began in 2008 forced additional reductions of services, hiring freezes, and even layoffs in many state and local government agencies, including police departments.14

These kinds of fiscal conditions certainly present headaches and challenges to police executives. Police chiefs have a harder time arguing for their annual budgets before mayors and city councils. The need for federal grants to supplement an agency’s budget grows greater, but so does the competition for those grants from other police agencies in equally desperate straits. Many police agencies have had to trim their overtime budgets, which reduces operational flexibility and also hurts individual officers’ pocketbooks. Popular programs such as McGruff and DARE have been cut back or eliminated in some departments. Agencies have closed mini-stations, storefront offices, and other components of their community policing strategies. Police departments have examined the services they provide and, in some cases, opted to eliminate services such as funeral

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escorts, taking reports at minor traffic accidents, and responding to residential burglar alarms (unless there is verification that it is not a false alarm). In a few extreme cases, such as Pontiac, Michigan, agencies have simply given up and gone out of business for lack of adequate funding to continue in operation.15

In such difficult financial circumstances, and in line with trends in other sectors of American government, local governments have increasingly looked toward privatization of policing services, generally as a cost-cutting measure. One approach is to privatize or “outsource” administrative and specialized functions, such as building maintenance, vehicle maintenance, technology maintenance, purchasing, payroll, and analysis of digital and DNA evidence. Some police agencies have even taken a page from the military and begun hiring private security to guard their own facilities. The financial advantage in these kinds of arrangements usually comes from lower personnel costs (wages and benefits), but competitive bidding and economies of scale may also contribute to cost savings. A large private lab, for example, may be able to acquire automated equipment that enables much faster processing of DNA samples, a purchase that most local or state crime labs might not be able to afford.

It is more controversial to consider whether police operational functions can be privatized. Privately-employed security officers already operate in many quasi-public places, such as shopping malls and downtown business districts, often handling inci- dents, conducting investigations, and even making arrests. Private residential com- munities have employed their own private police for decades but, more recently, some traditional municipalities have considered contracting with security companies, either to supplement public police services or replace them.16 As with more limited forms of privatization, the motivation for broad forms of police privatization is usually financial. Over the next few years, we can expect to see even more pressure to reduce the costs of policing, more interest in privatization, and a heated debate over the degree to which the awesome responsibility for exercising police powers can and should be delegated to private companies.

Globalization The fourth theme that increasingly runs through modern policing is globaliza-

tion. Trends in business, finance, trade, travel, communications, and computers really have “shrunk the world” in the last few decades. It is far more likely now than 25 years ago that a local criminal investigation might involve international transactions and foreign  individuals. These foreign individuals might have traveled to the local jurisdiction,  or they might have played their roles (as witnesses, victims, or suspects) from afar.

Many traditional crimes such as drug distribution and theft can have international features today. Much has also been made in recent years of international organized crime

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involving Russians, Nigerians, and others. Crimes committed with computers, including fraud, theft, vandalism, and hacking, know no boundaries. Then there are newer crimes (or perhaps crimes that are simply receiving more attention today) such as human traf- ficking of women and children and illegal trafficking of immigrants, weapons, and even nuclear material. The term transnational crime has been coined to describe the increas- ingly international nature of crime.

International terrorism has become a huge concern for local, state, and federal law enforcement since the events of September 11, 2001. Americans and people all around the world witnessed the death and destruction that could be caused by a relatively small group of terrorists. These were far from the first acts of international terrorism committed against the United States, of course, and in fact other countries had for a long time been more seriously plagued by these kinds of attacks than had the United States. The attacks of 9/11 galvanized national and world attention, however, and drove home the new real- ity that crime and terrorism emanating from halfway around the globe could threaten American communities and American citizens.

Another aspect of globalization that has affected American policing has been the participation of local and state police in international policing missions in places like Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.17 As the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and other bodies have accepted peacekeeping roles in war-torn countries around the world, it has become evident that a key element in the restoration of order and civil society is effective policing. Typically, police and military forces in these countries were previously aligned with repressive regimes. Once the ini- tial military phase of peacekeeping has been accomplished, the country needs reliable, professional policing to maintain order and reassure the citizenry of their safety. While a policing system is being rebuilt along democratic lines, police officers are sometimes brought in from around the world to provide police service and help train the country’s new police.

Many American police officers have now had the experience of serving in such international missions, and many American police departments believe that part of their responsibility is to support the development of more professional and democratic policing in other countries. This is a relatively new awareness for American police and contributes to their sense of being part of a global police community. It is also a fairly new realization for those in the U.S. government responsible for foreign relations “that security is important to the development of democracy and police are important to the character of that security. Assisting in the democratic reform of foreign police systems has become a front-burner issue in American foreign policy.”18

It is difficult to predict all the future ramifications for policing of this trend toward globalization. Clearly, international issues and considerations that were once thought to be irrelevant for local American policing have become relevant and even significant. This trend can only continue.

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Four Contemporary Issues

Civil Liberties and Police Legitimacy Our world has changed since September 11, 2001, and the changes have caused

us to rethink how we feel about extra security measures. Many citizens think that these measures are necessary precautions that will prevent another devastating occurrence that could once again shatter our perceptions of the “safe” nation in which we live. Others think, however, that our rights are in danger of being taken from us or compromised in some other way. “Some believe that civil liberties have become a casualty in that process; others insist that the exigencies of national security demand restrictions on liberties”19 or even that “the age-old dichotomy between security and liberty is false and … that liberty cannot exist without order.”20

Some Americans are not concerned that the National Security Agency has been given expanded authority to monitor potential terrorist communications, including phone calls and e-mails originating within the United States. Others argue that intelligence and law enforcement agencies already have sufficient authority and simply need to follow estab- lished procedures that worked well in the past. Some are incensed that the New York Police Department would put mosques throughout New York and New Jersey under surveillance, while others see that kind of intelligence gathering as simply prudent.21 This kind of debate has been going on throughout American history, but has become more heated and intense since 9/11.

Our long-standing debates about civil liberties and proper use of government author- ity have frequently centered on the police. For example, racial profiling, or “driving while black,” emerged in the 1990s as perhaps the most serious and sensitive issue facing police departments in the United States.22 It was the subject of lawsuits, civil rights investiga- tions, and consent decrees. It was discussed and debated in the U.S. Congress and in the 2000 presidential election. Many states mandated new police policies and data collection systems, and even more local communities did so. However the events of 9/11 deflected attention away from racial profiling for a decade or so, and when the issue re-emerged, it was initially focused more on profiling of potential terrorists and the effects this might have on the rights of Middle Eastern and Islamic persons.

