Question Attached

How the Chickasaws Saved the Cumberland Settlement in the 1790s

Author(s): Wendy St. Jean

Source: Tennessee Historical Quarterly , SPRING 2009, Vol. 68, No. 1 (SPRING 2009), pp. 2-19

Published by: Tennessee Historical Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42628109

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Historian asserted Settlement James that (todays the Henry Cumberland Nashville) Malone asserted that the Cumberland

Settlement (todays Nashville)

"would have been entirely destroyed and the

pioneers murdered and scalped, but for the

restraining influence of the small Chickasaw

nation." The Chickasaws proved themselves

to be good friends and allies of the Tennessee

settlers and contributed much to the safety

and survival of the settlement. In their oppo-

sition to the hostile Creek nation, they ulti-

mately helped to pacify the frontier and

assure security for Americans in the tumul-

tuous and formative period of early nine-

teenth United States frontier history. But why

was the Chickasaw nation, which numbered

only 800 warriors and about 2,000 people

altogether, so important to the early settlers of

Tennessee? According to the U.S agent to the

Chickasaws, General James Robertson, Creek

raids on the early Tennessee settlement abated

when the Creeks became preoccupied with

the hostile Chickasaws. In 1795 the governor

of the Southwest Territory, William Blount

praised the Chickasaws in even grander terms: "What do the United States not owe

to the Chickasaws?" Here he noted their suc-

cessful challenge to an emergent anti-

American Southern Indian Confederacy

headed by Creeks.1

The Chickasaws were the smallest but

also the most cohesive of the agricultural

societies that pre-dated Tennesseans settle-

ment. They were an agricultural people and

had been since about 700 A.D. when maize

cultivation thrived in the Southeast. Like

other Indians in this region, including the

Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks, the

Chickasaws developed a system of beliefs

oriented around the yearly cycle of the

crops, with deities such as the Sun, Moon,

and the Corn Mother. They also developed

an elaborate social system based on hierar-

chical rank, clan membership, and descent

through the female line.2 Although they shared cultural characteristics with the

Creeks, Cherokees, and Choctaws, the

Chickasaws developed an independent strat-

egy for surviving Euro-American expansion

into their lands in northern Mississippi and

western Tennessee. In direct opposition to

the Creeks effort to unite the Southern

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"What do the United States not owe the Chickasaws?" The small nation's location and

competition with the more numerous Creeks led the Chickasaws to be allies of the early

Tennessee settlers. (From The Southern Frontier 1670-1732 , 1929)

Indians into a military alliance funded by

Spain, the Chickasaws chose accommoda-

tion as the best strategy for dealing with the

U.S. and Tennessee governments.

Governor Manuel Lemos de Gayoso of

Spanish Louisiana observed that the

Chickasaws refused to join the Indian

Confederacy, "for the sake of showing that

they are a people by themselves."3

Membership in the Southern Confederacy

would have subjected them to the will of

the Creeks and put them on the warpath

against their best prospective trading part-

ners. On their own, Chickasaw leaders

steered a course that maximized their mili-

tary and diplomatic strength while fostering

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economic ties to the developing Cumberland region. American settlers in Tennessee on the Cumberland River were

well situated for trade and offered the

Chickasaws "What Supplies of Ammunition

they May Want" to hunt game and ward off

enemies.4

Judging that the U.S. was a stronger

party than the Creeks and other Indian mili-

tants combined, the Chickasaws established

friendships with their white neighbors, espe-

cially their agent Robertson. The Chickasaws

viewed the Creeks as foolhardy for depend-

ing exclusively on the ill-supplied Spanish

whose support was limited, and whose fear

of direct confrontation with Americans was

obvious.5 Whereas the Creeks' numerical

superiority to the Chickasaws and their

white neighbors gave them a false sense of

their might, the Chickasaws never believed

that they could resist U.S. armies and Tennessee frontiersmen.

The Chickasaws would not pick a battle

with the American Republic that they were

sure to lose. They knew it was futile to obstruct the westward movement of

American settlers. Chickasaw war chief

Piomingo pointed out the southern Indians'

relative weakness before Tennessee militias

and the US army, stating in a speech to the

Creeks: "If you had any prospect of Kiling

and Driving the white people back to where

they come from it mite have answered a

Good End enough . . . but you had no

prospect of any such hopes."6 He criticized

the Creeks for "Railing at me ... for Trying

to live in peace [with the Americans] and

save my land; as we are but few the Only

method we could take to secure it."7

The roots of Chickasaw-Creek animos-

ity ran deep, but the Chickasaws' conflict

with Kentucky frontiersmen during the

American Revolution gave no indication

that they would prove fast friends to

Tennesseans. In 1781, the Chickasaws

drove American settlers from Fort Jefferson.

At the war's end, they explained that they

had not cared about the British-American

quarrel, except to the extent that they

meant to protect their hunting grounds.

