HOMELAND SECURITY 1
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Homeland_Security-_Safeguarding_the_U.S._Against_Domestic_Catastrophic_Destruction.pdf
Homeland SecurityHomeland Security
Safeguarding the U.S. from Domestic Catastrophic DestructionSafeguarding the U.S. from Domestic Catastrophic Destruction
by CW Productions Ltd.
Edited by Richard White, Ph.D., Tina Bynum, DM, and Stan Supinski, Ph.D.
Homeland Security
Safeguarding the U.S. from Domestic Catastrophic Destruction
By CW Productions Ltd.
Edited by:
Richard White, Ph.D., Tina Bynum, DM, and Stan Supinski, Ph.D.
Homeland SecurityHomeland Security
Safeguarding the U.S. from Domestic Catastrophic DestructionSafeguarding the U.S. from Domestic Catastrophic Destruction
by CW Productions Ltd.
Edited by Richard White, Ph.D., Tina Bynum, DM, and Stan Supinski, Ph.D.
Cover art: New York City Freedom Tower, Mandritoiu, courtesy of Shutterstock.com
Copyright © 2016 by CW Productions, Ltd.
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All trademarks, service marks, registered trademarks, and registered service marks are the property of their respective owners and
are used herein for identification purposes only.
Previously published as The U.S. Department of Homeland Security: An Overview, by Richard White, Tina Markowski, and Kevin
Collins © 2010
Printed in the United States of America.
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ISBN 0-536-15295-0
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A Homeland Security Education Company
ii
Preface
Welcome to the third edition of our textbook. As indicated by the new title, this edition is significantly different than
the previous two, and accordingly stocked with mostly new material. Whereas the first two editions described “what”
was being done in the name of homeland security, this one explains “why”. In keeping with our previous approach, we
do not ascribe ourselves as “authors” but “editors” because the bulk of material is drawn directly from government
documents, either primary sources or publicly available derivatives. Two of our foremost derivative sources were
reports published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Government Accountability Office (GAO). They
have access to information, unclassified as it may be, well beyond the means of the general public. We would also like
to acknowledge the many public websites that were also instrumental in completing this text. And while we were only
“editors”, we think this book offers its own unique contributions to the field of homeland security. First, it delivers both
a comprehensive yet concise treatment of a very broad subject spanning numerous separate fields, from national
security to military operations to law enforcement to emergency management, to name only a few. Second, and most
importantly, it offers insight into the exact nature of homeland security. Because it was brought to the forefront of
national attention by an act of terrorism, homeland security has become confused with terrorism. While terrorism
certainly remains a concern to homeland security, it is not the root concern. As we try to make eminently clear in this
textbook, the homeland security concern predates 9/11, stemming back to the 1995 Tokyo Subway Attacks which saw
the first employment of a weapon of mass destruction by non-state actors. As our title suggests, the homeland
security concern is domestic catastrophic destruction. 9/11 demonstrated how it could be achieved by subverting
critical infrastructure. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated how it could be accomplished without malicious intent. While
we give due attention to the terrorist motive, we don’t give it the undue attention it has gained by becoming almost
synonymous with homeland security. In this regard, we hope to set the record straight and make it clear what
homeland security “is”, and what it “is not”. Homeland security is not terrorism, nor is it mass killings. While closely
related, homeland security, terrorism, and mass killings are distinctly separate. We hope to demonstrate that in this
book. More importantly, we hope to impart a clarity of understanding that will give you, the reader, a corresponding
advantage in your academic and professional pursuits supported by this knowledge.
iii
Richard White, Ph.D.
Rick White is an Assistant Research Professor at the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs. His Ph.D. is in
Engineering Security. He has published works on critical infrastructure risk management. Rick’s interest in homeland
security stems back to 9/11 when he was teaching at the Air Force Academy and watched together with his cadets as
the hijacked aircraft crashed into the Twin Towers. A retired Air Force officer, Rick has developed and taught
homeland security courses for colleges, universities, and various government agencies over the years. Other textbooks
include Homeland Defense: An Overview (Pearson 2007), Introduction to Joint and Coalition Warfare (FastPlanet
2005), and United States Military Power (FastPlanet 2004).
Tina Bynum , DM
Tina Bynum is the University Program Director for the College of Security Studies at Colorado Technical University
where she develops and manages the curriculum for homeland security, criminal justice, and public administration
programs at the undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral levels. She is an editorial review board member for the Journal
for Homeland Security Education and is a member of the International Society for Preparedness, Resilience and
Security (INSPRS). A retired firefighter and emergency medical technician, Dr. Bynum also plays key roles in local
emergency planning and exercising under the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) protocols
and teaches courses in criminal justice, emergency and fire management services, public administration, and homeland
security. While serving as the Associate Director for the University of Colorado's Trauma, Health and Hazards Center,
she developed a peer support program to build resilience and assist recovery from high-risk occupational traumatic
experiences that was implemented in local police and fire departments. This program has gone on to serve the needs
of military personnel returning from combat. Dr. Bynum also co-authored The United States Department of Homeland
Security, An Overview (2Ed, 2010).
Stan Supinski, Ph.D.
Stan Supinski is the Deputy Director of Partnership Programs and faculty member for the Naval Postgraduate School,
Center for Homeland Defense and Security. He has taught and directed Homeland security courses for a variety of
institutions, to include Long Island University, the University of Denver and the University of Massachusetts. He also
founded and formerly directed the Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium on behalf of NORAD/US
Northern Command. Dr. Supinski is a retired US Air Force officer, having served as a professor of Russian at the US Air
Force Academy and as an intelligence officer in various locations worldwide.
About the Authors
iv
Contents
Part I: Hard Lessons Chapter 1: Turning Point ............................................................................... 3
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities ..................................................................... 19
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes ............................................................. 33
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many .............................................................. 47
Chapter 5: Not by Chance ........................................................................... 71
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion .......................................................... 89
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination ................................................................ 99
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative .................................................................... 111
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise Chapter 9: Homeland Security .................................................................. 135
Chapter 10: DHS Formation ...................................................................... 149
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution ....................................................................... 163
Chapter 12: DHS Progress ....................................................................... 187
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise ........................................................................ 223
Part III: Mission Areas Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection ............................................. 239
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy .......................................................... 251
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity ........................................................................ 261
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism.................................................................... 277
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response ................................. 293
Chapter 19: Aviation Security ..................................................................... 309
Chapter 20: Maritime Security .................................................................... 327
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security ............................................. 341
Chapter 22: Border Security ....................................................................... 353
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement ........................................................ 367
v
Contents
Part IV: Mission Components Chapter 24: National Protection & Programs Directorate ........................... 383
Chapter 25: Science & Technology Directorate .......................................... 397
Chapter 26: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office ......................................... 413
Chapter 27: Intelligence & Analysis ............................................................ 425
Chapter 28: Federal Emergency Management Agency .............................. 439
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard ................................................................... 457
Chapter 30: Transportation Security Administration ................................... 473
Chapter 31: U.S. Customs & Border Protection .......................................... 485
Chapter 32: U.S. Secret Service ................................................................ 503
Chapter 33: U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement .............................. 513
Chapter 34: U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services ................................. 529
Part V: Mission Partners Chapter 35: Congress ................................................................................ 543
Chapter 36: National Security Council ........................................................ 555
Chapter 37: Intelligence Community .......................................................... 567
Chapter 38: Department of Defense ........................................................... 583
Chapter 39: National Guard ....................................................................... 595
Chapter 40: Federal Bureau of Investigation .............................................. 613
Chapter 41: State & Local Law Enforcement .............................................. 625
Chapter 42: First Responders .................................................................... 641
Appendices Appendix A: DHS Budgets ......................................................................... 651
Appendix B: Glossary ................................................................................. 669
Appendix C: Index ...................................................................................... 681
Appendix D: Works Cited ........................................................................... 695
vi
Contents
List of Tables 3-1: 9/11 Hijackers & Flights ........................................................................ 34
3-2: 9/11 Timeline ........................................................................................ 45
8-1: Hurricane Katrina New Orleans Timeline ............................................ 119
10-1: Organizations Transferred to DHS .................................................... 155
11-1: DHS Initial Operating Organization ................................................... 169
11-2: Mapping DHS Organization & Critical Mission Areas ........................ 170
11-3: Comparison of Strategy Objectives .................................................. 177
11-4: QHSR Missions & Goals .................................................................. 180
12-1: 2007 GAO Assessment of Border Security ....................................... 190
12-2: 2007 GAO Assessment of Immigration Enforcement ........................ 191
12-3: 2007 GAO Assessment of Immigration Services .............................. 192
12-4: 2007 GAO Assessment of Aviation Security ..................................... 193
12-5: 2007 GAO Assessment of Surface Transportation Security.............. 194
12-6: 2007 GAO Assessment of Maritime Security .................................... 195
12-7: 2007 GAO Assessment of Emergency Preparedness& Response ... 196
12-8: 2007 GAO Assessment of Critical Infrastructure Protection .............. 197
12-9: 2007 GAO Assessment of Science and Technology ........................ 198
12-10: Comparison of 2011 & 2007 GAO Mission Area Assessments ....... 199
12-11: 2011 GAO Expectations for Aviation Security ................................. 202
12-12: 2011 GAO Expectations for CBRN Threats .................................... 203
12-13: 2011 GAO Expectations for CIP of Physical Assets........................ 204
12-14: 2011 GAO Expectations for Surface Transportation ....................... 205
12-15: 2011 GAO Expectations for Border Security ................................... 207
12-16: 2011 GAO Expectations for Maritime Security ................................ 209
12-17: 2011 GAO Expectations for Immigration Enforcement .................... 211
12-18: 2011 GAO Expectations for Immigration Services .......................... 213
12-19: 2011 GAO Expectations for CIP of Cyber Assets ........................... 215
12-20: 2011 GAO Expectations for Emergency Preparedness & Response ........ 217
12-21: 2015 GAO Assessment of DHS Management Functions .............. 2019
vii
Contents
List of Tables (continued) 14-1: CIP Directives, Strategies, & Plans ................................................... 242
14-2: Infrastructure Sectors and Lead/Sector-Specific Agencies ................ 243
15-1: CWMD Guidance Documents ........................................................... 253
16-1: U.S. Tier 1 ISPs ................................................................................ 266
16-2: DHS National Cyber Risk Alert Levels............................................... 272
19-1: Transportation Subsectors ................................................................ 310
19-2: Cyber Attack Vectors ........................................................................ 322
19-3: Potential Types of Aircraft Cyber Attacks .......................................... 323
20-1: Transportation Subsectors ................................................................ 328
21-1: Transportation Subsectors ................................................................ 342
24-1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors ............................................................ 386
25-1: DHS Laboratories ............................................................................. 403
25-2: DOE Laboratories ............................................................................. 403
25-3: DHs Centers of Excellence ............................................................... 404
38-1: Organization of U.S. Military Forces .................................................. 584
38-2: National Guard Direction, Payment, & Authorities ............................. 585
38-3: U.S. Combatant Commands ............................................................. 585
viii
Contents
List of Figures 5-1: Pentagon Crash Sites........................................................................... 75
5-2: AFCD Incident Command on 9/11 ........................................................ 79
8-1: Track of Hurricane Katrina .................................................................. 115
10-1: DHS Organization ............................................................................ 159
11-1: 2003 DHS Organization .................................................................... 171
11-2: 2008 DHS Organization .................................................................... 179
11-3: 2015 DHS Organization .................................................................... 181
12-1: Selected Factors Influencing DHS Mission and Performance
Ten Years Following 9/11 ................................................................. 200
14-1: 2013 NIPP Risk Management Framework ........................................ 244
14-2: PSA Security Survey Example “Dashboard” Results ........................ 246
15-1: DoD Geographic Combatant Commands ......................................... 254
16-1: Schematic Representation of a Portion of the Internet ...................... 265
16-2: Internet ISP Tiers ............................................................................. 266
16-3: IXP Role in Today’s Internet ............................................................. 267
16-4: AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy .................................................... 269
20-1: USCG Security In-Depth .................................................................. 335
22-1: Total Estimated Illegal Border Inflows, FY2000-FY2012 ................... 364
23-1: Annual Immigration Admissions 1900-2010 ...................................... 369
23-2: Immigrant Countries of Origin 1900-2010 ......................................... 370
23-3: Foreign-Born Residents by Region of Origin 1960-2010 ................... 371
23-4: Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by U.S. Department of State 1987-2013 ......... 372
23-5: Nonimmigrant Admissions at U.S. Ports of Entry 2003-2013 ............ 373
23-6: Inadmissible Aliens at Ports of Entry 2005-2013 ............................... 374
23-7: Alien Formal Removals and Voluntary Returns 1990-2013 .............. 376
23-8: Estimated Number of Unauthorized Resident Aliens ........................ 377
24-1: NPPD Organization Chart ................................................................ 385
24-2: NIPP Risk Management Framework ................................................. 386
25-1: DHS S&T Organization ..................................................................... 399
ix
Contents
List of Figures (continued) 25-2: DHS S&T Annual Funding ................................................................. 406
26-1: DNDO Organization .......................................................................... 415
26-2: Layers of the Nuclear Detection Architecture .................................... 419
27-1: DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis Organization Chart ................. 428
28-1: FEMA Leadership Organization Chart ............................................... 444
28-2: FEMA Regions .................................................................................. 445
29-1: United States Coast Guard Organization Chart ................................. 466
29-2: United States Coast Guard Districts .................................................. 467
30-1: TSA Organization Chart 2010 ........................................................... 477
31-1: CBP Organization Chart .................................................................... 488
31-2: The U.S. Import Process ................................................................... 496
32-1: U.S. Secret Service Organization Chart ............................................ 505
33-1: ICE Organization Chart ..................................................................... 515
33-2: ICE Removal Statistics ...................................................................... 524
34-1: USCIS Organization Chart ................................................................ 532
36-1: National Security Council Organization ............................................. 560
37-1: The U.S. Intelligence Community ...................................................... 576
38-1: Geographic Combatant Commands’ Areas of Responsibility ............ 586
38-2: Dual-Status Commander Chain of Command ................................... 590
39-1: Reserve Component Mobilization Authorities .................................... 598
40-1: Balancing Civil Liberties .................................................................... 621
42-1; Emergency Preparedness Cycle ....................................................... 646
x
Contents
List of Figures (continued) A-1: FY03 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 653
A-2: FY04 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 654
A-3: FY05 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 655
A-4: FY06 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 656
A-5: FY07 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 657
A-6: FY08 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 658
A-7: FY09 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 659
A-8: FY10 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 660
A-9: FY11 DHS Budget Allocation ............................................................. 661
A-10: FY12 DHS Budget Allocation ........................................................... 662
A-11: FY13 DHS Budget Allocation ........................................................... 663
A-12: FY14 DHS Budget Allocation ........................................................... 664
A-13: FY15 DHS Budget Allocation ........................................................... 665
A-14: FY16 DHS Budget Allocation ........................................................... 666
xi
Part I:
Hard Lessons
This section explores the events that created and shaped U.S. homeland security policy. It begins shortly after the end
of the Cold War in 1991. After a four-decade standoff between the United States and Soviet Union, there was a global
sense of relief and great expectation that the world would become a much safer place after the threat of imminent
nuclear war had subsided. Those illusions were shattered in March 1995 after a religious cult attempted to murder
thousands of Japanese commuters aboard the Tokyo subway system using Sarin nerve gas. It was the first time a non-
state actor employed a weapon of mass destruction, marking a watershed moment in history when small groups
attained the destructive power of nations. The implication was not lost on Congress which, spurred by the Oklahoma
City bombing a few months later, chartered a number of commissions to investigate the prospects of WMD attack on
U.S. soil. Because the Tokyo subway attacks sought to topple the Japanese government, they were, by definition, acts
of terrorism. The congressional committees subsequently blurred the distinction between act and motive, labeling a
WMD attack by non-state actors as “terrorism”. The committees also introduced the term “homeland security” to
describe various organizational proposals to prevent and respond to WMD attack. In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman
Commission recommended creation of a National Homeland Security Agency. These recommendations would’ve gone
unheeded except for 9/11. On September 11th, 2001, nineteen hijackers inflicted as much damage as the Imperial
Japanese Navy on December 7th, 1941; 3,000 dead and $40 billion in direct damages. The 9/11 Commission
characterized the attack as one of “surpassing disproportion”. However, instead of using WMD, the attackers
achieved WMD effects by subverting the nation’s transportation infrastructure, turning passenger jets into guided
missiles. The enduring lesson from 9/11 is that the critical infrastructure essential to an industrial economy also
contains the means for catastrophic destruction. What makes critical infrastructure particularly vulnerable, and
therefore a tempting target, is that little of it was designed to withstand deliberate attack, and much of it, due to the
Internet revolution, is susceptible to cyber attack. Moreover, the national security system built during the Cold War to
counter threats from nation states, suffered a collective “failure of imagination” to counter threats from non-state
actors. Accordingly, the U.S. Federal government underwent its largest reorganization since the end of World War II
and created a new Department of Homeland Security. But in its rush to close the gap exposed by this new threat, the
Federal government overlooked the consequences posed by an even older threat. In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina
forced the evacuation of a major U.S. city and killed over 1,400 of its citizens. It was another hard lesson that
catastrophic destruction comes in both natural and manmade forms.
2
Part I: Hard Lessons
3
Turning Point
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the significance of the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks.
Describe the legal definition of terrorism.
Compare the different classes of weapons of mass destruction.
Discuss how the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks precipitated U.S. homeland security policy.
Chapter 1
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 1: Turning Point
4
“The 1995 Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway marked a turning point in the
history of terrorism.”
- 1999 Gilmore Commission Report
Introduction
Providing for the common defense is a purpose of U.S. government enumerated in the
Preamble to the Constitution. For over two hundred years the nation’s military
defended the country from other nations who sought to do us harm. But as weapons
of war developed into weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a new threat began to
emerge towards the end of the 20th century that the nation’s military could not
counter. That threat was nuclear terrorism, or more generally speaking, the
employment of WMD by non-state actors. This chapter examines the turning point
when the nation first realized its vulnerability, and events surrounding the evolution
from national security to homeland security.
From the Frying Pan into the Fire
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in August 1991, the United States emerged
from the Cold War as the world’s sole remaining superpower. After forty-four years of
facing down the Soviet Union in global brinkmanship, it seemed the United States
could finally step back from the nuclear abyss that threatened at a moment’s notice to
turn the Cold War into World War III. As events would turn out though, it seemed that
the United States had jumped from the frying pan into the fire.
Loose Nukes
By 1991, the Soviet Union had amassed a stockpile of 35,000 nuclear warheads1 [1]
strategically located in the Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. The failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and subsequent disintegration
of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety and security of nuclear weapons
in the former Soviet Republics. [2, pp. 3-4] In 1968, the United States and Soviet
Union signed the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) agreeing to keep nuclear
weapons from countries that did not have them. [3] Fearing that those weapons and
their secrets might now fall into the hands of rogue nations, in November 1991,
senators Sam Nunn (D-GA), and Richard Lugar (R-IN) sponsored the Soviet Nuclear
Threat Reduction Act authorizing $400 million to assist former members of the Soviet
Union with 1) destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction, 2)
providing secure transport for weapons on their way to destruction, and 3) establishing
verifiable safeguards against proliferation of these weapons. [2, pp. 3-4]
Part I: Hard Lessons
1By 1991, the United States had amassed over 20,000 nuclear warheads. [1]
5
Chapter 1: Turning Point
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar as an emergency
response to impending chaos in the former Soviet Union. Even after the sense of
immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many analysts and members of Congress
remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss of control of nuclear
and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely weak and press accounts
reported that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black market in
Western Europe. Consequently, many began to view the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program as part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort in keeping
with the 1968 Nonproliferation Treaty. This view changed, though, after 1995 Tokyo
Subway Attack. [2, p. 5]
1995 Tokyo Subway Attack
At 6:00 am on the morning of March 20, 1995, Ken’ichi Hirose was driven to the
Yotsuya subway station in Tokyo. Upon arrival, Hirose boarded a westbound train to
Shinjuku Station where he caught a northbound train to Ikebukuro Station. While
waiting to board his next train, Hirose bought a sports tabloid then sought to isolate
himself among the crowd. After surveying the other passengers to confirm nobody
was looking, Hirose removed two plastic bags filled with clear liquid and wrapped them
in the newspaper. The bags were filled with the deadly nerve agent Sarin. Ken’ichi
Hirose was part of a five-man team dispatched by Shoko Asahara to attack the
Japanese government. [4]
Shibuya Asahara proclaimed himself “Christ” and sought to take on the sins of the
world in advance of a nuclear Armageddon from which he would emerge as “emperor”
of Japan. On March 20, 1995, Asahara sought to hasten his prophesied apocalypse by
murdering thousands of commuters transiting Tokyo’s Kasumigaseki and Nagatacho
districts, home to the Japanese government. Asahara also hoped it would put an end
to a police investigation into murder charges against the cult. To attain his designs,
Asahara would release the chemical agent Sarin within the crowded and confined
Tokyo subway. [4]
Sarin is an odorless, colorless liquid that attacks the nervous system. Developed as a
pesticide in 1938 Germany, it is outlawed by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.
Sarin quickly vaporizes when exposed to the atmosphere, posing a threat to victims
either through inhalation or direct contact. Sarin is fatal even at very low
concentrations; a single drop the size of a pinhead can kill an adult. Death follows
quickly in one to ten minutes. [5]
Sarin is an odorless,
colorless liquid that
attacks the nervous
system.
6
On the morning of March 20, 1995, five members of Aum Shinrikyo, Ken’ichi Hirose,
Ikuo Hayashi, Toru Toyoda, Masato Yokoyama, and Yasuo Hayashi, picked up their bags
of Sarin and set out for the rush hour commute aboard the Tokyo subway. Hirose was
a thirty-year-old doctor of Physics. Hayashi was a medical doctor held in esteem at the
Ministry of Science and Technology before quitting his job and joining Aum. Toyoda
was a Physics student who graduated with honors from the University of Tokyo and
was about to begin doctoral studies when he joined Aum. Yokoyama was a thirty-one-
year-old Applied Physics major who worked at an electronics firm before joining Aum.
Thirty-seven year old Hayashi, the oldest member of the group, studied Artificial
Intelligence at university and traveled to India to study yoga before joining Aum. Five
men, all highly educated and psychologically sound, set out that Monday morning to
launch a chemical attack on the world’s busiest commuter transport system at the
peak of morning rush hour. [4]
Each perpetrator carried two bags of Sarin, except Yasuo Hayashi who carried three.
Carrying their bags of sarin and umbrellas with sharpened tips, the perpetrators
boarded their appointed trains. At prearranged stations, the sarin bags wrapped in
newspaper were dropped and punctured several times with the sharpened tip of an
umbrella. Each perpetrator then got off the train and exited the station to rendezvous
with pre-arranged getaway cars. They left behind them packets of Sarin leaking out
onto train cars packed with passengers. [4]
Ken’ichi Hirose was aboard the second car of the A777 heading inward to the
government district. As he was about to release the Sarin, Hirose caught the
unwanted attention of a schoolgirl. He paused. To ward off her attention, Hirose
decided to move up to the third car, taking his packet with him. As the train
approached Ochanomizu Station, Hirose dropped the packet to the floor, whispered an
Aum mantra, then punctured it with the tip of his umbrella. Hirose poked the packet
with such force that he bent the tip of his sharpened umbrella. Still, both bags were
successfully broken, and the Sarin began to leak across the train floor. Hirose
immediately departed and fled for his waiting getaway car. [4]
Ikuo Hayashi arrived at Sendagi Station and purchased a copy of the Japan Communist
Party newspaper to wrap his bags of Sarin. At 7:48 am he boarded the first car of the
A725K inbound to Tokyo’s central business district. Hayashi wore a surgical mask
commonly worn by Japanese during cold and flu season. At Shin-Ochanomizu Station
he dropped his packet to the floor and poked it with his umbrella. In his haste to flee,
though, Hayashi succeeded in puncturing only one of the two bags. Sarin leaked out
across the train as Hayashi moved quickly to join his getaway driver. [4]
Part I: Hard Lessons
7
Masato Yokoyama stopped on his way to Shinjuku Station to buy a paper to wrap his
bags of Sarin. Yokoyama put on a wig and fake glasses before boarding the fifth car of
the B801 inbound to the government district on the Marunouchi Line. As his train
approached Yotsuya Station, Yokoyama dropped his packet to the floor and began
poking it. He succeeded in making only a single puncture in one of the bags. As
Yokoyama fled the scene, the single bag leaked Sarin slowly across the floor. [4]
Toru Toyoda picked up a newspaper and wrapped his Sarin bags on the way to Naka-
Meguro Station. At 7:59 am he boarded the first car of the B711T inbound to Tokyo’s
central district. Sitting close to the door, Toyoda set the Sarin packet on the floor.
When the train arrived at the next station, Ebisu, Toyoda punctured the bags as he
disembarked. He was on the train a total of two minutes, the quickest drop of the day.
[4]
In order to prove his loyalty, Yasuo Hayashi carried three bags of Sarin. These he
wrapped in newspaper before boarding the train at 07:43. Hayashi took the third car
of the A720S departing Ueno Station. Shortly after boarding, he dropped his packet to
the floor. Two stops later, Hayashi punctured the bags as he departed the train at
Akihabara Station. Hayashi made the most punctures of any of the perpetrators. [4]
As the Sarin started vaporizing, passengers within the packed cars began to fall sick.
Victims would later report feeling nauseous and experiencing blurred vision. Neither
knowing nor understanding what was happening, instinct took control and compelled
them to flight. As the trains pulled into the next station, victims pushed their way out
of the contaminated cars, unwittingly spreading the agent onto the crowded platforms.
One passenger, noticing a liquid-soaked package on the floor, kicked it out the door
onto the Kodenmacho Station platform. Soon, waiting commuters began feeling the
effects and started pushing towards the exits. Some collapsed on the platform before
they could make it. [4]
Unaware what was happening, the contaminated trains continued towards central
Tokyo. Only after people started collapsing did agents realize something was seriously
wrong and ordered all trains stopped. But not before thousands had been exposed.
Hundreds collapsed outside the station entrances and lay on the ground waiting for
assistance. Ambulances transported 688 to nearby hospitals. More than 4,000 made
their own way, including the “worried well”. Hospitals were overwhelmed. [4]
Chapter 1: Turning Point
8
Of the 5,510 who sought treatment, 17 were deemed critical, 37 severe, and 984
moderate. By mid-afternoon, the mildly affected victims had recovered from vision
problems and were released. Most of the remaining patients were well enough to go
home the next day. Twelve people were not so fortunate and eventually died from
their exposure. Most of them were station attendants who had sought to help stricken
passengers. Experts suggest that if the attackers had been more successful in deploying
the Sarin, thousands could have died. [4]
In 2008, victims were authorized payment of damages because the attack had been
directed at the Japanese government. By 2009, 5,259 had applied for benefits under
the law. Of those, 47 were certified disabled, and 1,077 certified having serious
injuries or illnesses. Surveys of the victims showed that many still suffer from post-
traumatic stress disorder. In one survey, 27% of 837 respondents complained they felt
insecure whenever riding a train. [4]
The Terrorism Threat
The Tokyo subway attack was a seminal event; it was the first time a non-state group
had used a weapon of mass destruction against civilians. The incident appeared to
underscore both the vulnerabilities and potentially catastrophic consequences of
unprotected societies and ill-prepared governments in the face of indiscriminate
attacks employing weapons of mass destruction. Two years earlier, the bombing of
New York City’s World Trade Center by Islamic fundamentalists had demonstrated that
the United States itself was not immune to acts of terrorism intent on causing large
numbers of casualties. Indeed, the six persons who perished in that attack and the
approximately 1,000 others who were injured paled in comparison to the tens of
thousands who might have been harmed had the terrorists’ plans to topple one of the
towers into the other actually had succeeded. If any further evidence were needed of
this potential, it was provided less than a month after the Tokyo attack when Timothy
McVeigh used a large truck bomb to demolish the Alfred P. Murrah Federal office
building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 persons and injuring hundreds more. [6, p. 1]
Terrorism. “Acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of
the United States or of any State, that appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a
civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping.”
- Title 18 United States Code, Section 2331
Part I: Hard Lessons
The Tokyo subway
attack was a seminal
event; it was the first
time a non-state group
had used a weapon of
mass destruction
against civilians.
9
Until the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, most Americans thought that
terrorism was something that happened elsewhere. However frequently U.S. citizens
and interests were the target of terrorists abroad, many nonetheless believed that the
United States itself was somehow immune to such violence within its own borders.
Terrorism, accordingly, was regarded as a sporadic—albeit attention-grabbing—
problem that occasionally affected Americans traveling or living overseas and
concerned only those U.S. government agencies with specific diplomatic and national
security responsibilities. If the 1993 World Trade Center bombing shattered that
complacency, then the explosion in Oklahoma City two years later dramatically
underscored the breadth of grievances felt toward the U.S. government. The list of
potential adversaries had seemed suddenly to grow from the foreign radicals and
religious extremists located in other regions of the world about whom we had always
worried, to include wholly domestic threats, such as those posed by the militantly
antigovernment, white supremacist organizations that had come to light in the
aftermath of the Oklahoma City tragedy. [6, p. 6]
In the wake of the New York and Oklahoma City bombings and Tokyo subway attacks,
there was a dramatic shift in the perceived threat of WMD terrorism. A number of
developments account for this sudden shift in direction and appreciation for what had
been previously dismissed as a far less realistic threat scenario. [6, p. 7]
First, terrorism had arguably shown a marked trend toward greater lethality. While
some observers pointed optimistically to the decline in the number of international
terrorist incidents during the 1990s as a noteworthy and salutary development in the
struggle against terrorism, the percentage of terrorist incidents with fatalities had
paradoxically increased. For example, at least one person was killed in 29% of terrorist
incidents in 1995. That represented the highest ratio of fatalities to incidents recorded
over the previous thirty years. [6, p. 7]
Second, the dangers posed specifically by chemical and biological weapons became
increasingly apparent. In part, this was a function of the demise of the Cold War
preoccupation with the nuclear dimension of international relations. Perhaps more
significant, however, was the possibility that, given the ongoing travails of the Russian
economy, poorly paid, disgruntled former Soviet scientists might attempt to sell their
expertise in chemical, biological and nuclear weapons on the “open market” to
terrorists or rogue states. [6, p. 8]
Chapter 1: Turning Point
In the wake of the New
York and Oklahoma City
bombings and Tokyo
subway attacks, there
was a dramatic shift in
the perceived threat of
WMD terrorism.
10
Finally, a precedent for mass destruction had been set in the guise of the 1995 Aum
nerve gas attack. That incident represented the first widely known attempt by a non-
state group to use WMD with the specific intent of causing mass civilian casualties.
Moreover, Aum’s use of such an exotic weapon as sarin may have raised the stakes for
terrorists everywhere, who might feel driven to emulate or create their own version of
the Tokyo attack to attract attention to themselves and their causes. [6, p. 9]
In the wake of these incidents, a new era of terrorism was perceived by experts and
government officials alike who foresaw a potentially bloodier and more destructive age
of violence emerging as we approached the twenty-first century. The changes in
terrorism that they described raised concerns in the United States, especially within
Congress and the Executive Branch, about the implications of evolving terrorist threats
that were now seen to include use of WMD. [6, p. 1]
WMD Terrorism
According to 18USC S2332a, a weapon of mass destruction is “any weapon that is
designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; any
weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector; or any weapon that is designed to
release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.” For simplicity,
current convention recognizes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
agents as general classes of WMD. 18USC S2332a makes it illegal to employ WMD
against U.S. citizens, anywhere in the world.
Chemical weapons are defined in 18USC S229F as “chemicals, precursors, munitions, or
devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties
of the chemicals.” Under 18USC S229F, it is illegal to develop, produce, acquire, or
transfer chemical weapons. Chemical agents are generally classified by their effects.
Thus nerve agents attack the body’s nervous system, blood agents block oxygen
transfer in the blood, blister agents cause blisters, and choking agents attack the
respiratory system. Experts also recognize that a host of toxic industrial chemicals
(TICs) essential to manufacturing processes may also be employed as weapons. [7, pp.
II-10 - II-11] In 2005, the National Planning Scenarios were released, examining
possible attack scenarios and their potential consequences. Of the fifteen listed
scenarios, four related to chemical attacks. Two pertained to the release of chemical
agents. The other two involved the release of toxic industrial chemicals. The
deliberate destruction of a chlorine storage tank produced the most casualties,
estimated at 17,500 according to the scenario. The nerve agent attack resulted in the
second most casualties, estimated at 6,000 according to that scenario. In both
scenarios, rescue operations were hampered by the difficulty of operating in a
contaminated environment. [8]
Part I: Hard Lessons
WMD is defined in
18USC S2332a. Current
convention recognizes
chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear
agents as general
classes of WMD.
11
Biological weapons are defined in 18USC S178 as “any microorganism or infectious
substance, or any naturally occurring, bioengineered or synthesized component of any
such microorganism or infectious substance, capable of causing death, disease, or
other biological malfunction in a human, animal, plant, or other living organism;
deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or materials of any kind; or
deleterious alteration of the environment.” As with chemical weapons, it is illegal to
develop, produce, stockpile, transfer, acquire, retain, or possess a biological agent or
delivery system for use as a weapon. Biological agents include three basic categories:
pathogens, toxins, and bioregulators. Pathogens are disease producing
microorganisms such as bacteria, rickettsia, or viruses. Pathogens can occur naturally
or can be altered with biotechnology. Toxins are poisons formed by a vegetable or
animal, but can be produced synthetically also. Bioregulators affect cell processes in
the body. Used as a bioweapon, they can cause severe adverse effects or death. [7, pp.
II-18] The fifteen National Planning Scenarios describe five different types of biological
incidents, four of them stemming from some form of attack. According to the Planning
Scenarios, an anthrax attack could result in 13,000 casualties. Alternatively, the
deliberate introduction of foot and mouth disease could kill an untold number of
livestock. Either attack would be hugely disruptive to the national economy. [8]
Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs), or “dirty bombs” are covered by the definition
for WMD found in 18USC S2332a. Specifically, they include “any weapon that is
designed or intended to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to
human life; or any device or object that is capable of and designed or intended to
endanger human life through the release of radiation or radioactivity.” 18USC S2332h
makes it illegal to knowingly produce, construct, acquire, transfer, receive, possess,
import, export, possess, or threaten to use an RDD. The Planning Scenarios have only
one RDD scenario. An RDD is not considered particularly destructive, but it is
considered highly disruptive. According to the scenario, an RDD released in a major
urban area could contaminate up to thirty-six city blocks. Essentially, the area of
contamination would have to be evacuated until such time as it could be
decontaminated. Decontamination could take years and cost billions of dollars. [8, pp.
11-1 - 11-4]
Chapter 1: Turning Point
18USC S2332a makes it
illegal to employ WMD
against U.S. citizens,
anywhere in the world.
12
Nuclear weapons are also covered by the definition for WMD found in 18USC S232a.
The Planning Scenarios postulate a situation in which a terrorist group assemble a gun-
type nuclear device from highly enriched uranium (HEU) stolen from a former Soviet
facility. The materials are smuggled into the United States and assembled near a major
metropolitan center. The improvised nuclear device (IND) is transported by van to the
central business district and detonated. The estimated 10-kiloton blast would
incinerate most everything within half mile of the detonation. Blast damage would
gradually taper off out to four miles from the epicenter. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
would render any surviving electronics inoperative within three miles of the
detonation. Those outside the blast radius but within twelve miles of detonation could
be affected by radiation exposure. Winds could carry radioactive fallout as far as 150
miles and contaminate as much as 3,000 square miles. [8, pp. 1-1 - 1-5] Dissimilar
circumstances make it difficult to draw comparisons with the August 6, 1945 bombing
of Hiroshima with a similar type device, but casualties from the blast, radiation, and
fallout might be expected to exceed 100,000. Of course, recovery would take decades
and cost hundreds of billions of dollars.
Still, most experts agree that even if terrorists want to employ WMD, they don’t
necessarily have the requisite scientific knowledge or technical capabilities to
implement their violent ambitions. Accordingly, as easy as some may argue it is for
terrorists to culture anthrax spores or brew up a concoction of deadly nerve gas, the
effective dissemination or dispersal of these viruses and poisons still presents serious
technological hurdles that greatly inhibit their effective use. Indeed, the ultimate
failure of the Tokyo subway attacks seems to affirm this position. [6, p. 38]
It should also be noted that, as serious and potentially catastrophic as a domestic
terrorist CBRN attack might prove, it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely
undermine the national security, much less threaten the survival, of the United States
as a nation. Indeed, following the 1995 nerve gas attack, the Japanese government did
not fall, widespread disorder did not ensue, nor did society collapse. There is no reason
to assume that the outcome would be any different in the United States. [6, pp. 37-38]
However, because of the extreme consequences that could result from a successful
CBRN attack, even the remotest likelihood of one cannot be dismissed as insignificant.
The challenge in responding to the threat of potential terrorist use of CBRN weapons is
to craft defense capabilities to respond to an incident if it occurs that are not only both
cost-effective and appropriate, but dynamic enough to respond as effectively as
possible in a wide a range of circumstances or scenarios. [6, pp. 34-35] The problem
was, the Federal government was not ready.
Part I: Hard Lessons
As serious and
potentially catastrophic
a CBRN attack might
prove, it is highly
unlikely it could ever
completely undermine
national security.
However, because of the
extreme consequences
that could result from a
successful CBRN attack,
event the remotest
likelihood of one cannot
be dismissed as
insignificant.
13
U.S. Counterterrorism Posture
At the time of the Tokyo Subway Attacks, the U.S. response to a terrorist incident was
seen as a highly coordinated interagency operation that included federal, state, and
local participation. Primary federal agencies besides the Department of Justice (DoJ),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) included the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Energy (DoE), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS). [9, pp. CRS-6]
The National Security Council was the center of U.S. government efforts to coordinate
the national response to threats or acts of domestic terrorism. The NSC Principals
Committee, the Deputies Committee, and the Counterterrorism and National
Preparedness Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) constituted the major policy and
decision making bodies involved in the federal response to terrorism. [9, pp. CRS-7]
The PCC had four standing subordinate groups to coordinate policy in specific areas.
The Counterterrorism and Security Group (CSG) coordinated policy for preventing and
responding to foreign terrorism, either internationally or domestically. The
Preparedness and Weapons of Mass Destruction Group provided policy coordination
for preventing WMD attacks in the United States and developing response and
consequence management capabilities to deal with domestic WMD incidents. The
Information Infrastructure Protection and Assurance Group handled policy for
preventing and responding to major threats to America's cyberspace, and the
Continuity of Federal Operations Group was charged with policy coordination for
assuring the continued operation of Constitutional offices and federal departments and
agencies. [9, pp. CRS-7 - CRS-8]
When the NSC was advised of the threat of a terrorist incident or actual event, the
appropriate subordinate group would convene to formulate recommendations for the
Counterterrorism and Preparedness PCC who in turn would provide policy analysis for
the Deputies Committee. The Deputies Committee would ensure that the issues being
brought before the Principals Committee and NSC were properly analyzed and
prepared for a decision by the President. [9, pp. CRS-8]
In the wake of the Tokyo subway attacks and Oklahoma City bombing, President
Clinton in June 1995 signed Presidential Decision Directive #39 (PDD-39) updating U.S.
policy on counterterrorism. Among its provisions, PDD-39 designated the FBI the Lead
Federal Agency for responding to terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. PDD-39 also assigned
FEMA primary responsibility for coordinating federal efforts in responding to the
consequences of a WMD attack. [9, pp. CRS-5]
Chapter 1: Turning Point
In the wake of the Tokyo
subway attacks and
Oklahoma City bombing,
President Clinton in June
1995 signed PDD-39
updating U.S. policy on
counterterrorism. PDD-
39 designated the FBI as
the Lead Federal Agency
for responding to
terrorist attacks on U.S.
soil. FEMA was assigned
responsibility for
coordinating the Federal
response to a WMD
attack.
14
The FBI’s first step when a terrorist threat was discovered was to initiate a threat
credibility assessment. The FBI would take immediate steps to identify, acquire, and
plan for the use of federal resources to augment the State and local authorities if the
threat was deemed highly credible or an incident was verified. The FBI will designate a
Federal On-Scene Commander (OSC) who would function as the incident manager for
the U.S. Government. The FBI would operate from a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and
report back to the Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) at FBI Headquarters
in Washington DC. If necessary, the FBI could call upon a Domestic Emergency Support
Team (DEST) comprised of representatives from other Federal agencies to help advise
on the incident. In the event of a WMD incident, the FBI on-scene commander could
request DoD support through the Attorney General. [9, pp. CRS-9 - CRS-13]
Homeland Security
Concerned about the overall leadership and coordination of programs to combat
terrorism, Congress established three separate commissions to include the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of
Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Panel because it was chaired by
Governor James Gilmore III of Virginia); the United States Commission on National
Security in the 21st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission because it
was chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman); and the National
Commission on Terrorism (also known as the Bremer Commission because it Chairman
was former Ambassador Paul Bremer). [10, p. 37]
The Bremer Commission raised the issue that the National Coordinator, the senior
official responsible for coordinating all U.S. counterterrorism efforts, didn't have
sufficient authority to ensure the President's priorities were reflected in agencies'
budgets. The United States didn't have a single counterterrorism budget. Instead,
counterterrorism programs existed in the individual budgets of 45 departments and
agencies of the federal government. [11]
In December 2000, the second report of the Gilmore Commission issued a finding that
the organization of the federal government's programs for combating terrorism was
fragmented, uncoordinated, and politically unaccountable. It linked the lack of a
national strategy to the fact that no entity had the authority to direct all of the
agencies that may be engaged. At the federal level, no entity had the authority even
to direct the coordination of relevant federal efforts. As a consequence, the Gilmore
Commission recommended that the next President should establish a National Office
for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the President, and should seek a
statutory basis for this office. [12]
Part I: Hard Lessons
Concerned about the
overall leadership and
coordination of
programs to combat
terrorism, Congress
established three
separate commissions to
investigate the
prospects for WMD
attack on U.S. soil.
15
The Gilmore Commission recommended that the National Office for Combating
Terrorism should have a broad and comprehensive scope, with responsibility for the
full range of deterring, preventing, preparing for, and responding to international as
well as domestic terrorism. The director of the office should be the principal
spokesman of the Executive Branch on all matters related to federal programs for
combating terrorism and should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The office should have a substantial and professional staff, drawn from
existing National Security Council offices and other relevant agencies. The Gilmore
Commission argued that the office should have at least five major sections, each
headed by an Assistant Director:
1. Domestic Preparedness Programs
2. Intelligence
3. Health and Medical Programs
4. Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E), and National Standards
5. Management and Budget [12]
The Hart-Rudman Commission decried the fact that responsibility for homeland
security resided at all levels of the U.S. government—local, state, and federal. That
within the federal government, almost every agency and department was involved in
some aspect of homeland security, but none was organized to focus on the scale of the
contemporary threat to the homeland. The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended
an organizational realignment that:
Designated a single person, accountable to the President, to be responsible for
coordinating and overseeing various U.S. government activities related to
homeland security;
Consolidated certain homeland security activities to improve their effectiveness
and coherence;
Established planning mechanisms to define clearly specific responses to specific
types of threats; and
Ensured that the appropriate resources and capabilities were available. [13]
In February 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission recommended the creation of a
National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning,
coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland
security. [13] Sadly, the recommendation came too little too late. Less than seven
months later the nation would suffer a terrorist attack of catastrophic proportions on
its own soil. What few had foreseen was how it would be accomplished not by WMD,
but by subverting the nation’s infrastructure.
Chapter 1: Turning Point
In February 2001, the
Hart-Rudman
Commission
recommended the
creation of a National
Homeland Security
Agency .
16
Conclusion
The United States stepped back from the brink of nuclear annihilation at the end of the
Cold War only to face the threat of nuclear terrorism at the outset of the 21st century.
The incident that brought this terrible prospect to the forefront of national security
concern was the Tokyo subway bombing in 1995. It was the first employment of WMD
by a non-state agent. Taken together with the increasing frequency and ferocity of
terrorist attacks against the United States itself, the Tokyo subway bombing suddenly
made the unthinkable not only thinkable, but credible. So as the United States
prepared for a new century, it also started preparing for the prospect of a domestic
terrorist attack employing a CBRN agent. As various advisory committees investigated
the matter and advised Congress, they developed the concept of homeland security
and the recommendation for a homeland security agency. What made it happen was
what nobody expected would happen.
Part I: Hard Lessons
17
Chapter 1: Turning Point
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What was the historic significance of the Tokyo subway attacks?
2. Why are the Tokyo subway attacks considered an act of terrorism?
3. Do you have to be a terrorist to employ a WMD agent? Explain your answer.
4. What type of WMD agent do you think would be easiest to acquire? Explain your answer.
5. What type of WMD agent do you think would be most physically destructive? Explain your answer.
6. What type of WMD agent do you think could possibly cause the most deaths? Explain your answer.
7. Would you rather have one enemy with many WMD, or many enemies with one WMD? Explain your answer.
8. Identify five differences between a soldier fighting for a country and a terrorist fighting for a cause.
9. Identify five differences between the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.
10. Identify five differences between the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks and the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting.
18
Part I: Hard Lessons
19
Lost Opportunities
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain why Osama bin Laden declared war on the U.S.
Describe the difficulties in arresting or killing Osama bin Laden.
Compare the differences between an attack on U.S. soil and an attack against U.S. foreign interests.
Discuss how 9/11 might have been prevented.
Chapter 2
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
20
Part I: Hard Lessons
"A direct attack against American citizens on American Soil is likely over the next
quarter century.”
- Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century
February 15, 2001
Introduction
On September 11th, 2001, the unthinkable happened, but not in the manner anybody
imagined. This chapter examines the opportunities missed in the gathering storm that
would become 9/11.
New Priorities
After a bitterly contested election, George W. Bush was inaugurated the 46th President
of the United States in January 2001. He campaigned on a platform that included
bringing integrity and honor back to the White House, increasing the size of the
military, cutting taxes, improving education, and aiding minorities. [1] Under the
direction of his newly appointed National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, the
incoming national security team focused their priorities on China, missile defense, the
Middle East peace process, and the Persian Gulf. In January 2001, Rice was briefed by
the outgoing National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, and told she would find herself
spending more time on terrorism in general, and al Qaeda in particular. [2, p. 199]
Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda was conceived in 1988 by Osama Bin Laden, the seventeenth child of a Saudi
construction magnate. [2, p. 55] In 1980, Bin Laden left university to help the
mujahideen fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. [3] In December 1979, the Soviet Union
sent the 40th Army into the Afghan capital of Kabul to prop up the pro-Soviet
government of Nur Mohammad Taraki. [4] Arriving in Pakistan, bin Laden joined
Abdullah Azzam and used money and machinery from his own construction company
to help the mujahideen. By 1984, bin Laden and Azzam established Maktab al-
Khidamat (MAK) to funnel money, arms, and fighters from around the Arab world into
Afghanistan. [3] After nine years, the Soviets had killed 850,000-1.5 million Afghan
civilians at a cost to their own forces of 14,453 killed and 11,654 wounded, but were
still no nearer to suppressing the mujahideen insurgency. Unwilling or unable to
sustain a counter-insurgency, Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in April 1988.
[4] As they departed, Bin Laden and Azzam agreed that the organization they created
should not be allowed to dissolve. Accordingly, they established what they called a
base or foundation, “al Qaeda” as a potential general headquarters for future jihad.
Though Azzam had been considered number one in the MAK, by August 1988 bin
Laden was clearly the leader of al Qaeda [2, pp. 55-56]
Al Qaeda was conceived
in 1988 by Osama Bin
Laden, the seventeenth
child of a Saudi
construction magnate.
21
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
Bin Laden
In 1990, bin Laden returned home to Saudi Arabia. On August 2, 1990, Saddam
Hussein launched the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. With nothing to stop Iraqi forces from
crossing into Saudi Arabia, the royal family felt at risk. Bin Laden, whose efforts in
Afghanistan had earned him celebrity and respect, proposed to the Saudi monarchy
that he summon mujahideen for a jihad to retake Kuwait. He was rebuffed, and the
Saudis joined the U.S.-led coalition. [2, p. 57] On August 7, 1990, the U.S. 82nd
Airborne landed in Dhahran Saudi Arabia, and took up positions barely 400 miles from
Medina, the second holiest site in Islam. [3] Bin Laden and a number of Muslim clerics
began to publicly denounce the arrangement. The Saudi government exiled the clerics
and undertook to silence bin Laden by, among other things, confiscating his passport.
With help from a dissident member of the royal family, bin Laden managed to get out
of the country and make his way to Sudan. [2, p. 57]
Exile in Sudan
Previously, In 1989, bin Laden had been invited by Hassan al Turabi, head of the
National Islamic Front, to assist him in Sudan. After making his escape from Saudi
Arabia in 1991, bin Laden moved to Khartoum and set about building a large set of
complex and intertwined business and terrorist enterprises. In time, his business
ventures would encompass numerous companies and a global network of bank
accounts and nongovernmental institutions. Fulfilling his bargain with Turabi, bin
Laden used his construction company to build a new highway from Khartoum to Port
Sudan on the Red Sea coast. Meanwhile, al Qaeda finance officers and top operatives
used their positions in bin Laden’s companies to acquire weapons, explosives, and
technical equipment for terrorist purposes. In early 1992, al Qaeda issued a fatwa, a
religious edict calling for jihad against the Western “occupation” of Islamic lands,
specifically singling out U.S. forces for attack. During bin Laden’s time in Sudan, al
Qaeda was suspected of supporting attacks against U.S. forces in Yemen, Somalia, and
Saudi Arabia. [2, pp. 57-61] In 1995 al Qaeda was implicated in an assassination
attempt against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Subsequent pressure from Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and the United States forced the expulsion of bin Laden from Sudan.
Because his citizenship had been revoked in 1994, bin Laden could not return to Saudi
Arabia. Instead, he chose to return to Pakistan and eventually make his way back to
Afghanistan. [3]
In response to Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait on August 2,
1990, the U.S. 82nd
Airborne deployed to
Dhahran Saudi Arabia,
and took up positions
barely 400 miles from
Medina, the second
holiest site in Islam. Bin
Laden and a number of
Muslim clerics began to
publicly denounce the
arrangement.
22
Part I: Hard Lessons
Return to Afghanistan
When bin Laden arrived in Pakistan in May 1996, the Taliban were still fighting to gain
control of Afghanistan. After the Soviets departed in April 1988, Afghanistan erupted
in civil war between competing militias. In 1994, the Taliban arose as a political-
religious force, and with financial backing from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, succeeded in
rising to power in September 1996. [5] Under the protection of the Taliban leader,
Mullah Muhammed Omar, bin Laden re-established al Qaeda operations in Kandahar,
Afghanistan. Through his connections, bin Laden brought much needed financial
support to the Taliban. In return, bin Laden and al Qaeda were given a sanctuary in
which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, and plot and
staff terrorist schemes. The Taliban seemed to open the doors to all who wanted to
come to Afghanistan to train in the camps. It is estimated some 10,000 to 20,000
fighters underwent instruction at bin Laden supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996
to 2001. [2, pp. 65-67]
War on the United States
Shortly after arriving in Afghanistan in 1996, bin Laden issued a fatwa declaring war
against the United States. U.S. forces remained in Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom
from any further aggression by Saddam Hussein. [3] In his 1996 fatwa, bin Laden
decried the “occupation of the land of the two Holy Places—the foundation of the
house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of
the noble Ka’ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims—by the armies of the American Crusaders
and their allies.” [6] Two years later, after al Qaeda had regathered its strength, bin
Laden issued a second fatwa in February 1998. The second fatwa declared the killing
of North Americans and their allies an “individual duty for every Muslim” to “liberate
the al Aqsa Mosque (in Jerusalem) and the holy mosque (in Mecca) from their grip”. At
the public announcement of the fatwa, bin Laden called North Americans “very easy
targets”, and told journalists “You will see the results of this in a very short time.” On
August 7, 1998, two truck bombs were exploded outside U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Together, the explosions killed 224 people
including 12 Americans, and injured 4,500 more. The attacks were linked to al Qaeda,
and bin Laden was placed on the FBI’s list of Ten Most Wanted. [3]
Shortly after arriving in
Afghanistan in 1996, bin
Laden issued a fatwa
declaring war against
the United States.
23
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
Cat and Mouse
Al Qaeda and bin Laden had come to the attention of the U.S. before the African
embassy bombings. The CIA had even conceived a kidnapping plan to deliver bin
Laden to an Arab court to answer for his role in the failed assassination attempt on
Egypt’s president. Because CIA senior management didn’t think the plan would work,
it was never executed. Still, the CIA maintained surveillance of bin Laden and al Qaeda.
It was because of this monitoring they were able to quickly trace the embassy
bombings back to bin Laden. Debate about what to do settled very soon on one
option: Tomahawk cruise missiles. [2, pp. 114-118] Two weeks later, on March 20,
1998, Navy vessels in the Arabian Sea fired about 75 cruise missiles at four training
camps inside Afghanistan. One camp was where bin Laden met with other leaders.
According to the CIA, bin Laden departed the camp just hours before the cruise
missiles hit. [7] At the same time he authorized the cruise missile attacks, President
Clinton issued a Memorandum of Notification authorizing the CIA to capture bin Laden.
A second memorandum issued in December authorized the CIA to capture or kill bin
Laden. As the agency examined alternative plans throughout 1999, all were discarded
as either unlikely to succeed or likely to cause significant collateral damage. [2, pp. 126
-143] At the turn of the new century, al Qaeda was implicated in failed attacks against
targets in Jordan, and the USS The Sullivans. Jordanian police foiled the first, and the
boat filled with explosives sank before detonating. Together with a failed attack on Los
Angeles International Airport they were collectively called the “Millennium Plot”. [8]
While reviewing these actions in January 2000, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
was advised that more al Qaeda attacks were not a question of “if” but rather of
“when” and “where”. The warning placed increased pressure on efforts to capture or
kill bin Laden. The State Department was thwarted by the Taliban’s refusal to give him
over. CIA progress was slowed by attempts to recruit Taliban rivals in southern
Afghanistan. Military options were stymied by absence of a friendly operating base in
the area. President Clinton noted the lack of progress in March 2000 when he wrote in
the margin of his daily briefing that “the United States could surely do better.” [2, pp.
182-190] On October 12, 2000, a speed boat laden with explosives rammed the USS
Cole in Yemen, killing 17 sailors and heavily damaging the destroyer. While al Qaeda
was suspected in the attack, the absence of “smoking gun” evidence prevented the
White House from delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban to give up bin Laden. Further
action was subsequently deferred to the new Bush Administration after belatedly
winning one of the closest presidential contests in U.S. history. [2, pp. 190-198]
On October 12, 2000, a
speed boat laden with
explosives rammed the
USS Cole in Yemen,
killing 17 sailors and
heavily damaging the
destroyer.
24
Part I: Hard Lessons
The Planes Operation
By early 1999, al Qaeda was already a potent adversary of the United States. Bin Laden
and his chief of operations, Abu Hafs al Masri, also known as Mohammed Atef,
occupied undisputed leadership positions atop al Qaeda’s organizational structure.
Within this structure, al Qaeda’s worldwide terrorist operations relied heavily on the
ideas and work of enterprising and strong willed field commanders who enjoyed
considerable autonomy. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) was one such commander.
[2, p. 145] KSM was involved in the “Bojinka” plot, a 1995 plan to bomb 12 U.S.
commercial jets in midair over the Pacific as they flew home from the Philippines. The
plot was discovered, however, and KSM’s accomplices arrested in Manila. KSM evaded
capture and made his way to Afghanistan in 1996. Shortly after arriving, he managed a
meeting with bin Laden and Mohammed Atef. KSM presented several ideas for attack
against the United States. One proposal involved hijacking ten planes to attack targets
on both the East and West coasts of the United States. In addition to the Twin Towers
and Pentagon, the planes were to hit the White House, CIA and FBI headquarters,
unidentified nuclear power plants, and the tallest buildings in California and
Washington State. The tenth plane was to kill every adult male passenger before
landing and denouncing U.S. Middle East policies in front of the media. Bin Laden
listened, but did not commit. [9, pp. 1-2] He had just arrived in Afghanistan himself,
and had yet to re-establish al Qaeda operations. It wasn’t until after the African
embassy bombings in 1998 that planning for the 9/11 operation began in earnest. In
March/April 1999, bin Laden summoned KSM to Kandahar and told him al Qaeda
would support his proposal, but he had to scale it back. KSM and bin Laden agreed to
four targets: the Twin Towers, Pentagon, White House, and U.S. Capitol. The plot was
now referred to within al Qaeda as the “Planes Operation”. [2, pp. 148-154]
Recruitment
Bin Laden soon selected four individuals to serve as suicide operatives: Nawaf al
Hazmi, Khalid al Mihdhar, Walid Muhammad Salih bin Attash, also known as Khallad,
and Abu Bara Taizi. Hazmi and Mihdhar were Saudi nationals; Khallad and Abu Bara
were from Yemen. KSM knew the Yemeni nationals would have trouble obtaining U.S.
visas. Therefore, KSM decided to split the operation into two parts. Hazmi and
Mihdhar would go to the United States, and Khallad and Abu Bara would go to
Malaysia to carry out a smaller version of the Bojinka plot. The four spent most the rest
of the year at the Mes Aynak training camp in Afghanistan before they flew to Kuala
Lumpur where they were to study airport security and conduct surveillance of U.S.
carriers. On January 15, 2000, Hazmi and Mihdhar took off for Los Angeles to complete
plans for the U.S. portion of the attack. Khallad and Abu Bara remained behind, but
they would never complete their portion of the Planes Operation; in the spring of
2000, bin Laden cancelled the Malaysia part of the operation because it was too
difficult to coordinate with the U.S. part. Meanwhile, those plans continued. [9, pp. 2-
3]
al Qaeda’s worldwide
terrorist operations
relied heavily on the
ideas and work of
enterprising and strong
willed field commanders
who enjoyed
considerable autonomy.
Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed (KSM) was
one such commander.
KSM presented several
ideas for attack against
the United States.
25
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
While KSM was deploying his initial operatives for the 9/11 attacks to Kuala Lumpur, a
group of four Western-educated men who would prove ideal for the attacks were
making their way from Hamburg Germany to al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The four
were Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Ramzi Binalshibh. Atta,
Shehhi, and Jarrah would become pilots for the 9/11 attacks, while Binalshibh would
act as a key coordinator for the plot. [9, p. 3]
Binalshibh, Atta, and Jarrah met with Bin Laden’s deputy, Mohamed Atef, who directed
them to return to Germany and enroll in flight training. Atta was chosen as the emir, or
leader, of the mission. He met with Bin Laden to discuss the targets: the World Trade
Center, which represented the U.S. economy; the Pentagon, a symbol of the U.S.
military; and the U.S. Capitol, the perceived source of U.S. policy in support of Israel.
The White House was also on the list, as Bin Laden considered it a political symbol and
wanted to attack it as well. In early 2000, Shehhi, Atta, and Binalshibh met with KSM in
Karachi for training that included learning about life in the United States and how to
read airline schedules. [9, p. 4]
By early March 2000, all four new al Qaeda recruits were back in Hamburg. They began
researching flight schools in Europe, but quickly found that training in the United
States would be cheaper and faster. Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah obtained U.S. visas, but
Binalshibh—the sole Yemeni in the group—was rejected repeatedly. In the spring of
2000, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah prepared to travel to the United States to begin flight
training. Binalshibh would remain behind and help coordinate the operation, serving as
a link between KSM and Atta. [9, p. 4]
Training
While the Hamburg operatives were just joining the 9/11 plot, Nawaf al Hazmi and
Khalid al Mihdhar were already living in the United States. Having arrived in Los
Angeles in January, they moved to San Diego in February. KSM contends that he
directed the two to settle in San Diego after learning from a phone book about
language and flight schools there. Hazmi and Mihdhar were supposed to learn English
and then enroll in flight schools, but they made only cursory attempts at both. Mihdhar
paid for an English class that Hazmi took for about a month. The two al Qaeda
operatives also took a few short flying lessons. According to their flight instructors,
they were interested in learning to fly jets and did not realize that they had to start
training on small planes. In June 2000, Mihdhar abruptly returned to his family in
Yemen, apparently without permission. KSM was very displeased and wanted to
remove him from the operation, but Bin Laden interceded, and Mihdhar remained part
of the plot. [9, pp. 4-6]
In March/April 1999, bin
Laden summoned KSM
to Kandahar and told
him al Qaeda would
support his proposal,
but he had to scale it
back. KSM and bin
Laden agreed to four
targets: the Twin
Towers, Pentagon,
White House, and U.S.
Capitol. The plot was
now referred to within
al Qaeda as the “Planes
Operation”.
26
Part I: Hard Lessons
On the East Coast, in May and June 2000, the three operatives from Hamburg who had
succeeded in obtaining visas began arriving in the United States. Mohamed Atta and
Marwan Shehhi flew into New Jersey; Ziad Jarrah flew into Florida. Atta and Shehi
looked into flight schools in New Hampshire and New Jersey, and, after spending about
a month in New York City, visited the Airman Flight School in Norman, Oklahoma. For
some reason, Atta and Shehhi decided not to enroll there. Instead, they went to
Venice, Florida, where Jarrah had already started his training at Florida Flight Training
Center. Atta and Shehhi enrolled in a different flight school, Huffman Aviation, and
began training almost daily. Jarrah obtained his single engine private pilot certificate in
early August; Atta and Shehhi received their pilots’ licenses a few weeks later. Their
instructors described Atta and Shehhi as aggressive and rude, and in a hurry to
complete their training. [9, p. 6]
The plot called for four pilots. By the fall of 2000, Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah were
progressing in their training. It was clear, though, that Hazmi and Mihdhar would not
learn to fly aircraft. In their place was sent a young Saudi named Hani Hanjour.
Hanjour had studied in the United States intermittently since 1991, and had undergone
enough flight training in Arizona to obtain his commercial pilot certificate in April 1999.
In 2000, he was training for al Qaeda at the al Faruq camp in Afghanistan. Recognizing
his skills, Hanjour was sent to KSM for inclusion in the plot. On December 8, 2000,
Hani Hanjour joined Nawaf al Hazmi in San Diego; Khalid al Mihdhar was still absent in
Yemen. Together, Hanjour and Hazmi relocated to Mesa Arizona where Hanjour spent
most of his previous time in the United States. By early 2001, Hanjour was training in a
Boeing 737 simulator. Because his performance struck his flight instructors as sub-
standard, they discouraged Hanjour from continuing, but he persisted. By the end of
March, Hanjour finished training and drove east with Hazmi. On April 1 they were
stopped and issued a speeding ticket in Oklahoma. A few days later they arrived in
Northern Virginia and rented an apartment in Alexandria outside Washington DC. In
May they moved to Paterson New Jersey to be closer to New York City. [9, pp. 7-8]
Back in Florida, the Hamburg pilots—Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah—continued to train. By
the end of 2000, they also were starting to train on jet aircraft simulators. Around the
beginning of the New Year, all three of them left the United States on various foreign
trips. Atta traveled to Germany for an early January 2001 meeting with Ramzi
Binalshibh. Atta reported that the pilots had completed their training and were
awaiting further instruction from al Qaeda. After the meeting, Atta returned to Florida
and Binalshibh headed to Afghanistan to brief the al Qaeda leadership. [9, p. 7]
The plot called for four
pilots. By the fall of
2000, Atta, Shehhi, and
Jarrah were progressing
in their training.
27
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
While the pilots trained in the United States, Bin Laden and al Qaeda leaders in
Afghanistan started selecting the muscle hijackers—those operatives who would storm
the cockpit and control the passengers on the four hijacked planes. (The term “muscle”
hijacker appears in the interrogation reports of 9/11 conspirators KSM and Binalshibh,
and has been widely used to refer to the non-pilot hijackers.) The so-called muscle
hijackers actually were not physically imposing, as the majority of them were between
5’5” and 5’7” in height and slender in build. In addition to Hazmi and Mihdhar, the first
pair to enter the United States, there were 13 other muscle hijackers, all but one from
Saudi Arabia. They were Satam al Suqami, Wail and Waleed al Shehri (two brothers),
Abdul Aziz al Omari, Fayez Banihammad (from the UAE), Ahmed al Ghamdi, Hamza al
Ghamdi, Mohand al Shehri, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmad al Haznawi, Ahmed al Nami,
Majed Moqed, and Salem al Hazmi (the brother of Nawaf al Hazmi). [9, p. 8]
The muscle hijackers received special training in Afghanistan on how to conduct
hijackings, disarm air marshals, and handle explosives and knives. Next KSM sent them
to the UAE, where his nephew, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and another al Qaeda member,
Mustafa al Hawsawi, would help them buy plane tickets to the United States. In late
April 2001, the muscle hijackers started arriving in the United States, specifically in
Florida, Washington, DC, and New York. They traveled mostly in pairs and were
assisted upon arrival by Atta and Shehhi in Florida or Hazmi and Hanjour in DC and
New York. The final pair, Salem al Hazmi and Abdulaziz al Omari, arrived New York on
June 29 and likely were picked up the following day by Salem’s brother, Nawaf, as
evidenced by Nawaf’s minor traffic accident while heading east on the George
Washington Bridge. Finally, on July 4, Khalid al Mihdhar, who had abandoned Nawaf al
Hazmi back in San Diego 13 months earlier, re-entered the United States. Mihdhar
promptly joined the group in Paterson, New Jersey. [9, pp. 8-9]
In addition to assisting the newly-arrived muscle hijackers, the pilots busied
themselves during the summer of 2001 with cross-country surveillance flights and
additional flight training. In addition to the test flights, some of the operatives
obtained additional training. The 9/11 operatives were now split between two
locations: southern Florida and Paterson, New Jersey. Atta had to coordinate the two
groups, especially with Nawaf al Hazmi, who was considered Atta’s second-in-
command for the entire operation. Their first in-person meeting probably took place in
June, when Hazmi flew round-trip between Newark and Miami. [9, p. 9]
While the pilots trained
in the United States, Bin
Laden and al Qaeda
leaders in Afghanistan
started selecting the
muscle hijackers—those
operatives who would
storm the cockpit and
control the passengers
on the four hijacked
planes.
28
Part I: Hard Lessons
The next step for Atta was a mid-July status meeting with Binalshibh at a small resort
town in Spain. According to Binalshibh, the two discussed the progress of the plot, and
Atta disclosed that he would still need about five or six weeks before he would be able
to provide the date for the attacks. Atta also reported that he, Shehhi, and Jarrah had
been able to carry box cutters onto their test flights; they had determined that the best
time to storm the cockpit would be about 10-15 minutes after takeoff, when they
noticed that cockpit doors were typically opened for the first time. Atta also said that
the conspirators planned to crash their planes into the ground if they could not strike
their targets. Atta himself planned to crash his aircraft into the streets of New York if
he could not hit the World Trade Center. After the meeting, Binalshibh left to report
the progress to the al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan, and Atta returned to Florida on
July 19. [9, pp. 9-10]
In early August, Atta spent a day waiting at the Orlando airport for one additional
muscle hijacker intended for the operation, Mohamed al Kahtani. Kahtani was turned
away by U.S. immigration officials and failed to join the operation. On August 13,
another in-person meeting of key players in the plot apparently took place, as Atta,
Nawaf al Hazmi, and Hanjour gathered in Las Vegas. Two days later, the FBI learned
about the strange behavior of Zacarias Moussaoui, who was now training on flight
simulators in Minneapolis. [9, p. 10]
On August 15, 2001, the flight school reported its suspicions about Moussaoui to the
FBI, including that he only wanted to learn how to take off and land the airplane, that
he had no background in aviation, and that he had paid in cash for the course. The
Minneapolis FBI opened an investigation on Moussaoui, believing that he was seeking
flight training to commit a terrorist act. . [10, p. 101] On August 16, 2001, Moussaoui
was arrested by FBI and INS agents in Minnesota and charged with an immigration
violation. Materials itemized when he was arrested included a laptop computer, two
knives, flight manuals pertaining to Boeing's 747 aircraft, a flight simulator computer
program, fighting gloves and shin guards, and a computer disk with information about
crop dusting. [11] Without any firm evidence of terrorist intentions, and unable to
obtain a warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop, the FBI began plans to deport
Moussaoui to France and ask French authorities to search his belongings. [10, p. 101]
On August 15, 2001, a
flight school reported to
the FBI that one of its
students, Zacarias
Moussaoui only wanted
to learn how to take off
and land the airplane,
that he had no
background in aviation,
and that he had paid in
cash for the course.
29
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
Moussaoui’s arrest occurred about a month after an FBI field agent in Phoenix sent an
electronic communication to headquarters suggesting that bin Laden affiliated agents
were attending flight schools with possible intent of targeting civil aviation. Later
referred to as the “Phoenix Memo”, the message was transmitted to the FBI
Counterterrorism Division and New York Division on July 10, 2001. The message was
sent after conducting surveillance on four students attending aviation colleges and
universities in Arizona. While some of the subjects confessed to being al Qaeda
members, none were associated with the Planes Operation. The Phoenix Memo did
not raise any particular alarm at the FBI because it gave no specific evidence and was
marked for “routine” action. [10, pp. 60-64]
Just over two weeks before the attacks, the conspirators purchased their flight tickets.
Between August 26 and September 5, they bought tickets on the Internet, by phone,
and in person. Once the ticket purchases were made, the conspirators returned excess
funds to al Qaeda. The last step was to travel to the departure points for the attacks.
[9, p. 10]
The teams assembled according to their assigned targets. Operatives attacking the
Pentagon gathered in Laurel Maryland near Dulles Airport where they were scheduled
to take American Airlines Flight 77. On September 10th they stayed the night at a
hotel in Herndon, Virginia. Operatives assigned to attack the White House gathered in
Newark where they were scheduled to take United Airlines Flight 93. Just after
midnight on September 9, Jarrah received a speeding ticket as he headed north
through Maryland along Interstate 95, towards his team’s staging point in New Jersey.
The two teams targeting the Twin Towers both staged out of Boston. By September 9,
Marwan al Shehhi and the team he would lead against United Airlines Flight 175 had
arrived in Boston. The team that Mohammed Atta would lead against American
Airlines Flight 11 was also assembled in Boston. Then, for reasons unknown, on
September 10, Atta picked up Abdul Aziz al Omari, one of the Flight 11 muscle
hijackers, from his Boston hotel and drove to Portland, Maine. They would take a
commuter flight to Boston during the early hours of September 11 to connect to Flight
11. The Portland detour almost prevented Atta and Omari from making Flight 11 out of
Boston. In fact, the luggage they checked in Portland failed to make it onto the plane.
On the morning of September 11, after years of planning and many months of
intensive preparation, all four terrorist teams were in place to execute the attacks of
that day. [9, pp. 10-11]
On August 16, 2001,
Moussaoui was arrested
and charged with an
immigration violation.
Moussaoui’s arrest
occurred about a month
after an FBI field agent
sent what was later
called the “Phoenix
Memo” to headquarters
suggesting that bin
Laden affiliated agents
were attending flight
schools with possible
intent of targeting civil
aviation.
30
Part I: Hard Lessons
Conclusion
Though the 9/11 attacks were unforeseen, it is plausible they might still have been
prevented. Before the attacks occurred, bin Laden was a known terrorist with an
avowed mission to kill Americans, wanted by the U.S. government. Attempts to
capture or kill him, though, were ultimately thwarted by a lack of will; while the CIA
dallied in tribal negotiations, the administration was unwilling to risk the collateral
damage attendant to overt military operations. Still, the Planes Operation might have
been foiled during any number instances at home, particularly when 1) known al
Qaeda operatives crossed U.S. borders, 2) the FBI received the Phoenix Memo warning
of a potential strike against U.S. civil aviation, coupled with 3) the arrest of Zacarias
Moussaoui while attending flight school, and 4) when plot members were ticketed for
speeding. These lost opportunities, and more such on the day of the attacks, would
figure prominently in shaping the nation’s homeland security policy.
31
Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why did Osama bin Laden declare war on the United States?
2. Describe the two different attacks Osama bin Laden successfully mounted against the U.S. before 9/11.
3. Identify five similarities between the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing.
4. Identify five differences between the 2000 attack on the USS Cole and the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.
5. Would you classify the following attacks as a criminal act or act of war? Explain your answers.
a. 1983 Beirut barracks bombing
b. 1993 attack on the World Trade Center
c. 2000 attack on the USS Cole
6. Why didn’t the U.S. simply arrest Osama bin Laden after the 2000 attack on the USS Cole?
7. Why didn’t the U.S. simply kill Osama bin Laden after the 2000 attack on the USS Cole?
8. List three reasons why an attack on U.S. soil would be harder than an attack against U.S. foreign interests.
9. List three reasons why Osama bin Laden would want to mount an attack on U.S. soil.
10. Do you think 9/11 was preventable? Explain your answer.
32
Part I: Hard Lessons
33
We Have Some Planes
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the 9/11 attacks.
Explain the significance of the targets.
Assess whether a similar attack would be successful today.
Demonstrate the relationship between 9/11 and the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks.
Chapter 3
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
34
Part I: Hard Lessons
“American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay. We are
returning to the airport.”
- 2004 9/11 Commissioner Report
Introduction
Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless in the eastern
United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves for work. Some made
their way to the Twin Towers, the signature structures of the World Trade Center
complex in New York City. Others went to Arlington, Virginia, to the Pentagon. Across
the Potomac River, the United States Congress was back in session. At the other end
of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began to line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota,
Florida, President George W. Bush went for an early morning run.
For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have been better for a
safe and pleasant journey. Among the travelers were Mohamed Atta and Abdul Aziz al
Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland Maine.
Boston: American 11 and United 175
On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, Mohammed Atta and Abul Aziz al Omari arrived at
the airport in Portland Maine to catch a 6:00 a.m. flight to Boston's Logan
International Airport. [1, p. 253]
When he checked in for his flight to Boston, Atta was selected by a computerized
prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System), created to identify passengers who should be subject to special security
measures. Under security rules in place at the time, the only consequence of Atta's
selection by CAPPS was that his checked bags were held off the plane until it was
confirmed that he had boarded the aircraft. [1, p. 1]
Table 3-1: 9/11 Hijackers & Flights
AA Flt. 11, Boston Logan AA Flt. 77, Dulles
1. Mohammed Atta* 11. Hani Hanjour*
2. Abul Aziz al Omari 12. Khalid al Midhhar
3. Satam al Suqami 13. Majed Moqed
4. Wail al Shehri 14. Nawaf al Hazmi
5. Waleed al Shehri 15. Salem al Hazmi
UA Flt. 175, Boston Logan UA Flt. 93, Newark
6. Marwan al Shehhi* 16. Ziad Jarrah*
7. Fayez Banihammad 17. Saeed al Ghamdi
8. Mohand al Shehri 18. Ahmed al Nami
9. Ahmed al Ghamndi 19. Ahad al Haznawi
10. Hamza al Ghamdi *Designated Pilot
35
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
At 6:45 a.m., Atta and Omari arrived in Boston. Between 6:45 and 7:40, Atta and
Omari, along with Satam al Suqami, Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in
and boarded American Airlines Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles. The flight was
scheduled to depart at 7:45. [1, p. 2]
Elsewhere at Logan Airport, Marwan al Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al Shehri,
Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi checked in for United Airlines Flight 175, also
bound for Los Angeles. Their flight was scheduled to depart at 08:00. [1, p. 2]
As Atta's team passed through passenger screening, three members--Suqami, Wail al
Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri--were selected by CAPPS. Their selection affected only
the handling of their checked bags, not their screening at the checkpoint. All five men
cleared the checkpoint and made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari,
and Suqami took their seats in business class. The Shehri brothers had adjacent seats
in row 2 in the first-class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40.