Most recently, though, racial profiling of African Americans has resurfaced as a crit- ical issue, especially in relation to police use of force and fatal police–citizen encounters. Given the emphasis on community policing throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with its focus on community engagement and the improvement of police–community relations, it might have been expected that police–minority relations would have been greatly improved. During the same period, however, three well-publicized abuses of police use of force—the 1991 Rodney King incident in Los Angeles, and the 1997 Abner Louima and

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1999 Amadou Diallo incidents in New York—and many other instances of questioned police use of force against people of color occurred in the United States. Understandably, uneasiness and suspicion continued to characterize the relationship between race and policing, as illustrated by the nationally publicized 2009 incident involving Harvard University professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Cambridge police sergeant James Crowley,23 and controversies in New York regarding alleged discrimination in the use of stop and frisk tactics that led to a 2013 federal court ruling that the New York Police Department’s practices were unconstitutional.24

The racial profiling issue clearly strikes a strong chord in minority communities and among those most concerned about civil rights and civil liberties in America.25 While most police ardently deny that they use, or support the use of, any such profiles, 40 percent of African Americans believe they have been profiled by police, and even a majority of whites believe the problem is widespread.26 As racial profiling-inspired data collection has taken place around the country, it has frequently been discovered that minority drivers are overrepresented, in comparison to the total population, in vehicle stops by the police.27 They are also typically more likely to have their persons and vehicles searched subsequent to vehicle stops.28 Whether this overrepresentation of minorities in stops and searches is the result of police profiling (discrimination), or alternatively, a reflection of police deployment in lower-income neighborhoods, police efforts to address crime- and gang-related problems, or even differential driving habits, is currently not empirically known.29 It is the subject of much discussion and debate, however. In the most promising scenario, police and citizens work together to collect and analyze these data, interpret the results, discuss implications, and fashion appropriate responses.30 This approach employs the themes of community engagement and collaboration within the framework of community policing to encourage open conversation about a thorny and complex issue—something that has not happened often enough with respect to race and policing in America.

The other aspect of the racial profiling phenomenon that makes it a particularly salient contemporary issue is that it reflects the larger and even more endemic issues of police accountability and legitimacy. When officers were absolved of criminal responsibil- ity following several incidents in 2014 and 2015 that involved police use of deadly force against African Americans in controversial and/or questionable circumstances (including Ferguson, Missouri, and New York City), public clamor arose about the need for greater police accountability. On the heels of these incidents were others in which police use of force seemed clearly excessive or even completely unjustified (including Cleveland, North Charleston, and Baltimore), fueling the concern that police cannot be trusted to treat people fairly, especially people of color, people with mental illness, and others not lucky enough to belong to the privileged classes. These incidents have spurred a huge and emotional debate that is likely to make policing a presidential election issue for the first time in more than 20 years.

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As a result of these recent incidents, police in America are facing a crisis of legitimacy, that is, more and more people question whether the institution of policing is worthy of their trust and confidence. In a free society, policing is difficult, if not impossible, without public consent and cooperation. The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing issued its report in May 2015; with regard to legitimacy, it noted:31

Building trust and nurturing legitimacy on both sides of the police/citizen divide is the foundational principle underlying the nature of relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve. Decades of research and practice support the premise that people are more likely to obey the law when they believe that those who are enforcing it have authority that is perceived as legitimate by those subject to the authority. The public confers legitimacy only on those whom they believe are acting in procedurally just ways. In addition, law enforcement cannot build community trust if it is seen as an occupying force coming in from outside to impose control on the community.

Under the heading “Building Trust & Legitimacy” the President’s Task Force pre- sented nine recommendations (see “Building Trust and Legitimacy: President’s Task Force Recommendations,” Box 15.1) along with 19 action items. Police executives would be well advised to take these recommendations and action items to heart.

Mass Media and Social Media The mass media, both news and entertainment, have changed substantially over

the last few decades. The media, and through them the public, seem to be increasingly interested in police work and crime. With more channels competing for the public’s attention (thanks to cable and satellite TV), and the new medium of the Internet with

MODERN POLICING BLOG Police, race and politics December 22, 2014

This article provides a balanced perspective on the divisive situation facing the U.S. in the wake of tragic events in Ferguson and New York. It reminds us that the volatile mix of policing, race, and politics led to recurring crises in the 20th century and it identifies some common ground that might help us respond constructively to the current crisis.

Source: The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner.wordpress. com/2014/12/22/police-race-politics/. The hyperlink at “This article” links to http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/12/22/ new-york-police-killings-the-politics-of-race-and-police-use-of-force.

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unlimited “channels,” it is easy to feel overwhelmed. At the very least, the attention of the mass media can definitely overwhelm a police agency that happens to find itself in the spotlight.

One example of the effect of the mass media was illustrated during a series of sniper slayings in the Washington, DC, area in the autumn of 2002.32 For several weeks, area

BOX 15.1 Building Trust and Legitimacy: President’s Task Force Recommendations

1. Law enforcement culture should embrace a guardian mindset to build public trust and legiti-

macy. Toward that end, police and sheriffs’ departments should adopt procedural justice as the

guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with

the citizens they serve.

2. Law enforcement agencies should acknowledge the role of policing in past and present injustice

and discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the promotion of community trust.

3. Law enforcement agencies should establish a culture of transparency and accountability in

order to build public trust and legitimacy. This will help ensure decision making is understood

and in accord with stated policy.

4. Law enforcement agencies should promote legitimacy internally within the organization by

applying the principles of procedural justice.

5. Law enforcement agencies should proactively promote public trust by initiating positive nonen-

forcement activities to engage communities that typically have high rates of investigative and

enforcement involvement with government agencies.

6. Law enforcement agencies should consider the potential damage to public trust when imple-

menting crime fighting strategies.

7. Law enforcement agencies should track the level of trust in police by their communities just as

they measure changes in crime. Annual community surveys, ideally standardized across juris-

dictions and with accepted sampling protocols, can measure how policing in that community

affects public trust.

8. Law enforcement agencies should strive to create a workforce that contains a broad range of

diversity including race, gender, language, life experience, and cultural background to improve

understanding and effectiveness in dealing with all communities.

9. Law enforcement agencies should build relationships based on trust with immigrant communi-

ties. This is central to overall public safety.

Source: President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task

Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

p. 11–18. Online at: http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf.

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police departments had to contend with an army of news reporters representing local, national, and international news organizations. Some of these organizations, especially those providing 24-hour news programming, seemed to have unquenchable appetites for information. Such organizations need something new every few hours, whether the police have any “real” news to report or not. In addition, these news organizations compete vigorously (some would say viciously) with each other for readers, listeners, watchers and, ultimately, advertisers (i.e., money). Consequently, hundreds of reporters were constantly pestering witnesses, victims, families, Montgomery County Police Chief Charles Moose, and other police officials for new information. This led to leaks from the investigation team and the release of both inaccurate information and information that the police had hoped would be kept confidential while the investigation was underway.

