Case Summary Assignment including three scholarly sources

CHAPTER 13 Police Strategies and Tactics

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

• Identify the three cornerstones of modern police strategy for dealing with crime. • Summarize the findings of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment. • Summarize the findings of research on the effects of police response time. • Summarize the findings of research on the effectiveness of detective follow-up investigations. • Distinguish between reactive and proactive repeat offender programs. • Explain the rationale underlying differential responses to calls for service. • Distinguish between the police–community relations programs of the 1960s and 1970s and com-

munity policing of the 1980s and 1990s. • Explain how problem-oriented policing differs from traditional single-complaint policing. • Describe how the police response to domestic violence has evolved over the last two decades. • Describe how the police response to missing children has changed in recent years.

Any analytical approach to organizations focuses naturally on the methods used to perform the basic work of the organization. These work methods are sometimes referred to as tasks or as organizational technology. The use of the term “technology” in this context does not imply highly sophisticated or complicated methods or equipment, but simply the techniques, whether simple or complex, employed to perform the organiza- tion’s work. Assembly line manufacturing, for example, is a basic organizational technol- ogy in which each worker performs a single specialized task on a product as it moves by on the assembly line, resulting in the finished product having been worked on by many specialized employees. If, instead, each worker assembled a complete product, performing all the various tasks necessary to finish the product, we would recognize that a different organizational technology was in use, even though the product was the same.

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In this chapter, we look analytically at police organizational technology. Traditional police terminology refers to tactics and strategies, which are simply combinations of spe- cific tasks and general approaches to achieving police organizational objectives. We will identify the most commonly utilized police strategies and tactics and assess the available evidence about their effectiveness. Since the early 1970s there has been a tremendous number of studies aimed at evaluating and analyzing police strategies and tactics.

In a rational approach to police administration, managers should carefully design work tasks and organize them into tactics and strategies in such a way that the organiza- tion’s goals of protecting life and property and maintaining order are maximally attained. This chapter is intended to introduce the reader to a rational approach while, at the same time, identifying constraints that limit such an approach. One constraint is the vague- ness of the police goal of maintaining order. While all citizens may favor orderliness in the abstract, differences of opinion emerge about whether a particular party, outdoor concert, or adult bookstore is orderly or disorderly. The police goals of protecting life and property are clearer, but public conflict is still evoked over the propriety of methods of protection, such as eavesdropping, aggressive patrol, or sting operations.1 Even if the goals were clearer and there was less controversy about law enforcement methods, we still lack a great deal of knowledge about what methods to employ to achieve which goals most completely.

The lack of agreement in our society about the proper degree of order to be main- tained, and about proper methods for enforcing the law, poses serious constraints on police administration. The situation directly impinges on what James Q. Wilson sees as the three prerequisites for rational management.

First, the goals must be sufficiently operational so that one can make a reason- ably unambiguous judgment as to whether the desired state of affairs has actually been brought into being. Second, the organization must have the technology to achieve its goal. Third, the organization must be reasonably free to apply a suitable technology to a given objective.2

Because police goals are vague, the effects of police strategies are not precisely known, and the police are restricted in the strategies they can employ, police adminis- tration tends to become as much survival- and constraint-oriented as goal- and task- oriented. Police chiefs have traditionally been more concerned about avoiding scandals than about improving services and attaining goals. This, however, may be changing in the modern era, especially given new confidence among police administrators that they can have a significant impact on crime.3 As Wilson notes, “constraints do not uniquely determine how administrators shall behave, they only reduce significantly the room to maneuver.”4

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Crime Control Strategies

Most police officers are assigned to the patrol function. At the beginning of their eight-, 10-, or 12-hour workday, they are assigned to patrol areas, often called beats. Each officer patrols his or her beat until assigned a call by the police dispatcher. The officer responds promptly to the call; it could be a crime, a traffic accident, or a neighborhood dispute. The officer is expected to handle the call. This may involve writing a report, con- ducting a preliminary investigation, giving first aid, directing traffic, arresting or ticketing a citizen, breaking up an argument, giving advice, providing information, or even getting a cat out of a tree. As soon as the officer finishes handling the call, he or she returns to patrolling until the next call. If the call involves a crime or other serious matter, sometime later a detective may conduct a follow-up investigation to try to identify and arrest the perpetrator or recover stolen property.

This brief description includes the three cornerstones of traditional police strategy for dealing with crime: preventive patrol; immediate response to calls; and follow-up investigation. Each is examined in the sections that follow.

Preventive Patrol Most police officers are assigned to patrol duties, with much of their time spent on

routine patrol. Typically, only about one-half of patrol time is consumed by handling calls and performing administrative chores.5 The larger portion is spent patrolling, that is, riding around in the patrol car, sitting in the parked patrol car, or patrolling on foot. Some police officers see this part of their workday as wasting time or downtime, i.e., time spent waiting for something to happen.

Patrolling, however, does have important purposes and is an operational necessity. In 1829, Sir Robert Peel perceived the police as a preventive force, with uniformed officers on patrol as the primary mechanism of prevention. To this day, the strategy is termed preventive patrol by many. In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found that “preventive patrol (the continued scrutiny of the community by visible and mobile policemen) is universally thought of as the best method of controlling crime that is available to the police.”6

Patrolling relies on omnipresence and unpredictability (see “Police Patrol,” Box 13.1). Officers on patrol are expected to prevent crime by giving the impression that they are omnipresent—that they are everywhere. Because it is not actually possible to be omni- present, officers are expected to patrol unpredictably so that at any moment they might be right around the corner. This unpredictable patrolling is often referred to as random patrol.

Another purpose of patrolling is to apprehend those who perpetrate crimes and commit disorderly acts. Unpredictable patrol and patrol of areas of high crime incidence

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improve the chances of an officer stumbling upon a crime in progress. In addition, the apprehension of violators can be an excellent preventive tool if potential and would-be violators are given the impression that the risk of capture is great.

Police officers on patrol are also required to look for and correct any dangerous or threatening conditions on their beats. Historically, watching for fires was a central pur- pose of nighttime patrolling. Today, patrol officers are expected to check for damaged street signs, broken traffic signals, potholes, downed wires, unsupervised children, flood- ing, and other community safety hazards.

There is another important operational necessity underlying the patrolling strategy. In order to be ready to respond immediately to a citizen’s call for service, a patrol officer must essentially be doing nothing at the time the call is received.7 This is referred to as the availability factor. At any given moment, there must be officers patrolling and available to respond to calls, if rapid response is to be a reality.

Patrol officers traditionally have enjoyed great freedom in determining how they patrol. Each patrol officer is limited to a beat and must handle in expeditious fashion all calls that are dispatched on that beat. Within the beat, during the hours each workday that are not consumed by handling calls, patrol officers are given considerable leeway. As a result, they differ tremendously in how they patrol their beats.8 Some officers con- centrate on trouble-prone areas; others hide. Some make numerous traffic enforcement stops; others make none. Some drive only the main streets; others patrol alleys and residential areas. Little or no instruction or direction is generally given to patrol officers about how best to allocate their patrol time. Officers are supposed to use what they

BOX 13.1 Police Patrol

Like most things, the most satisfactory method of patrol is a combination of two extremes; com-

bining the two, using the best of each, parts of both, depending on the situation. Thus, for general

police patrol, the best system is to patrol so that everyone knows you are on the job, yet patrol so

that no one knows where you will be next. A police chief of many years of experience expresses

this very well by telling his men to be “systematically unsystematic.” That is, do not follow any

fixed route or schedule that a criminal might observe, but at the same time see that you cover all

of your beat in such a way as to give adequate protection. This is not easy. The easiest way to

operate, of course, is to lay out a route and schedule so that you need not think about what you

are doing. Yet, remember that while this is the easiest way for you, it is also the easiest way for

the criminals. There is nothing they like better than a police officer who is so systematic that they

know that he visits a certain point, say the back door of a drug store, every night at say, 11:36,

12:03, 12:49, 1:32.

Few officers have so little interest or intelligence that they will knowingly use such a regular

schedule, but far too many officers have fallen into certain regular habits without realizing it.

Source: Richard L. Holcomb. 1948. Police Patrol. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, p. 19.

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know about their beats to determine which areas need more attention than others, and react accordingly.

Although some in the police field have long regarded routine patrol as a waste of time and others have strongly defended it as the backbone of modern policing, it was not until the early 1970s that the strategy’s effectiveness was rigorously tested. Then, during 1972 and 1973, the Kansas City Police Department and the Police Foundation conducted a remarkable experiment to test the effects of routine preventive patrol.9 The experiment has been both influential and controversial. One of the most interesting features of the study is that it was proposed by a task force of Kansas City police officers and not, as might have been expected, by outside researchers.

Experimental conditions in the Kansas City study were maintained for an entire year. Included in the study were 15 patrol beats in the city’s South Patrol Division. Five of these beats were assigned to a control group with no changes in normal patrol staffing or tactics. Five other beats were chosen as reactive beats, with all preventive patrolling eliminated. Although outside patrol units handled calls in these reactive beats, the units left the beats once the calls were cleared. The final five beats in the experiment were proactive beats, in which two to three times the usual level of preventive patrolling was provided.

Prior to the outset of the experiment, researchers collected data on reported crime, arrests, response time, citizen attitudes, and citizen and business victimization for each of the 15 beats in the study. They collected similar data after the conclusion of the year-long experiment. During the experiment, the activities of the police officers assigned to the beats were observed and monitored.