The aircraft pushed back from the gate at 7:40. [1, p. 2]
Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, boarded United 175
between 7:23 and 7:28. Their aircraft pushed back from the gate just before 8:00. [1,
p. 2]
Washington Dulles: American 77
At 7:15 a.m., Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed checked in with the American
Airlines ticket counter at Dulles International Airport in Virginia. Both were ticketed for
Flight 77 bound for Los Angeles. Within 20 minutes, three other members of the team
checked in including Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Salem al Hazmi. Hani Hanjour,
Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged by CAPPS. The Hazmi brothers
were also selected for extra security by the airline's customer service representative at
the check-in counter. He did so because one of the brothers did not have photo
identification nor could he understand English, and because the agent found both
passengers to be suspicious. The only consequence of their selection was that their
checked bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had boarded the
aircraft. [1, p. 3]
On the morning of
September 11, 2001,
eight of the nineteen
hijackers were flagged
by the Computer
Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System
(CAPPS). Under security
rules in place at the
time, the only
consequence was that
their checked bags were
held off the plane until it
was confirmed that they
had boarded the
aircraft.
36
Part I: Hard Lessons
The five hijackers proceeded to the Main Terminal's west security screening point. The
checkpoint featured closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the
hijackers as they were screened. Both Mihdhar and Moqed set off the metal detector
and were directed to a second metal detector. Mihdhar did not trigger the alarm and
was permitted through the checkpoint. Moqed set it off, a screener wanded him with
a hand-held magnetic detector. He passed this inspection. About 20 minutes later,
Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi, and Salem al Hazmi entered the screening area. Nawaf
al Hazmi set off both the first and second metal detectors and was then hand-wanded
before being passed. In addition, his over-the-shoulder carry-on bag was swiped by an
explosive trace detector and then passed. [1, p. 3]
At 7:50 a.m., Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded American 77 and were
seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B in first class, soon
followed. The Hazmi brothers, sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in the first-class
cabin. [1, pp. 3-4]
Newark: United 93
At Newark Airport in New Jersey, another hijacking team assembled. Between 7:03
and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed al Nami, Ahad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked
in at the United Airlines Ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles. Haznawi
was selected by CAPPS. His checked bag was screened for explosives and then loaded
on the plane. [1, p. 4]
The four men passed though the security checkpoint and boarded their plane between
7:39 and 7:48. All four had seats in the first-class cabin. Jarrah was in seat 1B, closest
to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Haznawi in 6B. [1, p. 4]
The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights. They were planning to hijack
these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons
of jet fuel. By 8:00 a.m. on the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, they had
defeated all the security layers that America's civil aviation security system then had in
place to prevent hijacking. [1, p. 4]
The Hijacking of American 11
American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to Los Angeles. On
September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Officer Thomas McGuinness piloted
the Boeing 767. It carried its full capacity of nine flight attendants. Eighty-one
passengers boarded the flight with them, including the five terrorists. [1, p. 4]
At Washington Dulles,
three of the hijackers set
off metal detectors and
were directed to
secondary screening. All
three passed inspection
with a hand-held
magnetic detector.
37
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
American Flight 11 took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not
quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. All communications and flight
profile data were normal. About this time, the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would usually
have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin
service. [1, p. 4]
At this time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it
acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA's air traffic control (ATC) center
in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmission, ATC instructed the aircraft's pilots
to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the
flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, it is believed the
hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter. [1, p. 4]
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong and Madeline "Amy"
Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how the hijacking happened. As it
began, some of the hijackers--most likely Wail al Shehri and Waleed al Shehri, who
were seated in row 2 in first class--stabbed the two unarmed flight attendants who
would have been preparing for cabin service. [1, p. 5]
It's not known exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit; FAA rules
required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight. Ong speculated that
they had "jammed their way" in. Perhaps the terrorists stabbed the flight attendants
to get a cockpit key, to force one of them to open the cockpit door, or to lure the
captain or first officer out of the cockpit. [1, p. 5]
At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta--the only terrorist on board trained to fly a
jet--would have moved to the cockpit from his business-class seat, possibly
accompanied by Omari. As this was happening, passenger Daniel Lewin, who was
seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed by one of the hijackers--
probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated directly behind Lewin. Lewin had served
four years as an officer in the Israeli military. He may have made an attempt to stop
the hijackers in front of him, not realizing that another was sitting behind him. [1, p. 5]
The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, or some other
irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to for the passengers and flight attendants
toward the rear of the plane. They claimed they had a bomb. [1, p. 5]
By 8:00 a.m. on the
morning of Tuesday,
September 11, 2001, the
nineteen hijackers had
defeated all the security
layers that America's
civil aviation security
system then had in place
to prevent hijacking.
38
Part I: Hard Lessons
About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted the American
Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Carolina, via an AT&T airphone
to report an emergency aboard the flight. The emergency call lasted approximately 25
minutes, as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about events taking
place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. [1, p. 5]
At 8:19, Ong reported: "The cockpit is not answering, somebody's stabbed in business
class--and I think there's Mace--that we can't breathe--I don't know, I think we're
getting hijacked." She then told of the stabbings of the two flight attendants. [1, p. 5]
American's Southeastern Reservations Office quickly contacted the American Airlines
operations center in Fort Worth, Texas, who soon contacted the FAA's Boston Air
Traffic Control Center. Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because
just before 8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers.
The microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said, "Nobody move.
Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you'll endanger yourself and the
airplane. Just stay quiet." Air traffic controllers heard the transmission; Ong did not.
The hijackers probably did not know how to operate the cockpit radio communication
system correctly, and thus inadvertently broadcast their message over the air traffic
control channel instead of the cabin public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at
8:29, Amy Sweeney got through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but
was cut off after she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight. Three minutes
later, Sweeney was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to her
manager. [1, pp. 5-6]
At 8:26, Ong reported that the plane was "flying erratically." A minute later, Flight 11
turned south. American also began getting identifications of the hijackers, as Ong and
then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers of those who had gained
unauthorized access to the cockpit. [1, p. 6]
At 8:41 Sweeney reported that passengers in coach were under the impression there
was a routine medical emergency in first class. Other flight attendants were busy at
duties such as getting medical supplies while Ong and Sweeney were reporting events.
[1, p. 6]
At 8:41, American's operations center learned that air traffic controllers had declared
Flight 11 a hijacking, and thought it was headed toward Kennedy airport in New York
City. Air traffic control was busy moving other flights out of the way as they tracked
Flight 11 on primary radar, which seemed to show the aircraft descending. [1, p. 6]
At 8:46:40, American 11
crashed into the North
Tower of the World
Trade Center in New
York City. All on board,
along with an unknown
number of people in the
tower, were killed
instantly.
39
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
At 8:44 contact was lost with Betty Ong. About this time Sweeney reported
"Something is wrong. We are in a rapid descent... we are all over the place." When
asked to look out the window, Sweeney reported "We are flying low. We are flying
very, very low. We are flying way too low." Seconds later she said, "Oh my God we are
way too low." The phone call ended. [1, p. 7]
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in
New York City. All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower,
were killed instantly. [1, p. 7]
The Hijacking of United 175
United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00. Captain
Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing767, which had
seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight. [1, p. 7]
United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airport at 8:14. By
8:33, it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet. The flight attendants
would have begun their cabin service. [1, p. 7]
The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46. They used knives, Mace, and
the threat of a bomb. They stabbed members of the flight crew. Both pilots had been
killed. The eyewitness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, from
passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign that passengers and
perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. [1, p. 7]
The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on United 175 came at
8:47 when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within a minute. At 8:51, the flight
deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minute later New York air traffic controllers
began repeatedly and unsuccessfully trying to contact it. [1, p. 7]
At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received a phone call from
his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son told him: "I think they've taken over
the cockpit--an attendant has been stabbed--and someone else up front may have
been killed. The plane is making strange moves. Call United Airlines--Tell them it's
Flight 175, Boston to LA." Lee Hansen then called the Easton Police Department and
relayed what he had heard. [1, p. 7]
The first operational
evidence that something
was abnormal on United
175 came at 8:47 when
the aircraft changed
beacon codes twice
within a minute. At
8:51, the flight deviated
from its assigned
altitude, and a minute
later New York air traffic
controllers began
repeatedly and
unsuccessfully trying to
contact it.
40
Part I: Hard Lessons
Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francisco. The flight
attendant reported that the flight had been hijacked, both pilots killed, a flight
attendant stabbed, and the hijackers were probably flying the plane. The call lasted
about two minutes. [1, pp. 7-8]
At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City. At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger
Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wife, Julie. He left a message on their home
answering machine that the plane had been hijacked. He then called his mother, Luise
Sweeney, told her the flight had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were
thinking about storming the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the
hijackers. [1, p. 8]
At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter: It's getting bad, Dad--A
stewardess was stabbed--They seem to have knives and Mace--They said they have a
bomb--It's getting very bad on the plane--Passengers are throwing up and getting sick--
The plane is making jerky movements--I don't think the pilot is flying the plane--I think
we are going down--I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a
building--Don't worry Dad--If it happens, it'll be very fast--My God, my God. [1, p. 8]
The call ended abruptly. Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just before it cut off.
He turned on a television, and in her home so did Luise Sweeney. Both then saw the
second aircraft hit the World Trade Center. [1, p. 8]
At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the World Trade
Center. All on board, along with an unknown number of people in the tower, were
killed instantly. [1, p. 8]
At 9:03:11, United
Airlines Flight 175 struck
the South Tower of the
World Trade Center. All
on board, along with an
unknown number of
people in the tower,
were killed instantly.
41
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
The Hijacking of American 77
American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dulles for Los
Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Captain Charles F.
Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were four flight attendants. On
September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers. [1, p. 8]
American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20. At 8:46, the flight
reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin service would have begun.
At 8:51, American 77 transmitted its last routine radio communication. The hijacking
began between 8:51 and 8:54. As on American 11 and United 175, the hijackers used
knives and moved all the passengers to the rear of the aircraft. Unlike the earlier
flights, the Flight 77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters.
Finally, a passenger reported that an announcement had been made by the "pilot" that
the plane had been hijacked. Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any
stabbings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace, though both witnesses began
the flight in the first-class cabin. [1, p. 8]
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south. Two minutes
later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar contact with the aircraft
was lost. The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repeatedly tried and failed to
contact the aircraft. American Airlines dispatchers also tried, without success. [1, p. 9]
At 9:00, American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learned that
communications had been lost with American 77. This was now the second American
aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights in the Northeast that had
not taken off to remain on the ground. After learning that United Airlines was missing
a plane, American Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide. [1, p. 9]
At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She said her flight
was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to the rear of the plane.
She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy May and her husband
promptly did so. [1, p. 9]
As some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husband, Ted Olson,
the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that the flight had been
hijacked, and the hijackers had knives and box cutters. She further indicated that the
hijackers were not aware of her phone call, and that they had put all the passengers in
the back of the plane. About a minute into the conversation the call was cut off. [1, p.
9]
At 8:54, American 77
deviated from its
assigned course, turning
south. Two minutes
later the transponder
was turned off and even
primary radar contact
with the aircraft was
lost. The Indianapolis
Air Traffic Control
Center repeatedly tried
and failed to contact the
aircraft. American
Airlines dispatchers also
tried, without success.
42
Part I: Hard Lessons
Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. She reported that
the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, and she asked her husband
what she should tell the captain to do. Ted Olson asked for her location and she
replied that the aircraft was then flying over houses. Another passenger told her they
were traveling northeast. The Solicitor General then informed his wife of the two
previous hijackings and crashes. She did not display signs of panic and did not indicate
any awareness of an impending crash. At that point the second call was cut off. [1, p.
9]
At 9:20, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was at 7,000 feet
and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon. At 9:32, controllers at the Dulles
Terminal Radar Approach Control "observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound
at a high rate of speed." This was later determined to have been Flight 77. [1, p. 9]
At 9:34, Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret Service of an
unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House. American 77 was then 5
miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began a 330 degree turn. At the end of the
turn, it was descending through 2,200 feet, pointed toward the Pentagon and
downtown Washington. The hijacker pilot then advanced the throttles to maximum
power an dove toward the Pentagon. [1, p. 9]
At 9:37:46, American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, traveling at
approximately 530 miles per hour. All on board, as well as many civilian and military
personnel in the building, were killed. [1, p. 10]
The Battle for United 93
At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Liberty
International Airport bound for San Francisco. The aircraft was piloted by Captain
Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer, and there were five flight attendants. Thirty-
seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the plane. Scheduled to depart the
gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757's takeoff was delayed because of the airport's typically
heavy morning traffic. [1, p. 10]
As United 93 left Newark, the flight's crew members were unaware of the hijacking of
American 11. Around 9:00, the FAA, American, and United were facing the staggering
realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, they would see another aircraft
strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers at the FAA and the airlines did not yet
act to warn other aircraft. At the same time, Boston Center realized that a message
transmitted just before 8:25 by the hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,
"We have some planes." [1, p. 10]
At 9:37:46, American
Airlines Flight 77
crashed into the
Pentagon, traveling at
approximately 530 miles
per hour. All on board,
as well as many civilian
and military personnel
in the building, were
killed.
43
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
The hijackers attacked at 9:28. While traveling 35,000 feet above eastern Ohio, United
93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the descent, the FAA's air traffic
control center in Cleveland received the first of two radio transmissions from the
aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or first officer could be heard declaring
"Mayday" amid the sounds of a physical struggle in the cockpit. The second radio
transmission, 35 seconds later, indicated that the fight was continuing. The captain or
first officer could be heard shouting: "Hey get out of here--get out of here--get out of
here." [1, p. 11]
At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the following
announcement to the passengers of Flight 93: "Ladies and Gentlemen: Here the
captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting. We have a bomb on board. So, sit."
The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah then instructed the
plane's autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east. [1, p. 11]
The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flight attendant,
was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of the hijackers who
killed or otherwise silenced her. [1, p. 12]
Shortly thereafter, the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls from GTE
airphones and cellular phones. The calls between family, friends, and colleagues took
place until the end of the flight and provided those on the ground with firsthand
accounts. They enabled the passengers to gain critical information, including the news
that two aircraft had slammed into the World Trade Center. [1, p. 12]
Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew members to revolt
against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted on whether to rush the
terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decided, and acted. [1, p. 13]
At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminated phone calls
with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the callers ended her message as
follows: "Everyone's running up to first class. I've got to go. Bye." [1, p. 13]
The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assault muffled by
the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listened to the recording
report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among the din. We cannot identify
whose voices can be heard. But the assault was sustained. [1, p. 13]
Aboard United 93, five
calls described the
intent of passengers and
surviving crew members
to revolt against the
hijackers. According to
one call, they voted on
whether to rush the
terrorists in an attempt
to retake the plane.
They decided, and
acted.
44
Part I: Hard Lessons
In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left and right,
attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah told another
hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll the airplane sharply
left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarrah changed tactics and
pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disrupt the assault. The recorder
captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shouts, and breaking glasses and plates.
At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane. [1, pp. 13-14]
Five seconds later, Jarrah asked, "Is that it? Shall we finish it off?" A hijacker
responded, "No. Not yet. When they all come, we finish it off." The sounds of fighting
continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of the aircraft up and
down. At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said, "In the cockpit. If we don't
we'll die!" Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled, "Roll it!" Jarrah stopped the
violent maneuvers about 10:01:00 and said, "Allah is the greatest! Allah is the
greatest!" He then asked another hijacker in the cockpit. "Is that it? I mean, shall we
put it down?" To which the other replied, "Yes, put it in it, and pull it down." [1, p. 14]
The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23, a hijacker said, "Pull it down!
Pull it down!" The hijackers remained at the controls but must have judged that the
passengers were only seconds from overcoming them. The airplane headed down; the
control wheel was turned hard to the right. The airplane rolled onto its back, and one
of the hijackers began shouting "Allah is the greatest. Allah is the greatest." With the
sounds of the passenger counterattack continuing, the aircraft plowed into an empty
field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes flying time
from Washington, D.C. [1, p. 14]
Jarrah's objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the American Republic, the
Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alerted, unarmed passengers of
United 93. [1, p. 14]
Table 3-2: 9/11 Timeline
11 Sep 01 Flt. Events
07:59 AA 11 Takeoff from Boston Logan
08:14 UA 175 Takeoff from Boston Logan
08:19 AA 11 Report of Onboard Trouble
08:20 AA 77 Takeoff from Dulles
08:41 AA 11 Declared Hijacking
08:42 UA 175 Suspected Time of Attack
08:42 UA 93 Takeoff from Newark
08:46 AA 11 Crashes into WTC North Tower
08:47 UA 175 Aircraft Beacon Codes Changed
08:51 AA 77 Suspected Time of Attack
08:54 AA 77 Aircraft Deviates from Course
09:03 UA 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower
09:28 UA 93 Suspected Time of Attack
09:32 AA 77 Tracked Inbound to DC
09:37 AA 77 Crashes into Pentagon
09:57 UA 93 Passengers Assault Hijackers
10:03 UA 93 Crashes in Shanksville, PA
At 10:02:23, with the
sounds of the passenger
counterattack
continuing, United 93
plowed into an empty
field in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania, at 580
miles per hour, about 20
minutes flying time from
Washington, D.C.
45
Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
Conclusion
More than 2,600 people died at the World Trade Center; 125 died at the Pentagon;
256 died on the four planes. The death toll surpassed that at Pearl Harbor in December
1941. This immeasurable pain was inflicted by 19 young Arabs acting at the behest of
Islamist extremists headquartered in distant Afghanistan. Some had been in the United
States for more than a year, mixing with the rest of the population. Though four had
training as pilots, most were not well-educated. Most spoke English poorly, some
hardly at all. In groups of four or five, carrying with them only small knives, box cutters,
and cans of Mace or pepper spray, they had hijacked the four planes and turned them
into deadly guided missiles.
Table 3-2: 9/11 Timeline
11 Sep 01 Flt. Events
07:59 AA 11 Takeoff from Boston Logan
08:14 UA 175 Takeoff from Boston Logan
08:19 AA 11 Report of Onboard Trouble
08:20 AA 77 Takeoff from Dulles
08:41 AA 11 Declared Hijacking
08:42 UA 175 Suspected Time of Attack
08:42 UA 93 Takeoff from Newark
08:46 AA 11 Crashes into WTC North Tower
08:47 UA 175 Aircraft Beacon Codes Changed
08:51 AA 77 Suspected Time of Attack
08:54 AA 77 Aircraft Deviates from Course
09:03 UA 175 Crashes into WTC South Tower
09:28 UA 93 Suspected Time of Attack
09:32 AA 77 Tracked Inbound to DC
09:37 AA 77 Crashes into Pentagon
09:57 UA 93 Passengers Assault Hijackers
10:03 UA 93 Crashes in Shanksville, PA
46
Part I: Hard Lessons
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Who was responsible for airport security on 9/11?
2. Describe three airport security measures the 19 hijackers defeated on 9/11.
3. What was the purpose of hijacking transcontinental passenger jets?
4. Describe three different methods the hijackers used to subdue aircraft cabin and crew.
5. How were the hijackers able to evade FAA tracking?
6. Why do you suppose the Twin Towers and Pentagon were selected as targets?
7. What do you suppose was the target of the fourth aircraft?
8. Why do you suppose the passengers of the first three aircraft didn’t mount a collective resistance?
9. Identify five similarities between 9/11 and the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks.
10. Do you think a similar attack would be successful today? Explain your answer.
47
And They Saved Many
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe emergency response efforts in New York City on 9/11.
Evaluate emergency response efforts in New York City on 9/11.
Appreciate the dedication and effectiveness of first responders on 9/11.
Chapter 4
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
48
Part I: Hard Lessons
“That day we lost 2,752 people at the World Trade Center; 343 were firefighters. But
we also saved 25,000 people. And that’s what people should remember because
firefighters and rescuers went in and they knew it was dangerous, but they went in to
save people. And they saved many.”
- 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 13, 2004
Introduction
Unlike most of America, both New York City and the World Trade Center had been the
target of terrorist attacks before 9/11. On February 26, 1993, a 1,500-pound bomb
stashed in a rental van was detonated on a parking garage ramp beneath the Twin
Towers. The explosion killed six people, injured 1,000 more, and exposed
vulnerabilities in the World Trade Center’s and the City’s emergency preparedness. The
towers lost power and communications capability. Generators had to be shut down to
assure safety. Elevators stopped. The public address system and emergency lighting
systems failed. The unlit stairwells filled with smoke and were so dark as to be
impassable. Rescue efforts by the Fire Department of New York were hampered by the
inability of its radios to function in buildings as large as the Twin Towers. The 9-1-1
emergency call system was overwhelmed. [1, p. 3] Despite a $100 million overhaul to
the WTC, including fire safety enhancements, many of the same problems plagued the
WTC response on 9/11. This chapter reviews the emergency response to the 9/11
attacks in New York City, and examines compounding factors that contributed to the
largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in U.S. history.
The World Trade Center
The World Trade Center (WTC) complex was built for the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey. Construction began in 1967, and tenants began to occupy its space in
1970. The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of
New York City and America. [1, p. 2]
The WTC actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16
acres of land. The buildings were connected by an underground mall one level below
the plaza area. The Twin Towers (“1 WTC” or the “North Tower,” and “2 WTC” or the
“South Tower”) were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of
office space. On any given work day up to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers,
and 40,000 visitors passed through the complex. [1, p. 2]
The WTC actually
consisted of seven
buildings spread across
16 acres, connected by
an underground mall.
The Twin Towers were
the signature structures,
containing 10.4 million
square feet of office
space. On any given
work day up to 50,000
office workers occupied
the towers, and 40,000
visitors passed through
the complex.
49
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
The Twin Towers
Both towers had 110 stories and were about 1,350 feet high. Both were square; each
wall measured 208 feet in length. The outside of each tower was covered by a frame of
14- inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel columns were 40 inches apart.
These exterior walls bore the majority of the weight of the building. [1, p. 2]
The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and
stairwells were grouped. Each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran
essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the
lobby ran to “sky lobbies” on upper floors, where further elevators carried passengers
to the tops of the buildings. [1, p. 2]
Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor to the mezzanine level and Stairwell B ran
from the 107th floor to level B6. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and
down, except for two deviations in Stairwells A and C where the staircase jutted out
toward the perimeter of the building. These deviations were necessary because of the
placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms. These areas were located between
the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. [1, p. 2]
On the upper and lower boundaries of these deviations were “transfer” hallways
contained within the stairwell proper. Each hallway contained “smoke doors” to
prevent smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building. Smoke doors
were kept closed but not locked. Other than these slight deviations in Stairwells A and
C, the stairs ran straight up and down. [1, p. 2]
Doors leading to the roof were kept locked. The Port Authority told us that this was
because of structural and radiation hazards, and for security reasons. To access the
roof in either towers required passing through three doors: one leading from the
stairwell onto the 110th floor, and two leading from the floor onto the roof itself.
There was no rooftop evacuation plan. The roof was a cluttered surface that would be
a challenging helipad even in good conditions and, in a fire, smoke from the building
would travel upward. [1, pp. 2-3]
Emergency Preparedness
To address the problems encountered during the response to the 1993 bombing, the
Port Authority implemented $100 million in physical, structural, and technological
changes to the WTC. In addition, the Port Authority enhanced its fire safety plan. [1, p.
3]
50
Part I: Hard Lessons
The Port Authority added battery-powered emergency lighting to the stairwells and
backup power to its alarm system. Other upgrades included glow-in-the-dark signs and
markings. Upgrades to the elevator system included a redesign of each building’s lobby
command board to enable it to monitor all of the elevators. [1, p. 3]
To aid communications the Port Authority installed a “repeater system” for use by the
Fire Department of New York. The “repeater” used an antenna on the top of 5 WTC to
“repeat” and greatly amplify the wave strength of radio communications, so they could
be heard more effectively by firefighters operating many floors apart. [1, p. 3]
The Port Authority also sought to prepare civilians better for future emergencies.
Deputy fire safety directors conducted biannual fire drills, with advance notice to
tenants. During a fire drill, designated fire wardens were instructed to lead people in
their respective areas to the center of the floor where they would use an emergency
intercom phone to obtain specific information on how to proceed. [1, p. 3]
Civilians were taught basic procedures such as to evacuate by the stairs and to check
doors for heat before proceeding. Civilians who evacuated in both 1993 and 2001 have
told us that they were better prepared in 2001. [1, p. 3]
Civilians were not, however, directed into the stairwells during these drills. Civilians
were not provided information about the configuration of the stairwells and the
existence of transfer hallways or smoke doors. Neither full nor partial evacuation drills
were held. Participation in the drills that were held, moreover, varied greatly from
tenant to tenant. [1, pp. 3-4]
Civilians were never instructed not to evacuate up. The standard fire drill instructions
advised participants that in the event of an actual emergency, they would be directed
to descend to at least two floors below the fire. Most civilians recall simply being
taught to await instructions which would be provided at the time of an emergency. [1,
p. 4]
Civilians were not informed that rooftop evacuations were not part of the Port
Authority’s evacuation plan. They were not informed that access to the roof required a
key. The Port Authority acknowledges that it had no protocol for rescuing people
trapped above a fire in the towers. [1, p. 4]
Civilians were not
informed that rooftop
evacuations were not
part of the Port
Authority’s evacuation
plan. They were not
informed that access to
the roof required a key.
The Port Authority
acknowledges that it
had no protocol for
rescuing people trapped
above a fire in the
towers.
51
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
First Responders
On 9/11, the principal first responders were from the Fire Department of New York
(FDNY), the New York Police Department (NYPD), the Port Authority Police Department
(PAPD), and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management (OEM). [1, p. 4]
NYPD
The 40,000-officer New York Police Department consisted of three primary divisions:
operations, intelligence, and administration. The Special Operations Division
supervised units critical in responding to a major event. This division included the
aviation unit, which provided helicopters for the purpose of survey and/or rescue, and
the Emergency Service Units (ESU), or rescue teams, which carried out specialized
missions. [1, p. 4]
The NYPD had standard operating procedures for the dispatch of officers to an
incident. Gradations in response were called “mobilization” levels and went from 1
(lowest) to 4 (highest). Level 3 and 4 mobilizations could not be ordered by someone
below the rank of captain. [1, p. 4]
The NYPD ran the City’s 9-1-1 emergency call center. 9-1-1 operators were civilians
trained in the rudiments of emergency response. Fire emergencies were transferred to
the FDNY dispatch center. [1, p. 4]
FDNY
The 11,000-member Fire Department of New York was headed by a Fire Commissioner,
who, unlike the Police Commissioner, lacked operational authority. Operations were
controlled by the Chief of the Fire Department. The logistics of fire operations were
coordinated by Fire Dispatch Operations division. 9-1-1 calls concerning fire
emergencies were transferred to this division. [1, p. 4]
Basic operating units included ladder companies, to conduct standard rescue
operations, and engine companies, to put out fires. The Department’s Specialized
Operations Command contained specialized units, including five rescue companies, to
perform specialized and highly risky rescue operations, and one HAZMAT team. [1, p.
4]
On 9/11, the principal
first responders were
from the Fire
Department of New
York (FDNY), the New
York Police Department
(NYPD), the Port
Authority Police
Department (PAPD), and
the Mayor’s Office of
Emergency
Management (OEM).
52
Part I: Hard Lessons
Alarm levels escalated from first (lowest) to fifth (highest) with a pre-established
number of units associated with each. Prior to 9/11, it was common FDNY practice for
units to arrive with extra personnel, and for off-duty firefighters to respond to major
incidents. . [1, p. 5]
The years leading up to 9/11 were successful ones for the FDNY. In 2000, fewer people
died from fires in New York City—107—than in any year since 1946. Firefighter
deaths—22 during the 1990s—compared favorably with the best periods in FDNY
history. The FDNY had fought 153,000 fires in 1976; in 1999, that number had been
reduced to 60,000. [1, p. 5]
Emergency Operations
In July 2001, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani signed a directive entitled “Direction and Control
of Emergencies in the City of New York.” Its purpose was “to ensure the optimum use
of agency resources while … eliminating potential conflict among responding agencies
which may have areas of overlapping expertise and responsibility.” [1, p. 5]
The directive designated, for different types of emergencies, an appropriate agency as
“Incident Commander.” The Incident Commander would be “responsible for the
management of the City’s response to the emergency.” The role of the Mayor’s Office
of Emergency Management was supportive, to “coordinate the participation of all city
agencies in resolving the event,” and to “assist the Incident Commander in his/her
efforts in the development and implementation of the strategy for resolving the
event.” [1, p. 5]
The Mayor’s creation of the Office of Emergency Management and the issuance of his
Incident Command Directive were attempts to address the long-standing rivalry
between the NYPD and the FDNY. This rivalry has been acknowledged by every witness
we have asked about it. Some characterized the more extreme manifestations of the
rivalry—fistfights at the scenes of emergencies, for instance—as the actions of “a few
knuckleheads.” Some described the rivalry as the result of healthy organizational pride
and competition. Others told us that the problem has escalated over time and has
hampered the ability of the City to respond well in emergency situations. [1, p. 5]
The NYPD and the FDNY were two of the preeminent emergency response
organizations in the United States. But each considered itself operationally
autonomous. Each was accustomed to responding independently to emergencies. By
September 11 neither had demonstrated the readiness to respond to an “Incident
Commander” if that commander was an official outside of their Department. The
Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management had not overcome this problem. [1, p. 5]
The Mayor’s creation of
the Office of Emergency
Management and the
issuance of his Incident
Command Directive
were attempts to
address the long-
standing rivalry
between the NYPD and
the FDNY.
53
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
September 11, 2001
At 8:46:40 a.m. the hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 flew into the upper portion of
the North Tower. [1, p. 6]
A jet fuel fireball erupted upon impact, and shot down at least one bank of elevators.
The fireball exploded onto numerous lower floors, including the 77th, 50th, 22nd,
West Street lobby level, and the B4 level, four stories below ground. The burning jet
fuel immediately created thick, black smoke which enveloped the upper floors and
roof of the North Tower. The roof of the South Tower was also engulfed in smoke
because of prevailing light winds from the north. [1, p. 6]
Within minutes, New York City’s 9-1-1 system was flooded with eyewitness accounts of
the event. Most callers correctly identified the target of the attack. Some identified the
plane as a commercial airliner. [1, p. 6]
The first response came from private firms and individuals—the people and companies
in the building. Everything that would happen to them during the next few minutes
would turn on their circumstances and their preparedness, assisted by building
personnel on site. [1, p. 6]
Trapped
Because all of the building’s stairwells were destroyed in the impact zone, the
hundreds of survivors trapped on or above the 92nd floor gathered in large and small
groups, primarily between the 103rd and 106th floors. A large group was reported on
the 92nd floor, technically below the impact but trapped by debris. Civilians were also
reported trapped below the impact zone, mostly on floors in the eighties, though also
on at least the 47th and 22nd floors, as well as in a number of elevators. [1, p. 6]
Because of damage to the building’s systems, civilians did not receive instructions on
how to proceed over the public address system. Many were unable to use the
emergency intercom phones as instructed in fire drills. Many called 9-1-1. [1, p. 6]
At 8:46:40 a.m. the
hijacked American
Airlines Flight 11 flew
into the upper portion of
the North Tower. The
first response came
from private firms and
individuals—the people
and companies in the
building. Everything that
would happen to them
during the next few
minutes would turn on
their circumstances and
their preparedness,
assisted by building
personnel on site.
54
Part I: Hard Lessons
9-1-1 operators and FDNY dispatchers had no information about either the location or
magnitude of the impact zone and were therefore unable to provide information as
fundamental as whether callers were above or below the fire. 9-1-1 operators were
also not given any information about the feasibility of rooftop rescues. In most
instances, 9-1- 1 operators and FDNY dispatchers, to whom the 9-1-1 calls were
transferred, therefore relied on standard operating procedure for high-rise fires. Those
procedures are to advise civilians to stay low, remain where they are, and wait for
emergency personnel to reach them. This advice was given to callers from the North
Tower for locations both above and below the impact. [1, pp. 6-7]
The protocol of advising against evacuation, of telling people to stay where they were,
was one of the lessons learned from the 1993 bombing. Fire chiefs told us that the
evacuation of tens of thousands of people from skyscrapers can create many new
problems, especially for disabled individuals or those in poor health. Many of the
injuries after the 1993 bombing occurred during the evacuation. Evacuees also may
complicate the movements and work of firefighters and other emergency workers. [1,
p. 7]
Although the default guidance to stay in place may seem understandable in cases of
conventional high rise fires, all the emergency officials that morning quickly judged
that the North Tower should be evacuated. The acting fire safety director in the North
Tower immediately ordered everyone to evacuate that building, but the public address
system was damaged and no one apparently heard the announcement. [1, p. 7]
Hence, one of the few ways to communicate to people in the building was through
calls to the 9-1-1 or other emergency operators. We found no protocol for
communicating updated evacuation guidance to the 9-1-1 operators who were
receiving calls for help. Improvising as they learned information from callers, some
operators advised callers that they could break windows. Some operators were
advising callers to evacuate if they could. [1, p. 7]
Evacuation
Below the impact zone in the North Tower, those civilians who could began evacuating
down the stairs almost immediately. [1, p. 7]
Although the default
guidance to stay in place
seemed understandable
in cases of conventional
fire, all the emergency
officials that morning
quickly judged that the
North Tower should be
evacuated. The acting
fire safety director in the
North Tower
immediately ordered
everyone to evacuate
that building, but the
public address system
was damaged and no
one apparently heard
the announcement.
55
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
Civilians who called the Port Authority police desk at 5 WTC were advised to leave if
they could. Most civilians began evacuating without waiting to obtain instructions over
the intercom system. Some had trouble reaching the exits because of damage caused
by the impact. While evacuating, they were confused by deviations in the increasingly
crowded stairwells, and impeded by doors which were locked or jammed as a result of
the impact. Despite these obstacles, the evacuation was relatively calm and orderly. [1,
p. 7]
Within ten minutes of impact, smoke was beginning to rise to the upper floors in
debilitating volumes and isolated fires were reported, although there were some
pockets of refuge. Faced with insufferable heat, smoke, and fire, and no prospect for
relief, some jumped or fell from the building. [1, p. 8]
Confusion Next Door
Many civilians in the South Tower were unaware initially of what happened in the
other tower. Many people decided to leave. Some were advised to do so by fire
wardens. In addition, some entire companies, including Morgan Stanley, which
occupied over 20 floors of the South Tower, were evacuated by company security
officials. [1, p. 8]
The evacuation standard operating procedures did not provide a specific protocol for
when to evacuate one tower in the event of a major explosion in the other. At 8:49
a.m. the deputy fire safety director in the North Tower spoke with his counterpart in
the South Tower. They agreed to wait for the FDNY to arrive before determining
whether to evacuate the South Tower. According to one fire chief, it was unimaginable,
“beyond our consciousness,” that another plane might hit the adjacent tower. [1, p. 8]
In the meantime, an announcement came over the public address system in the South
Tower urging people to stay in place. Indeed, evacuees in the sky lobbies and the main
lobby were advised by building personnel to return to their offices. The Port Authority
told us that the advice may have been prompted by the safety hazard posed by falling
debris and victims outside the building. Similar advice was given by security officials in
the sky lobby of the South Tower. We do not know the reason for this advice, in part
because the on-duty deputy fire safety director in charge of the South Tower perished
in the tower’s collapse. As a result of the announcement, many civilians in the South
Tower remained on their floors. Others reversed their evacuation and went back up.
The Port Authority Police desk in 5 WTC gave conflicting advice to people in the South
Tower about whether to evacuate. [1, pp. 8-9]
Within ten minutes of
impact, smoke was
beginning to rise to the
upper floors in
debilitating volumes and
isolated fires were
reported, although there
were some pockets of
refuge. Faced with
insufferable heat,
smoke, and fire, and no
prospect for relief, some
jumped or fell from the
building.
56
Part I: Hard Lessons
FDNY Response
The FDNY response began immediately after the crash. Chief Pfeifer, Deputy Assistant
Chief, FDNY and four companies arrived at about 8:52 a.m. As they entered the lobby,
they immediately encountered badly burned civilians who had been caught in the path
of the fireball. [1, p. 9=10]
Peter Hayden, Assistant Chief, FDNY, and Chief Pfeifer, the initial FDNY incident
commanders were briefed on building systems by building personnel. Units began
mobilizing in the increasingly crowded lobby. It was challenging for the chiefs to keep
track of arriving units. They were frustrated by the absence of working building
systems and elevators. [1, p. 10]
Shortly before 9:00 a.m., FDNY chiefs advised building personnel and a Port Authority
Police Department officer to evacuate the adjacent South Tower. Impressed by the
magnitude of the catastrophe, fire chiefs had decided to clear the whole WTC complex,
including the South Tower. [1, p. 11]
By 9:00 a.m., many senior FDNY leaders, including seven of the eleven most highly
ranked chiefs in the department, had begun responding from headquarters in
Brooklyn. The Chief of Department and the Chief of Operations called a 5th alarm,
which would bring additional engine and ladder companies; they also called two more
FDNY Rescue teams. The Chief of Department arrived at approximately 9:00 a.m. He
established an overall Incident Command Post on the median of the West Side
Highway. [1, p. 11]
Emergency Medical Service (EMS) personnel were directed to one of four triage areas
around the perimeter of the WTC. In addition, many private hospital ambulances were
rushing to the WTC complex. [1, p. 11]
In the North Tower lobby, the chiefs quickly made the decision that the fire in the
North Tower could not be fought. The chiefs decided to concentrate on evacuating
civilians from the North Tower, although they held various views about whether
anyone at or above the impact zone could be saved. [1, p. 11]
As of 9:00 a.m., if only those units dispatched had responded, and if those dispatched
units were not “riding heavy” with extra men, 235 firefighters would be at the scene or
enroute. The vast majority of these would be expected to enter the North Tower. [1, p.
11]
The FDNY response
began immediately after
the crash. Chief Pfeifer,
Deputy Assistant Chief,
FDNY and four
companies arrived at
about 8:52 a.m. Shortly
before 9:00 a.m., FDNY
chiefs advised building
personnel and a Port
Authority Police
Department officer to
evacuate the adjacent
South Tower. Impressed
by the magnitude of the
catastrophe, fire chiefs
had decided to clear the
whole WTC complex.
57
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
NYPD Response
The NYPD response also began seconds after the crash. At 8:47 a.m. the NYPD ordered
a Level 3 Mobilization. An initial mobilization point for patrol officers was established
on the west side of the intersection of West and Liberty Streets. NYPD rescue teams
were directed to mobilize at the intersection of Church and Vesey Streets. The first of
these officers arrived at Church and Vesey at 8:56 a.m. At 8:50 a.m., the aviation unit
of the NYPD dispatched two helicopters to the WTC to report on conditions and assess
the feasibility of a rooftop landing or special rescue operations. [1, p. 12]
Within ten minutes of the crash, NYPD and Port Authority Police personnel were
assisting with the evacuation of civilians. [1, p. 12]
At 8:58 a.m., a helicopter pilot reported on rooftop conditions for the possibility of
rooftop extraction. They didn’t see anybody up on the roof. Even so, the heat and the
smoke from the building interfered with the rotor system, making it difficult to hold
position. [1, p. 12]
At 8:58 a.m., while enroute, the Chief of the NYPD raised the department’s
mobilization to Level 4—its highest level—which would result in the dispatch of
approximately 30 lieutenants, 100 sergeants, and 800 police officers, in addition to
rescue teams, which were already at the scene. The Chief of Department arrived at
Church and Vesey at 9:00 a.m. [1, p. 12]
At 9:01 a.m., the NYPD patrol mobilization point at West and Liberty was moved to
West and Vesey, in order to handle the greater number of patrol officers who would
be responding to the Level 4 mobilization. These officers would be stationed around
the perimeter of the complex to assist with evacuation and crowd control. [1, p. 13]
Around the city, the NYPD cleared routes along major thoroughfares for emergency
vehicles responding to the WTC. The NYPD and Port Authority police coordinated the
closing of bridges, subways, PATH trains, and tunnels into Manhattan. [1, p. 13]
The NYPD response also
began seconds after the
crash. At 8:47 a.m. the
NYPD ordered a Level 3
Mobilization. At 8:58
a.m., the NYPD Chief
raised the department’s
mobilization to Level 4—
its highest level—which
would result in the
dispatch of
approximately 30
lieutenants, 100
sergeants, and 800
police officers, in
addition to rescue
teams, which were
already at the scene.
58
Part I: Hard Lessons
Port Authority Response
The Port Authority’s on-site commanding police officer was standing in the concourse
when a fireball exploded out of the North Tower lobby, causing him to dive for cover.
Within minutes of impact Port Authority police from bridge, tunnel, and airport
commands began responding to the WTC. Officers from the WTC command began
assisting in evacuating civilians. The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear
standard operating procedures to guide personnel responding from one command to
another during a major incident. [1, p. 13]
The fire safety director in charge of the complex arrived in the North Tower lobby at
approximately 8:52 a.m. and was informed by the deputy fire safety director there that
evacuation instructions had been announced over the public address system within
one minute of impact. As mentioned earlier, to our knowledge, because the public
address system had been damaged upon impact, no civilians heard that
announcement. [1, p. 13]
At 9:00 a.m., the Port Authority Police commanding officer ordered an evacuation of
civilians in the World Trade Center complex because of the danger posed by highly
flammable jet fuel from Flight 11. The order was issued, however, over a radio channel
which could be heard only by officers on the Port Authority WTC command channel.
There is no evidence that this order was communicated to officers in other Port
Authority Police commands or to members of other responding agencies. At 9:00 a.m.,
the Port Authority Police Superintendent and Chief of Department arrived together at
the WTC complex, and made their way to the North Tower lobby. Some Port Authority
officers immediately began climbing the stairs and assisting civilians. [1, p. 13]
OEM Response
Officials in the Office of Emergency Management’s headquarters at 7 WTC began to
activate its emergency operation center immediately after the North Tower was hit. At
approximately 8:50 a.m. a senior representative from that office arrived in the lobby of
the North Tower and began to act as its field responder. [1, p. 13]
In the 17-minute period between 8:46 a.m. and 9:03 a.m. on September 11, New York
City and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey had mobilized the largest
rescue operation in the City’s history. Well over one thousand first responders had
been deployed, evacuations had begun, and the critical decision that the fire could not
be fought had been made. [1, p. 14]
The Port Authority’s on-
site commanding police
officer was standing in
the concourse when a
fireball exploded out of
the North Tower lobby,
causing him to dive for
cover. Within minutes of
impact Port Authority
police from bridge,
tunnel, and airport
commands began
responding to the WTC.
Officers from the WTC
command began
assisting in evacuating
civilians.
59
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
The decision was made to evacuate the South Tower as well. At 9:02 a.m., a further
announcement in the South Tower advised civilians to begin an orderly evacuation if
conditions warranted. [1, p. 14]
One minute later, a plane hit the South Tower. [1, p. 14]
Second Crash
At 9:03 a.m., the hijacked United Airlines Flight 175 hit 2 WTC (the South Tower) from
the south, crashing through the 78th to 84th floors. What had been the largest and
most complicated rescue operation in city history instantly doubled in magnitude. [1,
p. 14]
The plane banked as it hit the building, leaving portions of the building undamaged on
impact floors. As a consequence—and in contrast to the situation in the North Tower—
one of the stairwells (Stairwell A) initially remained passable from top to bottom. [1, p.
14]
At the lowest point of impact, the 78th floor sky lobby, hundreds had been waiting to
evacuate when the plane hit. Many were killed or injured severely; others were
relatively unaffected. We know of at least one civilian who seized the initiative and
shouted that anyone who could walk should walk to the stairs, and anyone who could
help should help others in need of assistance. At least two small groups of civilians
descended from that floor. [1, p. 14]
Others remained alive in the impact zone above the 78th floor, though conditions on
these floors began to deteriorate within ten minutes. [1, p. 14]
Repeat Nightmare
As in the North Tower, civilians became first responders. Some civilians ascended the
stairs and others remained on affected floors to assist colleagues. Although Stairwell A
in the South Tower remained passable from above the impact zone to the lobby,
conditions were difficult and deteriorating. [1, p. 15]
Many ascended in search of clearer air or to attempt to reach the roof. Those
attempting to reach the roof were thwarted by locked doors. Others attempting to
descend were frustrated by jammed or locked doors in stairwells or confused by the
structure of the stairwell deviations. [1, p. 16]
In the 17-minute period
between 8:46 a.m. and
9:03 a.m. on September
11, New York City and
the Port Authority of
New York and New
Jersey had mobilized the
largest rescue operation
in the City’s history. Well
over one thousand first
responders had been
deployed, evacuations
had begun, and the
critical decision that the
fire could not be fought
had been made.
60
Part I: Hard Lessons
By 9:35 a.m., the West Street lobby level of the South Tower was becoming
overwhelmed by injured who had descended to the lobby but were having difficulty
continuing. [1, p. 16]
Within 15 minutes of the impact, debilitating smoke had reached at least one location
on the 100th floor, and severe smoke conditions were reported throughout floors in
the nineties and hundreds over the course of the following half hour. By 9:30 a.m. a
number of civilians who had failed to reach the roof and could not descend because of
intensifying smoke became trapped on the 105th floor. There were reports of
tremendous smoke in most areas of that floor, but at least one area remained less
affected until shortly before the building collapsed. [1, p. 16]
Still, there were several areas between the impact zone and the uppermost floors
where conditions were better. At least a hundred people remained alive on the 88th
and 89th floors, in some cases calling 9-1-1 for direction. The 9-1-1 system remained
plagued by the operators’ lack of awareness of what was occurring and by the sheer
volume of emergency calls. [1, p. 16]
No one in the first responder community knew that Stairwell A remained potentially
passable. No callers were advised that helicopter rescues were not feasible. Civilians
below the impact were also generally advised to remain where they were by 9-1-1 or
FDNY dispatch operators. [1, p. 17]
North Tower
Back in the North Tower, evacuation generally continued. Thousands of civilians
continued to descend in an orderly manner. On the 91st floor, the highest floor with
stairway access, all but one were uninjured and able to descend. At 9:11 a.m., Port
Authority workers at the 64th floor of the North Tower were told by the Port Authority
Police desk in Jersey City to stay near the stairwells and wait for assistance. These
workers eventually began to descend anyway, but most of them died in the collapse of
the North Tower. [1, p. 17]
Those who descended Stairwell B of the North Tower exited between the elevator
banks in the lobby. Those who descended the Stairwells A and C exited at the raised
mezzanine level, where the smoky air was causing respiratory problems. All civilians
were directed into the concourse at lobby level. Officers from the Port Authority and
New York Police Departments continued to assist with the evacuation of civilians, for
example, guiding them through the concourse in order to shelter the evacuees from
falling debris and victims. [1, p. 17]
In the North Tower,
evacuation generally
continued. Thousands of
civilians continued to
descend in an orderly
manner. On the 91st
floor, the highest floor
with stairway access, all
but one were uninjured
and able to descend.
61
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
By 9:55 a.m., those few civilians who were still evacuating consisted primarily of
injured, handicapped, elderly, or severely overweight individuals. [1, p. 17]
Calls to 9-1-1 reflect that others remained alive above and below the impact zone,
reporting increasingly desperate conditions. [1, p. 17]
Double Trouble
Immediately after the second plane hit, the FDNY Chief of Department called a second
5th alarm. While nine Brooklyn units had been staged on the Brooklyn side of the
Brooklyn Battery tunnel at 8:53 a.m., these units were not dispatched to the scene at
this time. Instead, units from further away were dispatched. [1, p. 17]
Just after the South Tower impact, chiefs in the North Tower lobby huddled to discuss
strategy for the operations and communication in the two towers. [1, p. 18]
At 9:05 a.m., two FDNY chiefs tested the WTC complex’s repeater system. This was the
system installed after the 1993 bombing in order to enable firefighters operating on
upper floors to maintain consistent radio communication with the lobby command.
The system had been activated for use on portable radios at 8:54 a.m., but a second
button which would have enabled the master hand-set was not activated at that time.
The chief testing the master handset at 9:05 a.m. did not realize that the master
handset had not been activated. When he could not communicate, he concluded that
the system was down. The system was working, however, and was used subsequently
by firefighters in the South Tower. [1, p. 18]
The FDNY Chief of Safety agreed with the consensus that the only choice was to let the
fires “burn up and out.” The chiefs in the North Tower were forced to make decisions
based on little or no information. [1, p. 18]
Climbing up the stairwells carrying heavy equipment was a laborious task even for
physically fit firefighters. Though the lobby command post did not know it, one
battalion chief in the North Tower found a working elevator, which he took to the 16th
floor before beginning to climb. Just prior to 10:00 a.m., about an hour after
firefighters first began streaming into the North Tower, at least two companies of
firefighters had climbed to the sky lobby on the 44th floor of the North Tower.
Numerous units were located between the 5th and 37th floors in the North Tower. [1,
p. 18]
Just after the South
Tower impact, chiefs in
the North Tower lobby
huddled to discuss
strategy for the
operations and
communication in the
two towers.
62
Part I: Hard Lessons
South Tower
At approximately 9:07 a.m., two chiefs commenced operations in the South Tower
lobby. Almost immediately they were joined by an Office of Emergency Management
field responder. They were not immediately joined by a sizable number of fire
companies, as most, if not all units which had been in the North Tower lobby remained
there. One chief and a ladder company found a working elevator to the 40th floor.
From there they proceeded to climb Stairwell B. One member of the ladder company
stayed behind to operate the elevator. [1, pp. 18-19]
Poor Communications
Unlike the commanders in the North Tower lobby, these chiefs in the South Tower
kept their radios on the repeater channel. For the first 15 minutes of the operations in
the South Tower, communications among them and the ladder company which
ascended with the chief worked well. Upon learning from a company security official
that the impact zone began at the 78th floor, a ladder company transmitted this
information, and the chief directed an engine company on the 40th floor to attempt to
find an elevator to reach that upper level. [1, p. 19]
Unfortunately, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the repeater
channel was functioning and being used by units in the South Tower. Chiefs in the
North Tower lobby and outside were unable to reach the South Tower lobby command
post initially. [1, p. 19]
Communications also began to break down within the South Tower. Those units
responding to the South Tower were advised to use tactical channel 3. From
approximately 9:21 a.m. on, the ascending chief was unable to reach the South Tower
lobby command post. The lobby chief ceased to transmit on repeater channel 7 at that
time. [1, p. 19]
The first FDNY fatality of the day occurred at approximately 9:25 a.m. when a civilian
landed on a fireman on West Street. [1, p. 19]
At approximately 9:07
a.m., two FDNY chiefs
commenced operations
in the South Tower
lobby. Unlike the
commanders in the
North Tower lobby,
these chiefs in the South
Tower kept their radios
on the repeater channel.
Because they were
unaware of the repeater
channel, chiefs in the
North Tower lobby and
outside were unable to
reach the South Tower
lobby command post
initially.
63
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
Confusion
By 9:30 a.m., few of the units dispatched to the South Tower had arrived at their
staging area. Many units were unfamiliar with the complex and could not enter the
South Tower because of the danger of victims and debris falling on Liberty Street.
Some units entered the Marriott Hotel and were given assignments there; others
mistakenly responded to the North Tower. An additional 2nd alarm was requested at
9:37 a.m. because so few units had reported. At this time, units which had been staged
on the Brooklyn side of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel were sent, and many of them
arrived at the WTC by 9:55 a.m. [1, p. 19]
At 9:50 a.m., a ladder company had made its way up to the 70th floor of the South
Tower. There they encountered many seriously injured people. At 9:53 a.m. a group of
civilians were found trapped in an elevator on the 78th floor sky lobby. By 9:58 a.m.,
the ascending chief had reached the 78th floor on Stairwell A, and reported that it
looked open to the 79th floor. He reported numerous civilian fatalities in the area. A
ladder company on the 78th floor was preparing to use hoses to fight the fire when the
South Tower collapsed. [1, p. 19]
Incident Command
The overall incident command was just outside the WTC complex. At approximately
9:10 a.m., because of the danger of falling debris, this command post was moved from
the middle of West Street to its western edge by the parking garage in front of 2 World
Financial Center. The overall command post’s ability to track all FDNY units was
extremely limited. [1, pp. 19-20]
At approximately 9:20 a.m., the Mayor and the NYPD Commissioner reached the FDNY
overall command post. The FDNY Chief of Department briefed the Mayor on
operations and stated that this was a rescue mission of civilians. He stated that he
believed they could save everyone below the impact zones. He also advised that, in his
opinion, rooftop rescue operations would be impossible. None of the chiefs present
believed a total collapse of either tower was possible. Later, after the Mayor had left,
one senior chief present did articulate his concern that upper floors could begin to
collapse in a few hours, and so he said that firefighters thus should not ascend above
floors in the sixties. [1, p. 20]
By 9:30 a.m., few of the
units dispatched to the
South Tower had arrived
at their staging area.
Many units were
unfamiliar with the
complex and could not
enter the South Tower
because of the danger
of victims and debris
falling on Liberty Street.
Some units entered the
Marriott Hotel and were
given assignments
there; others mistakenly
responded to the North
Tower.
64
Part I: Hard Lessons
Surge
By 9:20 a.m., significantly more firemen than were dispatched were at the WTC
complex or enroute. Many off-duty firemen were given permission by company officers
to “ride heavy.” Others found alternative transportation and responded. In one case an
entire company of off-duty firefighters managed to congregate and come to the WTC
as a complete team, in addition to the on-duty team which already had been
dispatched to the scene. Numerous fire marshals also reported to the WTC. [1, p. 20]
At 9:46 a.m., the Chief of Department called a third 5th alarm. This meant that over
one third of all of the FDNY units in New York City were at or enroute to the WTC. [1, p.
20]
The Police Department was also responding massively after the attack on the South
Tower. Almost 2,000 officers had been called to the scene. In addition, the Chief of the
Department called for Operation Omega, to evacuate and secure sensitive locations
around the city. At 9:06 a.m. the NYPD Chief of Department instructed that no units
were to land on the roof of either tower. [1, p. 20]
An NYPD rescue team in the North Tower lobby prepared to climb at approximately
9:15 a.m. They attempted to check in with the FDNY chiefs present, but were rebuffed.
Office of Emergency Management personnel present did not intercede. The team went
to work anyway, climbing Stairwell B in order to set up a triage center on upper floors
for victims who could not walk. Later, a second rescue team arrived in the North Tower
and did not attempt to check-in with the FDNY command post. [1, p. 20]
NYPD rescue teams also entered the South Tower. The Office of Emergency
Management field responder present ensured that they check-in with the lobby chief.
In this case, both agreed that the rescue team would ascend in support of FDNY
personnel. By 9:15 a.m., two more of these teams were preparing to leave the Church
and Vesey mobilization point in order to enter the towers. [1, p. 20]
At approximately 9:30 a.m. one of the helicopters present advised that a rooftop
evacuation still would not be possible. [1, p. 20]
By 9:20 a.m.,
significantly more
firemen than were
dispatched were at the
WTC complex or
enroute. Many off-duty
firemen were given
permission by company
officers to “ride heavy.”
Others found alternative
transportation and
responded. In one case
an entire company of off
-duty firefighters
managed to congregate
and come to the WTC as
a complete team.
65
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
Structural Failure
At 9:37 a.m., a civilian on the 106th floor of the South Tower reported to a 9-1-1
operator that a lower floor—“90-something floor”—was collapsing. This information
was conveyed incorrectly by the 9-1-1 operator to an NYPD dispatcher. The NYPD
dispatcher further confused the substance of the 9-1-1 call in conveying at 9:52 a.m. to
NYPD officers that “the 106th floor is crumbling.” [1, p. 21]
By 9:58 a.m., there were two NYPD rescue teams in each of the two towers, another
approaching the North Tower, and approximately ten other NYPD officers climbing in
the towers. [1, p. 21]
In addition, there were numerous NYPD officers on the ground floors throughout the
complex, assisting with evacuation, and patrolling and securing the WTC perimeter. A
greater number of NYPD officers were staged throughout lower Manhattan, assisting in
civilian evacuation, keeping roads clear, and conducting other operations in response
to the attacks. [1, p. 21]
Prior to 9:59 a.m., no NYPD helicopter transmission predicted that either tower would
collapse. [1, p. 21]
Agency Coordination
Initial responders from outside Port Authority Police commands proceeded to the
police desk in 5 WTC or to the fire safety desk in the North Tower lobby. Officers were
assigned to assist in stairwell evacuations and to expedite evacuation in the plaza,
concourse, and PATH station. As reports of trapped civilians were received, Port
Authority Police officers also started climbing stairs for rescue efforts. Others, including
the Port Authority Police Superintendent, began climbing toward the impact zone in
the North Tower. The Port Authority Police Chief and other senior officers began
climbing in the North Tower with the purpose of reaching the Windows of the World
restaurant on the 106th floor, where there were at least 100 people trapped. [1, p. 21]
The Port Authority Police Department lacked clear standard operating procedures for
coordinating a multi-command response to the same incident. It also lacked a radio
channel that all commands could access. Many officers remained on their local
command channels, which did not work once they were outside the immediate
geographic area of their respective commands. [1, pp. 21-22]
The Port Authority
Police Department
lacked clear standard
operating procedures
for coordinating a multi-
command response to
the same incident. It
also lacked a radio
channel that all
commands could access.
Many officers remained
on their local command
channels, which did not
work once they were
outside the immediate
geographic area of their
respective commands.
66
Part I: Hard Lessons
Many Port Authority Police officers from different commands responded on their own
initiative. By 9:30 a.m. the Port Authority’s central police desk requested that
responding officers meet at West and Vesey and await further instructions. In the
absence of predetermined leadership roles for an incident of this magnitude, a number
of Port Authority inspectors, captains, and lieutenants stepped forward at West and
Vesey to formulate an on-site response plan. They were hampered by not knowing
how many officers were responding to the site and where those officers were
operating. Many of the officers who responded to this command post lacked suitable
protective equipment to enter the complex. [1, p. 22]
By 9:58 a.m., one Port Authority Police officer had reached the sky lobby on the 44th
floor of the North Tower. Also in the North Tower, two Port Authority teams had
reached floors in the upper and lower twenties. Numerous officers also were climbing
in the South Tower, including the Port Authority rescue team. Many also were on the
ground floors of the complex assisting with evacuation, manning the Port Authority
Police desk in 5 WTC, or supporting lobby command posts. [1, p. 22]
The emergency response effort escalated with the crash of United 175 into the South
Tower. With that escalation, communications and command-and-control became
increasingly critical and increasingly difficult. First responders assisted thousands of
civilians in evacuating the towers, even as incident commanders from responding
agencies lacked knowledge of what other agencies and, in some cases, their own
responders were doing. [1, p. 22]
Then the South Tower collapsed. [1, p. 22]
South Tower Collapse
At 9:59 a.m., the South Tower collapsed in ten seconds. It is believed that all of the
people still inside the tower were killed, as well as a number of individuals—both first
responders and civilians—in the concourse, the Marriott, and on neighboring streets.
[1, pp. 22-23]
The next emergency issue was to decide what to do in the North Tower, once the
South Tower had collapsed. In the North Tower, 9-1-1 calls placed from above the
impact zone grew increasingly desperate. The only civilians still evacuating above the
10th floor were those who were injured or handicapped. First responders were
assisting those people in evacuating. [1, p. 23]
At 9:59 a.m., the South
Tower collapsed in ten
seconds. It is believed
that all of the people
still inside the tower
were killed, as well as a
number of individuals—
both first responders
and civilians—in the
concourse, the Marriott,
and on neighboring
streets.
67
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
Every FDNY command post ceased to operate upon the collapse of the South Tower.
Lacking awareness of the South Tower’s collapse, the chiefs in the North Tower
nonetheless ordered an evacuation of the building. [1, p. 23]
An FDNY marine unit radioed immediately that the South Tower had collapsed. To our
knowledge, this information did not reach the chiefs at the scene. [1, p. 23]
Within minutes some firefighters began to hear evacuation orders over tactical 1, the
channel being used in the North Tower. Some FDNY personnel also gave the
evacuation instruction on command channel 2, which was much less crowded, as only
chiefs were using it. Two battalion chiefs on upper floors heard the instruction on
Command 2 and repeated it to everyone they encountered. At least one of them also
repeated the evacuation order on tactical 1. [1, p. 23]
Other firefighters did not receive the transmissions. The reasons varied. Some FDNY
radios may not have picked up the transmission in the difficult high-rise environment.
The difficulty of that environment was compounded by the numerous communications
all attempted on tactical 1 after the South Tower collapsed; the channel was
overwhelmed, and evacuation orders may have been lost. Some of the firefighters in
the North Tower were among those who had responded even though they were off-
duty, and they did not have their radios. Finally, some of the firefighters in the North
Tower were supposed to have gone to the South Tower and were using the tactical
channel assigned to that Tower. [1, p. 24]
Many firefighters who did receive the evacuation order delayed their evacuation in
order to assist victims who could not move on their own. Many perished. [1, p. 24]
Many chiefs on the scene were unaware that the South Tower collapsed. To our
knowledge, none of the evacuation orders given to units in the North Tower followed
the specific protocols—which would include stating “mayday, mayday, mayday”—to
be given for the most urgent building evacuation. To our knowledge none of the
evacuation orders mentioned that the South Tower had collapsed. Firefighters who
received these orders lacked a uniform sense of urgency in their evacuation. [1, p. 24]
None of the evacuation
orders given to FDNY
units in the North Tower
followed the specific
protocols to be given for
the most urgent building
evacuation. None of the
evacuation orders
mentioned that the
South Tower had
collapsed. Firefighters
who received these
orders lacked a uniform
sense of urgency in their
evacuation.
68
Part I: Hard Lessons
The Police Department had a better understanding of the situation. The South Tower’s
collapse disrupted the NYPD rescue team command post at Church and Vesey.
Nonetheless, the NYPD command structure gave vital help to its units. [1, p. 24]
Many NYPD radio frequencies became overwhelmed with transmissions relating to
injured, trapped, or missing officers. By 10:10 a.m., the NYPD rescue team advised that
they were moving their command post north and began moving vehicles in that
direction. [1, p. 25]
NYPD Aviation radioed in immediately that the South Tower had collapsed. At 10:08
a.m., an aviation helicopter pilot advised that he did not believe the North Tower
would last much longer. There was no ready way to relay this information to the fire
chiefs in the North Tower. [1, p. 25]
Both NYPD rescue teams in the North Tower knew that the South Tower had collapsed
and evacuated the building. One remained in the complex near 5 and 6 WTC in order
to keep searching for people who needed help. A majority of these officers died. [1, p.
25]
At the time of the South Tower’s collapse, a number of NYPD and Port Authority Police
officers, as well as some FDNY personnel, were operating in different groups in the
North Tower mezzanine, the WTC plaza, and the concourse, as well as on the
neighboring streets. Many of these officers were thrown into the air and were
enveloped in the total darkness of the debris cloud. Within minutes of the South Tower
collapse, these officers began to regroup in the darkness and to lead the remaining
civilians and injured officers out of the complex. Many of these officers continued
rescue operations in the immediate vicinity of the North Tower and remained there
until the North Tower collapsed. Many lost their lives. [1, p. 25]
The collapse of the South Tower also forced the evacuation of the Port Authority Police
command post on West and Vesey, forcing its officers to move north. There is no
evidence that Port Authority Police officers from outside the WTC command ever
heard an evacuation order on their radios. Some of these officers in the North Tower
determined to evacuate, either on their own, or in consultation with other first
responders they came across. One Port Authority Police officer from the WTC
command reported that he heard an urgent evacuation instruction on his radio soon
after the South Tower collapsed. Other Port Authority police stayed in the WTC
complex, assisting with the evacuation. [1, pp. 25-26]
The Police Department
had a better
understanding of the
situation. The South
Tower’s collapse
disrupted the NYPD
rescue team command
post at Church and
Vesey. Nonetheless, the
NYPD command
structure gave vital help
to its units.
69
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
North Tower Collapse
The FDNY Chief of Department and the Port Authority Police Department
Superintendent and many of their senior staff were killed. The Fire Department of New
York suffered 343 casualties, the largest loss of life of any emergency response agency
in U.S. history. The Port Authority Police Department suffered 37 casualties, the largest
loss of life of any American police force in history. The New York Police Department
suffered 23 casualties, the second largest loss of life of any police force in U.S. history,
exceeded only by the loss of Port Authority police the same day. [1, p. 26]
On 9/11, 403 officers from FDNY, NYPD, and PAPD lost their lives. They were part of
the 2,752 killed at the World Trade Center that day. The nation suffered the largest
loss of civilian life on its soil as a result of a domestic attack in its history. [1, p. 26]
Conclusion
Because of its experience in 1993, New York City was seen as the best prepared city in
the nation ready to contend with catastrophic terrorism. The events of 9/11 proved
otherwise. And if New York City wasn’t ready, how did that bode for the rest of the
nation? These concerns would weigh heavily in the shaping of U.S. homeland security
policy.
On 9/11, 403 officers
from FDNY, NYPD, and
PAPD lost their lives.
They were part of the
2,752 killed at the World
Trade Center that day.
The nation suffered the
largest loss of civilian
life on its soil as a result
of a domestic attack in
its history.
70
Part I: Hard Lessons
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Which tower was first hit, and which tower was first to collapse on 9/11?
2. Why do you suppose the standing guidance was to remain in place during an emergency?
3. What options were available to those whose offices were located above the crash sites?
4. What options were available to those whose offices were located below the crash sites?
5. Identify the three agencies who led emergency response efforts at the World Trade Center.
6. Summarize the overall emergency response plan devised by the first responders.
7. Describe the problems with coordination and communication between first responders at the World Trade Center.
8. Identify two reasons why self-dispatching units would complicate an emergency response?
9. Identify two ways that first responders significantly reduced the death toll at the World Trade Center.
10. If you had been mayor of New York City, what would you have done different on 9/11?
71
Not By Chance
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe emergency response efforts at the Pentagon on 9/11.
Evaluate emergency response efforts at the Pentagon on 9/11.
Appreciate the dedication and effectiveness of first responders on 9/11.
Compare emergency operations at the Pentagon to emergency operations at the World Trade Center.
Chapter 5
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
72
Part I: Hard Lessons
“The success of the ACFD response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon did not
happen by chance.”
- Arlington County After Action Report, 2002
Introduction
On any other day, the disaster at the Pentagon would be remembered as a singular
challenge, an extraordinary national story. Yet the calamity at the World Trade Center
included catastrophic damage 1,000 feet above the ground that instantly imperiled
tens of thousands of people. The two experiences are not comparable. Nonetheless,
broader lessons in integrating multiagency response efforts are apparent in analyzing
the Pentagon response. [1, p. 4]
The Pentagon
The Pentagon is the headquarters of the United States Department of Defense, located
in Arlington County, Virginia. [2] It has served for more than 70 years as a symbol of
power in defense of the United States. Ironically, the groundbreaking ceremony for
construction of the Pentagon took place on September 11, 1941, less than 3 months
before the U.S. entry into World War II. Built on a site previously known as Arlington
Farms, the five surrounding roadways dictated its pentagonal shape. The Pentagon’s
placement was personally approved by President Franklin Roosevelt to avoid
obstructing the view of the U.S. Capitol from Arlington National Cemetery. The 380,000
tons of sand dredged from the Potomac River produced the reinforced concrete used
to construct the building and the 41,492 concrete piles that support it. This innovative
use of concrete saved enough steel to build an additional aircraft carrier for the War
Department. Construction of the Pentagon was completed in just 16 months at a cost
of $83 million. [3, p. 7]
The Pentagon is a massive structure. The building covers 29 acres of land, with a floor
area of almost 7 million square feet. Almost 18 miles of corridors connect the 5 floors
of office space housing some 23,000 employees. The heating and refrigeration plant
alone covers a full acre and more than 100,000 miles of telephone cables run through
the building. Although the network of corridors, escalators, elevators, and stairwells is
designed to speed movement from place to place, to the uninitiated, maneuvering
through the Pentagon can be daunting. [3, p. 7]
On September 11, 2001, exactly 60 years after the building's construction began,
American Airlines Flight 77 was hijacked and flown into the Western side of the
building, killing 189 people including the five hijackers. It was the first significant
foreign attack on the capital's governmental facilities since the burning of Washington
during the War of 1812. [2]
On September 11, 2001,
exactly 60 years after
the Pentagon’s
construction began,
American Airlines Flight
77 was hijacked and
flown into the Western
side of the building,
killing 189 people
including the five
hijackers. It was the first
significant foreign
attack on the capital's
governmental facilities
since the burning of
Washington during the
War of 1812.
73
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
Emergency Preparedness
In the event of a fire, even one of significant size, the issue of “who’s in charge” is
usually straightforward. The fire department that owns the jurisdiction owns the scene
until the fire is extinguished or brought under control. All other organizations support
and are under the tactical control of the fire department’s designated Incident
Commander. Once the fire is out, command might be transferred to a law enforcement
agency if, for example, arson or some other criminal act is suspected. The fire scene
would then become a crime scene. [3, pp. A-20]
While the Pentagon resided firmly within the jurisdiction of the Arlington County Fire
Department (ACFD), many unique aspects about the facility combined to create
overlapping areas of authority. To begin with, the Pentagon is a U.S. military facility
under direct control of the Secretary of Defense. Building entry is restricted and
controlled by its own law enforcement organization, the Defense Protective Service
(DPS). The fire station at the Pentagon heliport is operated by the Fort Myer Fire
Department. [3, pp. A-20] The responsibility for contingency operations at Department
of Defense (DoD) facilities in the Washington Metropolitan Area, including the
Pentagon, belong to the Commanding General of the Military District of Washington
(MDW). [3, p. 8]
Another complication was the nature of the incident itself. Following on the heels of
the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, it was clear this was a terrorist act.
Under the terms of Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39, acts of terrorism are the
exclusive domain of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI. This major fire
incident, the jurisdictional responsibility of the ACFD, occurred because of a terrorist
attack, thereby rendering the site a crime scene, the responsibility of the FBI. These
complex jurisdictional and organizational relationships tested the coordination and
relationships of everyone involved. [3, pp. A-20]
Fortunately, in March 2001, the Washington area Council of Governments adopted the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS)
model. Thus, there was a common understanding of basic working relationships among
local jurisdictions. However, establishing and maintaining command of the response to
the Pentagon attack was daunting. There were thousands of people and hundreds of
pieces of equipment from more than a dozen different jurisdictions, as well as many
Federal, State, and Arlington County government agencies, and scores of volunteer
organizations, businesses, and individuals. This understandably challenged the
leadership of a fire department that usually directs the efforts of some 260 uniformed
personnel. Although the ACFD performed well in responding to the terrorist attack on
the Pentagon, the actual experience of coordinating the multifaceted response proved
significantly more challenging than previously envisioned. [3, pp. A-20]
While the Pentagon
resided firmly within the
jurisdiction of the
Arlington County Fire
Department (ACFD),
many unique aspects
about the facility
combined to create
overlapping areas of
authority. Fortunately,
in March 2001, the
Washington area
Council of Governments
adopted the National
Incident Management
System (NIMS) and
Incident Command
System (ICS) model.
74
Part I: Hard Lessons
September 11, 2001
The only thing special about the morning of September 11, 2001, was the spectacular
fall weather across the Washington Metropolitan Area. In Arlington County, the 67
firefighters and emergency medical technicians of the fire department’s “B” shift were
staffing the county’s 10 neighborhood fire stations. By 8:30 a.m., training classes at the
Arlington County Fire Training Academy were in full swing. Other ACFD personnel were
engaged in meetings in the District of Columbia, preparing for the upcoming
International Monetary Fund (IMF) conference. Several Arlington County chief officers
were at a county sponsored management class at the Fairlington Community Center.
At 8:45 a.m., when American Airlines Flight #11 slammed into the north tower of New
York City’s World Trade Center, it was abundantly clear this would be a day like no
other. At 9:06 a.m., United Airlines Flight #175 crashed into the World Trade Center’s
south tower, revealing the true nature of the unprecedented horror. A brutal, mind-
numbing terrorist attack was under way against the United States. [3, pp. A-4]
At 9:37 a.m., in Arlington County, Captain Steve McCoy and the crew of ACFD Engine
101 were enroute to a training session in Crystal City, traveling north on Interstate 395.
Their conversation about the World Trade Center attack earlier that morning was
interrupted by the sight and sound of a commercial airliner in steep descent, banking
sharply to its right before disappearing beyond the horizon. At the same time,
Arlington County Police on patrol in south Arlington County, saw a large American
Airlines aircraft in a steep dive and on a collision course with the Pentagon. [3, p. 9]
At 9:38 a.m., American Airlines Flight #77 crashed into the west side of the Pentagon,
just beyond the heliport. It was traveling at a speed of about 400 miles per hour,
accelerating with close to its full complement of fuel at the time of impact. [3, p. 9]
The destruction caused by the attack was immediate and catastrophic. The 270,000
pounds of metal and jet fuel hurtling into the solid mass of the Pentagon was the
equivalent in weight of a diesel train locomotive, except it was traveling at more than
400 miles per hour. More than 600,000 airframe bolts and rivets and 60 miles of wire
were instantly transformed into white-hot shrapnel. The resulting impact, penetration,
and burning fuel had catastrophic effects to the five floors and three rings in and
around Pentagon Corridors 4 and 5. [3, p. 9]
All 64 people aboard the airliner were killed, as were 125 people inside the Pentagon
(70 civilians and 55 military service members). [1, p. 5]
75
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
Emergency Response
At 9:38 a.m., shortly after American Airlines Flight #77 disappeared from sight, a
tremendous explosion preceded a massive plume of smoke and fire. Unable to
pinpoint the precise location, Captain McCoy aboard Engine 101 immediately radioed
the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center (ECC), reporting an airplane
crash in the vicinity of the 14th Street Bridge or in Crystal City. Aware of the World
Trade Center attack, Captain McCoy also advised that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation should be notified, since this was a possible terrorist attack. Hearing the
radio message, fire and rescue units from Arlington County and elsewhere began to
respond, self-dispatching from stations or diverting from other destinations. [3, pp. A-
4]
Figure 5-1: Pentagon Crash Site [3, p. 8]
At 9:38 a.m., shortly
after American Airlines
Flight #77 disappeared
from sight, a
tremendous explosion
preceded a massive
plume of smoke and fire.
Unable to pinpoint the
precise location, Captain
McCoy aboard Engine
101 immediately
radioed the Arlington
County Emergency
Communications Center
(ECC), reporting an
airplane crash in the
vicinity of the 14th
Street Bridge or in
Crystal City.
76
Part I: Hard Lessons
At 9:38 a.m. on September 11, only one fire crew, Foam 161 of the Fort Myer Fire
Department, knew the exact location of the crash site. Captain Dennis Gilroy and his
team were already on station at the Pentagon when Flight #77 slammed into it, just
beyond the heliport. Foam 161 caught fire and suffered a flat tire from flying debris.
Firefighters Mark Skipper and Alan Wallace were outside the vehicle at impact and
received burns and lacerations. Recovering from the initial shock, they began helping
victims climb out of the Pentagon’s first floor windows. Captain Gilroy called the Fort
Myer Fire Department, reporting for the first time the actual location of the crash. [3,
pp. A-4]
Help was already on the way from several directions as units sped toward the source of
the smoke plume, not toward a specific street address. ACFD Truck 105 reached the
scene first, followed shortly by fire and medical units from several Arlington County
stations. [3, pp. A-5]
At the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO), Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) Arthur
Eberhart was putting in motion the steps necessary to support New York City. Of
WFO’s four senior leaders, he was the only one present at headquarters that morning.
Upon learning of the World Trade Center crashes, SAC Eberhart activated the WFO
Command Center. Members of the WFO National Capital Response Squad (NCRS) were
paged and instructed to report immediately to headquarters. Supervisory Special
Agent (SSA) Jim Rice, the NCRS leader, was at the FBI WFO Command Center on the
telephone with Mr. Larry Cirutti of the Military District of Washington at the Pentagon
when a monitored District of Columbia police radio transmission reported an explosion
at the Pentagon. Mr. Cirutti told SSA Rice a helicopter must have “slid off the helipad”
into the building. Special Agent Chris Combs, the NCRS Fire Service Liaison, was
teaching a class at the District of Columbia Fire Academy when he received his page.