Intense news attention can be beneficial as well. In the case of the sniper slayings, it is unlikely that an old acquaintance of the eventual suspects, who lived 2,500 miles away in Tacoma, Washington, would have known about the DC-area crimes, put two and two together, and notified the authorities about his suspicions, if not for the intense, nationwide news coverage of the crimes. Similarly, it was an unauthorized leak about the suspect vehicle, broadcast over commercial radio, which led a trucker and another citizen to locate the suspects at an interstate rest stop in western Maryland within a few hours of the broadcast.

“Reality TV” cop shows have joined 24-hour news and live TV coverage as means of presenting nonfictional accounts of policing to mass audiences.33 These shows, from Cops to Real Stories of the Highway Patrol, are typically filmed by riding along with police officers for hundreds of hours and then editing the film down to a 30-minute or 60-minute program. Thus, although the footage is realistic, the condensed form of presentation gives audiences an unrealistic sense of the pace of police work and an unrep- resentative sample of police activity. These shows stand in contrast to the many fictional TV dramas based on police work, which audiences presumably understand to be fiction and not news or documentary.

A different application of the mass media is represented by the television show America’s Most Wanted. Originally a network TV show and still running on cable after more than 20 years, AMW is specifically designed to help police solve actual crimes and capture real suspects. It is essentially a bigger-budget, national version of Crimestopper shows that run regularly on many local TV stations. Unsolved crimes are dramatized in order to solicit the public’s assistance in identifying and/or locating persons involved in the crimes.

As these examples illustrate, the entertainment and news media have complicated and multifaceted effects on policing and police administration. These media, especially 24-hour television and Internet news, create demands for information that are difficult to satisfy. They present a combination of live, edited, realistic, and fictional accounts of police work to millions of viewers that influence the public’s perceptions and expectations.

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This in turn affects police officers, who are aware that members of the public (including victims, offenders, journalists, lawyers, and politicians) watch these shows, form opin- ions about the police, and develop expectations that are often unrealistic.34 The police sometimes then find themselves playing to roles defined by Cops, Law and Order, or CSI instead of to roles defined by their agency’s values, policies, and training.

For police administrators, the mass media are both a blessing and a curse; regardless, they are a reality. One hundred years ago, most police executives only had to deal with a local newspaper or two. Once television came onto the scene, most police chiefs still only had to deal with local TV news and reporters. This could be challenging, of course, but relationships could be developed, and the parameters were fairly well understood. As tel- evision matured, the LAPD and the FBI were early pioneers in working with Hollywood to influence fictional portrayals of their agencies, and a few other large police departments began to attract attention from national news organizations. Gradually, mass media began to affect policing through more intense news coverage and a seemingly endless array of TV shows and movies.

Only in the last 20 years or so, however, have the mass media really become a factor that the average police executive might actually have to work with and respond to. The Fox Network could show up at any time to film a reality show. Alternatively, following a significant crime or police shooting, a fleet of satellite TV trucks can be expected to park across the street from police headquarters. Any chief ’s worst nightmare would be to have an officer’s questionable actions replayed every half hour on CNN or available continu- ously on YouTube. That scenario becomes increasingly more likely with the proliferation of mini-cams, surveillance cameras, cell phone cameras, and police car video systems. This all represents a revolutionary shift in the police–media relationship that is still developing. The effects that it will have on police–public relations, and on police officer behavior, are uncertain. What is certain is that police executives will have to become more sophisticated and savvy in their relationships with the mass media.

MODERN POLICING BLOG Nextdoor and neighborhood watch May 7, 2015

In this interview the co-founder of the social media platform Nextdoor explains how it differs from Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. According to her, participation in neighborhood watch has doubled in Sacramento and tripled in San Diego using Nextdoor.

Source: The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner.wordpress. com/2015/05/07/nextdoor-neighborhood-watch/. The hyperlink at “this interview” links to http://www.mercurynews.com/ business/ci_27982164/q-nextdoor-co-founder-sarah-leary-building-safer.

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One new approach increasingly taken by police agencies is to utilize the Internet and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to communicate directly with the public, bypassing the news media.35 Police departments have been able to sign up thousands of followers and fans who get alerts, news items, and feature stories from their local police department. The value of this kind of connectivity was dramatically illustrated in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, when the Boston Police Department’s Twitter feed jumped from 40,000 to 300,000 followers and became the only trusted source of accurate information, in large part because the news media, trying too hard to keep up with rapidly unfolding developments, repeatedly broadcast rumors that turned out to be untrue.36

In addition, since these social media are two-way streets, the public can submit questions and tips directly to their local law enforcement organization. Because today’s public, and especially younger people, are continuously online and on the grid with their tablets and smart phones, these new media present terrific opportunities to inform the public and seek the public’s input, in real time, without the restrictions and filters traditionally imposed by the news media. Of course, this also involves sidestepping the checks-and-balances role historically played by the news media, giving the police more power to shape the form and content of their message as they want it. The evo- lution of this newly-developing media world will deserve close attention over the next few years.

New Crimes Computer crime, or cybercrime, did not exist 50 years ago, and was fairly rare even

20–30 years ago, but is now common. Cybercrime is computer-mediated activity that is illegal and that can be performed through electronic networks.37 It can best be under- stood by examining the potential roles of the computer in criminal activity. Three useful categories are: (1) the computer as a target; (2) the computer as a tool for the commis- sion of a crime; and (3) the computer as incidental to the crime itself, or simply put, as evidence. Crimes in which the computer is the target involve individuals breaking into or attacking a victim’s system and may include activities such as hacking, cracking, or sabotage. Crimes in which the computer is used as a tool for the commission of a crime typically involve traditional crimes, such as fraud, being committed in ways to which we are less accustomed. For example, theft, forgery, embezzlement, and even stalking are familiar crimes to us. However, any of these crimes may be committed today using a computer, consequently complicating the investigation. Finally, crimes in which the computer is incidental to the criminal activity could include using a computer to keep financial records of illegal business activities or perhaps sending a threatening e-mail message to someone.38

Numerous efforts have been undertaken to give us a better description of the

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incidence and prevalence of cybercrime. Long-term initiatives are viewed as key in obtain- ing a valid assessment of cybercrime. For example, the National Crime Victimization Survey has added questions to examine fraud, identify theft, and stalking victimization. The FBI has also included a question in the National Incident-Based Reporting System to indicate whether an offender used a computer in the commission of a crime. A Bureau of Justice Statistics national survey of state prosecutors found that the most frequently prosecuted type of computer-related crime is child pornography, followed by credit card and bank card fraud.39 The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted an assessment of the needs of state and local law enforcement in combating electronic crime and cyber- terrorism, and then designed a program to help the criminal justice community build capacity for addressing electronic crime through collaboration among federal, state, and local law enforcement, industry, and academia.40

When addressing cybercrime, community engagement and community education are important. Citizens must know the extent of cybercrime so they will be less likely to become a victim. Anecdotal evidence indicates that a complicating factor about cyber- crime is that its victims often go for long periods without knowing they are a victim. This is unlike most of the crimes with which law enforcement is familiar and accus- tomed to investigating. Collaborative efforts for dealing with cybercrime will require more partnerships among the private and public sector, specifically law enforcement and security. This may come in the form of assistance with investigations, training, and/ or education.