When the study was finished, the researchers concluded “that decreasing or increas- ing routine preventive patrol within the range tested in (the) experiment had no effect on crime, citizen fear of crime, community attitudes toward the police on the delivery of police service, police response time or traffic accidents.”10 In fact, citizens in the experi- mental areas were completely unaware that any changes had been made in the levels of patrolling.

The study did have its limitations, of course. For example, the use of patrol beats as the unit of analysis meant that the overall analysis was based on only 15 research units. Consequently, only very substantial differences among control, reactive, and proactive beats stood a chance of being statistically significant. In other words, the methodological design of the study was biased in the direction of finding no differences attributable to the varying levels of patrol.11 This probably did not matter much, though, because not only was there a lack of statistically significant differences among the beats, there were also virtually no patterns among the non-significant differences that would suggest that any of the three categories of beats was better or worse off for having more or less preventive patrol for a year.

The actual differences in levels of patrolling among the control, reactive, and pro- active beats were not as definitive or as clear-cut as the researchers had intended them

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to be. While routine patrolling was controlled and monitored, other operational units of the police department were not. Special police units, for example, were free to roam and to operate in any of the beats as they saw fit. In addition, reactive units responding to calls in their reactive beats were forced to drive through their beat areas going to and from the calls; this resulted in a substantial police presence that researchers were unable to eliminate from the reactive areas.

Additionally, there was no way to determine if reactive beat residents were able to differentiate between patrol units observed throughout the city and patrol units seen close to home. Furthermore, some critics have suggested that Kansas City is not sufficiently representative of urban America for the results of the study to be widely applicable, and others have criticized the study on the basis of its limited (one-year) duration.

Despite these criticisms and limitations, the Kansas City study has become widely respected by both researchers and police executives. While the study did not result in the elimination of preventive patrol, as some had predicted, it did set the stage for further experimentation with alternative patrol strategies and tactics. The Kansas City study demonstrated convincingly that police chiefs could try alternative patrol tactics without fearing that reduced preventive patrolling would result in calamity. The study did not give police chiefs any final answers about what new tactics to employ, but it did give them the opportunity to try something new and different.

Immediate Response to Calls Studies of the effects of police response time also gave police administrators a license

to innovate. As mentioned earlier, immediate police response to calls has been a corner- stone of modern police strategy. Technological developments, especially the telephone and the police radio, greatly aided police in their efforts to reduce response time. The adoption of the 911 emergency telephone system was aimed at making it easier for citi- zens to contact the police quickly. Computer systems were developed to design beats for optimal response time and to aid dispatchers in assigning calls to the nearest available patrol units.

Many police departments continually monitor their average response times to calls and, in part, base requests for additional personnel on the need to keep response times within an acceptable range. There is a tendency on the part of police officials, elected leaders, and citizens to make several assumptions with regard to the advantages of rapid response:

1. it improves the odds of catching the offender at the scene or nearby;

2. it enhances the opportunity of the police to identify witnesses;

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3. it provides for the immediate gathering of physical evidence; 4. it permits the police to administer lifesaving first aid quickly; 5. it enhances a police department’s image and reputation, thereby serving a crime

prevention function; 6. it creates citizen satisfaction.

Several studies have examined the extent to which rapid police response actually pro- duces these desired outcomes; for the most part, findings have not been very supportive of the assumptions. The earliest studies found that quick response made an arrest more likely but emphasized that only extremely short response times were likely to be pro- ductive.12 When police response time was one or two minutes, a desirable outcome was likely; improvements in these response times of even 15 to 30 seconds greatly improved the likelihood of a successful outcome. On the other hand, when response time exceeded three or four minutes, success probabilities dropped off sharply, and modest reductions in response time mattered very little.

Two later studies produced even less promising findings.13 These studies looked more carefully at response time itself and at the different types of situations that give rise to calls for police assistance. One important finding was that citizens often delay after an incident occurs before calling the police. Sometimes a telephone was not available, or the victim was physically prevented from calling the police. In other instances, the victim was temporarily disoriented, frightened, ashamed, or even apathetic. It was not unusual for crime victims to call their parents, their doctor, their minister, or even their insurance company before calling the police. Average citizen delay in calling the police for serious crimes was found in these studies to be 5–10 minutes.

In previous studies and in police administration practice, response time had always been measured from the time that the police department was notified of the crime or incident (usually via a telephone call from a citizen) until the time the first patrol unit arrived at the scene. The time it took the citizen to call the police in the first place had not been part of response time measurement. However, the likelihood of catching an offender at the scene, locating a witness, or rendering lifesaving first aid actually depends on the length of time from occurrence to police arrival, not on the length of time from the call to the police until police arrival. The realization that citizens often delay for several minutes before calling the police puts response time in a different light and suggests that rapid response may not be as significant as once thought.

An important distinction was also made in the later studies between involvement crimes and discovery crimes. Involvement crimes are those experienced by a victim or witness while they are occurring. Robberies and assaults are by definition involve- ment crimes; the victim is involved and personally threatened. Burglaries and thefts, on the other hand, are not usually discovered until after the fact. They are not usually

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involvement crimes. When a victim or witness becomes aware of the crime only after it has occurred, it is referred to as a discovery crime.

The distinction between involvement and discovery crimes is an important factor in any consideration of police response time. With involvement crimes, rapid police response might be productive if citizen delay has not been too long. With discov- ery crimes, however, rapid police response is unlikely to matter, because the time of occurrence in all likelihood would have been a long time before the call to the police. Frequently, the actual time of occurrence is hours or sometimes days earlier, making even instantaneous police arrival irrelevant.14

Given these considerations, it is not surprising that we conclude that police response time is not usually a crucial factor in arresting offenders and gathering evidence. In their careful study of response time in four cities, William Spelman and Dale K. Brown found the following:

Rapid police response may be unnecessary for three out of every four serious crimes reported to police. The traditional practice of immediate response to all reports of serious crimes currently leads to on-scene arrests in only 29 of every 1000 cases. By implementing innovative programs, police may be able to increase this response-related arrest rate to 50 or even 60 per 1000, but there is little hope that further increases can be generated.15

This study found that median citizen delay in reporting involvement crimes ranged from four to five and one-half minutes. Delay was about 10 minutes for discovery crimes. Involvement crimes reported in progress had a response-related arrest probability of 35 percent; those reported within a few seconds, 18 percent; those reported one minute after the fact, 10 percent; and those reported within one to five minutes, seven percent. Involvement crimes for which citizen reporting was delayed beyond five minutes had extremely low response-related arrest likelihoods. Response-related arrest probabilities for discovery crimes were even lower. In sum, “police response time had no effect on the chances of on-scene arrest in 70 to 85 percent of Part I crimes because they were discov- ered after they had occurred and had no effect on 50 percent to 60 percent of the rest because they were reported too slowly.”16

Despite these limitations on the effectiveness of rapid police response, some police executives are still eager to promise immediate response time because they believe the public demands it. The research has indicated, however, that citizen satisfaction depends not so much on rapid police response as on whether the police arrive within a reasonable amount of time.17 Moreover, citizen expectations of reasonable response time are affected by what they are told when they call the police. If they are told that an officer will be there immediately, then a five-minute delay seems endless. On the other hand, if the citizen calling in about a non-emergency is informed that other urgent matters must be handled

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first and that an officer will arrive within 30 minutes, then a response at any time within that 30 minutes is typically satisfactory to the citizen.

Certainly, when violent crimes, personal injury traffic accidents, and other emer- gencies are reported immediately to the police, rapid response serves a very important purpose. Being able to administer first aid quickly is an unquestionable advantage of rapid response to emergency calls and serves in a significant way in helping the police achieve their goal of protecting lives. However, for non-emergency calls and especially for discov- ery crimes and when citizens themselves delay before calling the police, rapid response serves little useful purpose. As with the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, the response time research demonstrates that traditional practice is not entirely effective and suggests an opportunity to revise and innovate. The development of new response strategies, as well as new patrol strategies, has been a high priority in police research and planning since these pioneering studies.

Follow-Up Investigations Most police departments assign 10 to 20 percent of their personnel to the investiga-

tive or detective function.18 This function follows preliminary investigations conducted by patrol officers; thus, such investigations are referred to as follow-up or reactive investigations. It should be recognized, of course, that some detective work, especially vice-related activity (narcotics, gambling, prostitution), is more proactive and instigative as opposed to follow-up in nature.19 In such cases, a detective poses as a customer or as a criminal in order to instigate criminal activity, always being careful not to illegally entrap the person or persons who are the object of the investigation. Most detective work, however, involves follow-up activity, investigating crimes after they have occurred and focusing on discovering how the crimes were committed and who committed them.

Follow-up investigations are the third cornerstone of modern police crime control strategy. A follow-up investigation is typically conducted by a detective within a day or, at the very most, within a few days of the preliminary investigation. Traditionally, almost every reported serious crime was assigned to a detective for a follow-up investigation. In large departments, detectives specialize in certain kinds of cases, such as burglary, robbery, arson, or homicide; in small agencies, detectives are generalists and work on a variety of cases.