While enroute to the WFO Headquarters, he heard a news report of the Pentagon
attack and proceeded directly to the Pentagon. [3, pp. A-6]
Meanwhile, at the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) Fire
Department at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, Captain Michael Defina
was investigating an incident at Terminal B when he heard the impact and saw the
smoke rising in the distance. He called Fire Communications and was advised of a
report of a Boeing 757 crash off the end of Runway 1-19. That was quickly amended,
identifying the Pentagon as the crash site. The MWAA contacted the Arlington ECC and
was directed to respond to the Pentagon. They did so with substantial resources: a
rescue engine, two foam units, two mass casualty units, a mini-pumper, and a
command vehicle. Because MWAA had authority to respond automatically to an
airplane crash within 5 miles of the airport, two heavy rescue units had already self-
dispatched to the Pentagon. [3, pp. A-6]
Help was already on the
way from several
directions as units sped
toward the source of the
smoke plume, not
toward a specific street
address. ACFD Truck 105
reached the scene first,
followed shortly by fire
and medical units from
several Arlington County
stations.
77
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
ACFD’s Training Officer Captain Chuck Gibbs reached the incident site within the first 3
minutes, followed by Battalion Chief Bob Cornwell, who assumed initial Incident
Command responsibilities. Those duties were quickly assumed by Assistant Fire Chief
for Operations James Schwartz, who assigned Battalion Chief Cornwell, a 35-year
veteran firefighter, to lead fire suppression efforts inside the building. Captain Gibbs
commanded the River Division. Special Agent Combs arrived moments after Chief
Schwartz. The partnership between Chief Schwartz and Special Agent Combs, who
served as FBI agency representative to the Incident Commander, proved invaluable in
the days ahead. [3, pp. A-6]
Incident Command
When ACFD Chief Edward Plaugher arrived at the Pentagon shortly after the attack, he
chose not to assume Incident Command, but let it remain delegated to Chief Schwartz.
Chief Plaugher recognized he would be more valuable as a free agent, buffering the
command structure from outside distractions, such as the media, and directing his
attention to support requiring his personal intervention. This proved to be a fortuitous
decision. [3, pp. A-21]
A tiered command structure quickly evolved in the first hours of the incident. Chief
Schwartz directed fire and rescue operations from the Incident Command Post (ICP).
Around midday, he established an ICS Operations Section at the Pentagon heliport,
from which day-to-day firefighting and rescue efforts were planned and executed.
Chief Gray, a second-generation ACFD Firefighter, led the Operations Section
supported by Chief Cornwell and Captain Gibbs. Battalion Chief Tom Hurlihy, from the
District of Columbia, was later added to the operations team. [3, pp. A-21]
Away from the incident scene, Battalion Chief George Lyon designated Fire Station 1 as
a Field Operations Center. It was there that replacement personnel and equipment
were organized and dispatched to the Pentagon. [3, pp. A-21]
At about 1:00 p.m., Chief Schwartz learned that a task force led by Loudoun County
Chief Jack Brown had arrived at Fire Station 1. He asked Chief Brown, formerly with the
Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and a long-time colleague, to report to the
ICP and lead the Planning Section. When the Fairfax County Urban Search and Rescue
(US&R) Team deployed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) arrived
about 2:00 p.m., the Incident Commander recognized that these very special resources
would require considerable attention and asked Chief Brown to serve as their liaison. A
Logistics Section was added later that day. It ramped up and was fully operational on
the morning of September 12. Functional branches were established for fire
suppression at the impact area (River Division), the Center Courtyard (A-E Division),
and medical treatment (South Parking Lot). [3, pp. A-21]
A tiered command
structure quickly evolved
in the first hours of the
incident. Chief Schwartz
directed fire and rescue
operations from the
Incident Command Post
(ICP). Around midday,
he established an ICS
Operations Section at
the Pentagon heliport,
from which day-to-day
firefighting and rescue
efforts were planned
and executed.
78
Part I: Hard Lessons
The Incident Command also interfaced with the Arlington County Emergency
Operations Center (EOC), located in the county government complex. The EOC was
responsible for policy guidance and resource support. EOC personnel and equipment
were assembled by 10:30 a.m. and, at 12:30 p.m., County Manager Ron Carlee
convened the first Emergency Management Team meeting. [3, pp. A-22]
The FBI deployed both the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Capital
Response Squad. Special Agent Combs established the FBI initial command presence
with the ACFD Incident Command. The collaboration and cooperation between the FBI
and ACFD was remarkable. The FBI Evidence Recovery Team began arriving before
10:00 a.m. and set up in a grassy area a short distance from the heliport. Because of
the extremely congested traffic conditions, it took several hours for the entire FBI
contingent to negotiate the route from the District of Columbia to the Pentagon. [3,
pp. A-22]
The FBI had more than one role. It was responsible for the entire crime scene
operation, including evidence gathering and body recovery. That operation engaged
more than 700 FBI agents at the Pentagon, assisted by hundreds of people from other
organizations. It was also responsible for organizing and operating the Federal
interagency Joint Operations Center (JOC) as the Federal agency “coordination” center.
The FBI was also responsible for investigating the hijacking at Washington Dulles
International Airport. [3, pp. A-23]
Thus, the Pentagon attack required a fully coordinated response by the ACFD Incident
Commander, the FBI On-Scene Commander, and the Commanding General of the
MDW representing the DoD. From the moment Special Agent Combs reported to Chief
Schwartz as the FBI representative and initial FBI On-Scene Commander, the
collaboration and cooperation between the FBI and ACFD was under way. The FBI
carefully respected the command primacy of the ACFD while it retrieved evidence
during the 10-day fire and rescue phase. The FBI assumed command of the scene from
the ACFD on September 21. The foundation for this relationship had formed long
before the attack on the Pentagon. Special Agent Combs, a former New York
firefighter, had worked routinely with every Washington Metropolitan Area fire
department. He had taught classes at area fire academies and met regularly with the
fire community leadership. Similarly, Major General James Jackson of the MDW placed
his formidable resources in support of the ACFD Incident Command and the FBI until
control was returned to the DoD on September 28. [3, pp. A-20]
Thus, the Pentagon
attack required a fully
coordinated response by
the ACFD Incident
Commander, the FBI On-
Scene Commander, and
the Commanding
General of the MDW
representing the DoD.
From the moment
Special Agent Combs
reported to Chief
Schwartz as the FBI
representative and
initial FBI On-Scene
Commander, the
collaboration and
cooperation between
the FBI and ACFD was
under way.
79
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
Emergency Medical Services
ACFD Captain Edward Blunt also arrived at the Pentagon within minutes of the crash
and assumed control of Emergency Medical Services (EMS). Captain Blunt immediately
contacted the Arlington County Emergency Communications Center and requested and
immediately received a separate EMS operations channel. He also asked for 20 medic
units, 2 buses, and a command vehicle (EMS Supervisor Vehicle 112) to support the
EMS response. Captain Blunt designated the field adjacent to Washington Boulevard
(Route 27) as the treatment area, and asked the Arlington County Police Department
(ACPD) patrol units on-scene to clear Washington Boulevard to create north and south
access for emergency response traffic. Captain Alan Dorn arrived shortly after Captain
Blunt, and was assigned as Triage Officer. Together, Captains Blunt and Dorn began
working with military medical personnel who volunteered to help set up triage areas.
[3, pp. A-6 - A-7]
Initially, medical units staged in the Pentagon South Parking Lot, adjacent to Route
110, until called forward to the EMS sector on Route 27. By 9:50 a.m., six ACFD EMS
units had already arrived at the incident site (M-102, M-104, M-105, M-106, M-109,
and M-110). M-101, Engine 103, and an ACFD Reserve Medic Unit quickly joined them.
Two additional ACFD Reserve Medic Units (RM-111 and RM-112) arrived next and were
directed to provide EMS support at the Pentagon’s Center Courtyard. [3, pp. A-7]
At 9:50 a.m., the ECC advised Captain Blunt that Virginia Hospital Center - Arlington,
Inova Fairfax Hospital, and Washington Hospital Center were prepared to accept as
many victims as needed. [3, pp. A-7]
Figure 5-2: ACFD Incident Command on 9/11 [3, pp. A-23]
At 9:50 a.m., the ECC
advised Captain Blunt
that Virginia Hospital
Center - Arlington, Inova
Fairfax Hospital, and
Washington Hospital
Center were prepared to
accept as many victims
as needed.
80
Part I: Hard Lessons
Sizing Up
The massive size of the Pentagon and the complexity of its various rings, corridors, and
floors compounded the challenge of the response force. First of all, it distorted the
perception of the task at hand. It is true that fire damage was contained to a relatively
small area, but it was a relatively small area in one of the largest business complexes in
the world. This was office space built to accommodate a substantial workforce, with all
the accompanying common space, meeting and conference rooms, and other support
facilities. [3, pp. A-7]
To those watching on television, or even from the Pentagon’s South Parking Lot, the
gash created by the Boeing 757 airliner was large, but it affected a specific area of only
two of the Pentagon’s five Wedges. Neither the depth of the incursion nor the massive
devastation inside the building was readily apparent as flames burned behind blast-
proof windows. Huge heaps of rubble and burning debris littered with the bodies and
body parts of 188 victims covered an area the size of a modern shopping mall. Flight
#77 penetrated the outer wall of the Pentagon’s E Ring and the damage extended all
the way through the inner wall of the C Ring, a distance of approximately 285 feet. [3,
pp. A-8]
Furthermore, the unique design of the Pentagon hid from view activities at the Center
Courtyard in the middle of the complex. Battalion Chief Jerome Smith was assigned
responsibility for fire suppression from the Center Courtyard, with units from the
District of Columbia and ACFD. His mission was to prevent the fire from breaching the
B Ring. Upon reaching the Center Courtyard, Battalion Chief Smith found the area in
turmoil. More than 400 building occupants crowded the Center Courtyard. Others
leapt from the upper floors, as colleagues armed with fire extinguishers attempted to
extinguish the flames consuming burning comrades. [3, pp. A-10 - A-11]
Dispatching Units
Although self-dispatching quickened the arrival of a substantial number of fire, rescue,
and medical units, many arrived haphazardly. The occupants of those vehicles were
singularly intent on saving victims and attacking the fire. Police engaged in area traffic
control were understandably reluctant to delay emergency vehicles descending on the
scene with lights flashing and sirens blaring. [3, pp. A-10]
Deploying EMS units from other jurisdictions, particularly self-dispatched units, found
it easy to bypass the staging area and proceed directly to the response site. Some
victims flagged down EMS units before they reached the staging area. The crew from
one Alexandria unit reported that it independently performed triage and treatment in
the Pentagon South Parking Lot to assist five severely burned victims. [3, pp. A-10]
The gash created by the
Boeing 757 airliner was
large, but it affected a
specific area of only two
of the Pentagon’s five
Wedges. Neither the
depth of the incursion
nor the massive
devastation inside the
building was readily
apparent as flames
burned behind blast-
proof windows. Huge
heaps of rubble and
burning debris littered
with the bodies and
body parts of 188
victims covered an area
the size of a modern
shopping mall.
81
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
As a result, although the ACFD instituted Incident Command procedures very early on,
they still faced the monumental challenge of gaining control of the resources already
onsite and those arriving minute-by-minute. [3, pp. A-10]
Unit Accountability
Captain Jeff Liebold, working at the Incident Command Post, was tasked to determine
what units were onsite and where they were working. Because radio communications
were overloaded and ineffective, Captain Liebold sent two firefighters on foot to
record the identification number and location of every piece of equipment on the
Pentagon grounds. In the first few hours, foot messengers at times proved to be the
most reliable means of communicating. [3, pp. A-10]
The uncontrolled influx of fire and rescue personnel had important accountability
implications. had there been a second attack, as occurred at the World Trade Center, it
would have been virtually impossible for the Incident Commander to assess the impact
to response operations. [3, pp. A-10]
As it was, at 10:15 a.m., Chief Schwartz ordered the immediate evacuation of the
incident site. The FBI had warned him that a second hijacked airliner was flying on a
course toward the Pentagon and was 20 minutes away. [3, pp. A-13]
Triage
At approximately 9:55 a.m., Assistant Chief John White arrived and was directed by
Chief Schwartz to command the EMS Branch. Chief Schwartz advised him that Captains
Dorn and Blunt were assessing and establishing mass triage sites at the traffic circle
area of Washington Boulevard and westbound Columbia Pike. Captain Dorn organized
responders and military volunteers, while Captain Blunt performed forward
assessment. [3, pp. A-12]
Chief White instructed Captain Dorn to continue making preparations for casualties in
the designated triage and treatment areas and to use the EMS units located along
Route 27. ACFD triage and treatment sectors were established using ACFD assets,
mutual-aid responders and military emergency medical technicians, nurses, and
physicians. The military participants were receptive to direction and readily deferred to
EMS officers. A military nurse equipped with a radio was able to communicate with the
Defense Protective Service and aid stations in the Pentagon. [3, pp. A-13]
At 10:15 a.m., Chief
Schwartz ordered the
immediate evacuation
of the incident site. The
FBI had warned him that
a second hijacked
airliner was flying on a
course toward the
Pentagon and was 20
minutes away.
82
Part I: Hard Lessons
Chief White then met with Captain Blunt along Route 27 adjacent to the Pentagon
heliport for a forward assessment report. Chief White asked him for a count of the
casualties in his area by triage designators: red (IMMEDIATE: Life Threatening Injury);
yellow (DELAYED: Serious, Not Life Threatening); and green (MINOR: Ambulatory). [3,
pp. A-13]
After Chief Schwartz issued the 10:15 a.m. evacuation order, Chief White instructed
Captain Blunt to ”load and go,” transporting as many patients as possible out of the
area. The first wave of patients was enroute to area hospitals within 10 minutes of the
evacuation notice and all other personnel were relocated to the Columbia Pike
underpass at the South Parking Lot. Medivac helicopters that had responded to the
Pentagon incident scene were relocated to a safer place. [3, pp. A-13]
At the underpass, Chief White, in coordination with EMS officers and military medical
volunteers, made plans to reestablish triage in that area. He designated Captain Dorn
as Triage Officer, Captain Blunt as Forward Triage Officer, Chief Glen Butler from the
MWAA as Treatment Officer, and Firefighter Paramedic David Hehr as Transportation
and Disposition Officer. [3, pp. A-14]
Dr. James Vafier, the Alexandria EMS Medical Director, accompanied an EMS unit to
the incident site and was assigned a forward assessment role with a position on the
sidewalk between Corridors 3 and 4. The plan was for military stretcher bearers to
carry victims extracted by firefighters to Dr. Vafier’s position for preliminary
assessment. He would then assign them to the appropriate triage and treatment area.
[3, pp. A-14]
After the all clear was sounded and site evacuation ended, EMS and military
responders implemented Chief White’s operations plan. [3, pp. A-14]
Fire Suppression
During the first 24 hours, it was necessary to evacuate the Pentagon on four separate
occasions because of the risk of structural collapse or the threat of additional terrorist
attacks. It is difficult to measure the full impact of repeated building evacuations, but it
was clearly negative and significant. Each time an evacuation was ordered, firefighters
interrupted operations, abandoned equipment, shut off hoses, and ran several
hundred yards to protected areas. From there, they had to watch as flames reclaimed
the parts of the Pentagon they had just evacuated. [3, pp. A-16] Firefighting was also
hampered by unique aspects of the Pentagon itself.
83
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
Teams of firefighters assigned suppression work on the Pentagon roof had difficulty
finding access points from the fifth floor. Neither building engineers nor detailed
structural drawings were available to assist them at that location. Captain Robert
Swarthout, Incident Safety Officer at the ICP, was in contact with a Pentagon engineer,
but that resource was not accessible at the point of fire attack. Firefighters eventually
climbed onto a ledge from a fifth-floor window then hoisted themselves onto the roof.
[3, pp. A-16]
Attacking the fire on the roof was particularly difficult. The thick wood-plank inner
layer burned out of control, protected by a layer of concrete below and a thick slate
roof above. Firefighters cut trenches across the slate roof. It was physically demanding
and involved a certain degree of guesswork to breach the roof ahead of a fire that
could not be seen. On the second day, September 12, a military representative pointed
out to Battalion Chief Randy Gray, the Incident Command Operations Section Chief, the
locations of two key communications and operations facilities threatened by the roof
fire. The fire was stopped short of those facilities. [3, pp. A-16]
Height restrictions limited equipment access along A-E Drive into the Center Courtyard.
Eventually, the tiller cab had to be cut off of an ACFD ladder truck so it could support
the fire attack from inside the Center Courtyard. [3, pp. A-16]
Despite these difficulties, fire suppression in the first 12 hours was able to contain the
damage without interrupting critical worldwide military command and control during a
major national security emergency. Despite the magnitude, complexity, and duration
of operations, there were no fatalities or serious injuries among fire and rescue
personnel. This can be attributed in large part to the skill level in core competencies,
professionalism, training, and teamwork of ACFD personnel and their counterparts in
supporting jurisdictions. [3, pp. A-17]
Communications
Communication at the scene was challenging. Radio traffic overwhelmed the system to
the extent that foot messengers became the most reliable means of communicating.
Fortunately, there was a growing surplus of people onsite and available to serve in that
capacity. [3, pp. A-36]
Radio communications inside the Pentagon were, for the most part, impossible. Where
line of sight could be achieved, “talk around” was minimally effective. Initially, as calls
jammed local towers, cellular telephones were not useful. No priority was assigned to
emergency services. Nextel telephones with the 2-way radio capability were somewhat
more reliable. [3, pp. A-36]
84
Part I: Hard Lessons
There was not a clearinghouse hospital designated. Thus, EMS Control did not have a
single communications point of contact among hospitals and clinics. [3, pp. A-36]
Some mutual-aid jurisdictions arrived without handheld radios. Others used
equipment incompatible with the ACFD or preprogrammed in ways that limited
communications. [3, pp. A-37]
Beginning on September 12, the Incident Command Operations Section organized the
fire suppression units into four divisions, each led by a chief officer from the
preeminent jurisdiction (Division A – Arlington, Division B – the District of Columbia,
Division C – Alexandria, and Division D – Fairfax). They were instructed to use the
assigned home jurisdiction radio channel for communicating. This facilitated “talk
around” within each division. However, in one instance, a DCFD replacement crew
worked on one portion of the roof of the Pentagon while an ACFD team worked on a
different portion. The two units had no way to communicate with each other in case
either team needed help. [3, pp. A-37]
Crime Scene Investigation
The FBI began collecting evidence immediately after arriving at the Pentagon incident
site on September 11. As fire and rescue efforts proceeded, FBI activity involving
evidence recovery and removal of bodies and body parts became a 24-hour operation.
Special Agent Adams directed this phase of the criminal investigation during the day
shift, with Special Agent Thomas O’Connor taking over at night. The FBI worked closely
with FEMA US&R teams and the fire department Technical Rescue Teams (TRTs).
Special Agent Adams and Special Agent O’Connor attended the preshift briefings by the
US&R Incident Support Team (IST) coordinator. US&R and TRT members would first
shore up an area to ensure it was reasonably safe, then begin hunting through the
debris, searching primarily for surviving victims buried in the rubble. [3, pp. C-54]
As they encountered bodies, parts of bodies, and other evidence linked to the crime,
they called forward the FBI contingent assigned to each team. Each item was
photographed, numbered, and tagged. This information, along with a diagram showing
where the evidence was found, was given to one of the soldiers from the Army’s Old
Guard, the 3rd Infantry Regiment from Fort Myer, VA, who transported the human
remains to the FBI’s temporary morgue at the North Parking Lot loading dock. Sixty
soldiers supported the FBI on each 12-hour shift. [3, pp. C-54]
The FBI began collecting
evidence immediately
after arriving at the
Pentagon incident site
on September 11. As fire
and rescue efforts
proceeded, FBI activity
involving evidence
recovery and removal of
bodies and body parts
became a 24-hour
operation.
85
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
SSA Jim Rice assigned Special Agent Tara Bloesch to set up and manage the temporary
morgue. Special Agent Bloesch had previous experience establishing morgue
operations during FBI overseas operations in Kosovo and other overseas locations. She
determined that the North Parking Lot loading dock was a suitable site. The doors
remained closed except when receiving remains, and a large tarp was hung to
safeguard the privacy of the morgue. The DPS, the FBI Critical Incident Response Group
(CIRG), the ACPD SWAT team, the U.S. Marshals Service, and military police from MDW
provided security at different times throughout the operation. [3, pp. C-55]
Summary
The first ACFD personnel arrived at the Pentagon within 2 minutes of the attack. ACFD
and mutual-aid medical personnel began aiding victims immediately. Within 4 minutes
of the attack, the ACFD had established its command presence. MWAA fire and
medical units were on the scene and the first contingent of the FBI’s NCRS had arrived
within 5 minutes of impact. Three major Washington Metropolitan Area hospitals were
ready to receive injured victims 12 minutes after the attack. By 10:00 a.m. on
September 11, most of the ACFD duty shift was engaged at the Pentagon. [3, pp. A-7]
All 64 aboard Flight #77 were killed when the Boeing 757 crashed into the Pentagon.
Damage and debris penetrated halfway into the five-story building, about 285 feet,
killing an additional 125 personnel including 70 civilians and 55 service members.
Approximately 110 people were seriously injured and transported to area hospitals. [1,
pp. 4-5] Only 42 injured victims received on-site medical care. An estimated 100
additional victims were treated for minor injuries. [3, pp. A-14] Because of the quick
response and triage of ACFD EMS and supporting units, all of them survived. [3, pp. A-
8]
By September 13, all surviving victims had been treated or transported from the
Pentagon, and the EMS branch stood down. Eight days later, ten days after arriving on
scene, the Arlington County Fire Department also stood down, and on September 21
turned over Incident Command to the FBI. [3, pp. A-27]
The first ACFD personnel
arrived at the Pentagon
within 2 minutes of the
attack. ACFD and
mutual-aid medical
personnel began aiding
victims immediately.
Within 4 minutes of the
attack, the ACFD had
established its
command presence.
86
Conclusion
To be sure, several factors facilitated the response to the Pentagon and distinguish it
from the response to the World Trade Center: 1) there was a single incident; 2) the
incident site was relatively easy to secure and contain; 3) there were no other buildings
in the immediate area; and 4) there was no collateral damage beyond the Pentagon.
[1, p. 5] To be fair, the Pentagon response encountered problems similar to those at
the WTC, including 1) difficulties accounting for self-dispatched units, and 2)
overwhelmed and incompatible radio communications. [1, pp. 9-10] Even so, while no
emergency response is flawless, the response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the
Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons: 1) strong professional relationships
and trust established among emergency responders; 2) the pursuit of a regional
approach to response, and 3) the adoption of the Incident Command System. [1, p. 5]
As a result, following 9/11 a consensus emerged among the First Responder
community that a clear Incident Command System should be required of all response
agencies. [1, p. 6]
Part I: Hard Lessons
87
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. List the response agencies having jurisdictional authority at the Pentagon on 9/11.
2. How did Incident Command facilitate emergency operations at the Pentagon on 9/11?
3. What was the advantage of having a single Incident Command Post at the Pentagon on 9/11?
4. Describe the circumstances behind the order to evacuate first responders from the Pentagon.
5. How was the order to evacuate first responders from the Pentagon different from the order to evacuate first
responder from the South Tower on 9/11?
6. Why was it important for Incident Command to notify area hospitals of pending casualties?
7. Why is it important for Incident Command to maintain accountability of first responders on scene of an incident?
8. At what point, as Incident Commander, do you let crime scene investigators take control of the site?
9. Explain how emergency operations at the Pentagon were similar to emergency operations at the World Trade
Center on 9/11.
10. Explain how emergency operations at the Pentagon were different to emergency operations at the World Trade
Center on 9/11.
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
88
Part I: Hard Lessons
89
Surpassing Disproportion
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the distinguishing characteristic of the 9/11 attacks.
Explain how critical infrastructure makes the nation vulnerable to domestic catastrophic attack.
Describe the relationship between critical infrastructure protection and cyber security.
Separate motive from action; differentiate terrorism from domestic catastrophic attack.
Chapter 6
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
90
“The 9/11 attack was an event of surpassing disproportion.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
The 9/11 attacks killed 2,973 people and caused more than $41.5B in damages. [1, pp.
CRS-2 - CRS-3] On September 11th, 2001, nineteen hijackers inflicted more damage on
the United States than the Imperial Japanese Navy on December 7th, 1941. [2, p. 2]
According to the 9/11 Commission, the attacks were distinguished by their “surpassing
disproportion”. They were carried out by a tiny group of people dispatched from one
of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth. Measured on
a governmental scale, the resources behind it were trivial. [3, pp. 339-340] Altogether,
the attacks cost no more than $500,000 to execute. [3, p. 172] The hijackers were able
to achieve this level of destruction not by employing weapons of mass destruction, but
by subverting the nation’s transportation infrastructure, turning passenger jets into
guided missiles. This chapter will explore the new, unprecedented threat unveiled by
9/11: the threat of domestic catastrophic attack by non-state actors preying on the
nation’s critical infrastructure.
Critical Infrastructure
According to Title 42, Section 5195c of United States Code, “critical infrastructure” is
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.” The nation’s health, wealth, and security rely on the
production and distribution of certain goods and services. The array of physical assets,
functions, and systems across which these goods and services move is called critical
infrastructure. [4, p. 2] Critical infrastructure is a network of independent, mostly
privately-owned, man-made systems and processes that function collaboratively and
synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and
services. [5, p. 3]
The transportation infrastructure moves goods and people within and beyond our
borders, and makes it possible for the United States to play a leading role in the global
economy. [5, p. 3]
The oil and gas production and storage infrastructure fuels transportation services,
manufacturing operations, and home utilities. [5, p. 3]
Part I: Hard Lessons
According to the 9/11
Commission, the attacks
were distinguished by
their “surpassing
disproportion”.
91
The water supply infrastructure assures a steady flow of water for agriculture, industry
(including various manufacturing processes, power generation, and cooling), business,
firefighting, and our homes. [5, p. 4]
The emergency services infrastructure in communities across the country responds to
urgent police, fire, and medical needs, saving lives and preserving property. [5, p. 4]
The government services infrastructure consists of federal, state, and local agencies
that provide essential services to the public, promoting the general welfare. [5, p. 4]
The banking and finance infrastructure manages trillions of dollars, from deposit of our
individual paychecks to the transfer of huge amounts in support of major global
enterprises. [5, p. 4]
The electrical power infrastructure consists of generation, transmission, and
distribution systems that are essential to all other infrastructures and every aspect of
our economy. Without electricity, our factories would cease production, our televisions
would fade to black, and our radios would fall silent (even a battery-powered receiver
depends on an electric-powered transmitter). Our street intersections would suddenly
be dangerous. Our homes and businesses would go dark. Our computers and our
telecommunications would no longer operate. [5, p. 4]
The telecommunications infrastructure has been revolutionized by advances in
information technology to form an information and communications infrastructure,
consisting of the Public Telecommunications Network (PTN), the Internet, and the
many millions of computers in home, commercial, academic, and government use.
Taking advantage of the speed, efficiency and effectiveness of computers and digital
communications, all the critical infrastructures are increasingly connected to networks,
particularly the Internet. Thus, they are connected to one another. Networking enables
the electronic transfer of funds, the distribution of electrical power, and the control of
gas and oil pipeline systems. Networking is essential to a service economy as well as to
competitive manufacturing and efficient delivery of raw materials and finished goods.
The information and communications infrastructure is basic to responsive emergency
services. It is the backbone of our military command and control system. And it is
becoming the core of our educational system. [5, p. 4]
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
The hijackers were able
to achieve this level of
destruction not by
employing weapons of
mass destruction, but by
subverting the nation’s
transportation
infrastructure, turning
passenger jets into
guided missiles.
92
Disruption of any infrastructure is always inconvenient and can be costly and even life
threatening. Major disruptions could lead to major losses and affect national security,
the economy, and the public good. Mutual dependence and the interconnectedness
made possible by the information and communications infrastructure lead to the
possibility that our infrastructures may be vulnerable in ways they never have been
before. Intentional exploitation of these new vulnerabilities could have severe
consequences for our economy, security, and way of life. [5, p. 4]
Domestic Catastrophic Attack
In terms of fatalities, 9/11 ranks fourth among the top ten disasters in the United
States. [6] Suppose you are a member of a small militant group and you want to
surpass this record, how do you do it? You can’t do it with traditional firearms. The
Virginia Tech shooting on April 16, 2007, the single deadliest U.S. incident by a lone
gunman killed 32 people and wounded 17 others. [7] What about multiple shooters?
Unlikely. In November 2008, 10 members of Lashkar-e Taiba mounted coordinated
attacks on six separate locations in Mumbai India. They killed 164 people and
wounded at least 308. [8] Since the 1999 shooting at Columbine High School in
Colorado, U.S. police are trained to respond to active shooters as quickly as possible,
making it unlikely that a similar attack would last four days as it did in Mumbai. [9, pp.
1-2] So what about explosives? On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh detonated a truck
bomb that killed 168 people and injured more than 680 others in the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City. It would be difficult to replicate this attack since
ammonium nitrate, which comprised the main component of the bomb, is much more
closely controlled. [10] Furthermore, a similar bomb failed to topple the World Trade
Center in 1993. [11] Conventional weapons might suit conventional crime, but they are
unsuited to domestic catastrophic attack.
The single largest incident of manmade destruction was the atomic bombing of
Hiroshima Japan on August 6, 1945. The estimated toll from the blast was 70,000
casualties, plus the utter destruction of the city. [12] However, creating mass-casualty
weapons capable of killing thousands or even tens of thousands of people requires
advanced knowledge, significant financial resources, and access to unique equipment.
Stealing one presents equally challenging options as the materials and weapons are
kept under the tightest security. Even if one could be acquired, it would still entail
tremendous difficulties in transportation and deployment. [13, pp. 20-38] Just as the
1995 Tokyo subway attacks demonstrate the feasibility of employing WMD, they also
demonstrate the difficulty of employing WMD.
Unlike WMD which are sequestered under lock-and-key, critical infrastructure is
inherently accessible to the public. Millions depend on it to sustain their lives, and
millions are at risk should it go wrong. On April 26, 1986, the meltdown of the
Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine killed 31 personnel, forced the evacuation
Part I: Hard Lessons
Mutual dependence and
the interconnectedness
made possible by the
information and
communications
infrastructure lead to
the possibility that our
infrastructures may be
vulnerable in ways they
never have been before.
Intentional exploitation
of these new
vulnerabilities could
have severe
consequences for our
economy, security, and
way of life.
93
and resettlement of 350,400 residents, and exposed an estimated 530,000 recovery
workers to higher levels of radiation. While experts debate how this exposure might
affect future cancer rates, they have taken the precaution of establishing a “zone of
alienation” 19 miles in all directions from the plant (187 mi2). Ukrainian officials
estimate the area will not be safe for human life again for another 20,000 years. [14]
Most infrastructure failure is the result of accident, not only Chernobyl, but also
Bhopal India, where in December 1984, 2,259 people were killed overnight when
methyl isocyanate accidentally vented from a nearby Union Carbide pesticide plant.
[15]
But as demonstrated on 9/11, infrastructure may also be purposely subverted. The
essential vulnerability of today’s critical infrastructure is that little of it was centrally
planned or designed, and virtually none of it was built to withstand deliberate attack.
The result is that millions of lives depend on networks that are not fully understood,
riddled with weaknesses, and susceptible to malicious tampering. And while physical
exploitation of physical vulnerabilities, such as happened on 9/11, remain worrisome,
the greater concern is virtual exploitation of cyber vulnerabilities through the Internet.
[5, p. 5]
Cyber Vulnerability
The information technology revolution of the 1990s-2000s changed the way U.S.
business and government operate. Without a great deal of thought about security, the
nation shifted control of essential processes in manufacturing, utilities, banking, and
communications to networked computers. As a result, the cost of doing business
dropped and productivity skyrocketed. [16, p. 5] But at the same time, the proliferation
of networks blurred ownership boundaries diffusing accountability, decreasing “end-to
-end” or system-wide analysis and responsibility, reducing investment in research and
development, and reserve capacity. Today’s processes are more efficient, but they lack
the redundant characteristics that gave their predecessors more resilience. They are
also susceptible to cyber attack. [5, pp. 8-10]
Technologies and techniques that have fueled major improvements in the
performance of our infrastructures can also be used to disrupt them. The United
States, where close to half of all computer capacity and 60 percent of Internet assets
reside, is at once the world’s most advanced and most dependent user of information
technology. More than any other country, we rely on a set of increasingly accessible
and technologically reliable infrastructures, which in turn have a growing collective
dependence on domestic and global networks. This provides great opportunity, but it
also presents new vulnerabilities that can be exploited. It heightens risk of cascading
technological failure, and therefore of cascading disruption in the flow of essential
goods and services. [5, pp. 4-5] A cyber attack against the national electric grid is a
particularly unsettling prospect.
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
Without a great deal of
thought about security,
the nation shifted
control of essential
processes in
manufacturing, utilities,
banking, and
communications to
networked computers.
Today’s processes are
more efficient, but they
lack the redundant
characteristics that gave
their predecessors more
resilience. They are also
susceptible to cyber
attack.
94
Electric utilities rely on supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to
manage the nation’s power generation, transmission, and distribution networks.
While generally protected from intrusion, SCADA systems operate over the Internet.
The move to SCADA boosts efficiency at utilities because it allows workers to operate
equipment remotely. But this access to the Internet exposes these once-closed
systems to cyber attacks. Project Aurora in 2006 demonstrated how a generator could
be remotely commanded over the Internet to physically self-destruct [11, p. 21].
Physical damage to generators and other critical components on a large scale could
result in a prolonged outage as procurement for these components range from months
to years [12, p. 12]. Of potential concern is a cyber attack causing an extended outage
across a significant portion of the North American Grid. In August 2003, an extended
blackout affected 50 million people in the northeastern United States and Canada,
causing an estimated $4-$10 billion in economic losses. Though it lasted only a week,
the outage resulted in a 0.7% drop in Canada’s gross domestic product [9, p. 2]. A John
Hopkins study determined that New York City experienced a 122% increase in
accidental deaths and 25% increase in disease-related deaths, and that ninety people
died as a direct result of the power outage [10]. Depending on the timing of the
attack, the death toll could be significant. In 1995, 739 people died from heat
exhaustion in Chicago. Most of the victims were elderly poor residents who could not
afford air conditioning. [17] In 2003, 14,802 French citizens died from heat-related
ailments because most homes did not have air conditioning. [18] An attack on the
North American Grid knocking out electricity over an extended region for an extended
period in summer could potentially dwarf the damage suffered on 9/11.
Cyber attacks against SCADA systems controlling oil refineries, or oil and gas pipeline
networks could be equally devastating, depriving large metropolitan areas of critical
fuel for extended periods. A cyber attack disrupting the Federal Reserve system would
have profound implications for the U.S. economy. [5, p. 12]
9/11 was a “wake-up call” to the catastrophic potential of critical infrastructure. [19, p.
5] The rapid assimilation of the Internet, originally designed to facilitate collaboration
among trusted colleagues, makes that same infrastructure vulnerable to hostile agents.
[16, p. viii] Together, the expansion and integration of the Internet with infrastructure
has fundamentally changed national security.
Changing Geography
Few enemies of the United States have ever had the means to seriously threaten our
heartland. Even in the darkest early days of World War II, just after Pearl Harbor, no
enemy had the shipping, landing craft, or forces to invade the continental U.S., or
aircraft with the range to reach the mainland and return. For most of our history we
never had to worry much about being attacked at home; broad oceans east and west
and peaceable neighbors north and south gave us all the protection needed. [5, p. 7]
Part I: Hard Lessons
9/11 was a “wake-up
call” to the catastrophic
potential of critical
infrastructure.. The
rapid assimilation of the
Internet, originally
designed to facilitate
collaboration among
trusted colleagues,
makes that same
infrastructure
vulnerable to hostile
agents. Together, the
expansion and
integration of the
Internet with
infrastructure has
fundamentally changed
national security.
95
In the early 1950s, the geography that kept us safe was overcome by Soviet long-range
bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed not only at our military
capabilities, but also at the industries and institutions that give our nation its character.
We had to learn to think differently about our safety and security. We built backyard
bomb shelters, and whole generations practiced diving beneath their school desks at
the sound of a siren. The fear of surprise nuclear attack slowly faded as we developed
satellites and other early warning capabilities that enabled us to overcome geography
and detect a Soviet missile launch in time to launch our own missiles— thus ensuring
the credibility of the deterrent policy of Mutual Assured Destruction. [5, p. 7]
The demise of the Soviet Union, “detargeting” of nuclear missiles, and strategic arms
reductions appeared to leave America once more relatively invulnerable to physical
attack by foreign nations. However, as the threat of a nuclear war has diminished, new
technologies have appeared that render physical geography less relevant and our
domestic sanctuary less secure. Today, a computer can cause switches or valves to
open and close, move funds from one account to another, or convey a military order
almost as quickly over thousands of miles as it can from next door, and just as easily
from an unauthorized computer as an authorized one. A false or malicious computer
message can traverse multiple national borders, leaping from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction to avoid identification, complicate lawful pursuit, or escape retribution. [5,
p. 7]
In short, the global reach of the Internet coupled with the catastrophic potential of
critical infrastructure, eliminates the protective advantage the U.S. has enjoyed most
of its history. The Internet makes it possible for an enemy to attack us from a distance,
using cyber tools, without first confronting our military power and with a good chance
of going undetected. The new geography is a borderless cyber geography whose major
topographical features are technology and change. [5, p. 7] Taking advantage of this
new geography is a new threat, that of the non-state actor.
Changing Threat
A threat is traditionally defined as a capability linked to hostile intent. Linking capability
to intent works well when malefactors are clearly discernible and U.S. intelligence
agencies can focus collection efforts to determine what capabilities they possess or are
trying to acquire. During the Cold War, for example, weapons with potential to
threaten the United States took years to develop, involved huge industrial complexes,
and were on frequent display in large military exercises. Today, however, malefactors
are no longer necessarily nation-states, and expensive weapons of war are joined by
means that are easier to acquire, harder to detect, and have legitimate peacetime
applications. [5, p. 14] The ability of non-state actors to wield destruction on a scale
previously reserved to nation-states represents an historic shift in national security
affairs.
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
In short, the global
reach of the Internet
coupled with the
catastrophic potential of
critical infrastructure,
eliminates the
protective advantage
the U.S. has enjoyed
most of its history.
96
Previously, national security entailed protecting U.S. interests from other nations.
Among the community of nations where each state is a sovereign entity unbound by
the laws of another nation, relations are maintained by diplomacy, commerce, and
when necessary, military force. Thus, for example, after a string of attacks in the early
1980s were linked to the Libyan government of Muammar Gaddafi, the U.S. applied
diplomacy, economic sanctions, and eventually military force to put an end to the
country’s malfeasance. [20] Al Qaeda, on the other hand, was not a sovereign entity,
nor bin Laden a head of state. Though they operated from Afghanistan they were not
Afghan, nor did they conduct their attacks at the behest of the Taliban government. In
fact, bin Laden could claim no country for his own, having had his Saudi citizenship
revoked in 1994. [3, p. 63] As private individuals, bin Laden and members of al Qaeda
were subject to law. Following the 1998 attack on the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and
Kenya, bin Laden was placed on the FBI’s list of Ten Most Wanted Fugitives. [21]
Following 9/11, bin Laden was indicted for terrorism and placed on the FBI’s list of
Most Wanted Terrorists. [22]
Title 18, Section 2331 of United States Code defines terrorism as “acts dangerous to
human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State
intended to i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; ii) influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or iii) affect the conduct of a government by
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.” Without doubt, the 9/11 attacks were terrorist acts, motivated as they
were by bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa declaring war on America. [3, p. 47] However, in
protecting the nation from future such attacks, focusing on “terrorism” as a motive for
hostile intent is very limiting. Narcotics trafficking and economic crime may also serve
as motivating factors for hostile intent in attacking the nation’s infrastructure. [5, p. 8]
In fact, the potential number of motives that might stoke hostile intent are
innumerable, making threat identification problematic at best.
Since 9/11, much attention has been devoted to the foreign terrorist threat. While
certainly a concern, it is only one possibility among an infinite variety. The inherent
vulnerability of critical infrastructure to physical and cyber attack means that the
perpetrator need not be foreign, and the motive need not be terrorism. Whatever the
motive, assault of any size is a crime under U.S. law. Together with motive, means and
opportunity are required to commit a crime. While infrastructure remains vulnerable
to various means of attack, and motives are impossible to count, perhaps the best
means of preventing another 9/11-type attack is to reduce the window of opportunity
by protecting critical infrastructure. This is precisely what was decided in the months
following 9/11, and why critical infrastructure protection became a cornerstone of
subsequent homeland security policy.
Part I: Hard Lessons
Since 9/11, much
attention has been
devoted to the foreign
terrorist threat. While
certainly a concern, it is
only one possibility
among an infinite
variety. The inherent
vulnerability of critical
infrastructure to
physical and cyber
attack means that the
perpetrator need not be
foreign, and the motive
need not be terrorism.
Whatever the motive,
assault of any size is a
crime under U.S. law.
97
Conclusion
9/11 exposed the vulnerability of critical infrastructure for abetting domestic
catastrophic attack by small groups or individuals. Overnight, the historical protection
afforded by vast oceans and friendly neighbors vanished. The instruments of
destruction were woven into the fabric of our society. Non-state actors had usurped a
power of devastation that was once reserved to nation-states. Our national security
posture was shattered. Whereas before we could count and specifically identify our
enemies and deter their actions, our enemies were now uncountable and more
difficult to identify. Though terrorism remains a likely threat indicator, it is but one of
an unlimited number of potential motives. Given a vast array of means and motives,
restricting a criminal’s opportunity seems the most efficient strategy for preventing a
similar crime. Thus, critical infrastructure protection became a cornerstone of the
nation’s homeland security policy.
Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
98
Part I: Hard Lessons
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. According to the 9/11 Commission, what was the distinguishing characteristic of the 9/11 attacks?
2. How did the 9/11 hijackers achieve WMD effects without using WMD?
3. Why is critical infrastructure critical?
4. Why is critical infrastructure vulnerable?
5. What is the relationship between critical infrastructure protection and cyber security?
6. Was 9/11 an act of terrorism? Explain your answer.
7. Was the Oklahoma City bombing an act of terrorism? Explain your answer.
8. Is terrorism the only motive that might precipitate catastrophic attack? Explain your answer.
9. Was 9/11 a criminal act or an act of war? Explain your answer.
10. Can we prevent another domestic catastrophic attack? Explain your answer.
99
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
Failure of Imagination
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the respective failures that precipitated the 9/11 tragedy.
Describe what changes might have prevented 9/11.
Discuss the need to improve post-attack emergency response.
Explain the need to undertake the largest reorganization of U.S. government since the end of World War II.
Chapter 7
Learning Outcomes
100
“We believe the 9/11 attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy,
capabilities, and management.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
While the 9/11 attacks ushered in a new threat to the nation’s security, they also
tested those institutions that were established at the end of World War II to prevent
another “Pearl Harbor”. The 9/11 Commission found those institutions sorely lacking,
and enumerated their failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.
And despite the heroic efforts of First Responders at the World Trade Center, the 9/11
Commission could not help but wonder if better coordination might have kept more of
them alive. This chapter presents those findings from the 9/11 Commission Report
that would result in profound changes to American institutions and significantly shape
subsequent homeland security policy.
Failure of Imagination
Before 9/11, al Qaeda and its affiliates had killed fewer than 50 Americans, including
the East Africa embassy bombings and the Cole attack. The U.S. government took the
threat seriously, but not in the sense of mustering anything like the kind of effort that
would be gathered to confront an enemy of the first, second, or even third rank. The
modest national effort exerted to contain Serbia and its depredations in the Balkans
between 1995 and 1999, for example, was orders of magnitude larger than that
devoted to al Qaeda. [1, p. 340]
Beneath the acknowledgment that Bin Laden and al Qaeda presented serious dangers,
there was uncertainty among senior officials about whether this was just a new and
especially venomous version of the ordinary terrorist threat America had lived with for
decades, or was radically new, posing a threat beyond any yet experienced. [1, p. 343]
Both Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush and their top advisers understood Bin
Laden was a danger. But given the character and pace of their policy efforts, it is not
clear they fully understood just how many people al Qaeda might kill, and how soon it
might do it. [1, pp. 342-343]
In late 1998, reports came in of a possible al Qaeda plan to hijack a plane. One, a
December 4 Presidential Daily Briefing for President Clinton, brought the focus back to
more traditional hostage taking; it reported Bin Laden’s involvement in planning a
hijack operation to free prisoners such as the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdel Rahman,
convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Threat reports also mentioned the
Part I: Hard Lessons
Before 9/11, al Qaeda
and its affiliates had
killed fewer than 50
Americans, including the
East Africa embassy
bombings and the Cole
attack. The U.S.
government took the
threat seriously, but not
in the sense of
mustering anything like
the kind of effort that
would be gathered to
confront an enemy of
the first, second, or even
third rank.
101
possibility of using an aircraft filled with explosives. The most prominent of these
mentioned a possible plot to fly an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city. [1, p. 344]
The possibility of a suicide hijacking emerged following the crash of a Boeing 767 off
the coast of Massachusetts, EgyptAir Flight 990 on October 31, 1999. The most
plausible explanation was that one of the pilots had gone berserk, seized the controls,
and flown the aircraft into the sea. President Clinton’s counter-terrorism advisor,
Richard Clarke, later testified he thought that warning about the possibility of a suicide
hijacking would have been just one more speculative theory among a thousand others,
probably hundreds of thousands. Yet the possibility was imaginable, and had been
imagined. [1, p. 345]
In early August 1999, the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Civil Aviation
Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Laden hijacking threat. After a solid
recitation of all the information available on the topic, the paper identified a few
principal scenarios, one of which was a “suicide hijacking operation.” The FAA analysts
judged such an operation unlikely, because “it does not offer an opportunity for
dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining Rahman and other key captive
extremists. . . . A suicide hijacking is assessed to be an option of last resort.” [1, p. 345]
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) imagined the possible use
of aircraft as weapons, too, and developed exercises to counter such a threat—from
planes coming to the United States from overseas, perhaps carrying a weapon of mass
destruction. None of this speculation was based on actual intelligence of such a threat.
One idea, intended to test command and control plans and NORAD’s readiness,
postulated a hijacked airliner coming from overseas and crashing into the Pentagon.
The idea was put aside in the early planning of the exercise as too much of a
distraction from the main focus (war in Korea), and as too unrealistic. [1, p. 346]
In citing a “failure of imagination”, the 9/11 Commission Report draws parallels
between the 9/11 attacks and the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. In both cases, the
evidence leading up to the attacks was clear and obvious in hindsight. The 9/11
Commission Report makes the argument, though, that the “clear signal” that emerges
in hindsight might have been equally evident in foresight had those responsible given
stronger consideration to scenarios they dismissed as implausible. The failure of
imagination was the failure to consider not only what had been, but also what could
be. If more concerted attention had been given to the suicide hijacking scenario
conceived by some agencies, then indicators and warnings could have been devised,
emerging evidence matched against them, and counteraction prepared in advance.
This was nothing new. Such procedures had been painstakingly developed by the
Intelligence Community in the decades after Pearl Harbor. In this case, they were not
employed to analyze an enemy that, as the twentieth century closed, was most likely
to launch a surprise attack directly against the United States. [1, pp. 344-348]
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
In citing a “failure of
imagination”, the 9/11
Commission Report
draws parallels between
the 9/11 attacks and the
1941 attack on Pearl
Harbor. In both cases,
the evidence leading up
to the attacks was clear
and obvious in
hindsight. The 9/11
Commission Report
makes the argument,
though, that the “clear
signal” that emerges in
hindsight might have
been equally evident in
foresight had those
responsible given
stronger consideration
to scenarios they
dismissed as
implausible.
102
Failure of Policy
The road to 9/11 again illustrates how the large, unwieldy U.S. government tended to
underestimate a threat that grew ever greater. The terrorism fostered by Bin Laden
and al Qaeda was different from anything the government had faced before. The
existing mechanisms for handling terrorist acts had been trial and punishment for acts
committed by individuals; sanction, reprisal, deterrence, or war for acts by hostile
governments. The actions of al Qaeda fit neither category. Its crimes were on a scale
approaching acts of war, but they were committed by a loose, far-flung, nebulous
conspiracy with no territories or citizens or assets that could be readily threatened,
overwhelmed, or destroyed. [1, p. 348]
The U.S. policy response to al Qaeda before 9/11 was essentially defined following the
embassy bombings of August 1998. The tragedy of the embassy bombings provided an
opportunity for a full examination, across the government, of the national security
threat that bin Laden posed. Such an examination could have made clear to all that
issues were at stake that were much larger than the domestic politics of the moment.
But the major policy agencies of the government did not meet the threat. [1, p. 349]
The diplomatic efforts of the Department of State were largely ineffective. Al Qaeda
and terrorism was just one more priority added to already-crowded agendas with
countries like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. After 9/11 that changed. [1, p. 349]
Policymakers turned principally to the CIA and covert action to implement policy.
Before 9/11, no agency had more responsibility—or did more—to attack al Qaeda,
working day and night, than the CIA. But there were limits to what the CIA was able to
achieve in its energetic worldwide efforts to disrupt terrorist activities or use proxies to
try to capture or kill bin Laden and his lieutenants. As early as mid-1997, one CIA
officer wrote to his supervisor: “All we’re doing is holding the ring until the cavalry gets
here.” [1, p. 349]
Military measures failed or were not applied. Before 9/11 the Department of Defense
was not given the mission of ending al Qaeda’s sanctuary in Afghanistan. Officials in
both the Clinton and Bush administrations regarded a full U.S. invasion of Afghanistan
as practically inconceivable before 9/11. It was never the subject of formal interagency
deliberation. [1, p. 349]
Lesser forms of intervention could also have been considered. One would have been
the deployment of U.S. military or intelligence personnel, or special strike forces, to
Afghanistan itself or nearby—openly, clandestinely (secretly), or covertly (with their
connection to the United States hidden). Then the United States would no longer have
Part I: Hard Lessons
The road to 9/11 again
illustrates how the
large, unwieldy U.S.
government tended to
underestimate a threat
that grew ever greater.
103
been dependent on proxies to gather actionable intelligence. However, it would have
needed to secure basing and overflight support from neighboring countries. A
significant political, military, and intelligence effort would have been required,
extending over months and perhaps years, with associated costs and risks. Given how
hard it later proved to locate bin Laden even with substantial ground forces in
Afghanistan, the odds of success before 9/11 are hard to calculate. There is no
indication that President Clinton was offered such an intermediate choice, or that this
option was given any more consideration than the idea of invasion. [1, p. 349]
These policy challenges are linked to the problem of imagination. Since both President
Clinton and President Bush were genuinely concerned about the danger posed by al
Qaeda, approaches involving more direct intervention against the sanctuary in
Afghanistan apparently must have seemed—if they were considered at all—to be
disproportionate to the threat. [1, p. 349]
Failures in Capability
Before 9/11, the United States tried to solve the al Qaeda problem with the same
government institutions and capabilities it had used in the last stages of the Cold War
and its immediate aftermath. These capabilities were insufficient, but little was done to
expand or reform them. [1, pp. 350-351]
For covert action, of course, the White House depended on the Counterterrorist
Center and the CIA’s Directorate of Operations. Though some officers, particularly in
the bin Laden unit, were eager for the mission, most were not. The higher
management of the directorate was unenthusiastic. The CIA’s capacity to conduct
paramilitary operations with its own personnel was not large, and the Agency did not
seek a large-scale general expansion of these capabilities before 9/11. James Pavitt, the
head of this directorate, remembered that covert action, promoted by the White
House, had gotten the Clandestine Service into trouble in the past. He had no desire to
see this happen again. He thought, not unreasonably, that a truly serious
counterterrorism campaign against an enemy of this magnitude would be business
primarily for the military, not the Clandestine Service. [1, p. 351]
At no point before 9/11 was the Department of Defense fully engaged in the mission of
countering al Qaeda, though this was perhaps the most dangerous foreign enemy then
threatening the United States. The Clinton administration effectively relied on the CIA
to take the lead in preparing long-term offensive plans against an enemy sanctuary.
The Bush administration adopted this approach, although its emerging new strategy
envisioned some yet undefined further role for the military in addressing the problem.
Within Defense, both Secretary Cohen and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld gave their
principal attention to other challenges. [1, pp. 351-352]
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
Before 9/11, the United
States tried to solve the
al Qaeda problem with
the same government
institutions and
capabilities it had used
in the last stages of the
Cold War and its
immediate aftermath.
These capabilities were
insufficient, but little
was done to expand or
reform them.
104
America’s homeland defenders faced outward. NORAD itself was barely able to retain
any alert bases. Its planning scenarios occasionally considered the danger of hijacked
aircraft being guided to American targets, but only aircraft that were coming from
overseas. It would have been a tough sell to make a costly change in NORAD’s defense
posture to deal with the danger of suicide hijackers before such a threat had ever
actually been realized. But NORAD did not canvass available intelligence and try to
make the case. [1, p. 352]
The most serious weaknesses in agency capabilities were in the domestic arena. [1, p.
352]
The FBI did not have the capability to link the collective knowledge of agents in the
field to national priorities. The acting director of the FBI did not learn of his Bureau’s
hunt for two possible al Qaeda operatives in the United States or about his Bureau’s
arrest of an Islamic extremist taking flight training until September 11. The director of
central intelligence knew about the FBI’s Moussaoui investigation weeks before word
of it made its way even to the FBI’s own assistant director for counterterrorism. [1, p.
352]
The FAA’s capabilities to take aggressive, anticipatory security measures were
especially weak. Any serious policy examination of a suicide hijacking scenario,
critiquing each of the layers of the security system, could have suggested changes to fix
glaring vulnerabilities—expanding no-fly lists, searching passengers identified by the
CAPPS screening system, deploying Federal Air Marshals domestically, hardening
cockpit doors, alerting air crew to a different kind of hijacking than what they had been
trained to expect, or adjusting the training of controllers and managers in the FAA and
NORAD. [1, p. 352]
Furthermore, the FAA set and enforced aviation security rules, which airlines and
airports were required to implement. The rules were supposed to produce a “layered”
system of defense. This meant that the failure of any one layer of security would not
be fatal, because additional layers would provide backup security. But each layer
relevant to hijackings—intelligence, passenger prescreening, checkpoint screening, and
onboard security—was seriously flawed prior to 9/11.Taken together, they did not stop
any of the 9/11 hijackers from getting on board four different aircraft at three different
airports. [1, p. 83]
Part I: Hard Lessons
The most serious
weaknesses in agency
capabilities were in the
domestic arena.
America’s homeland
defenders faced
outward.
105
In 2001, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was overwhelmed by the
challenges posed by illegal entry over the southwest border, criminal aliens, and a
growing backlog of applications for naturalizing immigrants. [1, p. 80] The immigration
system as a whole was widely viewed as increasingly dysfunctional and badly in need
of reform. [1, p. 384] The system was in such poor state that the 9/11 hijackers had
little trouble exploiting it to their advantage. Beginning in 1997, the 19 hijackers
submitted 24 applications and received 23 visas. They entered the United States a total
of 33 times. They arrived through ten different airports, though more than half came in
through Miami, JFK, or Newark. When applying for a visa, the application was checked
against a “consular lookout” database called CLASS, which included a substantial
watchlist of known and suspected terrorists called TIPOFF. Upon entering the country,
passports were again checked against terrorist watchlists and criminal databases.
Despite these measures, known al Qaeda operatives were able to secure U.S. visas
using detectable false statements, and enter the country with passports manipulated
in a fraudulent manner. Those operatives who were flagged for secondary screening
were still able to gain entry by making false statements to INS officials. Moreover, six
of the 9/11 hijackers violated immigration laws after arriving in country. None of these
violations were detected or acted upon by INS inspectors or agents. [2] The 9/11
Commission found that closer examination of the operatives’ travel documents and
more effective use of the watchlists might have exposed 15 of the 19 hijackers. The
central problems were 1) lack of well-developed counterterrorism measures, and 2)
the inability of the system to deliver on its basic commitments. [1, p. 384]
Failures in Management
In the events leading up to 9/11, many opportunities were lost to thwart the plot.
Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal
misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched.
Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating the foreign
and domestic agencies of the government. [1, p. 353]
However the specific problems are labeled, they appear to be symptoms of the
government’s broader inability to adapt how it manages problems to the new
challenges of the twenty-first century. The agencies are like a set of specialists in a
hospital, each ordering tests, looking for symptoms, and prescribing medications. What
is missing is the attending physician who makes sure they work as a team. [1, p. 353]
One missing element was effective management of transnational operations. Action
officers should have drawn on all available knowledge in the government. This
management should have ensured that information was shared and duties were
clearly assigned across agencies, and across the foreign-domestic divide. [1, p. 353]
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
In the events leading up
to 9/11, many
opportunities were lost
to thwart the plot.
Information was not
shared, sometimes
inadvertently or because
of legal
misunderstandings.
Analysis was not pooled.
Effective operations
were not launched.
Often the handoffs of
information were lost
across the divide
separating the foreign
and domestic agencies
of the government.
106
Consider, for example, the case of Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, and their
January 2000 trip to Kuala Lumpur. In late 1999, the National Security Agency (NSA)
analyzed communications associated with a man named Khalid, a man named Nawaf,
and a man named Salem. They correctly concluded that “Nawaf” and “Khalid” might be
part of “an operational cadre” and that “something nefarious might be afoot.” The NSA
did not pursue these leads however. It saw itself as an agency to support intelligence
consumers, such as CIA. It did not initiate actions, but it waited to be asked. Since
nobody asked, nobody was informed. If this information had been made available to
the CIA al Qaeda unit, a case officer might have checked with the State Department
and learned that U.S. visas had been issued to two gentlemen with the same names on
the same day in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Armed with this information, the CIA could have
notified the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and FBI to be on the look for
the two suspects when they entered the country. As it was, no such contact was made
and the two entered the country without notice. [1, pp. 353-354]
Even if watchlisting had prevented or at least alerted U.S. officials to the entry of Hazmi
and Mihdhar, it is unlikely that watchlisting, by itself, would have prevented the 9/11
attacks. Al Qaeda adapted to the failure of some of its operatives to gain entry into the
United States. None of these future hijackers was a pilot. Alternatively, had they been
permitted entry and monitored, some larger results might have been possible had the
FBI been watching. [1, p. 354]
The details of this case illuminate real management challenges, past and future. The
U.S. government must find a way of pooling intelligence and using it to guide the
planning of and assignment of responsibilities for joint operations involving
organizations as disparate as the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the military, and
the agencies involved in homeland security. [1, p. 357]
Beyond those day-to-day tasks of bridging the foreign-domestic divide and matching
intelligence with plans, the challenges include broader management issues pertaining
to how the top leaders of the government set priorities and allocate resources. [1, p.
357]
On December 4, 1998, DCI Tenet issued a directive to several CIA officials and his
deputy for community management, stating: “We are at war. I want no resources or
people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.”38 The memorandum
had little overall effect on mobilizing the CIA or the intelligence community. [1, p. 357]
Part I: Hard Lessons
107
The episode indicates some of the limitations of the DCI’s authority over the direction
and priorities of the intelligence community, especially its elements within the
Department of Defense. The DCI had to direct agencies without controlling them. He
did not receive an appropriation for their activities, and therefore did not control their
purse strings. He had little insight into how they spent their resources. U.S. intelligence
was not a coordinated effort. [1, p. 357]
Failure to Coordinate
The National Institute of Standards and Technology estimates that between 16,400
and 18,800 civilians were in the World Trade Center complex when American Airlines
Flight 11 slammed into the North Tower at 8:46 am, September 11. At most, 2,152
individuals died at the WTC who were not on the aircraft or were not First Responders.
Some 1,942 are thought to have worked or were attending meetings above the
respective impact zones in the Twin Towers. Only 110, or 5.36% of those who died
worked below the impact zone. It is impossible to measure how many more civilians
would have died without the assistance of the FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD. It is impossible
to measure the calming influence that ascending firefighters had on descending
civilians that might otherwise have turned into a panicked and dangerous mob. But
the positive impact of the First Responders on the evacuation came at a tremendous
cost in lives. [1, pp. 316-317] Given the contrast to the Pentagon response, it is not
unreasonable to speculate whether more First Responders would have been spared if
there had been better coordination between agencies.
To some degree, on 9/11 First Responders followed Mayor Giuliani’s directive for
incident command issued in July. It was clear that the lead response agency was the
FDNY, and that the other responding agencies acted in a supporting role. There was a
tacit understanding that FDNY personnel would have primary responsibility for
evacuating civilians who were above the ground floors of the Twin Towers, while NYPD
and PAPD personnel would be in charge of evacuating civilians from the WTC complex
once they reached ground level. The NYPD also greatly assisted responding FDNY units
by clearing emergency lanes to the WTC. In addition, coordination occurred at high
levels of command. For example, the Mayor and Police Commissioner consulted with
the Chief of the Department of the FDNY at approximately 9:20. There were other
instances of coordination at operational levels, and information was shared on an ad
hoc basis. For example, an NYPD Emergency Service Unit passed the news of their
evacuation order to firefighters in the North Tower. It is also clear, however, that the
response operations lacked the kind of integrated communications and unified
command contemplated in the directive. These problems existed both within and
among individual responding agencies. [1, p. 319]
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
It is impossible to
measure how many
more civilians would
have died without the
assistance of the FDNY,
PAPD, and NYPD. But
the positive impact of
the First Responders on
the evacuation came at
a tremendous cost in
lives. It is also clear,
however, that the
response operations
lacked the kind of
integrated
communications of a
unified command .
108
For a unified incident management system to succeed, each participant must have
command and control of its own units and adequate internal communications. This
was not always the case at the WTC on 9/11. FDNY was lacking command and control
as it proved incapable of coordinating the number of units dispatched to different
points within the 16-acre complex. As a result, numerous units were congregating in
the undamaged Marriott Hotel and at the overall command post on West Street by
9:30, while chiefs in charge of the South Tower still were in desperate need of units.
With better understanding of the resources already available, additional units might
not have been dispatched to the South Tower at 9:37. The situation was rendered even
more difficult by internal communications breakdowns resulting from the limited
capabilities of radios in the high-rise environment of the WTC, and from confusion over
which personnel were assigned to which frequency. Furthermore, when the South
Tower collapsed the overall FDNY command post ceased to operate, which
compromised the FDNY’s ability to understand the situation; an FDNY marine unit’s
immediate radio communication to FDNY dispatch that the South Tower had fully
collapsed was not conveyed to chiefs at the scene. The FDNY’s inability to coordinate
and account for the different radio channels that would be used in an emergency of
this scale contributed to the early lack of units in the South Tower, whose lobby chief
initially could not communicate with anyone outside that tower. Though almost no one
at 9:50 on September 11 was contemplating an imminent total collapse of the Twin
Towers, many First Responders and civilians were contemplating the possibility of
imminent additional terrorist attacks throughout New York City. Had any such attacks
occurred, the FDNY’s response would have been severely compromised by the
concentration of so many of its off-duty personnel, particularly its elite personnel, at
the WTC. [1, pp. 319-320]
Any attempt to establish a unified command on 9/11 would have been further
frustrated by the lack of communication and coordination among responding agencies.
Certainly, the FDNY was not positioned to be “responsible for the management of the
City’s response to the emergency,” as the Mayor’s directive would have required.
Agency command posts were in different locations, and OEM headquarters, which
could have served as a focal point for information sharing, did not play an integrating
role in ensuring that information was shared among agencies on 9/11, even prior to its
evacuation. There was a lack of comprehensive coordination between FDNY, NYPD,
and PAPD personnel climbing above the ground floors in the Twin Towers. Information
that was critical to informed decision making was not shared among agencies. FDNY
chiefs in leadership roles that morning were hampered by a lack of information from
NYPD aviation. At 9:51 A.M., a helicopter pilot cautioned that “large pieces” of the
South Tower appeared to be about to fall and could pose a danger to those below.
Immediately after the tower’s collapse, a helicopter pilot radioed that news. This
transmission was followed by communications at 10:08, 10:15, and 10:22 that called
into question the condition of the North Tower. The FDNY chiefs would have benefited
greatly had they been able to communicate with personnel in a helicopter. Moreover,
FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD did not coordinate their units that were searching the WTC
Part I: Hard Lessons
109
complex for civilians. In many cases, redundant searches of specific floors and areas
were conducted. It is unclear whether fewer first responders in the aggregate would
have been in the Twin Towers if there had been an integrated response, or what
impact, if any, redundant searches had on the total number of first responder
fatalities. [1, p. 320]
Whether the lack of coordination between the FDNY and NYPD on September 11 had a
catastrophic effect has been the subject of controversy. It is clear, however, that the
Incident Command System did not function to integrate awareness among agencies or
to facilitate interagency response [1, p. 320]
Conclusion
The 9/11 attacks were the culmination of many failures on the part of America’s
national security apparatus; too many failures for the 9/11 Commission to assess
specific blame, but sufficient to suggest that 9/11 might have been thwarted at any
number of opportunities if things had gone only slightly different. Emphasizing a
“failure of imagination” was the Commission’s way of pointing out a systemic problem
that stifled innovation and agility, and was absent accountability. Accordingly, the
appropriate solution was a systemic change to America’s national security apparatus,
adding justification to establishing a new Department of Homeland Security. The new
Department would bridge the gaps and provide accountability against this new threat
to national security. While attention was focused against these new manmade threats,
the nation was blindsided by a catastrophic natural hazard.
Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
110
Part I: Hard Lessons
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. List three different attacks on U.S. service members overseas in the years before the attack on the USS Cole.
2. Identify three differences and three similarities between the attacks you listed and the attack on the USS Cole.
3. Compared to the other three attacks, would you have thought al Qaeda a major threat in December 2000? Explain.
4. Describe the failed efforts by the CIA and DoD to capture or kill Osama bin Laden before 9/11.
5. Explain why the FBI failed to arrest known al Qaeda operatives in the U.S. as they trained for the 9/11 attacks.
6. Explain how FAA regulations abetted the 9/11 hijackers even after they were flagged by CAPPS.
7. Describe the U.S. air defense posture on 9/11.
8. Explain what the 9/11 Commission meant by a “failure of imagination”.
9. Even if the CIA and FBI had coordinated better, how might they have still failed to prevent 9/11? Explain.
10. Discuss the possible repercussions if NORAD had shot down the hijacked aircraft before they crashed into the
South Tower and Pentagon on 9/11.
111
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Failure of Initiative
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe events that contributed to the deaths of 1,464 New Orleans residents.
Discuss breakdowns between City, State, and Federal officials that frustrated emergency response.
Assess the consequences and difficulties of evacuating a major U.S. city.
Chapter 8
Learning Outcomes
112
“If 9/11 was a failure of imagination, then Katrina was a failure of initiative. It was a
failure of leadership.”
- 2005 House Committee Report
Introduction
No matter how secure the country is made from malicious acts, it will remain
susceptible to acts of nature. When a natural disaster overwhelms local emergency
management, an intricate choreography is required to engage State and Federal
support, and efficiently coordinate the combined response to maximize lifesaving
efforts within the first critical 72 hours of a disaster. The deaths and breakdown of civil
order in New Orleans as a result of Hurricane Katrina are a cautionary tale of what
happens when this choreography breaks down, and emergency aid is neither swift nor
efficient because of a leadership failure of initiative.
Local Disaster Response
First responders — local fire, police, and emergency medical personnel who respond to
all manner of incidents such as earthquakes, storms, and floods — have the lead
responsibility for carrying out emergency management efforts. Their role is to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergencies, including
natural disasters. Typically, first responders are trained and equipped to arrive first at
the scene of an incident and take action immediately, including entering the scene,
setting up a command center, evacuating those at the scene, tending to the injured,
redirecting traffic, and removing debris. [1, p. 45]
Local governments — cities, towns, counties or parishes — and the officials who lead
them are responsible for developing the emergency operations and response plans by
which their communities respond to disasters and other emergencies, including
terrorist attacks. Local emergency management directors are also generally
responsible for providing training to prepare for disaster response and seek assistance
from their state emergency management agencies when the situation exceeds or
exhausts local capabilities. In many states, they may also negotiate and enter into
Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs) with other jurisdictions to share resources when, for
example, nearby jurisdictions are unaffected by the emergency and are able to provide
some assistance. [1, p. 46]
Part I: Hard Lessons
First responders — local
fire, police, and
emergency medical
personnel who respond
to all manner of
incidents such as
earthquakes, storms,
and floods — have the
lead responsibility for
carrying out emergency
management efforts.
Their role is to prevent,
protect against, respond
to, and assist in the
recovery from
emergencies, including
natural disasters.
113
State Disaster Response
As the state’s chief executive, the Governor is responsible for the public safety and
welfare of the state’s citizens and generally has wide-ranging emergency management
responsibilities. Governors are responsible for coordinating state resources to address
the full range of actions necessary to prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents
such as natural disasters. [1, p. 46]
Upon their declaration of an emergency or disaster, governors typically assume a
variety of emergency powers, including authority to control access to an affected area
and provide temporary shelter. Also, in most cases, states generally authorize their
governors to order and enforce the evacuation of residents in disaster and emergency
situations. [1, p. 46]
Governors also serve as the commanders-in-chief of their state military forces,
specifically, the National Guard when in state active duty or Title 32 status. In state
active duty — to which governors can call the Guard in response to disasters and other
emergencies — National Guard personnel operate under the control of the governor,
are paid according to state law, and can perform typical disaster relief tasks, such as
search and rescue, debris removal, and law enforcement. Most governors have the
authority to implement mutual aid agreements with other states to share resources
with one another during disasters or emergencies when, for example, others
(particularly nearby states) are unaffected by the emergency and able to provide
assistance. Most states request and provide this assistance through the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). If all these resources are not fast enough or
sufficient, then the Governor may petition the President for support. [1, p. 46]
Federal Disaster Support
When an incident overwhelms, or is likely to overwhelm, state and local resources, the
Stafford Act (Title 42 USC Ch. 68) authorizes the President, in response to a request
from the Governor of the affected state, to issue two types of declarations—
emergency or major disaster. An emergency is “any occasion or instance for which, in
the determination of the President, federal assistance is needed to supplement state
and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health
and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
As the state’s chief
executive, the Governor
is responsible for the
public safety and
welfare of the state’s
citizens and generally
has wide-ranging
emergency
management
responsibilities.
114
States.” A major disaster is “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado,
storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire,
flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the
President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating
the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.” [1, p. 31]
If the President approves an emergency or major disaster declaration, then the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) will setup a Joint Field Office (JFO) in
proximity to the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC), and a FEMA Federal
Coordinating Officer (FCO) will begin working with the designated State Coordinating
Officer (SCO) to deliver requested federal assistance. [1, p. 38]
The federal government typically responds to most natural disasters after the affected
states request support. In practice, states may make these requests before disasters
strike because of the near certainty that federal assistance will be necessary after such
an event (e.g., with hurricanes) or, afterwards, once they have conducted preliminary
damage assessments and determined that their response capabilities are
overwhelmed. In either case, the resources the federal government provides in any
disaster response are intended to supplement state and local government resources
devoted to the ongoing disaster relief and recovery effort. This system in use for most
disasters — providing federal assistance in response to requests of the states (or local
governments via the states) — is often referred to as a “pull” system in that it relies on
states to know what they need and to be able to request it from the federal
government. [1, pp. 30-31]
In certain instances, however, the federal response may also be considered a “push”
system, in which federal assistance is provided and/or moved into the affected area
prior to a disaster or without waiting for specific requests from the state or local
governments. [1, p. 31] The “push” system can be risky, especially if resulting damages
are less than expected and the expended federal resources are not needed by the
State. The “push” system has the distinct advantage, though, of reducing delays and
expediting delivery of federal aid to the disaster. Much of the criticism leveled at the
federal government was that it relied on a “pull” system when it should have initiated
a “push” system in response to Hurricane Katrina.
Part I: Hard Lessons
Figure 8-1: Track of Hurricane Katrina [2]
If the President
approves an emergency
or major disaster
declaration, then the
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
(FEMA) will setup a Joint
Field Office (JFO) in
proximity to the State
Emergency Operations
Center (SEOC), and a
FEMA Federal
Coordinating Officer
(FCO) will begin working
with the designated
State Coordinating
Officer (SCO) to deliver
requested federal
assistance.
115
Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina was the costliest natural disaster, as well as one of the five deadliest
hurricanes in the history of the United States. The storm ranks third behind the 1935
Labor Day hurricane and Hurricane Camille in 1969. Overall, at least 1,500 people died
in the hurricane and subsequent floods, making it the deadliest United States
hurricane since the 1928 Okeechobee hurricane. Total property damage was estimated
at $108 billion. [2]
The tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina formed over the Bahamas on
August 23, 2005. Early the following day, the new depression intensified into Tropical
Storm Katrina. The cyclone headed generally westward toward Florida and
strengthened into a hurricane only two hours before making landfall between
Hallandale Beach and Aventura on Thursday morning, August 25. The storm weakened
as it crossed over Florida, but regained hurricane strength shortly after emerging into
the Gulf of Mexico on Friday, August 26. The storm strengthened to a Category 5
hurricane over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico, but weakened before making
its second landfall as a Category 3 hurricane in southeast Louisiana in the early
morning hours of Monday, August 29. [2]
Katrina caused severe destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas,
much of it due to high winds and flooding. Florida suffered twice, first when the storm
crossed over South Florida August 25, and a second time August 29 when Katrina
drove ashore in Louisiana, grazing the Florida Panhandle. Twelve deaths were blamed
on the storm in South Florida. It also left 1.45 million people without power and
caused $523 million in damages, most of it to crops. Two more deaths were attributed
to the storm as it grazed the Florida Panhandle, leaving another 77,000 people without
power, and causing an additional $100 million in damages. Overall, the hurricane
killed 14 people and caused $623 million in damages to Florida. Alabama was also hit
by winds and floods as Katrina made landfall. Sustained winds of 67 mph left 600,000
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Figure 8-1: Track of Hurricane Katrina [2]
Hurricane Katrina was
the costliest natural
disaster, as well as one
of the five deadliest
hurricanes in the history
of the United States. The
storm ranks third behind
the 1935 Labor Day
hurricane and Hurricane
Camille in 1969.
116
people without power. A 12-foot storm surge caused significant flooding several miles
inland along Mobile Bay. The combined winds and high waters washed ships, oil rigs,
boats, and fishing piers ashore along Mobile Bay. Four tornadoes were spawned
inland. Two deaths were attributed to the storm. Twenty-two Alabama counties were
declared disaster areas. In its second landfall, Katrina’s powerful right-front quadrant
passed over the west and central Mississippi coast, causing a 27-foot storm surge to
penetrate 6 miles inland, and up to 12 miles along bays and rivers. Together with the
storm surge, the state was battered by heavy winds and torrential rains. The
combination proved devastating, destroying 90% of all structures within a half mile of
the coastline. The storm destroyed bridges, barges, boats, piers, houses, and cars.
Eighty-two counties were declared disaster areas. Some 900,000 people were left
without power; 238 people were left dead. Mississippi might have been the center of
national attention, except for what happened in New Orleans. [2]
New Orleans
New Orleans was at particular risk. Though about half the city actually lies above sea
level, its average elevation is about six feet below sea level–and it is completely
surrounded by water. Over the course of the 20th century, the Army Corps of
Engineers had built a system of levees and seawalls to keep the city from flooding. The
levees along the Mississippi River were strong and sturdy, but the ones built to hold
back Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne and the waterlogged swamps and marshes to
the city’s east and west were much less reliable. Even before the storm, officials
worried that those levees, jerry-built atop sandy, porous, erodible soil, might not
withstand a massive storm surge. Neighborhoods that sat below sea level, many of
which housed the city’s poorest and most vulnerable people, were at great risk of
flooding. [3]
The day before Katrina hit, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued the city’s first-ever
mandatory evacuation order. [3] Between 80 and 90 percent of the residents of New
Orleans were evacuated safely in time before the hurricane struck. Despite this, about
100,000 remained in the city, mainly those who did not have access to personal
vehicles. [2] To assist those left behind, Mayor Nagin opened the Superdome as a
“shelter of last resort”. The stadium was situated on relatively high ground near
downtown. It had been used as a shelter during previous storms, including Hurricane
Georges in 1998. The Superdome had been estimated to withstand winds up to 200
miles per hour, and water levels of 35 feet. By the evening of August 28, the night
before Hurricane Katrina hit, some 20,000 people had taken shelter in the Superdome
under the care of 300 Louisiana National Guard. [4]
Part I: Hard Lessons
New Orleans was at
particular risk. Though
about half the city
actually lies above sea
level, its average
elevation is about six
feet below sea level–and
it is completely
surrounded by water.