Now, as Americans flooded into Tennessee

and Kentucky, the Chickasaws faced a more

formidable foe than any Indian or Euro-

American army of the past. American fron-

tiersmen clamored for their lands, backed

by state governments run by land specula-

tors. Desirous to reestablish peace and

trade, the Chickasaws negotiated separate

treaties with Virginia in 1783, Spain in 1784, and the United States in 1786.

The Creeks were outraged when a

Chickasaw delegation signed the Hopewell

Treaty (1786) with the U.S. government. Known to his American friends as

Mountain Leader, the Chickasaw chief used

his honorific title "Piomingo" (also spelled

Opoia Minko) when he engaged in formal

negotiations at Hopewell. Most likely,

"Piomingo" was derived from "minko"

(chief) and "hopayi" (medicine man). To

the Chickasaws, religion and warfare were

inseparable categories. War chiefs were

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Chickasaw Chief Piomingo desired peace

and trade with the new United States,

especially Tennessee. His friendship with,

and defense of, the Cumberland Settlement

helped lead to the Creek-Chickasaw War

of 1795-1796. "(Piomingo statue in Fair

Park, Tupelo, Miss.)

expected to enjoy divine favor and to have

dreams and premonitions that foretold the

outcome of battles/ Having spent part of

his youth among the Cherokees, Piomingo

was fluent in Cherokee and counted several

Cherokee leaders among his friends. His

Cherokee affiliation probably accounts for

his nickname Mountain Leader, for

Americans referred to the Cherokees, who

lived among the Blue Ridge Mountains, as the "Mountain Indians."9

At Hopewell, the Chickasaws relin-

quished an area five miles in diameter on

the Tennessee River in exchange for annu-

ities and a trading post. This was a major

commitment in support of the Americans

and the Tennessee settlers. When the

Cherokees and Creeks protested that the

Chickasaws had ceded common hunting

grounds, Piomingo dismissed their claims.

Alexander McGillivray, the Creeks' leading

war chief, determined to prevent Americans

from gaining a foothold in the southeastern

interior. He warned the Chickasaws "to

take care & not be duped by their promis-

es."10 Spanish Governor Gayoso attributed

the Chickasaw-Creek dispute to "the inti-

macy of a great part of the [Chickasaw] Nation with the Americans."11 Merchant

William Panton, who worked for the

Spanish, expected the Chickasaws to cave

into Creek demands that they break off relations with U.S. and Cumberland offi-

cials. If the Chickasaws stood by the

Americans, he wrote, they would "be cut to

pieces in one month" by the Creeks and

"become a lost people."12

Most Chickasaws wanted to avoid war

with the Creeks, if only because, with a

population of more than 20,000 people,

the Creeks greatly outnumbered them. In

1787, the Chickasaws persuaded Governor

George Mathews of North Carolina to

insert "a clause" in his treaty with the

Creeks "that they should forebear to com-

mit hostilities on us as we are too weak to

do anything of consequence against the

Creeks."13 However, Chief McGillivray and

his confederates, the "Creeks, Cherokees,

& a small tribe of the Delawares then liv-

ing on the Tennessee River" ignored the

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Chickasaws' peace overtures and sent war

parties to harass them. In addition,

McGillivray's warriors ambushed nearly

every American trader, messenger, and

packhorseman that tried to enter the

Chickasaws' towns. McGillivray said the

deaths would serve as a warning to the

Chickasaws not to "concert with any people

against us."14 After Creek warriors attacked

Major John Doughty of Tennessee's party

and stole the supplies intended for the

Chickasaws, Doughty survived the raid and

wrote an account of the Chickasaws' situa-

tion. The Chickasaws sided with the

Americans because they needed ammuni- tion to stave off their common enemies.

"Pressed as the Chicasaws & Choctaws are

by the Kickapoos & Wabash Indians on one side & the Creeks on the other,"

Doughty observed, "it is in their Interest &

Wish to be connected with us."15

Chief McGillivray threatened to kill

"the friends of the Americans among the

Chickasaws" if they engaged in trade with

U.S. settlers.16 Because Piomingo had per-

sonally promised to protect the trading

route to his country, the Natchez Path,

"from the plundering [Creek] parties,"