Because detectives work in plain clothes, because they are given wide latitude in handling their cases, and because they are free of the responsibility of responding to routine calls for police service, they have historically enjoyed much higher status than patrol officers. This so-called detective mystique has been reinforced by countless short stories, novels, movies, and television programs depicting the investigative exploits of the detective. While patrol officers are often portrayed as the dull foot soldiers and report takers of modern police work, detectives are characterized as smart, tough, individualistic, and even mysterious.

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Studies, though, clearly demonstrate that the detective mystique is a myth and that detectives deserve far less credit than they have been given for the work that they do. Looking at investigative work critically, it is first important to point out that only about one in five serious reported crimes is ever solved. Moreover,

The single most important determinant of whether or not a case will be solved is the information the victim supplies to the immediately responding patrol officer. If information that uniquely identifies the perpetrator is not presented at the time the crime is reported, the perpetrator, by and large, will not be subsequently identified. Of those cases that are ultimately cleared but in which the perpetrator is not identifiable at the time of the initial police incident report, almost all are cleared as a result of routine police procedures.20

These findings indicate that victims, witnesses, and patrol officers solve more cases than detectives. Research also indicates that case clearances attributable to detectives more frequently result from routine investigative activity than from any direct efforts or special work input contributed by detectives (see “Detective Work,” Box 13.2). Examination of how detectives typically spend their time also chips away at their mystique.

BOX 13.2 Detective Work

Part of the mystique of detective operations is the impression that a detective has diffi-

cult-to-come-by qualifications and skills, that investigating crime is a real science, that a detective

does much more important work than other police officers, that all detective work is exciting and

that a good detective can solve any crime. It borders on heresy to point out that, in fact, much of

what detectives do consists of very routine and rather elementary chores, including much paper

processing; that a good deal of their work is not only not exciting, it is downright boring; that

the situations they confront are often less challenging and less demanding than those handled by

patrolling police officers; that it is arguable whether special skills and knowledge are required for

detective work; that a considerable amount of detective work is actually undertaken on a hit-or-

miss basis; and that the capacity of detectives to solve crimes is greatly exaggerated.

This is not meant to imply that what detectives do has no value. In a large number of cases,

good detective work identifies the perpetrator and results in an apprehension. The dogged deter-

mination and resourcefulness of some detectives in solving cases are extremely impressive. But,

in the context of the totality of police operations, the cases detectives solve account for a much

smaller part of police business than is commonly realized. This is so because, in case after case,

there is literally nothing to go on: no physical evidence, no description of the offender, no witness

and often no cooperation, even from the victim.

Source: Herman Goldstein. 1977. Policing a Free Society. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, pp. 55–56.

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Our data consistently reveal that an investigator’s time is largely consumed in reviewing reports, documenting files, and attempting to locate and interview victims on cases that experience shows will not be solved. For cases that are solved (i.e. a suspect is identified), an investigator spends more time in post-clearance processing than he does in identifying the perpetrator.21

In sum, detectives spend most of their time in the office reading, writing, on the computer, and talking on the telephone. They spend relatively little time doing the things that fictional detectives are famous for: searching for clues, prying information out of informants, questioning suspects, interviewing witnesses and victims, conducting surveillances, and tracking down perpetrators. For better or for worse, modern detective work has largely been bureaucratized.22

Research also indicates that physical evidence is rarely the only basis for identifying a suspect or solving a crime, in spite of tremendous advances in forensic science, the development of DNA evidence techniques, and improved crime scene work. It is still true that most police departments collect much more physical evidence than can be processed and analyzed, resulting in evidence backlogs at crime labs and frustrations for victims and investigators. Forensic science may someday take a quantum leap and become the dominant form of evidence for crime solving and judicial decision making, but for now, eyewitnesses, informants, and suspect confessions continue to play a larger role than physical evidence in most criminal investigations.23

With respect to operational deficiencies, studies of detective work closely parallel those of preventive patrol and immediate response to calls: preventive patrol cannot be shown to prevent; immediate response is not really immediate and is often unnecessary; and follow-up investigations are frequently futile, often merely duplicating preliminary patrol investigations. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing to the present, an important aspect of research and development in policing has been the search for more effective crime control strategies and tactics, including improved methods of patrolling and investigating.

Refinements In each traditional area—patrol, rapid response, and investigations—significant

refinements have been achieved since the landmark studies described above. For the most part, refinements in each area have emphasized developing more targeted strategies and tactics that focus police resources where they can be most effective. The landmark studies have come to be interpreted as demonstrating that: (1) spreading patrol evenly over the entire jurisdiction; (2) trying to respond rapidly to every crime report; and (3) throwing a detective at every crime case, simply are not very effective approaches. The studies also demonstrate that substantial police resources can safely and responsibly be reallocated away from strict adherence to these traditional approaches and toward other, more effec- tive strategies and tactics.

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Patrol Refinements

One of the first programs to arise out of the “nothing works” disarray caused by early research findings, especially those of the Kansas City study, was Managing Patrol Operations (MPO).24 MPO was a federally funded initiative of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) that encouraged police agencies to adopt or improve rational patrol allocation methods, careful workload analysis, crime analysis, and directed patrol.

Directed patrol differs from routine preventive patrol in the use of uncommitted patrolling time. In directed patrol, officers are given instructions or directions to follow when they are not busy handling calls. These instructions are usually based on analysis of recent crime incidents and patterns and can be fairly general (“be on the lookout for sub- jects loitering suspiciously in the area of car dealerships”) or very specific (“At 11:00 p.m. park in the 200 block of Vine Street, walk across Broadway and then north one block to the Volvo/Honda dealerships. Approach quietly and observe from the perimeter for five minutes. If no suspicious activity is observed, proceed to check the lot and buildings. After completing the check, remain on the premises for 10 additional minutes before departing”).

The rationale behind directed patrol is to make patrolling as rational and informed as possible. Directed patrol is the opposite of random patrol. Directed patrol assignments attempt to guide patrol officers to locations where certain kinds of activities such as crimes and accidents are likely to occur, to give them tactics that may be used to prevent or detect target crimes, and to provide them with suspect and method information to increase the chances of prevention or detection. As police departments have improved their crime analysis capabilities and gotten better at identifying “hot spots,” the credibility of directed patrol has been enhanced.

Studies of directed patrol have yielded promising results. One small study in California reported crime decreases during a directed patrol project, but the design of the study made it difficult to conclusively attribute the decreases to the strategy.25 A later study in Pontiac, Michigan, found some evidence that target crimes were reduced by directed patrol; the findings indicated that the tactics employed during directed assignments, more than merely the amount of time devoted to directed patrol, had the greater effect on crime.26 In Minneapolis, the assignment of patrol officers to spend time at “hot spots” failed to reduce serious crime but did have an impact on disorder. In this case, mere visibility seemed to have caused the modest effect on disorder in very specific locations, as the officers’ activities at the hot spots were unstructured and not very substantial.27 Another study, in Indianapolis, found that directed patrol focused on firearms violations was successful in reducing the incidence of firearms-related crimes in the targeted area and that “focusing on individuals and situations where the police have some degree of suspicion of criminal behavior was more effective than casting a broad net over a neighborhood.”28

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In addition to providing more direction to patrol, many police departments have adopted a more active or aggressive approach to patrolling, especially in hot spot locations.29 This essentially involves a higher degree of intervention by patrol officers, such as stopping numerous cars for traffic violations, checking out suspicious people, using every legal opportunity to search for drugs and weapons, and frequently checking for outstanding warrants.30 The rationale underlying aggressive patrol is that these police interventions will result in apprehensions, interruptions of criminal activity, and preven- tion of crime. The main drawback is that aggressive patrol, if not properly and legally practiced, unnecessarily thrusts the police into many peoples’ lives, thereby having an intimidating and chilling effect on the law-abiding public and causing legitimate con- cerns about the abuse of police power. It has also been suggested that the tactic more frequently places police officers into dangerous situations that could result in injury or death.

A study in San Diego tested the effects of an element of aggressive patrol known as field interrogation, which was defined as “a contact initiated by a patrol officer who stops, questions and sometimes searches a citizen because the officer has reasonable sus- picion that the subject may have committed, may be committing, or may be about to commit a crime.”31 In the study, field interrogation (FI) activity was suspended for nine months in one experimental area but maintained at normal levels in two control areas. Suppressible crime in the experimental (no-FI) area increased by a substantial amount, while remaining about the same in the control areas. With the resumption of FI activity in the experimental area, the incidence of suppressible crime returned to approximately its pre-experimental level.

Two studies of a cross-section of the largest American cities produced comparable findings. One study used the number of traffic citations issued as a measure of patrol aggressiveness and a sophisticated mathematical model to determine the relationship between aggressive patrol and the robbery crime rate. The analysis suggested that aggres- sive patrol contributes to a higher robbery arrest ratio which, in turn, leads to a lower robbery crime rate.32 A similar study, which used expert judgments (ratings by observers knowledgeable about police practices around the country) of police departments’ “adher- ence to norms of efficiency and legalism” as a measure of patrol aggressiveness, produced comparable findings.33

A study in Kansas City demonstrated the value of aggressive patrol in identifying individuals illegally carrying firearms.34 Officers saturating a target area were successful in seizing substantially more weapons than other officers patrolling routinely in a control area, and the result was a significant decrease in gun crime in the target area. Target area residents also became less fearful of crime and more satisfied with their neighborhood, compared to control area residents. When the crackdown was stopped in the target area, gun crime increased.