Computer crime is merely the most obvious type of new crime in modern society, although it should be said that there are few truly new crimes, just new methods of com- mitting old crimes. At one time, for example, harassment could only be committed face to face; later, it could be committed using printed materials, then the telephone, and now it can be committed using mobile phones, e-mail, text messages, and Facebook posts. Illegal purchases of prescription drugs, perhaps using fraudulent prescriptions, used to require a visit to the pharmacy, but can now be committed by telephone or online. Nearly all thefts used to involve someone literally picking up and carrying away the property of another, but the Internet and the cashless society have changed the nature of much thievery. Selling stolen property used to be hard work, but online auction sites, FedEx, and UPS have turned it into an armchair exercise.

The impact of these new crimes, and new ways of committing old crimes, is that police departments have to pay close attention to the crime picture, making sure that their personnel have the knowledge and skills necessary to prevent, detect, and investi- gate modern crime. They also need to regularly update their public education efforts in support of crime prevention. For the police administrator, changing patterns of crime may require adjustments in resource allocation and even the creation or elimination of specialized anti-crime units.

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Technology Technological advancement in the last 25 years has dramatically changed the way

we work and the kind of work we do. This holds true for most occupations and certainly for law enforcement. While one might argue that technology makes our jobs easier, it also makes jobs more challenging. Technology can enable us to perform activities more efficiently and effectively, but that is assuming that we have the technology, understand its application, have been trained to use it, and that it does not have undesirable side effects. Another complicating factor is that offenders have access to technology as well, which enables them to commit crimes using means they have not had in the past, or commit crimes they have not considered in the past.

The RAND Science and Policy Institute categorized technology by its uses for law enforcement in an effort to assess needs and capabilities and identify future directions in maximizing appropriate technologies and finding technological gaps that must be filled.41 Law enforcement uses technology in the following areas, some of which might overlap:

• first response;

• investigation and apprehension;

• forensic analysis;

• administration and management;

• crime prevention.

Examples of first-responder technology applications include those used for situation reporting, officer safety, officer deployment, and tactical communications. Electronic control devices (Tasers), digital crime scene photography, and remote case filings are technologies that are used for criminal investigation and apprehension of suspects. Forensic analysis technologies deal primarily with the identification and analysis of physical evidence and include, for example, explosive residue analysis and ballistics analysis through the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN). Administration and management have broad-ranging technology applications in areas such as information processing, planning, training, and accountability. The line between crime prevention and crime detection technologies is sometimes blurry, but this cate- gory can include surveillance systems (cameras, acoustic detection, and eavesdropping), unmanned aerial systems (drones), improved theft prevention devices, and better alarm systems.

Technology can be a valuable asset, but it can also cause problems if used inappro- priately or inadequately. Potential barriers to effective technology use include real costs,

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MODERN POLICING BLOG LPR and privacy April 24, 2014

This article provides an update on new or pending legislation in several different states pertaining to police use of automated license plate reader technology. Most states are setting a maximum time period (such as 90 days) that the data can be stored unless it is evidence of a specific crime.

The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner.wordpress. com/2014/04/24/lpr-privacy-2/. The hyperlink at “This article” links to http://www.landlinemag.com/Story.aspx?StoryID=26911.

potential costs, technology risk, and human risk. Real costs include initial procurement, maintenance, and upgrades, as well as opportunity costs, as compared to the cost of other resources. Potential costs are those that are unanticipated and usually involve unintended consequences of the use of a technology. Technology risk is the risk that the technology will not work, either in its application to a problem or as it is intended to be used. Human risk typically deals with resistance to technology by personnel or their inability to use it appropriately. Occasionally, human risk may include potential danger with the use of a technology.

Technology certainly affects modern life in many ways. The nature of jobs and lei- sure, how we learn about the world, and how we communicate are heavily influenced by ever-changing technology. Two important themes described earlier in the chapter, community engagement and collaboration, might become easier or harder thanks to technology. If people spend all their time texting, playing with their smart phone applica- tions, and surfing the Internet, their face-to-face social skills and social interaction might wither. On the other hand, a lot of modern social interaction does occur via technology, and police agencies have become more adept in recent years at engaging the public elec- tronically.42 Within the policing profession itself, new technologies have the potential to enhance officer safety, improve accountability, and help control crime. But it can also be expected that every new technology will have unintended consequences, some negative, and that criminal offenders will adopt the same technologies in their efforts to commit crime and avoid detection. With regard to technology, it is certainly true that the only constant is change.43

Modern Perspectives on Management

The organization as we know it today is very different from the organization of 1950, when the traditional perspective on police administration reigned supreme. This is

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understandable. The fact that organizations are open systems means that they are affected by changing environmental influences. Organizations must necessarily change if they are to be responsive to changing societal demands.

In the 1970s, many observers believed that the organizational turmoil and loss of respect for authority then evident were indicators of social and organizational disintegra- tion that threatened the very foundations of society. Other observers saw these conditions as temporary aberrations of a society in a state of cultural lag, changing so rapidly that its institutions were unable to keep up with the change and respond to it meaningfully. Still others saw these trends producing an administrative revolution that would increase personal freedom as the organization became a “shelter without walls.”44

In recent years, however, with less fear of social and organizational disintegration, organizational life has become more humane and, indeed, more considerate of the needs and concerns of employees. In addition, the tenor of the times has changed. Foreign com- petition, trade imbalances, and national debt have forced the United States into a more pragmatic posture, with an emphasis on quality workmanship. Everyone now recognizes the necessity for improving their productivity in order to make their goods and services more competitive in the world market. In similar fashion, government agencies have begun to see the need to improve their productivity in order to provide more and better services at reduced cost to the taxpayer.

In this chapter, we briefly discuss some organizational improvement methodolo- gies and applications that have been advanced in recent years and that apply to police management. Some of these approaches to improvement are embodied in specific police programs, while others are adapted from general management practices. Five approaches are presented: strategic management, command accountability, emotional intelligence, the learning organization, and servant leadership.

Strategic Management Part IV of this text, with chapters on information systems, evaluating performance,

and police strategies and tactics, presented many of the latest developments in the stra- tegic management approach to police organizational improvement. Today, the police field has reached a stage of maturity in which we now recognize that police departments have some basic choices open to them in deciding how best to achieve their goals and objectives, serve their communities, and improve their efficiency and effectiveness. This represents a big step forward from a time when few options seemed to be available. It also signals perhaps the major responsibility of top police executives—choosing and then implementing their agencies’ basic strategies.