117
At 3 a.m. on August 29, Hurricane Katrina made landfall near Buras-Triumph, Louisiana
as a strong Category 3 storm with 125 mph winds. It brought a 14-foot storm surge
and 8-10 inches of rain. These raised the level of Lake Pontchartrain causing significant
flooding along its northeastern shore. Several bridges were destroyed, including the I-
10 Twin Span Bridge connecting New Orleans to Slidell. Most of the roads traveling
into and out of the city were damaged. The only routes out of the city were the
westbound Crescent City Connection and Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, which was
restricted to emergency traffic. Power went out. High winds blew out the windows of
many high-rise buildings, and peeled back the waterproof membrane of the
Superdome. However, by mid-day as the eye of the hurricane passed east of the city, it
seemed New Orleans had been spared the worst of the storm. Despite the heavy
winds and rain, most buildings appeared to be structurally intact. But then the levees
began to break. [4]
Katrina's storm surge overwhelmed the city’s levees and drainage canals. The
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet breached its levees in 20 places, flooding much of east
New Orleans, most of Saint Bernard Parish, and the East Bank of Plaquemines Parish.
The federally built levee system protecting metro New Orleans breached in 53 places,
including the 17th Street Canal, London Avenue Canal, and the Industrial Canal. By
August 31, 2005, 80% of New Orleans was flooded, with some parts under 15 feet of
water. [4]
The extensive flooding stranded many residents in their homes. Many chopped their
way onto their roofs with hatchets and sledge hammers, which residents had been
urged to store in their attics in case of such events. House tops across the city were
dotted with survivors. Some were trapped inside their attics, unable to escape.
Trapped in their homes, many families awaited rescue, without power, without water,
without food. [4]
The first deaths were reported shortly before midnight on August 28, as three nursing
home patients died during an evacuation to Baton Rouge. By 11:00 pm on August 29,
Mayor Nagin described the loss of life as "significant" with reports of bodies floating on
the water throughout the city, though primarily in the eastern portions. The National
Guard began setting up temporary morgues in select locations. [4]
After the storm passed, on August 30, as flood waters continued to rise, the media
reported rampant arson and looting across the city. Atrocities were reported at the
Superdome. Later investigations proved most of the reports greatly exaggerated. Still,
there was a breakdown in civil order, spurred, in part, by desertions within the New
Orleans Police Department. On August 31, Mayor Nagin imposed a curfew and
ordered the NOPD to abandon search and rescue missions in order to restore civil
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Katrina's storm surge
overwhelmed the city’s
levees and drainage
canals. The Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet
breached its levees in 20
places, flooding much of
east New Orleans, most
of Saint Bernard Parish,
and the East Bank of
Plaquemines Parish.
The federally built levee
system protecting metro
New Orleans breached
in 53 places
118
order. The same day, Governor Blanco ordered in 6500 National Guard. Relief efforts
were disrupted by violence. Charity Hospital was forced to halt patient evacuations
after coming under gunfire. On September 2, Governor Blanco requested an additional
40,000 National Guard for assistance in evacuation and security. [4]
The situation was indeed miserable at the Superdome. On August 29, as Katrina
passed over New Orleans it ripped two holes into the roof. The scene inside the
building was described as chaotic; reports of rampant drug use, fights, rape, and filthy
living conditions were widespread. Despite increasingly squalid conditions, the
population inside continued to grow as many more arrived hoping to find food, water,
and maybe transportation out of town. On August 31, Governor Blanco ordered the
Superdome evacuated, and sent in 68 school buses to relocate civilians to the Houston
Astrodome. By September 4, the Superdome was completely evacuated. [4]
As rescue operations commenced on August 29, rescuers began dropping people off
outside the Convention Center. It was meant to be a transit point to shelter. The
problem was, no transportation was sent. By the afternoon of the 29th, a crowd of
about 1,000 people had begun to gather outside the Convention Center. After being
told the facility had no food, water, or services, the crowd nonetheless broke in and
took refuge. The next day, a contingent of 250 National Guard engineers arrived and
began working from the facility. The engineers were never given orders to control the
crowd, nor were they prepared for the task. Still, the number of people at the
Convention Center continued to grow over the next three days; some sent there from
the Superdome, some dropped off after being rescued from their roof, and some
arriving of their own volition. There was nobody in charge; nobody to provide for the
evacuees’ care and safety. Reports of robberies, murder, and rape began to surface. A
large cache of alcohol was stolen. People died, and their bodies left where they passed.
Finally, on September 2, a sizable contingent of National Guard arrived to establish
order and provide essential provisions. On September 3, buses began arriving and
refugees evacuated. By September 4, the Convention Center was completely
evacuated. [4]
Final reports indicate that the official death toll, according to the Louisiana Department
of Health, was 1,464 people. [4] Investigations following the hurricane decried many of
the deaths as “preventable”. [1, p. 2] Furthermore, they determined that the suffering
in the days and weeks after the storm was unnecessarily prolonged, and even
exacerbated by the failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare, and respond
aggressively to the storm. [5, p. 2]
Part I: Hard Lessons
Final reports indicate
that the official death
toll, according to the
Louisiana Department of
Health, was 1,464
people. Investigations
following the hurricane
decried many of the
deaths as “preventable”.
Furthermore, they
determined that the
suffering in the days and
weeks after the storm
was unnecessarily
prolonged.
119
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Table 8-1: Hurricane Katrina New Orleans Timeline
Date Description Wed. 24 Aug 05
First alerts of a tropical storm stirring in Caribbean
Fri. 26 Aug 05
Most residents work a full day and take "wait and see" approach
5 pm warnings from National Weather Service show Hurricane Katrina turning
New Orleans potentially within range Sat. 27 Aug 05
Saturday morning most residents learn that Katrina's path is set for New Orleans
Metro-area evacuations begin en masse clogging all outbound arteries of the city for 48 hours
St. Tammany, St. Charles, Plaquemines Parishes announce mandatory evacuations
Orleans and Jefferson Parish both announce voluntary evacuations
Governor Blanco sends "State of Emergency" letter to President Bush
Louisiana State University scientists issue a projected storm surge map Sun. 28 Aug 05
At 9:30 am Orleans Parish issues first-ever mandatory evacuation
At 10 am Katrina becomes a Category 5 storm with winds of 175 mph
At 11:30 am, President Bush vows to help those affected by the storm
State puts contra-flow plan into effect on interstates
Superdome designated city's "refuge of last resort"
Director of the National Hurricane Center warns Times-Picayune of a “worst-case scenario"
Tropical storm-force winds close down emergency services in metro area
At 9 pm, Times-Picayune building loses power, generators power up Mon. 29 Aug 05
At 3 am, Katrina makes landfall as a Category 3 hurricane
Metro-area emergency officials hold status meeting
At 6 am, 317,000 households are without power
At 7 am, water reported coming over the levee in the 9th Ward
At 8:45 am, six to eight-foot flood waters reported in Lower 9th Ward
At 9 am, winds rip hole in roof of Superdome
At 9 am, eye of the storm passes to the east of New Orleans central business district.
Windows in high-rise buildings blow out
11 am, National Weather Service reports a breach in the Industrial Canal levee, emptying Lake Pontchartrain into the neighborhoods of Eastern New Orleans, the Lower Ninth Ward in Orleans Parish and all of St. Bernard Parish
2 pm, breach in the 17th Street Canal is confirmed; Lakeview, Mid-City, Broodmoor, Gentilly flooded over next 48 hours.
2 pm, flood waters in the Lower Ninth Ward reach 12 feet in some areas
Flood waters continue to rise and it becomes apparent that it is a worst-case scenario Tue. 30 Aug 05
9 am, Times-Picayune employees evacuate building in delivery trucks as water rises a foot an hour
Local media reports that Martial Law is declared in Orleans, Jefferson and Plaquemines Parish
Looting reports go national presenting
Flood waters continue to rise throughout city Wed. 31 Aug 05
Flood waters reach an equilibrium as the "bowl" of the city is now even with Lake Ponchartrain
Some neighborhoods under as much as 20 feet of water
Hellish scenes reported from those stranded in the Superdome: assaults, rape and suicide reported though later most dismissed
Estimates of 30 days before city can be pumped out
Thousands stranded in houses, on roofs
Approximately one million people without power in metro area
Media reports that thousands are stranded in the New Orleans Convention Center without food or water as a steady stream of people, many from the flooded Central City neighborhood, trickled first toward Lee Circle and then to the Convention Center, hoping to be saved from increasingly desperate straits
120
Failure Analysis
According to the Senate investigation of Hurricane Katrina, government failure was
pervasive in that 1) long-term warnings went unheeded and government officials
neglected their duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 2) government officials
took insufficient actions or made poor decisions in the days immediately before and
after landfall; 3) systems on which officials relied on to support their response efforts
failed, and 4) government officials at all levels failed to provide effective leadership.
The results were tragic loss of life and human suffering on a massive scale, and an
undermining of confidence in the governments’ ability to plan, prepare for, and
respond to national catastrophes. [5, p. 2]
Unheeded Warnings
The potentially devastating threat of a catastrophic hurricane to the Gulf region has
been known for forty years: New Orleans experienced flooding in some areas of
remarkably similar proportions from Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane Camille
devastated the Gulf Coast in 1969. More recently, numerous experts and
governmental officials had been anticipating an increase in violent hurricanes, and
Part I: Hard Lessons
Date Description Thu. 1 Sep 05
Corps of Engineers begins to build dam to stop levee breach at the 17th Street Canal
More than 10,000 people have been rescued in St. Bernard Parish
Times-Picayune asks, "Where is the Cavalry?"; No federal help arrived
Governor Blanco demands "no less than 40,000 troops"
Mayor Nagin lambasts federal officials in a tirade for their lack of effective response
First 5,000 of approximately 23,000 evacuees arrive at Houston Astrodome by bus
Bush seeks $10.5 billion storm-relief package Fri. 2 Sep 05
7,000 soldiers move in on the Convention Center; they confront 15,000 angry refugees and a boulevard littered with putrefying corpses
Fires break out in various warehouses across the city
Bush tours area, says what is wrong "we're going to make right"
Mayor Nagin predicts electricity to be out in city for three months
Airport becomes way station for refugees
Thousands of refugees still in Superdome, Convention Center and I-10 Sat. 3 Sep 05
FEMA says storm overwhelmed agency; outrage grows in Washington
Authorities begin to regain grip on city with military's aid
President Bush orders 7,200 additional active duty troops to the region, for a total of 30,000
Rape, gunfire reported at Convention Center
Law enforcement agencies fielded about 1,000 distress 911 calls Saturday
St. Bernard rescuers find 31 dead in nursing home
Death toll expected to be in thousands, though nothing official yet
Last of evacuees taken from Superdome and Convention Center
Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard breaks down on "Meet the Press" and tells how a colleague's elderly mother died in her home Friday after waiting four days for rescuers that never arrived
Rescuers continue to pluck residents from hellish waters Sun. 4 Sep 05
Estimated 2,000 people, many of them with serious medical problems, were still housed inside Louis Armstrong International Airport
Mon. 5 Sep 05
16,000 National Guard troops dedicated to search and rescue mission
Jefferson Parish residents allowed home to survey damage
Agencies begin trying to save stranded pets
Corps of Engineers shifts work to damning London Avenue Canal
Mayor Nagin says more than 10,000 could be dead
Makeshift morgue set up in St. Gabriel, La. to handle 140 bodies per day [6]
121
New Orleans’ special and growing vulnerability to catastrophic flooding due to
changing geological and other conditions was widely described in both technical and
popular media. [5, p. 4]
Hurricane Georges hit the Gulf in 1998, spurring the state of Louisiana to ask FEMA for
assistance with catastrophic hurricane planning. Little was accomplished for the next
six years. Between 2000 and 2003, state authorities, an emergency-preparedness
contractor, and FEMA’s own regional staff repeatedly advised FEMA headquarters in
Washington that planning for evacuation and shelter for the “New Orleans scenario”
was incomplete and inadequate, but FEMA failed to approach other federal agencies
for help with transportation and shelter or to ensure that the City and State had the
matters in hand. [5, p. 4]
Then, in 2004, after a White House aide received a briefing on the catastrophic
consequences of a Category 3 hurricane hitting New Orleans, the federal government
sponsored a planning exercise, with participation from federal, state, and local officials,
based on a scenario whose characteristics foreshadowed most of Katrina’s impacts.
While this hypothetical “Hurricane Pam” exercise resulted in draft plans beginning in
early 2005, they were incomplete when Katrina hit. Nonetheless, some officials took
the initiative to use concepts developed in the drafts, with mixed success in the critical
aspects of the Katrina response. However, many of its admonitory lessons were either
ignored or inadequately applied. [5, p. 4]
During the Pam exercise, officials determined that massive flooding from a
catastrophic storm in New Orleans could threaten the lives of 60,000 people and trap
hundreds of thousands more, while incapacitating local resources for weeks to
months. The Pam exercise gave all levels of government a reminder that the “New
Orleans scenario” required more forethought, preparation, and investment than a
“typical” storm. Also, it reinforced the importance of coordination both within and
among federal, state, and local governments for an effective response. [5, p. 5]
The specific danger that Katrina posed to the Gulf Coast became clear on the afternoon
of Friday, August 26, when forecasters at the National Hurricane Center and the
National Weather Service saw that the storm was turning west. First in phone calls to
Louisiana emergency management officials and then in their 5 p.m. EDT Katrina
forecast and accompanying briefings, they alerted both Louisiana and Mississippi that
the track of the storm was now expected to shift significantly to the west of its original
track to the Florida panhandle. The National Hurricane Center warned that Katrina
could be a Category 4 or even a 5 by landfall. By the next morning, Weather Service
Officials directly confirmed to the Governor of Louisiana and other state and local
officials that New Orleans was squarely at risk. [5, p. 5]
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
According to the Senate
investigation of
Hurricane Katrina,
government failure was
pervasive in that 1) long
-term warnings went
unheeded ; 2)
government officials
took insufficient actions;
3) systems on which
officials relied on to
support their response
efforts failed, and 4)
government officials at
all levels failed to
provide effective
leadership.
122
Over the weekend, there was a drumbeat of warnings: FEMA held video-
teleconferences on both days, where the danger of Katrina and the particular risks to
New Orleans were discussed; Max Mayfield of the Hurricane Center called the
governors of the affected states, something he had only done once before in his 33
year career; President Bush took the unusual step of declaring in advance an
emergency for the states in the impact zone; numerous media reports noted that New
Orleans was a “bowl” and could be left submerged by the storm; the Department of
Homeland Security’s Simulation and Analysis group generated a report stating that the
levees protecting New Orleans were at risk of breaching and overtopping; internal
FEMA slides stated that the projected impacts of Katrina could be worse than those in
the Hurricane Pam exercise. The warnings were as widespread as they were dire. [5, p.
5]
Insufficient Preparation
While the State of Louisiana and the City of New Orleans undertook unprecedented
measures to prepare ahead of the storm, ineffective leadership, poor advance planning
and an unwillingness to devote sufficient resources to emergency management over
the long term doomed them to fail when Katrina struck. Despite the understanding of
the Gulf Coast’s particular vulnerability to hurricane devastation, officials braced for
Katrina with full awareness of critical deficiencies in their plans and gaping holes in
their resources. While Katrina’s destructive force could not be denied, state and local
officials did not marshal enough of the resources at their disposal. [5, p. 6]
For example, while Governor Blanco stated in a letter to President Bush two days
before landfall that she anticipated the resources of the state would be overwhelmed,
she made no specific request for assistance in evacuating the known tens of thousands
of people without means of transportation, and a senior state official identified no
unmet needs in response to a federal offer of assistance the following day. The state’s
transportation secretary also ignored his responsibilities under the state’s emergency
operations plan, leaving no arm of the state government prepared to obtain and
deliver additional transportation to those in New Orleans who lacked it, when Katrina
struck. In view of the long-standing role of requests as a trigger for action by higher
levels of government, the state bears responsibility for not signaling its needs to the
federal government more clearly. [5, p. 6]
Compounded by leadership failures of its own, the federal government bears
responsibility for not preparing effectively for its role in the post storm response. [5, p.
6]
Part I: Hard Lessons
While Katrina’s
destructive force could
not be denied, state and
local officials did not
marshal enough of the
resources at their
disposal.
123
FEMA was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina. Established in
1979 to consolidate emergency management functions previously dispersed
throughout federal government, FEMA had not developed – nor had it been designed
to develop – response capabilities sufficient for a catastrophe the size of Katrina. Nor
had it developed the capacity to mobilize sufficient resources from other federal
agencies, and the private and nonprofit sectors. [5, p. 6]
Moreover, FEMA’s Director, Michael Brown, lacked the leadership skills that were
needed. Before landfall, Brown did not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical
personnel and equipment, and willfully failed to communicate with his boss, Secretary
Chertoff. Earlier in the hurricane season, FEMA had pre-positioned an unprecedented
amount of relief supplies in the region. But the supplies were not enough. Similarly,
while both FEMA and the Department of Health and Human Services made efforts to
activate the federal emergency health capabilities of the National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health Service, only a limited number of federal
medical teams were actually in position prior to landfall to deploy into the affected
area. Only one such team was in a position to provide immediate medical care in the
aftermath of the storm. [5, p. 7]
More broadly, the newly created Department of Homeland Security, charged with
preparing for and responding to domestic incidents, failed to effectively lead the
federal response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of
urgency to the federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary
Chertoff himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend
before landfall. Secretary Chertoff made only top-level inquiries into the state of
preparations, and accepted uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not
appear to reach out to the other Cabinet Secretaries to make sure that they were
readying their departments to provide whatever assistance DHS – and the people of
the Gulf – might need. [5, p. 7]
Similarly, had he invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the NRP, Secretary
Chertoff could have helped remove uncertainty about the federal government’s need
and authority to take initiative before landfall and signaled that all federal government
agencies were expected to think – and act – proactively in preparing for and
responding to Katrina. The Secretary’s activation of the National Response Plan (NRP)
CIA could have increased the urgency of the federal response and led the federal
government to respond more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
More broadly, the newly
created Department of
Homeland Security,
charged with preparing
for and responding to
domestic incidents,
failed to effectively lead
the federal response to
Hurricane Katrina.
124
overwhelmed state and local officials. Understanding that delay may preclude
meaningful assistance and that state and local resources could be quickly
overwhelmed and incapacitated, the NRP CIA directed federal agencies to pre-position
resources without awaiting requests from the state and local governments. Even then,
the NRP CIA held these resources at mobilization sites until requested by state and
local officials, except in certain prescribed circumstances. [5, p. 7]
The military also had a role to play, and ultimately, the National Guard and active duty
military troops and assets deployed during Katrina constituted the largest domestic
deployment of military forces since the Civil War. And while the Department of
Defense took additional steps to prepare for Katrina beyond those it had taken for
prior civil support missions, its preparations were not sufficient for a storm of Katrina’s
magnitude. Individual commanders took actions that later helped improve the
response, but these actions were not coordinated by the Department. The
Department’s preparations were consistent with how DOD interpreted its role under
the National Response Plan, which was to provide support in response to requests for
assistance from FEMA. However, additional preparations in advance of specific
requests for support could have enabled a more rapid response. [5, pp. 7-8]
In addition, the White House shared responsibility for the inadequate pre-landfall
preparations. To be sure, President Bush, at the request of FEMA Director Michael
Brown, did take the initiative to personally call Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory
evacuation. He also took the unusual step of declaring an emergency in the Gulf States
prior to Katrina making landfall. On the other hand, the President did not leave his
Texas ranch to return to Washington until two days after landfall, and only then
convened his Cabinet as well as a White House task force to oversee federal response
efforts. [5, p. 8]
The effect of the long-term failures at every level of government to plan and prepare
adequately for a catastrophic hurricane in the Gulf was evident in the inadequate
preparations before Katrina’s landfall and then again in the initial response to the
storm. [5, p. 8]
Inadequate Response
Flooding in New Orleans drove thousands of survivors to attics and rooftops to await
rescue. Infrastructure damage complicated the organization and conduct of search-and
-rescue missions. Destruction of communications towers and equipment in particular
limited the ability of crews to communicate with one another, undermining
coordination and efficiency. Rescuers also had to contend with weapons fire, debris,
and polluted water. [5, p. 8]
Part I: Hard Lessons
The military also had
a role to play, and
ultimately, the
National Guard and
active duty military
troops and assets
deployed during
Katrina constituted
the largest domestic
deployment of
military forces since
the Civil War.
125
Planning for search and rescue was also insufficient. FEMA, for instance, failed to
provide boats for its search and rescue teams even though flooding had been
confirmed by Tuesday. Moreover, interagency coordination was inadequate at both
the state and federal levels. While the Louisiana Department of Fisheries and Wildlife
and FEMA are responsible for interagency search and rescue coordination at the state
and federal levels respectively, neither developed adequate plans for this mission.
Staggeringly, the City of New Orleans Fire Department owned no boats, and the New
Orleans Police Department owned five. Meanwhile, widespread communications
failures in Louisiana and Mississippi were so bad that many officers reverted to either
physically running messages from one person to another, or passing messages along a
daisy chain of officers using radios with limited range. [5, p. 9]
While authorities recognized the need to begin search-and-rescue missions even
before the hurricane winds fully subsided, other aspects of the response were
hindered by a failure to quickly recognize the dimensions of the disaster. On the day
after landfall, DHS officials were still struggling to determine the “ground truth” about
the extent of the flooding despite the many reports it had received about the
catastrophe; key officials did not grasp the need to act on the less-than-complete
information that is to be expected in a disaster. DHS leaders did not become fully
engaged in recovery efforts until Thursday, September 1, two days after Hurricane
Katrina hit New Orleans. But this effort should have begun sooner. [5, p. 9]
FEMA Director Michael Brown, then in Louisiana, contributed to the problem by
refusing to communicate with Secretary Chertoff opting instead to pass information
directly to White House staff. Moreover, even though senior DHS officials did receive
on the day of landfall numerous reports that should have led to an understanding of
the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans, many indicated they were not aware of
the crisis until sometime Tuesday morning, August 30, the day after landfall. [5, p. 9]
The Department of Defense also was slow to acquire information regarding the extent
of the storm’s devastation. DOD officials relied primarily on media reports for their
information. Many senior DOD officials did not learn that the levees had breached until
Tuesday; some did not learn until Wednesday, August 31, two days after Katrina made
landfall. As DOD waited for DHS to provide information about the scope of the
damage, it also waited for the lead federal agency, FEMA, to identify the support
needed from DOD. The lack of situational awareness during this phase appears to have
been a major reason for DOD’s belated adoption of the forward-looking posture
necessary in a catastrophic incident. [5, p. 10]
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
The Department of
Defense also was slow
to acquire information
regarding the extent of
the storm’s devastation.
DOD officials relied
primarily on media
reports for their
information.
126
While large numbers of active-duty troops did not arrive until the end of the first week
following landfall, the Department of Defense contributed in other important ways
during that period. Early in the week, DOD ordered its military commanders to push
available assets to the Gulf Coast. They also streamlined their ordinarily bureaucratic
processes for handling FEMA requests for assistance and emphasized movement based
on vocal commands with the paperwork to follow, though some FEMA officials believe
that DOD’s approval process continued to take too long. They provided significant
support to search-and-rescue missions, evacuee airlifts, logistics management of buses
arriving in the State for evacuation, and other matters. [5, p. 11]
Toward the end of the week, with its own resources stretched thin, FEMA turned to
DOD to take over logistics for all commodity movements. The Department of Defense
acceded to the request, and provided some logistics assistance to FEMA. However, it
did not undertake the complete logistical take-over initially requested by FEMA
because that was not needed. [5, p. 12] On Wednesday, August 31, the National Guard
Bureau began calling on state Adjutants General to deploy National Guard forces. This
process quickly resulted in the largest National Guard deployment in U.S. history, with
50,000 troops and supporting equipment arriving from 49 states and four territories
within two weeks. [5, p. 11] These forces brought in relief supplies provided by FEMA,
established law and order, and assisted with evacuations. [5, p. 12]
Law Enforcement
Law enforcement outside the Superdome and the Convention Center was a problem,
and was fueled by several contributing factors, including erroneous statements by top
city officials inflaming the public’s perception of the lawlessness in New Orleans. [5, p.
12]
Without effective law enforcement, real or imagined safety threats interrupted
virtually every aspect of the response. Fearing for their personal safety, medical and
search and rescue teams withdrew from their missions. FEMA and commercial vendors
of critical supplies often refused to make deliveries until military escorts could be
arranged. In fact, there was some lawlessness, yet for every actual act there were
rumors of dozens more, leading to widespread and inaccurate reporting that severely
complicated a desperate situation. Unfortunately, local, state, and federal officials did
little to stanch this rumor flow. Police presence on the streets was inadequate, in part
because in a matter of hours Katrina turned the New Orleans police department from
protectors of the public to victims of the storm. Nonetheless, most New Orleans police
officers appear to have reported for duty, many setting aside fears about the safety of
their families or the status of their homes. [5, p. 12]
Part I: Hard Lessons
Without effective law
enforcement, real or
imagined safety threats
interrupted virtually
every aspect of the
response.
127
Even so, the ability of the officers who remained to perform their duties was
significantly hampered by the lack of basic supplies. While supplies such as weapons
and ammunition were lost to flooding, the NOPD leadership did not provide its officers
with basic necessities such as food; nor did the department have logistics in place to
handle supplies. Members of the NOPD also identified the lack of a unified command
for this incident as a major problem; eight members of the Command Staff were
extremely critical of the lack of leadership from the city’s Office of Emergency
Preparedness (OEP). The department’s rank and file were unfamiliar with both the
department’s and the city’s emergency-operations manuals and other hurricane
emergency procedures. Deficiencies in the NOPD’s manual, lack of training on this
manual, lack of familiarity with it, or a combination of the three resulted in inadequate
protection of department resources. [5, p. 13]
Federal law-enforcement assistance was too slow in coming, in large part because the
two federal departments charged with providing such assistance – DHS and the
Department of Justice (DOJ) – had done almost no pre-storm planning. In fact, they
failed to determine even well into the post-landfall period which of the two
departments would assume the lead for federal law enforcement. As a result, later in
the week, as federal law-enforcement officers did arrive, some were distracted by a
pointless “turf war” between DHS and DOJ over which agency was in the lead. In the
end, federal assistance was crucial, but should have arrived much sooner. [5, p. 13]
Health Care
Medical teams had to triage more than 70,000 evacuees and provide acute care to the
sick and wounded. While officials used plans developed in Hurricane Pam as a helpful
framework for managing this process, existing emergency-room facilities were
overwhelmed by the volume of patients. Local and state officials quickly set up
temporary field hospitals at a sports arena and a K-mart in Baton Rouge to supplement
hospital capacity. [5, p. 14]
New Orleans had a large population of “special needs patients,” individuals living at
home who required ongoing medical assistance. Before Katrina struck, the City Health
Department activated a plan to establish a care facility for this population within the
Superdome and provided transportation to evacuate several hundred patients and
their caregivers to Baton Rouge. While Superdome facilities proved useful in treating
special needs patients who remained behind, they had to contend with shortages of
supplies, physical damage to the facility necessitating a post-landfall relocation of
patients and equipment to an area adjacent to the Dome, and a population of more
than 20,000 people using the Superdome as a refuge of last resort. Also, FEMA’s
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Federal law-
enforcement assistance
was too slow in coming,
in large part because
the two federal
departments charged
with providing such
assistance – DHS and
the Department of
Justice (DOJ) – had done
almost no pre-storm
planning.
128
Disaster Medical Assistance Teams which provide the invaluable resources of
pharmacies and hospital equipment, arrived at the Superdome on the night following
landfall, but left temporarily on Thursday, before the evacuation of the Superdome’s
special needs population was completed, because of security concerns. [5, p. 14]
In Louisiana, hospitals had to evacuate after landfall on short notice principally due to
loss of electrical power. While hospitals had evacuated some of their patients before
landfall, they had retained others thought to be too frail for transport, and believed by
staying open they would be available to serve hurricane victims. Their strategy became
untenable after landfall when power was lost, and their backup generators were
rendered inoperable by flooding and fuel shortages. The Louisiana Department of
Health and Hospitals stepped in to arrange for their evacuation; while successful, it had
to compete with search and rescue teams for helicopters and other needed resources.
[5, p. 14]
Many nursing homes in and around New Orleans lacked adequate evacuation plans.
While they were required to have plans on file with local government, there was no
process to ensure that there were sufficient resources to evacuate all the nursing
homes at once, and dozens of patients who were not evacuated died. When
evacuation became necessary, some sent their patients to the Superdome, where
officials struggling to handle the volume of patients already there were obliged to
accept still more. [5, p. 14]
Evacuations
The City of New Orleans, with primary responsibility for evacuation of its citizens, had
language in its plan stating the city’s intent to assist those who needed transportation
for pre-storm evacuation, but had no actual plan provisions to implement that intent.
In late 2004 and 2005, city officials negotiated contracts with Amtrak, riverboat owners
and others to pre-arrange transportation alternatives, but received inadequate
support from the city’s Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
and contracts were not in place when Katrina struck. As Katrina approached,
notwithstanding the city’s evacuation plans on paper, the best solution New Orleans
had for people without transportation was a private-citizen volunteer carpool initiative
called Operation Brothers’ Keepers and transit buses taking people – not out of the
city, but to the Superdome. [5, p. 16]
Part I: Hard Lessons
The City of New Orleans,
with primary
responsibility for
evacuation of its
citizens, had language in
its plan stating the city’s
intent to assist those
who needed
transportation for pre-
storm evacuation, but
had no actual plan
provisions to implement
that intent.
129
The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, whose Secretary had
personally accepted departmental responsibility under the state’s emergency
operations plan to arrange for transportation for evacuation in emergencies, had done
nothing to prepare for that responsibility prior to Katrina. Had his department
identified available buses or other means of transport for evacuation within the state
in the months before the hurricane, at a minimum the State would have been
prepared to evacuate people stranded in New Orleans after landfall more quickly than
it did. [5, p. 16]
While the Superdome provided shelter from the devastating winds and water,
conditions there deteriorated quickly. Katrina’s “near miss” ripped the covering off the
roof, caused leaking, and knocked out the power, rendering the plumbing, air
conditioning, and public announcement system totally useless. [5, p. 16] By Tuesday
afternoon, the New Orleans Superdome had become overcrowded, leading officials to
turn additional refugees away. Mayor Nagin directed evacuees be sent to the
Convention Center, but communicated his decision to state and federal officials poorly,
if at all. That failure, in addition to the delay of shipments due to security concerns and
DHS’s own independent lack of awareness of the situation, contributed to the paucity
of food, water, security or medical care at the Convention Center, as a population of
approximately 19,000 gathered there. [5, p. 12]
On Monday, August 29, as Katrina passed over New Orleans, Governor Blanco asked
FEMA Director Michael Brown for buses. Brown assured the state the same day that
500 buses were enroute to assist in the evacuation of New Orleans and would arrive
within hours. In spite of Brown’s assurances and the state’s continued requests over
the course of the next two days, FEMA did not direct the U.S. Department of
Transportation to send buses until very early on Wednesday, August 31, two days after
landfall. Still, the buses did not begin to arrive until Wednesday evening and not in
significant numbers until the next day, four days after landfall. Concerned over FEMA’s
delay in providing buses – and handicapped by the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development’s utter failure to make any preparation to carry out
its lead role for evacuation under the state’s emergency plan – Governor Blanco
directed members of her office to begin locating buses on Tuesday and approved an
effort to commandeer school buses for evacuation on Wednesday. But these efforts
were too little, too late. Tens of thousands of people were forced to wait in
unspeakably horrible conditions until as late as Saturday, September 4, to be
evacuated. [5, p. 13]
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
The Louisiana
Department of
Transportation and
Development, whose
Secretary had personally
accepted departmental
responsibility under the
state’s emergency
operations plan to
arrange for
transportation for
evacuation in
emergencies, had done
nothing to prepare for
that responsibility prior
to Katrina.
130
Conclusion
Effective response to mass emergencies is a critical role of every level of government.
It is a role that requires a substantial amount of planning, coordination and dispatch
among governments’ diverse units. Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the nation
underwent one of the most sweeping reorganizations of federal government in history.
While driven primarily by concerns of terrorism, the reorganization was designed to
strengthen our nation’s ability to address the consequences of both natural and man-
made disasters. In its first major test, this reorganized system failed. [5, p. 2]
Part I: Hard Lessons
131
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why wasn’t New Orleans completely evacuated in advance of the storm?
2. How did City and State emergency managers fail to assist the evacuation?
3. How did City and State emergency managers fail to provide adequate shelter?
4. How did the breakdown in local law enforcement contribute to the disaster?
5. Describe the breakdown in communications between the Governor and President.
6. Describe the breakdown in communications within the new Department of Homeland Security.
7. Describe the breakdown in communications between the responding military forces.
8. Explain why the House Report characterized the response to Hurricane Katrina as a “failure of initiative”.
9. If you were mayor of New Orleans, why would you wait to evacuate your city?
10. If you were mayor of New Orleans, how would you expedite your city’s evacuation?
132
133
Part II:
HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
This section examines the purpose, formation, evolution, and performance of the Department of Homeland Security,
and its role within the Homeland Security Enterprise. We begin by examining the definition of homeland security.
Unfortunately, the official definition as listed in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and affirmed in the
2014 QHSR, is completely inadequate. If terrorism and natural disasters are indeed the primary homeland security
concerns as indicated, then a Department of Homeland Security would’ve been created decades earlier following any
number of terrorist incidents or natural disasters. In order to cut through the confusion we offer our own working
definition of homeland security: “To safeguard the United States from domestic catastrophic destruction.” This
definition makes clear that the homeland security concern is domestic catastrophic destruction, no matter what the
motive or cause. And because there are no guaranteed safeguards, homeland security must encompass missions
across the spectrum of prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover. In the prevent and protect mission areas,
DHS is nationally responsible for aviation security, maritime security, surface transportation security, border security,
and immigration enforcement. In the mitigation mission area, DHS works together in partnership with public and
private agencies to reduce critical infrastructure vulnerability to attack, especially cyber attack. And in the respond
and recover mission areas, DHS leads national efforts to enhance interoperability and capability within the First
Responder community. Under authorities provided in the Homeland Security Act, and at the explicit direction of
Congress, DHS has evolved since it was established to better meet its mission requirements. In 2010, at the direction
of Congress, DHS instituted the QHSR process to continuously and systematically review their mission and organization
to ensure they continue to do the right thing, and that they continue to do it right. And while DHS has filled important
gaps exposed by 9/11, homeland security remains a team sport, requiring cooperation not just among Federal
agencies, but also among State, Local, and Tribal governments as part of the Homeland Security Enterprise. For some
missions, like critical infrastructure protection, DHS is the primary agency and leads efforts with help from many
supporting agencies, including infrastructure owners and operators. For other missions, like counterterrorism, DHS is a
supporting agency to the FBI, forwarding actionable leads developed by its many components and partners. Though
DHS’ progress has not been without significant challenges, and they still have substantial ground to gain, it can be
confidently stated that the nation is better prepared to deal with catastrophic destruction than at any time before 9/11
or Hurricane Katrina.
134
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
135
Homeland Security
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Discuss the evolving definition of “homeland security”.
Evaluate the various definitions of “homeland security”.
Explain why the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in October 2001.
Chapter 9
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
136
Con·flate /kənˈflāt/ Verb. To combine two or more ideas into one.
- Dictionary.com
Introduction
The 1995 Tokyo subway attack was a turning point in American national security policy
when non-state actors bearing weapons of mass destruction became a credible threat
to the United States. [1] After the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and 1995
Oklahoma City bombing, two terrorist-motivated attacks on U.S. soil, three separate
government commissions were established to investigate terrorist attacks employing
WMD in the United States. As 9/11 would prove, the commissions found the nation
unprepared to respond let alone thwart a catastrophic attack, and ultimately
recommended the establishment of a homeland security agency to address such
threats. [2, p. vi] In the process, they also conflated the concepts of “terrorism” and
“domestic catastrophic attack”, consequently confusing the concept of “homeland
security”. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the definition of “homeland
security”, and make a clear understanding of what it is, and what it is not.
Pre-9/11
The Hart-Rudman Commission was chartered by Secretary of Defense William Cohen in
1998 to provide a comprehensive review of U.S. national security requirements for the
21st century. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century was tasked "to
analyze the emerging international security environment; to develop a U.S. national
security strategy appropriate to that environment; and to assess the various security
institutions for their current relevance to the effective and efficient implementation of
that strategy, and to recommend adjustments as necessary". [3] Phase I concluded in
September 1999 with the publication of “New World Coming: American Security in the
21st Century”. Phase II produced the April 2000 publication, “Seeking a National
Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom”. Phase III,
presented in February 2001 was titled “Road Map for National Security: Imperative for
Change”. [2, pp. v-vi]
Six months before 9/11, the Hart-Rudman Commission summarized its previous
findings with this chilling prediction:
“The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the
persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of
the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack. A direct attack against American
citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. The risk is not
only death and destruction but also a demoralization that could undermine
U.S. global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or
integrated governmental structures.” [2, p. viii]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
“A direct attack against
American citizens on
American soil is likely
over the next quarter
century.”
- Hart-Rudman
Commission, February
2001
137
In recognition of this perceived threat, the Commission Phase III report recommended
establishing an independent National Homeland Security Agency “with responsibility
for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved
in homeland security.” The report went on to recommend building the proposed new
agency on the foundation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
incorporating the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and Border Patrol. Additionally, the
agency would have responsibility for protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. [2,
p. viii]
The Phase III report is interesting for what it does: 1) it accurately predicts a
catastrophic attack on the U.S., 2) it proposes a cabinet-level agency foreshadowing
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and 3) it anticipates the
composition and functions of the future DHS. The report is also interesting for what it
does not do: it doesn’t define “homeland security”. The Hart-Rudman Commission
first makes reference to homeland security in its Phase II report, yet does not define it
there either. [4, p. 14] While the Commission fails to give an outright definition of
“homeland security”, it does make it clear that it is about domestic catastrophic attack
involving weapons of mass destruction or disruption employed by non-state actors.
Because the expected target was U.S. territory, the Commission saw homeland security
as central to national security, not peripheral to it. [2, p. 10] It also saw that homeland
security was a mission too broad for any single agency, but requiring the coordination
of many agencies at the Federal, State, and Local levels. [2, pp. 11-22]
Post-9/11
The first definition of “homeland security” appeared after 9/11. On October 8, 2001,
only weeks after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228
establishing an Office of Homeland Security (OHS) within the White House. The
purpose of OHS was to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to “detect, prepare
for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the
United States.” One of OHS’ first priorities was to develop “a comprehensive national
strategy to secure the United States from terrorist attacks.” [5] It is in this document
that the first definition of homeland security was published:
“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
The first definition of
homeland security is
found in the 2002
National Strategy for
Homeland Security.
138
Terrorism is defined in 18 USC S2331, as ““Acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, that appear to be
intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by
mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” Terrorism is a specific crime
distinguished by a specific motive, that of intimidating or coercing the U.S.
government. Though it may not be the only motive that might prompt domestic
catastrophic attack, it was certainly the motive behind the 9/11 attacks. Thus, given its
directive, OHS defined homeland security in terms of terrorism. This definition was
retained in the 2007 update to homeland security strategy, [6, p. 3] but was changed in
2010 as a result of Hurricane Katrina.
In recognition that homeland security is an integral part of national security, in 2010
the Obama Administration merged homeland security strategy with national security
strategy. Unlike the previous homeland security strategies, the 2010 National Security
Strategy did not define homeland security but described its functions instead. [7, p. 15]
Similarly, the 2015 National Security Strategy did not define homeland security either.
[8] The task of defining homeland security had been removed by Congress from
strategy formulation to mission formulation. In August 2007, Congress passed Public
Law 110-53, “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act”. Among
its provisions, the law required DHS to conduct a comprehensive examination of the
nation’s homeland security strategy every four years starting in fiscal year 2009. In
February 2010, DHS released its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
defining homeland security. [9, p. 13] The same definition was not included, but
affirmed in the 2014 QHSR. [10, p. 94]
“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is safe,
secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests,
aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”
- 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Analysis
While the focus on “terrorism” is understandable, it is also dangerously misleading
because it is peripheral to the problem that launched three separate government
commission investigations: domestic catastrophic destruction. The Gilmore
Commission was established to investigate the potential for “mass destruction” or
“mass casualties” as the result of domestic employment of WMD. [1, pp. i-xi] The Hart-
Rudman Commission independently came to this conclusion when it determined that
“America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and
our military superiority will not entirely protect us.” [11, p. 4] The Bremer Commission
was also motivated by concerns of “mass casualties”. [12, p. iv] Yet, the three
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The second and reigning
definition of homeland
security was advanced
in the 2010 QHSR, and
affirmed (though not
stated) in the 2014
QHSR.
139
commissions investigated domestic catastrophic destruction in connection with
terrorism, which is how the two concepts became conflated. As defined in 18 USC
S2331, terrorism is a crime distinguished by a specific motive to affect change in U.S.
government actions. In the universe of potential motives for causing domestic
catastrophic destruction, terrorism is but one possibility among countless others. In
fact, the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina proved that no motive is necessary at
all.
The current definition of homeland security is also incomplete. The current definition
is focused on initiators of catastrophic destruction related to terrorist motive, natural
means, and accidental opportunity. It does not address other motives, cyber means,
or infrastructure opportunities. Certainly they could be included, but this would be
cumbersome and also incomplete. Instead of trying to enumerate all possible
“initiators” of the problem, why not focus on the problem itself? Why not make the
definition about the effect, regardless of the cause? Why not make a more clear and
concise definition of homeland security?
Working Definition
It is good to know the official definition of homeland security as promulgated by the
U.S. government. Unfortunately, knowing this definition is not helpful to
understanding homeland security. As such, the following working definition is offered
to help guide study in this textbook:
“Safeguard the United States from domestic catastrophic destruction.”
The stated working definition is as insightful as it is direct. It is direct because it
directly identifies “domestic catastrophic destruction” as the central concern of
homeland security. Yet, it is not restricted by specifying either the cause or scale of
destruction. Because it’s unspecified, the destruction may be measured either in terms
of deaths or damages, or a combination of both. Moreover, the destruction is not
confined to first-order effects, but may include second- or third-order effects resulting
from mass disruption. The ultimate determinant is the impact on society, which is
clearly “catastrophic”, distinguishing the destruction from other incidents by its
magnitude. Similarly, because the cause of destruction is not specified, it can
encompass all means, motives, and opportunities that might result in catastrophic
destruction. These include both natural and manmade means, as well as terrorist and
other motives, and accidental as well as intentional opportunities.
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
The current definition
confuses causes with
effects. Consequently,
we offer a working
definition of homeland
security focusing on
effect to eliminate such
confusion: “Safeguard
the U.S. from domestic
catastrophic
destruction.”
140
Regarding manmade means, the working definition is insightful as to the relationship
between homeland security and national security. If the threat is a sovereign state,
then the homeland security concern is addressed by national security measures. If the
threat is a non-state actor, then the homeland security concern is addressed by legal
measures under U.S. law. In both circumstances, the threat remains a homeland
security concern.
The word “safeguard” was also carefully chosen. It was chosen in recognition of the
fact that no defense is invulnerable to a determined attacker, and you can’t stop
natural disasters. Consequently, the word “safeguard” encompasses actions during
the four phases of any catastrophe: 1) prevent, 2) protect, 3) respond, and 4) recover.
Prevention measures necessarily include detection, and deterrence and interception in
the case of manmade threats, and mitigation and sheltering in the case of natural
hazards. Protection measures may be similar for both manmade threats and natural
hazards, including isolation, hardening, redundancy, and a host of other actions.
Prevention and protection measures are typically implemented before an incident.
Response and recovery measures are typically implemented after an incident.
Response measures include resources and actions necessary to save lives and protect
property. Recovery measures include resources and actions necessary to restore living
conditions to their pre-incident status or better. Most importantly, the word
“safeguard” means that nothing is ever completely safe. Everything is a matter of risk,
and all measures taken before and after an incident are about risk management.
Understanding the working definition provides a lens through which you can gain
insight and perspective on homeland security. We will now use this lens to examine
events following 9/11.
Ultimatum
By late in the evening of September 11, the President had addressed the nation on the
terrible events of the day. The long day was not yet over. When the larger meeting that
included his domestic department heads broke up, President Bush chaired a smaller
meeting of top advisers, a group he would later call his “war council.” This group
usually included Vice President Cheney, Secretary of State Powell, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, General Hugh Shelton, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (later to
become chairman) General Myers, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet,
Attorney General Ashcroft, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. From the White House
staff, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Chief of Staff Card were part of
the core group, often joined by their deputies, Stephen Hadley and Joshua Bolten. In
this restricted National Security Council meeting, the President said it was a time for
self-defense. The United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the attacks,
but also those who harbored them. [13, p. 330]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The word “safeguard”
was chosen in
recognition of the fact
that no defense is
invulnerable, and you
can’t stop natural
disasters.
141
A cross check of the 9/11 flight manifests implicated al Qaeda in the attacks. On
September 13, The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban:
produce bin Laden and his deputies and shut down al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48
hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist
infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. President
Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administration would have to invade
Afghanistan with ground troops. [13, p. 332]
The State and Defense departments would have to build an international coalition to
go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and
request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their
capabilities and resources. All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over
the weekend of September 15–16, as President Bush convened his war council at
Camp David. After hearing from his senior advisers, President Bush discussed with Rice
the contents of the directives he would issue to set all the plans into motion. Rice
prepared a paper that President Bush then considered with principals on Monday
morning, September 17. “The purpose of this meeting,” he recalled saying,“ is to assign
tasks for the first wave of the war against terrorism. It starts today.” [13, p. 333]
In a speech before Congress on September 21, President Bush delivered the U.S.
ultimatum to the Taliban: “Deliver to U.S. authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda… or
share in their fate.” He said: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”
The terms were non-negotiable. [14] That same day, the Taliban ambassador to
Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef, insisted his country would not hand over Osama bin
Laden. He told a news conference in the capital, Islamabad: "Our position on this is
that if America has proof, we are ready for the trial of Osama bin Laden in light of the
evidence." Asked if he was ready to hand Bin Laden over, he replied: "No." [15]
On September 22, the United Arab Emirates, and later Saudi Arabia, withdrew
recognition of the Taliban as Afghanistan's legal government, leaving neighboring
Pakistan as the only remaining country with diplomatic ties. On October 4, the Taliban
agreed to turn bin Laden over to Pakistan for trial in an international tribunal that
operated according to Islamic Sharia law, but Pakistan blocked the offer as it was not
possible to guarantee his safety. On October 7, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan
offered to detain bin Laden and try him under Islamic law if the U.S. made a formal
request and presented the Taliban with evidence. The offer was rejected on grounds
there would be no negotiating. Plus, the U.S. had begun military operations in
Afghanistan. [16]
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
9/11 was a criminal act.
Any assault against U.S.
citizens or territory is a
crime, no matter what
the nationality of the
perpetrator. Osama bin
Laden was guilty of
planning and
committing murder on
U.S. soil.
142
Enduring Freedom
President Bush approved military plans to attack Afghanistan in meetings with Central
Command’s General Tommy Franks and other advisers on September 21 and October
2. Originally titled “Infinite Justice,” the operation’s code word was changed—to avoid
the sensibilities of Muslims who associate the power of infinite justice with God
alone—to “Enduring Freedom.” [13, p. 337]
On October 7, less than one month after the September 11 attacks, the U.S., aided by
the United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries including several from the NATO
alliance, initiated military action, bombing Taliban and Al-Qaeda-related camps. The
stated intent of military operations was to remove the Taliban from power, and
prevent the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations. [16]
The CIA's elite Special Activities Division (SAD) units were the first U.S. forces to enter
Afghanistan. They joined with the Afghan United Front, also known as the Northern
Alliance, to prepare for the subsequent arrival of U.S. Special Operations forces. [16]
The CIA provided intelligence, experience, cash, covert action capabilities, and liaison
with tribal allies. In turn, the U.S. military offered combat expertise, firepower,
logistics, and communications. [13, p. 338] Together, the Northern Alliance and SAD
and Special Forces combined to overthrow the Taliban with minimal coalition
casualties, and without the use of international conventional ground forces. [16]
On October 14, the Taliban offered to discuss handing over Osama bin Laden to a
neutral country in return for a bombing halt, but only if the Taliban were given
evidence of bin Laden's involvement. The U.S. rejected this offer, and continued
military operations. Mazar-i-Sharif fell to United Front troops of Ustad Atta
Mohammad Noor and Abdul Rashid Dostum on November 9, triggering a cascade of
provinces falling with minimal resistance. [16]
On the night of November 12, the Taliban retreated south from Kabul. On November
15, they released eight Western aid workers after three months in captivity. By
November 13, the Taliban had withdrawn from both Kabul and Jalalabad. Finally, in
early December, the Taliban gave up Kandahar, their last stronghold, dispersing
without surrendering. [16]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
When the Taliban
government of
Afghanistan refused to
extradite Osama bin
Laden and turn him over
to the FBI, President
Bush sent in the U.S.
military to take down
the Taliban government
for abetting terrorism,
and capture or kill
Osama bin Laden.
143
Within about two months of the start of combat operations, several hundred CIA
operatives and Special Forces soldiers, backed by the striking power of U.S. aircraft and
a much larger infrastructure of intelligence and support efforts, had combined with
Afghan militias and a small number of other coalition soldiers to destroy the Taliban
regime and disrupt al Qaeda. They had killed or captured about a quarter of the
enemy’s known leaders. Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander and a
principal figure in the 9/11 plot, had been killed by a U.S. air strike. [13, p. 338]
At the Bonn Conference in December 2001, Hamid Karzai was selected to head the
Afghan Interim Administration, which after a 2002 loya jirga in Kabul became the
Afghan Transitional Administration. In the popular elections of 2004, Karzai was
elected president of the country, now named the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. [17]
Escape
The U.S. and its allies drove the Taliban from power and built military bases near major
cities across the country. Most al-Qaeda and Taliban, however, were not captured,
escaping to neighboring Pakistan or retreating to rural or remote mountainous regions.
[17] Among the escapees was Osama bin Laden.
In December 2001, Afghan forces, with limited U.S. support, engaged al Qaeda
elements in a cave complex called Tora Bora. It was later determined that bin Laden
was present, and the failure by the United States to commit enough ground troops
allowed him to escape. [18]
In March 2002, the largest engagement of the war was fought, in the mountainous
Shah-i-Kot area south of Gardez, against a large force of al Qaeda jihadists. Almost all
remaining al Qaeda forces fled across the border and took refuge in Pakistan’s equally
mountainous and lightly governed frontier provinces. [13, p. 338]
As the U.S. turned its attention to Iraq, the Taliban began to reorganize under their
former leader Mohammed Omar, and in 2003 launched an insurgency against the
newly established Afghan government and its supporting allies. The insurgency drew
the United States into its longest lasting military engagement in history. After 13 years,
the United States officially ended combat operations in Afghanistan on October 26,
2014. Despite Mohammed Omar’s death in April 2013, the insurgency continued. As of
2015, U.S. forces still maintained a presence in Afghanistan and supported the Afghan
military with air strikes and Special Operations raids. [17]
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
In less than two months,
the U.S. military
succeeded in toppling
the Taliban. However,
in the midst of action,
both the Taliban leader,
Mohammed Omar, and
Osama bin Laden
managed to escape and
evade capture.
144
Captured or Killed
Beginning on September 11, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents working in
cooperation with the FBI began arresting individuals for immigration violations.
Eventually, 768 aliens were arrested as “special interest” detainees. Some, such as
Zacarias Moussaoui, were already in INS custody before 9/11. [13, p. 327] Moussaoui
had been arrested by the FBI for immigration violation in August 2001 after arousing
suspicion over his flight training courses in Eagan, Minnesota. On December 11, 2001,
Moussaoui was indicted by a federal grand jury in United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia on six felony charges: conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries, conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, conspiracy to
destroy aircraft, conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to murder
United States employees, and conspiracy to destroy property. Moussaoui was alleged
by federal prosecutors to have been a replacement for the "first" 20th hijacker,
possibly Ramzi bin al-Shibh who was denied a visa. Moussaoui pleaded guilty in federal
court for which he was found guilty in May 2006. As a result of his conviction, he is
serving six life sentences without parole at the Federal Supermax prison in Florence,
Colorado. [19]
On March 1, 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind behind the 9/11 plot,
was captured in hiding in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, by a combined force from the CIA and
Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Over the next several years, KSM was
interrogated by the CIA in secret prison camps located in Europe. In 2006 he was
transferred to military custody and Guantanamo Bay detention camp in Cuba. In
February 2008, KSM was charged with war crimes and murder by a U.S. military
commission. He remains in Guantanamo awaiting trial. [20]
After bin Laden fled Tora Bora in 2001, numerous speculative press reports were
issued about his whereabouts or even death. Some placed bin Laden in different
locations during overlapping time periods. None were ever definitively proven. After
military offensives in Afghanistan failed to uncover his whereabouts, Pakistan was
regularly identified as his suspected hiding place. [18]
In April 2011, various intelligence outlets pinpointed bin Laden's suspected location
near Abbottabad, Pakistan. It was previously believed that bin Laden was hiding near
the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas,
but he was found 100 miles away in a three-story mansion in Abbottabad, less than a
mile from the Pakistan Military Academy. [18]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
After bin Laden fled Tora
Bora in 2001, numerous
speculative press reports
were issued about his
whereabouts or even
death. In April 2011,
various intelligence
outlets pinpointed bin
Laden's suspected
location near
Abbottabad, Pakistan.
145
On April 29, 2011, President Obama authorized a team of Navy SEALs to raid the
compound in Abbottabad. On May 2, 2011, Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR launched from
Afghanistan into Pakistan aboard specially modified stealth helicopters. They were
supported by multiple additional aircraft, including Air Force fighters and drones. As
the helicopters maneuvered to discharge the SEALs, one lost lift and crash landed
inside the compound. None of the team was seriously injured, and they quickly
regained their composure. The other helicopter landed outside the compound and the
SEALs scaled the walls to get inside. The SEALs then advanced into the house,
breaching walls and doors with explosives. The interior was pitch dark because CIA
operatives had cut the power to the neighborhood. However, the SEALs wore night
vision goggles. They made their way to the third floor where bin Laden lived with his
family. Bin Laden peered through his bedroom door at the Americans advancing up
the stairs, and then retreated into the room as the lead SEAL fired a shot at him, which
either missed or hit him in the side. Bounding into the room, they found bin Laden with
one of his wives. Bin Laden was shot twice in the forehead, and once more as he
crumpled to the floor. He was dead. The SEAL team leader radioed, "For God and
country—Geronimo, Geronimo, Geronimo", using a call sign to confirm they had found
bin Laden. After being prompted for confirmation, the SEAL team leader announced
"Geronimo E.K.I.A.", military-speak for “enemy killed in action”. Watching the
operation in the White House Situation Room, Obama said, "We got him." [18]
From entry to exit, the SEALS spent no more than 38 minutes in the Abbottabad
compound. The helicopter damaged in the crash was destroyed to safeguard its
classified equipment. A standby Chinook was sent in to pick up the SEALS together
with bin Laden’s body and evidence gathered in the raid. The team flew back to
Afghanistan where bin Laden’s body was transferred to a waiting V-22 Osprey and
flown out to the aircraft carrier Carl Vinson. Muslim religious rites were performed
and the body wrapped in a white sheet and placed in a weighted plastic bag. At
approximately 11:00 am, bin Laden’s body was buried at sea, to be gone forever. [18]
But the threat did not end with him.
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
"For God and country—
Geronimo, Geronimo,
Geronimo."
146
Conclusion
Homeland security is about safeguarding the United States from domestic catastrophic
destruction. Osama bin Laden was indicted by the FBI for capital crimes related to the
1998 embassy bombings and 9/11 attacks. When the Taliban government of
Afghanistan refused to extradite him, the United States initiated military action to
remove the Taliban and capture bin Laden. In the confusion of battle, both bin Laden
and Mohammed Omar managed to escape and become fugitives. Mohammed Omar
instigated the Taliban insurgency which continued after his death in 2013. Osama bin
Laden was eventually located inside Pakistan, and killed in a special operations raid in
2011. The U.S. remains engaged in Afghanistan as part of U.S. national security
strategy to prevent that country from again harboring agents who would pose a
homeland security threat. By the same token, the U.S. federal government undertook
sweeping changes to close the gaps exposed by 9/11, and establish homeland security
as an essential component of national security.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
147
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. When and where did the term “homeland security” originate?
2. What was the first definition of “homeland security”?
3. What was the second definition of “homeland security”?
4. What are the basic differences between the first and second definitions?
5. What precipitated the change in definitions?
6. Which of the following incidents would be considered a homeland security concern by the first definition? Explain.
a. 9/11 Attacks
b. Hurricane Katrina
c. 2003 Northeast Blackout
7. Which of the previous incidents would be considered a homeland security concern by the second definition? Explain.
8. Which of the previous incidents would be considered a homeland security concern by the working definition? Explain.
9. Why are the 9/11 attacks considered a crime, but not the 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor?
10. What is the relationship between Osama bin Laden and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001?
148
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149
DHS Formation
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain why Congress was already considering homeland security legislation before 9/11.
Describe measures taken by the White House to coordinate homeland security immediately after 9/11.
Explain why the White House advocated an executive department for homeland security after 9/11.
Assess the organization and mission of the new Department of Homeland Security.
Chapter 10
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
150
“The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of
international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to
catastrophic attack. We therefore recommend the creation of an independent National
Homeland Security Agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and
integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.”
- Phase III Report of the Hart-Rudman Commission, February 15, 2001
Introduction
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a Cabinet department of
the Federal government of the United States that is concerned with protecting the
American homeland and the safety of American citizens. The department was created
from a conglomeration of twenty-two existing federal agencies in response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. It was established on November 25th, 2002,
by the Homeland Security Act and officially began operation on January 24th, 2003.
The formation of the Department of Homeland Security was the largest government
reorganization in 50 years since the establishment of the Department of Defense in
1947.
Organizing for Homeland Security
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, White House Deputy chief of Staff, Joshua Bolten,
chaired a temporary “domestic consequences” group to address problems of how to
help victims and stanch the flowing losses to the American economy stemming from
the closure of American airspace and the stock market. The very process of reviewing
these issues underscored the absence of an effective government organization
dedicated to assessing vulnerabilities and handling problems of protection and
preparedness. Though a number of agencies had some part of the task, none had
security as its primary mission. [1, p. 327]
By September 14, Vice President Cheney had decided to recommend, at least as a first
step, a new White House entity to coordinate all the relevant agencies rather than
tackle the challenge of combining them in a new department. This new White House
entity would be a homeland security adviser and Homeland Security Council—
paralleling the National Security Council system. Vice President Cheney reviewed the
proposal with President Bush and other advisers. President Bush announced the new
post and its first occupant— Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge—in his address to a
joint session of Congress on September 20. [1, p. 327]
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151
Office of Homeland Security
On October 8, 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228 establishing both an
Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council. Both would be headed by
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The mission of the Office was to
develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States
from terrorist attacks. To fulfill its mission, OHS was assigned functions necessary to
detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recovery from terrorist
attacks within the United States. [2]
Detection. The Homeland Security Advisor was to work with the National Security
Advisor in setting priorities for collection of intelligence outside the United States
regarding threats of terrorism inside the United States. Furthermore, the Homeland
Security Advisor was to facilitate collection from State and Local government of
information pertaining to terrorist threats or activities within the United States, and
ensure that such information was legally disseminated among all appropriate and
necessary law enforcement agencies. [2]
Preparedness. The Office of Homeland Security was to coordinate national efforts to
prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within the United
States. This meant updating federal emergency response plans, developing a national
exercise program, reviewing vaccination policies (for biological attack), and lending
federal assistance to State and Local governments to help them prepare for and
respond to terrorist attacks. [2]
Prevention. The Office of Homeland Security was to coordinate national efforts to
prevent terrorist attacks within the United States. To facilitate this, the Homeland
Security Advisor was to strengthen border security to prevent entry of terrorists and
terrorist materials and supplies into the United States. All suspected terrorists already
in the United States were to be removed, and monitoring and surveillance increased
along the land, air, and sea approaches. [2]
Protection. Office of Homeland Security was to coordinate efforts to protect the
United States and its critical infrastructure from terrorist attack. This included
strengthening measures for protecting high-value assets, services, and events;
developing plans for protecting critical infrastructure; and preventing unauthorized
access to, development of, and unlawful importation into the United States, of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, or other related materials that
have the potential to be used in terrorist attacks. [2]
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
On October 8, 2001,
President Bush issued
Executive Order 13228
establishing both an
Office of Homeland
Security and Homeland
Security Council.
152
Response and Recovery. The Office of Homeland Security was to coordinate efforts to
respond to and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. This included
working with Federal, State, and Local governments, and private entities as
appropriate to rapidly restore essential services following an attack. The Office was to
develop plans and programs to provide medical, financial, and other assistance to
victims and their families. The Office was also to coordinate the containment and
removal of chemical, biological, radiological, explosive, or other hazardous materials
resulting from a terrorist attack. [2]
Additionally, EO 13228 designated the Homeland Security Advisor the primary official
responsible for coordinating the federal response to domestic attack, and ensuring
continuity of the Federal government following an attack. [2]
The Office of Homeland Security was formed as a matter of expediency to assist the
President with the urgent task of securing the nation immediately following 9/11.
Congress, in the meantime, began debating the necessity of fundamentally
restructuring the Federal government to assure a more permanent solution.
Department of Homeland Security
Congress's deliberations on reorganizing the government's homeland security
functions were largely built on the recommendations of the U.S. Commission on
National Security for the 21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), which submitted its
last report to Congress in February 2001. This commission proposed creating a new
federal agency by consolidating the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS), and FEMA into a new National Homeland Security
Agency. [3]
In April 2001, Representative William (Mac) Thornberry (R-TX) introduced H.R. 1158 to
create that agency. Shortly after September 11, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)
proposed similar legislation (S. 1534) to create a National Homeland Security
Department (NHSD). Other Members, such as Representative Alcee Hastings (D-FL) and
Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), promoted the findings of the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Gilmore Commission) in H.R. 3078. The Gilmore Commission had concluded that a
White House office with detailed statutory authority, modeled after the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), would be best situated to solve the federal
government's coordination problems. [3]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The Office of Homeland
Security was formed as
a matter of expediency
to assist the President
with the urgent task of
securing the nation
immediately following
9/11. Congress, in the
meantime, began
debating the necessity
of fundamentally
restructuring the
Federal government to
assure a more
permanent solution.
153
After the introduction of H.R. 1158 and S. 1534, Representative Thornberry and
Senator Lieberman refined their proposals to gain the support of more Members of
Congress, and in May 2002 introduced the National Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism Act of 2002 (H.R. 4660). Before debate could proceed much further, on June
6, 2002, the White House issued a presidential proposal for a new cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security. [3]
In the eight months after its creation, the Office of Homeland Security was hindered by
the fragmentation of responsibilities among federal agencies, as well overlapping
authorities and insufficient resources within agencies. [3] According to the White
House, responsibilities for homeland security were dispersed among more than 100
different government organizations. No one single government agency had homeland
security as its primary mission. [4] The President’s initiative called for consolidating
most federal agencies with homeland security missions in one department to focus the
government's resources more efficiently and effectively on domestic security. The
President's plan built on the recommendations of various national commissions as well
as some of the legislative proposals placed before Congress. Creating a Department of
Homeland Security would solve such organizational problems and facilitate the OHS’
coordination role. [3]
The President's proposal combined existing federal agencies and offices with homeland
security responsibilities under one authority. For example, the proposal transferred
Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard to the DHS, removing all
direct homeland security duties from the U.S. Department of Transportation. The
proposal also folded the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the
Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) into
DHS. The functions of the offices relocated to the DHS would be distributed among
four major divisions:
1. Border and Transportation Security;
2. Emergency Preparedness and Response;
3. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures; and
4. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. [3]
Acting on the President’s proposal, on June 24, 2002, Representative Richard Armey (R
-TX) submitted House Resolution 5005 (H.R. 5005) calling for the establishment of a
Department of Homeland Security. HR 5005 incorporated most of the provisions set
forth in H.R. 4660. H.R. 5005 passed the House July 26, 2002, and was handed over to
the Senate on July 30th. [5] H.R. 5005 wasn’t without its detractors, and stalled in the
Senate.
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
On June 24, 2002,
Representative Richard
Armey (R-TX) submitted
House Resolution 5005
(H.R. 5005) calling for
the establishment of a
Department of
Homeland Security.
154
Controversy centered on whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central
Intelligence Agency should be incorporated in part or in whole (neither were included).
The bill itself was also controversial for the presence of unrelated "riders", as well as
for eliminating standard civil service and labor protections for department employees.
Without these protections, employees could be expeditiously reassigned or dismissed
on grounds of security, incompetence or insubordination. [6]
The impasse was broken when both the House and Senate agreed to a compromise
resolution, H.R. 5710 incorporating provisions by Senator Joseph Lieberman
authorizing the President to bypass traditional civil service procedures provided he first
consult with Congress and mediate with the federal employees union. [7]
On November 20, 2002, the Senate passed H.R. 5005 by a vote of 90-9 authorizing the
creation of a Department of Homeland Security consolidating twenty-two federal
agencies under a single executive department. President Bush signed the bill into law,
Public Law 107-296, the Homeland Security Act, on November 25, 2002. Tom Ridge
was made secretary of the new department.
Pulling It Together
Pursuant to section 1502 of the of the Homeland Security Act, on November 25, 2002,
the White House submitted to the House of Representatives a Reorganization Plan for
the Department of Homeland Security. The plan identified what agencies would be
transferred to the new Department, and how and when they would be transferred. [8]
According to the plan, all transfers were to be completed no later than March 1, 2003.
[9] Approximately 169,000 personnel were transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security from the organizations shown in Table 1. [10]
Organizing Concept
The organization of the Department of Homeland Security was designed to realign the
previous patchwork of government activities into a single department with the primary
mission to protect the homeland. [11, p. 1] The Department of Homeland Security
would make the country safer because the nation would have:
One department whose primary mission is to protect the American homeland;
One department to secure borders, the transportation sector, ports, and critical
infrastructure;
One department to synthesize and analyze homeland security intelligence from
multiple sources;
One department to coordinate communications with state and local governments,
private industry, and the American people about threats and preparedness;
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
On November 25, 2002,
President Bush signed
into law the Homeland
Security Act establishing
the Department of
Homeland Security.
Tom Ridge, the former
governor of
Pennsylvania, was
appointed the first
Secretary of Homeland
Security.
155
One department to coordinate efforts to protect the American people against
bioterrorism and other weapons of mass destruction;
One department to help train and equip for first responders;
One department to manage federal emergency response activities; and
More security officers in the field working to stop terrorists and fewer resources in
Washington managing duplicative and redundant activities that drain critical
homeland security resources. [11, p. 1]
DHS Organization
In the final version of H.R. 5005 signed into law as the Homeland Security Act, the
Department of Homeland Security would be comprised of five directorates:
1. Border and Transportation Security;
2. Emergency Preparedness and Response;
3. Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection;
4. Science and Technology; and
5. Management [12]
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
Table 10-1: Organizations Transferred to DHS [10]
DHS Directorate Transferred Organization Transferring Agency
1 Border & Transportation Security U.S. Customs Service Treasury
2 Immigration and Naturalization Service Justice
3 Federal Protective Service
4 Transportation Security Administration Transportation
5 Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Treasury
6 Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Agriculture
7 Office for Domestic Preparedness Justice
8 Emergency Preparedness & Response
FEMA FEMA
9 Strategic National Stockpile & National Disaster Medical System
HHS
10 Nuclear Incident Response Team Energy
11 Domestic Emergency Support Teams Justice
12 National Domestic Preparedness Office FBI
13 Science & Technology Directorate CBRN Countermeasures Programs Energy
14 Environmental Measurements Laboratory Energy
15 National BW Defense Analysis Center Defense
16 Plum Island Animal Disease Center Agriculture
17 Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection
Federal Computer Incident Response Center GSA
18 National Communications System Defense
19 National Infrastructure Protection Center FBI
20 Energy Security and Assurance Program Energy
21 U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret Service Treasury
22 U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard Transportation
156
Border and Transportation Security Directorate. BTS was designed to ensure the
security of the nation’s borders and transportation systems. Its first priority was to
prevent the entry of terrorists and the instruments of terrorism while simultaneously
ensuring the efficient flow of lawful traffic and commerce. BTS managed and
coordinated port of entry activities and led efforts to create borders that feature
greater security through better intelligence, coordinated national efforts and
international cooperation against terrorists and the instruments of terrorism and other
international threats. BTS was comprised of the Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), and the Office
of Domestic Preparedness (ODP). [8, p. 8]
U.S. Customs and Border Protection provided security at the borders and ports of entry
as well as extending the zone of security beyond physical borders so that they are the
last line of defense, not the first. CBP was also responsible for apprehending individuals
attempting to enter the United States illegally, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and
other contraband; protecting the nation’s agricultural and economic interests from
harmful pests and diseases; protecting American businesses from theft of intellectual
property; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting import duties; and
enforcing United States trade laws. [8, p. 8]
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement enforced federal immigration, customs
and air security laws. ICE’s primary mission was to detect vulnerabilities and prevent
violations that threatened national security. ICE was the largest investigative arm of
the new department. ICE deterred, interdicted and investigated threats arising from
the movement of people and goods into and out of the United States; and by policing
and securing federal government facilities across the Nation. [8, p. 8]
The Transportation Security Administration was a new government agency created in
the wake of 9/11 because airline security screeners had failed to spot weapons carried
by the hijackers. Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act in November 2001 creating the Transportation Security Administration
mandating a federalized workforce of security screeners to inspect airline passengers
and their baggage. The act gave the TSA broad authority to assess vulnerabilities in
aviation security and take steps to mitigate these risks. [8, p. 8] [13, p. iii]
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) was the Federal Government’s
leader for law enforcement training. FLETC prepared new and experienced law
enforcement professionals to fulfill their responsibilities safely and at the highest level
of proficiency. [8, p. 9]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The same day President
Bush signed the
Homeland Security Act,
he submitted a
Reorganization Plan for
the Department of
Homeland Security,
identifying what
agencies would be
transferred to the new
Department, and how
and when they would be
transferred. All transfers
were to be completed
no later than March 1,
2003.
157
Office of Domestic Preparedness ensured the United States was prepared for acts of
terrorism by providing training and funds for the purchase of equipment, support for
the planning and execution of exercises, and technical assistance and other support to
assist State and Local jurisdictions in preventing, planning for, and responding to acts
of terrorism. [8, p. 9]
Emergency Preparedness and Response. EP&R was designed to ensure that the nation
was prepared for, and able to recover from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
EP&R provided domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinated government
disaster response. The core of emergency preparedness was the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, responsible for reducing the loss of life and property and
protecting our nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive,
emergency management program of preparedness, prevention, response and
recovery. [8, p. 9]
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. IAIP was designed to identify and
assesses a broad range of intelligence information concerning threats to the homeland,
issue timely warnings and take appropriate preventive and protective action.
Information Analysis was meant to provide actionable intelligence for preventing acts
of terrorism and, with timely and thorough analysis and dissemination of information
about terrorists and their activities, improve the government’s ability to disrupt and
prevent terrorist acts and to provide useful warning to state and local government, the
private sector and citizens. Infrastructure Protection was meant to coordinate national
efforts to secure America’s critical infrastructure, including vulnerability assessments,
strategic planning efforts and exercises. Protecting America’s critical infrastructure was
the shared responsibility of federal, state and local governments, in active partnership
with the private sector, the owners and operators of the majority of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. [8, p. 8]
Science and Technology Directorate. S&T provided federal, state and local operators
with the technology and capabilities needed to protect the nation from catastrophic
terrorist attacks, including threats from weapons of mass destruction. The S&T
Directorate would develop and deploy state-of-the-art, high performance, low
operating cost systems to detect and rapidly mitigate the consequences of terrorist
attacks, including those that may use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
materials. [8, p. 9]
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
The Department of
Homeland Security was
formed from the
consolidation of twenty-
two Federal agencies
and transfer of
approximately 169,000
personnel.
158
The Management Directorate oversaw the budget; appropriations; expenditure of
funds; accounting and finance; procurement; human resources and personnel;
information technology systems; facilities, property, equipment and other material
resources; and identification and tracking of performance measures aligned with the
mission of the Department. The Chief Financial Officer, Chief Information Officer, Chief
Human Capital Officer, Chief Procurement Officer and the Chief of Administrative
Services reported to the Undersecretary for Management as allowed by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. [8, p. 9]
In addition to the five major directorates, the Department of Homeland Security was in
charge of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), United States Secret Service (USSS),
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). [8, p. 9]
The United States Coast Guard ensured maritime safety, mobility and security and
protected natural marine resources. Its mission was to protect the public, the
environment and the United States economic interests in the nation’s ports and
waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as
required to support national security. The Coast Guard also prevented maritime
terrorist attacks; halted the flow of illegal drugs and contraband; prevented individuals
from entering the United States illegally; and prevented illegal incursion into exclusive
economic zones. The Coast Guard had dual responsibility. Upon declaration of war, or
when the President so directed, the USCG would operate as an element of the
Department of Defense. [8, p. 9]
The United States Secret Service protected the President and Vice President, their
families, heads of state and other designated individuals; investigated threats against
these protectees; protected designated buildings within Washington, D.C.; and
planned and implemented security for designated National Special Security Events. The
USSS also investigated violations of laws relating to counterfeiting and financial crimes,
including computer fraud and computer-based attacks on the nation’s financial,
banking, and telecommunications infrastructure. [8, p. 9]
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services directed the nation’s immigration system
and promoted citizenship values by providing immigration services such as immigrant
and nonimmigrant sponsorship; adjustment of status; work authorization and other
permits; naturalization of qualified applicants for United States citizenship; and asylum
or refugee processing. USCIS made certain that America continues to welcome visitors
and those who seek opportunity while excluding terrorists and their supporters. [8, p.
9]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The establishment of the
Department of
Homeland Security was
the largest
reorganization of
Federal government
since the 1947 National
Security Act created the
National Security
Council, Department of
Defense, and Central
Intelligence Agency.
159
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
Figure 10-1: DHS Organization [8, p. 10]
Where is the Department of Homeland Security Located?
DHS personnel are currently located in 50 different offices across the Washington DC metropolitan area.
Headquarters is located at 3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW, Washington, DC. The Nebraska Avenue Complex (NAC)
is a 37-acre site with 30 buildings and 653,400 square feet of office space. The campus is a secure facility with an
established security perimeter and on-site generators. Unfortunately, the NAC only accommodates about 2,390
of the 28,000 employees in the DC region. [7, p. i] It also wastes millions of dollars in leased office space and
transportation costs. According to former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, the attendant logistical difficulties of a
dispersed workforce slowed the government response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and a terrorist plot to blow
up transatlantic airliners with liquid explosives in 2006. Chertoff recalled “People were shuttling back and forth
in those critical days after the plot was exposed, and that just made it much more difficult and time-consuming,”
he said. Calling it urgent, Chertoff released a plan in 2006 to begin construction of a new centralized
headquarters to be completed by 2015. The new headquarters would cost about $3 billion and accommodate
14,000 DHS employees. With the exception of the new Coast Guard building, little progress has been made,
while cost estimates have risen to $4.5 billion and completion pushed out to 2026. One of the main reasons for
the cost overruns and schedule delays is that the chosen site for DHS headquarters is the former St. Elizabeth's
Hospital, a national historic landmark. Built in 1852 on a 176-acre hilltop site east of the Anacostia River, St.