McGillivray targeted him for assassination.17

Although McGillivray failed to wipe out

Piomingo, his war parties killed Piomingo's

closest relatives.18 McGillivray claimed that

"the Chickesaw Nation are Content (what-

ever pio Mingo Can Say to the Contrary) to

put up with the loss of that Chiefs Brother

&C Son as having fallen in Bad Company."19

Piomingo was anything but content, for

the spirits of his beloved relatives demanded

blood revenge. Still, without provisions and

war supplies, he was too weak to avenge the

white traders and Chickasaw escorts who

McGillivray had killed. He journeyed to

Virginia, Tennessee, and New York to drum

up American military support for an anti-

Creek campaign. Wherever he went, gover-

nors welcomed him and gave him arms to

use in his Creek campaign.20

In 1792, while Piomingo and other chiefs met with Tennessee officials, Creek

warriors stole their horses, and their head-

men refused to restore them. One Spanish

informant thought war imminent, remark-

ing that "the death of Piomingo's Nephew

for which he has long breathed Vengeance

will now be urged again to involve them in

a War."21 Indeed, Piomingo brushed aside

Spanish efforts to reconcile the Chickasaws

and Creeks, stating the Creeks "kill all the

white traders in the nation and pillage any-

thing they can lay their hands on. . . we are

going to take revenge."22

Creek assaults on the Chickasaws were

indiscriminate, and soon the Creeks killed

the nephew of another Chickasaw chief,

the Spanish partisan Wolf's Friend, better

known to Cumberland settlers as the

Ugly Cub (a play on his Indian name

Ugulayacabe). The Spanish commissary

reported, "He weeps continually," and now

demanded "complete revenge to which effect he has sent to the Choctaws three red

knives . . . asking them to declare war also

on the Creeks."23 To the Chickasaws like

Piomingo and Ugulayacabe, who had lost

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near relations, the Creeks posed a more

immediate threat than American expansion.

Individual Chickasaws had their own rea-

sons for war, which included blood

vengeance and personal quarrels with the

Creeks over access to trade, land cessions,

hunting grounds, horse theft, and the cus-

tody of runaway slaves.

Without the prospect of American and

Choctaw aid, the Chickasaws could not

have retaliated for Creek injuries. Strengthened by their supposed influence

over the Choctaws, who numbered over

twelve thousand persons, the Chickasaws

garnered diplomatic leverage from their

association with the larger tribe.24 Several

Choctaws became Piomingos followers in order to share in his access to American

bounty. A war faction of Choctaws was

reportedly loyal to Piomingo, who

"instructs them in everything that happens

in the Nation."25 A much larger nation, the

Choctaws preferred neutrality to the

Chickasaws open defiance of the anti- American Creeks. However, the Choctaws

had common interest with them in this war.

As the Chickasaws maintained, the Creeks

kept them poor and would "give nobody

any peace in this Contry."26 Baron Francisco

Luis Hector De Carondelet XV, Governor

of Spanish Louisiana, feared that the

Chickasaws would "always draw along the

Choctaws with it."27 His spy and commis-

sary to the Chickasaws and Choctaws, Don

Juan de la Villebreuve, maintained that the

Choctaws were likely to get "mixed up in it"

if Choctaws married to Chickasaw women

were killed.28 In fact, Choctaw chief

Franchimastabe warned Spanish officials

that he was obligated by marriage ties to

assist the Chickasaws.29

The Choctaws never actually sent any

warriors to assist the Chickasaws, who pre-

sumably exaggerated the strength of the

Chickasaw-Choctaw military alliance. In

the resource-dwindling Mississippi Valley,

the Chickasaws and Choctaws regarded

each other alternatively as friends and as

economic rivals.- In one instance, a party of

Chickasaw warriors asked the Spanish not

to permit the Choctaws to trade at their new

post, stating that when "the Choctaws

learned that there was here a trading post

they would run to it and establish their

hunting grounds in this vicinity to their

great prejudice which might be the ruin of

their nation."30 The Chickasaws were deter-

mined to promote their distinct interests as

they perceived them.

The Chickasaw nation as a whole did

not support a Creek war until the Creeks

challenged them with an atrocity. Governor

Blount gave this account of the 1793 out- break of intertribal warfare: "Four

Chickasaws were in the hunting grounds

fifteen miles from the towns where a party

of Creeks fired on them, and killed one,

besides scalping him as is usual they were

much hacked and mangled his body, and

threw it into a pond. The Chickasaws

immediately called a national council and .

. . unanimously determined to make war

against the Creeks." Piomingo stirred up

his people at the Creeks' insult, relating,

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" [The Creeks] have made very light of us .

. . saying that [as] we were but a handfull of

people, they could lay us desolate in a little

time." Such contempt demanded a nation-

al response. The Chickasaws fortified their

towns and prepared for the worst.

The Chickasaws took a calculated risk.

They would not be bullied by Creek harass-

ment so long as they had powerful Indian

and white allies. Instead of backing down to

Creek threats, Chickasaw warriors looked to

Americans, their cannons and their rifles, to

strengthen the Chickasaws' position relative

to the Creeks. The Spanish orchestrated an

uneasy truce between the Creeks and the

Chickasaws. As Governor Blount reported,

"The Creek and Chickasaw war does not go

on with the ferocity and spirit that might be

expected, owing it is said to Mr. [William]

Panton having informed the Creeks, that if

red people went to war with each other that

he would withhold all supplies of arms and

ammunition."31 Governor Carondelet

feared that a Creek warrior would mistaken-

ly kill a Choctaw, and thereby ignite a mas-

sive Choctaw-Chickasaw-Creek war, and

perhaps draw Spaniards and Americans into

the field. The Chickasaws were content to

wait until they had stronger assurances of

American intervention in a full-scale war

against the Creeks.32

To help the Chickasaw take care of Creek militants in 1 792, General Anthony Wayne sent

the Chickasaws 500 stands of arms and 10,000 pounds of lead, powder, and flint.