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Rapid Response Refinements

A number of studies challenged the importance of immediate response to calls for service and paved the way for a new approach, often termed differential responses to calls for service.35 Stated simply, differential responses advocates abandoning the traditional practice of immediately responding to all calls for service, substituting the principle of matching the response to the call. Under this program, some calls are handled over the telephone, by online reporting, by appointment, by delayed patrol response, or by immediate non-sworn police response, thus reducing and managing the workload of the sworn patrol force.

Reducing and managing the patrol workload provides opportunities for alternative strategies and allocation decisions. More time may be devoted to directed patrol, prelim- inary patrol investigations, or crime prevention activities. Some patrol resources might be redistributed to investigations or other functions. In addition, more patrol officers will be available to respond en masse to crimes in progress and emergencies, perhaps improving patrol apprehension effectiveness.

Successful implementation of the differential response program requires planning and, in particular, skilled communications personnel. Police telephone operators are required to assess the nature of each incoming call and determine the appropriate response mode. Categories are established in advance (see Figure 13.1), but operators must still diagnose the endless variety of calls for police service and make decisions about seriousness and immediacy. Operators must also explain to callers with low-priority prob- lems why the police will not appear immediately at their doorsteps. Research has shown that most complainants will accept such explanations if they are politely and logically presented, but experience suggests that providing such explanations goes beyond the tra- ditional role of police communications personnel and requires training and supervision.

Tests of the differential responses program have yielded promising results.36 Several police departments have successfully implemented the program and diverted up to 50  percent of calls to alternative responses without suffering any reductions in citizen satisfaction. Some difficulties are usually encountered with communications personnel early in the program, including hesitancy in choosing alternative responses, but these dwindle with experience. The program succeeds in releasing patrol resources for other, more productive strategies; the challenge is to identify the more productive strategies, and have officers and communications personnel accept them.

Investigative Refinements

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components as solvability factors, case screening, case enhancement, and police/ prosecutor coordination.37 The first step in MCI was often the redesign of crime reports, highlighting important evidentiary items called solvability factors. The new report form, along with special training, was intended to encourage patrol officers to be investigators rather than mere report takers. When patrol reports were forwarded to the detective division, case screening could then be based on the presence or absence of solvability factors. A super- visor could screen out cases in which few or no solvability factors had been uncovered by the preliminary patrol investigation, and not assign those cases for follow-up investigation. Because many cases are characterized by little or no evidence, the portion of cases screened out would be considerable. Detectives could then reallocate their time to the remaining cases that are potentially solvable, as well as to post-arrest case enhancement.

Some MCI programs use quantitative formulas to determine whether a case should be assigned for follow-up investigation.38 Studies have identified the solvability factors that best predict whether a case will be solved and the probability of case solution, given different amounts of evidence available following preliminary patrol investigation. A checklist or scoring system can be applied to each case to decide its eligibility for further investigation. Research conducted by numerous police departments has demonstrated that scoring systems successfully screen out low-probability cases and identify promising cases.39 Of course, some cases are so serious in nature or so important for other reasons that they deserve follow-up investigation regardless of their potential solvability following preliminary investigation.

Another investigative refinement was to refocus attention on offenders rather than offenses. This is called the repeat offender approach. The rationale behind this approach rests on research indicating that a few very active criminal offenders account for a dis- proportionate amount of criminal activity. The reactive type of repeat offender program focuses on offenders already arrested. Prior records of arrestees are examined to identify repeat offenders, especially those who meet the criteria of subsequent offender laws (some- times called three-strikes laws) enacted in many states. When an arrestee is found who meets the criteria, specially trained, highly skilled detectives review the arrest, enhance the prosecution through additional investigation, shepherd the case through the courts, and collect the necessary records to document prior convictions. In this way, the case is kept from falling through the cracks in the court system, inappropriate plea bargaining is avoided, and the full weight of legal sanctions is brought to bear on the repeat offender.40

Some police departments also utilize more proactive repeat offender tactics, includ- ing extensive surveillance of suspected active repeaters. In general, this is an expensive undertaking because it takes several officers to conduct a continuing surveillance. Only very active offenders are likely to merit such an investment. A study in Washington, DC, however, found that a proactive repeat offender unit was successful in arresting targeted offenders and that offenders who were apprehended had prior records that were much longer than average. The tactics of this unit included conducting surveillances

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of active offenders, locating wanted serious offenders, acting on tips from informants, and employing decoy and sting-type methods.41 A similar study conducted in Phoenix focused on a mixed proactive/reactive model. Suspected repeat offenders were identified to police department personnel, so that some proactive work could take place, but the primary tactic was to seek additional evidence and conduct extensive background checks after repeat offenders were arrested, which was usually during the course of routine police business.42 This study found that targeted repeat offenders were slightly more likely to be arrested than non-targeted ones but, more importantly, they were more likely to get prison sentences, and their sentences were on average 18 months longer than those given to non-targeted repeat offenders.

Problem-Oriented Policing As described above, most of the refinements to preventive patrol, rapid response,

and follow-up investigation since the 1970s have emphasized taking a more targeted approach by concentrating police resources on specific locations, specific types of calls and cases, and specific offenders. But the actual policing methods have not changed very much—for the most part, what has been targeted and concentrated is visible police authority and enforcement action. Since the 1980s, though, another targeted approach, called problem-oriented policing, has gained popularity.

Simply put, problem-oriented policing (POP) posits that police should focus more attention on problems, as opposed to incidents.43 Problems may be recognizable as col- lections of incidents related in some way (such as by occurring at the same location) or as underlying conditions that give rise to incidents, crimes, disorder, and other sub- stantive community issues that people expect the police to handle. By focusing more on problems than on incidents, police can address causes rather than mere symptoms and, consequently, have a greater impact. The public health analogy is often used to illustrate this difference in conceptualizing the police role, with its emphasis on preven- tion and taking a proactive approach. This analogy is useful, too, because it reminds us that even with a strong public health approach, people still get sick and need medical attention—that is, police still need to respond to calls and make arrests, even as POP tries to prevent problems in the first place and reduce the overall demand for reactive policing.

One of the most fundamental tenets of POP is that law enforcement—using the criminal law—should be understood as one means of policing, not the end or goal of policing. This is much more than a subtle shift in terminology. It emphasizes that police pursue large and critically important societal goals—controlling crime, protecting people, reducing fear, maintaining order. In every instance, police should choose those lawful and ethical means that yield the most efficient and effective achievement of these ends. Sometimes this may involve enforcement of the criminal law, and sometimes it

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may not. Thus, the terms “policing” and “law enforcement” are not synonymous, and law enforcement is not the only—or even necessarily the principal—technique of policing.

In place of overreliance on the criminal law, POP recommends a rational and analyti- cal approach to problem solving using a process best known in police circles as the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, assessment).44 According to this approach, police should continually scan their areas of responsibility, drawing on a variety of sources of information in order to identify apparent problems. Next, they should carefully analyze those problems in order to verify, describe, and explain them. Only after this analysis stage should police turn their attention to responses and, when they do, they should identify and consider a wide range of responses before narrowing their focus down to the most promising alternatives. After implementing these responses, they should then carefully assess impact in order to determine whether they need to try something else, and also to document lessons learned for the benefit of future problem-solving efforts.

POP analysis and responses are often focused on the three sides of the “crime trian- gle”—offenders, victims, and locations. Arguably, all three are needed for crimes or other problems to occur. Thus, analysis of these three factors should shed light on the nature of the problem and why it is occurring when and where it is. Moreover, given the nature of a triangle, pulling out any one side should cause it to collapse—this encourages problem solvers to focus attention on responses that might affect offenders, victims, or locations. Additionally, offenders have “handlers,” victims have “guardians,” and locations have “managers.”45 These are people who have a stake in protecting, monitoring, controlling, or improving offenders, victims, or locations. Problem solvers should look for allies and partners who can contribute to the implementation of responses and the overall effec- tiveness of the POP effort.

Early POP field tests were conducted in Baltimore County, Maryland,46 and Newport News, Virginia.47 POP has been greatly popularized through two articles in the Atlantic Monthly magazine48 and further diffused through its association with community policing.49 There are many specific examples and case studies of problem solving now available50 and a few empirical studies of POP in practice.51 The consensus of 15-plus years of experience is that problem-oriented policing is an effective strategy for dealing with both crime- and non-crime-related problems at both the neighborhood and citywide levels.52

Community Relations Strategies

As already described in this chapter, police strategies and tactics aimed at reducing crime have received a great deal of research and undergone a great deal of refinement since the early 1970s. At the same time, substantial research and development activity has also been focused on another major concern of the police—improving relations with the

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community. For the most part, developments in this area have occurred separately from crime control efforts, although some see community policing as the logical culmination of both streams of development.

Public Relations In the 1950s and 1960s, many police departments established community relations

units in response to perceived problems in police–community relations. Initially, these community relations units engaged mostly in public relations by presenting the police point of view to the community. This one-sided approach was soon recognized as inad- equate and expanded to provide the community with a forum for expressing its views to the police. The two-way police–community relations philosophy emphasized the impor- tance of communication and mutual understanding.