In Chapter 1, we presented a simple outline of police history based on the evolution of police strategy from political through professional to community eras.45 This picture of police history has the virtue of simplicity, but it has been criticized for oversimplifying

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the 150-plus years of American policing.46 It has also given rise to endless arguments about which of the three models is best and, in particular, whether the community model should replace the professional model.

In our view, this latter debate is naive and once again overly simplistic. The choice between the community and professional models is not an either/or decision, but rather is a matter of degree and emphasis. Moreover, there are more choices than just these two. For example, in the series that offered the three-stage vision of the evolution of policing, a later paper identified four contemporary “corporate” strategies of policing: professional crime fighting, strategic crime fighting, problem-solving policing, and community polic- ing.47 A brief description of each of these strategies will help illustrate the choices now open to police executives and their departments.

The professional crime-fighting approach heavily emphasizes the crime control function of policing, the law and professional standards as sources of police legitimacy, and the traditional tactics of motorized patrol, rapid response, and follow-up investi- gations. Under this model, the police seek and accept the primary responsibility for crime control. Police officers are seen as professionals, with the attendant reliance on training and technology. Police executives seek maximum independence in running their departments.

The strategic crime-fighting approach accepts most of the tenets of the professional model outlined above, except for two modifications: the effectiveness of traditional police tactics is questioned, and more focus is placed on types of crime other than common street crime. The strategic model emphasizes such targeted techniques as directed patrol, case screening, differential responses, and repeat offender programs. This model also gives greater attention than the professional model to organized crime, white-collar crime, drug trafficking, and other specialized types of criminal activity. It is sometimes described as policing smarter, rather than harder.48

The problem-solving approach varies from both the professional and strategic models in several respects. It recognizes the importance of the crime control function but also stresses other important functions of the police, such as fear reduction, dispute resolution, and control of disorder. It emphasizes that law enforcement is but one method available to the police for controlling crime, fear, and disorder; other methods include prevention, mediation, education, and referral, to name just a few. The problem-solving approach urges police to re-conceptualize their business away from incident handling and law enforcement and toward problem solving and prevention. This model gives the greatest importance to gathering and analyzing information as the bases for identifying and solving problems.

The community policing model, more than the others, insists on giving citizens a greater role in policing and police administration. The idea that the police can effectively assume the primary responsibility for crime control is rejected. Instead, police must work closely with citizens and communities in identifying problems, setting priorities,

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and solving problems. Community policing argues that policing must become more customer-oriented and that, in the end, the customer is almost always right. This model urges departments to assign police officers and commanders to geographic areas on a more permanent basis so that they will come to identify more strongly with communities and so that those communities can influence them more effectively. Ultimately, under community policing, community norms and values join the law as sources of police legitimacy. Creating positive police–community relations is seen as a valid and important objective of policing.

To these four major police strategies we can now add a fifth option, intelligence-led policing,49 discussed in Chapter 14. The basic premise of this strategy is that police resources and tactics should be deployed based on systematic and continuous analysis of information and intelligence. The use of the term “intelligence” tends to suggest that this is a strategy solely aimed at terrorism, organized crime, gangs, and drugs but, in fact, its reach is much broader. In principle, all police resources, including patrol, traffic, and investigations, could be targeted and deployed based on up-to-the-moment informa- tion about crime, disorder, vulnerabilities, threats, and other problems confronting the community.

Many police executives, upon reading these descriptions, are inclined to say that they support all five strategies and that their agencies are guided by each one. This response is commendable in the sense that these executives recognize the merits of each strategy and want to avoid unnecessary either/or choices. However, any police agency will tend to emphasize some features of these strategies over others. In today’s tight financial con- straints, most police agencies cannot afford to be all things to all people. In fact, whether by design or by default, police departments will adhere more to one or two of these strat- egies than to the others. The job of the police executive is to choose the organization’s strategy consciously and carefully instead of letting it drift or emerge by default.

Which strategy is best? It all depends. The police executive should make every effort to adopt the strategy or combination of strategies that best fits the needs of his or her community and police organization. Just as critically, police executives must continually monitor developments within the field of policing, within their organizations, and within their communities in order to make strategic adjustments and changes when they are needed. For, as noted by Kenneth Andrews, “the highest function of the executive is … leading the continuous process of determining the nature of the enterprise, and setting, revising, and achieving its goals.”50

Command Accountability Just as police supervisors have long found it difficult to hold police officers truly

accountable, police chief executives have often wrestled with the task of holding their commanders accountable. In recent years, owing largely to the popularity of the Compstat

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system developed in the New York Police Department,51 command accountability has received renewed attention. The Compstat process is based on four principles: (1) accu- rate and timely intelligence; (2) effective tactics; (3) rapid deployment of personnel and resources; and (4) relentless follow up and assessment.52 In the Compstat process, area commanders (e.g., precinct captains) are regularly “put on the hot seat” in front of their peers, presented with the latest crime analysis information from their command areas, and expected to demonstrate intimate familiarity with ongoing problems and present solutions already undertaken to resolve those problems. The commander who is caught unaware or unprepared is not only embarrassed, but also may be looking at a different assignment if the performance is repeated.

Although this Compstat system sometimes seems to be rather harsh in its imple- mentation, and although it may be more about “the numbers” than actual community conditions,53 it addresses a real problem of police administration. Perhaps its greatest potential contribution is that it shifts the focus of command accountability away from merely internal administrative issues (the budget, personnel, etc.) toward what really mat- ters the most—substantive problems in the community. Any process that can successfully redirect police management’s attention and accountability away from internal concerns and toward community problems is probably beneficial.54

Emotional Intelligence Daniel Goleman proposes that while technical skills and high IQ are important

qualities in leaders, emotional intelligence (EQ) is imperative for quality leadership.55 His research indicates that most effective leaders have high degrees of emotional intelligence. In related research, David McClellan found that a correlation exists between EQ and high performance.56 In other words, leaders who had high degrees of emotional intelligence outperformed others who were similarly situated.

Emotional intelligence consists of five components that culminate in the keystone of the concept, which is “awareness of one’s own feelings as they occur.”57 The five com- ponents that make up EQ are self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skill. Self-awareness is a critical awareness of one’s emotions, strengths, weaknesses, needs, and drives, with an acute understanding of how these affect self-perception, others’ perceptions, and their job performance. Self-regulation is being in control of one’s feelings and impulses—mastering one’s emotions. Motivation is the want and desire to achieve simply for the satisfaction of achievement versus some external reward such as notoriety. Empathy, often easily recognized, is the thoughtful consideration of others’ feelings in decision making. Finally, social skill is “friendliness with a purpose” that enables leaders to direct people in ways they desire.58

Can emotional intelligence be learned? Goleman indicates that while there is a genetic component to EQ, nurture plays a significant role as well since EQ increases with age

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and maturity, plus an individual’s sincere desire and concerted effort are more important than innate characteristics. While EQ may not have been considered a crucial element of traditional police leadership, it is worthy of consideration for managers not only for their own self-improvement, but also for developing leadership skills in their employees.