(Library of Congress)

In building a Chickasaw-American alliance, the Chickasaws made the most of

Americans fears of a pan-Indian confeder-

ation by reminding Americans that if their

concerns were ignored, they would join with the militant Indians of the Northwest

and Southeast. The U.S. agent to the south-

ern tribes, Joseph Martin, observed in 1788

that the Chickasaws were restive and need-

ed attention: "I am not doubtful [that] the

Chickasaws will be in the same unfriendly

disposition [as northern and southern con-

federates] shortly if neglected." Indeed,

Piomingo warned the U.S. that without

"supplies, the Chicasaws & Choctaws may

be over-run & forced to join the Creeks."33

To underline their opposition to militant

Indian resisters, the Chickasaws sent warriors

to fight against the Indians in Northwest

Ohio. Piomingo and other war chiefs

brought warriors to aid Arthur St. Clair, but

they arrived too late to help the defeated

General. President George Washington read

the Chickasaws' easy recruitment as a sign of

their "constancy" and "devotion;" in reality,

the federal government expended a large

sum of money for the Chickasaws' minimal

participation. As one observer noted, "The

English and American Commissaries have

spoiled the Indians by giving presents in

great profusion, without which they do not

respond. The most rhetorical and beautiful

talks scarcely cause any attention unless

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adorned with red and blue Blankets. They

promise much and do nothing."34 From the

Chickasaws' perspective, with a Creek war

threatening, they could not afford to send

many warriors out of their country for an

extended length of time.

While the service of the Chickasaws to

the United States was somewhat limited, on

the Tennessee borderland the Chickasaws

promised a more active role. Thrilled to

have the Chickasaws taking care of Creek militants in the south while he defeated the

Miamis in the north, General Anthony

Wayne sent the Chickasaws "500 stand of

arms, 4000 pounds led, 2000 pounds pow-

der, 4000 flint, 50 pounds vermillion, 100

gallons whiskey, 100 bushels salt, 1500 bushels corn, armourer and tools." In addi-

tion, President Washington sent three thou-

sand pounds of ammunition, as well as

rapid-firing "swivels" and long rifles to

Piomingo. McGillivray reported that after

the American guns and powder arrived,

Piomingo "ruled the roost" and command-

ed the support of nearly all the Chickasaw

towns and some of the Choctaws.35

Because President Washington saw the

Chickasaws as key to preventing the success

of a broad pan-Indian alliance, he tried to

guarantee their current boundaries and

promised to compensate for future land

cessions. After sending military supplies,

Washington courted Chickasaw leaders at

the capitol in 1794 and gave his assurances

that he would safeguard the Chickasaw

homeland. Ostensibly to reward the

Chickasaws for their military assistance

against the Indians of the Northwest,

Washington hosted a party of Chickasaw

war chiefs in Philadelphia. Following the

peace pipe ceremony and presentation of

gifts, Washington presented the Chickasaw

delegates with a charter that guaranteed

their title to their homeland and remaining

hunting grounds. According to Vice President John Adams, who was at this

meeting, Washington promised that Americans "would never bother within

these boundaries."36 Although well-intend-

ed, Washington could not back his prom-

ise, which later politicians claimed was made "under duress" because the U.S.

feared a united southern and northern

Indian confederacy. The pressure on the United States at the time was the rationale

of Washington supporters for why the

treaty was not binding.

At the same 1794 meeting, Washington

led the Chickasaws to expect U.S. military

aid against the Creeks. As he did at

Hopewell, the president guaranteed the

Chickasaws "protection" and reaffirmed

Americans' intention to "erect a post at the

Creeks crossing place on the Tenasee. . . for

the purpose of Indian Trade and defense."

Then the president appointed Chickasaw

war chief William Colbert a major and

enjoined him to kill the Indian enemies of

the U.S. From this point on, Major Colbert

became an aggressor in the Chickasaw- Creek conflict.

The Chickasaw-Creek animosity sealed

the Chickasaws' alliance with Cumberland

settlers. During the 1780s and the early

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friendship. Knox sent silver peace medals,

"rich uniform clothes," rifles, and other gifts

for Piomingo and the brothers William and

George Colbert in recognition of their serv-

ice in St. Clair's failed expedition against the

northern Indian confederacy.38

When at the Conference of Nashville

in 1792, Governor Blount met with some

five hundred representatives of the Chickasaws, and a lesser number of

Choctaws, he reaffirmed the Tennesseans'

peace with both nations. Brigadier General

Andrew Pickens vowed, "We will always

look upon it that your enemies are our ene-

mies and ours yours." To the Chickasaws,

the importance of the meeting was the for-

mation of a Tennessee-U.S. -Chickasaw

military alliance against the Creek

Confederacy. For his part, Piomingo

pledged to protect the Cumberland emi-

grants "from the plundering [Creek] par-

ties."39 Blount appreciated the fact that the

Chickasaws "were the nearest neighbors of

the Cumberland people," and a useful

source of intelligence. He fostered their

alliance through personal relationships with Chickasaw war chiefs and traders.