Elizabeth's was the first federal psychiatric institution. Its grounds were once home to patients like Ezra Pound,
the poet, and John Hinckley Jr., the attempted assassin of President Reagan. St. Elizabeth's was among 14
possibilities because it was the only location that met size and security requirements. More than 50 historic
buildings would need to be renovated and new ones erected for DHS’ new home. Even before costs began to
soar, planners were aware they would face millions of dollars in outlays for historic preservation and
rehabilitation of antiquated utilities and infrastructure. A decade after work began, St. Elizabeth's venture – the
capital region’s largest planned construction project since the Pentagon – has become a monumental example of
Washington inefficiency and drift. [8]
160
Conclusion
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, on October 8, 2001, President Bush issued E.O.
13228 establishing an Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council
under the direction of a new Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Former
Pennsylvania Governor, Tom Ridge, was appointed the first Homeland Security
Advisor. OHS was responsible for developing and coordinating the implementation of
a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist attacks.
HSC was responsible for advising and assisting the President with respect to all aspects
of homeland security. In his June 2002 proposal for a Department of Homeland
Security, President Bush appeared to anticipate the continued operation of both OHS
and HSC. When the Homeland Security Act was signed into law November 25, 2002, it
created the Department of Homeland Security and rechartered the HSC as an agency
within the Executive Office of the President [14, pp. CRS-1] Tom Ridge was appointed
the new Secretary of Homeland Security. Many of the functions of the Office of
Homeland Security transferred to the new Department together with the new
Secretary. [15, p. 9] OHS was closed and the remnants transferred to HSC. [14, pp. CRS-
3] The Department of Homeland Security was formed by realigning the previous
patchwork of twenty-two government activities into a single department with the
primary mission to protect the homeland. President Bush signed Executive Order
13284 activating the Department of Homeland Security effective January 23rd, 2003.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
161
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What findings from the Hart-Rudman Commission report prompted a bill to be submitted before Congress in April
2001 to form a National Homeland Security Department?
2. List and describe the two organizations created immediately after 9/11 to assist the President with developing and
managing homeland security policy.
3. Why did the White House feel the need to propose an executive department for homeland security?
4. List and describe two arguments for, and two arguments against creating a Department of Homeland Security.
5. What was the primary mission proposed by the White House for the Department of Homeland Security?
6. How was the new Department of Homeland Security going to improve domestic security?
7. Do you think it would’ve been a good idea to integrate either or both the CIA and FBI within DHS? Explain.
8. What do you notice when you compare DHS’ original organization to the Critical Mission Areas listed in the 2002
National Strategy for Homeland Security (written before DHS was formed)?
9. Which DHS directorate do you think had the most important mission? Explain your answer.
10. Where did FEMA fit into the new Department of Homeland Security?
162
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163
DHS Evolution
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain how and why the DHS mission and organization were oriented when it was created in 2003.
Explain how and why the DHS mission and organization significantly changed after Hurricane Katrina.
Describe both internal and external initiatives that re-oriented DHS’ mission between 2005 and 2007.
Evaluate the evolution of the DHS cybersecurity mission between 2003 and 2010.
Debate the merits of merging homeland security strategy and national security strategy.
Discuss the purpose and value of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review.
Chapter 11
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
164
“The most serious mistakes are not being made as a result of wrong answers. The true
dangerous thing is asking the wrong question.”
- Peter F. Drucker
Introduction
Peter Drucker is hailed as “the man who invented management”. His writings are
highly regarded for predicting major business trends and influencing successful
corporations through much of the 20th century. [1] Among his key insights was the
need to continually reassess core assumptions and ensure that an organization’s
missions are properly aligned with their objectives. Accordingly, the Department of
Homeland Security’s mission and organization have evolved since it first became
operational, January 23, 2003. This chapter examines the evolution of DHS’ mission
and organization, and the factors that influenced that change.
2002 Homeland Security Strategy
On October 8, 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13228 establishing the
Office of Homeland Security within the Executive Office of the President. The mission
of the office was to develop and implement a comprehensive national strategy to
secure the United States from terrorist attacks. [2]
In July 2002, the Office of Homeland Security released the first National Strategy for
Homeland Security. The 2002 Strategy set the stage by defining homeland security,
and explaining its terms:
“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security [3, p. 2]
The 2002 Strategy explained that a “concerted national effort” meant that homeland
security was not just the job of the anticipated new Department of Homeland Security,
but the shared responsibility of all branches at all levels of government, and the private
sector. The fact that DHS could not accomplish the mission alone would lead to the
concept of a “homeland security enterprise” presented later in this book. The 2002
Strategy explained that “prevention” is the first priority, obviously to avoid the
consequences of a domestic catastrophic attack. It noted that “detection” is an
essential precondition for “prevention”, suggesting the need for intelligence
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The 2002 National
Strategy for Homeland
Security defined
homeland security as “a
concerted national
effort to prevent
terrorist attacks within
the United States,
reduce America’s
vulnerability to
terrorism, and minimize
the damage and recover
from attacks that do
occur.”
165
surveillance both at home and abroad. In explaining the definition of homeland
security, the 2002 Strategy made it clear that the central risk was “mass casualties,
massive property loss, and immense social disruption.” It further identified the
potential means for inflicting domestic catastrophic destruction in the form of
“weapons of mass destruction, strategic information warfare, attacks on critical
infrastructure, and attacks on the highest leadership of government.” These are the
types of attacks homeland security seeks to prevent by terrorists. Additionally, the
2002 Strategy defined “terrorist attacks” as “any premeditated, unlawful act
dangerous to human life or public welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce
civilian populations or governments.” According to the 2002 Strategy, this definition
covered kidnappings; hijackings; shootings; conventional bombings; attacks involving
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons; cyber attacks; and any number
of other forms of malicious violence. The 2002 Strategy also noted that terrorists could
be U.S. citizens or foreigners, acting in concert with others, on their own, or on behalf
of a hostile state. Detection was again singled out as a method of reducing the nation’s
vulnerability to terrorist attack. But the 2002 Strategy also noted the specific
vulnerability of critical infrastructure, as exposed by 9/11, and prescribed the need for
the government to work with the private sector to identify and protect it. The difficulty
of reducing vulnerabilities, as noted in the 2002 Strategy, is that it requires an
imprecise and constant adjusting of the balance between safety and security, and cost
and liberty. The 2002 Strategy was also insightful, noting that as defenses are shored
up in one area, terrorists might exploit vulnerabilities in others. By this observation
the 2002 Strategy tacitly acknowledged the impossibility of preventing all terrorist
attacks. Thus, the definition also addressed minimizing damages and quickly
recovering from attacks that do occur. To minimize damages, the 2002 Strategy
proposed improving coordination and helping prepare First Responders for
catastrophic incidents. Similarly, rapid recovery was deemed necessary to restoring
economic growth and public confidence. [3, pp. 2-3]
The 2002 Strategy further explained that homeland security is an exceedingly complex
mission. It involves efforts both at home and abroad, and demands a range of
government and private sector capabilities. It also calls for coordinated and focused
effort from many agencies who are not otherwise required to work together and for
whom security is not always a primary mission. In order to provide clear direction
amidst this confusion, the 2002 Strategy recast the definition of homeland security into
a set of three objectives to help prioritize actions:
1. Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States;
2. Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and
3. Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. [3, p. 3]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
The corresponding
objectives from the 2002
National Strategy for
Homeland Security
were:
1. Prevent terrorist
attacks within the
U.S.;
2. Reduce America’s
Vulnerability to
terrorism; and
3. Minimize the
damage and
recovery from
attacks that do
occur.
166
From the preceding definition of homeland security, the 2002 Strategy also derived six
critical mission areas for aligning and focusing homeland security functions: this is
what the new Department was expected to do:
1. Intelligence & Warning
2. Border & Transportation Security
3. Domestic Counterterrorism
4. Protecting Critical Infrastructure
5. Defending Against Catastrophic Terrorism
6. Emergency Preparedness and Response [3, p. viii]
The first three mission areas focus primarily on preventing terrorist attacks (objective
#1); the next two on reducing the nation’s vulnerabilities (objective #2); and the final
one on minimizing the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur (objective
#3).
Intelligence & Warning. The essential function of I&W is to detect terrorist activity
before it manifests itself into an attack so that proper preemptive, preventative, and
protective action can be taken. The 2002 Strategy identified five major initiatives in
this area:
1. Enhance the analytic capabilities of the FBI for domestic intelligence;
2. Conduct vulnerability assessments and risk analysis of critical infrastructure;
3. Implement a Homeland Security Advisory System;
4. Cross reference and correlate terrorist activity with “dual-use” items;
5. Employ “red team” techniques. [3, p. viii]
Border & Transportation Security. The essential function of BTS is to promote the
efficient and reliable flow of people, goods, and services across borders while keeping
out terrorists and terrorist weapons. The 2002 Strategy identified six major initiatives
in this area:
1. Ensure accountability in border and transportation security;
2. Create “smart borders” through better intelligence and coordination;
3. Increase security of international shipping containers;
4. Implement the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001;
5. Recapitalize the U.S. Coast Guard; and
6. Reform immigration services. . [3, p. viii]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
From the 2002 definition
and objectives for
homeland security were
derived six critical
mission areas:
1. Intelligence &
Warning
2. Border &
Transportation
Security
3. Domestic
Counterterrorism
4. Protecting Critical
Infrastructure
5. Defending Against
Catastrophic
Terrorism
6. Emergency
Preparedness &
Response
167
Domestic Counterterrorism. While law enforcement agencies will continue to
investigate and prosecute criminal activity, they should now assign priority to
preventing and interdicting terrorist activity within the United States. All legal means—
both traditional and nontraditional—will be used to identify, halt, and, prosecute
terrorists in the United States. The 2002 Strategy identified six major initiatives under
this area:
1. Improve intergovernmental law enforcement coordination;
2. Facilitate apprehension of potential terrorists;
3. Continue ongoing investigations and prosecutions;
4. Complete FBI restructuring to emphasize prevention of terrorist attacks;
5. Target and attack terrorist financing; and
6. Track foreign terrorists and bring them to justice. [3, p. ix]
Protecting Critical Infrastructure. This function seeks to improve protection of the
individual pieces and interconnecting systems that make up our critical infrastructure.
The 2002 Strategy identified eight major initiatives under this area:
1. Unify America’s infrastructure protection effort in the Department of Homeland
Security;
2. Build and maintain a complete and accurate assessment of America’s critical
infrastructure and key assets;
3. Enable effective partnership with state and local governments and the private
sector;
4. Develop a national infrastructure protection plan;
5. Secure cyberspace;
6. Harness the best analytic and modeling tools to develop effective protective
solutions;
7. Guard America’s critical infrastructure and key assets against “inside” threats; and
8. Partner with the international community to protect our transnational
infrastructure. [3, p. ix]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
168
Defending Against Catastrophic Threats. This function seeks a unified approach to
preventing, preparing, responding, and recovering from the deployment of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons in the United States. The 2002 Strategy
identified six major initiatives in this area:
1. Prevent terrorist use of nuclear weapons through better sensors and procedures;
2. Detect chemical and biological materials and attacks;
3. Improve chemical sensors and decontamination techniques;
4. Develop broad spectrum vaccines, antimicrobials, and antidotes;
5. Harness the scientific knowledge and tools to counter terrorism; and
6. Maintain the Select Agent Program regulating the shipment of hazardous biological
organisms and toxins. [3, p. ix]
Emergency Preparedness and Response. The EP&R function seeks to build a
comprehensive national system to bring together and coordinate all necessary
response assets quickly and effectively. This function also includes planning,
equipping, training, and exercising First Responders to mobilize without warning for
any emergency. The 2002 Strategy identified twelve major initiatives in this area:
1. Integrate separate federal response plans into a single all-discipline incident
management plan;
2. Create a national incident management system;
3. Improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities;
4. Enable seamless communication among all responders;
5. Prepare health care providers for catastrophic terrorism;
6. Augment America’s pharmaceutical and vaccine stockpiles;
7. Prepare for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination;
8. Plan for military support to civil authorities;
9. Build the Citizen Corps;
10. Implement the First Responder Initiative of the Fiscal Year 2003 Budget;
11. Build a national training and evaluation system; and
12. Enhance the victim support system.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
169
DHS Formation
The Department of Homeland Security was established by the Homeland Security Act,
signed by President Bush November 25, 2002. Former Pennsylvania Governor Tom
Ridge relinquished his position as Homeland Security Advisor to become the first
Secretary of Homeland Security. Between November 2002 and January 2003,
Secretary Ridge consolidated 180,000 personnel from twenty-two federal agencies to
form the new Department of Homeland Security. On January 23, 2003, President Bush
issued Executive Order 13284 activating the new Department. [4, p. 7]
When it began operations, DHS was largely organized like a hand — the palm being the
office of the Secretary/Deputy Secretary with the thumb and fingers being individual
directorates for (1) Management, (2) Science and technology, (3) information Analysis
and Infrastructure protection, (4) Border and Transportation Security, and (5)
Emergency preparedness and response. In addition, however, approximately two
dozen other units within the department, but not located within one of the
directorates, reported directly to the Secretary. These included program entities, such
as the United States Coast Guard and United States Secret Service, and units within the
office of the Secretary, such as the Office of International Affairs and Office of State
and Local Government Coordination, as well as some Assistant Secretaries. At the time
of its creation, only 18,000 DHS employees worked in the Washington, DC, area,
indicating that the new department had a considerable field organization. [5, pp. CRS-
2]
As the former director of the Office of Homeland Security responsible for developing
the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security, Secretary Ridge strove to
implement the critical mission initiatives within the new Department. But the 2002
Strategy was based on the President’s proposed organization for DHS, and the actual
organization as stipulated in the 2002 Homeland Security Act was slightly different as
shown in Table 1.
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Table 11-1: DHS Initial Operating Organization
President’s Proposal, June 24, 2002 [6, p. 2] Homeland Security Act, November 25, 2002
1. Border & Transportation Security Border & Transportation Security
2. Emergency Preparedness & Response Emergency Preparedness & Response
3. CBRN Countermeasures Science & Technology
4. Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection
5. U.S. Coast Guard U.S. Coast Guard
6. U.S. Secret Service U.S. Secret Service
7. Office of State & Local Coordination Office of State & Local Coordination
8. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services
On January 23, 2003,
President Bush issued
Executive Order 13284
activating the new
Department.
170
The most significant difference between the President’s proposed structure for DHS
and the organization resulting from the Homeland Security Act was replacement of the
CBRN Countermeasures Directorate with the Science and Technology Directorate. The
President’s proposed CBRN Countermeasures Directorate would have led the federal
government’s efforts in preparing for and responding to the full range of threats
involving weapons of mass destruction. According to the President’s proposal, this
would have required setting national policy and establishing guidelines for State and
Local governments. It would direct exercises and drills for Federal, State, and Local
CBRN response teams and plans. [6, p. 2] The Homeland Security Act conceived a
greater role for the Science & Technology Directorate. In addition to formulating
national policy and plans to prepare and respond to WMD, S&T would also develop
countermeasures for CBRN agents. Moreover, it would support basic and applied
research to develop, demonstrate, test, and evaluate activities relevant to any or all
elements of the Department. [4]
The Department of Homeland Security, as initially established, was designed to have a
clear and efficient relationship between its organization and function. [6, p. 2]
2003 Reorganization Plan
Although Section 442 of the Homeland Security Act established a Bureau of Border
Security within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, it did not fully
delineate its responsibilities. On January 30, 2003, President Bush submitted a
modification to the November 2002 reorganization plan that established and described
new organizational units in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate. [9, p.
12]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 11-2: Mapping DHS Organization & Critical Mission Areas
DHS Agency Assigned Critical Mission Areas
1. Border & Transportation Security Border & Transportation Security
2. Emergency Preparedness & Response Emergency Preparedness & Response
3. Science & Technology Defending Against Catastrophic Threats
4. Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection Intelligence & Warning Domestic Counterterrorism Protecting Critical Infrastructure
5. U.S. Coast Guard Border & Transportation Security Protecting Critical Infrastructure
6. U.S. Secret Service Domestic Counterterrorism Protecting Critical Infrastructure
7. Office of State & Local Coordination Domestic Counterterrorism Emergency Preparedness & Response
8. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services Border & Transportation Security
The most significant
difference between the
President’s proposed
structure for DHS and
the organization
resulting from the
Homeland Security Act
was replacement of the
CBRN Countermeasures
Directorate with the
Science and Technology
Directorate.
171
The January 2003 Plan renamed the Bureau of Border Security as the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, incorporating parts of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Customs Service, and the Federal Protective Service
(FPS) and outlined its functions: to enforce immigration and customs laws within the
interior of the United States and to protect specified federal buildings. [9, p. 12]
The January 2003 plan also renamed the U.S. Customs Service as the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (now known as U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or
CBP). The new Bureau incorporated the border and ports of entry functions of the
Customs Service, inspection responsibilities and the Border Patrol from INS, and
agricultural inspection functions from the Department of Agriculture. [9, p. 12]
These changes were made after the Department became operational, but before
marking its official inception date of March 1, 2003. On that date, the majority of the
previously existing agencies, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the
Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the
United States Secret Service transferred to the new Department. [9, p. 12]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Table 11-2: Mapping DHS Organization & Critical Mission Areas
DHS Agency Assigned Critical Mission Areas
1. Border & Transportation Security Border & Transportation Security
2. Emergency Preparedness & Response Emergency Preparedness & Response
3. Science & Technology Defending Against Catastrophic Threats
4. Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection Intelligence & Warning Domestic Counterterrorism Protecting Critical Infrastructure
5. U.S. Coast Guard Border & Transportation Security Protecting Critical Infrastructure
6. U.S. Secret Service Domestic Counterterrorism Protecting Critical Infrastructure
7. Office of State & Local Coordination Domestic Counterterrorism Emergency Preparedness & Response
8. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services Border & Transportation Security
Figure 11-1: 2003 DHS Organization [4, p. 10]
The Department of
Homeland Security, as
initially established,
maintained clear
alignment between its
missions and
organization.
172
2004 Adjustments
In 2004, Secretary Ridge exercised his authority under Section 872 of the 2002
Homeland Security Act to adjust the Department’s organization [10], adding two new
reports to the Secretary: The Headquarters Operational Integration Staff (I-Staff) and
the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (SGLCP). [9,
p. 14]
On March 26, 2004, the Department consolidated the Office for Domestic
Preparedness and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination to form the
Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, reporting
directly to the Secretary. [9, p. 14]
On January 15, 2004, the I-Staff was formed to assist DHS leadership with coordinating
and Department missions and operational activities, including threat response and
preparedness, within DHS Headquarters. I-Staff also took the lead on drafting the
National Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) and
implementing coordination between Headquarters and field offices as part of the
Regions plan. I-Staff activities were discontinued with the implementation of the
Second Stage Review (2SR) reorganization in October 2005. [9, p. 14]
2005 Second Stage Review
Tom Ridge was Secretary of Homeland Security for two years before resigning on
November 30, 2004. [11] In January 2005, President Bush nominated Michael Chertoff
to replace Tom Ridge as Secretary of Homeland Security. Michael Chertoff was a
distinguished attorney who was serving as a Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals when
Secretary Ridge resigned. [12] Secretary Chertoff took office on February 15, 2005, and
launched the Second Stage Review, or 2SR, a systematic evaluation of the
department’s operations, policies, and structures. [9, p. 16]
More than 250 members of the department, formed into 18 action teams,
participated. The teams also consulted with public and private partners at the federal,
state, local, tribal, and international levels. Based on the findings, on July 13, 2005,
Secretary Chertoff proposed to Congress the following six point agenda: [9, p. 16]
1. Increase preparedness, with particular focus on catastrophic events.
2. Strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration
processes.
3. Harden transportation security without sacrificing mobility.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Within provisions
authorized in the 2002
Homeland Security Act,
Secretary Ridge
continued until the end
of his term to make
minor adjustments to
the Department’s
organization.
173
4. Enhance information sharing with our partners, particularly with state, local and
tribal governments and the private sector.
5. Improve DHS stewardship, particularly with stronger financial, human resource,
procurement and information technology management.
6. Re-align the DHS organization to maximize mission performance. [5, pp. CRS-3]
Spurred in part by the flawed response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress formally
approved the 2SR recommendations October 18, 2005. [13, p. 259] The subsequent
reorganization abolished the Directorates for Border and Transportation Security,
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, and Emergency Response and
Preparedness. With the abolition of these Directorates, the Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection, the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration,
Director of Operations Coordination, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis
and the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement now reported
directly to the Secretary. [9, p. 16]
The reorganization created two new directorates. The Policy Directorate took on most
of the policy responsibilities from the former Assistant Secretary for Policy and
Planning in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate, as well as newly
created Assistant Secretaries for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Strategic
Plans, the Private Sector, and International Affairs. The Preparedness Directorate
consisted of preparedness functions transferred from FEMA and also included the U.S.
Fire Administration, the Office of National Capitol Region, the Office of Infrastructure
Preparedness, functions of the Office of State and Local Government Coordination, and
the new offices of the Assistant Secretary for Grants and Training and the Chief
Medical Officer. [9, p. 16]
The reorganization also created four new offices. The Office of Policy was created to
serve as the primary Department-wide coordinator for policies, regulations, and other
initiatives. These functions were previously performed under the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis was created
to gather, analyze, and report information from relevant field operations and
information from other parts of the intelligence community. These functions were
previously performed, in part, under the Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. The Office of Operations Coordination was established to
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Shortly after assuming
office in February 2005,
Secretary Chertoff
announced his intention
to reorganize DHS
according to a plan he
called the Second Stage
Review (2SR).
174
conduct joint operations across the Department, coordinate incident management and
the management of the Homeland Security Operations Center. The Office of Legislative
and Intergovernmental Affairs was created to merge similar functions previously
provided by the Office of Legislative Affairs and the Office of State and Local
Government Coordination. [13, p. 259]
2006 Post-Katrina Reform Act
Hurricane Katrina struck Florida and the Gulf Coast states in the last days of August
2005, followed within weeks by Hurricanes Rita and Wilma. These disasters will long be
remembered for disrupting families, changing and ending lives, and forcing Americans
to rethink vulnerability and risk assumptions. In addition to these impacts, the
hurricanes served as catalysts for significant changes in federal policy and the
organization of responsible federal entities, notably within the Department of
Homeland Security. [14, p. 1]
Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal offices
of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others,
concluded that the losses caused by Hurricane Katrina were due, in part, to
deficiencies such as questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational
failures, overwhelmed preparation and communication systems, and inadequate
statutory authorities. As a result, the 109th Congress revised federal emergency
management policies vested in the President; reorganized the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; and enhanced and clarified the mission, functions, and
authorities of the agency, as well as those of its parent, the Department of Homeland
Security. [14, p. i]
After FEMA was established in 1979, it was charged with carrying out activities to
enable Federal, State, and Local governments to address a broad spectrum of
emergency management functions. In carrying out its mission, FEMA 1) funded and
coordinated emergency preparedness activities, 2) provided and coordinated
immediate federal response to save lives and property, 3) funded the reconstruction of
damaged homes and infrastructure to help stricken families and communities recover,
and 4) supported hazard mitigation activities to ensure that future disasters do not
recur, or are less destructive in the future. These four elements of preparedness,
response, recovery, and hazard mitigation constitute what has been generally referred
to as the Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) system. [14, p. 3]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
As a result of the flawed
response to Hurricane
Katrina, Congress
approved the 2SR
reorganization and
added its own
adjustments with the
2006 Post-Katrina
Emergency Reform Act.
175
When the Homeland Security Act transferred FEMA to DHS in 2003, some CEM
responsibilities were transferred to the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate. As part of the Second Stage Review, CEM functions were further divided
between FEMA and the new Preparedness Directorate. As part of its investigation into
Hurricane Katrina, Congress concluded that these mission and organizational shifts
deteriorated FEMA’s capabilities as functions, resources, and responsibilities moved to
other DHS units. Others argued that an emphasis on terrorist-caused incidents within
DHS dominated planning and allocation decisions and contributed to FEMA’s
diminished capabilities for all hazards. These findings led to congressional enactment
of significant revisions to FEMA’s structure and mission in the Post-Katrina Act. [14, pp.
3-4]
On October 4, 2006, as part of the Homeland Security FY2007 Appropriations Bill
(Public Law 109-295), the President signed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency
Reform Act. The Act established new leadership positions within the Department,
brought additional functions into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
and created and reallocated functions within the Department. [9, p. 25]
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 established new
leadership positions and position requirements within the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, brought new missions into FEMA and restored some that had
previously been removed, and enhanced the agency’s authority by directing the FEMA
Administrator to undertake a broad range of activities before and after disasters occur.
The Post-Katrina Act contained provisions that set out new law, amended the
Homeland Security Act, and modified the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act). [14, p. 1]
Specifically, the Act renamed the Under Secretary for Federal Emergency Management
as the Administrator of FEMA and elevated the position to the deputy secretary level.
The Administrator was designated the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland
Security Council, and the Secretary for all matters relating to emergency management
and can be designated by the President to serve as a member of the Cabinet in the
event of disasters. FEMA was legislatively protected as a distinct entity in the
Department and is subject to reorganization only by statute. [9, p. 25]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
One of the most
significant changes
brought about by the
Post-Katrina Reform Act
was that it expanded
and elevated FEMA as a
distinct entity within the
Department of
Homeland Security.
176
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act transferred to FEMA all
functions of the Preparedness Directorate, including the Office of Grants and Training,
the United States Fire Administration (USFA), and the Office of National Capital Region
Coordination. The Office of Infrastructure Protection, the National Communications
System, the National Cybersecurity Division, and the Office of the Chief Medical Officer
remained in the Preparedness Directorate. [9, p. 25]
The Post-Katrina Act reorganized DHS with a reconfigured FEMA with consolidated
emergency management functions, elevated status within the department, and
enhanced organizational autonomy. Effective March 31, 2007, the Post-Katrina Act
restored to FEMA the responsibility to lead and support efforts to reduce the loss of
life and property and protect the nation from all hazards through a risk-based system
that focuses on expanded CEM components. The statute also added a fifth
component—protection—to the four CEM components, but did not define the term.
[14, pp. 5-6]
2006 SAFE Port Act
On October 13, 2006, Congress passed the Security Accountability for Every Port Act,
or SAFE Port Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-347). The act authorized the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and completed the reorganization of FEMA,
transferring the Radiological Preparedness Program and the Chemical Stockpile
Emergency Preparedness Program to FEMA. [9, p. 25]
To implement and complement the changes in FEMA mandated by the Post-Katrina
Management Reform Act of 2006 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006, the Department
reorganized FEMA and made other organizational changes. [9, p. 25]
After the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act transferred many functions to FEMA, the
Preparedness Directorate was renamed the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) and retained some Preparedness elements not transferred to
FEMA, including the Office of Infrastructure Protection; the Office of Cyber Security
and Telecommunications combined with National Communications System and new
Office of Emergency Communications and renamed the Office of Cyber Security and
Communications; and the Office for State and Local Government Coordination,
renamed the Office of Intergovernmental Programs. Additionally the new Directorate
contained US-VISIT and the Office of Risk Management and Analysis, formerly a part of
the Office of Infrastructure Protection. An Office of Health Affairs was also established
within NPPD, led by an Assistant Secretary/Chief Medical Officer. These changes
became effective March 21, 2007. [9, pp. 25-26]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The 2006 SAFE Port Act
completed the
reorganization of FEMA,
and authorized the
creation of a Domestic
Nuclear Detection
Office. After the Post-
Katrina Emergency
Reform Act transferred
many functions to
FEMA, the Preparedness
Directorate was
renamed the National
Protection and
Programs Directorate
(NPPD).
177
2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Hurricane Katrina resulted in a fundamental change to homeland security strategy,
adding natural disasters to the list of domestic catastrophic threats together with
manmade disasters. This change was reflected in the 2007 National Strategy for
Homeland Security. In addition to hurricanes, the 2007 Strategy identified
earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, wildfires, and infectious disease as significant hazards.
[15, p. 10] While this recognition did not change the definition of homeland security
according to the 2007 Strategy, [15, p. 3] it did lead to the introduction of a new term,
that of “all-hazards”. [15, p. 32] FEMA defines “all-hazards” as: “Any incident or event,
natural or human caused, that requires an organized response… in order to protect
life, public health, and safety… and to minimize any disruption to governmental, social,
and economic services.” [16] Accordingly, to accommodate this expanded mission set,
the 2007 Strategy identifies four primary goals of homeland security:
1. Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks;
2. Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources;
3. Respond and recover from incidents that do occur;
4. Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success. [15, p. 1]
As shown in Table 3, the 2007 Strategy Objectives compare very similar to the 2002
Strategy Objectives. The primary difference is subtle word changes that shift the focus
away from the exclusive concern over terrorism. Objective #2 in the 2007 Strategy is
still concerned with reducing vulnerability, but it replaces the threat to vulnerability
with the targets of vulnerability, allowing broader interpretation beyond just terrorism.
Objective #3 replaces “attacks” with “incidents” so it too can encompass a broader
range of threats and hazards besides terrorism.
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Table 11-3: Comparison of Strategy Objectives
2007 Strategy 2002 Strategy
1. Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks Prevent terrorist attacks within the U.S.
2. Protect the American people, & CI/KR Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism
3. Respond and recover from incidents that do occur Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur
4. Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long- term success
The second National
Strategy for Homeland
Security released in
2007 adjusted its
homeland security
objectives, now called
“goals”, to
accommodate lessons
learned from Hurricane
Katrina and encompass
“all hazards”, not just
terrorist threats.
178
Similar to the 2002 Strategy Objectives, the first three objectives of the 2007 Strategy
were designed to organize and prioritize national efforts. Objective #4 of the 2007
Strategy was different in that it was aimed at creating and transforming homeland
security principles, systems, structures, and institutions. This included applying a
comprehensive approach to risk management, building a culture of preparedness,
improving incident management, better utilizing science and technology, and
leveraging all instruments of national power and influence. [15, p. 1] In short, Objective
#4 was meant to put the Department on a path of continuous and systematic
improvement. That objective was met when Congress passed and the President signed
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
Months after the 9/11 Commission had officially issued its seminal report and ceased
its functions, Chairman Kean and other commissioners toured the country to draw
attention to the recommendations of the commission for reducing the terror risk,
claiming that some of their recommendations were being ignored. Co-chairs Kean and
Hamilton wrote a book about the constraints they faced as commissioners titled
Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission. The book was released
August 15, 2006 and chronicled the work of Kean (Commission Chairman) and
Hamilton (Commission Vice-Chairman) of the 9/11 Commission. [17] Congress
responded in January 2007 by introducing a bill titled “Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act”. The bill was finally approved and
signed into law (PL 110-53) on August 3, 2007. [18] The Act built on the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, focusing on the reorganization of the
grant process as administered by FEMA. The Act also reorganized intelligence
operations at the Department, elevating the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis to the Under Secretary level, requiring Senate confirmation. [9, p. 30] Among
the many provisions impacting DHS programs and organization, Section 707 required
the Department to conduct a comprehensive examination of its mission and
organization every four years starting in 2009. These periodic introspectives were
designated the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). [19]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
The Implementing
Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 further
empowered FEMA,
elevated Intelligence
and Analysis within the
Department, and
directed the Secretary
to systematically
examine its mission and
organization in a
Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review (QHSR).
179
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
In 2009, DHS conducted its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review under the
auspices of its new Secretary, Janet Napolitano. Former Governor of Arizona, Janet
Napolitano was appointed by the incoming Obama Administration and later confirmed
by Congress as Secretary of Homeland Security on January 20, 2009. [21] The first
QHSR was released in February 2010. The QHSR was a comprehensive examination of
the homeland security strategy of the nation and included recommendations regarding
the long-term strategy and priorities of the nation for homeland security. The QHSR
Report included the results of the QHSR, a national homeland security strategy, a
description of the critical homeland security missions of the nation, and an explanation
of the underlying assumptions used in conducting the review. [22, p. v]
The 2010 QHSR revised the definition of homeland security first established in the
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security. The new definition of homeland
security according to the 2010 QHSR:
“Homeland security is a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that is
safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American
interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive.”
- 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review [23, p. 13]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Figure 11-2: 2008 DHS Organization [20]
180
From this new definition, the 2010 QHSR derived five homeland security missions and
associated goals listed in Table 4.
The most notable difference between the QHSR and 2002 and 2007 homeland security
strategy mission sets was the elevation of Cybersecurity. Cybersecurity is defined as
“The activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and
communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from
and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or
exploitation.” [24] The potential for using the Internet as an avenue for attacking the
nation’s critical infrastructure was first raised by the President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection in October 1997. [25] This concern was not forgotten even
though the 9/11 attacks were precipitated through physical subversion of the nation’s
critical infrastructure. Even so, cybersecurity was subordinated as a function of critical
infrastructure protection in both the 2002 and 2007 Strategies, [3, p. ix] [15, p. 27]
although a separate National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was issued in February
2003. [26] By the time the QHSR was conducted in 2009, the U.S. had been subject to
cyber attacks of increasing frequency and severity [27]. Because much of the nation’s
critical infrastructure was interconnected through the Internet, safeguarding and
securing it became one of homeland security’s most important missions. [23, p. 29]
The elevation of the cybersecurity mission in the 2010 QHSR was preceded by the
establishment of the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) in DHS. On January 8,
2008, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (HSPD-23),
creating NCSC, making it responsible for coordinating cybersecurity efforts and
improving situational awareness and information sharing across the Federal
government. [9, p. 32]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 11-4: QHSR Missions & Goals [23, p. x]
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
Goal 1.1: Prevent Terrorist Attacks
Goal 1.2: Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of CBRN Materials and Capabilities
Goal 1.3: Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key Leadership, and Events
Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders
Goal 2.1: Effectively Control U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders
Goal 2.2: Safeguard Lawful Trade and Travel
Goal 2.3: Disrupt and Dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws
Goal 3.1: Strengthen and Effectively Administer the Immigration System
Goal 3.2: Prevent Unlawful Immigration
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace
Goal 4.1: Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment
Goal 4.2: Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters
Goal 5.1: Mitigate Hazards
Goal 5.2: Enhance Preparedness
Goal 5.3: Ensure Effective Emergency Response
Goal 5.4: Rapidly Recover
The first QHSR
conducted in 2010 under
Secretary Napolitano
provided a new
definition of homeland
security and
reformulation of
missions. The most
notable difference
between the QHSR and
2002 and 2007
homeland security
strategy mission sets
was the elevation of
Cybersecurity.
181
As a result of the findings from the QHSR, DHS initiated a bottom-up review (BUR) in
November 2009. The BUR included an assessment of the organizational alignment of
the Department with the homeland security missions set forth in the QHSR, including
the Department’s organizational structure, management systems, procurement
systems, and physical and technical infrastructure. The BUR also included a review and
assessment of the effectiveness of the mechanisms of the Department for turning the
requirements developed in the QHSR into an acquisition strategy and expenditure plan
within the Department. [22, p. v]
The BUR resulted in a comprehensive catalogue of DHS activities across the homeland
security missions, as well as a list of over 300 potential initiatives and enhancements.
The resulting report detailed the results of the analysis, describing the alignment of the
Department with the homeland security missions, and setting forth the Department’s
priority initiatives and enhancements to increase mission performance, improve
Departmental management, and increase accountability over the next four years. The
BUR Report also included recommendations for improving the organizational
alignment of the Department and enhancing its business processes. DHS subsequently
included these recommended changes in its FY 2012 budget request to Congress. [22,
p. v]
In 2014, DHS conducted its second QHSR under the auspices of its fourth Secretary Jeh
Charles Johnson. Jeh Johnson was serving as General Counsel for the Department of
Defense when he was nominated by President Obama to replace Secretary Napolitano
after she resigned in August 2013. Secretary Johnson was confirmed by the Senate on
December 16, 2013. [28] The 2014 QHSR built upon the 2010 QHSR to provide an
updated view of the nation’s homeland security mission goals and objectives. While
the missions remained unchanged, the 2014 QHSR introduced five strategic priorities
impacting them:
1. An updated posture to address the increasingly decentralized terrorist threat;
2. A strengthened path forward for cybersecurity that acknowledges the increasing
interdependencies among critical systems and networks;
3. A homeland security strategy to manage the urgent and growing risk of biological
threats and hazards;
4. A risk segmentation approach to securing and managing flows of people and goods
into and out of the United States; and
5. A new framework for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS mission
execution through public-private partnerships. [29, p. 16]
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Table 11-4: QHSR Missions & Goals [23, p. x]
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security
Goal 1.1: Prevent Terrorist Attacks
Goal 1.2: Prevent the Unauthorized Acquisition or Use of CBRN Materials and Capabilities
Goal 1.3: Manage Risks to Critical Infrastructure, Key Leadership, and Events
Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Borders
Goal 2.1: Effectively Control U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders
Goal 2.2: Safeguard Lawful Trade and Travel
Goal 2.3: Disrupt and Dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws
Goal 3.1: Strengthen and Effectively Administer the Immigration System
Goal 3.2: Prevent Unlawful Immigration
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace
Goal 4.1: Create a Safe, Secure, and Resilient Cyber Environment
Goal 4.2: Promote Cybersecurity Knowledge and Innovation
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Disasters
Goal 5.1: Mitigate Hazards
Goal 5.2: Enhance Preparedness
Goal 5.3: Ensure Effective Emergency Response
Goal 5.4: Rapidly Recover
As a result of the
findings from the QHSR,
DHS initiated a bottom-
up review (BUR) in
November 2009. The
BUR included an
assessment of the
organizational
alignment of the
Department with the
homeland security
missions set forth in the
QHSR.
182
Beyond these strategic priorities, the 2014 QHSR also highlighted ongoing areas of
priority and renewed areas of emphasis based on risk and other considerations—
countering nuclear threats, strengthening the immigration system, and enhancing
national resilience. [29, p. 16] The Department’s current organization is depicted in
Figure 3.
Homeland Security Strategy
In order to be effective, an organization must not only be aligned internally, but
externally as well. In the case of the Department of Homeland Security, its missions
and organization must align with nationally promulgated homeland security strategy.
Strategy, in general, is defined as a plan of action design to achieve a particular aim.
[31] The 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security articulated five critical mission
areas to attain the strategic objectives of 1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United
States; 2) Reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and 3) Minimize the damage
and recover from attacks that do occur. [3, p. vii] Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005,
homeland security strategy was adjusted to account for natural as well as manmade
disasters. The 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security revised the previous
strategy objectives to 1) Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; 2) Protect the American
People, critical infrastructure, and key resources; and 3) Respond to and recover from
incidents that do occur. [15, p. 13]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Figure 11-3: 2015 DHS Organization [30]
The second QHSR,
conducted under
Secretary Johnson in
2014, introduced
“strategic priorities”
giving precedence to the
missions and goals
formulated under the
2010 QHSR.
183
Both the 2002 and 2007 homeland security strategies were crafted separate from
national security strategy. The 2002 Strategy was written by the Office of Homeland
Security before the Department of Homeland Security was established. The 2007
Strategy was written by the Homeland Security Council after the Department was
established. The Homeland Security Council was established shortly after 9/11 to
advise the President and coordinate homeland security actions among Federal
agencies. While homeland security was always recognized as a part of national
security, [3, p. 5] the split in staff raised concerns about effective coordination. Shortly
after assuming office, on February 23, 2009 President Obama launched a 60-day
organizational review of White House staff. Based on this review, on May 26, 2009,
President Obama announced the merging of the Homeland Security Council with the
National Security Council. [32] As a result, homeland security strategy was
incorporated into the Obama Administration’s 2010 National Security Strategy.
Section 603 of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (P.L. 99-433) requires the President to
submit a report of national security strategy annually to Congress. [33] The 2010
National Security Strategy recast homeland security strategy objectives as shared
efforts to 1) identify and interdict threats; 2) deny hostile actors the ability to operate
within our borders; 3) maintain effective control of our physical borders; 4) safeguard
lawful trade and travel into and out of the United States; 5) disrupt and dismantle
transnational terrorist, and criminal organizations; and 6) ensure national resilience in
the face of the threat and hazards. [34, p. 15]
In February 2015, the Obama Administration issued a revised National Security
Strategy. In a highly abbreviated form, the 2015 National Security Strategy essentially
affirmed the strategic objectives enumerated in the 2010 National Security Strategy.
[35, p. 8] Perhaps most notably, the 2015 National Security Strategy addressed the
threat of catastrophic terrorist attack, [35, p. 9] spread and use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, [35, p. 11] and cybersecurity [35, p. 12] outside the confines of homeland
security, together with more traditional national security objectives. The changes mark
the most intensive attempt yet to integrate homeland security strategy and national
security strategy.
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
After 9/11, President
Bush created a separate
Homeland Security
Council and separate
homeland security
strategy to ensure
dedicated treatment to
the mission. In 2009
President Obama re-
integrated the HSC into
the NSC, and in 2010 he
merged homeland
security into national
security strategy to
ensure both missions
were interlocked and
aligned.
184
Conclusion
According to the management guru Peter Drucker, the hallmark of an effective
organization is when its people and policies are aligned with its mission. The mission
of the Department of Homeland Security has evolved since it was first founded in
January 2003. The original mission set was founded on a definition of which, in turn,
was shaped by the events of 9/11. Thus, when it was first founded DHS was primarily
focused on the threat of domestic catastrophic damage resulting from manmade
actions associated with terrorist motives. The Department’s flawed response to
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 prompted a fundamental change in its focus, adding
natural disasters to the list of threats that could create domestic catastrophic damage.
Between 2005 and 2007, DHS underwent a number changes, initiated both internally
and externally to re-align its mission sets accordingly. Included in these changes was a
mandate by Congress for the Department to periodically review its missions and
organization. The first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in 2010 revised the
definition of homeland security to include both natural and manmade threats. Both
the Department’s organization and mission support the nation’s overall homeland
security strategy. Initially, homeland security strategy was devised by the Homeland
Security Council established after 9/11. In 2009, the Homeland Security Council was
absorbed into the National Security Council. Since 2010, homeland security strategy
has been combined and published as part of National Security Strategy. In one sense,
the effectiveness of the Department of Homeland Security may be measured by
alignment of its organization to mission, strategy, and definition of homeland security.
Another measure of the Department’s effectiveness is by what is has accomplished.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
185
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. How did the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security influence the organization and missions of DHS?
2. Identify three significant changes the Second Stage Review made to the Department of Homeland Security.
3. Identify the single most significant change the 2006 Post-Katrina Reform Act made to DHS.
4. Identify the single most significant change the 2006 Safe Port Act made to DHS.
5. Describe the motivation behind the 2007 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.
6. What was the major difference between the 2002 and 2007 homeland security strategies?
7. Summarize the Department’s change in mission and organization between 2003 and 2008.
8. What is the purpose of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review?
9. Why was homeland security strategy merged into national security strategy in 2009?
10. Summarize how the cybersecurity mission evolved from 2003 to 2010.
186
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
187
DHS Progress
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the findings from the 2007 GAO Assessment of DHS performance.
Describe the findings from the 2011 GAO Assessment of DHS performance.
Evaluate the collective findings from the 2007 and 2011 GAO assessments.
Assess for yourself whether you think DHS has made the nation safer.
Chapter 12
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
188
"Measurement is the first step that leads to control and eventually to improvement. If
you can't measure something, you can't understand it. If you can't understand it, you
can't control it. If you can't control it, you can't improve it."
- H. James Harrington
Introduction
The Department of Homeland Security was formed from 22 different federal agencies
to consolidate many separate homeland security activities under a single agency. Since
DHS began operations in March 2003, it has implemented various policies and
programs to meet its mission requirements and taken actions to integrate its
management functions and to transform its component agencies into an effective
cabinet department. [1, p. 2] Often it takes years for the consolidated functions in new
organizations to effectively build on their combined strengths, and it is not uncommon
for management challenges to remain for decades. For example, the 1947 legislation
creating the Department of Defense was amended by Congress in 1949, 1953, 1958,
and 1986 to improve the department’s structural effectiveness. Despite these and
other changes made by DOD, sixty years after its establishment, DOD continues to face
a number of serious management challenges. [1, p. 1] Thus the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) designated the implementation and transformation of DHS
as high-risk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would require time
to achieve in an effective and efficient manner. Additionally, the components merged
into DHS already faced a wide array of existing challenges, and any DHS failure to
effectively carry out its mission would expose the nation to potentially serious
consequences. Accordingly, DHS has remained on GAO’s high-risk list since 2003. [1, p.
2] In the meantime, GAO has conducted periodic assessments of DHS’ progress. This
chapter examines DHS’ progress in performing assigned homeland security missions by
way of reviewing findings from GAO’s assessments.
2007 GAO Assessment
In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into law, creating
DHS. This act defined the department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks
within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the
damages, and assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United
States. The act also specified major responsibilities for the department, including
analyzing information and protecting infrastructure; developing countermeasures
against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging terrorist
threats; securing U.S. borders and transportation systems; and organizing emergency
preparedness and response efforts. DHS officially began operations on March 1, 2003.
[1, pp. 6-7]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
189
Based on the notion it takes 5 to 7 years to complete a successful merger, GAO
performed a comprehensive assessment of DHS’ progress four years after the
Department was activated. [1, p. ii] The 2007 GAO investigation examined DHS
progress across 14 areas:
For each mission and management area, GAO identified performance expectations and
vetted them with DHS officials. Performance expectations were a composite of the
responsibilities or functions—derived from legislation, homeland security presidential
directives and executive orders, DHS planning documents, and other sources—that the
department was to achieve. GAO analysts and subject matter experts reviewed prior
GAO work, DHS Inspector General work, and evidence DHS provided between March
and July 2007, including DHS officials’ assertions when supported by documentation.
On the basis of this analysis and expert judgment, GAO then assessed the extent to
which DHS had achieved each of the expectations identified. If DHS generally achieved
more than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations, GAO identified its
overall progress as substantial. When the number achieved was more than 50 percent
but 75 percent or less, GAO identified its overall progress as moderate. If DHS generally
achieved more than 25 percent but 50 percent or less, GAO identified its overall
progress as modest. For mission and management areas in which DHS generally
achieved 25 percent or less of the performance expectations, GAO identified overall
progress as limited. [1, pp. 9-10]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
1. Border Security
2. Immigration Enforcement
3. Immigration Services
4. Aviation Security
5. Surface Transportation Security
6. Maritime Security
7. Emergency Preparedness and Response
8. Critical Infrastructure Protection
9. Science and Technology
10. Acquisition Management
11. Financial Management
12. Human Capital Management
13. Information Technology Management
14. Real Property Management [1, p. 8]
For each mission and
management area, GAO
identified performance
expectations and vetted
them with DHS officials.
GAO then assessed the
extent to which DHS had
achieved each of the
expectations identified.
190
Border Security. This mission includes detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States; facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of
legitimate trade and travel; interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband;
apprehending individuals who are attempting to enter the United States illegally;
inspecting inbound and outbound people, vehicles, and cargo; and enforcing laws of
the United States at the border. GAO identified 12 performance expectations for DHS
in the area of border security and found that DHS generally achieved 5 of them and
generally did not achieve 7 others. [1, p. 12]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-1: 2007 GAO Assessment of Border Security [1, p. 12]
191
Immigration Enforcement. This mission includes apprehending, detaining, and
removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of
humans and contraband as well as human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting
those who engage in benefit and document fraud; blocking and removing employers’
access to undocumented workers; and enforcing compliance with programs to monitor
visitors. GAO identified 16 performance expectations for DHS in the area of
immigration enforcement and found that DHS has generally achieved 8 of them and
generally did not achieve 4 others. For performance expectations, GAO could not make
an assessment. [1, pp. 12-13]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-2: 2007 GAO Assessment of Immigration Enforcement [1, p. 13]
192
Immigration Services. This mission includes administering immigration benefits and
working to reduce immigration benefit fraud. GAO identified 14 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of immigration services and found that DHS generally
achieved 5 of them and generally did not achieve 9 others. [1, p. 13]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-3: 2007 GAO Assessment of Immigration Services [1, p. 14]
193
Aviation Security. This mission includes strengthening airport security; providing and
training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers against terrorist watch lists;
and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo. GAO identified 24 performance
expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security and found that DHS generally
achieved 17 of them and generally did not achieve 7 others. [1, p. 14]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-4: 2007 GAO Assessment of Aviation Security [1, p. 15]
194
Surface Transportation Security. This mission includes establishing security standards
and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, which
include passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways, including commercial
vehicles; and pipelines. GAO identified 5 performance expectations for DHS in the area
of surface transportation security and found that DHS generally achieved 3 of them
and generally did not achieve 2. [1, pp. 15-16]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-5: 2007 GAO Assessment of Surface Transportation Security [1, p. 16]
195
Maritime Security. This mission includes port and vessel security, maritime intelligence,
and maritime supply chain security. GAO identified 23 performance expectations for
DHS in the area of maritime security and found that DHS generally achieved 17 of them
and generally did not achieve 4 others. For 2 performance expectations, GAO could not
make an assessment. [1, p. 16]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-6: 2007 GAO Assessment of Maritime Security [1, p. 17]
196
Emergency Preparedness and Response. This mission includes preparing to minimize
the damage and recover from terrorist attacks and disasters; helping to plan, equip,
train, and practice needed skills of first responders; and consolidating federal response
plans and activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident management.
GAO identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of emergency
preparedness and response and found that DHS generally achieved 5 of them and
generally did not achieve 18 others. For 1 performance expectation, GAO could not
make an assessment. [1, pp. 17-18]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-7: 2007 GAO Assessment of Emergency Preparedness & Response [1, p. 18]
197
Critical Infrastructure Protection. This mission includes developing and coordinating
implementation of a comprehensive national plan for critical infrastructure protection,
developing partnerships with stakeholders and information sharing and warning
capabilities, and identifying and reducing threats and vulnerabilities. GAO identified 7
performance expectations for DHS in the area of critical infrastructure and key
resources protection and found that DHS generally achieved 4 of them and generally
did not achieve 3 others. [1, p. 19]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-8: 2007 GAO Assessment of Critical Infrastructure Protection [1, p. 19]
198
Science and Technology. This mission includes coordinating the federal government’s
civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats. GAO identified 6
performance expectations for DHS in the area of science and technology and found
that DHS generally achieved 1 of them and generally did not achieve 5 others. [1, p. 19]
Overall, the 2007 GAO report determined that DHS made more progress in its mission
areas than in its management areas, reflecting an understandable focus on
implementing efforts to secure the nation. Even so, GAO concluded that while DHS
made progress in developing plans and programs, it faced difficulties in implementing
them. [1, p. 2] GAO acknowledged that DHS had to undertake its missions while also
working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult task
for any organization. Still, GAO noted the importance for the Department to continue
to develop more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable
better accountability. GAO also urged DHS to continually reassess its mission and
management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past
and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to effectively address those
obstacles.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-9: 2007 GAO Assessment of Science and Technology [1, p. 20]
Table 12-10: Comparison of 2011 & 2007 GAO Mission Area Assessments
2010 GAO Mission Area Assessments 2007 GAO Mission Area Assessments
1. Aviation Security 4. Aviation Security
2. CBRN Threats
3. Critical Infrastructure Protection – Physical 8. Critical Infrastructure Protection
4. Surface Transportation Security 5. Surface Transportation Security
5. Border Security 1. Border Security
6. Maritime Security 6. Maritime Security
7. Immigration Enforcement 2. Immigration Enforcement
8. Immigration Services 3. Immigration Services
9. Critical Infrastructure Protection – Cyber Assets
10. Emergency Preparedness and Response 7. Emergency Preparedness & Response
9. Science and Technology
Overall, the 2007 GAO
report determined that
DHS made more
progress in its mission
areas than in its
management areas,
reflecting an
understandable focus on
implementing efforts to
secure the nation.
199
2011 GAO Assessment
Ten years after 9/11, GAO took another look at DHS’ progress. By 2011, DHS had
grown to become the third-largest Federal department, with more than 200,000
employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. [2, p. 2] In February 2010,
DHS issued its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). The report
identified five homeland security missions—Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing
Security; Securing and Managing Our Borders; Enforcing and Administering Our
Immigration Laws; Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace; and Ensuring Resilience to
Disasters—and goals and objectives to be achieved within each mission. The ensuing
Bottom-Up Review (BUR) made recommendations to align DHS’s programs and
organization with missions and goals identified in the QHSR. [2, pp. 4-5]
Since the 2007 GAO assessment, DHS continued to take action to strengthen its
operations and the management of the department, including enhancing its
performance measurement efforts. In 2011, GAO was again asked to review the
progress made by DHS in implementing its homeland security missions since its
creation. Accordingly, the 2011 assessment was based on past GAO reviews plus DHS
Inspector General reports, but with an emphasis on work completed since 2008. GAO
drew their 2011 mission areas from the 2010 QHSR. With the exception of Science and
Technology, the 2011 assessment addresses all the mission areas from the 2007
assessment, plus CBRN Threats and Cybersecurity. [2, pp. 6-7]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-10: Comparison of 2011 & 2007 GAO Mission Area Assessments
2010 GAO Mission Area Assessments 2007 GAO Mission Area Assessments
1. Aviation Security 4. Aviation Security
2. CBRN Threats
3. Critical Infrastructure Protection – Physical 8. Critical Infrastructure Protection
4. Surface Transportation Security 5. Surface Transportation Security
5. Border Security 1. Border Security
6. Maritime Security 6. Maritime Security
7. Immigration Enforcement 2. Immigration Enforcement
8. Immigration Services 3. Immigration Services
9. Critical Infrastructure Protection – Cyber Assets
10. Emergency Preparedness and Response 7. Emergency Preparedness & Response
9. Science and Technology
The 2011 assessment
was based on past GAO
reviews plus DHS
Inspector General
reports, but with an
emphasis on work
completed since 2008.
200
For the 2011 assessment, GAO began with the expectations identified in the August
2007 report, and updated or added to them by analyzing requirements and plans set
forth in homeland security-related laws, presidential directives and executive orders,
national strategies related to homeland security, and DHS’s and components’ strategic
plans and documents. The 2011 assessment further grouped the expectations into
“sub areas” to account for criteria that pertained to more than one mission area.
Otherwise, the analysis was conducted similar to the 2007 assessment, from April to
September 2011. Unlike the 2007 assessment, however, the 2011 assessment does not
assign a measure of progress, such as “substantial”, “moderate”, “modest”, or
“limited”. Instead, the 2011 assessment provides a narrative description of what
progress DHS made in implementing a given mission function since operations began,
together with a narrative description of what work, if any, remains. [2, pp. 7-9]
Consequently, it is difficult to compare progress between the 2007 and 2011
assessments. Perhaps a direct comparison between the two assessments would be
fruitless, given that DHS mission and performance have always been subject to change
by external influencing factors. Figure 1 identifies some of the significant influencing
factors affecting DHS in the first ten years following 9/11.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Figure 12-1: Selected Factors Influencing DHS Mission and Performance Ten Years Following 9/11 [2, p. 15]
The 2011 GAO
Assessment began with
the expectations
identified in the 2007
GAO Assessment.
Unlike the 2007 GAO
Assessment, however,
the 2011 GAO
Assessment does not
assign a measure of
progress.
201
Aviation Security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for
screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed
new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo.
However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening
technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a
mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is
being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is
loaded onto a pallet or container. [2, p. ii]
Key Progress: DHS has enhanced aviation security in key areas related to the aviation
security workforce, passenger prescreening, passenger checkpoint screening, checked
baggage security, air cargo screening, and security of airports. For example, DHS
developed and implemented Secure Flight, a passenger prescreening program through
which the federal government now screens all passengers on all domestic and
international commercial flights to, from, and within the United States. DHS also
deployed technology to screen passengers and checked baggage at airports. For
example, in response to the December 25, 2009, attempted attack on Northwest flight
253, DHS revised the advanced imaging technology procurement and deployment
strategy, increasing the planned deployment of advanced imaging technology from 878
to between 1,350 and 1,800 units. Further, DHS is screening passengers using staff
trained in behavior detection principles and has deployed about 3,000 Behavior
Detection Officers to 161 airports as part of its Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques program. Moreover, DHS reported, as of August 2010, that it had
established a system to screen 100 percent of domestic air cargo (cargo transported
within and outbound from the United States) transported on passenger aircraft by,
among other things, creating a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout
the air cargo supply chain and taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo.
[2, p. 19]
Remaining Work: DHS should take additional action to strengthen its aviation security
efforts. For example, a risk-based strategy and a cost/benefit analysis of airport
checkpoint technologies would improve passenger checkpoint screening. TSA’s
strategic plan to guide research, development, and deployment of passenger
checkpoint screening technologies was not risk-based and did not reflect some of the
key risk management principles, such as conducting a risk assessment based on the
three elements of risk— threat, vulnerability, and consequence—and including a cost-
benefit analysis and performance measures. Further, in March 2010, GAO reported
that it was unclear whether the advanced imaging technology would have detected the
weapon used in the December 25, 2009, attempted terrorist attack based on the
preliminary testing information received. DHS also had not validated the science
supporting its Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques program, or
determined if behavior detection techniques could be successfully used across the
aviation system to detect threats before deploying the program. DHS completed a
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
202
program validation study in April 2011 which found that the program was more
effective than random screening, but that more work was needed to determine
whether the science could be used for counterterrorism purposes in the aviation
environment. Moreover, DHS does not yet have a plan and schedule for deploying
checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive
detection requirements. In addition, DHS does not yet have a mechanism to verify the
accuracy of domestic and inbound air cargo screening data to help ensure that
screening is being conducted at reported levels, and DHS does not yet have approved
technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container—both of which
are common means of transporting air cargo on passenger aircraft, thus requiring that
screening occur before incorporation into pallets and containers. [2, p. 19]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-11: 2011 GAO Expectations for Aviation Security [2, pp. 40-41]
203
CBRN Threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to
detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN
risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made
in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. [2, p. iii]
Key Progress: DHS made progress in assessing risks posed by CBRN threats, developing
CBRN detection capabilities, and planning for nuclear detection. For example, DHS
develops risk assessments of CBRN threats and has issued seven classified CBRN risk
assessments since 2006.b DHS also assessed the threat posed by specific CBRN agents
in order to determine which of those agents pose a material threat to the United
States, known as material threat assessments. With regard to CBRN detection
capabilities, DHS implemented the BioWatch program in more than 30 metropolitan
areas to detect specific airborne biological threat agents. Further, DHS established the
National Biosurveillance Integration Center to enhance the federal government’s
capability to identify and track biological events of national concern. In addition, DHS
coordinated the development of a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection
architecture—a multidepartment effort to protect against terrorist attacks using
nuclear and radiological materials through coordinated activities—and has deployed
radiation detection equipment. [2, p. 20]
Remaining Work: More work remains for DHS to strengthen its CBRN assessment,
detection, and mitigation capabilities. For example, DHS should better coordinate with
the Department of Health and Human Services in conducting CBRN risk assessments by
developing written policies and procedures governing development of the
assessments. Moreover, the National Biosurveillance Integration Center lacks
resources necessary for operations, such as data and personnel from its partner
agencies. Additionally, work remains for DHS in its implementation of the global
nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, the strategic plan for the architecture did
not include some key components, such as funding needed to achieve the strategic
plan’s objectives, or monitoring mechanisms for determining programmatic progress
and identifying needed improvements. DHS officials told us that they will address these
missing elements in an implementation plan, which they plan to issue by the end of
2011. [2, p. 20]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-12: 2011 GAO Expectations for CBRN Threats [2, p. 41]
204
Critical Infrastructure Protection of Physical Assets.
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts to conduct risk assessments and planning,
provide for protection and resiliency, and implement partnerships and coordination
mechanisms for physical critical assets. For example, DHS updated the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan to include an emphasis on resiliency (the capacity to
resist, absorb, or successfully adapt, respond to, or recover from disasters), and an
enhanced discussion about DHS risk management. Moreover, DHS components with
responsibility for critical infrastructure sectors, such as transportation security, have
begun to use risk based assessments in their critical infrastructure related planning and
protection efforts. Further, DHS has various voluntary programs in place to conduct
vulnerability assessments and security surveys at and across facilities from the 18
critical infrastructure sectors, and uses these assessments to develop and disseminate
information on steps asset owners and operators can take to protect their facilities. In
addition, DHS coordinated with critical infrastructure stakeholders, including other
federal regulatory authorities to identify overlaps and gaps in critical infrastructure
security activities. [2, p. 20]
Remaining Work: Additional actions are needed for DHS to strengthen its critical
infrastructure protection programs and efforts. For example, DHS has not fully
implemented an approach to measure its effectiveness in working with critical asset
owners and operators in their efforts to take actions to mitigate resiliency gaps
identified during various vulnerability assessments. Moreover, DHS components have
faced difficulties in incorporating risk-based assessments in critical infrastructure
planning and protection efforts, such as in planning for security in surface
transportation modes like highway infrastructure. Further, DHS should determine the
feasibility of developing an approach to disseminating information on resiliency
practices to its critical infrastructure partners to better position itself to help asset
owners and operators consider and adopt resiliency strategies, and provide them with
information on potential security investments. [2, p. 21]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Table 12-13: 2011 GAO Expectations for CIP of Physical Assets [2, p. 41]
205
Surface Transportation Security.
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts in key surface transportation security areas,
such as risk assessments and strategic planning; the surface transportation inspector
workforce; and information sharing. For example, DHS conducted risk assessments of
surface transportation modes and developed a transportation sector security risk
assessment that assessed risk within and across the various modes. Further, DHS more
than doubled its surface transportation inspector workforce and, as of July 2011,
reported that its surface inspectors had conducted over 1,300 site visits to mass transit
and passenger rail stations to complete station profiles, among other things.
Moreover, DHS allocates transit grant funding based on risk assessments and has taken
steps to measure performance of its Transit Security Grant Program, which provides
funds to owners and operators of mass transit and passenger rail systems. In addition,
DHS expanded its sharing of surface transportation security information by, among
other things, establishing information networks. [2, p. 21]
Remaining Work: DHS should take further action to strengthen its surface
transportation security programs and operations. For example, DHS’s efforts to
improve elements of risk assessments of surface transportation modes are in the early
stages of implementation. Moreover, DHS noted limitations in its transportation sector
security risk assessment—such as the exclusion of threats from lone wolf operators—
that could limit its usefulness in guiding investment decisions across the transportation
sector as a whole. Further, DHS has not yet completed a long-term workforce plan that
identifies future needs for its surface transportation inspector workforce. It also has
not yet issued regulations for a training program for mass transit, rail, and bus
employees, as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007. Additionally, DHS’s information sharing efforts would benefit
from improved streamlining, coordination, and assessment of the effectiveness of
information sharing mechanisms. [2, p. 21]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-14: 2011 GAO Expectations for Surface Transportation Security [2, pp. 41-42]
206
Border Security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the
country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet
determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to
address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States
(individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized
periods of admission). DHS also deployed infrastructure to secure the border between
ports of entry, including more than 600 miles of fencing. However, DHS experienced
schedule delays and performance problems with the Secure Border Initiative Network,
which led to the cancellation of this information technology program. [2, p. ii]
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts in key border security areas, such as inspection
of travelers and cargo at ports of entry, security of the border between ports of entry,
visa adjudication security, and collaboration with stakeholders. Specifically, DHS has
undertaken efforts to keep terrorists and other dangerous people from entering the
country. For example, DHS implemented the US-VISIT program to verify the identities
of foreign visitors entering and exiting the United States by storing and processing
biometric and biographic information. DHS established plans for, and had begun to
interact with and involve stakeholders in, developing an exit capability. DHS deployed
technologies and other infrastructure to secure the border between ports of entry,
including more than 600 miles of tactical infrastructure, such as fencing, along the
border. DHS also improved programs designed to enhance the security of documents
used to enter the United States. For example, DHS deployed the Visa Security Program,
in which DHS personnel review visa applications to help prevent individuals who pose a
threat from entering the United States, to 19 posts in 15 countries, and developed a 5-
year expansion plan for the program. In addition, DHS improved collaboration with
federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners on northern border security
efforts through, among other things, the establishment of interagency forums. [2, p.
22]
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Remaining Work: More work remains for DHS to strengthen its border security
programs and operations. For example, although it has developed a plan, DHS has not
yet adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work
needed to deliver a comprehensive biometric exit solution as part of the US-VISIT
program. Further, DHS experienced schedule delays and performance problems with
its information technology program for securing the border between ports of entry—
the Secure Border Initiative Network—which led to its cancellation. Because of the
program’s decreased scope, uncertain timing, unclear costs, and limited life cycle
management, it was unclear whether DHS’s pursuit of the program was cost-effective.
DHS is transitioning to a new approach for border technology, which GAO is assessing.
With regard to the Visa Security Program, DHS did not fully follow or update its 5-year
expansion plan. For instance, it did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in
2009 and 2010, and had not taken steps to address visa risk at posts that did not have
a Visa Security Program presence. Additionally, DHS should strengthen its oversight of
interagency forums operating along the northern border. [2, p. 22]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-15: 2011 GAO Expectations for Border Security [2, p. 42]
208
Maritime Security.
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts in key maritime security areas, such as port
facility and vessel security, maritime security domain awareness and information
sharing, and international supply chain security. For example, DHS strengthened risk
management through the development of a risk assessment model, and addressed
risks to port facilities through annual inspections in which DHS identified and corrected
deficiencies, such as facilities failing to follow security plans for access control. Further,
DHS took action to address risks posed by foreign seafarers entering U.S. seaports by,
for example, conducting advance screening before the arrival of vessels at U.S. ports,
inspections, and enforcement operations. DHS developed the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program to manage the access of unescorted maritime
workers to secure areas of regulated maritime facilities. DHS also implemented
measures to help secure passenger vessels including cruise ships, ferries, and energy
commodity vessels such as tankers, including assessing risks to these types of vessels.
Moreover, for tracking vessels at sea, the Coast Guard uses a long-range identification
and tracking system, and a commercially provided long-range automatic identification
system. For tracking vessels in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports, the
Coast Guard operates a land-based automatic identification system, and also either
operates, or has access to, radar and cameras in some ports. DHS also developed a
layered security strategy for cargo container security, including deploying screening
technologies and partnering with foreign governments. [2, p. 23]
Remaining Work: DHS should take additional action to strengthen its maritime security
efforts. For example, because of a lack of technology capability, DHS does not
electronically verify identity and immigration status of foreign seafarers, as part of its
onboard admissibility inspections of cargo vessels, thus limiting the assurance that
fraud could be identified among documents presented by them. In addition, the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential program’s controls were not designed
to provide reasonable assurance that only qualified applicants acquire credentials. For
example, during covert tests of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential at
several selected ports, their investigators were successful in accessing ports using
counterfeit credentials and authentic credentials acquired through fraudulent means.
Moreover, DHS has not assessed the costs and benefits of requiring cruise lines to
provide passenger reservation data for screening, which could help improve
identification and targeting of potential terrorists. Further, the vessel tracking systems
used in U.S. coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports had more difficulty tracking
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
209
smaller and noncommercial vessels because these vessels were not generally required
to carry automatic identification system equipment, and because of the technical
limitations of radar and cameras. In addition, DHS has made limited progress in
scanning containers at the initial ports participating in the Secure Freight Initiative, a
program at selected ports with the intent of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-bound
container cargo for nuclear and radiological materials overseas, leaving the feasibility
of 100 percent scanning largely unproven. CBP has not yet developed a plan for full
implementation of a statutory requirement that 100 percent of U.S.-bound container
cargo be scanned by 2012. [2, p. 23]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-16: 2011 GAO Expectations for Maritime Security [2, pp. 42-43]
210
Immigration Enforcement.
Key Progress. DHS expanded its immigration and customs enforcement programs and
activities in key areas such as overstay enforcement, compliance with workplace
immigration laws, alien smuggling, and firearms trafficking. For example, DHS
increased its resources for investigating overstays (unauthorized immigrants who
entered the United States legally on a temporary basis then overstayed their
authorized periods of admission) and alien smuggling operations, and deployed border
enforcement task forces to investigate illicit smuggling of people and goods, including
firearms. In addition, DHS took action to improve the E-Verify program, which provides
employers a voluntary tool for verifying an employee’s authorization to work in the
United States, by, for example, increasing the program’s accuracy by expanding the
number of databases it can query. Further, DHS expanded its programs and activities
to identify and remove criminal aliens in federal, state, and local custody who are
eligible for removal from the United States by, for example, entering into agreements
with state and local law enforcement agencies to train officers to assist in identifying
those individuals who are in the United States illegally. [2, p. 24]
Remaining Work: Key weaknesses remain in DHS’s immigration and customs
enforcement efforts. For example, DHS took action to address a small portion of the
estimated overstay population in the United States, and lacks measures for assessing
its progress in addressing overstays. In particular, DHS field offices had closed about
34,700 overstay investigations assigned to them from fiscal year 2004 through 2010, as
of October 2010; these cases resulted in approximately 8,100 arrests, relative to a total
estimated overstay population of 4 million to 5.5 million. Additionally, GAO reported
that since fiscal year 2006, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement within DHS
allocated about 3 percent of its investigative work hours to overstay investigations.
Moreover, DHS should better leverage opportunities to strengthen its alien smuggling
enforcement efforts by assessing the possible use of various investigative techniques,
such as those that follow cash transactions flowing through money transmitters that
serve as the primary method of payment to those individuals responsible for smuggling
aliens. Further, weaknesses with the E-Verify program, including challenges in
accurately estimating E-Verify costs, put DHS at an increased risk of not making
informed investment decisions. [2, p. 24]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
211
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-17: 2011 GAO Expectations for Immigration Enforcement [2, pp. 43-44]
212
Immigration Services.
Key Progress: DHS improved the quality and efficiency of the immigration benefit
administration process, and expanded its efforts to detect and deter immigration
fraud. For example, DHS initiated efforts to modernize its immigration benefit
administration infrastructure; improve the efficiency and timeliness of its application
intake process; and ensure quality in its benefit adjudication processes. Further, DHS
designed training programs and quality reviews to help ensure the integrity of asylum
adjudications. Moreover, in 2004 DHS established the Office of Fraud Detection and
National Security, now a directorate, to lead immigration fraud detection and
deterrence efforts, and this directorate has since developed and implemented
strategies for this purpose. [2, p. 24]
Remaining Work: More work remains in DHS’s efforts to improve its administration of
immigration benefits. For example, DHS’s program for transforming its immigration
benefit processing infrastructure and business practices from paper-based to digital
systems missed its planned milestones by more than 2 years, and has been hampered
by management challenges, such as insufficient planning and not adhering to DHS
acquisition guidance before selecting a contractor to assist with implementation of the
transformation program. Additionally, while the Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate put in place strategies for detecting and deterring immigration fraud, DHS
should take additional action to address vulnerabilities identified in its assessments
intended to determine the extent and nature of fraud in certain applications. Further,
despite mechanisms DHS had designed to help asylum officers assess the authenticity
of asylum claims, such as identity and security checks and fraud prevention teams,
asylum officers surveyed cited challenges in identifying fraud as a key factor affecting
their adjudications. For example, 73 percent of asylum officer survey respondents
reported it was moderately or very difficult to identify document fraud. [2, p. 25]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
213
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-18: 2011 GAO Expectations for Immigration Services [2, p. 44]
214
Critical Infrastructure Protection of Cyber Assets.
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts to conduct cybersecurity risk assessments and
planning, provide for the protection and resilience of cyber assets, and implement
cybersecurity partnerships and coordination mechanisms. For example, DHS developed
the first National Cyber Incident Response Plan in September 2010 to coordinate the
response of multiple federal agencies, state and local governments, and hundreds of
private firms, to incidents at all levels. DHS also took steps to secure external network
connections in use by the federal government by establishing the National
Cybersecurity Protection System, operationally known as Einstein, to analyze computer
network traffic information to and from agencies. In 2008, DHS developed Einstein 2,
which incorporated network intrusion detection technology into the capabilities of the
initial version of the system. Additionally, the department made progress in enhancing
its cyber analysis and incident warning capabilities through the establishment of the
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which, among other things, coordinates
the nation’s efforts to prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats to systems
and communications networks. Moreover, since conducting a major cyber attack
exercise, called Cyber Storm, DHS demonstrated progress in addressing lessons it had
learned from this exercise to strengthen public and private incident response
capabilities. [2, p. 25]
Remaining Work: Key challenges remain in DHS’s cybersecurity efforts. For example, to
expand its protection and resiliency efforts, DHS needs to lead a concerted effort to
consolidate and better secure Internet connections at federal agencies. Further, DHS
faced challenges regarding deploying Einstein 2, including understanding the extent to
which its objective was being met because the department lacked performance
measures that addressed whether agencies report whether the alerts represent actual
incidents. DHS also faces challenges in fully establishing a comprehensive national
cyber analysis and warning capability. For example, the U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team did not fully address 15 key attributes of cyber analysis and warning
capabilities. These attributes are related to (1) monitoring network activity to detect
anomalies, (2) analyzing information and investigating anomalies to determine
whether they are threats, (3) warning appropriate officials with timely and actionable
threat and mitigation information, and (4) responding to the threat. For instance, the
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team provided warnings by developing and
distributing a wide array of notifications; however, these notifications were not
consistently actionable or timely. Additionally, expectations of private sector
stakeholders are not being met by their federal partners in areas related to sharing
information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. [2, p. 26]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
215
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-19: 2011 GAO Expectations for CIP of Cyber Assets [2, p. 44]
216
Emergency Preparedness and Response. DHS issued the National Preparedness
Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities- based preparedness,
and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities
defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery
Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology.
However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards
preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and
involvement with state and local governments’ capacity. DHS should also improve the
efficacy of the grant application process by mitigating duplication or redundancy within
the various preparedness grant programs. [2, pp. ii-iii]
Key Progress: DHS expanded its efforts to improve national emergency preparedness
and response planning; improved its emergency assistance services; and enhanced
emergency communications. For example, DHS developed various plans for disaster
preparedness and response. In particular, in 2004 DHS issued the National Response
Plan and subsequently made revisions to it, culminating in the issuance of the National
Response Framework in January 2008, which outlines the guiding principles and major
roles and responsibilities of government, nongovernmental organizations, and private
sector entities for response to disasters of all sizes and causes. Further, DHS issued the
National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-
based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List, designed to provide a national-level
generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS also assisted local
communities with developing long-term disaster recovery plans as part of its post-
disaster assistance. For example, DHS assisted Iowa City’s recovery from major floods
in 2008 by, among other things, identifying possible federal funding sources for specific
projects in the city’s recovery plan, and advising the city on how to prepare effective
project proposals. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework,
intended to provide a model to identify and address challenges that arise during the
disaster recovery process. Moreover, DHS issued the National Emergency
Communications Plan—the first strategic document for improving emergency
communications nationwide. [2, p. 26]
Remaining Work: More work remains in DHS’s efforts to assess capabilities for all-
hazards preparedness and provide long-term disaster recovery assistance. For
example, DHS has not yet developed national preparedness capability requirements
based on established metrics to provide a framework for assessing preparedness.
Further, the data DHS collected to measure national preparedness were limited by
reliability and measurement issues related to the lack of standardization. Until a
framework for assessing preparedness is in place, DHS will not have a basis on which to
operationalize and implement its conceptual approach for assessing local, state, and
federal preparedness capabilities against capability requirements and identify
capability gaps for prioritizing investments in national preparedness. Moreover, with
regard to long-term disaster recovery assistance, DHS’s criteria for when to provide the
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
217
assistance were vague, and, in some cases, DHS provided assistance before state and
local governments had the capacity to work effectively with DHS. Additionally, DHS
should improve the efficacy of the grant application and review process by mitigating
duplication or redundancy within the various preparedness grant programs. Until DHS
evaluates grant applications across grant programs, DHS cannot ascertain whether or
to what extent multiple funding requests are being submitted for similar purposes. [2,
p. 27]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-20: 2011 GAO Expectations for Emergency Preparedness and Response [2, pp. 45-46]
218
Overall, the 2011 GAO assessment found that since it began operations in 2003, DHS
has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and
milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential.