In the 1970s, it became apparent that police–community relations officers and units were not effective in guaranteeing smooth relations between a community and its police department. A community experiences its police department through the actions of patrol officers and detectives more than through the presentations of a few community relations specialists. Efforts were undertaken to train patrol officers in community relations and crime prevention techniques and to make them more knowledgeable about community characteristics and problems.53 Team policing programs were also implemented, in part as a means of improving police responsiveness to community concerns.54

Crime Prevention Early police efforts at public relations and community relations naturally evolved

toward crime prevention, in part because of the public’s thirst for information about how  to protect themselves and their families. This was ironic in the sense that police efforts to improve community relations led the public to ask for information about how best to control crime. Because of this history, crime prevention as a police strategy refers not so much to preventive patrol as to special programs designed to make citizens, homes, and businesses more difficult to victimize. Organizationally, crime prevention units are often combined with community services and community relations units rather than with patrol or investigations.

One method, called target hardening, seeks improvements in doors, windows, locks, alarms, lighting, and landscaping that make illegal entry into homes and businesses more difficult and more time-consuming. Another method is to train citizens to avoid threat- ening situations and to react correctly when attacked or threatened. Still other methods encourage citizens to watch out for their neighbors’ property and even to patrol their own neighborhoods.

Some police departments assign one or more officers to crime prevention duties.

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These officers then specialize in performing security surveys, giving public crime pre- vention lectures and presentations, and organizing community participation in crime prevention programs. Other departments have chosen to assign crime prevention duties to all patrol officers. Under this model, each officer is responsible for crime prevention duties on his or her beat.

The effects of crime prevention programs have not been conclusively established. Many police executives, however, have attributed crime decreases to community par- ticipation in crime prevention programs. Target hardening and increased community participation in crime prevention certainly contribute to crime reduction, and evidence is available that crime prevention programs at least make citizens feel safer and more willing to report suspicious activity.55 On the other hand, there is some tendency to oversell com- munity crime prevention as the solution to every community’s crime and fear of crime problems. Yet some communities may not be receptive to such programs; citizen partici- pation is frequently difficult to maintain over extended periods, and some programs may have unintended side effects such as increased fear among some participants.56

An increasingly popular approach that closely parallels problem-oriented policing is situational crime prevention.57 This approach emphasizes the necessity of tailor- ing crime prevention responses to the specific characteristics of the crime problem being  addressed—it rejects any one-size-fits-all thinking. It also focuses primarily on reducing opportunities for crime by, for example, increasing the effort required to commit offenses, increasing the risk of being detected, reducing the reward should the offense be consummated, restricting access to crime facilitators, and removing excuses. Situational crime prevention has achieved substantial success when targeted at a wide variety of offenses, including auto theft, shoplifting, thefts from vending machines, assaults at bus stops, and robberies at convenience stores.58

Foot Patrol Many observers now believe that the abandonment of foot patrol by most American

police departments by the mid-1900s changed the nature of police work and negatively affected police–citizen relations. Officers assigned to large patrol car beats do not develop the intimate understanding of and cordial relationship with the community that foot patrol officers assigned to small beats develop. Officers on foot are in a position to relate more intimately with citizens than officers driving by in cars.

The results of two research studies, together with the development of small police radios, gave a boost to the resurgence of foot patrol starting in the 1980s. Originally, the police car was needed to house the bulky two-way radio. Today, foot patrol officers carry tiny, lightweight radios that enable them to handle calls promptly and to request information or assistance whenever needed. They are never out of touch and they are always available. An experimental study conducted in Newark, New Jersey, was unable

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to demonstrate that either adding or removing foot patrol affected crime in any way.59 This finding mirrored what had been found in Kansas City regarding motorized patrol. However, citizens involved in the foot patrol study were less fearful of crime and more satisfied with foot patrol service than with motor patrol. In addition, citizens were aware of additions and discontinuations of foot patrol in their neighborhoods, a finding that stands in stark contrast to the results of the Kansas City study, in which citizens did not even perceive changes in the levels of motorized patrol. A second major foot patrol research program in Flint, Michigan, reported findings that were similar to the Newark findings, except that crime decreased as well.60

These studies were widely interpreted as demonstrating that even if foot patrol did not decrease crime, at least it made citizens feel safer and led to improvements in police– community relations. Why the difference between motorized patrol and foot patrol? In what has come to be known as the “broken windows” thesis, foot patrol officers pay more attention to disorderly behavior and minor offenses than do motor patrol officers.61 Moreover, they are in a better position to manage their beats—to understand what con- stitutes threatening or inappropriate behavior, to observe it, and to correct it. Foot patrol officers are likely to pay more attention to derelicts, petty thieves, disorderly persons, vagrants, panhandlers, noisy juveniles, and street people, who, although not committing serious crimes, cause concern and fear among many citizens. Failure to control even the most minor aberrant activities on the street contributes to neighborhood fears. Foot patrol officers have more opportunity than motor patrol officers to control street disorder and reassure ordinary citizens.

Geography plays a large role in determining the viability of foot patrol as a police strategy. The more densely populated an area, the more the citizenry will travel on foot and the more street disorder there will be. The more densely populated an area, the more likely that foot patrol can be effectively used as a police strategy. While foot patrol may never again become the dominant police strategy it once was, it can play a large role in contributing police services to many communities.

Community Policing Starting in the 1980s, an even broader approach than community relations and

foot patrol began developing. More police departments began employing foot patrol as a central component of their operational strategy rather than as a novelty or as an accommodation to downtown business interests. Crime prevention programs became more reliant on community involvement, such as in neighborhood watch, community patrol, and crime-stoppers programs. Police departments began making increased use of civilians  and  volunteers in various aspects of policing and made permanent geographic assignment an important element of patrol deployment. The combination of all this came to be called community policing, involving a substantial change in police thinking,

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one where police strategy and tactics are adapted to fit the needs and require- ments of the different communities the department serves, where there is a diver- sification of the kinds of programs and services on the basis of community needs and demands for police services and where there is considerable involvement of the community with police in reaching their objectives.62

Research on the effectiveness of community policing has yielded mixed results. Foot patrol seems to make citizens feel safer, but it may not have much of an effect on the amount of crime.63 A small study in Houston, Texas, which involved patrol officers visiting households to solicit viewpoints and information, did report decreases in both crime and fear in the study area.64 Studies of community policing officers in two U.S. cities and in England, however, found that the officers actually spent very little of their time in direct contact with citizens, despite role expectations that emphasized community contact.65 A lengthy study of department-wide community policing in Chicago similarly discovered some officer resistance to working closely with citizens, but nevertheless yielded promising effects on public satisfaction, fear, disorder, and crime.66

A study in Baltimore County, Maryland, provided some insight into the mixed results from community-oriented policing.67 Three squads of 15 officers each were cre- ated, initially for the purpose of reducing fear of crime in target neighborhoods. These squads were designated as Citizen-Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) units. During the first phase of COPE evolution, the units primarily employed preventive patrol tactics and based their analyses of neighborhood problems largely on crime analysis information. This phase of COPE was not truly community-oriented, and it was not very successful. Citizen awareness of COPE presence and reductions in community fear were minimal at best.

During the second phase of the COPE project, police–citizen contact was substan- tially increased. Police officers increased their canvassing of households, seeking informa- tion about citizen fears and concerns. COPE officers also made widespread use of crime prevention tactics, including home security surveys and community meetings, instead of relying so heavily on preventive patrol. With increased citizen contact, COPE’s effects on fear improved, as did citizen awareness of COPE’s presence.

COPE officers increased their citizen contact during this second phase of the project; in the process they became more aware of community concerns, but they did not make thorough use of this information. That is, after gathering information about the com- munity’s problems, COPE officers largely ignored that information, instead routinely implementing crime prevention and patrol as their solutions to any and all problems. Thus, this second phase of COPE, although it incorporated substantial community con- tact, was not truly community-oriented or community-responsive.

COPE became genuinely community-oriented during its third phase. COPE officers adopted a process whereby they collected information from community residents and

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other sources before deciding what tactics to adopt. With information in hand, COPE officers analyzed the situation in a given target neighborhood and then chose the tactics most likely to solve the problems and improve the situation. In some situations, crime prevention tactics seemed most likely to succeed but, in other situations, different tactics, such as surveillance, saturation patrol, a focus on repeat offenders, nuisance abatement, better traffic control, or enhanced recreational opportunities for youths seemed better suited to the problems at hand. The COPE units became increasingly more adept at gath- ering information from community residents, analyzing that information, and designing good-fit solutions. This style of policing was community-oriented; citizens were heavily involved with COPE officers in problem identification and, to a lesser degree, problem solution. Not coincidentally, citizen satisfaction with the police, reductions in fear, and reductions in reported crimes in target neighborhoods were greatest during this third phase of the COPE project.

Besides being community-oriented, in its third phase, the Baltimore County COPE project also provided an example of problem-oriented policing. In its first and second phases, the COPE project had fallen victim to traditional tactics and a one-size-fits-all tendency. Despite having an atypical police objective (the reduction of fear of crime), and despite gathering information from police and community sources about problems in target neighborhoods, when it came time to implement solutions the COPE units had resorted only to traditional, comfortable methods. The COPE response to problems was limited to the conventional repertoire of police strategies and tactics. Even when choosing among these few options, the COPE units failed to employ a problem-oriented approach. In the first phase of the project, preventive and saturation patrol were used predominantly, because officers were more familiar with these methods than any others. In the second phase, crime prevention tactics were emphasized, because the COPE units had been reminded of their citizen-oriented mandate and because security surveys and community meetings seemed the most convenient methods for achieving citizen con- tact. In neither phase were methods chosen because they were deemed the most effective responses to specific community problems and concerns.