They were always welcome at his home.

Although the Chickasaws counted on

Tennessee military assistance, Blount never

secured the Chickasaws' complete trust. In

a speech to the Spanish governor following

the Conference of Nashville, Piomingo

reported that Blount was a "thief, that the

governor has been putting things in his own barns that were intended for the red

men."40 Chickasaw chief Wolf s Friend, the

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1790s militant Cherokees (the breakaway

Chickamaugans), Creeks, and Shawnees,

supported by Spain, relentlessly attacked

the Nashville settlements. Endangering the

lives of his constituents, Governor Blount

made no secret of his death wish for all

Creeks. He wrote in 1792: "The Creeks

must be scourged and well too and the Cherokees deserve it." He added that it

would give the inhabitants of Tennessee "a

party of pleasure" to "totally destroy both

nations." In 1794 he wrote another fiery

letter, arguing that the Chickasaws and

Choctaws would "readily aid the Arms of

the United States in chastising and hum-

bling this bloodthirsty nation," the Creeks.

Tennesseans gave the Chickasaws sever-

al indications of their friendship and the

importance of preserving their alliance.

According to Robertson, the Chickasaws were attached to Tennesseans because he

always supplied them with corn and other

provisions. Robertson commended Blount

for his skill in Indian diplomacy, reporting

that the Chickasaws praised the governors

hospitality, for he gave them "10 beaves a

day and what Rum they wanted and tobac-

co to smoak after they get home."37 But the

Chickasaws were not blind to the

Tennesseans' machinations. If Blount had

had his way, he would have immediately

grabbed the Chickasaws' lands and turned

them over to land speculation companies. In

1791 Secretary of War Henry Knox curbed

his ambition, instructing Blount not to demand more lands from the Chickasaws

and to use U.S. largesse to reaffirm their

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Spanish partisan, related that Blount had

stared at him with "evil eyes" when he

refused the former's request to establish a

trading post on Chickasaw lands.41

In 1793, when Chickasaw war parties killed a few Creeks near the Cumberland

settlements, a full-blown Chickasaw-Creek

war seemed eminent. At that time Piomingo

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of friendship by all ranks of citizens," the

Knoxville Gazette reported.44 On July 4,

1795, Cumberland officials toasted

"Opiomingo and our gallant sans cullo te allies of the Chickasaw and Choctaw

nations/'45 Only occasionally did Americans

mistake individual Chickasaws for enemies

and these isolated incidents were deeply

regretted. For example, in 1793, after a band of white horse thieves killed a

Chickasaw named John Morris, Governor

Blount buried him with military honors,

and his funeral was well-attended by "sor-

rowful" whites.46

The second phase of the Creek-

Chickasaw War of 1795-179 6 began just months after the Chickasaws' return from

Philadelphia in 1794, when Blount purport-

edly re-ignited the Chickasaw-Creek war by

secretly offering Chickasaws American dol-

lars for Creek scalps. He met a receptive

audience, for Chickasaw warriors were dis-

gruntled at the Creeks for stealing their hors-

es on their passage home.47 In addition to

financial incentives, General Robertson

assured the Chickasaws that Congress would

"order an army in the course of the ensuing

Spring or summer sufficient to humble if not

destroy the Creek Nation." Secretary of War

Timothy Pickering observed that the expec-

tation of U.S. military aid "presented a

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James Robertson claimed the Chickasaws were attached to Tennesseans because he sup-

plied them with corn and other provisions. He also sent them swivel guns and militiamen

to operate the artillery. (Tennessee State Museum)

boasted that he would "call in the Americans

from the Cumberland settlement to help

them."42 General Robertson sent militiamen

and another swivel. Robertson himself

helped the Chickasaws operate the artillery.

Again, the Spanish were shocked to see the

powerful weapons that Americans placed in

Chickasaw hands. Governor Carondelet

protested, stating that the swivel was "an

arm too dangerous in the hands of Indians,"

the use of which should be concealed.

Robertson responded that he may have been

foolhardy, but "that step was merely the

effect of an effusion of friendship for them

in consequence of their faithful adherence to

our interest."43

Although Chickasaw-Creek hostilities

were contained to only a handful of casual-

ties, the Chickasaws enjoyed great marks of

favor for their antagonism toward the

Creeks. That antagonism provided some

security to the^ Tennesseans. Cumberland

settlers treated the Chickasaws with honors

when they traveled through their communi-

ties. When a party of Chickasaw chiefs

passed through Winchester, Tennessee, in

the summer of 1794, they were met by the

towns cavalry and infantry and paraded to a

tavern, "followed by a numerous train of cit-

izens." After a light lunch, Piomingo and

the others, accompanied by the Winchester

infantry and cavalry, proceeded on their

journey. They "were treated with every mark

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prospect so gratifying to them [the Chickasaws] as Warriors and the inveterate

enemies of the Creeks" that they could hard-

ly resist instigating a war. This false hope as

well as Blount's other "indirect encourage-

ments" led Major William Colbert and his Chickasaw warriors to attack Creeks. In

1795, when Major Colberts war party killed

five Creeks, who were allegedly on their way

to kill Cumberland settlers, Blount described

Colberts act as "the proofs the Chickasaws

give of their love for the people of the United

States." The Knoxville Gazette described

Colbert and his warriors' procession into Nashville:

They said they were the people of the

US, bearing commissions from the President himself and therefore felt

themselves bound to retaliate his ene-

mies. They were received with great

applause by the people of Nashville,

who gave a public entertainment in

their honor, escorting them from General Robertson's house with a com-

pany of cavalry in uniform. On their

part, the Chickasaws held a war dance

that night around the scalps of their Creek victims.48

To Colbert's request for aid, Blount sent

guns and about fifiy volunteers for the

Chickasaws' defense, who remained until the

Creeks abandoned their siege of the Chickasaws in about a month's time.49

With the help of the Tennessee militia,

the Chickasaws repelled a massive Creek

attack, killed twenty-six invaders, and took

all their baggage. In addition to militia-

men, Robertson turned the Chickasaw

nation into a formidable stronghold with

the most advanced weaponry of the time.

Captain John Gordon diverted (presum-

ably at Robertson's request) to the

Chickasaws heavy equipment, among

which were six howitzers, powder and ball,

sent by Henry Knox, and intended for Mero District 's defense.

With war in full swing, Piomingo

begged the U.S. government for help: "If

you think anything of your Brothers you

will send one or two hundred of your war-

riors and help your Brothers hold their

Land. I expect they will come [again]." He

promised that he would warn the Spaniards in West Florida not to "interrupt

anything that comes."50 When Colbert learned that the United States would not

back a Chickasaw-Creek war, he was

enraged and insisted on meeting with the

president himself. Pickering reported, "I

found Major Colbert singularly difficult to

please perhaps because the president could

not gratify his wishes in making open war

against the Creeks." In addition to clothing

Colbert and his companions and their fam-

ilies, and supplying the Chickasaws with

provisions, Pickering gave Colbert "$400

to buy an elegant Stallion but he seemed to

consider the sum as hardly proficient ... it

was not easy tip please him."51 Even

Washington had a difficult time placating the chief. Here was a headman who was

sure of his importance.

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After making peace with the Creeks, Piomingo wrote southern Indian agent Benjamin

Hawkins for blacksmiths, iron plows, and spinning looms to enable the Chicksaws to pros-

per as planters. (Benjamin Hawkins and the Creek Indians, ca. 1 805, Greenville County

Museum of Art, gift of the Museum Association, Inc.)

The Creeks were loath to send an army

against the Chickasaws because they

believed that that the nation was "supported

by the US," and they were in the process of

negotiating a peace treaty with President

Washington. The Creeks protested the

Tennessee militias engagement in a "red

mans war," to use their expression, fearing

trouble, should Creek warriors injure or kill

a U.S. citizen.52

The Creeks now wanted peace with the

United States. General Wayne had defeated

the powerful Northern Indian Confederacy,

and the United States could now turn their

full attention and their guns against the

Creeks. They saw that Spain was unwilling

to commit its national resources to a war

against Americans. Spanish governors backed off whenever conflict with Americans

seemed imminent.53 The Creek-Chickasaw

war never exploded into the large conflict

that Indian haters, like Blount in Tennessee,

desired. Nevertheless, the Chickasaws played

a crucial role in Middle Tennessee's survival.

Not only did they warn local officials of

impending Creek raids, they patrolled the

borders and frustrated the formation of a

full-fledged Southern Indian Confederacy.

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Although they feared U.S. expansion, the

Chickasaws rejected pan-Indian military

resistance against the white settlers on the

Cumberland River. Instead of resisting

Americans, Piomingo and his followers befriended them. An "astute observer,"

Piomingo perceived Americans' growing

power and took full advantage of them. For a

time, he made himself the most powerful

chief in the southeast by virtue of the how-

itzers, swivels, and stands of muskets at his dis-

posal. Piomingos amicable relations with

Americans brought him the military assistance

and manufactured goods on which his influ-

ence rested.54 After making peace with the

Creeks, he retired from war and prepared to

live out his life as a prosperous planter. He had

his daughter educated in reading and writing

and asked southern Indian agent Benjamin

Hawkins for blacksmiths, iron plows, and

spinning looms to enable the Chickasaws to

prosper as planters.55 It is likely that Piomingo

died around 1796, for he disappeared from

the historical record after that date.