In a later work, Primal Leadership, Goleman and colleagues describe what they call a “resonant leader.”59 A resonant leader is one who has not only acute self-awareness and social awareness, but also the ability to use these in dealing with his or her employees. Empathy, which is achieved through self-awareness and social awareness, is of extreme importance to the leader in dealing with employees. By being empathetic, leaders are able to motivate people and spread enthusiasm about the work of the organization. According to the authors, leaders who exhibit empathy can be especially effective in service occupa- tions or those that require extensive dealings with the public, such as policing.

Goleman et al. also stress the importance of a leader letting employees see who he or she really is—letting emotions show. For example, they advocate the use of humor in the workplace (under appropriate circumstances), to engage people and to contribute to a calming work environment. In policing, gallows humor has long been a common device for relieving stress, but humor has not been widely recognized as a leadership technique. Nor has “letting emotions show.” While the macho nature of the traditional police culture may have worked against open displays of emotion and humor by leaders and managers, it seems highly likely that police leader effectiveness has always been enhanced by EQ. Finding better ways to incorporate EQ into police promotional testing and leadership training should probably be a high priority.

The Learning Organization The learning organization approach was popularized by Peter Senge in his book The

Fifth Discipline.60 In this approach, you will see concepts that have been previously dis- cussed throughout this text and have been developed into a contemporary multifaceted perspective by Senge. Learning organizations are those “where people continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together.”61 The fifth discipline that is necessary for the creation of learning organizations is systems thinking. Only when systems thinking is accompanied by building shared vision, mental models, team learning, and personal mastery, however, will it work to create a learning organization.

As we discussed earlier, systems thinking, or the systems approach, emphasizes the interrelatedness among different parts of the organization in working toward the unified goals and objectives of the organization. As Senge maintains, systems thinking (the fifth discipline) is the framework for the learning organization. Shared vision is necessary for people to work toward common goals and objectives while learning and excelling at what

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they do. Mental models are deeply ingrained assumptions and generalizations through which individuals develop perspective and consequently view the world. Team learning is necessary because these are the fundamental learning units in organizations; without them, nothing can be accomplished. Finally, personal mastery is the cornerstone of the learning organization. It is the process of continually clarifying personal vision by main- taining patience and focusing one’s energies in order to see reality objectively.

Geller suggests that applying the learning organization model to policing would be no easy task. Among obstacles he identifies are skepticism about research, unwillingness to encourage critical thinking among all members of the organization, and the belief that too much “thinking” prevents action. However, he maintains that while obstacles do exist, benefits from adopting a learning organization model may outweigh the costs. Geller identified 13 suggestions for fostering a learning police organization:62

1. Create a Research and Development Unit that is well supported, actually does research, and is run by someone who actually understands policing.

2. Use geographical crime analysis that spans work units.

3. Involve senior police administrators in the process so as not to create turf battles; encourage collaboration.

4. Inventory the wealth of talent of all sworn and civilian employees.

5. Inventory the wealth of talent of citizens and groups in the community.

6. Use the SARA model for problem solving.

7. Encourage critical thinking and discourage groupthink.

8. Use middle managers to facilitate critical thinking.

9. Hold units accountable, measured against industry (CALEA) standards.

10. Institutionalize bottom-up evaluation of organizational performance.

11. Demonstrate practical results of previous police research.

12. Expand police–researcher partnerships.

13. Hire a “research broker” to enable the organization to become a better consumer of research.

Of course, not all of these suggestions would be practical in every police organiza- tion. Additionally, resources may dictate the extent to which a police administrator can employ some of these suggestions. Those that present little or no cost to the organization are easier to implement. The size of an organization is a characteristic that may affect the

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applicability of any of the suggestions. For example, in a small police organization there may be little need or few resources to create a Research and Development Unit. However, encouragement of critical thinking of all personnel seems reasonable and would probably be very useful.

Alarid examined the applicability of the learning organization to police agencies implementing community-oriented policing.63 She maintains that because an essential element of community policing is organizational change, the learning organization framework could support the sometimes monumental changes involved in communi- ty-policing implementation. Going from a traditional law enforcement organizational structure to one that embodies tenets such as decentralization and individual empower- ment can be quite overwhelming for a manager. By employing some of the principles of the learning organization, such as shared vision and personal mastery, managers may find the task of organizational change not quite so daunting (see Box 15.2, “Organizational Learning and Police Leadership”).

Servant Leadership The final topic to be considered is servant leadership.64 In Chapter 7, we mentioned

four police executive styles: the administrator, the top cop, the politician, and the states- man. In Chapter 10, we discussed the autocratic, bureaucratic, diplomatic, participative, and free-rein styles of leadership, and suggested that situational styles may be most effective. Earlier in this chapter, we added another consideration, emotional intelligence, which likely contributes to successful managing and leading. One final perspective is serv- ant leadership—the idea that leaders should see their role as serving their organizations, including both employees and customers. Their role is to create a winning team and, as in sports, they need not generally seek the limelight and may not get the credit if their

BOX 15.2 Organizational Learning and Police Leadership

The development of learning organizations rests on a shared approach to leadership and a com-

mitment to ongoing organizational learning. Supporting this starts with developing leaders and

their individual skill sets, but it does not end there; consideration needs to be taken of the organ-

izational settings required for leadership to flourish and organizations to thrive. If we want true

leadership in policing, then we need to support it within police organizations. And that means we

need to better understand that leadership is about creating a climate in which innovation, experi-

mentation and collaboration can flourish, valuing this, and accepting that this may be challenging.

Source: Edward A. Flynn and Victoria Herrington. 2015. “Toward a Profession of Police

Leadership.” New Perspectives in Policing. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, p. 13.

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team is successful. The earlier quote from ancient Chinese philosophy sums it up: “When the best leaders’ work is done the people say, we did it ourselves.”65

Servant leadership deserves attention because there seems to be some tendency toward rampant egoism among contemporary police executives. Schafer and his col- leagues identified several characteristics of police chiefs who perhaps have developed inflated egos:66

• traveling everywhere with an entourage; • an obsession with media attention; • extreme concern that subordinates always salute them and adopt other overt demon-

strations of respect; • taking personal credit for everything and emphasizing “I” over “we”; • frequent name-dropping; • ignoring or demeaning employees below a certain level in the organization.