The third phase of COPE adopted the problem-oriented approach. As described, the COPE units became more adept at collecting information about situations in target communities, using that information to identify and analyze problems, and considering a wide range of alternative responses before choosing those most likely to succeed. One clear change in this phase of COPE was a greater utilization of other government agencies and private resources to solve community problems.68 If a vacant lot was at the center of neighborhood problems, COPE officers marshaled park and recreation, zoning, sanita- tion, and other public agencies to address the problematic conditions or force the prop- erty’s owner to make improvements. If broken street lighting concerned neighborhood residents, COPE pressured the electric company, apartment complex management, or whoever else had the authority to correct the problem. If a particular individual or group

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was terrorizing neighborhood residents, COPE adopted enforcement tactics to address the problem behaviors directly. The important innovation in this problem-oriented phase of COPE was the selection of methods based on analysis of problems rather than mindless utilization of comfortable, familiar methods without regard to the nature of the specific problems being addressed.

The third phase of COPE illustrates the possible confluence of the two major streams of development of police strategies, one focused on improving crime control and the other on improving community relations. Community policing seems to be the most effective strategy in the arsenal for improving police relations with the community. When combined with problem-oriented policing, it also seems to have great merit for improving the crime control effectiveness of policing.

Specific Problems and Issues

To this point we have discussed police strategies that are relatively broad approaches to providing police services and pursuing police objectives. In our examination of some of these strategies we have noted that the available research is sometimes inconclusive or inconsistent. This is due in part to the complexities of the strategies themselves. It is diffi- cult to attribute effects to a strategy that has several components and that is implemented differently by different police departments.

In addition to broad strategies for controlling crime and improving community relations, police departments adopt specific strategies and tactics to deal with specific problems. In the remainder of this chapter we touch on just a few significant examples of these specific problems and issues.

Domestic Violence Arguments and disputes among family members, particularly between husbands and

wives, are a relatively common target of police intervention. Domestic disputes are one of the most frequent types of calls assigned to patrol officers, and one of the least desirable. These disputes can sometimes be dangerous; in most instances they are difficult to resolve. Almost all police officers have experienced situations in which the disputing parties turn their anger on the police or when a husband or wife insists on the arrest of a spouse only to refuse to press charges the following morning.

In the 1970s, police attention was directed toward developing crisis intervention and conflict management skills for handling domestic disputes.69 Patrol officers were trained in counseling techniques, and procedures were instituted to refer disputants to appropri- ate social agencies for treatment of their underlying problems. Some large departments created specialized crisis intervention units or domestic violence units to relieve patrol

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officers of the burden of handling domestic disputes. In general, the emphasis was on diverting family members away from the legal system and into health, welfare, and social systems.

Later in the 1970s, concerned feminists and others who were more aware of, and sensitive to, domestic violence began to criticize the police for not adequately protect- ing women in domestic dispute situations. When domestic disputes erupt in violence, women are usually the victims. Critics complained that the police, whether out of their zeal to utilize referral to social agencies, their tendency to identify with husbands, their desire to avoid the work involved in arrests, or their apathy, were failing to provide women with equal protection of the law as provided by the constitution.70 Battered spouse pro- grams and shelters produced numbers of vocal, articulate victims of domestic violence who believed that the police had abandoned them.

In response to these criticisms, many states passed laws toughening spousal assault penalties, laws empowering police officers to make misdemeanor probable cause arrests in spousal assault situations, and laws mandating police protection of spousal assault victims. Initial research supported the more legalistic approach to dealing with domestic violence, reporting that arrest of the assailant was the single most effective short-term method of preventing additional violence.71 Subsequent studies, however, produced mixed and sometimes conflicting findings.72 At present, the legalistic approach to domes- tic violence cannot claim strong support from research for the proposition that it works best; it remains in place, though, supported by legislation and greater social awareness of the harm caused by domestic violence.

Perhaps most promising are community policing and problem-solving approaches. For example, when officers in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, analyzed domestic violence cases, they found several interesting factors: many abusers were on probation or parole for other offenses; many abusers had previously committed “indicator” crimes against their partners, such as harassment, trespassing, and vandal- ism; and many couples had previously come to police attention, but it was not always discovered through repeat call analysis of home addresses (because incidents may have occurred at previous addresses or at places of work). Based on these discoveries, officers began compiling more complete databases on victims and assailants, targeting indicator crimes in hopes of heading off more violent episodes, coordinating more closely with social service agencies and prosecutors, and implemented a Police Watch program to focus more attention and pressure on assailants and those engaged in indicator crimes. Initial results have been promising.73

Missing Children Another problem for which police tactics and procedures have changed considerably

in recent years is that of runaways and missing children. In the past, many, if not most,

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police departments took a somewhat lackadaisical approach to the problem. Departments often refused to take an official report until the child had been missing for at least 24 hours, in effect assuming that the child had run away and would return shortly. If the child remained missing for a day, a patrol officer would complete a report and perhaps enter the missing person in the computer information system. Little investigative effort would be expended unless there was strong evidence of foul play. If investigators were assigned to missing person cases, they were often the least experienced and least skillful of all detectives.

The documentation of child kidnapping cases, the apparent growth of the missing children problem and growing awareness of related problems of child abuse and child exploitation have now combined to force police departments to assign the highest priority to missing children reports. Reports are taken immediately and investigations begun promptly. State and federal investigative agencies now perform investigative and coordinative functions. Missing children cases now receive as much or more publicity as almost any kind of crime, and public pressure on police departments to solve missing children cases can be intense. Since 1984, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) has helped focus attention on child kidnapping, parental abduction, and child sexual exploitation. Other programs, such as Code Adam and the Amber Alert system, have also been developed to help solicit the community’s participation in locating missing children more quickly.74

Drug Control Few aspects of police work arouse such strong feelings as drug control strategies.

Some citizens regard drug abuse as a tremendous problem and urge the police to take an all-out enforcement approach. Others who also regard it as a very serious problem would rather see an emphasis on education, prevention, and treatment. Still others think drug problems are over-exaggerated. In recent years, of course, several states have taken steps to legalize or at least decriminalize marijuana possession and to regulate and tax its production and sale.

Within the enforcement realm, citizens have widely differing opinions about whether police should use specific tactics, such as drug-sniffing dogs, consent searches, surveil- lance, informants, and undercover operations. Concerns also develop about the equity of enforcement actions, which inevitably target public and street corner violations more than private and country-club violations, resulting in a disproportionate impact on young and minority offenders.

Traditionally, efforts to control drug abuse have fallen into two categories—demand reduction and supply reduction. Demand reduction includes education and prevention, as well as enforcement targeted at drug users. Supply reduction includes crop eradication, alternative crop subsidies, control over prescription drugs and chemicals, anti-smuggling

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efforts, and various enforcement activities aimed at low-level and high-level drug sellers. A third general approach is harm reduction. This approach does not focus so much on trying to eliminate drug abuse as on trying to identify the worst harms associated with drugs and then looking for ways to minimize those harms. Often, this harm-reduction approach is advocated by those who argue in favor of medicalizing the drug problem rather than criminalizing it.

Most citizens, even if they personally lean toward education, prevention, treatment, harm reduction, or some other non-enforcement approach, expect the police to take action if a crack house or methamphetamine lab shows up next door. Police departments have been most successful in addressing neighborhood-level and street-level drug prob- lems when taking a community policing and problem-oriented policing approach.75 The community policing approach leads officers to work with the community, other govern- ment agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in identifying and tackling specific drug problems. These other entities can often provide information, resources, and even authority (e.g., by working with probation officers or code enforcement officers) to help solve the problem. The problem-oriented approach encourages officers to gather and analyze information first, use the crime triangle to identify leverage points that can be exploited to reduce the problem, and consider a wide array of traditional and nontradi- tional responses.76

Protest Historically, one of the reasons that police forces were formed in the early 1800s was

in response to the challenge of handling large crowds, demonstrations, protests, and riots. Before police departments existed, large assemblies of upset and angry people usually either (1) got completely out of control, resulting in significant property damage and many deaths or (2) the military was called in, resulting in even more deaths. Thus, crowd control and riot control have been among the most important responsibilities of police ever since police departments were created.

In the United States, mass demonstrations and riots have not been a continuous phenomenon over the last 180 years, but rather an occasional one. As a result, many police departments have had the experience of being caught unprepared, then investing in the development of a sophisticated crowd-control capacity, and then going many years without having to use the capacity, only to get caught by surprise again. The civil rights era in the 1950s and 1960s, overlapping with the anti-war era of the 1960s and 1970s, was a sustained period of protest during which most police departments did improve their ability to respond more safely and effectively to masses of people. Since that time, a few individual cities have experienced critical events, such as Los Angeles following the Rodney King verdict and Seattle during the World Trade Organization meetings,77 but many other cities have had little or no recent experience with mass protest.