Henceforth Major William Colbert became

the Chickasaws official "Piomingo," although

Tennesseans preferred to call him "Billie," per-

haps, because in their view, there was only one

Piomingo, the great man who had protected

the frontier settlers from Creek raids.56

The Chickasaws might have combined

with larger tribes against American settlers,

but the price would have been high and victo-

ry unlikely.57 They would have found them-

selves in the unenviable position of the Cherokees, who blamed the Creeks for their

dangerous predicament. As they awaited an

invading force of Kentucky militiamen,

Cherokee headman Little Turkey wrote to a

Creek chief, "It is chiefly your peoples doings

that brings so much trouble on us; the eyes of

all white and red people are looking both on

your nation as well as ours, for our doings."58

The Chickasaws defended the Tennesseans

against Creek war parties because they desired

manufactured goods and autonomy from

Creek leaders, such as the autocratic

McGillivray. The Chickasaws' Tennessee

alliance helped them to safeguard their lands

and independence, and enlarged Piomingos

power base. It also provided support and pro-

tection to Tennessee settlers and helped assure

the settlement of the area by Americans.

In 1798 Americans formed the

Mississippi Territory after Spain ceded its

claims to the disputed region, and thousands

of eastern settlers passed through Chickasaw

lands en route to now American Natchez,

Mississippl. Again, a Chickasaw chief took

the lead in urging peaceful relations with

Americans. In 1804, George Colbert, broth-

er to Major Colbert, censured sporadic

Creek violence against American travelers,

asserting, "The road to Cumberland was

freely granted to the United States, and it

should remain a clear and white path."59 Colbert and other Chickasaws made the best

of the Americans' westward immigration by

setting up stores and accommodations along

the Natchez Trace. The Chickasaws built

accommodations for travelers along the

Natchez Trace and engaged in a flourishing

frontier barter system with American settlers

in Mississippl.60

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Never forgetting their ancient enemies,

in 1813 the Chickasaws later joined

Andrew Jackson in destroying the militant

Creek "Red Stick" faction that revived

attacks on frontier settlements. However,

that story of alliance, war, and the ultimate

American reward of the Chickasaws must

wait for another day.

The author acknowledges the support of a Jesse

Wills Memorial Research Fellowship from the Tennessee Historical Society and the assistance of

the Tennessee State Library and Archives staff in the research for this article.

1 . James Henry Malone, The Chickasaw Nation y a Short Sketch of a Noble People... (Louisville, 1922), 337.

2. David LaVere, Contrary Neighbors: Southern

Plains and Removed Indians in Indian Territory (Norman, Okla., 2000), 8-9.

3. Gayoso to Ougoulayacabe, 14 March 1795,

in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., "Papers

from the Spanish Archives," East Tennessee Historical

Society Publications [ETHSP] 44 (1972): 110. 4. Forbes to Carondelet, 1 November 1792, in

D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds., "Papers

from the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 28 (1956): 132; Miró to Favrot, 6 July 1786, in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds. (hereafter Corbitt and

Corbitt), "Papers from the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 10 (1938): 141.

5. Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things:

Property. ; Power ; and the Transformation of the Creek

Indians , 1733-1816 (Cambridge, 1999).

6. Ougoulayacabe to Gayoso, 1 1 June 1794, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP AO (1968): 101. 7. Ibid.

8. James Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid

People: The Chickasaw Indians to Removal (Tuscaloosa, 2003), 125. Atkinson notes that

Piomingo was "a postjuvenile title signifying that an

individual had become recognized as an exceptional war leader."

9. Bloodyfellow to Carondelet, February 1793,

ETHSP 29: 156; Atkinson, Splendid Landy Splendid

People y 126.

10. Miró to Cruzat, 5 March 1786, Spain in the

Mississippi Valley 2:170; McGillivray to O'Neill, 28

March 1786, in John Walton Caughey, McGillivray

of the Creeks (Norman, Okla., 1938), 106.

11. Gayoso to Carondelet, 8 January 1795, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP M (1970): 103.

12. William Panton to Carondelet, 2 January

1783, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from

the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 23 (1951): 201.

13. M. Thomas Hatley, The Dividing Paths:

Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of

Revolution (New York, 1995), 53; James Robertson to

Governor George Mathews, 3 October 1787, in Southeastern Native American Documents , 1730-1842 ,

Doc. TCC289. Digital Library of Georgia Database.

14. McGillivray to Miró 24 June 1789, in

Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 238-40.

15. Ed. Colton Storm, "Up the Tennessee in

1790: The Report of Major John Doughty to the

Secretary of War," ETHSP 17 (1945): 125.

16. McGillivray to O'Neill, 12 May 1786, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives, n ETHSP 10 (1938): 138; McGillivray to Miró,, Dec. 1787, in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta

Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish Archives,"

ETHSP 12 (1940): 115; Kentucky Gazette , 18 August 1787, 15-16.

17. Pennsylvania Packet, 27 October 1785 from

Draper Manuscript 3JJ. Harvard Library Microfilm.

18. Talks of the King, Chiefs, and Warriors of

the Chickasaw Nation to the Governor of Georgia,

[1786?], Southeastern Native American Documents ,

1730-1742, Doc. TCC223. Digital Library of Georgia.

19. McGillivray to Panton, 10 August 1789, in

Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 245-9.