As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and
weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen
the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS’s
accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying
workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. Such
accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself
into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions—a difficult
undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its
transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. [2, p. ii]
2015 GAO Assessment
By 2015, DHS had grown to 240,000 employees and approximately $60 billion in
budget authority. [3, p. 1] In 2003, GAO designated implementing and transforming
DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one department, and
failure to address associated risks could have serious consequences for U.S. national
and economic security. As a result, in its 2013 high-risk update, GAO narrowed the
scope of the high-risk area to focus on strengthening and integrating DHS management
functions (human capital, acquisition, financial, and information technology). At the
request of Congress, in February 2015 GAO took another look at DHS’s progress and
actions remaining in strengthening and integrating its management functions. [3, p. ii]
Key to addressing the department’s management challenges is DHS demonstrating the
ability to achieve sustained progress across 30 actions and outcomes that GAO
identified and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area. GAO found in its
2015 high-risk update report that DHS fully addressed 9 of these actions and
outcomes, while work remains to fully address the remaining 21. Of the 9 actions and
outcomes that DHS has addressed, 5 have been sustained as fully implemented for at
least 2 years. For example, DHS fully met 1 outcome for the first time by obtaining a
clean opinion on its financial statements for 2 consecutive years. DHS has also mostly
addressed an additional 5 actions and outcomes, meaning that a small amount of work
remains to fully address them. However, DHS has partially addressed 12 and initiated 4
of the remaining actions and outcomes. For example, DHS does not have modernized
financial management systems, a fact that affects its ability to have ready access to
reliable information for informed decision making. Addressing some of these actions
and outcomes, such as modernizing the department’s financial management systems
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Overall, the 2011 GAO
Assessment found that
since it began
operations in 2003, DHS
has implemented key
homeland security
operations and achieved
important goals and
milestones in many
areas to create and
strengthen a foundation
to reach its potential.
219
and improving employee morale, are significant undertakings that will likely require
multiyear efforts. In GAO’s 2015 high-risk update report, GAO concluded that in the
coming years, DHS needs to continue to show measurable, sustainable progress in
implementing its key management initiatives and achieving the remaining 21 actions
and outcomes. [3, p. ii]
While challenges remain for DHS across its range of missions, it has made considerable
progress. DHS efforts to strengthen and integrate its management functions have
resulted in the Department meeting two and partially meeting three of GAO’s criteria
for removal from the high-risk list. [3, p. ii]
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Table 12-21: 2015 GAO Assessment of DHS Management Functions [3, p. ii]
220
Conclusion
Since DHS’ activation in March 2003, the General Accountability Office, the “watch
dog” arm of U.S. government, has made approximately 2,200 recommendations to
DHS to strengthen program management, performance measurement efforts, and
management processes, among other things. DHS has implemented more than 69
percent of these recommendations and has actions under way to address others. [3, p.
1] As generally acknowledged, DHS remains a “work in progress”. The key question,
“are we safer” is undoubtedly a resounding “yes”. Unfortunately, the nature of the
threat makes it impossible to ever be completely safe, leading to the ultimate question
about homeland security: “how safe at what cost?” The answer at present is
unknown, and likely will never be answered conclusively.
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
221
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What was the focus of the 2007 GAO Assessment?
2. According to the 2007 GAO Assessment, which DHS mission demonstrated the most progress?
3. According to the 2007 GAO Assessment, which DHS mission demonstrated the least progress?
4. Given the broad changes in organization and mission between 2003and 2007, do you think the GAO Assessment
was accurate? Explain your answer.
5. How did the 2011 GAO Assessment differ from the 2007 GAO Assessment?
6. How did the highest performing mission in the 2007 GAO Assessment compare in the 2011 GAO Assessment?
7. How did the lowest performing mission in the 2007 GAO Assessment compare in the 2011 GAO Assessment?
8. Given the less expansive changes in organization and mission between 2007 and 2011, do you think the GAO
Assessment was accurate? Explain your answer.
9. Do you think a member of Congress, trying to assess the return on taxpayer investment, would find the GAO
assessments useful? Explain your answer.
10. Do you think yourself that the GAO assessments answer the question, “are we safer?”
222
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223
HS Enterprise
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the purpose of the homeland security enterprise.
Describe the role of DHS with respect to the homeland security enterprise.
Identify the roles and responsibilities of different members of the homeland security enterprise.
Chapter 13
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
224
“This Nation can protect itself. But we must all play a role—and in the commitment of
each, we will secure the homeland for all.”
- 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
Introduction
9/11 marked a watershed in national security. 9/11 demonstrated the ability of small
groups to wreak destructive power on a scale once only wielded by the military might
of nations. Whereas national security was focused on protecting United States
sovereignty among the community of nations, homeland security became necessary to
protect United States citizens from the catastrophic designs of non-state actors, both
foreign and domestic. This required an unprecedented level of cooperation between
Federal, State, and Local law enforcement and the national security apparatus. With
the addition of natural disasters to the list of catastrophic agents following Hurricane
Katrina, it also required an unprecedented level of integration with the emergency
response community. In order to safeguard the nation from domestic catastrophic
incidents, the Department of Homeland Security must work together in close
coordination with other Federal, State, and Local public and private agencies
comprising the Homeland Security Enterprise.
Homeland Security Enterprise
The Department of Homeland Security is one among many components of the
Homeland Security Enterprise. In some areas, like securing borders or managing the
immigration system, the Department possesses unique capabilities and, hence,
responsibilities. In other areas, such as critical infrastructure protection or emergency
management, the Department’s role is largely one of leadership and stewardship on
behalf of those who have the capabilities to get the job done. In still other areas, such
as counterterrorism, defense, and diplomacy, other Federal departments and agencies
have critical roles and responsibilities, including the Departments of Justice, Defense,
and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism
Center. Homeland security can only be optimized when the distributed and
decentralized nature of the enterprise is oriented in pursuit of common goals. [1, p. iii]
The term “enterprise” refers to the collective efforts and shared responsibilities of
Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector
partners—as well as individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical
homeland security capabilities. It connotes a broad-based community with a common
interest in the public safety and well-being of America and American society and is
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Whereas national
security was focused on
protecting United States
sovereignty among the
community of nations,
homeland security
became necessary to
protect United States
citizens from the
catastrophic designs of
non-state actors, both
foreign and domestic.
225
composed of multiple partners and stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities are
distributed and shared. Yet it is important to remember that these partners and
stakeholders face diverse risks, needs, and priorities. The challenge for the enterprise,
then, is to balance these diverse needs and priorities, while focusing on shared
interests and responsibilities to collectively secure the homeland. [1, p. 12]
With the establishment of homeland security, and the linking of domestic security
concerns to broader national security interests and institutions, there is a temptation
to view homeland security so broadly as to encompass all national security and
domestic policy activities. This is not the case. Homeland security is deeply rooted in
the security and resilience of the nation, and facilitating lawful interchange with the
world. As such, it intersects with many other functions of government. Homeland
security is built upon critical law enforcement functions, but is not about preventing all
crimes or administering our Nation’s judicial system. It is deeply embedded in trade
activities, but is neither trade nor economic policy. It requires international
engagement, but is not responsible for foreign affairs. Rather, homeland security is
meant to connote a concerted, shared effort to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure,
and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where American interests,
aspirations, and way of life can thrive. [1, p. 13]
Homeland security spans the authorities and responsibilities of Federal departments
and agencies, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial governments, the private sector, as
well as private citizens and communities. For this reason, coordination and cooperation
are essential to successfully carrying out and accomplishing the homeland security
missions. Documents such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and
National Response Framework (NRF), as well as documents produced by the National
Counterterrorism Center, spell out roles and responsibilities for various aspects of
homeland security. The following discussion highlights key current roles and
responsibilities of the many actors across the Homeland Security Enterprise. They are
derived largely from statutes, Presidential directives, and other authorities, as well as
from the NIPP and NRF. [1, pp. A-1]
President of the United States
The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief and the leader of the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government. The President, through the National
Security Council and the National Security Staff, provides overall homeland security
policy direction and coordination. [1, pp. A-1]
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
Homeland security
spans the authorities
and responsibilities of
Federal departments
and agencies, State,
Local, Tribal and
Territorial governments,
the private sector, as
well as private citizens
and communities. For
this reason,
coordination and
cooperation are
essential to successfully
carrying out and
accomplishing the
homeland security
missions.
226
Secretary of Homeland Security
The Secretary of Homeland Security leads the Federal agency as defined by statute
charged with homeland security: preventing terrorism and managing risks to critical
infrastructure; securing and managing the border; enforcing and administering
immigration laws; safeguarding and securing cyberspace; and ensuring resilience to
disasters. [1, pp. A-1]
United States Attorney General
The Attorney General has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts
or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at
United States citizens or institutions abroad, as well as for related intelligence
collection activities within the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual
incident that falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the Attorney
General identifies the perpetrators and brings them to justice. The Attorney General
leads the Department of Justice, which also includes the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives, each of which has key homeland security responsibilities. [1,
pp. A-1]
Secretary of State
The Secretary of State has the responsibility to coordinate activities with foreign
governments and international organizations related to the prevention, preparation,
response, and recovery from a domestic incident, and for the protection of U.S.
citizens and U.S. interests overseas. The Department of State also adjudicates and
screens visa applications abroad. [1, pp. A-1]
Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Defense leads the Department of Defense, whose military services,
defense agencies, and geographic and functional commands defend the United States
from direct attack, deter potential adversaries, foster regional stability, secure and
assure access to sea, air, space, and cyberspace, and build the security capacity of key
partners. DOD also provides a wide range of support to civil authorities at the direction
of the Secretary of Defense or the President when the capabilities of State and Local
authorities to respond effectively to an event are overwhelmed. [1, pp. A-2]
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227
Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Health and Human Services leads the coordination of all functions
relevant to Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Medical Response.
Additionally, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) incorporates steady-
state and incident-specific activities as described in the National Health Security
Strategy. HHS is the coordinator and primary agency for Emergency Support Function
(ESF) #8 – Public Health and Medical Services, providing the mechanism for
coordinated Federal assistance to supplement State, local, tribal, and territorial
resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual
incident requiring a coordinated Federal response, and/or during a developing
potential health and medical emergency. HHS is also the Sector-Specific Agency for the
Healthcare and Public Health Sector. [1, pp. A-2]
Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of the Treasury works to safeguard the U.S. financial system, combat
financial crimes, and cut off financial support to terrorists, WMD proliferators, drug
traffickers, and other national security threats. [1, pp. A-2]
Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Agriculture provides leadership on food, agriculture, natural
resources, rural development, and related issues based on sound public policy, the
best available science, and efficient management. The Department of Agriculture
(USDA) is the Sector-Specific Agency for the Food and Agriculture Sector, a
responsibility shared with the Food and Drug Administration with respect to food
safety and defense. In addition, USDA is the coordinator and primary agency for two
Emergency Support Functions: ESF #4 – Firefighting and ESF #11 – Agriculture and
Natural Resources. USDA, together with the Department of the Interior, also operates
the National Interagency Fire Center. [1, pp. A-2]
Director of National Intelligence
The Director of National Intelligence serves as the head of the Intelligence Community
(IC), acts as the principal advisor to the President and National Security Council for
intelligence matters relating to national security, and oversees and directs
implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The IC, composed of 16
elements across the U.S. Government, functions consistent with law, Executive order,
regulations, and policy to support the national security-related missions of the U.S.
Government. It provides a range of analytic products that assess threats to the
homeland and inform planning, capability development, and operational activities of
homeland security enterprise partners and stakeholders. In addition to IC elements
with specific homeland security missions, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence maintains a number of mission and support centers that provide unique
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
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Part II: HS, DHS, & HS
capabilities for homeland security partners, including the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), National Counterproliferation Center, and National Counterintelligence
Executive. NCTC serves as the primary U.S. government organization for analyzing and
integrating all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism, and conducts
strategic operational planning for integrated counterterrorism activities. [1, pp. A-3]
Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce, supportive of national economic security interests and
responsive to Public Law and Executive direction, is responsible for promulgating
Federal information technology and cybersecurity standards; regulating export of
security technologies; representing U.S. industry on international trade policy and
commercial data flow matters; security and privacy policies that apply to the Internet’s
domain name system; protecting intellectual property; conducting cybersecurity
research and development; and assuring timely availability of industrial products,
materials, and services to meet homeland security requirements. [1, pp. A-3]
Secretary of Education
The Secretary of Education oversees discretionary grants and technical assistance to
help schools plan for and respond to emergencies that disrupt teaching and learning.
The Department of Education is a supporting Federal agency in the response and
management of emergencies under the National Response Framework. [1, pp. A-3]
Secretary of Energy
The Secretary of Energy maintains stewardship of vital national security capabilities,
from nuclear weapons to leading edge research and development programs. The
Department of Energy (DOE) is the designated Federal agency to provide a unifying
structure for the integration of Federal critical infrastructure and key resources
protection efforts specifically for the Energy Sector. It is also responsible for
maintaining continuous and reliable energy supplies for the United States through
preventive measures and restoration and recovery actions. DOE is the coordinator and
primary agency for ESF #12 – Energy when incidents require a coordinated Federal
response to facilitate the restoration of damaged energy systems and components. [1,
pp. A-3]
Environmental Protection Agency
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) leads the EPA, which
is charged with protecting human health and the environment. For certain incidents,
EPA is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials
Response, in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or uncontrolled release
of oil or hazardous materials. EPA is the Sector-Specific Agency for securing the Water
Sector. [1, pp. A-4]
229
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is the coordinator and primary
agency for ESF #14 – Long-Term Community Recovery, which provides a mechanism
for coordinating Federal support to State, tribal, regional, and local governments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector to enable community
recovery from the long-term consequences of extraordinary disasters.
Secretary of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior develops policies and procedures for all types of hazards
and emergencies that impact Federal lands, facilities, infrastructure, and resources;
tribal lands; and insular areas. The Department of the Interior (DOI) is also a primary
agency for ESF #9 – Search and Rescue, providing specialized lifesaving assistance to
State, tribal, and local authorities when activated for incidents or potential incidents
requiring a coordinated Federal response. DOI, together with the Department of
Agriculture, also operates the National Interagency Fire Center. [1, pp. A-4]
Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Transportation collaborates with DHS on all matters relating to
transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection and in regulating
the transportation of hazardous materials by all modes (including pipelines). The
Secretary of Transportation is responsible for operating the national airspace system.
[1, pp. A-4]
Other Federal Agencies
Other Federal Agencies are also part of the homeland security enterprise and
contribute to the homeland security mission in a variety of ways. This includes
agencies with responsibilities for regulating elements of the Nation’s critical
infrastructure to assure public health, safety, and the common defense, developing
and implementing pertinent public policy, supporting efforts to assure a resilient
homeland, and collaborating with those departments and agencies noted above in
their efforts to secure the homeland. [1, pp. A-4]
Critical Infrastructure Owners and Operators
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CIKR) Owners and Operators develop
protective programs and measures to ensure that systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, are secure from and resilient to cascading, disruptive impacts.
Protection includes actions to mitigate the overall risk to CIKR assets, systems,
networks, functions, or their interconnecting links, including actions to deter the
threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the consequences associated with a
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230
terrorist attack or other incident. CIKR owners and operators also prepare business
continuity plans and ensure their own ability to sustain essential services and
functions. [1, pp. A-5]
Major and Multinational Corporations
Major and Multinational Corporations operate in all sectors of trade and commerce
that foster the American way of life and support the operation, security, and resilience
of global movement systems. They take action to support risk management planning
and investments in security as a necessary component of prudent business planning
and operations. They contribute to developing the ideas, science, and technology that
underlie innovation in homeland security. During times of disaster, they provide
response resources (donated or compensated)—including specialized teams, essential
service providers, equipment, and advanced technologies—through public-private
emergency plans/partnerships or mutual aid and assistance agreements, or in
response to requests from government and nongovernmental-volunteer initiatives. [1,
pp. A-5]
Small Business
Small Businesses contribute to all aspects of homeland security and employ more than
half of all private-sector workers. They support response efforts by developing
contingency plans and working with local planners to ensure that their plans are
consistent with pertinent response procedures. When small businesses can survive and
quickly recover from disasters, the Nation and economy are more secure and more
resilient. They perform research and development, catalyze new thinking, and serve as
engines of innovation for development of new solutions to key challenges in homeland
security. [1, pp. A-5]
Governors
Governors are responsible for overseeing their State’s threat prevention activities as
well the State’s response to any emergency or disaster, and take an active role in
ensuring that other State officials and agencies address the range of homeland security
threats, hazards, and challenges. During an emergency, Governors will play a number
of roles, including the State’s chief communicator Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resource (CIKR) Owners and Operators develop protective programs and measures to
ensure that systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, are secure from and
resilient to cascading, disruptive impacts. Protection includes actions to mitigate the
overall risk to CIKR assets, systems, networks, functions, or their interconnecting links,
including actions to deter the threat, mitigate vulnerabilities, or minimize the
consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. CIKR owners and
operators also prepare business continuity plans and ensure their own ability to
sustain essential services and functions. [1, pp. A-5]
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231
State and Territorial Governments
State and Territorial Governments coordinate the activity of cities, counties, and
intrastate regions. States administer Federal homeland security grants to local and
tribal (in certain grant programs) governments, allocating key resources to bolster their
prevention and preparedness capabilities. State agencies conduct law enforcement
and security activities, protect the Governor and other executive leadership, and
administer State programs that address the range of homeland security threats,
hazards, and challenges. States government officials lead statewide disaster and
mitigation planning. During response, States coordinate resources and capabilities
throughout the State and are responsible for requesting and obtaining resources and
capabilities from surrounding States. States often mobilize these substantive resources
and capabilities to supplement the local efforts before, during, and after incidents. [1,
pp. A-6]
Tribal Leaders
Tribal Leaders are responsible for the public safety and welfare of their membership.
They can serve as both key decision makers and trusted sources of public information
during incidents. [1, pp. A-6]
Tribal Governments
Tribal Governments, which have a special status under Federal laws and treaties,
ensure the provision of essential services to members within their communities, and
are responsible for developing emergency response and mitigation plans. Tribal
governments may coordinate resources and capabilities with neighboring jurisdictions,
and establish mutual aid agreements with other tribal governments, local jurisdictions,
and State governments. Depending on location, land base, and resources, tribal
governments provide law enforcement, fire, and emergency services as well as public
safety to their members. [1, pp. A-6]
Mayors and Other Elected Officials
Mayors and other local elected and appointed officials (such as city managers) are
responsible for ensuring the public safety and welfare of their residents, serving as
their jurisdiction’s chief communicator and a primary source of information for
homeland security-related information, and ensuring their governments are able to
carry out emergency response activities. They serve as both key decision makers and
trusted sources of public information during incidents. [1, pp. A-6]
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232
Local Governments
Local Governments provide front-line leadership for local law enforcement, fire, public
safety, environmental response, public health, and emergency medical services for all
manner of hazards and emergencies. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative
(UASI) program, cities (along with counties in many cases) address multijurisdictional
planning and operations, equipment support and purchasing, and training and
exercises in support of high-threat, high-density urban areas. UASI grants assist local
governments in building and sustaining homeland security capabilities. Local
governments coordinate resources and capabilities during disasters with neighboring
jurisdictions, NGOs, the State, and the private sector. [1, pp. A-7]
County Leaders
County Leaders serve as chief operating officers of county governments, both rural and
urban. This includes supporting and enabling the county governments to fulfill their
responsibilities to constituents, including public safety and security. In some States,
elected county officials such as sheriffs or judges also serve as emergency managers,
search and rescue officials, and chief law enforcement officers. [1, pp. A-7]
County Governments
County Governments provide front-line leadership for local law enforcement, fire,
public safety, environmental response, public health, and emergency medical services
for all manner of hazards and emergencies. In many cases, county government officials
participate in UASIs with other urban jurisdictions to assist local governments in
building and sustaining capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover
from threats or acts of terrorism. County governments coordinate resources and
capabilities during disasters with neighboring jurisdictions, NGOs, the State, and the
private sector. [1, pp. A-7]
American Red Cross
The American Red Cross is a supporting agency to the mass care functions of ESF #6 –
Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services under the NRF. As the
Nation’s largest mass care service provider, the American Red Cross provides
sheltering, feeding, bulk distribution of needed items, basic first aid, welfare
information, and casework, among other services, at the local level as needed. In its
role as a service provider, the American Red Cross works closely with local, tribal, and
State governments to provide mass care services to victims of every disaster, large and
small, in an affected area. [1, pp. A-7]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
233
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD) is a consortium of
approximately 50 national organizations and 55 State and territory equivalents that
typically send representatives to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s
National Response Coordination Center to represent the voluntary organizations and
assist in response coordination. Members of National VOAD form a coalition of
nonprofit organizations that respond to disasters as part of their overall mission. [1,
pp. A-8]
Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) provide sheltering, emergency food supplies,
counseling services, and other vital support services to support response and promote
the recovery of disaster victims. They often provide specialized services that help
individuals with special needs, including those with disabilities, and provide
resettlement assistance and services to arriving refugees. NGOs also play key roles in
engaging communities to integrate lawful immigrants into American society and
reduce the marginalization or radicalization of these groups. [1, pp. A-8]
Community Organizations
Communities and community organizations foster the development of organizations
and organizational capacity that act toward a common goal (such as Neighborhood
Watch, Community Emergency Response Teams, or providing emergency food or
shelter). These groups may possess the knowledge and understanding of the threats,
local response capabilities, and special needs within their jurisdictions and have the
capacity necessary to alert authorities of those threats, capabilities, or needs.
Additionally, during an incident these groups may be critical in passing along vital
incident communications to individuals and families, and to supporting critical
response activities in the initial stages of a crisis. [1, pp. A-8]
Individuals and Families
Individuals and Families take the basic steps to prepare themselves for emergencies,
including understanding the threats and hazards that they may face, reducing hazards
in and around their homes, preparing an emergency supply kit and household
emergency plans (that include care for pets and service animals), monitoring
emergency communications carefully, volunteering with established organizations,
mobilizing or helping to ensure community preparedness, enrolling in training courses,
and practicing what to do in an emergency. These individual and family preparedness
activities strengthen community resilience and mitigate the impact of disasters. In
addition, individual vigilance and awareness can help communities remain safer and
bolster prevention efforts. [1, pp. A-8]
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
234
Conclusion
In order to safeguard the nation from domestic catastrophic incidents requires the
collective and coordinated efforts of many agencies, organizations, and individuals.
While the nation looks to the Department of Homeland Security to lead the way,
homeland security is an enterprise. Each of us—government, business, and individual
alike—has a role to play in contributing to the collective strength of this country. [1, p.
78]
Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
235
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why is a homeland security “enterprise” necessary?
2. What are the essential elements required to make the homeland security enterprise work?
3. Which member of the enterprise is responsible for overseeing their State’s threat prevention activities as well the State’s
response to any emergency or disaster?
4. Which member of the enterprise serves as the head of the Intelligence Community, acts as the principal advisor to the
President and National Security Council for intelligence matters relating to national security?
5. Which member of the enterprise provides sheltering, emergency food supplies, counseling services, and other vital services to
support response and promote the recovery of disaster victims?
6. Which member of the enterprise provides front-line leadership for local law enforcement, fire, public safety, environmental
response, public health, and emergency medical services for all manner of hazards and emergencies?
7. Which member of the enterprise is responsible for criminal investigations of terrorist acts inside the United States, or directed
at United States citizens or institutions abroad, as well as for related intelligence collection activities within the United States?
8. Which member of the enterprise defends the United States from direct attack, deters potential adversaries, fosters regional
stability, secures and assures access to sea, air, space, and cyberspace?
9. Which member of the enterprise is responsible for taking basic steps to prepare themselves for emergencies and
understanding the threats and hazards that they may face?
10. Which member of the enterprise is the coordinator and primary agency in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or
uncontrolled release of oil or hazardous materials?
236
237
Part III:
Mission Areas
In this section we will examine the missions performed by the Department of Homeland Security to safeguard the U.S.
from domestic catastrophic destruction. These missions are defined in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review and are re-evaluated every four years under the QHSR process. As was seen in Chapter 11, these missions have
evolved since DHS’ activation in 2003. Still, they remain grounded in the strategic implications and tactical lessons
learned from 9/11. From a strategic standpoint, they address the means for committing domestic catastrophic
destruction by protecting critical infrastructure, countering weapons of mass destruction, and securing cyberspace.
From a tactical perspective, they seek to plug the holes exposed on 9/11, and subsequent attacks in Madrid (2004) and
London (2007), by rooting out those with malicious intent, preventing them from entering the country or otherwise
smuggling in WMD, and tightening security within our mass transit systems. However, because no defense is
invulnerable and we cannot stop the destructive forces of nature, the ability to mount a coordinated response and
recovery remains critical to saving lives and alleviating suffering. In order to facilitate understanding, each chapter is
organized to 1) describe the problem, 2) explain what’s being done to address it, 3) what has been accomplished and,
4) what remains to be done.
238
Part III: Mission Areas
239
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Critical Infrastructure
Protection
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain how the importance of critical infrastructure protection was realized before 9/11.
Describe how critical infrastructure protection has been shaped and evolved since PDD-63.
Explain the role of the Federal government in critical infrastructure protection.
Assess the importance of various steps in the Risk Management Framework.
Chapter 14
Learning Outcomes
240
“We did find widespread capability to exploit infrastructure vulnerabilities. The
capability to do harm—particularly through information networks—is real; it is growing
at an alarming rate; and we have little defense against it.”
- 1997 President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
Introduction
9/11 thrust critical infrastructure protection to the forefront of US security concerns.
Previously, in July 1996 President Clinton appointed a Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection to report the scope and nature of vulnerabilities and threats
to the nation’s critical infrastructure, and recommend a comprehensive national plan
for protecting them including any necessary regulatory changes. The Commission was
chartered in response to growing concerns stemming from the 1993 attack on the
World Trade Center in New York City, 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City, and 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers US military barracks in
Dhahran Saudi Arabia. Examining both the physical and cyber vulnerabilities, the
Commission found no immediate crisis threatening the nation’s infrastructures.
However, it did find reason to take action, especially in the area of cybersecurity. The
rapid growth of a computer-literate population (implying a greater pool of potential
hackers), the inherent vulnerabilities of common protocols in computer networks, the
easy availability of hacker “tools” (available on many websites), and the fact that the
basic tools of the hacker (computer, modem, telephone line) were the same essential
technologies used by the general population indicated to the Commission that both
threat and vulnerability exist. The Commission Report, released in October 1997, led to
Presidential Decision Directive No. 63 (PDD-63) issued in May 1998. PDD-63 set as a
national goal the ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from intentional
attacks (both physical and cyber) by the year 2003. According to the PDD, any
interruptions in the ability of these infrastructures to provide their goods and services
must be “brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated, and minimally
detrimental to the welfare of the United States”. [1, p. 4]
PDD-63
PDD-63 identified a set of twelve infrastructure “sectors” whose assets should be
protected: information and communications; banking and finance; water supply;
aviation, highways, mass transit, pipelines, rail, and waterborne commerce; emergency
and law enforcement services; emergency, fire, and continuity of government services;
public health services; electric power, oil and gas production, and storage. A federal
Lead Agency (LA) was assigned to each of these “sectors”. Each Lead Agency was
directed to appoint a Sector Liaison Official to interact with appropriate private sector
organizations. The private sector was encouraged to select a Sector Coordinator to
work with the agency’s sector liaison official. Together, the liaison official, sector
coordinator, and all affected parties were to contribute to a Sector Security Plan (SSP)
which was to be integrated into a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. [1, p. 4]
Part III: Mission Areas
In July 1996, President
Clinton appointed a
Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection
to report on the scope
and nature of
vulnerabilities and
threats to the nation’s
critical infrastructure.
The Commission found
concern for cyber attack.
As a result, in May 1998,
President Clinton issued
PDD-63 setting a
national goal to protect
the nation’s critical
infrastructure from
intentional attack.
241
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, critical infrastructure protection became
a high priority. On October 16, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order (EO)
13231 stating that it is US policy “to protect against the disruption of the operation of
information systems for critical infrastructure ... and to ensure that any disruptions
that occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable, and cause the least
damage possible.” On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the USA
PATRIOT Act, defining critical infrastructure as “systems and assets, whether physical
or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters”. In July
2002, the Office of Homeland Security released the first National Strategy for
Homeland Security. It identified protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures and key
assets as one of six critical mission areas. The Strategy also expanded upon the list of
sectors considered to comprise critical infrastructure to include public health, the
chemical industry and hazardous materials, postal and shipping, the defense industrial
base, and agriculture and food. Key assets were defined later to include national
monuments and other historic attractions, dams, nuclear facilities, and large
commercial centers, including office buildings and sport stadiums, where large
numbers of people congregate to conduct business, personal transactions, or enjoy
recreational activities. Then on December 17, 2003, the Bush Administration released
Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 7 (HSPD-7). HSPD-7 essentially updated
the policy of the United States and the roles and responsibilities of various agencies in
regard to critical infrastructure protection as outlined in previous documents, national
strategies, and the Homeland Security Act of 2002. For example, the Directive
reiterated the Secretary of Homeland Security’s role in coordinating the overall
national effort to protect critical infrastructure. It also reiterated the role of Sector-
Specific Agencies (formerly “Lead Agencies”) to work with their sectors to identify,
prioritize, and coordinate protective measures. The Directive captured the expanded
set of critical infrastructures and key assets and Sector-Specific Agencies assignments
made in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. One major difference between
PDD-63 and the Bush Administration’s efforts was a shift in focus. PDD-63 focused on
cybersecurity. While the post-September 11 effort was still concerned with
cybersecurity, its focus on physical threats, especially those that might cause mass
casualties, was greater than the pre-September 11 effort. [1, p. 12]
HSPD-7
HSPD-7 directed development of a National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key
Resources Protection to outline national goals, objectives, milestones, and key
initiatives. Previously, PDD-63 had called for development of a National Infrastructure
Assurance Plan. The corresponding focus on cybersecurity resulted in the National
Plan for Information Systems Protection released in January 2000. While this plan
formed the basis for the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, it did not
support the revised focus on physical security stemming from 9/11. After two furtive
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
In December 2003,
President Bush issued
HSPD-7 updating
national policy on
critical infrastructure
protection, following the
same pattern
established in PDD-63.
Because 9/11 had
succeeded in subverting
critical infrastructure in
a physical attack, HSPD-
7 gave greater emphasis
to physical protection
compared to PDD-63’s
emphasis on
cybersecurity.
242
attempts in 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in June 2006. The NIPP identified and integrated
specific processes to guide an integrated national risk management effort. It defined
and standardized, across all sectors, a Risk Management Framework (RMF) process for
identifying and selecting assets for further analysis, identifying threats and conducting
threat assessments, assessing vulnerabilities to those threats, analyzing consequences,
determining risks, identifying potential risk mitigation activities, and prioritizing those
activities based on cost effectiveness. The NIPP also called for implementation plans
for these risk reduction activities, with timelines and responsibilities identified, and
tied to resources. Each Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) was to work with its sector to
generate Sector Specific Plans, utilizing the processes outlined in the NIPP. DHS was to
use these same processes to integrate the sector specific plans into a national plan
identifying those assets and risk reduction plans that require national level attention
because of the risk the incapacitation of those assets pose to the nation as a whole.
The NIPP was updated in 2009 to adopt an “all-hazards” approach to risk management,
and again in 2013 to emphasize the importance of resilience. [1, p. 24]
PPD-21
In February 2013, the Obama Administration issued Presidential Policy Directive No. 21
(PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, superseding HSPD-7. PPD-21
made no major changes in policy, roles and responsibilities, or programs, but did order
an evaluation of the existing public-private partnership model, the identification of
baseline data and system requirements for efficient information exchange, and the
development of a situational awareness capability (a continuous policy objective since
President Clinton’s PDD- 63). PPD-21 reflected an increased interest in resilience and
all-hazard approach that has evolved in critical infrastructure policy over the years. It
also updated sector designations, but made no major changes in Sector-Specific
Agency designations. However, PPD-21 did give the energy and communications
sectors a higher profile, due to the Administration’s assessment of their importance to
the operations of the other infrastructures. To date, the Obama Administration has
kept or slowly evolved the policies, organizational structures, and programs governing
physical security of critical infrastructure assets. It has focused much more effort to
expand upon the cybersecurity policies and programs associated with critical
infrastructure protection. [1, pp. 13-14]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 14-1: CIP Directives, Strategies, & Plans
HS Law HS Directives HS Strategies CIP Plans
2002 HSA 1998 PDD-63 2002 NSHS 2005 Interim NIPP
2003 HSPD-7 2007 NSHS 2005 Draft NIPP
2013 PPD-21 2010 NSS 2006 NIPP
2015 NSS 2009 NIPP
2013 NIPP
In February 2013,
President Obama issue
PPD-21 again updating
national policy on
critical infrastructure
protection. PPD-21
restored emphasis on
cybersecurity, and
introduced the concept
of resilience.
243
Risk Management Framework
The Risk Management Framework has evolved since it was first introduced in the 2005
Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. [2, p. 8] Yet it remains, as currently
prescribed in the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan, a continuous process
for incrementally reducing vulnerability within critical infrastructure. The Risk
Management Framework is conducted in voluntary cooperation between the
Department of Homeland Security and public and private partners organized into
Sector Coordinating Councils representing the sixteen infrastructure sectors listed in
Table 2. [3, pp. 10-11] The Risk Management Framework is conducted in five steps
comprised of 1) Set Goals and Objectives, 2) Identify Infrastructure, 3) Assess and
Analyze Risks, 4) Implement Risk Management Activities, and 5) Measure Effectiveness.
[3, p. 15]
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Table 14-1: CIP Directives, Strategies, & Plans
HS Law HS Directives HS Strategies CIP Plans
2002 HSA 1998 PDD-63 2002 NSHS 2005 Interim NIPP
2003 HSPD-7 2007 NSHS 2005 Draft NIPP
2013 PPD-21 2010 NSS 2006 NIPP
2015 NSS 2009 NIPP
2013 NIPP
Table 14-2: Infrastructure Sectors and Lead/Sector-Specific Agencies
1998 PDD-63
2003 HSPD-7
2013 PPD-21
# Sector LA # Sector SSA # Sector SSA
1. Intelligence CIA 1. Chemical DHS 1. Chemical DHS
2. Information & Communications
DOC 2. Commercial Facilities
DHS 2. Commercial Facilities
DHS
3. National Defense DOD 3. Communications DHS 3. Communications DHS
4. Electric, Power, Gas, & Oil
DOE 4. Critical Manufacturing
DHS 4. Critical Manufacturing
DHS
5. Emergency Law Enforcement
DOJ 5. Dams DHS 5. Dams DHS
6. Law Enforcement & Internal Security
DOJ 6. Emergency Services
DHS 6. Emergency Services
DHS
7. Foreign Affairs DOS 7. Government Facilities
DHS 7. Information Technology
DHS
8. Transportation DOT 8. Information Technology
DHS 8. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste
DHS
9. Water EPA 9. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, & Waste
DHS 9. Transportation Systems
DHS & DOT
10. Emergency Fire Service
FEMA 10. Postal & Shipping DHS 10. Government Facilities
DHS & GSA
11. Emergency Medicine
HHS 11. Defense Industrial Base
DOD 11. Defense Industrial Base
DOD
12. Banking & Finance TREAS 12. Energy DOE 12. Energy DOE
13. National Monuments & Icons
DOI 13. Water & Wastewater Systems
EPA
14. Transportation Systems
DHS & DOT
14. Healthcare & Public Health
HHS
15. Water EPA 15. Financial Services TREAS
16. Healthcare & Public Health
HHS 16. Food & Agriculture USDA
17. Banking & Finance TREAS
18. Agriculture & Food USDA
244
RMF Step 1: Set Goals and Objectives. The risk reduction priorities for each sector are
established in Sector Specific Plans (SSPs). [3, p. 16] The first SSPs were released in
May 2007, after the first official National Infrastructure Protection Plan was issued in
2006. Of the 17 plans drafted, 7 were made available to the public. The other 11 plans
were designated “For Official Use Only” and withheld from public release. A review by
the Government Accountability Office found that while all the plans complied, more or
less, with NIPP requirements, some were more developed and comprehensive than
others. The Sector Security Plans were revised in 2010 after the NIPP was revised in
2009. HSPD-7 stipulated that the SSPs should be updated annually. However, in 2010,
DHS and its sector partners decided that a four-year cycle was sufficient for updating
the SSPs. [1, pp. 23-24] As of 2015, the SSPs had yet to be updated and the most
recent versions were dated 2010.
RMF Step 2: Identify Infrastructure. Despite the definition in the USA PATRIOT Act,
critical infrastructure identification has been fraught with difficulties. While the
National Infrastructure Protection Plan was still under development, the Department
of Homeland Security undertook Operation Liberty Shield to catalog the nation’s
critical infrastructure in advance of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Over the summer of 2003,
DHS personnel cataloged 160 assets across various sectors it determined needed
additional protection or mitigation against potential attack. Under pressure from
Congress, the list was expanded to 1,849 assets and called the Protected Measures
Target list (PMTL). At the same time it was conducting Operation Liberty Shield, DHS
issued a grant asking states to conduct a critical infrastructure self-assessment. The
resulting data call added another 26,359 assets to the PMTL, including zoos, festivals,
shopping centers, and other “out-of-place” assets. [4, p. 6] The dubious results were
attributed to “minimal guidance” given to the states. Accordingly, in July 2004 DHS
issued a second data call to correct the problems from the 2003 data call. The 2004
data call included more precise instructions in the form of separate Guidelines for
Identifying National Level Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources. States responded
by submitting 47,701 additional assets to the PMTL. Together, the combined data
from Operation Liberty Shield and 2003 and 2004 data calls comprised 77,069 assets of
what DHS called the National Asset Database (NADB). Still, the DHS Inspector General
noted that the list contained too many “out-of-place” assets, making subsequent
prioritization difficult. [4, pp. 8-10] Congress intervened with the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act which mandated the establishment of
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 14-1: 2013 NIPP Risk Management Framework [3, p. 15]
The DHS Risk
Management
Framework is the
implementing procedure
of the National
Infrastructure Protection
Plan.
245
a second database containing a prioritized list of assets. [5] DHS complied with
Congress by initiating the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP)
working with public and private partners to identify and classify critical infrastructure
as either Level 1 or Level 2 priority based on the consequences associated with the
asset’s disruption or destruction. [6, p. 4] In 2006, the NADB was replaced by the
Infrastructure Information Collection System (IICS) available from the DHS
Infrastructure Protection Gateway. [7] According to the 2013 NIPP, the National Critical
Infrastructure Prioritization Program remains the primary program for prioritizing
critical infrastructure at the national level. [6, p. 17] The number and identity of assets
collected by NCIPP is protected information unavailable to the public.
RMF Step 3: Assess and Analyze Risks. DHS Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) located
in all fifty States and Puerto Rico conduct Security Surveys and Resilience Assessments
under the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) and Regional Resiliency
Assessment Program (RRAP). [8] According to DHS guidance, PSAs are to conduct Site
Assistance Visits (SAVs) with infrastructure owners and operators within their districts
giving priority to Level 1 assets. PSAs use an Infrastructure Survey Tool to gather
information on 1,500 variables covering six major components and forty-two
subcomponents. The results are compiled by Argonne National Laboratory into a
“dashboard” indicating the asset’s overall protective measure score and compare it
with the scores of similar assets that have previously undergone a Security Survey. The
interactive dashboard allows owners to consider alternative security upgrades and see
how they affect the overall security of the asset as shown in Figure 2. PSA Security
Surveys are done in voluntary cooperation with infrastructure owner/operators. [9, pp.
9-10] Out of 2,195 Security Surveys and 655 Vulnerability Assessments conducted
during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, GAO identified a total of 135 Security Surveys
and 44 Vulnerability Assessments that matched assets on the NCIPP list of high-priority
assets. GAO also identified an additional 106 Security Surveys and 23 Vulnerability
Assessments that were potential matches with assets on the NCIPP lists of priority
assets, but could not be certain that the assets were the same because of
inconsistencies in the way the data were recorded in the two different databases. All
told, GAO determined that in two years DHS had conducted 241 Security Surveys and
67 Vulnerability Assessments on high-priority assets listed in the NCIPP database. [9,
pp. 15-17]
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
The Risk Management
Framework is a risk-
based methodology for
prioritizing allocation of
scarce national
resources to reducing
vulnerabilities among
critical infrastructure.
246
The Infrastructure Survey Tool is but one method for performing risk analysis on critical
infrastructure. Over the years, each sector has developed its own set of risk analysis
tools. The 2010 Sector Security Plan for Water identifies three assessment tools: 1)
Risk Assessment Methodology-Water (RAM-W), 2) Security and Environmental
Management System (SEMS); and 3) Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool (VSAT). [10, p.
27] Similarly, the 2010 Transportation Systems Sector Specific Plan cites the use of the
Aviation Modal Risk Assessment (AMRA) as part of a broader Transportation Systems
Sector Security Risk Assessment (TSSRA) program. [11, pp. 135-136] The PSA Site
Assistance Visit is listed as the method for conducting risk assessments in the 2010
Sector Specific Plan for Energy. [12, p. 32] Originally, DHS intended for every sector to
use the same risk analysis tool in order to facilitate risk comparison across not only
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 14-2: PSA Security Survey Example "Dashboard" Results
247
infrastructure assets, but also across infrastructure sectors. In the 2006 National
Infrastructure Protection Plan DHS announced it was sponsoring development of a
suite of tools based on the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection
(RAMCAP). [13, p. 36] RAMCAP was developed at the request of the White House by
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). [14, p. xiii] The 2006 NIPP
deemed RAMCAP to satisfy the “baseline criteria for risk assessment”. This “baseline
criteria” assessed risk as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat,
expressed as R=f(C,V,T). [13, pp. 35-36] The 2013 NIPP affirmed this formulation as
part of Step 3 in the Risk Management Framework, [3, p. 17] but RAMCAP was no
longer the preferred method. It was not mentioned in either the 2009 or 2013
National Infrastructure Protection Plans. It did survive, however, as the American
Water Works Association (AWWA) J100-10 standard for Risk and Resilience
Management of Water and Wastewater Systems. [14]
RMF Step 4: Implement Risk Management Activities. As a result of risk analysis,
owners/operators are expected to take actions to increase resilience and reduce their
vulnerability to potential consequences. [3, p. 18] However, infrastructure owner/
operators are very sensitive to costs, in many instances regulated, and cannot afford to
take all measures on their own. Accordingly, DHS may lend assistance through the
FEMA Grants Program Directorate State and Local Grant Programs. Specific grant
programs include the State Homeland Security Formula-based Grants, the Urban Area
Security Initiative (UASI) Grants (both of which primarily support first responder needs,
but include certain infrastructure protection expenditures), Port Security Grants, Rail
and Transit Security Grants, Intercity Bus Security Grants, and Highway (Trucking)
Security Grants, and Buffer Zone Protection Plan. [1, pp. 27-28] Ostensibly, the results
from risk analysis are included in a Critical Infrastructure National Annual Report [3, p.
26] submitted each year with the DHS budget to the Executive Office of the President.
[15, p. 2]
RMF Step 5: Measure Effectiveness. The 1993 Government Performance and Results
Act, as amended, requires all Federal programs to develop “outcome measures” and
report them annually to Congress to guide and assess effective investment of taxpayer
funds. [16] The Risk Management Framework incorporates this principle in Step 5,
before starting all over again with Step 1 in an incremental, continuous improvement
process. [3, p. 20]
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
The Risk Management
Framework has proven
problematic at every
step. DHS has yet to
make the system work
as envisioned. Until
these problems are
solved, the nation’s
critical infrastructure
will remain vulnerable
to malicious attack.
248
Conclusion
While supporting aspects of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan including
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and Sector Coordinating Councils
have increased awareness and security among participating infrastructure sectors, the
core of the plan, the Risk Management Framework, has yet to live up to expectations.
Various GAO reports detail fundamental problems with each step of the process
including 1) inability to adequately identify infrastructure assets (mobile assets, such as
aircraft, are not included in NCIPP criteria), 2) matching PSA Site Assistance Visits with
priority assets listed on NCIPP, 3) deploying a standard formulation to uniformly assess
risk across all infrastructure sectors, 4) applying risk results to determine Federal grant
priorities, and 5) providing an objective risk measure to guide and assess taxpayer
investments. While these problems remain, the nation will remain vulnerable to the
potential catastrophic effects inherent in critical infrastructure as demonstrated on
9/11.
Part III: Mission Areas
249
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the scope and authority of a presidential executive order or directive?
2. What was the finding by the Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection that prompted President Clinton to
issue PDD-63?
3. How did HSPD-7 issued by President Bush change the emphasis on critical infrastructure protection from PDD-63?
4. How did PPD-21 issued by President Obama again change the emphasis on critical infrastructure protection from
HSPD-7?
5. Why can’t owners/operators protect their own infrastructure?
6. What is the purpose of the Risk Management Framework?
7. How does it affect the RMF if you can’t correctly identify critical infrastructure?
8. How does it affect the RMF if you can’t assess risk uniformly across different infrastructures?
9. As a member of Congress, what would be your priority in allocating funding to protect critical infrastructure?
10. What do you suppose might be a moral hazard of funding infrastructure protection programs?
250
Part III: Mission Areas
251
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
Counter WMD
Strategy
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the various prohibitions against WMD agents.
Explain how the 1995 Tokyo subway attack changed the WMD threat.
Explain the different roles of agencies in national counter WMD strategy.
Chapter 15
Learning Outcomes
252
“The potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear
weapons, poses a grave risk. Even as we have decimated al-Qa’ida’s core leadership,
more diffuse networks of al-Qa’ida, ISIL, and affiliated groups threaten U.S. citizens,
interests, allies, and partners.”
- 2015 National Security Strategy
Introduction
The history of human warfare may be characterized as an escalating development of
tactics and weapons designed to kill more people more quickly. As the industrial
revolution accelerated the production and refinement of weapons on an
unprecedented scale, the Geneva Conventions were begun in 1864 to contain the
carnage and bound the limits of warfare [1]. Similar attempts were made with the
Hague Conventions to place limits on the types of weapons that could be employed.
As early as 1899, the Hague Conventions sought to outlaw the use of chemical
weapons by warring nations. [2] After Germany breached this agreement in 1915, the
British retaliated in kind, and every major belligerent was guilty of employing chemical
weapons by the end of World War I. [3] After the war, nations continued to maintain
and expand their stocks of chemical weapons as a deterrent to their future use. It
wasn’t until the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1997 that nations agreed to destroy
their stocks, but the task is only 85% complete as nations remain wary of relinquishing
their deterrent capability against the possibility of hidden caches. [4] The prohibition
against chemical weapons came after a similar agreement prohibiting the
development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons in the 1975 Biological
Weapons Convention. [5] This was preceded by the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty in
which nations agreed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology. [6] The most difficult problem with all these treaties is enforcement.
Despite monitoring and surveillance provisions written into them, the ultimate
guarantor of compliance is the threat of retaliation by similar means. While this threat
may work on nations, it does not work as well on individuals. The 1995 Tokyo subway
attacks demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to employ weapons of mass
destruction. And while Title 18 U.S. Code Section 2332a makes it illegal to use,
threaten, attempt, or conspire to use a weapon of mass destruction in the United
States, arresting the perpetrator after the fact is too little too late. Thus the nation’s
security today relies on an unprecedented cooperation between military, intelligence,
and law enforcement agencies, between Federal, State, and Local governments to
combat weapons of mass destruction (CWMD).
Part III: Mission Areas
WMD agents are
prohibited under Title 18
USC, S2332a, and
international
conventions, including
the 1968 (nuclear) Non-
Proliferation Treaty,
1975 Biological
Weapons Convention,
and 1997 Chemical
Weapons Convention.
253
Combating WMD
The Department of Homeland Security is member of the Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee (CPRC) together with the Department of Defense (DoD),
Department of Energy (DoE), Department of State (DoS), Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI), and Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS). Together, they represent the primary Federal agencies responsible for
safeguarding the U.S. from WMD attack. In 1994, Congress commissioned the CPRC to
report on their combined efforts to combat WMD and its means of delivery. [7, p. 1]
The missions and objectives of CPRC members are guided by the 2002 National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The 2002 Strategy prescribes three
primary mission areas: 1) Nonproliferation (NP), 2) Counterproliferation (CP), and 3)
Consequence Management (CM). [7, p. 3] Nonproliferation seeks to dissuade or
impede both state and non-state actors from acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Counterproliferation seeks to develop both
active and passive measures to deter and defend against the employment of CBRN
weapons. Consequence management seeks to develop measures to quickly respond
and recover against a domestic CBRN attack. [8, p. 2] This basic strategy is further
refined by supplemental guidance listed in Table 1. These assist departments and
agencies with developing goals and objectives, identifying capability requirements, and
ultimately providing material and nonmaterial solutions for combating weapons of
mass destruction. [9, p. 2]
Department of Defense
DoDD 2060.2 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and formalizes relationships
among DoD components to combat weapons of mass destruction. [9, p. 15] DODD
2060.2 refers to CWMD mission areas described in the 2006 National Military Strategy
to Combat WMD. [10, p. 2] This was replaced in 2014 by the Defense Strategy to
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
Table 15-1: CWMD Guidance Documents [9, p. 2]
2012 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense
2012 National Strategy for Biosurveillance
2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism
2010 Nuclear Posture Review
2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
2006 National Strategy for Strategic Interdiction
2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Department of
Defense, Department of
Energy, Department of
State, and Office of the
Director of National
Intelligence together
represent the primary
Federal agencies
responsible for
safeguarding the U.S
from WMD attack.
254
Combat WMD. According to the 2014 Defense Strategy, DoD works towards three
CWMD end states: 1) no new WMD possession (NP), 2) no WMD use (CP), and 3)
minimization of WMD effects (CM). The end states are pursued through three main
lines of effort: 1) Prevent Acquisition, 2) Contain and Reduce Threats, and 3) Respond
to Crises. According to this strategy, DoD will seek to dissuade those who do not
possess WMD from acquiring them by promoting transparency, security, and
disarmament; convincing aspirants that their activities will be detected, attributed, and
mitigated; taking action to delay, disrupt, or complicate WMD acquisition; and when
necessary, undertake direct actions to prevent WMD acquisition. DoD will contain and
reduce threats by supporting arms control initiatives; working with partners to guard
against accidental or unintentional WMD employment; maintaining an effective
defense and retaliatory deterrent; and when necessary, undertaking operations to
secure, exploit, and destroy WMD. DoD will also remain prepared to locate, disrupt,
disable neutralize, or destroy an adversary’s WMD assets before they can be used;
however, if employed, DoD is prepared to support civil authorities with CBRN response
capabilities to mitigate consequences. [11, pp. 9-12] DoD capabilities supporting
CWMD policy reside with DoD agencies, commands, and components. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) leads the Department’s nonproliferation efforts by
implementing provisions of the Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation Program and
promoting arms control. United States Strategic Command directs the nation’s air,
land, and sea based nuclear forces. [9, pp. 15-17] United States Northern Command
maintains defense of the nation’s air, land, sea, and space approaches. United States
Special Operations Command is prepared to undertake precise missions around the
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 15-1: DoD Geographic Combatant Commands [12]
According to the 2014
Defense Strategy, DoD
works to 1) prevent
acquisition of WMD
(nonproliferation), 2)
contain and reduce the
threat of WMD
employment
(counterproliferation),
and 3) respond to crises
(consequence
management).
255
world. The remaining geographic combatant commands, Southern Command, Central
Command, European Command, Pacific Command, and Africa Command, maintain
stabilizing relations within their areas of responsibility, but are prepared to conduct
military operations with assigned Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units when
directed by the President. [12] In the event WMD is employed within the U.S., the
National Guard maintains 10 regional Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) that may be
tasked to a State governor to assist with CBRN mitigation. [13]
Department of Energy
DOE contributes to national CWMD efforts by ensuring energy security, producing and
maintaining the nation’s nuclear stockpile, promoting nuclear nonproliferation,
providing specialized nuclear and radiological emergency response, assisting nuclear
and radiological counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts, and fostering
fundamental science, advanced computing, and technological innovation. [14, pp. III-
10] DOE supports CWMD missions through its nuclear proliferation prevention and
counter-terrorism activities as well as through access to the many sites engaged by its
scientific cadre. DOE plays a critical role, through its core nuclear work, in addressing
inspection and monitoring activities of arms control agreements and regimes;
protection of WMD and WMD-related materials and components; detection and
tracking of these materials and components; removal of materials from compliant
nation states; export control activities; and responding to nuclear and radiological
emergencies in the United States and abroad. DOE works closely with DoD, DHS, DOS,
and the Intelligence Community to detect, characterize, and defeat WMD and WMD-
related facilities. [7, p. 18] Within DOE, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) is responsible for performing these missions. The NNSA works together with
the Group of Eight (G8) Global Partnership and the International Atomic Energy Agency
to perform its missions abroad. Within the NNSA, responsibility for countering nuclear
terrorism resides principally with the Office of Counterterrorism and
Counterproliferation, designated NA-80. NA-80’s purpose is to advance government’s
technical understanding of the terrorist nuclear threat and advocate for technically
informed policies across Federal agencies. [9, p. 18] The NNSA also maintains Nuclear
Emergency Response Teams (NERTs) capable of 1) searching for radiological devices, 2)
rendering them safe, and 3) mapping radiological contamination that might be spread.
[15]
Department of State
Central to DOS’s responsibility for diplomatic engagement on international security,
DOS aims to build international consensus on arms control and nonproliferation based
on common concern and shared responsibility. The Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security leads interagency policy development on nonproliferation
and manages global US security policy, principally in the areas of nonproliferation,
arms control, regional security and defense relations, and arms transfers and security
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
DOE contributes to
national CWMD efforts
by ensuring energy
security, producing and
maintaining the nation’s
nuclear stockpile,
promoting nuclear
nonproliferation,
providing specialized
nuclear and radiological
emergency response,
assisting nuclear and
radiological
counterterrorism and
counterproliferation
efforts, and fostering
fundamental science,
advanced computing,
and technological
innovation.
256
assistance. This entails overseeing the negotiation, implementation, and verification of
international agreements in arms control and international security. Other specific
responsibilities include directing and coordinating export control policies and policies
to prevent missile, nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons
proliferation. All of these contribute to the DOS’s strategic goal of countering threats
to the US and the international order. DOS CWMD responsibilities are primarily
planned and executed via: the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
(AVC); the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN); and the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM); all of which report to the Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security. [14, pp. III-7]
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ODNI directs the activities of the Intelligence Community to provide high-value
intelligence supporting U.S. policies and actions to discourage, prevent, rollback, deter,
and mitigate the consequences of WMD. ODNI leads the nation’s CWMD intelligence
efforts through various interagency groups and centers: [9, p. 20]
CBRN Counterterrorism Group (CCTG). ODNI manages the CCTG formed by the merger
of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) Counterterrorism Center and National
Counterterrorism Center’s CBRN analysis group. The CCTG pools analytical experts
from CIA, NCTC, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), FBI, and other U.S. Government
organizations to support a wide range of intelligence activities focused on CWMD. [9,
p. 20]
National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC). The NCPC helps the U.S counter threats
caused by the development and spread of WMD. NCPC works with the Intelligence
Community to identify critical gaps in WMD knowledge resulting from shortfalls in
collection, analysis, or exploitation and then develop solutions to reduce or close these
gaps. The NCPC does this by analyzing, integrating, and disseminating comprehensive
all-source WMD proliferation intelligence; providing all-source intelligence support
needed for the execution of counterproliferation plans or activities; and performing
independent WMD proliferation analyses. It may also play a role in the nuclear
attribution process by fusing law enforcement and intelligence information with
nuclear forensics conclusions provided by national technical nuclear forensics center.
The NCPC also provides WMD briefs and analyses to the President, Congress, and the
appropriate Federal departments and agencies, as required. The majority of the NCPC
staff are detailees from the intelligence community, as well as DoD and the DOE
national laboratories. [14, pp. III-6 - III-7]
Part III: Mission Areas
ODNI directs the
activities of the
Intelligence
Community to
provide high-value
intelligence
supporting U.S.
policies and actions to
discourage, prevent,
rollback, deter, and
mitigate the
consequences of
WMD.
257
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is the primary organization in the
U.S. Government that integrates and analyzes intelligence pertaining to terrorism and
counterterrorism, including all intelligence related to terrorist use of WMD. The CT
community lead for identifying critical intelligence problems, key knowledge gaps, and
major resource constraints is the NCTC. The NCTC combines intelligence, military, law
enforcement, and homeland security networks to facilitate information sharing across
government departments and agencies. In addition to its information sharing role, the
NCTC provides a strategic-level operational planning function for CT activities and is
responsible for integrating all elements of national power toward successful
implementation of the national CT strategy. [14, pp. III-6]
Department of Homeland Security
The 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review identified three CWMD-related
mission areas: 1) Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security; 2) Securing and
Managing Borders; and 3) Ensuring Resilience to Disasters. [9, pp. 18-19] DHS also
maintains the National Response Framework (NRF) for guiding how U.S. Government
departments and agencies should work together to prepare for and respond to WMD
events. DHS agencies, along with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DOE, the
Department of the Treasury (TREAS), the Department of Commerce (DOC), and the
intelligence community, play a vital role in supporting national CWMD efforts. Agencies
within the DHS that contribute to the CWMD mission include: [14, pp. III-8]
United States Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG may play an integral role in WMD
interdiction operations by protecting US economic and security interests in maritime
regions, including international waters, U.S. coastal regions, ports, and waterways.
USCG personnel can be used to enforce U.S. laws anywhere in the world, with certain
restrictions, and can participate in regular DoD-led interdiction operations under their
Title 14, USC authorities, even if assigned DoD forces. [14, pp. III-8]
Customs and Border Protection (CBP). To prevent WMD smuggling, the CBP works
through existing partnerships with customs and law enforcement agencies in partner
nations to protect U.S. borders, ports of entry, and screen admissibility of persons,
cargo, and vessels arriving into U.S. ports. CBP also supports a National Targeting
Center and operates the Container Security Initiative with the DOE. [14, pp. III-8]
Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Federal Emergency Management Agency
provides support to our nation’s critical infrastructure in response to CBRN hazards
through comprehensive emergency management programs including risk reduction,
preparedness, response, and recovery. [14, pp. III-8]
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
The Department of
Homeland Security also
plays a role in national
CWMD strategy by: 1)
Preventing Terrorism
and Enhancing Security;
2) Securing and
Managing Borders; and
3) Ensuring Resilience to
Disasters.
258
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). DNDO improves the Nation’s ability to
detect and report transportation of nuclear or radiological material. Additionally,
DNDO operates the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, which has two
primary missions. The first provides centralized planning, integration, assessment, and
stewardship of the nation’s nuclear forensics capabilities to ensure a ready, robust, and
enduring capability in coordination with other U.S. Government departments and
agencies who have assigned responsibilities for national technical nuclear forensics.
These include the Department of Justice and FBI, who is the lead federal agency
responsible for the criminal investigation of terrorist events and the nuclear forensic
investigation of planned or actual attack; DoD, DOE, DOS, ODNI, and DHS. The second
mission is to advance the capability to perform nuclear forensics on nuclear and
radiological materials in a pre-detonation (intact) state. [14, pp. III-8]
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE enforces US immigration and customs
regulations. One of its highest priorities is to prevent illicit procurement networks,
terrorist groups, and hostile nations from illegally obtaining U.S. military products,
sensitive dual-use technology, WMD, or CBRN materials. The ICE homeland security
investigation’s counterproliferation investigations program oversees a broad range of
investigative activities related to such violations. The counterproliferation
investigations program enforces US laws involving the export of military items,
controlled dual-use goods, firearms, and ammunition, as well as exports to sanctioned
or embargoed countries. [14, pp. III-9]
Conclusion
The effects of U.S. CWMD policy range from the mundane to the profound. Patients of
nuclear medicine are routinely pulled aside after tripping Radiation Portal Monitors
installed in airports and other major U.S. ports of entry. [16] Citing the need to disarm
Iraq of suspected caches of WMD, President Bush in March 2003 launched the U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq. The invasion and subsequent eight-year occupation cost the nation
$1.7 trillion, 4,488 U.S. casualties, and 32,223 U.S. wounded. Iraq itself suffered an
estimated 189,000 casualties and counting as it continues to struggle with internal
strife. [17] No definitive caches of WMD were found.
Part III: Mission Areas
259 Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Which WMD agent was first used in warfare?
2. Which WMD agent emerged during World War One?
3. Which WMD agent emerged during World War Two?
4. How did the 1995 Tokyo subway attacks change the WMD threat?
5. What is DoD’s role in national counter WMD strategy?
6. What is DOS’s role in national counter WMD strategy?
7. What s DOE’s role in national counter WMD strategy?
8. What is ODNI’s role in national counter WMD strategy?
9. What is DHS’s role in national counter WMD strategy?
10. Which WMD agent do you think is easiest to obtain? Explain your answer.
260
Part III: Mission Areas
261
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the relationship between cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protections.
Explain why cyber attack holds so much destructive potential.
Describe Internet ownership and management relationships.
Identify key components of the Internet.
Discuss potential Internet vulnerabilities.
Evaluate computer crime.
Describe DHS’s cybersecurity roles and responsibilities.
Chapter 16
Learning Outcomes
262
“Because our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent cyber-supported
infrastructures, non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems
may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy.”
- 1998 Presidential Decision Directive No. 63
Introduction
Cybersecurity goes hand-in-hand with critical infrastructure protection, because 1)
cyberspace provides an avenue for attacking critical infrastructure from anywhere
around the world; 2) cyber components make critical infrastructure susceptible to
subversion, disruption, or destruction; and 3) cyberspace itself is a critical
infrastructure on which many other critical infrastructures depend. What keeps the
experts awake at night is the knowledge that the potential consequences of a
coordinated cyber attack could dwarf any previous disaster in U.S. history, either
natural or manmade. This chapter will take a look at some of those nightmare
scenarios and examine what the Department of Homeland Security is doing to keep
them from becoming reality.
Worst Case Scenarios
The worst disaster in U.S. history was the 1900 hurricane that hit Galveston Texas; as
many as 12,000 people are thought to have perished in that disaster. The worst
manmade disaster in U.S. history was 9/11 in which 3,000 people lost their lives. [1]
Yet the death and damages resulting from these disasters might pale in comparison to
the destruction that could conceivably be wrought by a coordinated cyber attack on
selected infrastructure. We present just three plausible scenarios that have been
considered, at one time or another, at the highest levels of U.S. leadership.
Shutdown the North American Electric Grid.
In August 2003, an electricity blackout affected 50 million people in the northeastern
United States and Canada, causing an estimated $4-$10 billion in economic losses.
Though it lasted only a week, the outage resulted in a 0.7% drop in Canada’s gross
domestic product. [2, p. 2] A John Hopkins study determined that New York City
experienced a 122% increase in accidental deaths and 25% increase in disease-related
deaths, and that ninety people died as a direct result of the power outage. [3] Though
the 2003 outage was an accident, it raised concerns whether an even wider outage
could be induced deliberately. In 2006, DHS and the Department of Energy conducted
a joint experiment named Project Aurora. In this experiment, researchers proved that
a generator could be remotely commanded over the Internet to physically self-
destruct. [4, p. 21] The implications were shocking because the time necessary to
replace a generator can range from months to years. [5, p. 12] Of course the North
American electric grid is designed and monitored to sustain service in the event a given
component fails. It is not designed, however, to sustain large-scale damages that
Part III: Mission Areas
Cybersecurity Concerns:
1) cyberspace provides
an avenue for attacking
critical infrastructure
from anywhere around
the world; 2) cyber
components make
critical infrastructure
susceptible to
subversion, disruption,
or destruction; and 3)
cyberspace itself is a
critical infrastructure on
which many other
critical infrastructures
depend.
263
might result from a coordinated attack. If such an attack was successful, a significant
portion of the United States could lose power for periods lasting months, not weeks.
Unlike the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, there would be no “islands of power” from
which to stage recovery or seek refuge. The affected regions would go dark, and their
supporting infrastructure would collapse. The cascading effects would be disastrous.
No doubt the nation would survive, but it would be deeply wounded as no other
experience since the Civil War.
Multiple Simultaneous Meltdowns.
In March 1979, a series of incidents almost resulted in a meltdown of reactor number
two at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Dauphin County Pennsylvania.
Though a meltdown was averted, and only a slight amount of radiation released,
140,000 people were evacuated from a 20-mile radius before the situation was
contained. [6] By comparison, the residents of Pripyat in the Ukraine were not so lucky
when in April 1986, reactor number four at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant
exploded. Though a different design than the plant at Three Mile Island, the Chernobyl
nuclear accident amply demonstrates the dangers of a nuclear meltdown: 350,400
people were permanently evacuated from a radius extending 19-miles in all directions
from the plant. Radiation from the fallout is so intense inside the “zone of alienation”
that it will remain unsafe for human habitation for another 20,000 years (though a
stalwart contingent of 300 residents refuse to leave and remain in the area). [7] Again,
these were accidents, but as the Stuxnet attack in 2010 proved, they could conceivably
become deliberate. In 2010, the Iranian nuclear program was set back due to
production losses at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. The problem was
eventually traced to a piece of malware inserted in Siemens equipment controlling the
separation centrifuges. Later called Stuxnet, the malware was extraordinary not only
for the damage it caused, but also for how it was implanted. The equipment was not
connected to the Internet. The malware had been introduced in the supply chain,
somewhere between manufacture and delivery. [8] Stuxnet demonstrates how a
similar virus could be concealed inside critical components and timed to initiate a
simultaneous meltdown at multiple nuclear power plants. It certainly wouldn’t be
easy, but it’s certainly not improbable.
Shutting Down the Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve is the central banking system of the United States. The system is
comprised of a Board of Governors, a Federal Open Market Committee, and twelve
regional Federal Reserve Banks located in major cities throughout the nation. The
Federal Reserve was established in 1913 in response to the financial crisis of 1907 in
which payments were disrupted across the country because many banks refused to
clear checks drawn on other banks, eventually leading to their failure. To preclude
similar panics, the Federal Reserve was formed as a “banker’s bank” to facilitate
transactions between commercial institutions. Through its actions, the Federal
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
The death and damages
resulting from past
national disasters might
pale in comparison to
the destruction that
could conceivably be
wrought by a
coordinated cyber
attack on selected
infrastructure.
264
Reserve influences the availability of money and credit, transacting trillions of dollars
underpinning the U.S. economy. [9] The vast majority of these transactions are
conducted electronically, between the Reserve Banks and their corporate clients. The
system is mostly closed and very well protected, but no defense is invulnerable.
Conceivably it could be compromised through a Stuxnet-like attack or by an “insider”
attack. An “insider” attack is perpetrated by someone with legitimate access
conducting unauthorized actions. Alternatively, a “phishing” attack might trick an
authorized user into divulging their access codes to a criminal agent. This last
approach is particularly disconcerting because it means system security is only as
strong as the weakest person in the chain (of course the computer system has internal
as well as external access controls, but accomplished hackers will use their initial
access to gain higher authorizations). The potential consequences of a hostile agent
shutting down the Federal Reserve are too broad to contemplate. Like electricity,
monetary transactions pervade every aspect of society, from ordering a latte to paying
the mortgage. What would happen if all forms of electronic payment halted? While
you might not be evicted for missing a mortgage payment, you also could not buy that
latte, or more importantly, buy gas for your car or groceries for your family. How long
would the Federal Reserve have to be down before panic ensued? Not long at all.
Again, it’s not easy, but it’s not impossible.
Cyberspace
As explained in the introduction, cyberspace serves as both an avenue of attack and a
means of support for other critical infrastructure. Understanding what it is, therefore,
is an important precondition to protecting it. According to the DHS Glossary of
Common Cybersecurity Terminology, cyberspace is “the interdependent network of
information technology infrastructures, that includes the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.” [10]
Essentially “cyberspace” is a broad term encompassing the Internet and everything
connected to it. So what is the Internet? By definition the Internet is a “network of
networks”. The key enabling technologies are links, standards, protocols, and routers.
A link is a physical communications path between two points. A link may be wired
(copper or fiber) or wireless (light or radio), depending on required cost, distance, and
bandwidth. A link serves to transmit electronic data packets conforming to the Open
System Interconnection (OSI) standard. The source and destination of each data
packet are internally encoded in a globally unique Internet Protocol (IP) address. A link
may terminate at a router, which, in turn, may be connected to two or more links. A
router examines the destination address of each arriving packet and forwards it on to
another link to convey it closer or quicker to its final destination. It may require many
packets to transmit a single text, graphic, sound, or video object. The Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) ensures that all packets are properly re-assembled into the
Part III: Mission Areas
The Internet is a
connected graph of links
and routers. What is
fundamentally
important to the
Internet is that each
component is
independently owned
and operated by
different public and
private agencies: the
Internet does not belong
to any single entity.
265
original object at their intended destination1. While greatly simplified and highly
abstract, the preceding description provides a physical conception of the Internet,
which may be schematically represented as shown in Figure 1.
As shown in Figure 1, the Internet is a connected graph of links and routers. What is
not shown, and what is fundamentally important to the Internet, is that each
component is independently owned and operated by different public and private
agencies: the Internet does not belong to any single entity. It is a collection of diverse
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
1A “message” may be digitized text, graphics, sound, or video. Sound and video packets may be
transmitted using the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) which trades speed for reliability compared to TCP. A
few lost sound or video packets will not be discernable to the human ear or eye.
Figure 16-1: Schematic Representation of a Portion of the Internet
266
components conforming to an agreed set of engineering standards. The individual
owners are collectively called Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The Internet is built and
grows as ISPs join their networks with those of other ISPs.
ISPs are unofficially classified into “Tiers” based on the size of their networks and how
they connect with other ISPs. ISPs connect to each other through either a “peering” or
“transit” agreement. Peering is when a pair of ISPs establish a reciprocal agreement to
connect with each other and exchange traffic without charge. On the other hand, a
transit relationship requires some form of fee based on the amount of traffic shared
between the ISPs. [11] Accordingly, ISPs are classified as Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3. Tier 1
ISPs are the largest, and peer with other Tier 1 ISPs to reach every other ISP on the
Internet without purchasing transit. Table 1 lists the seven U.S. Tier 1 ISPs. Tier 2 ISPs
peer with some ISPs, but purchase transit to reach at least some portion of the
Internet. Examples of Tier 2 ISPs are major cable, Digital Service Link (DSL), and mobile
providers. Tier 3 ISPs must purchase transit from other ISPs to access the Internet.
Examples of Tier 3 ISPs are small regional providers, small mobile providers, and
university networks. [12]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 16-1: U.S. Tier 1 ISPs [13]
1. AT&T 5. Level 3
2. Verizon 6. NTT/Verio
3. Spring 7. Cogent
4. Century Link
Figure 16-2: Internet ISP Tiers
The individual owners
are collectively called
Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). The
Internet is built and
grows as ISPs join their
networks with those of
other ISPs.
267
Transiting and peering between ISPs is facilitated by Internet Exchange Points (IXPs).
The primary role of an IXP is to keep local traffic local and reduce the costs associated
with traffic exchange between Internet providers. IXPs are a vital part of the Internet.
Without them, the Internet would not function efficiently because the different
networks that make up the Internet would need to directly interconnect with every
other network in order to be able to exchange traffic with each other. [15]
The compelling benefits of IXPs spurred their rapid global growth. As of 2012, there
were 350 IXPs operational worldwide. The US has about 86 IXPs strategically located
across the country. Other countries with more than 10 IXPs are: Australia (11), Brazil
(19), France (15), Germany (14), Japan (16), Russia (14), Sweden (12), and United
Kingdom (12). [15]
As mentioned previously, the Internet is not owned by any single entity, however, it
does rely on central services to ensure unique Internet Protocol addresses for each
component connected to it. IP addresses are controlled by the Internet Corporation
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN is a global non-profit agency
operating out of Los Angeles California. IP addresses come in two forms: 1) human-
readable, i.e., “alias”, and 2) machine-readable, i.e., “numeric”. While the human-
readable address is easier for people to remember (e.g., facebook.com, Google.com,
Amazon.com), the machine-readable address is the form required by routers (e.g.,
173.252.120.6, 74.125.70.102, 72.21.215.232). Accordingly, the Internet relies on
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
Figure 16-3: IXP Role in Today's Internet [16]
Internet Exchange
Points (IXPs) are a vital
part of the Internet.
Without them, the
Internet would not
function efficiently
because the different
networks that make up
the Internet would need
to directly interconnect
with every other
network in order to be
able to exchange traffic
with each other.
268
Domain Name Services (DNS) to translate one form of IP address into another and help
route traffic along the Internet. DNS is maintained by a department of ICANN called
the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). IANA operates and maintains DNS
services provided by hundreds of computers known as root servers located in many
countries in every region of the world. Root servers contain the IP addresses of all the
Top-Level Domain (TLD) registry name servers; e.g., “.com” and “.de”. Root servers
“translate” aliases into numbers. They perform a critical if somewhat “back-office”
role in ensuring the continuity and therefore reliability of the Internet. [17]
Cyber Attack
The 1984 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud & Abuse Act (18 USC S1030)
prohibits unauthorized access to computers used by the Federal government, banks,
and otherwise used for interstate or international commerce. Due to the inter-state
nature of the Internet, the law is interpreted to mean most all computers including cell
phones. A 1986 amendment further criminalized the distribution of malicious code,
trafficking in passwords, and denial of service attacks. [18] According to the U.S.
National Research Council, a cyber attack is any “deliberate action to alter, disrupt,
deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and /or
programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks.” [19, p. 9] There are
many different ways to mount a cyber attack as illustrated in Figure 4. According to a
2014 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the two most
common attack methods are social engineering and vulnerability exploitation.
According to the Center, social engineering is where an attacker tricks a user into
granting access, and vulnerability exploitation is where an attacker takes advantage of
a programming or implementation failure to gain access. [20, p. 10] According to the
report, cybercrime is a growth industry because the returns are great and the risks are
low. The Center estimates that the annual cost to the global economy is more than
$400 billion, yet most cybercrime goes unreported, and few cybercriminals are caught
or even identified. [20, p. 2&4]
Cyber Security
The DHS Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology defines cybersecurity as “the
activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and
communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from
and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation.
[10] Cybersecurity is also a growth industry. According to the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, the global market for cybersecurity products and services is $58
billion and growing annually. [20, p. 17] In concept, cybersecurity is very simple. All you
have to do is ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the computer
system and its data. Confidentiality ensures the system and data are not accessed by
an unauthorized agent. Integrity ensures that the system and data are not corrupted
by an unauthorized agent. Availability ensures that the system and data are always
Part III: Mission Areas
The 1984 Counterfeit
Access Device and
Computer Fraud &
Abuse Act (18 USC
S1030) prohibits
unauthorized access to
computers used by the
Federal government,
banks, and otherwise
used for interstate or
international commerce.
Due to the inter-state
nature of the Internet,
the law is interpreted to
mean most all
computers including cell
phones.
269
accessible when needed. [21, pp. 1-2] These seemingly simple goals, however, are
very difficult to attain because computers are inherently stupid and fragile. Computers
are stupid, because unlike humans, computers are incapable of making value
judgments regarding their actions and will perform as directed regardless of outcome,
even if the consequences are catastrophic. Computers are also fragile; a single wrong
character can disrupt millions of lines of code, compared to buildings which do not
collapse because one brick fails. Finding such flaws is impossible. Even a small 100-
line program with some nested paths and a single loop executing less than twenty
times may contain 100 trillion paths. Assuming each path could be evaluated in a
millisecond (one-thousandth of a second), testing would take 3170 years. [22] The
cumulative effect makes computers inherently vulnerable to diversion from their
intended purpose, either through oversight or tampering.