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This situation changed dramatically in late 2011 when the “Occupy Wall Street” movement gained nationwide and international attention. The movement’s website claimed that Occupy protests against Wall Street, income inequality, and the effects of economic globalization were held in over 100 U.S. cities and over 1,500 cities worldwide during October and November 2011.78 As immortalized on television and YouTube, the protests were very difficult for the police to control. Some protesters intentionally pro- voked police responses and, in many cities, the protesters established encampments in public parks that eventually had to be forcibly dismantled. Major city police departments adopted varied tactics, some more confrontational and others more restrained. Police chiefs reported that their efforts to negotiate with the protesters were sometimes fruitless because the Occupy movement was officially leaderless, and also because the protesters were seeking as much confrontation with the police as possible in order to gain additional political and popular support.79

In 2014 and 2015, another wave of protests swept the nation in the aftermath of controversial incidents of police use of deadly force in New York, Ferguson, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Baltimore, and other cities. In these cases, police had to control crowds, demonstrations, and civil disorder that were in protest against the police, always a difficult and sometimes dangerous challenge.

Citizens have the right to assemble and speak their minds when they are not satisfied with their government, and few people seem satisfied with their government these days. In addition, police accountability, transparency, discrimination, and use of force have become prominent public and political concerns. When it comes to protest, the police have a hugely important role to play, facilitating the exercise of constitutional rights while  also protecting life and property and maintaining some semblance of order in public spaces. In the near future, at least, handling of mass protests is likely to become an even more significant criterion of police executive leadership and effectiveness than

MODERN POLICING BLOG Crowd control versus crowd management June 12, 2015

This article reports the Berkeley PD’s review of its handling of post-Ferguson protests last December, including a plan to shift from crowd control to crowd management. The article highlights the challenge facing police in mass protest situations—criticized from one side for using unnecessary force and from the other side for not doing enough to protect private property.

Source: The above is a reproduction of a post from the Modern Policing blog. The link to the post is https://gcordner.wordpress. com/2015/06/12/crowd-control-versus-crowd-management/. The hyperlink at “This article” links to http://www.dailycal. org/2015/06/11/police-face-questions-criticism-with-presentation-of-report-on-december-protests/.

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it has been over the past few decades. It is an important one because “the way in which police in a democracy respond to public protest is often a defining moment for them and the community.”80

Summary

In this chapter, we have reviewed a number of police strategies and tactics. Together these strategies and tactics comprise the police organizational technology—that is, the dominant methods by which police work is performed and police objectives are pursued. As we have seen, police strategies and tactics have changed over the years in response to changes in society, public pressures, and research. Police executives must continually reassess their organizational technology and make adjustments to improve the attainment of the goals of protecting life and property and maintaining order. Today, the knowledge base related to what works in policing is much farther along in its development than even a decade ago, making it possible for police executives to strive toward the objective of evidence-based policing.81

The three cornerstones of traditional police crime control strategy are routine preventive patrol, immediate response to calls, and follow-up investigations of reported crimes. As discussed in this chapter, major research studies have challenged the effectiveness of these strategies, leading to both refinements and new approaches, such as problem-oriented policing. On a parallel track, police departments have also sought more effective strategies for improving their relations with the community. Currently, com- munity policing is seen as the most effective strategy for improved police–community relations and, in combination with problem-oriented policing, as a promising approach to crime control as well. More variation is found in police strategies and tactics for dealing with specific problems and issues, although community policing and problem solving still often surface as effective approaches.

D I S C U S S I O N Q U E S T I O N S

1. What are your personal beliefs about the preventive effects of police patrol? The theory of patrol is that it prevents crime; why doesn’t it?

2. Why aren’t detectives more successful at solving crimes? Given their relative lack of success, how do you account for the “detective mystique”?

3. Why do you think that foot patrol is more effective than motor patrol in reassuring citizens and making them feel safe? To what extent can we replace motor patrol with foot patrol in today’s society?

4. Aggressive patrol produces arrests and may deter crime, but it also leads to more police intrusion into the lives of citizens. Do you favor its use? How would you balance the competing interests of civil liberties and crime control?

5. As a police chief, what policies and procedures would you institute to guide your officers in handling

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domestic violence cases? How much discretion would you leave in the officers’ hands? How would you respond to pressure from women’s rights and men’s rights groups?

Cases

One recurring theme in Cases 3 through 5 in the back of the text is the need to improve relations between police departments and their communities, often involving the implementation of community policing. You should analyze these three cases from the standpoint of this chapter’s discussion of police strategies and tactics, including community policing.

Suggested Reading

Braga, A.A. 2008. Problem-Oriented Policing and Crime Prevention. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Goldstein, H. 1990. Problem-Oriented Policing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. PERF. 2012. Improving the Police Response to Sexual Assault. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research

Forum. Skogan, W. and K. Frydl. 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC:

National Research Council. Weisburd, D. and A.A. Braga. 2006. Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Notes

1 J.Q. Wilson. 1968. “Dilemmas of Police Administration.” Public Administration Review (September/ October): 407–417.

2 J.Q. Wilson. 1978. The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents. New York, NY: Basic Books, p. 203.

3 W. Bratton with P. Knobler. 1998. Turnaround: How America’s Top Cop Reversed the Crime Epidemic. New York, NY: Random House.

4 Wilson. 1978. The Investigators, p. 204. 5 G.P. Whitaker. 1982. “What is Patrol Work?” Police Studies 4, no. 4 (winter): 13–17. 6 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. 1968. The Challenge of

Crime in a Free Society. New York, NY: Avon Books, p. 295. 7 J.Q. Wilson. 1968. Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities.

Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 26. 8 G.Cordner. 1982. “While on Routine Patrol: What the Police Do When They’re Not Doing Anything.”

American Journal of Police 1, no. 2: 94–112. 9 G.L. Kelling, T. Pate, D. Dieckman, and C.E. Brown. 1974. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol

Experiment: A Summary Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

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10 Kelling et al. 1974. The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, p. 16. 11 L.W. Sherman. 1986. “Policing Communities: What Works?” In A.J. Reiss Jr. and M. Tonry (eds),

Communities and Crime. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p. 359. 12 H.H. Isaacs. 1967. “A Study of Communications, Crimes, and Arrests in a Metropolitan Police

Department.” In Task Force Report: Science and Technology. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office; C. Clawson and S.K. Chang. 1977. “The Relationship of Response Delays and Arrest Rates.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 5: 53–68; D.P. Tarr. 1978. “Analysis of Response Delays and Arrest Rates.” Journal of Police Science and Administration 6: 429–451.

13 Kansas City Police Department. 1978. Response Time Analysis: Executive Summary. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office; W. Spelman and D.K. Brown. 1981. Calling the Police: Citizen Reporting of Serious Crime. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

14 G.W. Cordner, J.R. Greene, and T.S. Bynum. 1983. “The Sooner the Better: Some Effects of Police Response Time.” In R.R. Bennett (ed.), Police at Work: Policy Issues and Analysis. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 145–164.

15 Spelman and Brown. 1981. Calling the Police, p. xix. 16 Spelman and Brown. 1981. Calling the Police, p. 72. 17 T. Pate, A. Ferrara, R.A. Bowers, and J. Lorence. 1976. Police Response Time: Its Determinants and Effects.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 18 J.F. Heaphy (ed.). 1978. Police Practices: The General Administrative Survey. Washington, DC: Police

Foundation. 19 Wilson. 1978. The Investigators. 20 P.W. Greenwood and J. Petersilia. 1975. The Criminal Investigation Process Volume I: Summary and Policy

Implications. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, p. vii. 21 Greenwood and Petersilia. 1975. The Criminal Investigation Process, p. vii. 22 J.L. Kuykendall. 1986. “The Municipal Police Detective: An Historical Analysis.” Criminology 24, no. 1

(February): 175–201. 23 G. Cordner. 2013. “Science Solves Crime: Myth or Reality.” In R.M. Bohm and J.T. Walker (eds),

Demystifying Crime and Criminal Justice, second edition. New York, NY: Oxford, pp. 157–165. 24 D.F. Cawley and H.J. Miron. 1977. Managing Patrol Operations: Manual. Washington, DC: U.S.

Government Printing Office. 25 J.W. Warren, M.L. Forst, and M.M. Estrella. 1979. “Directed Patrol: An Experiment That Worked.”

Police Chief (July): 48–49, 78. 26 G.Cordner. 1981. “The Effects of Directed Patrol: A Natural Quasi-Experiment in Pontiac.” In J.J. Fyfe

(ed.), Contemporary Issues in Law Enforcement. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, pp. 37–58. 27 L.W. Sherman and D. Weisburd. 1995. “General Deterrent Effects of Police Patrol in Crime ‘Hot Spots’:

A Randomized, Controlled Trial.” Justice Quarterly 12, no. 4 (December): 625–648. 28 E.F. McGarrell, S. Chermak, and A. Weiss. 1999. Targeting Firearms Violence through Directed Police

Patrol. Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, p. viii; see also D. Weisburd and A.A. Braga. 2006. “Hot Spots as a Model for Police Innovation.” In D. Weisburd and A.A. Braga (eds), Police Innovation: Contrasting Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 225–244.

29 A. Braga. 2008. Police Enforcement Strategies to Prevent Crime in Hot Spot Areas: Crime Prevention Research Review No. 2. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

30 G.Cordner. 1996. “Evaluating Tactical Patrol.” In L.T. Hoover (ed.), Quantifying Quality in Policing. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 185–206.

31 J.E. Boydstun. 1975. San Diego Field Interrogation: Final Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 32 J.Q. Wilson and B. Boland. 1979. The Effect of the Police on Crime. Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office.

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33 J.Q. Wilson and B. Boland. 1976. “Crime.” In W. Gorham and N. Glazer (eds), The Urban Predicament. Washington, DC: Urban Institute.