20. McGillivray to Miró, 24 June 1789, ibid., 238-40.

21. John Forbes, 1792, in Corbitt and Corbitt,

eds., "Papers from the Spanish Archives," 132.

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22. Piomingo and Others to Carondelet, 11

February 1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds.,

"Papers from the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 29 (1957): 154.

23.Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 28 April 1793,

in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the

Spanish Archives," ETHSP 32 (1960): 79; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 18 April 1793, ibid., 75.

24. Daniel Usner, American Indians in the Lower

Mississippi Valley (Lincoln, Neb., 2004), Usner s pop-

ulation estimates for 1775: Choctaws 13,400;

Chickasaws 2,300, and Upper Creeks 9,200. Usner

does not include Lower Creeks in his figures.

25. Greg O'Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary

Age (Lincoln, Neb., 2005), xvi; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 4 April 1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt,

eds., "Papers from the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 30 (1958): 107.

26. Taskihatoka and Others to Villebeuvre, 10

March 1793, ETHSP 30 (1958): 97-98.

27. Carondelet to Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, 18 December 1792.

28. Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 16 January

1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from

the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 29 (1957): 145; Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 4 February 1793, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP 29 (1957): 148.

29. O'Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, 94.

30. Gayoso to Carondelet on Negotiations with Chickasaws (no date), Draper 32, George

Roger Clark Papers, no. 15: 159-175.

31. Blount to Knox, 23 May 1793, in Carter,

ed. , Territorial Papers 4:260.

32. Carondelet to Gayoso, 5 March 1793, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP 31 (1959): 65.

33. Blount to Andrew Pickens, 1 August 1793,

in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers 4: 292.

34. Villebeuvre to Gayoso, 5 February 1793, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP 29 (1957): 149.

35. McGillivray to Panton, 28 November 1792,

in Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks , 348.

36. Thomas Edwin Matthew, General James

Robertson: Father of Tennessee (Nashville, 1934), 47-49.

37. Robertson to Blount, 12 October 1792, in

Carter, ed., Territorial Papers 4: 198.

38. Atkinson, Splendid Land ' Splendid People , 155.

39. See also Piomingo to Creek Agent James

Seagrove, 1 September 1793, in Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish Archives,"

ETHSP 35 (1963): 90; Robertson to Sevier, 1

August 1787, Creek Letters, 1: 157.

40. Villebeuvre to Carondelet, 16 January 1793, in D.C. Corbitt and Roberta Corbitt, eds.,

"Papers from the Spanish Archives," ETHSP 29 (1957): 145-

41. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People , 150.

42. Carondelet to Casas, 9 March 1793, in

Corbitt and Corbitt, eds., "Papers from the Spanish

Archives," ETHSP 31 (1959): 67.

43. Albigence W. Putnam, History of Middle

Tennessee: Life and Times of General James Robertson

(Nashville, 1859), 439-440.

44. Knoxville Gazette , 31 July 1794, no. 17,

vol. 3. American Antiquarian Society.

45. Knoxville Gazette , 17 July 1795, no. 140,

vol. 4. American Antiquarian Society.

46. Blount to the Secretary of War, 28 May

1793, in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers, 4: 262.

47. McDonald to White, 28 December 1794,

Spain in the Mississippi Valley 2: 385.

48. Albert V. Goodpasture, "Indian Wars and Warriors of the Old Southwest," Tennessee

Historical Magazine 4 (1918): 286.

49. Putnam, History of Middle Tennessee , 52 7.

50. Chickasaw Nation to David Henley, 29

September 1795. David Henley Papers.

51. Pickering to Henley, 26 August 1796, Ayer

MS, folder 16, no. 926, Newberry Library.

52. Upper Creeks to Robertson, 22 April 1795, in Carter, ed., Territorial Papers, 4: 253.

53. Saunt, A New Order of Things.

54. Carondelet to McGillivray, 14 December

1792, in Caughey, ed., McGillivray of the Creeks,

350; R. S. Cotterill, "The Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783," The Journal of Southern History 8

(1942): 484-85. 55. Hawkins to Dearborn, 28 October 1801,

in Benjamin Hawkins, Letters of Benjamin Hawkins .

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Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, vol. 3,

pt. 1 (1848): 392-294; Atkinson, Splendid Landy

Splendid People y 183.

56. Goodpasture, "Indian Wars and Warriors," 109.

57. J. Leitch Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in

North America (Athens, Ga., 1971), 67; Jane M.

Berry, "Indian Policy of Spain in the Southwest,

1783-1795," Mississippi Valley Historical Review , 3

(1917): 465.

58. Little Turkey to Mad Dog, 18 November 1794, in Knoxville Gazette , no. 22, vol. 4. American

Antiquarian Society.

59. Letters from Mississippi Officials, 1804.

Papers of the States of the United States. Microfilm,

Library of Congress, Washington D.C.

60. Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians, Settlers, &

Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower

Mississippi Valley Before 1783 (Chapel Hill, 1992).

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