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
Figure 16-4: AVOIDIT Cyber Attack Taxonomy [23]
270
Protecting Cyberspace
Section 103 of the Homeland Security Act made the Department of Homeland Security
responsible for cybersecurity at the same time it made it responsible for critical
infrastructure protection. [24] As an infrastructure, the Internet underpins the
functioning of most other infrastructures, making it essential to the economy and
security of the United States. [25, p. 1] Although the Internet is comprised of billions of
components globally, it depends on only a thousand to maintain proper functioning,
offering a relatively small set of lucrative targets capable of incapacitating the Internet.
These include the Internet Exchange Points and DNS Root Servers. Any number of
attacks could possibly be launched and some have already been attempted against
these high-value assets. In October 2002, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
succeeded in affecting 9 of 13 root servers, and at least two root servers “suffered
badly” from another attack in February 2007. [26] Because IXPs are designed to
manage large traffic loads, a specific type of DDoS attack called a Cross-Plane Session
Termination (CXPST) attack employing about 250,000 “bots” would be needed. It is
surmised that a well targeted and well timed attack could take down significant parts
of the Internet. [16, p. 48]
As an infrastructure, the Internet is included in the DHS National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP). The DHS National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) under the
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) is the Sector Specific Agency (SSA)
for the Information Technology (IT) Sector. DHS has no regulatory authority over the IT
sector. NCSD, therefore, works in voluntary cooperation with private partners in the
Sector Coordinating Council (SCC), including some Tier 1 Internet Service Providers
listed in Table 1. As part of the NIPP, DHS supports an IT Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (IT-ISAC) to promote the exchange of threat and security information
among SCC partners. Private organizations may also report cyber incidents to the DHS
National Incident Coordinating Center (NICC). In 2010, NCSD worked with sector
partners to produce the IT Sector Specific Plan (IT-SSP). The 2010 IT-SSP reported the
results of a 2008-2009 IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment (ITSRA), noting concerns
about DNS root services. [27] ITSRA appears to be a one-off study, conducted as the
NIPP Risk Management Framework (RMF) was still gaining traction. In May 2013, DHS
noted the use of an NCSD-developed Cyber Assessment Risk Management Approach
(CARMA) for conducting risk assessment of cyber assets in conjunction with the NIPP
Risk Management Framework. [28]
The basic problem of the Internet is that it is a victim of its own success. Originally
designed as a research tool for a trusted community of researchers, the Internet has
expanded well beyond its original design specifications and must today operate in an
environment that cannot be trusted.
Part III: Mission Areas
Although the Internet is
comprised of billions of
components globally, it
depends on only a
thousand to maintain
proper functioning,
offering a relatively
small set of lucrative
targets capable of
incapacitating the
Internet. These include
the Internet Exchange
Points and DNS Root
Servers.
271
Protecting Infrastructure from Cyberspace
Many critical infrastructures including electricity transmission systems, gas pipelines,
and water distribution systems rely on Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) to monitor and
control physical objects and devices, such as switches and valves that are often located
in remote locations. Industrial Control Systems include Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCSs), Programmable Logic
Controllers (PLCs), and General-Purpose Controllers (GPCs). Most ICSs began as
proprietary, stand-alone systems that were separated from the rest of the world and
isolated from most external sources. Today, widely available software applications,
Internet-enabled devices and other nonproprietary information technology offerings
have been integrated into most ICSs. This connectivity has delivered many benefits,
but it also has increased the vulnerability of these systems to malicious attacks,
equipment failures, and other threats. ICS disruptions or failure can result in death or
injury, property damage, and loss of critical services. [29]
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity Division
established the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), which was chartered to work
with control systems security stakeholders through awareness and outreach programs
that encourage and support coordinated control systems security enhancement
efforts. In 2009, the CSSP established the Industrial Control System Joint Working
Group (ICSJWG) as a coordination body to facilitate the collaboration of control system
stakeholders and to encourage the design, development and deployment of enhanced
security for control systems. In 2011, the ICSJWG released a Cross-Sector Roadmap for
Cybersecurity. [29]
Industrial Control Systems present a particularly worrisome problem as a coordinated
attack might result in some form of worst case scenario examined at the beginning of
this chapter. Accordingly, in 2010 DHS released a National Cyber Incident Response
Plan (NCIRP) describing how it would prepare for, respond to, and begin to coordinate
recovery from a significant cyber incident. A significant cyber incident is classified as a
Level 2, “substantial” incident on the National Cyber Risk Alert Level (NCRAL) shown in
Table 2. Threat levels are monitored at the DHS National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), a 24-hour operations center ready to
coordinate a national cyber incident response. Among its assets, the NCCIC has access
to both the US-CERT and ICS-CERT. [30]
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
Industrial Control
Systems present a
particularly worrisome
problem as a
coordinated attack
might result in some
form of worst case
scenario. Accordingly,
in 2010 DHS released a
National Cyber Incident
Response Plan (NCIRP)
describing how it would
prepare for, respond to,
and begin to coordinate
recovery from a
significant cyber
incident.
272
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT). US-CERT is a partnership
between DHS and the public and private sectors. US-CERT is charged with providing
response support and defense against cyber attacks for the Federal Civil Executive
Branch (.gov) and information sharing and collaboration among State, Local, Tribal and
Territorial governments, industry, and international partners. US-CERT interacts with
Federal agencies, industry, the research community, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial
governments, and other entities to disseminate reasoned and actionable cybersecurity
information to the public. US-CERT also provides a way for citizens, businesses, and
other institutions to communicate and coordinate directly with the U.S. Government
about cybersecurity. [30, pp. N-2]
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT). ICS-CERT
provides focused operational capabilities for defending control system environments
against emerging cyber threats. ICS-CERT provides efficient coordination of control
systems-related security incidents and information sharing with Federal, State, Local,
Tribal and Territorial agencies and organizations; the Intelligence Community (IC);
private sector constituents, including vendors, owners, and operators; and
international and private sector CERTs. ICS-CERT leads this effort by responding to and
analyzing control systems-related incidents, conducting vulnerability and malware
analysis, providing onsite support for forensic investigations, and providing situational
awareness in the form of actionable intelligence and reports. [30, pp. N-2]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 16-2: DHS National Cyber Risk Alert Levels
Level Label Risk Response
1 Severe Highly disruptive levels of consequences are occurring or imminent
Response functions are overwhelmed, and top-level national executive authorities and engagements are essential. Exercise of mutual aid agreements and Federal/non-Federal assistance is essential
2 Substantial Observed or imminent degradation of critical functions with moderate to significant level of consequences, possibly coupled with indicators of higher levels of consequences impending
Surged posture becomes indefinitely necessary, rather than only temporarily. The DHS Secretary is engaged, and appropriate designation of authorities and activation of Federal capabilities such as the Cyber Unified Command Group take place. Other similar non-Federal incident response mechanisms are engaged
3 Elevated Early indications of, or the potential for but no indicators of, moderate to severe levels of consequences
Upward shift in precautionary measures occurs. Responding entities are capable of managing incidents/events within the parameters of normal, or slight enhanced, operational posture
4 Guarded Baseline of risk acceptance Baseline operations, regular information sharing, exercise of processes and procedures, reporting, and mitigation strategy continue without undue disruption or resource allocation
273
The DHS NCCIC primarily serves as a warning and alerting system. While the US-CERT
and ICS-CERT may provide analysis and recommendations, DHS does not have
deployable cyber units that will show up onsite and fix your cyber problems. The
closest such capability is being built by the Department of Defense (DoD) as part of
their National Cyber Mission Force (CMF) promulgated under the DoD’s Cyber
Strategy. The DoD Cyber Strategy has three missions: 1) defend DoD networks,
systems, and information; 2) defend the U.S. homeland and U.S. national interests
against cyber attacks of significant consequence; and 3) provide cyber support to
military operational and contingency plans. Towards this end, DoD will develop 68
Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) to perform the first mission; 13 National Mission Teams
(NMTs) for the second mission; 27 Combat Mission Teams (CMTs) for the third mission;
and 25 National Support Teams (NSTs) to assist them all. [31]
The 13 National Mission Teams comprising the National Mission Force (NMF) will be
supported by 8 NSTs (also called Direct Support Teams), and will be designed to defend
the nation against strategic cyber attacks on U.S. interests. Reportedly, the NMTs will
employ counter-cyber force to stop cyber attacks and malicious cyber activity of
significant consequences against the nation. [32, p. 9]
While details remain sketchy, it appears the NMTs will only be employed in the case of
foreign cyber attack. Attribution is a thorny problem when it comes to cyber attack. As
was already mentioned, few cyber criminals are identified let alone caught. The
implication is that NMTs will have very limited domestic utility, and there will be no
cyber cavalry coming to the rescue in the event of a significant domestic cyber attack.
Ultimately, infrastructure owners/operators must rely on their own devices to protect
their assets.
Protecting Cyber Assets
In February 2013, President Obama signed EO 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure
Cybersecurity, assigning the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
responsibility for developing a Cybersecurity Framework. The framework was to form
the basis for a Voluntary Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity Program that would
encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to improve the security of their
information networks. NIST released Version 1.0 of the Framework February 12, 2014.
[33, p. 13]
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
The DHS National
Cybersecurity and
Communications
Integration Center
(NCCIC) primarily serves
as a warning and
alerting system. While
the US-CERT and ICS-
CERT may provide
analysis and
recommendations, DHS
does not have
deployable cyber units
that will show up onsite
and fix your cyber
problems.
274
EO 13636 also required those agencies with regulatory authority over certain critical
infrastructure owner and operators to evaluate whether “the agency has clear
authority to establish requirements… to sufficiently address current and project cyber
risks to critical infrastructure.” Although DHS has no regulatory authority over Internet
Service Providers, as the Sector Specific Agency DHS recommended voluntary
application of cybersecurity measures for the Information Technology sector. [34]
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a risk-based approach to managing cybersecurity
risk, and is composed of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework
Implementation Tiers, and the Framework Profiles. Each Framework component
reinforces the connection between business drivers and cybersecurity activities. [35]
The Framework Core is a set of cybersecurity activities, desired outcomes, and
applicable references that are common across critical infrastructure sectors. The Core
presents industry standards, guidelines, and practices in a manner that allows for
communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from
the executive level to the implementation/operations level. The Framework Core
consists of five concurrent and continuous Functions—Identify, Protect, Detect,
Respond, Recover. When considered together, these Functions provide a high-level,
strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s management of cybersecurity risk.
The Framework Core then identifies underlying key Categories and Subcategories for
each Function, and matches them with example Informative References such as
existing standards, guidelines, and practices for each Subcategory. [35]
Framework Implementation Tiers (“Tiers”) provide context on how an organization
views cybersecurity risk and the processes in place to manage that risk. Tiers describe
the degree to which an organization’s cybersecurity risk management practices exhibit
the characteristics defined in the Framework (e.g., risk and threat aware, repeatable,
and adaptive). The Tiers characterize an organization’s practices over a range, from
Partial (Tier 1) to Adaptive (Tier 4). These Tiers reflect a progression from informal,
reactive responses to approaches that are agile and risk-informed. During the Tier
selection process, an organization should consider its current risk management
practices, threat environment, legal and regulatory requirements, business/mission
objectives, and organizational constraints. [35]
Part III: Mission Areas
In February 2013,
President Obama signed
EO 13636 directing the
National Institute of
Standards and
Technology (NIST) to
develop a Cybersecurity
Framework. A year
later, NIST released v1.0
of a framework that was
to form the basis of a
Voluntary Cybersecurity
Program encouraging
critical infrastructure
owners and operators to
improve the security of
their information
networks.
275
A Framework Profile (“Profile”) represents the outcomes based on business needs that
an organization has selected from the Framework Categories and Subcategories. The
Profile can be characterized as the alignment of standards, guidelines, and practices to
the Framework Core in a particular implementation scenario. Profiles can be used to
identify opportunities for improving cybersecurity posture by comparing a “Current”
Profile (the “as is” state) with a “Target” Profile (the “to be” state). To develop a
Profile, an organization can review all of the Categories and Subcategories and, based
on business drivers and a risk assessment, determine which are most important; they
can add Categories and Subcategories as needed to address the organization’s risks.
The Current Profile can then be used to support prioritization and measurement of
progress toward the Target Profile, while factoring in other business needs including
cost-effectiveness and innovation. Profiles can be used to conduct self-assessments
and communicate within an organization or between organizations. [35]
While the NIST Cybersecurity Framework doesn’t explain how, it is assumed that an
asset’s profile can be mapped to a tier level. Presumably the higher the tier level, the
more secure the asset. But this is all about risk management, so there are no
guarantees.
Conclusion
Cybersecurity as a mission of homeland security has come full circle. Recognizing that
the growing use of the Internet portended a potential avenue of attack, the 1997
Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure can be considered the
beginning of homeland security. PDD-63 laid the foundation for the critical
infrastructure protection mission. Whereas PDD-63 was focused on cyber threats to
infrastructure, HSPD-7 understandably gave priority to physical threats after the
example of 9/11. In response to the growing frequency and ferocity of cyber attacks
on the nation, PPD-21 restored the primacy of cybersecurity to homeland security.
Cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection are inseparable. Aware of the
potential worst case scenarios, today we remain an ever vigilant nation against cyber
attack.
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
276
Part III: Mission Areas
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. How is cybersecurity related to critical infrastructure protection?
2. Why does cyber attack hold so much destructive potential?
3. Of the possible worst case scenarios, which do you think would be most devastating? Explain.
4. Of the possible worst case scenarios, which do you think would be most long lasting? Explain.
5. Who owns the Internet?
6. Who manages the Internet?
7. According to the 1984 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, which of the following actions
constitute a crime?
a. Accessing a computer without the owner’s consent.
b. Probing a network to assess its security measures.
c. Disconnecting the Internet to contain a virus.
8. List and describe two potential targets that could shutdown the Internet.
9. What is DHS’s role in cybersecurity?
10. How many cyber teams does DHS have ready to deploy in the event of a national emergency?
277
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain how terrorism uniquely distinguishes the crime of assault.
Explain why Islamic extremism is considered a terrorist threat.
Evaluate the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism.
Assess the different roles of the FBI and DHS under PDD-39/HSPD-5.
Discuss the primary means for dealing with known terrorists, foreign or domestic.
Compare different options for dealing with foreign terrorists.
Chapter 17
Learning Outcomes
278
“Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety,
deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”
- Benjamin Franklin, November 11, 1755
Introduction
9/11 was largely seen as a failure of coordination between Law Enforcement and the
Intelligence Community. While debating the role and structure of the new Department
of Homeland Security, Congress briefly considered subordinating the Intelligence
Community under the direction of the new Department. Concerns over potential
abuses infringing on civil liberties, however, quickly ended this consideration. Instead,
DHS was assigned a role of bridging the gap between the Law Enforcement and
Intelligence Communities to prevent future such attacks. While the Department of
Homeland Security plays an integral role filling the gaps exposed by 9/11, primary
responsibility for counterterrorism remains with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
This chapter will briefly examine the threat, the roles and relationships of the
responsible Federal agencies, and what they’re doing to counter it.
Terrorism
As has already been seen, terrorism is a crime distinguished by motive. Terrorism is
defined in Title 18 United States Code, Section 2331, as “Acts dangerous to human life
that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, that
appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government
by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.” The particular crime is assault.
There are many different types of assault, all of them generally illegal. What
distinguishes terrorism is the motive behind the assault; an intention to intimidate or
coerce the U.S. population or government.
Terrorists, accordingly, are people guilty of the crime of terrorism. They need not
execute the crime to be guilty of it. Merely planning the crime makes them guilty of
criminal conspiracy, which makes the planners terrorists. Similarly, even though
terrorism is a crime under U.S. law, it does not just apply to U.S. citizens. Anybody
guilty of planning or committing a crime on U.S. territory is subject to U.S. law, and
may therefore be brought before U.S. justice.
Terrorism, as a motive, is a homeland security concern. Unfortunately, terrorism and
homeland security have become synonymous. It is important to understand the
difference. Certainly the 9/11 hijackers were terrorists by every means of the
definition. So was Timothy McVeigh, the criminal behind the 1995 Oklahoma City
Bombing. While terrorism is a concern for homeland security, it is not the homeland
Part III: Mission Areas
Assault of any type is
generally illegal. What
distinguishes terrorism
is the motive behind the
assault; an intention to
intimidate or coerce the
U.S. population or
government.
279
security concern. As has been shown, the homeland security concern is about
domestic catastrophic destruction. While terrorism may be one motivating factor, it is
not the only motivating factor. As Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, homeland security
threats need have no motive whatsoever.
A similar confusion seems to relate terrorism to mass murder. The two are not the
same. The act of “mass killing” is defined by the 2012 Investigative Assistance for
Violent Crimes Act (28 USC 530C) as “three or more killings in a single incident”. Thus
the 1999 shootings that killed 13 at Columbine High School CO, 2012 shootings that
killed 26 at Sandy Hook Elementary School CT, and 2007 shootings that killed 32 at
Virginia Technical University, VA may be labeled “mass killings”, but no evidence
indicates that the shooters harbored terrorist motives. They were not terrorist
incidents.
The Terrorist Threat
From a legal standpoint, the terrorist threat is nothing more than criminal assault
undertaken for the purpose of extorting the U.S. government. Of course all crime is to
be discouraged, but what makes this particular class of crime a national priority? The
short answer is 9/11; Oklahoma City too. In both cases, terrorist motives drove the
perpetrators to extreme measures. Their crimes were shocking in both their
magnitudes and proportions. It is concern about preventing another 9/11 that
distinguishes terrorism. And because of their anti-government sentiment, domestic
militias and radical Islamists are a particular concern.
The militia movement is a relatively new right-wing extremist movement consisting of
armed paramilitary groups, both formal and informal, with an anti-government,
conspiracy-oriented ideology. Militia groups began to form not long after the deadly
standoff at Waco, Texas, in 1993; by the spring of 1995, they had spread to almost
every state. Many members of militia groups have been arrested since then, usually on
weapons, explosives and conspiracy charges. Although the militia movement has
declined in strength from its peak in early 1996, it remains an active movement,
especially in the Midwest, and continues to cause a number of problems for law
enforcement and the communities in which militia groups are active. [1]
Radical Islamists, also known as Fundamental Islamists, Islamic Extremists, and Militant
Islamists, came to be represented by Osama bin Laden’s organization, al Qaeda,
following the 9/11 attacks. Al Qaeda became a rallying point for disaffected Muslims
who sought to strike at the United States directly during operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Founded on the writings of Sayyid Qutb, Al Qaeda fought to restore Islam
by establishing “true Islamic states”, implementing sharia, and eliminating non-Muslim
influences and the enemies of Islam, which in their view the United States figured
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
Terrorism is a crime
under Title 18 USC,
S2331. Anybody guilty
of planning or
committing a terrorist
act on U.S. territory, or
against a U.S. citizen
anywhere , is subject to
U.S. law and may be
brought before U.S.
justice.
280
prominently. [2] The al Qaeda movement continued long after bin Laden went into
hiding and was eventually killed. Then in 2013, al Qaeda was eclipsed by the Islamic
State (IS). The movement consolidated various opposition forces, including elements
of al Qaeda, to support armed insurgencies in Iraq and Syria. Two years after U.S.
troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, IS forces overran western Iraq and parts of Syria
and claimed the territory as part of a new Islamic Caliphate. IS became notorious for
broadcasting executions of captured western prisoners. IS also claimed responsibility
for the November 2015 attacks that killed 130 people in Paris. [3] The U.S. accordingly
renewed its commitment of military support to assist Iraq in driving back IS, and
similarly strengthened military operations against IS in Syria. Given their past records
of attack and avowed enmity towards the United States, the prevailing concern is that
either al Qaeda or IS might seek to mount another 9/11 or similar attack against the
U.S.
Counterterrorism
Following the Tokyo Subway and Oklahoma City attacks, on June 21 1995 President
Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 (PDD-39) stating U.S. Policy on
Counterterrorism: “The United States regards all such terrorism as a potential threat to
national security as well as a criminal act and will apply all appropriate means to
combat it. In doing so, the U.S. shall pursue vigorously efforts to deter and preempt,
apprehend and prosecute, or assist other governments to prosecute, individuals who
perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such attacks.” [4] The shorthand description for these
activities is “counterterrorism”, abbreviated “CT”. Counterterrorism is defined in Joint
Publication 3-26 as “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to
instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.” [5, pp. GL-3]
National Strategy for Counterterrorism
The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism articulates the U.S. Government’s
approach to countering terrorism and identifies the range of tools employed by the
strategy. Though specifically directed against the threat of al Qaeda, the same
approach applies to IS. [6, p. 2] The 2011 Strategy identified eight overarching goals:
1. Protect the American People, Homeland, and American Interests. The most solemn
responsibility of the President and the United States Government is to protect the
American people, both at home and abroad. This includes eliminating threats to
their physical safety, countering threats to global peace and security, and
promoting and protecting U.S. interests around the globe. [6, p. 8]
Part III: Mission Areas
Because of their anti-
government sentiment,
domestic militias and
radical Islamists are a
particular terrorist
concern.
281
2. Disrupt, Degrade, Dismantle, and Defeat al-Qa‘ida and Its Affiliates and Adherents.
The American people and interests will not be secure from attacks until this threat
is eliminated—its primary individuals and groups rendered powerless, and its
message relegated to irrelevance. [6, p. 8]
3. Prevent Terrorist Development, Acquisition, and Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The danger of nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to global
security. Terrorist organizations, including al-Qa‘ida, have engaged in efforts to
develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—and if successful, they
are likely to use them. Therefore, the United States will work with partners around
the world to deter WMD theft, smuggling, and terrorist use; target and disrupt
terrorist networks that engage in WMD-related activities; secure nuclear,
biological, and chemical materials; prevent illicit trafficking of WMD-related
materiel; provide multilateral nonproliferation organizations with the resources,
capabilities, and authorities they need to be effective; and deepen international
cooperation and strengthen institutions and partnerships that prevent WMD and
nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. Success will require us to
work with the international community in each of these areas while establishing
security measures commensurate with the threat, reinforcing counter-smuggling
measures, and ensuring that all of these efforts are sustained over time. [6, pp. 8-
9]
4. Eliminate Safehavens. Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents rely on the physical
sanctuary of ungoverned or poorly governed territories, where the absence of
state control permits terrorists to travel, train, and engage in plotting. In close
coordination with foreign partners, the United States will continue to contest and
diminish al-Qa‘ida’s operating space through mutually reinforcing efforts designed
to prevent al-Qa‘ida from taking advantage of these ungoverned spaces. We will
also build the will and capacity of states whose weaknesses al-Qa‘ida exploits.
Persistent insecurity and chaos in some regions can undermine efforts to increase
political engagement and build capacity and provide assistance, thereby
exacerbating chaos and insecurity. Our challenge is to break this cycle of state
failure to constrict the space available to terrorist networks. [6, p. 9]
5. Build Enduring Counterterrorism Partnerships and Capabilities. Foreign partners
are essential to the success of our CT efforts; these states are often themselves the
target of—and on the front lines in countering—terrorist threats. The United
States will continue to rely on and leverage the capabilities of its foreign partners
even as it looks to contribute to their capacity and bolster their will. To achieve our
objectives, partners must demonstrate the willingness and ability to operate
independently, augmenting and complementing U.S. CT efforts with their unique
insights and capabilities in their countries and regions. Building strong enduring
partnerships based on shared understandings of the threat and common
objectives is essential to every one of our overarching CT objectives. Assisting
partners to improve and expand governance in select instances is also critical,
including strengthening the rule of law so that suspected terrorists can be brought
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
Radical Islamists, also
known as Fundamental
Islamists, Islamic
Extremists, and Militant
Islamists, came to be
represented by al
Qaeda. Founded on the
writings of Sayyid Qutb,
Al Qaeda fought to
restore Islam by
establishing “true
Islamic states”,
implementing sharia,
and eliminating non-
Muslim influences and
the enemies of Islam,
which in their view the
United States figured
prominently.
282
to justice within a respected and transparent system. Success will depend on our
ability to work with partners bilaterally, through efforts to achieve greater regional
integration, and through multilateral and international institutions. [6, p. 9]
6. Degrade Links between al-Qa‘ida and its Affiliates and Adherents. Al-Qa‘ida senior
leaders in Pakistan continue to leverage local and regional affiliates and adherents
worldwide through formal and informal alliances to advance their global agenda.
Al-Qa‘ida exploits local grievances to bolster recruitment, expand its operational
reach, destabilize local governments, and reinforce safehavens from which it and
potentially other terrorist groups can operate and attack the United States.
Together with our partners, we will degrade the capabilities of al-Qa‘ida’s local and
regional affiliates and adherents, monitor their communications with al-Qa‘ida
leaders, drive fissures between these groups and their bases of support, and
isolate al-Qa‘ida from local and regional affiliates and adherents who can augment
its capabilities and further its agenda. [6, p. 9]
7. Counter al-Qa‘ida Ideology and Its Resonance and Diminish the Specific Drivers of
Violence that al-Qa‘ida Exploits. This Strategy prioritizes U.S. and partner efforts to
undercut al-Qa‘ida’s fabricated legitimization of violence and its efforts to spread
its ideology. As we have seen in the Middle East and North Africa, al-Qa‘ida’s calls
for perpetual violence to address longstanding grievances have met a devastating
rebuke in the face of nonviolent mass movements that seek solutions through
expanded individual rights. Along with the majority of people across all religious
and cultural traditions, we aim for a world in which al-Qa‘ida is openly and widely
rejected by all audiences as irrelevant to their aspirations and concerns, a world
where al-Qa‘ida’s ideology does not shape perceptions of world and local events,
inspire violence, or serve as a recruiting tool for the group or its adherents.
Although achieving this objective is likely to require a concerted long-term effort,
we must retain a focus on addressing the near-term challenge of preventing those
individuals already on the brink from embracing al-Qa‘ida ideology and resorting to
violence. We will work closely with local and global partners, inside and outside
governments, to discredit al-Qa‘ida ideology and reduce its resonance. We will put
forward a positive vision of engagement with foreign publics and support for
universal rights that demonstrates that the United States aims to build while al-
Qa‘ida would only destroy. We will apply focused foreign and development
assistance abroad. At the same time, we will continue to assist, engage, and
connect communities to increase their collective resilience abroad and at home.
These efforts strengthen bulwarks against radicalization, recruitment, and
mobilization to violence in the name of al-Qa‘ida and will focus in particular on
those drivers that we know al-Qa‘ida exploits. [6, pp. 9-10]
Part III: Mission Areas
The 2011 National
Strategy for
Counterterrorism
articulates the U.S.
Government’s approach
to countering terrorism
and identifies the range
of tools employed by the
strategy. Though
specifically directed
against the threat of al
Qaeda, the same
approach applies to
Islamic State (IS).
283
8. Deprive Terrorists of their Enabling Means. Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and
adherents continue to derive significant financial support from donors in the
Persian Gulf region and elsewhere through kidnapping for ransom and from
exploitation of or control over lucrative elements of the local economy. Terrorist
facilitation extends beyond the financial arena to those who enable travel of
recruits and operatives; acquisition and movement of materiel; and electronic and
non-electronic communication. The United States will collaborate with partner
nations around the world to increase our collective capacity to identify terrorist
operatives and prevent their travel and movement of supplies across national
borders and within states. We will continue to expand and enhance efforts aimed
at blocking the flow of financial resources to and among terrorist groups and to
disrupt terrorist facilitation and support activities, imposing sanctions or pursuing
prosecutions to enforce violations and dissuade others. We will also continue our
focus on countering kidnapping for ransom, which is an increasingly important
funding source for al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents. Through our
diplomatic outreach, we will continue to encourage countries—especially those in
Europe—to adopt a policy against making concessions to kidnappers while using
tailored messages unilaterally and with our partners to delegitimize the taking of
hostages. Mass media and the Internet in particular have emerged as enablers for
terrorist planning, facilitation, and communication, and we will continue to
counter terrorists’ ability to exploit them. [6, p. 10]
Counterterrorism Responsibilities
PDD-39 placed responsibility for U.S. counterterrorism efforts with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Department of State (DOS). PDD-39 made the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) under DOJ responsible for preventing and responding to domestic
terrorist attacks. Conversely, PDD-39 made the State Department responsible through
its ambassadors for coordinating response to attacks on U.S. interests overseas. [4]
Following 9/11, Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 5 modified these roles
making the Department of Homeland Security responsible for coordinating the Federal
response to domestic incidents, including terrorist attacks. Otherwise, HSPD-5
preserved the FBI’s role with investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism, and DOS
retained its role of protecting U.S. interests overseas. [7]
FBI Counterterrorism
The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism
investigations. This includes terrorist acts committed within and outside U.S. national
boundaries. Since the 9/11 attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms
intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused
on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and
intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. [8, p. ii] The FBI’s post-
9/11 transformation is particularly evident in four areas: The USA PATRIOT Act
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
PDD-39 made the FBI
responsible for
preventing and
responding to domestic
terrorist attacks. In
2003, after
establishment of the
Department of
Homeland Security,
HSPD-5 amended PDD-
39 making DHS
responsible for
coordinating the Federal
response to domestic
incidents, including
terrorist attacks.
284
provided the FBI additional authorities and enhanced investigative tools. The FBI and
DOJ altered the way the Bureau investigated terrorism with the 2008 revision of The
Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. The FBI expanded
operationally via a proliferation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across the United
States. In so doing, it also increased its cooperation with state, local, and federal
agencies. Finally, watershed changes were made in the Bureau’s intelligence program.
[8, p. 3]
Historically, there have been differences between electronic surveillance (wiretaps)
conducted for intelligence and for law enforcement purposes. Among these is the
protection of the constitutional rights of persons under criminal investigation. The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) regulates intelligence collection directed at
foreign powers and agents of foreign powers in the United States to include those
engaged in international terrorism. FISA required the government to certify that “the
purpose” of surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence information. Prior to the
USA PATRIOT Act, DOJ turned the “primary purpose” standard into written policy that
had the effect of limiting the coordination between intelligence and criminal
investigators. This came to be known as “the Wall” between intelligence and law
enforcement and the “unfortunate consequences” of this barrier to information
sharing were noted by the 9/11 Commission in its report on the 9/11 attacks. Section
218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to replace the phrase “the purpose” with
the phrase “a significant purpose.” As one legal scholar described it, by moving the
FISA requirement from the purpose to a significant purpose, the USA PATRIOT Act
“knocked out the foundation for ‘the Wall.’” This removed impediments to the
exchange of information about terrorism or other national security threats between
intelligence and law enforcement personnel. [8, pp. 3-4]
The FBI and DOJ also emphasized their forward-leaning approach with the September
29, 2008, revision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations,
which they claim “make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by
providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.” Referred to
as the “Mukasey Guidelines” after Michael B. Mukasey, who was Attorney General at
the time of their release, this is the latest in a series of guidelines stretching back to
1976 that govern the FBI’s investigative activities. The Mukasey Guidelines went into
effect on December 1, 2008. In large part, these guidelines sprang from the post-9/11
national security context, in which the FBI surmised that it could not simply react to
crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist
threats to the homeland. The most prominent changes in the Mukasey Guidelines
concern “assessments.” Agents and analysts may now use assessments outside of the
more traditional preliminary and full investigations, which require some level of factual
predication. Preliminary investigations can be opened with “any ‘allegation or
information’ indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.”
Opening a full investigation requires an “‘articulable factual basis’ of possible criminal
Part III: Mission Areas
Since the 9/11 attacks,
the FBI has implemented
a series of reforms
intended to transform
itself from a largely
reactive law
enforcement agency
focused on
investigations of
criminal activity into a
more proactive, agile,
flexible, and intelligence
-driven agency that can
prevent acts of
terrorism.
285
or national threat activity.” On the other hand, opening an assessment does not
require particular factual predication. Assessments are not to be “pursued for frivolous
or improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the
race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject of the assessment, or a
combination of only such factors.” Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety
of techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to
penetrate conspiracies. The Bureau has incorporated assessments into its investigative
processes. According to numbers made publicly available in March 2011, the FBI
initiated 11,667 assessments to check leads on individuals, activities, groups, or
organizations between December 2008 and March 2009. These, in turn, led to 427
preliminary or full investigations. Officials noted that about one-third of the
assessments resulted from vague tips. Reportedly, between March 2009 and March
2011, the Bureau opened 82,325 assessments. About half of the assessments from this
time frame focused on determining whether specific groups or individuals were spies
or terrorists. This pool of 42,888 assessments produced just under 2,000 full or
preliminary investigations. [8, pp. 11-12]
JTTFs are locally based, multi-agency teams of investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT
experts, and other specialists who investigate terrorism and terrorism-related crimes.
Seventy-one of the more than 100 JTTFs operated by DOJ and the FBI were created
since 9/11. Over 4,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents—
more than four times the pre-9/11 total— work in them. These officers and agents
come from more than 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. The FBI
considers the JTTFs “the nation’s front line on terrorism.” They “investigate acts of
terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those
employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.” As this suggests, their
operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources
(informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots. JTTFs also offer an
important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led
counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies and state and local law
enforcement. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists
has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police
working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009. There is also
a National JTTF, which was established in July 2002 to serve as a coordinating
mechanism with the FBI’s partners. Some 40 agencies are now represented in the
National JTTF, which has become a focal point for information sharing and the
management of large-scale projects that involve multiple partners. [8, pp. 13-14]
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
The FBI’s post-9/11
transformation was
facilitated by 1)
enhanced authorities
provided under the USA
PATRIOT Act; 2) new
General Guidelines
making it easier to
develop a terrorist case;
3) expansion of Joint
Terrorism Task Forces
(JTTFs) increasing
cooperation with State
and Local law
enforcement; and 4)
watershed changes to
the Bureau’s intelligence
program.
286
DOS Counterterrorism
The Department of State has six regional bureaus that address foreign policy
considerations on a regional basis. The assistant secretaries of the regional bureaus are
key actors in CT activities and operations policy in their assigned regions. Furthermore,
the DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism publishes an annual country report on terrorism
and manages US policy for a whole-of-government approach to CT. The DOS Bureau of
Counterterrorism maintains the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List that provides
justification for the President to block or freeze tangible property and freeze financial
accounts of individuals or terrorist organizations pursuant to Executive Order 13224,
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten
to Commit, or Support Terrorism. This tool is designed to sever terrorists’ organizations
logistics and resources. These efforts are worked through Partner Nations (PNs) where
the United States maintains country teams under the leadership of the local
ambassador, technically known as the Chief of Mission (COM). [5, pp. III-2]
The COM is the personal representative of the President and the official U.S.
Government (USG) representative in the host country. The COM is responsible for the
conduct of relations with the host government and is the primary channel for
communications with that government. The COM directs, coordinates, and supervises
all USG executive branch employees in that effort, except those under the command of
a U.S. military commander. CT activities and operations conducted by the Department
of Defense (DoD) and other USG departments and agencies require COM concurrence
prior to execution, unless otherwise directed by the President. [5, pp. III-2]
The FBI, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the COM, will assume lead
responsibility for law enforcement investigation of terrorist or WMD incidents abroad.
The FBI’s tasks may include taking custody of suspected terrorists, lawful transfer of
custody of suspected terrorists, forensic examination of material collected of possible
intelligence or criminal prosecution value, and hostage negotiation support. [5, pp. III-
2]
DHS Counterterrorism
The 2002 Homeland Security Act made it the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security to “prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.” [9] Since its inception
in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been
a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). The Homeland Security Act of 2002,
assigned the original DHS intelligence component—the Directorate of Information
Part III: Mission Areas
DHS does not generally
engage in traditional
foreign intelligence
collection activities such
as imagery intelligence,
signals intelligence,
human intelligence,
measurement and
signatures intelligence,
and foreign open source
intelligence.
287
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection—with responsibility to receive, analyze, and
integrate law enforcement and intelligence information in order to— “(A) identify and
assess the nature and scope of terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and
identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand such threats
in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the homeland.” [10, pp. ii-1]
Following the Second Stage Review (2SR) in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland
Security, Michael Chertoff established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis the Chief
Intelligence Officer (CINT) for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that
intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a
common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as
a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private
sector partners. [10, p. ii]
Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of those elements within DHS
that have an intelligence mission. These include I&A, the Office of Cyber and
Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA), and the Intelligence Division of the Office of Operations
Coordination and Planning (all located at DHS headquarters), and the intelligence
elements of six DHS operational components: U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S.
Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). [10, p. 3]
The heads of the DHS intelligence components do not report to the I&A Under
Secretary, but to their respective component chiefs. However, pursuant to the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, they are
required to advise and coordinate closely with the Under Secretary on their activities in
support of the intelligence mission of the Department. In order to provide senior-level
direction for Department-wide intelligence activities, a Homeland Security Intelligence
Council (HSIC) was formed. The HSIC is comprised of the key intelligence officials from
applicable DHS components. [10, p. 7]
DHS does not generally engage in traditional foreign intelligence collection activities
such as imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence, measurement
and signatures intelligence, and foreign open source intelligence. I&A combines the
unique information collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities
(e.g., at airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign intelligence from the
Intelligence Community; law enforcement information from Federal, state, local, and
tribal sources; private sector data about critical infrastructure and key resources; and
information from domestic open sources to develop homeland security intelligence.
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
DHS I&A combines the
unique information
collected by DHS
components as part of
their operational
activities (e.g., at
airports, seaports, and
the border) with foreign
intelligence from the
Intelligence Community;
law enforcement
information from
Federal, state, local, and
tribal sources; private
sector data about
critical infrastructure
and key resources; and
information from
domestic open sources
to develop homeland
security intelligence.
288
This encompasses a broad range of homeland security threats. It includes border
security information to counter human smuggling and trafficking, cargo data to
prevent the introduction of dangerous items, information to protect critical
infrastructure against all hazards, information about infectious diseases, and
demographic data and other research about ‘violent radicalization.’ [10, p. 5]
Nevertheless, I&A is a full partner within the Intelligence Community and represents
DHS on several IC committees. The Under Secretary, for example, is a member of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Executive Committee. I&A contributes analytic
staff to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The office also contributes items
to the President’s Daily Brief providing a unique homeland security perspective on
terrorism and other threats to the United States to the nation’s leaders. [10, p. 6]
I&A produces numerous intelligence products including the Homeland Security Threat
Assessment, an annual report identifying major threats to the homeland. I&A also
produces Intelligence Notes, Intelligence Warnings, Homeland Security Assessments,
etc. I&A makes the products of its analysis available to state and local officials through
the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), a web-based platform that
facilitates Sensitive But Unclassified information sharing and collaboration between
federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and international partners. HSIN provides
real-time, interactive connectivity between states and major urban areas and the DHS
National Operations Center (NOC). [10, pp. 9-10]
Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department’s intelligence
component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance
through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR
reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis;
information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state,
local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. [10, p. ii]
In an effort to strengthen intelligence and information sharing and analysis capabilities
with states and major urban areas, DHS established intelligence fusion centers.
Congress defines fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal,
state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or
information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent,
investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.” At the end of
2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI)
fusion centers. I&A supports these centers by providing operational, analytic,
reporting, and management advice and assistance; training; information technology
systems and connectivity; and intelligence officers and analysts. [10, pp. 11-12]
Part III: Mission Areas
As terrorism is a crime,
the first order of action
is to apprehend and
arrest those suspected
of planning or executing
such crimes and
prosecuting them under
State and Federal law.
289
Direct Actions
As terrorism is a crime, the first order of action is to apprehend and arrest those
suspected of planning or executing such crimes and prosecuting them under State and
Federal law. For suspects beyond our borders, the Attorney General will attempt to
extradite them and render them to U.S. justice. In the case that a foreign government
refuses to surrender a suspect, the U.S. might conduct a rendition essentially
kidnapping the suspect and forcefully taking them into custody. In the case where a
foreign government is incapable of surrendering or otherwise controlling a terrorist
menace, the U.S. might employ military force to remove or eliminate the threat.
Persons suspected of criminal or terrorist activity may be transferred from one State
(i.e., country) to another for arrest, detention, and/or interrogation. Commonly, this is
done through extradition, by which one State surrenders a person within its
jurisdiction to a requesting State via a formal legal process, typically established by
treaty. Far less often, such transfers are effectuated through a process known as
“extraordinary rendition” or “irregular rendition.” These terms have often been used
to refer to the extrajudicial transfer of a person from one State to another. [11, p. ii]
The first well-known rendition case involved the Achille Lauro hijackers in 1985: after
they were given a plane and were enroute in international air space, they were forced
by United States Navy fighter planes to land at the Naval Air Station Sigonella, an
Italian military base in Sicily used by the US Navy and NATO. [12] Following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, however, what had been a limited program expanded
dramatically, with some experts estimating that 150 foreign nationals taken by the CIA.
Foreign nationals suspected of terrorism have been transported to detention and
interrogation facilities in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Diego Garcia, Afghanistan, Guantánamo,
and elsewhere. [13] Suspects were reportedly arrested, blindfolded, shackled, and
sedated, or otherwise kidnapped, and transported by private jet or other means to the
destination country. [12] The practice became controversial during the Bush
Administration because the destination countries were known to employ harsh
interrogation techniques rising to the level of torture, purportedly with the knowledge
or acquiescence of the United States. In January 2009, President Obama issued an
Executive Order creating a special task force to review U.S. transfer policies, including
the practice of rendition, to ensure compliance with applicable legal requirements. [11,
p. ii]
Terrorist suspects beyond the reach of rendition may be subject to U.S. military force.
In November 2002, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, an al-Qaeda operative and Yemeni
citizen suspected of involvement in the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, was
killed by the CIA using a Predator drone firing a Hellfire missile. The attack was
controversial because it also killed Kamal Derwish, a U.S. citizen accompanying al-
Harethi. The Bush Administration defended the action citing a presidential finding that
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
For suspects beyond our
borders, the Attorney
General will attempt to
extradite them and
render them to U.S.
justice. In the case that
a foreign government
refuses to surrender a
suspect, the U.S. might
conduct a rendition
essentially kidnapping
the suspect and
forcefully taking them
into custody. In the case
where a foreign
government is incapable
of surrendering or
otherwise controlling a
terrorist menace, the
U.S. might employ
military force to remove
or eliminate the threat.
290
permitted worldwide covert actions against members of al-Qaeda. Despite the
controversy, the use of Predators to kill suspected terrorists has become common
practice. [14]
Military force may be delivered in all shapes and sizes, and not just by the Department
of Defense. The CIA has an extensive paramilitary capability of its own. By DoD
definition, paramilitary forces are distinct from the regular armed forces of any
country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission. In
addition to providing intelligence support US military operations from the Korean War
era to Iraq today, the CIA has also worked closely alongside DoD personnel in military
operations. The CIA typically takes on missions that must be clandestine or covert to
avoid directly implicating the U.S. Government. Examples of CIA covert operations
include the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, and interdiction missions along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail in Laos, a neutral country during the Vietnam conflict. Despite these
mixed results, the CIA is credited with helping depose the Taliban government after
they refused to surrender Bin Laden following 9/11. [15, p. 1] Units from the CIA’s
Special Activities Division (SAD) were the first U.S. forces to enter Afghanistan in
September 2001. They joined with the Afghan United Front (Northern Alliance) to
prepare for the subsequent arrival of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). Together,
the United Front, SAD, and SOF combined to overthrow the Taliban by November. The
campaign was noted for its minimal use of conventional military force and
correspondingly low casualty count among allies. [16] The CIA was also instrumental in
developing the Predator drone, which saw its first combat use in Afghanistan. Today,
the Predator is employed extensively to target suspected terrorist leaders around the
world. [17]
The DoD employs Special Operations Forces to deliver military capability in hostile,
denied, or politically sensitive areas of the world. Special operations are distinguished
from regular military operations by degree of physical and political risk, operational
techniques, and mode of employment. DoD special operations are frequently
clandestine, designed in such a say to conceal them, but not necessarily covert, that is,
designed to conceal the identity of the sponsor. [15, p. 1] SOF teams helped provide
the Afghan United Front with airpower during the early months of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM. Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) using laser range
finders helped direct precision guided munitions dropped from orbiting U.S. Air Force B
-1 and B-52 bombers onto Taliban targets. This use of airpower proved instrumental in
helping the United Front capture the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif in November
2001. [18] Supported by CIA operatives on the ground, Navy SEALs mounted the raid
into Pakistan that succeeded in killing Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011. [19]
Part III: Mission Areas
Military force may be
delivered in all shapes
and sizes, and not just
by the Department of
Defense. The CIA has an
extensive paramilitary
capability of its own.
291
Interagency Coordination
Interagency coordination for counterterrorism operations is accomplished through the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The National Counterterrorism Center was
established in 2004 to ensure that information from any source about potential
terrorist acts against the U.S. could be made available to analysts and that appropriate
responses could be planned. According to the NCTC Charter (P.S. 108-458), the NCTC
serves as the principal advisor to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on
intelligence operations relating to terrorism, and provides strategic operational plans
for military and civilian counterterrorism efforts and for effective integration of
counterterrorism intelligence and operations across agency boundaries within and
outside the United States. The NCTC Director is appointed by the President of the
United States. And though the Director reports to the DNI, in practice Director works
through the National Security Council and the White House staff. [20]
Interagency coordination for counterterrorism policy is orchestrated by the National
Security Council. The National Security Council is the key integrator of the President’s
whole-of-government CT policy and strategies, which requires interagency
coordination at the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and supporting
interagency policy committees, and the efforts of the National Security Council Staff.
The key interagency policy committee for CT is the Counterterrorist Security Group,
which is led by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (i.e., the former Homeland Security Advisor). [5, pp. III-1]
Conclusion
The basic difficulty in capturing or killing terrorists is finding them, preferably before
they strike. The first problem is identifying potential terrorists. Psychological studies
have found no common factors among the profiles of past terrorists: they can be
anybody. Attempts by the National Security Agency to identify terrorists by studying
their contacts and communications also proved fruitless as well as illegal. And even if
they are identified, terrorists are not easy to locate: it took ten years to locate Bin
Laden even with a $25 million bounty on his head. The unspoken fact of the matter is
that the terrorist threat can never be eliminated. Given this realization, the question
arises whether it is more effective to pursue terrorists, or deny them the means for
inflicting catastrophic damage?
Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
Interagency
coordination for
counterterrorism
operations is
accomplished through
the National
Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC). Interagency
coordination for
counterterrorism policy
is orchestrated by the
National Security
Council (NSC).
292
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. How does terrorism uniquely distinguish the crime of assault?
2. Why does al Qaeda remain a terrorist threat after Osama bin Laden’s death?
3. Looking at the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which short-term goal do you think most effective?
Explain.
4. Looking at the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which long-term goal do you think most effective?
Explain.
5. According to PDD-39/HSPD-5, what is the counterterrorism role of the FBI?
6. According to HSPD-5, what is the counterterrorism role of DHS?
7. How did the USA PATRIOT Act improve the FBI’s ability to investigate terrorism?
8. What is the primary means for dealing with known terrorists, foreign or domestic?
9. Describe two options available to the President if foreign governments are unwilling or unable to render unto
justice terrorist elements within their country that threaten the United States.
10. As the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, what circumstances might move you to recommend CIA
paramilitary forces over DoD special forces to perform a particular overseas counterterrorism mission?
Part III: Mission Areas
293
Emergency Preparedness &
Response
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the responsibility of State Governors to their citizens.
Explain why 9/11 raised concern about State and Local emergency preparedness.
Describe Stafford Act authorities to grant Federal disaster assistance to States.
Describe the FEMA process and means for delivering assistance to States.
Describe the considerable means available to States for responding to emergencies.
Evaluate the Incident Commander’s role and means for directing emergency response.
Evaluate the role of exercises for improving emergency preparedness.
Chapter 18
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
294
“We must prepare to minimize the damage and recover from any future terrorist
attacks that may occur despite our best efforts at prevention.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Introduction
9/11 forced the realization that the nation was unprepared to respond to a WMD
attack. While FEMA had been established in 1979 to streamline Federal support to
natural disasters, it had no corresponding capabilities to integrate Federal support to
manmade catastrophes. Moreover, the contrast between the local response at the
World Trade Center and the local response at the Pentagon on 9/11 proved that the
structured integration of responding agencies through the Incident Command System
saved lives. Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security was commissioned by
Congress to begin strengthening the response capabilities of the nation, and make sure
they were integrated from the bottom-up through the Local, State, and Federal levels
of government.
Integrating the Federal Response
Following 9/11, the President and Congress sought to improve the nation’s ability to
respond and recover to domestic catastrophic attack. Of particular concern was the
potential employment of WMD. In 2002, few parts of the country had the ability to
respond to a WMD attack. Even the best prepared states and localities didn’t have
adequate resources to respond to the full range of potential threats exposed by 9/11.
Many did not have in place mutual aid agreements to facilitate cooperation with their
neighbors in time of emergency. The Federal government had done relatively little to
remedy the situation. What few domestic preparedness programs that existed were
spread across eight different Federal departments and agencies, and provided money
under a tangled web of grant programs. Accordingly, one of the first objectives for the
new Department of Homeland Security was to create a fully integrated national
emergency response system capable of dealing with most any catastrophe, both
natural and manmade. [1, p. 42]
The first order of business was consolidation. The 2002 Homeland Security Act
authorized the establishment of an Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate within the new Department of Homeland Security. [2] The new directorate
incorporated the Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster Medical System
from Health and Human Services, the Nuclear Incident Response Team from the
Department of Energy, and the Domestic Emergency Support Teams from the
Department of Justice. [3] The Homeland Security Act also allowed the Federal
Emergency Management Agency to be incorporated as an independent agency under
the new directorate. With FEMA came the authority to distribute grants under the
Homeland Security Grant Program. [2]
Part III: Mission Areas
Following 9/11, the
President and Congress
sought to improve the
nation’s ability to
respond and recover to
domestic catastrophic
attack. Of particular
concern was the
potential employment of
WMD.
295
After consolidation, the next order of business was establishing clear lines of
responsibility and authority. On February 28, 2003, HSPD-5 was issued making the
Secretary of Homeland Security the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic
incident management. It was the Secretary’s responsibility to see that executive
agencies were prepared to respond and to coordinate their response when Federal
assistance was needed in a disaster. HSPD-5 also directed the Secretary to develop a
National Response Plan (NRP) detailing how the Federal government would marshal its
resources for a disaster, and a National Incident Management System (NIMS) detailing
how those resources would be integrated into a local disaster response. [4]
The NIMS provides a standard command and management structure for coordinating a
multi-agency response to disaster. Much of NIMS is built upon the Incident Command
System (ICS), which was developed by Federal, State, and local wildland fire agencies
during the 1970s. ICS is a management system designed to enable effective incident
management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel,
procedures and communications operating within a common organizational structure.
[5, pp. 48-49] To facilitate coordination between Federal, State, and Local agencies
responding to a disaster, HSPD-5 mandated NIMS for all Federal agencies starting in
2003, and made it a prerequisite for State and Local governments to receive Homeland
Security Grant Program funds starting in 2005. [4]
The Homeland Security Act mandated the creation of a National Response Plan to
replace the previous Federal Response Plan. [2] HSPD-5 assigned the task to the DHS
Secretary and provided further guidance on its preparation. [4] The subsequent NRP
was released in December 2004. It was a large document comprised of some 426
pages. It provided the basic plan how the Federal government would prepare and
respond to disaster at the request of State and Local government. The underlying
principle of the plan was that Federal capabilities would be packaged into fifteen
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Various Federal agencies were assigned
responsibility for preparing, maintaining, and providing these ESF capabilities when
requested. The Secretary of Homeland Security, under the authority of HSDP-5, was
responsible for seeing that the ESFs were ready and available when needed. [6, p. xi]
Because it was so big, the problem with the NRP was that few people were familiar
with it, let alone had read it by the time Hurricane Katrina struck in August 2005. The
flawed response to Hurricane Katrina was attributed, in part, to a failure to follow the
NRP. Congress acted by passing the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act which elevated FEMA to report directly to the Secretary, and mandated
changes to the NRP. [7, pp. CRS-3-CRS-4] As a result, in January 2008, DHS issued the
National Response Framework (NRF) which remains the nation’s plan for responding to
disaster.
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
HSPD-5 issued in
February 2003 directed
the Secretary to develop
a National Response
Plan (NRP) detailing
how the Federal
government would
marshal its resources for
a disaster, and a
National Incident
Management System
(NIMS) detailing how
those resources would
be integrated into a
local disaster response.
296
Requesting Federal Assistance
Federal disaster assistance is provided upon request of the State Governor. Such a
request is made under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended, hereinafter “the Stafford Act”). To
request Federal assistance, the Governor must declare either a State emergency or
major disaster. Emergency declarations are made to protect property and public
health and safety and to lessen or avert the threat of a major disaster or catastrophe.
Emergency declarations are often made when a threat is recognized (such as
emergency declarations for hurricanes which may be made prior to landfall) and are
intended to supplement and coordinate local and state efforts prior to the event.
Emergency declarations are also made to provide direct federal assistance to protect
lives and property. This aids activities such as evacuations and the protection of public
assets. In contrast, a major disaster declaration is made as a result of the disaster or
catastrophic event and constitutes a broader authority that helps states and local
communities, as well as families and individuals, respond and recover from the
damage caused by the event. [8, pp. ii-1]
Ordinarily, only a Governor can initiate a request for a Presidential emergency or major
disaster declaration. In extraordinary circumstances, the President may unilaterally
declare a major disaster or emergency. This request is made through the FEMA
Regional Administrator and based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity and
magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State and affected
local governments, and that Federal assistance is necessary. [5, p. 41]
The completed request, addressed to the President, is submitted through the FEMA
Regional Administrator, who evaluates the damage and requirements for Federal
assistance and makes a recommendation to the FEMA Administrator. The FEMA
Administrator, acting through the Secretary of Homeland Security, may then
recommend a course of action to the President. [5, p. 42] If the Governor’s request is
accepted, the President, in turn, will issue a corresponding declaration of emergency or
major disaster. This Presidential declaration triggers the release of funds from the
President’s Disaster Relief Fund, managed by FEMA under the Stafford Act. The
Presidential declaration will also activate disaster aid programs from other Federal
departments and agencies. A Presidential major disaster declaration triggers long-term
Federal recovery programs, some of which are matched by State programs, and
designed to help disaster victims, businesses, and public entities. An emergency
declaration is more limited in scope and without the long-term Federal recovery
programs of a major disaster declaration. Generally, Federal assistance and funding are
provided to meet a specific emergency need or to help prevent a major disaster from
occurring. [5, pp. 40-42]
Part III: Mission Areas
Federal disaster
assistance is provided
upon request of the
State Governor. Such a
request is made under
the authority of the
Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance
Act.
297
In many cases, assistance may be obtained from the Federal Government without a
Presidential declaration. For example, FEMA places liaisons in State EOCs and moves
commodities near incident sites that may require Federal assistance prior to a
Presidential declaration. Additionally, some types of assistance, such as Fire
Management Assistance Grants – which provide support to States experiencing severe
wildfires – are performed by Federal departments or agencies under their own
authorities and do not require Presidential approval. Finally, Federal departments and
agencies may provide immediate lifesaving assistance to States under their own
statutory authorities without a formal Presidential declaration. [5, p. 42]
Responding Federal departments and agencies respect the sovereignty and
responsibilities of local, tribal, and State governments while rendering assistance. The
intention of the Federal Government in these situations is not to command the
response, but rather to support the affected local, tribal, and/or State governments. [5,
p. 40]
NRF Response
The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) serves as the national fusion center,
collecting and synthesizing all-source information, including information from State
fusion centers, across all-threats and all-hazards information covering the spectrum of
homeland security partners. Federal departments and agencies report information
regarding actual or potential incidents requiring a coordinated Federal response to the
NOC. [5, p. 33]
When notified of a threat or an incident that potentially requires a coordinated Federal
response, the NOC evaluates the information and notifies appropriate senior Federal
officials and Federal operations centers: the FEMA National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC), the FBI Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC), the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Military Command Center (NMCC).
The NOC serves as the primary coordinating center for these and other operations
centers. [5, p. 34]
After being notified, departments and agencies should:
Identify and mobilize staff to fulfill their department’s or agency’s responsibilities,
including identifying appropriate subject-matter experts and other staff to support
department operations centers.
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
If the Governor’s request
is accepted, the
President, in turn, will
issue a corresponding
declaration of
emergency or major
disaster. This
Presidential declaration
triggers the release of
funds from the
President’s Disaster
Relief Fund, managed by
FEMA under the Stafford
Act.
298
Identify staff for deployment to the NOC, the NRCC, FEMA Regional Response
Coordination Centers (RRCCs), or other operations centers as needed, such as the
FBI’s Joint Operations Center. These organizations have standard procedures and
call-down lists, and will notify department or agency points of contact if
deployment is necessary.
Identify staff that can be dispatched to the Joint Field Office (JFO), including
Federal officials representing those departments and agencies with specific
authorities, lead personnel for the JFO Sections (Operations, Planning, Logistics,
and Administration and Finance) and the ESFs.
Begin activating and staging Federal teams and other resources in support of the
Federal response as requested by DHS or in accordance with department or agency
authorities.
Execute pre-scripted mission assignments and readiness contracts, as directed by
DHS. [5, p. 36]
The FEMA Regional Administrator deploys a liaison to the State Emergency Operations
Center (SEOC) to provide technical assistance and also activates the Regional Response
Coordination Center. Federal department and agency personnel, including Emergency
Support Function primary and support agency personnel, staff the RRCC as required.
The RRCCs:
Coordinate initial regional and field activities.
In coordination with State, tribal, and local officials, deploy regional teams to
assess the impact of the event, gauge immediate State needs, and make
preliminary arrangements to set up operational field facilities.
Coordinate Federal support until a Joint Field Office (JFO) is established.
Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) to provide a central point for coordinating
emergency public information activities. [5, p. 44]
In coordination with the RRCC and the State, FEMA may deploy an Incident
Management Assistance Team (IMAT). IMATs are interagency teams composed of
subject-matter experts and incident management professionals. IMAT personnel may
be drawn from national or regional Federal department and agency staff according to
established protocols. IMAT teams make preliminary arrangements to set up Federal
field facilities and initiate establishment of the Joint Field Office. [5, p. 44]
Part III: Mission Areas
Once a Presidential
declaration is issued,
FEMA will establish a
Joint Field Office (JFO) in
proximity to the State
Emergency Operations
Center (SEOC), and send
a Federal Coordinating
Officer (FCO) to assist
the State Coordinating
Officer (SCO) with
ordering Federal
resources.
299
Emergency Support Functions
FEMA coordinates response support from across the Federal Government and certain
NGOs by calling up, as needed, one or more of fifteen Emergency Support Functions.
The ESFs are coordinated by FEMA through its NRCC. During a response, ESFs are a
critical mechanism to coordinate functional capabilities and resources provided by
Federal departments and agencies, along with certain private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations. They represent an effective way to bundle and funnel
resources and capabilities to local, tribal, State, and other responders. These functions
are coordinated by a single agency but may rely on several agencies that provide
resources for each functional area. The mission of the ESFs is to provide the greatest
possible access to capabilities of the Federal Government regardless of which agency
has those capabilities.
ESF #1 - Transportation
ESF #2 - Communications
ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering
ESF #4 - Firefighting
ESF #5 - Emergency Management
ESF #6 - Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services
ESF #7 - Logistics Management and Resource Support
ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services
ESF #9 - Search and Rescue
ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response
ESF #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources
ESF #12 - Energy
ESF #13 - Public Safety and Security
ESF #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery
ESF #15 - External Affairs [5, p. 57]
ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act incidents
under circumstances as defined in HSPD-5. Not all incidents requiring Federal support
result in the activation of ESFs. FEMA can deploy assets and capabilities through ESFs
into an area in anticipation of an approaching storm or event that is expected to cause
a significant impact and result. This coordination through ESFs allows FEMA to position
Federal support for a quick response, though actual assistance cannot normally be
provided until the Governor requests and receives a Presidential major disaster or
emergency declaration. Many States have also organized an ESF structure along this
approach. [5, p. 57]
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
FEMA coordinates
response support from
across the Federal
Government and certain
NGOs by calling up, as
needed, one or more of
fifteen Emergency
Support Functions.
300
When ESFs are activated, they may have a headquarters, regional, and field presence.
At FEMA headquarters, the ESFs support decision making and coordination of field
operations within the NRCC. The ESFs deliver a broad range of technical support and
other services at the regional level in the Regional Response Coordination Centers, and
in the Joint Field Office and Incident Command Posts, as required by the incident. At all
levels, FEMA issues mission assignments to obtain resources and capabilities from
across the ESFs in support of the State. [5, p. 57]
All ESF support is directed to the local Incident Commander operating under the
Incident Command System. The incident command structure enables the ESFs to work
collaboratively. For example, if a State requests assistance with a mass evacuation, the
Joint Field Office would request personnel from ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #6 (Mass
Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services), and ESF #8 (Public Health
and Medical Services). These would then be integrated into a single branch or group
within the ICS Operations Section to ensure effective coordination of evacuation
services. [5, p. 57]
Bottom-Up Support
All disasters are local. Under the United States federal system of government, State,
County, Municipal, and Tribal governments are responsible for the safety and security
of the citizens within their jurisdiction. This separation of authorities is manifested in
Article X of the Constitution, which stipulates that “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.” From a more practical standpoint, local
jurisdictions are best suited to respond to incidents by virtue of their proximity.
Hence, the National Response Framework is a bottom-up system, designed to provide
assistance only when State and Local resources have been overwhelmed or exhausted.
Most jurisdictions maintain sufficient capability to respond to most incidents.
However, when an incident exceeds the capacity of the local jurisdiction, it may
request assistance from a neighboring or higher jurisdiction. This determination
typically originates with the on-scene Incident Commander (IC).
The Incident Commander is the individual responsible for all response activities,
including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and release of
resources. The Incident Commander has overall authority and responsibility for
conducting incident operations and is responsible for the management of all incident
operations at the incident site. The Incident Commander directs incident response
operations from an Incident Command Post (ICP). [5, p. 50]
Part III: Mission Areas
All ESF support is
directed to the local
Incident Commander
operating under the
Incident Command
System.
301
If the Incident Commander determines that additional resources or capabilities are
needed, he or she will contact the local Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and relay
requirements to the local Emergency Manager (EM). Local EOCs are the physical
locations where multiagency coordination occurs. EOCs help form a common operating
picture of the incident, relieve on-scene command of the burden of external
coordination, and secure additional resources. The core functions of an EOC include
coordination, communications, resource allocation and tracking, and information
collection, analysis, and dissemination. During an incident, the local Emergency
Manager ensures the EOC is staffed to support the Incident Command Post and
arranges needed resources. Resources may be provided in the form of Emergency
Support Functions, similar to the NRF. The EOC also serves to update and advise
elected or appointed officials so they may provide policy direction as needed to
support the incident response. [5, pp. 50-51]
The EOC might request additional resources from neighboring jurisdictions through a
Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA). An MAA is formed between neighboring jurisdictions
specifying the conditions under which assistance will be provided, and the terms for
remuneration. Because of the financial obligations involved with an MAA, the EOC
might first have to consult with fiduciary officials before invoking such an agreement.
Of course, time is most precious during an incident.
When multiple agencies become involved in the incident, as determined by the type of
incident or by invoking an MAA, then the Incident Commander might form a Unified
Command with other officials having legal authority over the responding assets.
Operating from the Incident Command Post, the Unified Command will exercise
direction and control over tactical operations through corresponding officials acting in
concert from a single Incident Action Plan (IAP). Under a Unified Command, each
participating agency retains its authority, responsibility and accountability for assigned
assets. [5, p. 48]
If the incident is of such magnitude or complexity that it exceed Local response
capacity, the EOC might have to defer to the State Emergency Operations Center
(SEOC) to request additional resources. In some cases, this might require the local
elected official to issue a declaration of emergency or disaster to gain access to State
funds or resources. The SEOC, in turn, might marshal resources under Mutual Aid
Agreements with other jurisdictions or even direct the use of the National Guard. All
responding assets report to the on-scene Incident Command Post and take direction
according to the Incident Action Plan.
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
If the Incident
Commander determines
that additional
resources are needed,
he or she will contact
the local Emergency
Operations Center (EOC)
and relay requirements
to the local Emergency
Manager (EM). In turn,
the EOC might request
additional resources
from neighboring
jurisdictions through a
Mutual Aid Agreement
(MAA).
302
If State resources prove insufficient to the task, the Governor might request assistance
from neighboring states under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC). Under the terms of the EMAC, neighboring States can provide civilian
resources and National Guard support under the direction of the local Incident
Command Post. [5, p. 6]
If the combined resources of the States are insufficient, or additional funds or special
capabilities are needed to contend with the incident, the Governor may appeal for
Federal assistance. The Governor may appoint a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to
work with the local FEMA region official to prepare the corresponding declarations of
emergency or major disaster to request Stafford Act support. Upon the
recommendation of the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
the President will appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to deploy to the SEOC.
[5, p. 67]
The FCO is a senior FEMA official trained, certified, and well experienced in emergency
management, and specifically appointed to coordinate Federal support in the response
to and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. The FCO executes Stafford Act
authorities, including commitment of FEMA resources and the mission assignment of
other Federal departments or agencies via ESFs. If a major disaster or emergency
declaration covers a geographic area that spans all or parts of more than one State, the
President may decide to appoint a single FCO for the entire incident, with other
individuals as needed serving as Deputy FCOs. [5, p. 67]
In all cases, the FCO represents the FEMA Administrator in the field to discharge all
FEMA responsibilities for the response and recovery efforts underway. For Stafford Act
events, the FCO is the primary Federal representative with whom the SCO and other
State, Tribal, and Local response officials interface to determine the most urgent needs
and set objectives for an effective response. [5, p. 67]
Strengthening Local Response
In 2003, FEMA initiated the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) to
strengthen State and Local response capabilities, particularly in regard to WMD and
other terrorist incidents. It authorized purchase of specialized equipment to enhance
State and Local agencies’ capabilities in preventing and responding to WMD incidents
and other terrorist incidents, and provided funds for protecting critical infrastructure
of national importance. SHSGP provided funds for designing, developing, conducting,
and evaluating terrorism response exercises; developing and conducting counter-
terrorism training programs; and updating and implementing each state’s Homeland
Security Strategy (SHSS). SHSGP funds could also be used to plan, design, develop,
conduct, and evaluate exercises to train First Responders, and to assess the readiness
Part III: Mission Areas
If the incident exceeds
Local response capacity,
the EOC might defer to
the State Emergency
Operations Center to
request additional
resources. States can
marshal resources under
Mutual Aid Agreements
with other jurisdictions
or even direct the use of
the National Guard. All
responding assets report
to the on-scene Incident
Command Post (ICP) and
take direction according
to the Incident Action
Plan (IAP).
303
of State and Local jurisdictions to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Exercises
had to be threat- and performance-based, in accordance with FEMA’s Homeland
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). [9, pp. CRS-4]
To help guide the incremental buildup of State and Local response capacity to WMD
and terrorist incidents, in December 2003 the Bush Administration issued HSPD-8
directing DHS to develop a National Preparedness Goal (NPG) establishing
preparedness objectives, measures, and priorities. In December 2005, DHS issued a
draft National Preparedness Goal as follows:
“To achieve and sustain capabilities that enable the nation to collaborate in
successfully preventing terrorist attacks on the homeland, and rapidly and
effectively responding to and recovering from any terrorist attack, major
disaster, or other emergency that does occur to minimize the impact on lives,
property, and the economy. This state of national preparedness will be
achieved by reaching risk-based target levels of capability, and sustained by
measuring readiness and directing resources to areas of greatest risk and
need.” [10, pp. CRS-3]
To help attain the NPG, DHS began work on a National Preparedness System (NPS).
The NPS began with identifying fifteen National Planning Scenarios providing examples
of potential catastrophic incidents. From these fifteen incidents, DHS worked with
Federal, State, and Local agencies to derive a Universal Task List (UTL). The UTL
identifies the operations and tasks expected to be performed in order to respond to
events similar to those set out in the National Planning Scenarios. The UTL was
comprised of hundreds of individual tasks set across four mission areas: 1) prevent, 2)
protect, 3) respond, and 4) recover. From the Universal Task List DHS then derived the
Target Capability List (TCL). The TCL identifies thirty-six areas in which responding
agencies would be expected to be proficient in order to meet the expectations set out
in the UTL. The National Preparedness System also included the National Response
Plan and National Incident Management System as the means for implementing these
capabilities. Starting in 2005, States had to demonstrate how they were meeting UTL
and TCL requirements in order to receive State Homeland Security Grant Program
funding. [10]
In March 2011, the Obama Administration issued PPD-8 calling for a new National
Preparedness Goal based on core capabilities. [11] In September 2011, DHS release its
new National Preparedness Goal as follows:
“A secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from
the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” [12, p. 1]
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
If State resources prove
insufficient to the task,
the Governor might
request assistance from
neighboring states
under the Emergency
Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC). Under
the terms of the EMAC,
neighboring States can
provide civilian
resources and National
Guard support under the
direction of the local
Incident Command Post.
304
The 2011 NPG replaced the 36 Target Capabilities with 35 Core Capabilities. The
revised National Preparedness System issued in November 2011 now required States
to link HSGP funding requests towards achieving the Core Capabilities. They would
demonstrate this by annually conducting a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA). [13]
The 2011 National Preparedness System also introduced the National Planning
Framework. Just as the NRP and NIMS were considered part of the 2005 National
Preparedness System, the National Planning Framework provided a family of plans, not
only updating the National Response Framework, and also adding a National
Prevention Framework, National Protection Framework, National Mitigation
Framework, and National Disaster Recovery Framework. [14, p. 1]
In September 2015, DHS issued a second National Preparedness Goal under the Obama
Administration. The 2015 version did not change the NPG itself, however, it did revise
the Core Capabilities, reducing their number from 35 to 32. Otherwise, the Disaster
Preparedness System remained unchanged. [15]
Homeland Security Exercises
To validate existing Core Capabilities, the 2011 National Preparedness System
advocates the use of homeland security exercises. [13, p. 5] In 2007, DHS issued
guidance in four volumes for conducting homeland security exercise in the form of the
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program. HSEEP offered a systematic
method for planning, executing, and documenting homeland security exercises. [16] In
2013, the four HSEEP volumes were slimmed down to one. [17] Otherwise, not much
had changed. The ultimate objective of HSEEP exercises is to identify deficiencies and
take actions to correct them. State and Local government may request funding to
conduct HSEEP exercises under the FEMA Homeland Security Grant Program.
At the Federal level, homeland security exercises are conducted more formally under
the National Exercise Program (NEP). In December 2003, the Bush Administration
issued HSPD-8 authorizing a National Exercise Program to train and test national
decision makers across multiple Federal departments. [18] The 2006 Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act required NEP to conform to HSEEP. NEP exercises
are planned and executed by the FEMA National Exercise Division under the guidance
and coordination of the White House Domestic Readiness Group. Prior to 2013, the
NEP consisted of two types of exercises: 1) National Level Exercises (NLEs), and 2)
Principal Level Exercises (PLEs). An NLE was an operations-based exercise conducted
annually addressing potential catastrophic scenarios involving Federal, State, and Local
agencies. A PLE was a quarterly discussion-based exercise designed to assist senior
policy makers with evaluating emerging threats. [19] Starting in 2013, the NEP began a
Part III: Mission Areas
First Responders may
apply to the FEMA
Homeland Security
Grant Program (HSGP)
to obtain funding for
equipment and training.
Funding needs are
determined by the
Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk
Assessment (THIRA)
program that requires
States to assess their
readiness against a set
of Core Capabilities. The
idea is to achieve the
National Preparedness
Goal through
incremental
improvement.
305
two-year exercise cycle. Each NEP cycle includes various types of exercises at the
Federal, State, and Local levels, culminating in a capstone NLE at the end of the cycle.
The sequence of exercises is designed to become increasingly more complex during the
course of the NEP cycle. Some exercises may be classified. The number of exercises
executed during each cycle depend on the Principal Objectives recommended by the
White House Domestic Readiness Group and approved by the National Security Council
Principal’s Committee. Lessons learned during the exercise are evaluated and
disseminated to respective agencies to take appropriate corrective action as necessary.
[20]
The first series of national homeland security exercises were called TOPOFF, short for
TOP OFFICIALS. TOPOFF exercises were conducted from 2000 to 2009.
TOPOFF 1, May 2000, simulated biological and chemical attacks in Denver CO and
Portsmouth NH.
TOPOFF 2, May 2003, simulated WMD attacks in Chicago IL and Seattle WA.
TOPOFF 3, April 2005, simulated biological and chemical attacks in Connecticut and
New Jersey.
TOPOFF 4, October 2007, simulated dirty bomb attacks in Guam, Phoenix AZ, and
Portland OR. [21]
TOPOFF exercises were replaced by NLEs starting in 2009. Then in 2013, NLEs became
Capstone exercises ending the two-year NEP cycle.
NLE 09, July 2009, simulated terrorist attempts to enter U.S. after major overseas
attack.
NLE 10, May 2010, simulated terrorist attack using Improvised Nuclear Device
(IND).
NLE 11, May 2011, simulated earthquake along the New Madrid Seismic Zone
(NMSZ).
NLE 12, multiple exercises simulating cyber attacks on critical infrastructure.
NLE 14, multiple exercises simulating nuclear weapon accident in Alaska.
NLE 15, multiple exercises simulating earthquakes, nuclear accidents, and chemical
attacks. [21]
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
Exercises are a part of
the National
Preparedness System
which establishes a
continuous cycle of
equipping, training,
exercising, and
evaluating. At the
national level, Federal
agencies participate in
the National Exercise
Program (NEP) that now
culminate in a two-year
capstone National Level
Exercise (NLE).
306
Conclusion
Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security has led efforts to integrate and
strengthen the nation’s ability to respond to catastrophic incidents. The failure of
Hurricane Katrina intensified those efforts. As a result, responding agencies across the
country have adopted the Incident Command System and acquired new capabilities
particularly with respect to WMD attack. Since hurricane Katrina, it is fair to say that
the nation has become proficient at responding to natural disasters. And though the
nation has mercifully not been put to the test, it may also be said that it is much better
prepared than it was on 9/11. This is a DHS success.
Part III: Mission Areas
307
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the responsibility of the State Governor?
2. How did 9/11 prompt Federal support for State and Local first responders?
3. List and describe the two major emergency response initiatives introduced by HSPD-5.
4. Under what authority may the President grant Federal assistance to State Governors?
5. Who does the FCO represent and who do they work with to coordinate Federal assistance?
6. In what form is Federal assistance provided to the States?
7. When Federal assistance arrives on-scene to the disaster, who do they work for?
8. How does the Incident Commander direct all elements towards a common objective?
9. What agreement allows States to request assistance from each other?
10. How do exercise programs help improve emergency preparedness?
308
Part III: Mission Areas
309
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
Aviation Security
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe aviation security changes since 9/11.
Explain ongoing aviation security challenges.
Evaluate different aviation security measures.
Assess different aviation security priorities.
Chapter 19
Learning Outcomes
310
“The security and economic prosperity of the United States depend significantly upon
the secure operation of its Aviation Transportation System and safe use of the world’s
airspace.”
- 2010 Transportation Sector-Specific Plan
Introduction
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Federal government moved swiftly to plug the security
gaps exposed in the nation’s Aviation Transportation System. The chapter describes
the security apparatus entrusted with protecting the aviation subsector, and ensuing
programs and concerns that have evolved since 9/11.
Aviation Infrastructure
The aviation infrastructure is a subsector of the transportation infrastructure sector,
one of sixteen national critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presidential Policy
Directive No. 21. Aviation is one of seven subsectors in the Transportation Sector as
listed in Table 1. As such, the aviation subsector is covered under the Department of
Homeland Security National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). As part of the NIPP,
aviation security is coordinated through a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) guided by
a U.S. Government Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), part of DHS, is the SSA for the overall transportation sector.