The Greeks established long ago that pride (hubris) is perhaps the greatest human failing of all. It is an understandable trait of leaders, especially senior leaders, since they have obviously made it to the top. But, ultimately, it is a fatal flaw. Those who aspire to be truly successful police leaders realize that the organization’s needs and their community’s needs come before their own. They work tirelessly and, hopefully, smartly, and they have a knack for introspection and reflection that helps keep them well grounded. In the end, they are recognizable mainly by their humility.

Summary

Four themes that run through modern policing at the start of the twenty-first century were discussed in this chapter. The community engagement theme refers to the impor- tance of police working closely with individual citizens and neighborhood groups. The collaboration theme is similar: police need to collaborate with other organizations and agencies. These two themes, community engagement and collaboration, are not simply feel-good programs, nor are they important merely because they tend to enhance public satisfaction with the police. Rather, research and the experience of recent decades demon- strate that they are central to effective policing—to controlling crime and disorder and solving community problems.

The third theme, privatization, is related to efficiency and the ongoing pressure on governments to find more cost-effective ways to provide services, including police protection. Nearly all police departments today are fighting the budget battle while learning to do more with less or, in some cases, less with less. Privatizing, outsourcing,

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and contracting are likely to become more and more common in the years to come. The fourth theme is globalization. While most policing is still local, the rest of the world is slowly creeping into local police work, thanks to immigration, travel, free trade, modern telecommunications, computers, and related social and economic trends. Today’s police executives must become more knowledgeable about global issues and international rela- tions than their predecessors ever had to be.

Four contemporary issues were also discussed: civil liberties and police legitimacy, mass media and social media, new crimes, and technology. The diversity of these issues illustrates the growing complexity of police administration. While extremely challenging, this diversity also serves to keep the study and practice of police administration dynamic and vibrant. Because of these contemporary issues as well as the endemic issues discussed throughout the text, modern police administration continues to need and deserve the best efforts of the best and brightest women and men who can be attracted to such an honorable calling.

This final chapter also discussed strategic management, command accountability, emotional intelligence, the learning organization, and servant leadership. These are among the most important developments in modern police administration and modern management. Serious students of police administration should be familiar with these concepts and should continue to scan the police and organizational literature for similar developments that are likely to arise in coming years.

D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S

1. What role do you think the United States—and U.S. police—should play in international police missions in places such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor?

2. When vehicle stop data are analyzed in a jurisdiction and it is found that African American and Hispanic drivers are overrepresented in stops and searches, what steps do you think should be taken?

3. As a police chief, what would you do if the Fox Network approached you about filming a Cops-style television show in your department?

4. A lot of modern technology has been introduced into policing in the past decade or two. Which new technologies do you think have had the biggest impact on police work? On the effectiveness of police? Which do you think have had the least impact?

5. What methods can you think of to make police agencies “greener”? Do you think modern police will be able to reduce their reliance on heavy, full-size automobiles? At what cost?

Cases

Cases 3 through 6 at the back of the text all describe efforts to implement organizational change and improvement in police departments. You should analyze these four cases from the perspective of the contemporary management models presented in Chapter 15 as well as other approaches to police organizational improvement presented throughout the text. You should draw

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upon everything you have learned to (1) analyze and explain the events and practices described in the cases and (2) make recommendations about how these organizations could be managed even more effectively.

Suggested Reading

Bayley, D.H. 2006. Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neyroud, P. and A. Beckley. 2001. Policing, Ethics and Human Rights. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing. O’Hara, P. 2012. Why Law Enforcement Organizations Fail: Mapping the Organizational Fault Lines in

Policing, second edition. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. PERF. 2015. Defining Moments for Police Chiefs. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century

Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

Notes

1 L. Fridell and M.A. Wycoff. 2003. The Future of Community Policing. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

2 Request for Proposal: Police–Public Contact Survey. 2002. City of Seattle, WA: Office of Policy and Management.

3 P. Finn. 2001. Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

4 See http://www.fortworthpd.com/get-involved/citizens-on-patrol.aspx. 5 R. Sampson and M. Scott. 2000. Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in

Problem-Solving. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 6 W.G. Skogan and S.M. Hartnett. 1997. Community Policing, Chicago Style. New York, NY: Oxford

University Press; M.E. Correia. 2000. Citizen Involvement: How Community Factors Affect Progressive Policing. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

7 P. Walters. 2009. “Philly Case Rekindles Debate on Vigilante Justice.” Associated Press (June 10). Online at: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31214450/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/philly-case-rekindles- debate- vigilante-justice/#.Vlh9_TZFDcs.

8 J. Bacon and W.M. Welch. 2015. “Tulsa Reserve Deputy Charged with Manslaughter.” USA Today (April 2). Online at: www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/04/13/oklahoma-shooting-video/25702233/.

9 D. Presman, R. Chapman, and L. Rosen. 2002. Creative Partnerships: Supporting Youth, Building Communities. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

10 G. Cordner and A. Cordner. 2008. “Law Enforcement Technology Program: Evaluation Report.” Richmond, KY: Justice & Safety Center. Report submitted to the National Institute of Justice, Office of Science and Technology.

11 Fridell and Wycoff. 2003. The Future of Community Policing. 12 G. Cordner and E.P. Biebel. 2005. “Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice.” Criminology & Public Policy

4, no. 2: 155–180.

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13 M.S. Scott and H. Goldstein. 2005. Shifting and Sharing Responsibility for Public Safety Problems. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services; S. Chamard. 2006. Partnering with Businesses to Address Public Safety Problems. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

14 B.K. Melekian. 2012. “Policing in the New Economy: A New Report on the Emerging Trends from the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.” The Police Chief 79 (January): 16–19; PERF. 2009. Violent Crime and the Economic Crisis: Police Chiefs Face a New Challenge, Part II. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

15 J. Oosting. 2011. “So Long: Pontiac Police Department Closes Doors.” Mlive (August 1, 2011). Online at: www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/08/so_long_pontiac_police_departm.html; A. Greenblatt. 2008. “Squeezing the Cops: You Thought Police Were Safe From Budget Cuts? So Did They.” Governing (June). Online at: http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/89056607. html; K. Johnson. 2009. “Economy Limiting Services of Local Police.” USA Today (May 18). Online at: www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-05-17-police-closure_N.htm.

16 K. Petrie and K. Marohn. 2001. “Minn. Town to Replace Police with Private Security Force.” USA Today (November 17). Online at: www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-14/ police-private-security-foley/51194090/1.

17 R.M. Perito. 2002. The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations. Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press.

18 D.H. Bayley. 2001. Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, p. 5.

19 K.B. Darmer. 2004. “Introduction.” In K.B. Darmer, R.M. Baird, and S.E. Rosenbaum (eds), Civil Liberties vs. National Security in a Post-9/11 World. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, pp. 11–19.

20 V. D. Dinh. 2004. “Freedom and Security after September 11.” In Darmer, Baird, and Rosenbaum (eds), Civil Liberties vs. National Security in a Post-9/11 World, pp. 105–113.