34 L.W. Sherman, J.W. Shaw, and D.P. Rogan. 1995. “The Kansas City Gun Experiment.” Research in Brief. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.

35 M.T. Farmer (ed.). 1981. Differential Police Response Strategies. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

36 M.F. Cahn and J.M. Tien. 1981. An Alternative Approach in Police Response: The Wilmington Management of Demand Program. Cambridge, MA: Public Systems Evaluation; J.T. McEwen, E.F. Connors III, and M.I. Cohen. 1986. Evaluation of the Differential Police Responses Field Test. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office; R.E. Worden. 1993. “Toward Equity and Efficiency in Law Enforcement: Differential Police Response.” American Journal of Police 12, no. 1: 1–32.

37 D.F. Cawley, H.J. Miron, W.J. Araujo, R. Wasserman, T.A. Mannello, and Y. Huffman. 1977. Managing Criminal Investigations: Manual. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

38 B. Greenberg, C.V. Elliott, L.P. Kraft, and H.S. Proctor. 1977. Felony Investigation Decision Model: An Analysis of Investigative Elements of Information. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

39 J.E. Eck. 1979. Managing Case Assignments: The Burglary Investigation Decision Model Replication. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

40 “The Baltimore County Repeat Offender Planning Project.” 1983. Towson, MD: Baltimore County Criminal Justice Coordinator.

41 S.E. Martin and L.W. Sherman. 1986. “Selective Apprehension: A Police Strategy for Repeat Offenders.” Criminology 24, no. 1 (February): 155–173.

42 A.F. Abrahamse, P.A. Ebener, P.W. Greenwood, and T.E. Kosin. 1991. “An Experimental Evaluation of the Phoenix Repeat Offender Program.” Justice Quarterly 8, no. 2: 141–168.

43 H. Goldstein. 1990. Problem-Oriented Policing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 44 J.E. Eck and W. Spelman. 1987. Problem-Solving: Problem-Oriented Policing in Newport News.

Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum. 45 G. Cordner. 1986. “Fear of Crime and the Police: An Evaluation of a Fear-Reduction Strategy.” Journal

of Police Science and Administration 14: 223–233; G. Cordner. 1988. “A Problem-Oriented Approach to Community-Oriented Policing.” In J. Greene and S. Mastrofski (eds), Community Policing: Rhetoric or Reality. New York, NY: Praeger, pp. 135–152.

46 See www.popcenter.org/about/?p=triangle. 47 Eck and Spelman. 1987. Problem-Solving. 48 J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling. 1982. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” Atlantic

Monthly (March): 29–38; J.Q. Wilson and G.L. Kelling. 1989. “Making Neighborhoods Safe.” Atlantic Monthly (February): 46–52.

49 H. Goldstein. 1987. “Toward Community-Oriented Policing: Potential, Basic Requirements and Threshold Questions.” Crime & Delinquency 33, no. 1: 6–30.

50 R. Sampson and M. Scott. 2000. Tackling Crime and Other Public-Safety Problems: Case Studies in Problem-Solving. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

51 B. Webster and E. Connors. 1993. “Police Methods for Identifying Community Problems.” American Journal of Police 12, no. 1: 75–102; M. Buerger. 1994. “The Problems of Problem Solving: Resistance, Interdependencies, and Conflicting Interests.” American Journal of Police 13, no. 3: 1–36; G.E. Capowich and J.A. Roehl. 1994. “Problem-Oriented Policing: Actions and Effectiveness in San Diego.” In D. Rosenbaum (ed.), The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 127–146; G. Cordner and E.P. Biebel. 2005. “Problem-Oriented Policing in Practice.” Criminology & Public Policy 4, no. 2: 155–180.

52 M. Scott. 2000. Problem-Oriented Policing: Reflections on the First 20 Years. Washington, DC: Office

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of Community Oriented Policing Services; see also W. Skogan and K. Frydl (eds). 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing: The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Research Council.

53 J.E. Boydstun and M.E. Sherry. 1975. San Diego Community Profile: Final Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

54 L. Sherman, C. Milton, and T. Kelly. 1973. Team Policing: Seven Case Studies. Washington, DC: Police Foundation; A. Schwartz and S. Clarren. 1977. The Cincinnati Team Policing Experiment: A Summary Report. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.

55 A.M. Pate, W. Skogan, M.A. Wycoff, and L.W. Sherman. 1985. Coordinated Community Policing: Executive Summary. Washington, DC: Police Foundation; M.A. Wycoff, W. Skogan, A.M. Pate, and L.W. Sherman. 1985. Police as Community Organizers: Executive Summary. Washington, DC: Police Foundation; K. Holloway, T. Bennett, and D.P. Farrington. 2008. Does Neighborhood Watch Reduce Crime? Crime Prevention Research Review No. 3. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services.

56 D.P. Rosenbaum. 1987. “The Theory and Research behind Neighborhood Watch: Is it a Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy?” Crime & Delinquency 33, no. 1 (January): 103–134.

57 R.V. Clarke (ed.). 1997. Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies, second edition. Guilderland, NY: Harrow and Heston.

58 N. Tilley (ed.). 2005. Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing.

59 The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. 1981. Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 60 R.C. Trojanowicz. 1982. An Evaluation of the Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program in Flint, Michigan. East

Lansing, MI: National Neighborhood Foot Patrol Center, Michigan State University. 61 Wilson and Kelling. 1982. “Broken Windows.” 62 A.J. Reiss Jr. 1985. “Shaping and Serving the Community: The Role of the Police Chief Executive.” In

William A. Geller (ed.), Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportunity. New York, NY: Praeger, p. 63.

63 The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. 1981. 64 M.A. Wycoff, W. Skogan, A. Pate, and L.W. Sherman. 1985. Citizen Contact Patrol: Executive Summary.

Washington, DC: Police Foundation. 65 R.B. Parks, S.D. Mastrofski, C. DeJong, and M.K. Gray. 1999. “How Officers Spend Their Time with

the Community.” Justice Quarterly 16, no. 3: 483–518; D. Brown and S. Iles. 1986. “Community Constables: A Study of a Policing Initiative.” NIJ International Summaries (October).

66 W.G. Skogan and S.M. Hartnett. 1997. Community Policing, Chicago Style. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; W.G. Skogan. 2006. Police and Community in Chicago: A Tale of Three Cities. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

67 G. Cordner. 1985. The Baltimore County Citizen Oriented Police Enforcement (COPE) Project: Final Evaluation. Baltimore, MD: Criminal Justice Department, University of Baltimore.

68 P.B. Taft, Jr. 1986. Fighting Fear: The Baltimore County COPE Project. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

69 M. Bard. 1973. Family Crisis Intervention: From Concept to Implementation. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

70 J. Meier. 1987. “Battered Justice.” Washington Monthly (May): 37–45. 71 L.W. Sherman and R.A. Berk. 1984. “The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment.” Police

Foundation Reports 1 (April): 1–8; L.W. Sherman. 1992. Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments and Dilemmas. New York, NY: Free Press.

72 J.D. Hirschel, I.W. Hutchison, C.W. Dean, and A.M. Mills. 1992. “Review Essay on the Law Enforcement Response to Spouse Abuse: Past, Present and Future.” Justice Quarterly 9, no. 2: 247–283.

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73 K. Bannerman. 2002. “Domestic Violence Intervention Project: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department.” In Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 2002 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum; see also R. Sampson. 2006. Domestic Violence, Program-Specific Guide No. 45. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Online at: http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2002/02-09(F).pdf.

74 See www.missingkids.com/ and www.missingkids.com/Amber. 75 J.E. Eck. 1999. “Drug Market Places: How They Form and How They Can Be Prevented.” In C.S.

Brito and T. Allan (eds), Problem-Oriented Policing: Crime-Specific Problems, Critical Issues, and Making POP Work, Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum, pp. 91–111; Vancouver Police Department and Grandview-Woodland Community Policing Centre. 2001. “Showdown at the Playground: A Community Confronts Drug and Disorder Problems in a Neighborhood Park.” Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: The 2000 Herman Goldstein Award Winners. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

76 A. Harocopos and M. Hough. 2005. Drug Dealing in Open Air Markets, Problem-Specific Guide No. 31. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Online at: www.popcenter.org/ problems/problem-drug_open_markets.htm; R. Sampson. 2001. Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes, Problem-Specific Guide No. 4. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Online at: www.popcenter.org/problems/problem-dealing-private.htm.

77 T. Narr, J. Toliver, J. Murphy, M. McFarland, and J. Ederheimer. 2006. Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.

78 See http://occupywallst.org/about/. 79 B. Yeung. 2011. “Police vs. OWS.” The Crime Report (November 30). Online at: www.thecrimereport.

org/archive/2011-12-police-vs-ows. 80 D.C. Couper. 2011. Arrested Development: A Veteran Police Chief Sounds Off about Protest, Racism,

Corruption and the Seven Steps Necessary to Improve Our Nation’s Police. Indianapolis, IN: Dog Ear Publishing, p. 181.

81 See the “Policing Strategies” section of the Crime Solutions website at www.crimesolutions.gov/ TopicDetails.aspx?ID=84. Also see G. Cordner. 2012. “Police Effectiveness.” In R. Rosenfeld (ed.), Oxford Bibliographies Online: Criminology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Online at: www. oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396607/obo-9780195396607-0048.xml.

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