21 A. Goldman and M. Apuzzo. 2012. “NYPD Built Secret Files on Mosques Outside NY.” Associated Press (February 22). Online at: www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/ NYPD-built-secret-files-on-mosques-outside-NY.

22 M. Buerger and A. Farrell. 2002. “The Evidence of Racial Profiling: Interpreting Documented and Unofficial Sources.” Police Quarterly 5, no. 3 (September): 272–305.

23 A. Goodnough. 2009. “Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer is Accused of Bias.” New York Times (July 20). Online at: www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/21gates.html.

24 J. Goldstein. 2013. “Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy.” New York Times (August 12). Online at: www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-judge- rules.html.

25 M. Alexander et al. 2002. Driving While Black or Brown: The California DWB Report. San Francisco: American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of California.

26 F. Newport. 1999. “Racial Profiling is Seen as Widespread, Particularly Among Young Black Men.” Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization.

27 See, for example, G. Cordner, B. Williams, and A. Velasco. 2002. “Vehicle Stops in San Diego: 2001.” Report to the San Diego Police Department.

28 E.L. Schmitt, P.A. Langan, and M.R. Durose. 2002. “Characteristics of Drivers Stopped by Police, 1999.” Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.

29 R.S. Engel, J.M. Calnon, and T.J. Bernard. 2002. “Theory and Racial Profiling: Shortcomings and Future Directions in Research.” Justice Quarterly 19, no. 2 (June): 249–273.

30 A. Farrell, J. McDevitt, and M. Buerger. 2002. “Moving Police and Community Dialogues Forward through Data Collection Task Forces.” Police Quarterly 5, no. 3 (September): 359–379.

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31 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. 2015. Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. p. 1. Online at: www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf.

32 G.R. Murphy and C. Wexler. 2004. Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

33 J.L. Worrall. 2000. “Constitutional Issues in Reality-Based Police Television Shows: Media Ride- Alongs.” American Journal of Criminal Justice 25, no. 1 (fall): 41–64.

34 D.D. Perlmutter. 2000. Policing the Media: Street Cops and Public Perceptions of Law Enforcement. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

35 D.W. Stephens, J. Hill, and S. Greenberg. 2011. Strategic Communication Practices: A Toolkit for Police Executives. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

36 Y. Bar-Tur. 2013. “Boston Police Schooled Us All on Social Media.” Mashable (April 22). Online at: http://mashable.com/2013/04/22/boston-police-social-media/.

37 D. Thomas and B.D. Loader. 2000. “Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Information Age.” In D. Thomas and B.D. Loader (eds), Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security, and Surveillance in the Information Age. London: Routledge, pp. 1–13.

38 S.W. Brenner. 2001. “Defining Cybercrime: A Review of State and Federal Law.” In R.D. Clifford (ed.), Cybercrime: The Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of a Computer-Related Crime. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, pp. 11–69.

39 C.J. DeFrance. 2002. Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. 40 National Institute of Justice. 2015. “Digital Evidence and Forensics.” Online at: http://www.nij.gov/

topics/forensics/evidence/digital/Pages/welcome.aspx. 41 W. Schwabe, L.M. Davis, and B.A. Jackson. 2001. Challenges and Choices for Crime-Fighting Technology:

Federal Support of State and Local Law Enforcement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. 42 G. Cordner and E. Perkins. 2013. E-COP: Using the Web to Enhance Community Oriented Policing.

Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Online at: http://ric-zai-inc.com/ ric.php?page=detail&id=COPS-W0706.

43 R. Silberglitt, B.G. Chow, J.S. Hollywood, D. Woods, M. Zaydman, and B.A. Jackson. 2015. Visions of Law Enforcement Technology in the Period 2024–2034. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Online at: www. ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248718.pdf.

44 G.E. Berkley. 1971. The Administrative Revolution: Notes on the Passing of Organization Man. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

45 G.L. Kelling and M.H. Moore. 1988. “The Evolving Strategy of Policing.” Perspectives on Policing No. 4. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

46 F.X. Hartmann (ed.).1988. “Debating the Evolution of American Policing.” Perspectives on Policing No. 5. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice; S. Walker. 1984. “Broken Windows and Fractured History: The Use and Misuse of History in Recent Police Patrol Analysis.” Justice Quarterly 1, no. 1: 75–90; V.G. Strecher. 1991. “Histories and Futures of Policing: Readings and Misreadings of a Pivotal Present.” Police Forum 1, no. 1: 1–9.

47 M.H. Moore and R.C. Trojanowicz. 1988. “Corporate Strategies for Policing.” Perspectives on Policing No. 6. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

48 J.K. Stewart. 1985. “Research and the Police Administrator: Working Smarter, Not Harder.” In W.A.  Geller (ed.), Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity. New York, NY: Praeger, pp. 371–382.

49 J.H. Ratcliffe. 2008. Intelligence-Led Policing. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing. 50 K.R. Andrews. 1980. The Concept of Corporate Strategy. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, p. iii. 51 D. Anderson. 1997. “Why Crime is Down.” New York Times Magazine (February): 47–62.

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52 J.M. Shane. 2007. What Every Chief Executive Should Know: Using Data to Measure Police Performance. Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Publishing, pp. 196–205.

53 J.A. Eterno and E.B. Silverman. 2012. The Crime Numbers Game: Management by Manipulation. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

54 H. Goldstein. 1990. Problem-Oriented Policing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 55 D. Goleman. 1995. Emotional Intelligence. New York, NY: Bantam. 56 D. Goleman. 1998. “What Makes a Leader?” Harvard Business Review (November–December): 93–102. 57 Goleman. 1995. Emotional Intelligence, p. 46. 58 Goleman. 1998. “What Makes a Leader?” p. 101. 59 D. Goleman, R. Boyatzis, and A. McKee. 2002. Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional

Intelligence. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 60 P. M. Senge. 1990. The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization. New York,

NY: Doubleday. 61 Senge. 1990. The Fifth Discipline, p. 3. 62 W.A. Geller. 1997. “Suppose We Were Really Serious about Police Departments Becoming Learning

Organizations?” National Institute of Justice Journal. Washington, DC: December. 63 L. Alarid. 1999. “Law Enforcement Departments as Learning Organizations: Argyris’s Theory as a

Framework for Implementing Community-Oriented Policing.” Police Quarterly 2, no. 3 (September): 321–337.

64 R.K. Greenleaf and L.C. Spears. 2002. Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press.

65 R. Townsend. 1970. Up the Organization. New York, NY: Knopf, p. 99. 66 J.A. Schafer, M.E. Buerger, R.W. Myers, C.J. Jensen III, and B.H. Levin. 2012. The Future of Policing:

A Practical Guide for Police Managers and Leaders. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, pp. 300–301.

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