However, TSA works in conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
which has regulatory authority over the aviation subsector. Under the NIPP, the SSA
works with the SCC to produce and periodically update a corresponding Sector-Specific
Plan (SSP). The first Transportation Systems SSP was produced in 2007. The
Transportation Systems SSP was last updated in 2010. Annex A to the 2010 SSP
addresses security measures undertaken within the aviation subsector. [1]
According to Annex A, the aviation subsector is formally identified as the Aviation
Transportation System (ATS). Furthermore, the ATS is said to be comprised of the
National Airspace System (NAS). The NAS, in turn, is comprised of more than 690 air
traffic control (ATC) facilities with associated systems and equipment to provide radar
and communication services; more than 19,800 general aviation and commercial
aviation airports capable of accommodating an array of aircraft operations; and
volumes of procedural and safety information necessary for users to operate in the
system. In addition, the NAS includes over 11,000 air navigation facilities and
approximately 13,000 flight procedures. [1, p. 129]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 19-1: Transportation Subsectors
1 Aviation 5. Mass Transit
2. Freight Rail 6. Passenger Rail
3. Highway 7. Pipelines
4. Maritime
The National Airspace
System (NAS) is
comprised of more than
690 Air Traffic Control
(ATC) facilities; more
than 19,800 general
aviation and commercial
aviation airports; and
over 11,000 air
navigation facilities.
311
Under Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), the FAA has regulatory
authority over aircraft operators, air cargo, foreign air carriers, indirect air carriers,
commercial airports, general aviation, and flight schools. Extensive rules and
regulations apply to aircraft operations in national airspace and around the globe. U.S.
security rules are also extended to those foreign airports and air carriers that fly to the
United States. [1, p. 130]
Aviation Security Partners
Aviation security and protection functions apply to non-travelers, travelers and their
carry-on items, checked baggage, cargo, and aviation industry personnel, including
staff, vendors, tenants, and flight crews. They impact the operation of foreign and
domestic airlines, airports, and the air cargo supply chain. Because various agencies
have jurisdictional authority over different components, aviation security entails a
complex choreography among both public and private stakeholders. [1, p. 131]
The Transportation Security Administration screens passengers and checked baggage;
deploys Federal Air Marshals (FAMs); assesses security at domestic and foreign
airports; performs vulnerability assessments of aviation assets; and provides training,
public education, and information sharing to enhance the protection of passengers,
cargo, and infrastructure. Additionally, TSA inspectors audit air carriers for compliance
with security programs, standards, and regulations. Furthermore, TSA deploys aviation
security specialists in response to high-threat situations and global security challenges.
TSA operations are monitored and coordinated nationally from the Transportation
Security Operations Center in Herndon, VA. [1, p. 132]
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents are law enforcement officers with legal
authority to arrest and apprehend unlawful travelers. CBP further maintains the Air
and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS) supporting counterterrorism and
counter-narcotics missions focused on general aviation aircraft. CBP coordinates these
actions nationally from its Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside CA.
[1, p. 132]
The Federal Aviation Administration within the Department of Transportation (DOT) is
responsible for securing NAS facilities and systems supporting air navigation. The FAA
also monitors safe air transit from its National Operations Control Center (NOCC) in
Herndon, VA. [1, p. 132]
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within the Department of Justice (DOJ) is
responsible for the ground-based tactical response to hijacking, air piracy, or other
terrorist threats; the investigation, enforcement, and prosecution of criminal law
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
The Transportation
Security Administration
(TSA) screens
passengers and checked
baggage; deploys
Federal Air Marshals
(FAMs); assesses
security at domestic and
foreign airports; and
performs vulnerability
assessments of aviation
assets.
312
violations within its jurisdiction that occur in the ATS; coordinating the law
enforcement community; and intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and foreign
intelligence sharing. [1, p. 132]
The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for deterring, defending against, and
defeating aviation threats to the United States and its global interests; airborne
response and resolution of nation-state threats within the ATS; and the operational
response to actual or potential airborne threats in U.S. airspace or the approaches to
the United States and the threat has either been resolved for defeated. [1, p. 132]
The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for coordinating U.S. Government
initiatives that involve foreign governments and international organizations, including
regional aviation security cooperation. [1, p. 132]
The Department of Commerce (DOC) is responsible for providing aviation industry and
trade policy expertise in both interagency policy efforts and international negotiations.
[1, p. 132]
Federal departments and agencies represent a segment of the aviation security
community. The large volume of cargo and number of passengers flying into the
United States from overseas increases the importance of strong partnerships at the
Federal level and with international and domestic aviation partners. Foreign
governments, State and Local law enforcement, and passengers play key roles in the
multi-layered protective posture that has been put in place since 9/11.
Post-9/11 Aviation Security
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress took swift action to create the
Transportation Security Administration, federalizing all airline passenger and baggage
screening functions and deploying significantly increased numbers of armed air
marshals on commercial passenger flights. To this day, the federalization of airport
screening remains controversial. Some in Congress contended that, in hindsight, the
decision to create TSA as a federal agency functionally responsible for passenger and
baggage screening was a “big mistake,” and that frontline screening responsibilities
should have been left in the hands of private security companies. While airports have
the option of opting out of federal screening, alternative private screening under TSA
contracts has been limited to 21 airports out of approximately 450 commercial
passenger airports where passenger screening is required. While Congress has sought
to ensure that optional private screening remains available for those airports that want
to pursue this option, proposals seeking more extensive reforms of passenger
screening have not been extensively debated. Rather, the aviation security legislation
Part III: Mission Areas
DoD is responsible for
deterring, defending
against, and defeating
aviation threats to the
United States; It
provides airborne
response and resolution
of nation-state threats
within the Air
Transportation System
(ATS); and it responds to
actual or potential
airborne threats in U.S.
airspace or the
approaches to our
territory.
313
in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks has largely focused on specific mandates to
comprehensively screen for explosives and carry out background checks and threat
assessments. [2, pp. 1-2]
Despite the extensive focus on aviation security for more than a decade, a number of
challenges remain, including
effectively screening passengers, baggage, and cargo for explosives threats;
developing effective risk-based methods for screening passengers and others with
access to aircraft and sensitive areas;
exploiting available intelligence information and watchlists to identify individuals
who pose potential threats to civil aviation;
effectively responding to security threats at airports and screening checkpoints;
developing effective strategies for addressing aircraft vulnerabilities to shoulder
fired missiles and other standoff weapons; and
addressing the potential security implications of unmanned aircraft operations in
domestic airspace. [2, p. 2]
Explosives Screening Strategy
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, explosives screening was limited in scope and focused on
selective screening of checked baggage placed on international passenger flights.
Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA; P.L. 107-71) mandated 100% screening of all checked baggage placed on
domestic passenger flights and on international passenger flights to and from the
United States. [2, p. 2]
In addition, the Implementing the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007
(P.L. 110-53) mandated the physical screening of all cargo placed on passenger flights.
Unlike passenger and checked baggage screening, TSA does not routinely perform
physical inspections of air cargo. Rather, TSA satisfies this mandate through the
Certified Cargo Screening Program. Under the program, manufacturers, warehouses,
distributors, freight forwarders, and shippers carry out screening inspections using TSA
-approved technologies and procedures both at airports and at off-airport facilities in
concert with certified supply-chain security measures and chain of custody standards.
Internationally, TSA works with other governments, international trade organizations,
and industry to assure that all U.S.-bound and domestic cargo carried aboard
passenger aircraft meet the requirements of the mandate. [2, p. 2]
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
Despite the extensive
focus on aviation
security for more than a
decade, a number of
challenges remain.
314
Additionally, TSA works closely with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to carry out
risk-based targeting of cargo shipments, including use of the CBP Advance Targeting
System-Cargo (ATS-C), which assigns risk-based scores to inbound air cargo shipments
to identify shipments of elevated risk. Originally designed to combat drug smuggling,
ATS-C has evolved and adapted over the years, particularly in response to the October
2010 cargo aircraft bomb plot that originated in Yemen, to assess shipments for
explosives threats or other terrorism-related activities. [2, pp. 2-3]
Given the focus on the threats to aviation posed by explosives, a significant focus of
TSA acquisition efforts has been on explosives screening technologies. However, in
2014, Congress found that TSA has continued to face numerous challenges in meeting
key performance requirements set for explosives detection, has only recently
developed a technology investment plan, and has not consistently implemented
Department of Homeland Security policy and best practices for procurement. The
Transportation Security Acquisition Reform Act (P.L. 113- 245) seeks to address these
concerns by requiring a five-year technology investment plan, and to increase
accountability for acquisitions through formal justifications and certifications that
technology investments are cost-beneficial. The act also requires tighter inventory
controls and processes to ensure efficient utilization of procured technologies, as well
as improvements in setting and attaining goals for small-business contracting
opportunities. [2, p. 3]
A major thrust of TSA’s acquisition and technology deployment strategy is improving
the capability to detect concealed explosives and bomb-making components carried by
airline passengers. On December 25, 2009, a passenger attempted to detonate an
explosive device concealed in his underwear aboard Northwest Airlines flight 253
during its approach to Detroit, MI. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed
responsibility. Al Qaeda and its various factions have maintained a particular interest in
attacking U.S.-bound airliners. Since 9/11, Al Qaeda has also been linked to the Richard
Reid shoe bombing incident aboard American Airlines flight 63 enroute from Paris to
Miami on December 22, 2001, a plot to bomb several trans-Atlantic flights departing
the United Kingdom for North America in 2006, and the October 2010 plot to detonate
explosives concealed in air cargo shipments bound for the United States. [2, p. 3]
Part III: Mission Areas
Given the focus on the
threats to aviation
posed by explosives, a
significant focus of TSA
acquisition efforts has
been on explosives
screening technologies.
315
In response to the Northwest Airlines flight 253 incident, the Obama Administration
accelerated deployment of Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) whole body imaging
(WBI) screening devices and other technologies at passenger screening checkpoints.
This deployment responds to the 9/11 commission recommendation to improve the
detection of explosives on passengers. In addition to AIT, next generation screening
technologies for airport screening checkpoints include advanced technology X-ray
systems for screening carry-on baggage, bottled liquids scanners, cast and prosthesis
imagers, shoe scanning devices, and portable explosives trace detection equipment. [2,
p. 3]
The use of AIT has raised a number of policy questions. Privacy advocates have
objected to the intrusiveness of AIT, particularly if used for primary screening. To allay
privacy concerns, TSA eliminated the use of human analysis of AIT images, and does
not store imagery. In place of human image analysts, TSA has deployed automated
threat detection capabilities using automated targeting recognition (ATR) software.
Another concern raised about AIT centered on the potential medical risks posed by
backscatter X-ray systems, but those systems are no longer in use for airport screening,
and current millimeter wave systems emit nonionizing millimeter waves not
considered harmful. [2, pp. 3-4]
Some have advocated for risk-based use of AIT. Past legislative proposals have
specifically sought to prohibit the use of WBI technology for primary screening,
although primary screening using AIT is now commonplace, at least at larger airports.
Checkpoints at many smaller airports, however, have not been furnished with AIT
equipment and other advanced checkpoint detection technologies. This raises
questions about TSA’s long-range plans to expand AIT to ensure more uniform
approaches to explosives screening across all categories of airports. Through FY2014,
TSA had deployed about 750 AIT units, roughly 86% of its projected full operating
capability of 870 units. Full operating capability, once achieved, will still leave many
smaller airports without this capability. TSA plans to manage this risk to a large extent
through risk-based passenger screening measures, primarily through increased use of
voluntary passenger background checks under the PreCheck trusted traveler program.
However, this program, likewise, has not been rolled out at many smaller airports:
currently, the program’s incentive of expedited screening is offered at less than one-
third of all commercial passenger airports. [2, p. 4]
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
In 2010, the Obama
Administration
accelerated deployment
of Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) whole
body imaging (WBI)
screening devices and
other technologies at
passenger screening
checkpoints. This
deployment responds to
the 9/11 commission
recommendation to
improve the detection of
explosives on
passengers.
316
Risk-Based Passenger Screening
TSA has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and
apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk.
These include a trusted traveler program called PreCheck, modified screening
procedures for children 12 and under, and a program for expedited screening of
known flight crew and cabin crew members. Programs have also been developed for
modified screening of elderly passengers similar to those procedures put in place for
children. [2, p. 4]
A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s
latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs
such as Global Entry, SENTRI, and NEXUS. Under the PreCheck program, participants
vetted through a background check process, as well as other passengers randomly
selected and deemed to be low-risk under a process known as “managed inclusion,”
are processed through expedited screening lanes where they can keep shoes on and
keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. As of March 2015, PreCheck expedited
screening lanes were available at more than 130 airports. The cost of background
checks under the PreCheck program is recovered through application fees of $85 per
passenger for a five-year membership. TSA’s goal is to process 50% of passengers
through PreCheck expedited screening lanes, thus reducing the need for standard
security screening lanes. [2, p. 4]
A predecessor test program, called the Registered Traveler program, which involved
private vendors that issued and scanned participants’ biometric credentials, was
scrapped by TSA in 2009 because it failed to show a demonstrable security benefit.
Although initial evaluations and consumer response have suggested that PreCheck
offers an effective, streamlined screening process, some questions remain regarding
whether PreCheck is fully effective in directing security resources to unknown or
elevated-risk travelers. While questions remain regarding the security effectiveness of
risk-based screening measures like PreCheck, these approaches have demonstrated
improved screening efficiency, resulting in cost savings for TSA. TSA estimates annual
savings in screener workforce costs totaling $110 million as a result of risk-based
screening efficiencies. [2, pp. 4-5]
One concern raised over PreCheck, and the passenger screening process in general, is
the public dissemination of instructions, posted on Internet sites, detailing how to
decipher boarding passes to determine whether a passenger has been selected for
expedited screening, standard screening, or more thorough secondary screening. The
lack of encryption and the limited capability TSA has to authenticate boarding passes
and travel documents could be exploited to attempt to avoid detection of threat items
by more extensive security measures. Other concerns raised over the PreCheck
program include the lack of biometric identity authentication and the extensive use of
Part III: Mission Areas
A cornerstone of TSA’s
risk-based initiatives is
the PreCheck program.
Participants vetted
through a background
check process, as well as
other passengers
randomly selected and
deemed to be low-risk
under a process known
as “managed inclusion,”
are processed through
expedited screening
lanes where they can
keep shoes on and keep
liquids and laptops
inside carry-on bags.
317
managed inclusion to route travelers not enrolled in or vetted through the PreCheck
program through designated PreCheck expedited screening lanes based on random
selection or observations by Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), canine explosives
detection teams, or explosives trace detection equipment. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) found that TSA had not fully tested its managed inclusion
practices, and recommended that TSA take steps to ensure and document that testing
of the program adheres to established evaluation design practices. [2, p. 5]
In addition to passenger screening, TSA, in coordination with participating airlines and
labor organizations representing airline pilots, has developed a known crewmember
program to expedite security screening of airline flight crews. In July 2012, TSA
expanded the program to include flight attendants. [2, p. 5]
TSA has also developed a passenger behavior detection program to identify potential
threats based on observed behavioral characteristics. TSA initiated early tests of its
Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques (SPOT) program in 2003. By
FY2012, the program deployed almost 3,000 BDOs at 176 airports, at an annual cost of
about $200 million. Despite its significant expansion, questions remain regarding the
effectiveness of the behavioral detection program, and privacy advocates have
cautioned that it could devolve into racial or ethnic profiling of passengers despite
concerted efforts to focus solely on behaviors rather than individual passenger traits or
characteristics. While some Members of Congress have sought to shutter the program,
Congress has not moved to do so. For example, House Amendment 127 (113th
Congress), an amendment to the FY2014 DHS appropriations measure that sought to
eliminate funding for the program, failed to pass a floor vote. Congress also has not
taken specific action to revamp the program, despite the concerns raised by GAO and
the DHS Office of Inspector General. [2, p. 5]
Terrorist Watchlists
The failed bombing attempt of Northwest Airlines flight 253 on December 25, 2009,
raised policy questions regarding the effective use of terrorist watchlists and
intelligence information to identify individuals who may pose a threat to aviation.
Specific failings to include the bomber on either the no-fly or selectee list, despite
intelligence information suggesting that he posed a security threat, prompted reviews
of the intelligence analysis and terrorist watchlisting processes. Adding to these
concerns, on the evening of May 3, 2010, Faisal Shazad, a suspect in an attempted car
bombing in New York’s Times Square, was permitted to board an Emirates Airline flight
to Dubai at John F. Kennedy International airport, even though his name had been
added to the no-fly list earlier in the day. He was subsequently identified, removed
from the aircraft, and arrested after the airline forwarded the final passenger manifest
to CBP’s National Targeting Center just prior to departure. Subsequently, TSA modified
security directives to require airlines to check passenger names against the no-fly list
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
TSA has also developed
a passenger behavior
detection program to
identify potential
threats based on
observed behavioral
characteristics. TSA
initiated early tests of its
Screening Passengers by
Observational
Techniques (SPOT)
program in 2003. By
FY2012, the program
deployed almost 3,000
BDOs at 176 airports.
318
within two hours of being electronically notified of an urgent update, instead of
allowing 24 hours to recheck the list. The event also accelerated the transfer of
watchlist checks from the airlines to TSA under the Secure Flight program. [2, p. 6]
By the end of November 2010, DHS announced that 100% of passengers flying to or
from U.S. airports are being vetted using the Secure Flight system. Secure Flight
continues the no-fly and selectee list practices of vetting passenger name records
against a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). On international flights,
Secure Flight operates in coordination with the use of watchlists by CBP’s National
Targeting Center - Passenger, which relies on the Advance Passenger Information
System (APIS) and other tools to vet both inbound and outbound passenger manifests.
In addition to these systems, TSA also relies on risk-based analysis of passenger data
carried out by the airlines through use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS). In January 2015, TSA gave notification that it would start
incorporating the results of CAPPS assessments, but not the underlying data used to
make such assessments, into Secure Flight, along with each passenger’s full name, date
of birth and PreCheck traveler number (if applicable). These data are used within the
Secure Flight system to perform risk-based analyses to determine whether passengers
receive expedited, standard, or enhanced screening at airport checkpoints. [2, p. 6]
Central issues surrounding the use of terrorist watchlists include the speed with which
watchlists are updated as new intelligence information becomes available; the extent
to which all information available to the federal government is exploited to assess
possible threats among passengers and airline and airport workers; the ability to
detect identity fraud or other attempts to circumvent terrorist watchlist checks; the
adequacy of established protocols for providing redress to individuals improperly
identified as potential threats; and the adequacy of coordination with international
partners. [2, p. 7]
Security Response to Incidents at Screening Checkpoints
On November 1, 2013, a lone gunman targeting TSA employees fired several shots at a
screening checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), killing one TSA
screener and injuring two other screeners and one airline passenger. The incident
raised concerns about the ability of TSA and airport security officials to mitigate and
respond to such threats. In a detailed post-incident action report, TSA identified
several proposed actions to improve checkpoint security, including enhanced active
shooter incident training for screeners; better coordination and dissemination of
information regarding incidents; expansion and routine testing of alert notification
capabilities; and expanded law enforcement presence at checkpoints during peak
times. TSA did not recommend mandatory law enforcement presence at checkpoints,
and did not support proposals to arm certain TSA employees or provide screeners with
bulletproof vests. [2, p. 7]
Part III: Mission Areas
By the end of November
2010, DHS announced
that 100% of passengers
flying to or from U.S.
airports are being vetted
using the Secure Flight
system. Secure Flight
continues the no-fly and
selectee list practices of
vetting passenger name
records against a subset
of the Terrorist
Screening Database
(TSDB).
319
The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015 (H.R. 720), named in honor of the
TSA screener killed in the LAX incident, addresses security incident response at
airports. It would mandate airports to put in place working plans for responding to
security incidents including terrorist attacks, active shooters, and incidents targeting
passenger checkpoints. Such plans would be required to include details on evacuation,
unified incident command, testing and evaluation of communications, time frames for
law enforcement response, and joint exercises and training at airports. Additionally,
the bill would require TSA to create a mechanism for sharing information among
airports regarding best practices for airport security incident planning, management,
and training. The bill also would require TSA to identify ways to expand the availability
of funding for checkpoint screening law enforcement support through cost savings
from improved efficiencies. [2, p. 7]
Mitigating the Threat of Shoulder-Fired Missiles to Civilian Aircraft
The threat to civilian aircraft posed by shoulder-fired missiles or other standoff
weapons capable of downing an airliner remains a vexing concern for aviation security
specialists and policymakers. The State Department has estimated that, since the
1970s, over 40 civilian aircraft have been hit by shoulder-fired missiles, causing 25
crashes and more than 600 deaths. Most of these incidents involved small aircraft
operated at low altitudes in areas of ongoing armed conflicts, although some larger
jets have also been destroyed. Notably, on April 6, 1994, an executive jet carrying the
presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down while on approach to Kigali,
Rwanda, and on October 10, 1998, a Boeing 727 was destroyed by rebels in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. The dangers of operating civil aircraft in and near
regions of armed conflict has recently been a topic of particular concern following the
July 17, 2014, downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a Boeing 777, over eastern
Ukraine after being struck by a much larger surface-to-air missile. [2, pp. 7-8]
The terrorist threat posed by small man-portable shoulder-fired missiles was brought
into the spotlight soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks by the November 2002
attempted downing of a chartered Israeli airliner in Mombasa, Kenya, the first time
such an event took place outside of a conflict zone. In 2003, then Secretary of State
Colin Powell remarked that there was “no threat more serious to aviation.” Since then,
Department of State and military initiatives seeking bilateral cooperation and voluntary
reductions of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) stockpiles have reduced
worldwide inventories by at least 32,500 missiles. Despite this progress, such weapons
may still be in the hands of potential terrorists. This threat, combined with the limited
capability to improve security beyond airport perimeters and to modify flight paths,
leaves civil aircraft vulnerable to missile attacks. [2, p. 8]
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
The threat to civilian
aircraft posed by
shoulder-fired missiles
or other standoff
weapons capable of
downing an airliner
remains a vexing
concern for aviation
security specialists and
policymakers. The State
Department has
estimated that, since
the 1970s, over 40
civilian aircraft have
been hit by shoulder-
fired missiles, causing 25
crashes and more than
600 deaths.
320
The most visible DHS initiative to address the threat was the multiyear Counter-
MANPADS program carried out by the DHS Science & Technology Directorate. The
program concluded in 2009 with extensive operational and live-fire testing along with
Federal Aviation Administration certification of two systems capable of protecting
airliners against heat-seeking missiles. The systems have not been operationally
deployed on commercial airliners, however, due largely to high acquisition and life-
cycle costs. Some critics have also pointed out that the units do not protect against the
full range of potential weapons that pose a potential threat to civil airliners.
Proponents, however, argue that the systems do appear to provide effective
protection against what is likely the most menacing standoff threat to civil airliners:
heat-seeking MANPADS. Nonetheless, the airlines have not voluntarily invested in
these systems for operational use, and argue that the costs for such systems should be
borne, at least in part, by the federal government. Policy discussions have focused
mostly on whether to fund the acquisition of limited numbers of the units for use by
the Civil Reserve Aviation Fleet, civilian airliners that can be called up to transport
troops and supplies for the military. Other approaches to protecting aircraft, including
ground-based missile countermeasures and escort planes or drones equipped with
antimissile technology, have been considered on a more limited basis, but these
options face operational challenges that may limit their effectiveness. [2, p. 8]
While MANPADS are mainly seen as a security threat to civil aviation overseas, a
MANPADS attack in the United States could have a considerable, long-lasting impact on
the airline industry. At the airport level, improving security and reducing the
vulnerability of flight paths to potential MANPADS attacks continues to pose unique
challenges. While major U.S. airports have conducted vulnerability studies, and many
have partnered with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to reduce
vulnerabilities to some degree, these efforts face significant challenges because of
limited resources and large geographic areas where aircraft are vulnerable to attack.
While considerable attention has been given to this issue in years past, considerable
vulnerabilities remain, and any terrorist attempts to exploit those vulnerabilities could
quickly escalate the threat of shoulder-fired missiles to a major national security
priority. [2, pp. 8-9]
Cybersecurity
While much attention has been focused on physical security, there is a growing
concern about the emerging threat from cyber attack. New generation electronic-
enabled (e-enabled) aircraft (such as the Boeing 787, Airbus A380, Airbus A350,
Bombardier C-Series, Gulfstream 650, and others ) and retrofitted legacy aircraft
implement an unprecedented amount of new technologies such as IP-enabled
networks, commercial-off-the shelf (COTS) components, wireless connectivity (e.g.,
Bluetooth®), and global positioning systems (GPSs). Aircraft/avionics manufacturers
are implementing “wireless” systems to reduce the amount of wiring within an aircraft.
Part III: Mission Areas
The DHS Counter-
MANPADS program
concluded in 2009 with
extensive operational
and live-fire testing
along with Federal
Aviation Administration
certification of two
systems capable of
protecting airliners
against heat-seeking
missiles. The systems
have not been
operationally deployed
on commercial airliners,
however, due largely to
high acquisition and life-
cycle costs.
321
The reduction in weight helps an aircraft achieve lower fuel consumption and can also
reduce support costs by simplifying aircraft configurations; however, these wireless
systems are vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. [3, p. 12]
With the introduction of new generation e-enabled aircraft, a new era has begun
where aircraft navigation and communication functions are transitioning from
operating as isolated and independent system to being integrated into a centralized
network system that is dependent on exchanging digital information between the e-
enabled aircraft and external networks located on the ground and on other e-enabled
aircraft. Current aircraft systems architectures are relying heavily on IP-based networks
that interconnect aircraft systems such as flight controls, displays, avionics, engine, and
cabin systems. While providing unprecedented global connectivity, these e-enabled
aircraft technologies and COTS components introduce many access points to aircraft
networks; as a result, e-enabled security vulnerabilities not present in past aircraft
designs have the potential to significantly impact current aircraft safety. [3, p. 12]
At the same time, unprecedented access to aircraft systems and networks from
external systems—including GateLink, wireless local area networks (WLANs), Avionics
Full Duplex Switched Ethernet (AFDX) Networking, engine health and usage monitoring
systems (HUMSs), and electronic flight bags (EFBs)—are being introduced. While these
connections allow for the convenience of two-way transfer of critical information to
and from the airplane, this two-way information transfer makes it easier for inaccurate
information to be transferred—either by mistake or through malicious intent—to and
from the airplane. [3, pp. 12-13]
In April 2015, a passenger was removed from a United Airlines flight after tweeting a
joke about hacking the plane’s Inflight Entertainment System (IFE). In a deposition to
the FBI the passenger claimed he was able to access the Thrust Management
Computer (TMC) through the IFE. The TMC works with the autopilot to calculate the
optimum power setting for the engines. According to the affidavit, the passenger was
able to issue a “climb command”, which “caused one of the airplane engines to climb
resulting in a lateral or sideways movement of the plane.” Boeing and independent
aviation experts asserted that what the FBI affidavit described was technically
impossible. Whether the passenger hacked the plane or not, it is clear they were able
to gain access and prod where they shouldn’t. United Airlines took the precaution of
banning the passenger from subsequent flights. [4]
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
The introduction of new
e-enabled aircraft is
centralizing aircraft
navigation and
communication
functions into a network
system capable of
exchanging data with
the ground and other e-
enabled aircraft. This
technology is creating
security vulnerabilities
not present in past
aircraft designs, and has
the potential to
significantly impact
current aircraft safety.
322
Whatever the true circumstances of the previous incident, the implications are clear:
newer aircraft are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cyber threats. Some potential
attack vectors against aircraft are listed in Table 2, and some potential forms of cyber
attack listed in Table 3. [5]
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Cybersecurity Division
(NCSD) established the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), which was chartered
to work with control systems security stakeholders through awareness and outreach
programs that encourage and support coordinated control systems security
enhancement efforts. In 2009, the CSSP established the Industrial Control System Joint
Working Group (ICSJWG) as a coordination body to facilitate the collaboration of
control system stakeholders and to encourage the design, development and
deployment of enhanced security for control systems. In 2011, the ICSJWG released a
Cross-Sector Roadmap for Cybersecurity. Roadmaps develop near, mid, and long-term
perspectives to guide industry efforts toward common goals. Based on the ICSJWG
effort, in 2012, the Transportation Sector Working Group (TSWG) released its own
Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Transportation Sector. The TSWG Roadmap
describes a plan for voluntarily improving Industrial Control Systems cybersecurity
across all transportation modes, including aviation. [3, pp. 1-5]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 19-2: Cyber Attack Vectors [5]
# Attack Vector
1. Remote Connections from Aircraft to Ground Websites
Anything traversing the internet is exposed to attack
2. Network Connections between Aircraft Systems and Vulnerable Equipment
Vulnerable due to external connections
Inherent vulnerabilities of laptops, tablets, & USB devices
3. Corrupted Services
Command Radio
Global Positioning System (GPS)
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)
Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B)
Digital Weather
Broadband Satellite
WiFi/Cellular Connections
In 2004, the Department
of Homeland Security’s
National Cybersecurity
Division (NCSD)
established the Control
Systems Security
Program (CSSP), which
was chartered to work
with control systems
security stakeholders
through awareness and
outreach programs that
encourage and support
coordinated control
systems security
enhancement efforts.
323
The TSWG Roadmap established four goals:
1. Build a Culture of Cybersecurity. End State: Cybersecurity and ICS are viewed as
inseparable and integrated throughout the Transportation Sector.
2. Assess and Monitor Risk. End State. The Transportation Sector has a robust
portfolio of ICS-recommended security analysis tools to effectively assess and
monitor ICS cybersecurity risk.
3. Develop and Implement Risk Reduction and Mitigation Measures. End State:
Security solutions for legacy systems, new architectural designs, and secured
communication systems in the Transportation Sector are readily available and
deployed across the Sector.
4. Manage Incidents. The Transportation Sector is quickly alerted of cybersecurity ICS
incidents, and sophisticated, effective, and efficient mitigation strategies are
implemented in operation. [3, p. 30]
When viewed together, the four goals are intended to capture the full spectrum of
activities needed for transportation control systems cybersecurity. To achieve these
goals within a ten-year timeframe, the TSWG Roadmap identifies subordinate
objectives with near-term (0-2 years), mid-term (2-5 years), and long-term (5-10 years)
milestones. The Transportation Roadmap milestones and metrics provide broad
quantification information that can be used to determine progress as a whole towards
achieving the corresponding objectives, and are presumably monitored under the
auspices of the corresponding National Infrastructure Protection Plan Sector
Coordinating Council and Sector-Specific Plan. [3, p. 30]
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
Table 19-3: Potential Types of Aircraft Cyber Attacks [6]
# Attack Type Examples
1. Spoofing
Modifying data that otherwise appears to be from a legitimate source
Uses protocol weaknesses, compromised security data or ground systems
Flight Plans
GPS Navigation Data
2. Exploiting
Using a digital connection to execute malicious instructions on installed equipment
Uses software vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows
Bots
Automated Sabotage
3. Denial of Service
Using a digital connection to disrupt service
Often uses inherent protocol features
Flooding
ARP Poisoning
4. Counterfeiting
Inserting malicious content into a legitimate part, software component, or database
Trojan Horse
Backdoor
RootKit
In 2012, the
Transportation Sector
Working Group (TSWG)
released its own
Roadmap to Secure
Control Systems in the
Transportation Sector.
The TSWG Roadmap
describes a plan for
voluntarily improving
Industrial Control
Systems cybersecurity
across all transportation
modes, including
aviation.
324
Conclusion
Despite much progress, many holes remain in securing the nation’s Aviation
Transportation System. From a physical standpoint, given that current security
measures are imperfect, the question remains “how much security at what price”?
And while TSA continues to search for the right balance, the emerging threat from
cyber attack may render most physical security measures meaningless. In the absence
of any specific solutions, the Department of Homeland Security can only do what it’s
already doing, and that’s to navigate a protective course guided by risk management.
Part III: Mission Areas
325
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why was the Transportation Security Administration created immediately following 9/11?
2. What are the respective roles of the FAA and DoD with regard to the National Airspace System?
3. Explain the challenge to preventing explosives from being smuggled aboard aircraft?
4. Explain the advantages and disadvantages to screening passengers with Advanced Imaging Technology.
5. List and describe two means TSA uses to keep potential hijackers from boarding aircraft.
6. Why was the DHS Counter-MANPADS program cancelled in 2009?
7. Why is cyber attack a potentially bigger concern than hijacking?
8. What is DHS doing to reduce the risk from cyber attack against aircraft?
9. Do you think all the airport security changes since 9/11 were worth the investment? Explain your answer.
10. If you were the TSA administrator, what would be your priority research project? Explain your answer.
326
Part III: Mission Areas
327
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
Maritime Security
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain why U.S. ports and navigable waterways are critical to the national economy.
Describe how the USCG protects U.S. ports and waterways.
Identify maritime patrol forces according to their respective capabilities.
Explain the USCG “security in-depth” strategy.
Evaluate both the importance and difficulty of screening shipping containers.
Chapter 20
Learning Outcomes
328
“The security of the MTS is paramount for protecting the Nation and its economy;
however, it presents daunting and unique challenges for managers of the maritime
mode.”
- 2010 Transportation Sector-Specific Plan
Introduction
Ships plying the maritime domain are the primary mode of transportation for world
trade, carrying more than 80 percent of the world’s trade by volume. U.S. maritime
trade is integral to the global economy, representing 10.68 percent of global trade
generated in 2008. From a system-of-systems perspective, the Maritime
Transportation System (MTS) is a network of maritime operations interfacing with
shoreside operations at intermodal connections and is part of global supply chains and
domestic commercial operations. Through the MTS, the maritime mode is the primary
transportation mode providing connectivity between the United States and global
economies; 99% of overseas trade by volume enters or leaves the United States by
ship. The nation’s economic and military security fundamentally relies upon the health
and functionality of the MTS. [1, p. 171]
Maritime Infrastructure
The maritime infrastructure is a subsector of the transportation infrastructure sector,
one of sixteen national critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presidential Policy
Directive No. 21. The maritime subsector is one of seven in the Transportation Sector
as listed in Table 1. As such, the maritime subsector is covered under the Department
of Homeland Security National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). As part of the
NIPP, maritime security is coordinated through a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC)
guided by a U.S. Government Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). The Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), part of DHS, is the SSA for the overall transportation
sector. However, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is the designated SSA for
maritime security. Under the NIPP, the SSA works with the SCC to produce and
periodically update a corresponding Sector-Specific Plan (SSP). The first Transportation
Systems SSP was produced in 2007. The Transportation Systems SSP was last updated
in 2010. Annex B to the 2010 SSP addresses security measures undertaken within the
maritime subsector. [1]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 20-1: Transportation Subsectors
1 Aviation 5. Mass Transit
2. Freight Rail 6. Passenger Rail
3. Highway 7. Pipelines
4. Maritime
The Maritime
Transportation System
(MTS) includes 361 ports
and 12,000 miles of
inland navigable waters.
The MTS serves 10
million passengers on
4,200 cruises annually;
147 million ferry
passengers; 7,100
commercial ships
making approximately
60,000 port calls; and
2.3 billion metric tons of
domestic and foreign
trade goods annually.
329
According to Annex B, the maritime subsector is formally identified as the Maritime
Transportation System. [1, p. 176] The MTS includes 95,000 miles of coastline and 361
ports, from the largest mega-ports to the smallest fishing harbors and marinas. The
MTS also includes the system of interconnected inland rivers and the Intracoastal
Waterway (ICW), which consists of 12,000 miles of navigable waters connecting inland
metropolitan areas, industrial complexes, and the agricultural heartland of the
country. The MTS includes the Great Lakes, along 6,700 miles of U.S. coastline and
1,500 miles of international maritime border with Canada, that connect the industrial
north and northern population centers of the Midwest through the St. Lawrence
Seaway System to the Atlantic Ocean. [2, p. 9] The MTS services 10 million passengers
on 4,200 cruises annually; 147 million ferry passengers; 7,100 commercial ships making
approximately 60,000 port calls; and 2.3 billion metric tons of domestic and foreign
trade goods. Forty-eight percent of U.S. foreign trade is transported by ship. [1, p.
176]
United States Coast Guard
The USCG is responsible for protecting the U.S. Maritime Transportation System. [3, p.
5] Title 14 of the U.S. Code specifies that the Coast Guard is a military service and a
branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times, not just in wartime or
when the President directs. Coast Guard cutters are warships of the United States. This
status affords certain rights under international conventions and practice, such as the
right to approach any vessel to ascertain its identity and country of origin. It gives
USCG vessels sovereign immunity from other countries’ laws. The USCG is the only
branch of the Armed Forces of the United States to which Posse Comitatus, preventing
the other military services from acting as law enforcement agents on U.S. soil, in U.S.
territorial waters, or against U.S. citizens under most circumstances, has not been
applied. The USCG possesses the authority to board any vessel subject to U.S.
jurisdiction, or to the operation of any U.S. law, to make inquiries, examinations,
inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which
the U.S. has jurisdiction. [3, p. 11]
Under its Title 14 authorities, the United States Coast Guard conducts maritime
security, protecting the U.S. from threats delivered by sea. Within this role, the USCG
performs four main missions: 1) Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; 2) Drug
Interdiction; 3) Migrant Interdiction; and 4) Defense Readiness. [2, p. 8]
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS). Under this mission, USCG conducts
harbor patrols, vulnerability assessments, enforces security zones, approves vessel and
facility security compliance, develops Area Maritime Security Plans, conducts risk
assessments, assesses foreign port antiterrorism measures, and other activities to
prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage from attacks that occur. [2, p. 8]
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
The U.S. Coast Guard
(USCG) is responsible for
protecting the MTS.
Under its Title 14
authorities, the USCG
conducts maritime
security, performing
four main missions: 1)
Ports, Waterways, and
Coastal Security; 2) Drug
Interdiction; 3) Migrant
Interdiction; and 4)
Defense Readiness.
330
Drug Interdiction. The USCG deploys cutters, aircraft and deployable specialized forces
to conduct patrols, interdict and seize maritime drug trafficking vessels. [2, p. 8] The
Coast Guard is the designated lead agency for maritime interdiction under the National
Drug Control Strategy and the co-lead agency for air interdiction operations with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection. USCG cutters and aircraft have forward deployed off
Central and South America in drug transit zones. They have disrupted trans-national
terrorist and criminal organizations by intercepting thousands of tons of contraband
that otherwise would have found its way to America’s streets, apprehending
thousands of suspected narco-terrorists and smugglers, and supporting successful
prosecutions in the United States and in many other countries. [3, pp. 11-12]
Migrant Interdiction. The USCG deploys cutters and aircraft to prevent, disrupt and
interdict maritime smuggling and maritime migration by undocumented migrants to
the U.S.
Defense Readiness. The USCG provides forces to the Department of Defense (DoD) to
perform joint military operations worldwide. It deploys cutters, boats, aircraft and
specialized forces in and around harbors to protect DoD force mobilization operations
in the U.S. and expeditionary operations overseas. [2, p. 8]
USCG Operational Areas
The Coast Guard has defined three geographic operational areas:
1. Offshore. The offshore operational area extends seaward from 50 nautical miles
(nm) seaward of the U.S. baseline to the far reaches of the sea, including foreign
waters, when authorized. It also includes international operations, including land-
based forces deployed to foreign territory, when authorized. This area also
includes the polar regions, defined as north of 60° N latitude (Arctic) and areas
south of 60° S latitude (Antarctic), but does not include the U.S. coastal operational
areas along Alaska.
2. Coastal. The coastal operational area includes waters extending from the U.S.
baseline seaward to a distance of 50 miles offshore, including the territorial sea,
contiguous zone, and that part of the U.S. Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ)
extending seaward to 50 miles from the baseline. This area includes the waters
seaward of the baseline on the U.S. side of the international boundary on the
Great Lakes.
3. Inland. The inland operational area includes all waters shoreward of the U.S.
baseline that are subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S., including the Western
Rivers System. This area does not include those waters on the U.S. side of the
international boundary on the Great Lakes that are seaward of (extending out
from) the baseline. [2, p. 9]
Part III: Mission Areas
The Coast Guard had
three defined
geographic operational
areas: 1) Offshore,
anywhere around the
world from 50 miles
seaward of the U.S.
coast; 2) Coastal, from
the beach to 50 miles
out from U.S. territory;
and 3) Inland, all waters
shoreward from the U.S.
coast.
331
USCG Operating Forces
Coast Guard forces are organized into the Coast Guard Maritime Trident of Forces: (1)
Shore-based Forces, (2) Maritime Patrol Forces, and (3) Deployable Specialized Forces.
[2, p. 19]
Shore-based Forces
Shore-based Forces are comprised of Sector commands and specific subordinate units
that operate in ports, waterways, and coastal regions of the U.S. and its territories.
Sector commands include a command and control element and staff (with organic
mission support and intelligence functions), and prevention and response elements.
Prevention elements conduct marine inspections, waterways management and marine
investigations activities (e.g., aids-to-navigation, issuing safety and security zones,
inspecting regulated vessels and facilities, investigating marine casualties). Response
elements conduct incident management and enforcement activities (e.g., SAR,
pollution investigation, security patrols, vessel boardings). [2, p. 19]
Shore-based Forces execute the broad legal authorities and roles of the Sector
Commander, which include Captain of the Port, Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection,
Federal On-Scene Coordinator, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, and SAR
Mission Coordinator. [2, p. 20]
Shore-based Forces include the following subordinate units:
Boat Stations. These fixed response units conduct operations in inland and coastal
areas using motor life boats, response boats, and special purpose craft.
Aids to Navigation Team (ANT). These mobile prevention units conduct operations
in inland and coastal areas using aids to navigation boats.
Marine Safety Unit (MSU) and Marine Safety Detachment (MSD). These fixed
prevention units, located geographically distant from the Sector headquarters and
staff, conduct operations through a range of prevention activities, including
inspections, investigations and waterways management in support of the Sector.
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS). These fixed prevention units conduct operations to
facilitate the safe and efficient transit of commercial vessel traffic along high-
density routes in inland and coastal areas. VTS coordinates commercial vessel
movement through specified areas using command and control, communications
and surveillance, and supports Coast Guard operations by providing domain
awareness.
River, Construction, and Inland Buoy Tenders. These cutters conduct operations to
maintain aids to navigation in inland areas. They also conduct other prevention
and response activities (e.g., assisting with flood recovery operations).
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
Coast Guard forces are
organized into the Coast
Guard Maritime Trident
of Forces: (1) Shore-
based Forces, (2)
Maritime Patrol Forces,
and (3) Deployable
Specialized Forces.
332
Harbor and Icebreaking Tugs. These cutters conduct operations to break ice in
inland areas, including the Great Lakes, to keep the MTS open for commerce. They
also conduct other prevention and response activities (e.g., SAR, maritime security
patrols). [2, p. 20]
Although Coast Guard Air Stations are shore-based commands, all fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft that deploy from Air Stations are categorized as Maritime Patrol
Forces because of their capabilities and employment. [2, p. 20]
Maritime Patrol Forces
Maritime Patrol Forces are comprised of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft, and their
crews. These assets deploy primarily in coastal and offshore areas to conduct
prevention and response operations through patrol, presence, and at-sea operations
(e.g., interdiction, boarding, enforcement, search and rescue). Cutters provide armed,
persistent presence and command and control capabilities throughout the maritime
domain. In addition to conducting Coast Guard operations, cutters project U.S.
presence and protect U.S. sovereignty. These forces provide unique capabilities to DoD
for joint operations, including warfighting under combatant commander operational
control. Cutters also include the polar icebreakers, the nation’s only capability for
providing access to polar regions when restricted by ice. [2, p. 20]
Maritime Patrol Forces also conduct Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR) activities in support of Coast Guard and national requirements. [2, p. 20]
Maritime Patrol Forces can also operate in inland areas when required, such as
performing mobile command and control, prevention and response operations
following a disaster or disruption to normal Sector operations, or when Sectors require
augmenting forces. Maritime Patrol Forces include:
Major Cutters. These large oceangoing cutters conduct the full range of Coast
Guard operations, except for icebreaking, primarily in the offshore operational
area. Superior endurance and sea keeping capabilities provide the ability to
maintain persistent presence in a range of environmental conditions. Major cutters
include national security cutters (NSC), high (WHEC) and medium endurance
(WMEC) cutters, and the planned offshore patrol cutters (OPC). Major cutters have
assigned small boats and routinely deploy with embarked rotary wing aircraft.
Part III: Mission Areas
Maritime Patrol Forces
are comprised of Coast
Guard cutters and
aircraft, and their crews.
These assets deploy
primarily in coastal and
offshore areas to
conduct prevention and
response operations
through patrol,
presence, and at-sea
operations (e.g.,
interdiction, boarding,
enforcement, search
and rescue).
333
Patrol Boats. These smaller cutters conduct the full range of Coast Guard
operations, except for icebreaking, primarily in the coastal operational area. Patrol
Boats include fast response cutters (FRC), patrol boats (WPB), and coastal patrol
boats (CPB). They are designed for rapid response, patrol, and interdiction. They
may also deploy overseas in support of the combatant commanders for foreign
coastal interdiction operations in the offshore operational area.
Polar and Great Lakes Icebreakers. These cutters assure access to the polar regions
and U.S. ports and navigational channels in the Great Lakes. They are specifically
designed with reinforced and tailored hulls for open-water icebreaking.
Polar Icebreakers. These cutters protect U.S. sovereignty in the polar
regions, support science and research, supply remote stations, and
perform other operations across the Coast Guard mission spectrum. They
are the only means of providing assured surface access in support of polar
maritime security, national defense, and sea control requirements.
Great Lakes Icebreaker. This cutter assists in keeping channels and harbors
open to commercial navigation on the Great Lakes to ensure a regular
navigation season on the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway.
Oceangoing and Coastal Buoy Tenders. These cutters maintain aids to navigation in
inland and coastal operational areas. They also conduct operations across the
Coast Guard mission spectrum. Certain oceangoing buoy tenders may carry an
organic dive team as part of the crew to support aids to navigation operations.
Fixed-Wing Aircraft. These all-weather aircraft deploy primarily from land-based
Coast Guard Air Stations to conduct airborne operations. They consist of Long
Range Surveillance (LRS) and Medium Range Surveillance (MRS) aircraft. These
aircraft conduct operations supporting all Coast Guard missions and perform
mission support activities (e.g., logistics/transport flights).
Rotary-Wing Aircraft. These aircraft deploy primarily from land-based Coast Guard
Air Stations or underway cutters to conduct airborne operations supporting all
Coast Guard missions. They consist of Medium Range Response (MRR) and Short
Range Response (SRR) helicopters. These aircraft conduct operations supporting all
Coast Guard missions and perform mission support activities (e.g., logistics/
transport flights). [2, p. 21]
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
Coast Guard icebreakers
assure access to the
polar regions and U.S.
ports and navigational
channels in the Great
Lakes.
334
Deployable Specialized Forces
Deployable Specialized Forces (DSF) are teams of readily available and globally
deployable personnel and assets with specialized capabilities, organized into unit types
by specialty function and capabilities. DSF conduct operations across a range of Coast
Guard missions where their unique capabilities are required. DSF includes:
Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST). These units consist of law enforcement
teams with boat forces and deployable boats that conduct waterborne operations
and limited shoreside security operations across Coast Guard mission areas. MSSTs
have specialized capabilities to conduct maritime security and response
operations. MSSTs operate primarily in the inland operational area.
Maritime Security Response Team (MSRT). This unit consists of advanced tactical
teams with specialized capabilities for conducting law enforcement and
counterterrorism operations through advanced interdiction, boarding, and
enforcement activities. MSRT has specialized capabilities to conduct maritime
security and response operations, including chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) detection and response. MSRT operates
in all operational areas.
Tactical Law Enforcement Team (TACLET). These units consist of deployable Law
Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs). LEDETs primarily deploy aboard and operate
from U.S. Navy or allied vessels to conduct law enforcement operations through
interdiction, boarding, and enforcement activities. LEDETs operate primarily in the
offshore areas.
Port Security Unit (PSU). These units consist of a command element, security
forces, and boat forces with deployable boats and organic mission support
capabilities. PSUs conduct expeditionary operations through coastal and port
security activities in support of combatant commander requirements. PSUs
operate primarily in the offshore operational area.
The National Strike Force (NSF). This unit consists of the National Strike Force
Coordination Center and three National Strike Teams that provide high-end
pollution and hazardous materials response. NSF has specialized capabilities to
detect and respond to CBRNE incidents. NSF operates in all operational areas.
Regional Dive Locker (RDL). These units conduct military diving operations in
support of PWCS, Aids to Navigation (ATON), and Polar Operations missions. Coast
Guard divers also conduct underwater ship husbandry and underwater search and
recovery in support of other operations and mission support requirements. This
does not include explosive ordnance disposal capabilities. [2, p. 22]
Part III: Mission Areas
335
Security-in-Depth
The Coast Guard employs security-in-depth to conduct operations. Personnel and
assets are deployed and stationed in layers in the offshore, coastal, and inland
operational areas to prevent and respond to threats well before they reach U.S. waters
and the MTS. Coast Guard forces reduce the risk of security incidents by identifying
and addressing vulnerabilities to threats, then detecting, interdicting and defeating
threats before they approach U.S. shores. When an incident occurs, Coast Guard forces
remain ready to conduct response operations and assist with initial recovery. [2, p. 28]
This layered security regime begins in foreign countries, where Coast Guard personnel
conduct foreign port assessments under the International Port Security Program to
assess effectiveness of foreign port security and antiterrorism measures. Also, Coast
Guard personnel are posted as attachés, liaisons, and maritime advisors with many U.S.
embassies around the world. The International Mobile Training Branch (MTB)
temporarily deploys to foreign countries under Department of State direction to
conduct international engagement with foreign partners. [2, p. 29]
In the offshore operational area, Maritime Patrol Forces and DSF (when embarked on
cutters, U.S. Navy or allied ships) provide persistent presence and deterrence in areas
of potential threats primarily by patrolling, conducting ISR, and response operations
through detection, interdiction, boarding, and enforcement. [2, p. 29]
In the coastal operational area, Maritime Patrol Forces, Shore-based Forces, and DSF
conduct operations through a combination of scheduled prevention operations,
patrols, and response operations. Coast Guard forces maintain high states of readiness
to enable immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents. [2, p. 29]
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
Figure 20-1: USCG Security In-Depth [2]
The Coast Guard
employs security-in-
depth to conduct
operations. Personnel
and assets are deployed
and stationed in layers
in the offshore, coastal,
and inland operational
areas to prevent and
respond to threats well
before they reach U.S.
waters and the MTS.
336
In the inland operational area, Shore-based Forces, DSF, and aviation forces conduct
prevention and response operations and maintain high states of readiness to enable
immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents. [2, p. 29]
Security-in-depth demands that Coast Guard operations be synchronized with other
U.S. and international operations to respond to maritime threats with unity of effort.
The Coast Guard relies on the National Response Framework (NRF), Incident Command
System (ICS), and Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan and Protocols to
synchronize U.S. response to maritime threats and incidents, including coordination
with foreign governments. [2, p. 29]
Maritime Security Concerns
Because the bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, the economic consequences
of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. [4, p. 14] A key concern is smuggling
an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) into the country or detonating one while at port.
In September 2002, high radiation levels were detected on the container ship
PALERMO SENATOR during a routine boarding in Newark, NJ. USCGC ESCANABA
escorted the container ship back out to sea and then detained the vessel offshore
while a multi-agency boarding was conducted to determine the source of the initial
radiation detection. The PALERMO SENATOR was eventually cleared to return to port;
it had been a false alarm. [2, p. 32]
A key challenge for U.S. policymakers is prioritizing maritime security activities among
a virtually unlimited number of potential attack scenarios. There are far more potential
attack scenarios than likely ones, and far more than could be meaningfully addressed
with limited counter-terrorism resources. Two port security initiatives are the 100%
container scanning requirement and the port worker security card system. [4, p. 14]
Container Scanning Requirement
Section 1701 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 (P.L. 110-53) requires that all imported marine containers be scanned by
nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign
loading port by July 1, 2012, unless DHS can demonstrate it is not feasible, in which
case the deadline can be extended by two years on a port-by-port basis. DHS has
sought a blanket extension for all ports, citing numerous challenges to implementing
the 100% scanning requirement at overseas ports. In a letter requesting renewal of the
two-year extension, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson stated:
Part III: Mission Areas
Because the bulk of U.S.
overseas trade is carried
by ships, the economic
consequences of a
maritime terrorist attack
could be significant. A
key concern is
smuggling an
Improvised Nuclear
Device (IND) into the
country or detonating
one while at port.
337
“I have personally reviewed our current port security and DHS’s short term and long
term ability to comply with 100% scanning requirement. Following this review, I must
report, in all candor, that DHS’s ability to fully comply with this unfunded mandate of
100% scanning, even in the long term, is highly improbable, hugely expensive, and in
our judgment, not the best use of taxpayer resources to meet this country’s port
security and homeland security needs.” [4, p. 14]
Major U.S. trading partners oppose 100% scanning. The European Commission has
determined that 100% scanning is the wrong approach, favoring a multilayered risk
management approach to inspecting cargo. DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
has tested the feasibility of scanning all U.S.-bound containers at several overseas
ports and identified numerous operational, technical, logistical, financial, and
diplomatic obstacles, including opposition from host government officials. One-
hundred percent scanning conflicts with DHS’s general approach to risk management,
which seeks to focus scarce inspection resources on the highest-risk containers. By
scanning a smaller number of containers, DHS may be able to devote additional
resources to each individual scan. This consideration is important because reviewing
the scans is labor-intensive, and scanning fewer containers may allow DHS to subject
individual scans to greater scrutiny, and to maintain a lower threshold for opening
containers with questionable scanning images. [4, pp. 14-15]
If illicit cargo is estimated to be limited to less than 1% of incoming containers, as CBP
believes to be the case, focusing enforcement on the likeliest containers may be the
most effective enforcement strategy. This approach would emphasize risk-based
scanning along with investment in CBP intelligence to improve targeting, and/or
increase CBP personnel, which would allow ports to conduct a larger number of
targeted special enforcement operations. [4, p. 15]
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC)
In January 2007, TSA and the Coast Guard issued a final rule implementing the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) at U.S. ports. Longshoremen,
port truck drivers, railroad workers, merchant mariners, and other workers at a port
must apply for a TWIC card to obtain unescorted access to secure areas of port
facilities or vessels. The card was authorized under the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA; §102 of P.L. 107-295). Since October 2007, when TSA
began issuing TWICs, about 2.9 million maritime workers have obtained a card. The
card must be renewed every five years. [4, p. 15]
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
Section 1701 of the
Implementing
Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 requires
that all imported marine
containers be scanned
at a foreign loading port
by July 1, 2012. In 2014,
Secretary Johnson wrote
to Congress saying that
the mandate was
“highly improbable,
hugely expensive, and
in our judgment, not the
best use of taxpayer
resources”.
338
TSA conducts a security threat assessment of each worker before issuing a card. The
security threat assessment uses the same procedures and standards established by
TSA for truck drivers carrying hazardous materials, including examination of the
applicant’s criminal history, immigration status, and possible links to terrorist activity
to determine whether a worker poses a security threat. A worker pays a fee of about
$130 that is intended to cover the cost of administering the cards. The card uses
biometric technology for positive identification. Terminal operators were to deploy
card readers at the gates to their facilities, so that a worker’s fingerprint template
would be scanned each time he enters the port area and matched to the data on the
card. [4, p. 15]
Finding a card reader that worked reliably in a harsh marine environment proved
difficult. In March 2013, the Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) in which it proposed requiring card readers only for facilities or vessels
handling dangerous bulk commodities (including barge fleeting areas) or facilities
handling more than 1,000 passengers at a time, as these are the areas the Coast Guard
considers to be of higher risk. The Coast Guard estimated that 38 U.S.-flag vessels and
352 facilities would be required to have card readers, which equates to about 0.3% of
the vessels and 16% of the facilities it regulates under MTSA. Other vessels and
facilities, including those handling containerized cargo, would continue to use the
TWIC as a “flash pass,” but the biometric data on the card would not be used to
positively identify the worker. Currently, the Coast Guard performs spot checks with
hand-held biometric readers while conducting port security inspections. [4, p. 15]
GAO audits have been highly critical of how the TWIC has been implemented. A 2013
audit found that the results of a pilot test of card readers should not be relied upon for
developing regulations on card reader requirements because they were incomplete,
inaccurate, and unreliable. Another 2013 GAO audit examined TSA’s Adjudication
Center (which performs security threat assessments on TWIC applicants and other
transportation workers), and recommended steps the agency could take to better
measure the center’s performance. A 2011 audit found internal control weaknesses in
the enrollment, background checking, and use of the TWIC card at ports, which were
said to undermine the effectiveness of the credential in screening out unqualified
individuals from obtaining access to port facilities. [4, p. 16]
Part III: Mission Areas
339
Conclusion
The Maritime Transportation System is critical to the health and functioning of the U.S.
economy. The United States Coast Guard maintains security in-depth to prevent
malicious agents and WMD from entering the country. The problem is the volume of
goods and people transiting the MTS are just too large to effectively screen. Despite
mandates to secure ship containers and the people who work with them, the programs
have proved ineffective, and the nation remains vulnerable to this potential avenue of
attack.
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
340
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What makes U.S. ports and navigable waterways such important assets?
2. List and describe three measures the USCG employs to protect ports and waterways.
3. Which type of USCG maritime patrol force has specifically designed and reinforced hulls to assure access to the
polar regions and U.S. ports and navigational channels in the Great Lakes?
4. Which type of USCG maritime patrol force has superior endurance and sea keeping capabilities allowing it to
maintain persistent presence under a range of environmental conditions in the offshore operational area?
5. Which type of USCG maritime patrol force designed for rapid response, patrol, and interdiction operates primarily
in the coastal operational area?
6. Which type of USCG maritime patrol force comes in two forms and is highly versatile at supporting all types of
USCG missions?
7. In what operational area do USCG maritime patrol forces primarily conduct intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, response operations, interdiction, boarding, and law enforcement?
8. In what operational area do USCG maritime patrol forces primarily maintain high states of readiness to enable
immediate or rapid response to threats or incidents?
9. What is considered the most significant threat to the Maritime Transportation System?
10. Why is container security so important, yet so difficult?
Part III: Mission Areas
341
Surface Transportation
Security
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Differentiate between the various types of surface transportation.
Compare the relative vulnerabilities and significance of each type of surface transportation.
Discuss the merits of different protection strategies being applied to surface transportation.
Chapter 21
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
342
“Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about
five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of
track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access.”
- 2015 Congressional Research Service Report
Introduction
Surface transportation networks are essential to the economic vitality of the nation.
They also afford opportunities for mass disruption and death through natural and
manmade causes. Protecting them is problematic due to their vastness and volume.
Protection is further complicated by the necessity to facilitate the free-flow of traffic.
This chapter examines how the Department of Homeland Security works with both
public and private partners to manage risks to this critical infrastructure.
Surface Transportation Infrastructure
The surface transportation infrastructure comprises multiple subsectors of the
transportation infrastructure sector, one of sixteen national critical infrastructure
sectors identified in Presidential Policy Directive No. 21. Surface transportation
encompasses the freight rail, highway, mass transit, and passenger rail subsectors in
the Transportation Sector as listed in Table 1. As such, surface transportation is
covered under the Department of Homeland Security National Infrastructure
Protection Plan (NIPP). As part of the NIPP, surface transportation security is
coordinated through a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC) guided by a U.S. Government
Sector-Specific Agency (SSA). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), part of
DHS, is the SSA for surface transportation modes. Under the NIPP, the SSA works with
corresponding SCCs to produce and periodically update a corresponding Sector-
Specific Plan (SSP). The first Transportation Systems SSP was produced in 2007. The
Transportation Systems SSP was last updated in 2010. Annexes C, D, and E to the 2010
SSP addresses security measures undertaken within the surface transportation
subsector. [1]
Part III: Mission Areas
Table 21-1: Transportation Subsectors
1 Aviation 5. Mass Transit
2. Freight Rail 6. Passenger Rail
3. Highway 7. Pipelines
4. Maritime
The surface
transportation sector
encompasses freight
rail, highway, mass
transit, and passenger
rail infrastructure
subsectors.
343
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail
The mass transit and passenger rail mode includes service by buses, rail transit
(commuter rail, heavy rail – also known as subways or metros, and light rail, including
trolleys and streetcars), long-distance rail – namely Amtrak and Alaska railroad, and
other, less common types of service (cable cars, inclined planes, funiculars, and
automated guideway systems). It also includes demand response services for seniors
and persons with disabilities as well as vanpool/rideshare programs and taxi services
operated under contract with a public transportation agency. The mass transit and
passenger rail mode does not include over-the-road motorcoach operators, school bus
systems, or private shuttle system operators. [1, p. 216]
Approximately 6000 transit service providers, commuter railroads, and long distance
passenger railroad providers operate in the United States. The majority of these
agencies operate more than one type of service. About 2,000 agencies provide bus
services; 5,300 agencies operate demand response services; and 150 agencies operate
other forms of transportation such as inclined planes or water-borne services. There
are 565 transit systems that operate in urban areas with a population greater than
50,000 persons. Amtrak operates the nation’s primary intercity passenger rail service
over a 22,000-mile network, primarily over leased freight railroad tracks, serving more
than 500 stations in 46 states and the District of Columbia. In fiscal year 2008, 28.7
million passengers traveled aboard Amtrak. About two-thirds of this ridership is
concentrated in the “Northeast Corridor,” between Boston and Washington DC.
Additionally, Amtrak operates commuter rail services in certain jurisdictions on behalf
of State and regional transportation authorities. Since 1995, the transit and commuter
ridership in the United States has grown by 38% due to rising fuel prices and increasing
road congestion. In 2008, Americans took 10.7 billion trips using mass transit and
passenger rail. The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) estimates that
about 35 million trips are taken each weekday in the United States. [1, p. 216]
The mass transit and passenger rail mode includes thousands of employees,
operational and maintenance facilities, construction sites, utilities, administrative
facilities, and thousands of computerized networks, which facilitate operations and
ensure efficient and reliable service. [1, p. 216]
Securing the mass transit and passenger rail infrastructure is a shared responsibility
between the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Transit Administration
(FTA), and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
The mass transit and
passenger rail mode
includes service by
buses, rail transit
(commuter rail, heavy
rail – also known as
subways or metros, and
light rail, including
trolleys and streetcars),
long-distance rail –
namely Amtrak and
Alaska railroad, and
other, less common
types of service (cable
cars, inclined planes,
funiculars, and
automated guideway
systems).
344
TSA is specifically empowered to develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with
threats to transportation. TSA is responsible for assessing intelligence and other
information to identify individuals who pose a threat to transportation security and to
coordinate countermeasures with other Federal agencies to address such threats. TSA
also is to enforce security-related regulations and requirements, oversee the
implementation and ensure the adequacy of security measures at transportation
facilities, and carry out other appropriate duties relating to transportation security.
Under the broad regulatory authorities assigned by the 2001 Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA), TSA may issue, rescind, and revise such regulations
as are necessary to carry out TSA functions, including issuing regulations and security
directives without notice or comment or prior approval of the Secretary of Homeland
Security if determined necessary to protect transportation security. TSA is also
charged with serving as the primary liaison for transportation security to the
intelligence and law enforcement communities. [1, p. 217]
The Federal Transit Administration is an agency within the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) that provides financial and technical assistance to local public
transit systems. The FTA is one of ten modal administrations within the DOT. [2] FTA
promotes safety and security through its grant-making authority. FTA stipulates
conditions of grants, such as safety and security statutory and regulatory
requirements, and may withhold funds for noncompliance. The FTA enforces 49 CFR
Part 659 requiring transit system operators to conduct an annual review of their
security plans, and regularly update and assess their effectiveness. [1, pp. 218-219]
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is also an agency within the U.S. Department
of Transportation. The FRA maintains regulatory authority for rail safety over
commuter rail operators and Amtrak. The agency employs a force of several hundred
rail inspectors that monitor the implementation of safety and emergency
preparedness plans required under 49 CFR Part 239. [1, p. 219]
Active deterrence is a strategic priority for the mass transit and passenger rail
subsectors. TSA support implementation of random, unpredictable security activities
designed to create changing layers of security through multiple means. [1, p. 213]
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) team deployments augment
security capabilities for random patrols and surges, behavior detection, and explosives
detection. More than 900 VIPR operations were conducted in mass transit and
passenger rail systems between 2005 and 2010. [1, p. 213]
Part III: Mission Areas
TSA is specifically
empowered to
develop policies,
strategies, and plans
for dealing with
threats to
transportation.
345
Eighty-two TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams also support random
patrols and security surges. The most extensive demonstration of this effort occurred
when law enforcement officers from 150 departments participated in surge operations
along the Northeast Corridor at passenger rail stations from Fredericksburg, VA, to
Portland ME. Similar deterrence operations are conducted in metropolitan areas
across the country with mass transit and passenger rail agencies and local law
enforcement departments simultaneously collaborating in random patrols and surges.
[1, p. 213]
Interagency coordination and collaboration help place limited resources where they
are most needed. The TSA Office of Intelligence (TSA-OI) works with the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and participates in the Public Transit Information Sharing
and Analysis Center (PT-ISAC) to make most effective use of deterrence measures. TSA
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) help facilitate this process, and also conduct
inspections to ensure carrier compliance with applicable security regulations. [1, pp.
212-213]
Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carriers
The nation’s highway network includes nearly 4 million miles of roadway, 600,000
bridges, and 400 tunnels. Although most of the highway infrastructure is funded and
maintained by the public sector, it is local governments who own and operate more
than 75% of the nearly 4 million miles of roadway, and over half of the nearly 600,000
bridges. Furthermore, most of the vehicles used on these roads are owned and
operated by private individuals and firms. Thus, protecting the nation’s highway
network is a shared responsibility between State and Local transportation and law
enforcement agencies, Federal transportation agencies, the private sector, and the
public, all of whom travel over 3 billion vehicle highway miles annually. [1, pp. 253-
254]
The motorcoach industry is comprised of approximately 3,137 for-profit companies
operating some 29,325 buses and employing over 118,000 people in full and part-time
jobs. These companies engage primarily in interstate operations that include wholly-
owned bus terminals, shared terminals with other transportation modes such as
passenger rail, charter group determined pick-up and drop-off locations, or form their
own company property. Motorcoaches carry approximately 751 million passengers
annually to millions of destinations in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. [1, p.
255]
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
Active deterrence is a
strategic priority for the
mass transit and
passenger rail
subsectors. TSA support
implementation of
random, unpredictable
security activities
designed to create
changing layers of
security through
multiple means.
346
The school transportation industry is a network that ensures the safe and secure
transportation of 23 million students to approximately 80,000 different schools within
15,000 school districts. The assets of this system include 460,000 school buses,
approximately 15,000 parking and maintenance locations, and more than 500,000
drivers, maintenance personnel, and staff officials. For the most part, each school
district is an independent entity working within the boundaries of State and Federal
rules and statutes. Approximately 70% of school transportation assets are owned and
operated by the individual school districts, and approximately 30% of school
transportation assets are privately owned by for-profit companies. [1, p. 255]
There are more than 214,000 for-hire motor carriers and an additional 27,600 private
trucking fleets engaged in interstate commerce. Additionally, there are 89,000 other
registered trucking fleets, including some that engage only in intrastate commerce.
These fleets operate over 29 million trucks, hauling more than 10 billion tons of freight
annually. Among motor carriers, 96% operate 20 trucks or less, while 87% operate 6
trucks or less. The trucking industry employs 8.9 million people, of whom nearly 3.5
million are drivers. In 2007, trucks hauled $325 billion in goods representing over 58%
of total trade with Canada, the United States largest trading partner. In that same
year, trucks hauled $230 billion worth of goods representing over 66% of total trade
with Mexico the United States’ third-largest trading partner. Nearly every good
consumed in the United States is put on a truck at some point. The industry hauls 69%
of all freight in the United States, by weight, and 83% of all freight by value. [1, p. 256]
That the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier (HMC) subsector is at risk is
evidenced by the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center in New York, and the
1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. That the
HMC remains susceptible is further demonstrated by the use of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) placed on or near highways in Iraq and Afghanistan. Destruction of key
tunnels or bridges would have significant impact on local economies in the United
States. Measureable economic impacts would result from the closure of main arteries
due not only to manmade incidents, but also natural disasters such as floods, fires,
earthquakes, and hurricanes. [1, p. 257]
Part III: Mission Areas
Destruction of key
tunnels or bridges would
have significant impact
on local economies in
the United States.
Measureable economic
impacts would result
from the closure of main
arteries due not only to
manmade incidents, but
also natural disasters
such as floods, fires,
earthquakes, and
hurricanes.
347
State, Local, and Tribal governments manage protection efforts for the highway sector
assets, systems, and networks within their jurisdiction. They serve as crucial
coordination hubs, bringing together prevention, protection, response, and recovery
authorities, capabilities, and resources of the various jurisdictions. State, Local, and
Tribal agencies are often the first on the scene of a transportation security incident,
either natural or manmade. Federal agencies work closely with these partners to
coordinate protection efforts and collaborate with transportation system owners and
operators. This cooperation is formally facilitated through the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan partnership councils, and actively through the Highway Information
Sharing and Analysis Center. [1, pp. 258-260]
HMC protection is also pursued through Risk Mitigation Activities (RMAs). The Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) conducts workshops to promote awareness of vehicle
-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) threats to bridge and tunnel components
of the HMC. FHWA developed the Component Level Risk Management Methodology
to assist engineers and managers with developing cost-effective risk management
plans. FHWA also developed online training to enhance risk awareness among freight
transportation and planning professionals. FHWA worked together with the American
Association of State and Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO) to develop a
Costing Asset Protection Guide (CAPTA) to assist transportation agencies with
managing and reducing risks relevant to specific threats and hazards. [1, p. 264]
Other Risk Mitigation Activities are targeted to specific components of the HMC. The
Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP) facilitates training and programs to
protect motorcoaches from explosive and non-conventional threats that could cause
major loss of life. Working with the National School Transportation Association (NSTA),
the Transportation Security Administration developed a voluntary list of security
actions for school transportation industry administrators and employees. TSA also
works with the U.S. DOT Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and
Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to ensure HAZMAT
shipments are transported according to Hazardous Materials Transportation Security
Requirements (HM-232). Industry also contributes to Risk Mitigation Activities such as
the American Chemistry Council which operates the Chemical Transportation
Emergency Center (CHEMTREC) providing round-the-clock immediate emergency
response information for accidental chemical releases. [1, pp. 265-266]
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
State, Local, and Tribal
governments manage
protection efforts for the
highway sector assets,
systems, and networks
within their jurisdiction.
Federal agencies work
closely with these
partners to coordinate
protection efforts. This
cooperation is formally
facilitated through the
National Infrastructure
Protection Plan
partnership councils,
and actively through the
Highway Information
Sharing and Analysis
Center.
348
Freight Rail
There are approximately 140,000 miles of active railroad track in the United States. A
total of 565 common carrier freight railroads use these tracks, and they earned $63
billion in revenue in 2008. Of the common carrier freight railroads, there are 7 Class I
freight railroads that generate a minimum operating revenue of $401 million. Though
they comprise only 1 percent of all railroads, Class I carriers operate on over 94,000
miles of track, representing 67% of the total track in the United States. Of the
approximately 180,000 railroad employees, Class I railroads employ over 164,000 and
generate over $59 billion or 93% of the total industry revenue. Class I railroads
operate over large areas, in multiple States, and concentrate on the long-haul, high-
density, intercity traffic lines. The remaining 558 carriers are commonly referred to as
regional and short line railroads, or otherwise classified as Class II and Class III carriers.
Regional railroads operate on at least 350 miles of active lines and have revenues
between $40 and $400 million. Freight railroads serve nearly every industrial,
wholesale, retail, and resource-based sector of the U.S. economy. In 2007, freight
railroads generated $91.5 billion in U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico. [1, p. 284]
Freight rail is especially important to the energy sector. Coal generates half of
America’s electricity. Freight railroads transport more than 70% of all coal shipments,
amounting to 7.7 million carloads in 2008. Of more concern are the approximately
101,000 shipments of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials transported by rail each
year. Ninety percent of that volume comes from six chemicals: 1) anhydrous
ammonia, 2) chlorine, 3) ethylene oxide, 4) anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, 5) sulfur
dioxide, and 6) anhydrous hydrogen chloride. Chlorine and anhydrous ammonia are
the most frequently transported and constitute 78% of all TIH rail shipments. These
materials are essential to making motor fuels, purifying drinking water, providing air
conditioning, and supporting farming, medicine, and industrial processes. In January
2005, 9 people were killed and 5,400 evacuated due to a derailment releasing 56.3
tons of chlorine. This and other accidents demonstrate the potential impact of an
intentional large-scale release of TIH materials. [1, p. 284]
Federal law requires freight railroads to carry all shipments (including TIH) that are
tendered in accordance with DOT regulations. Radioactive materials, which are
classified as hazardous materials, are also transported by rail. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Department of Energy have primary security oversight for these
shipments. [1, p. 284]
Part III: Mission Areas
Freight rail is especially
important to the energy
sector. Coal generates
half of America’s
electricity. Freight
railroads transport more
than 70% of all coal
shipments, amounting
to 7.7 million carloads in
2008. Of more concern
are the approximately
101,000 shipments of
Toxic Inhalation Hazard
(TIH) materials
transported by rail each
year.
349
The TSA Freight Rail Security Division (TSA-FRSD) maintains oversight of the freight rail
subsector. TSA-FRSD manages oversight through the Rail Security Coordinator
Network (RSCN), the primary means for sharing security information among public and
private freight rail partners. Under TSA regulations (73 FR 72130), operators who ship
Rail Security-Sensitive Materials (RSSM) in proximity to a High Threat Urban Area
(HTUA) are required to appoint a Rail Security Coordinator (RSC). RSCs serve as the
primary contact for intelligence information and security-related activities, and are the
primary liaison between freight rail operators and TSA through the RSCN. [1, pp. 288-
289]
Since 2001, the Association of American Railroads (AAR) Security Operations Center
has provided 24/7 security support to include threat warning and incident reporting.
The AAR security operations center supports the Railroad Alert Network (RAN), and
provides oversight and direction to the Surface Transportation ISAC (ST-ISAC). The ST-
ISAC provides the means for sharing threat and vulnerability information between
stakeholders. [1, p. 289]
TSA also manages the Toxic Inhalation Hazard Risk Reduction Program. As part of this
program, TSA together with DOT developed a list of best practices called Security
Action Items (SAIs). In June 2006, 24 SAIs were issued as voluntary security guidelines
to rail carriers and Federal partners. These SAIs covered a broad range of security
practices at both the corporate and field operational levels and addressed three
general areas: system security, access control, and enroute security. In November
2006, TSA issued supplemental SAI guidance addressing 1) expedited movement of TIH
materials through HTUAs; 2) reduced occurrences of unattended TIH cars; 3) providing
secure storage areas for TIH cars; and 4) limiting movement of TIH materials near
public venues during National Special Security Events (e.g. the Super Bowl). [1, p. 294]
Surface Transportation Security Concerns
Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia have illustrated the vulnerability of
passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway
systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as
do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed
primarily for easy access. The increased security efforts around air travel have led to
concerns that terrorists may turn their attention to “softer” targets, such as transit or
passenger rail. A key challenge is balancing the desire for increased rail passenger
security with the efficient functioning of transit systems, with the potential costs and
damages of an attack, and with other federal priorities. [3, p. 11]
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
Since 2001, the
Association of American
Railroads (AAR) Security
Operations Center has
provided 24/7 security
support to include
threat warning and
incident reporting. The
AAR security operations
center supports the
Railroad Alert Network
(RAN), and provides
oversight and direction
to the Surface
Transportation ISAC (ST-
ISAC).
350
The volume of ridership and number of access points make it impractical to subject all
rail passengers to the type of screening all airline passengers undergo. Consequently,
transit security measures tend to emphasize managing the consequences of an attack.
Nevertheless, steps have been taken to try to reduce the risks, as well as the
consequences, of an attack. These include vulnerability assessments; emergency
planning; emergency response training and drilling of transit personnel (ideally in
coordination with police, fire, and emergency medical personnel); increasing the
number of transit security personnel, installing video surveillance equipment in
vehicles and stations; and conducting random inspections of bags, platforms, and
trains. [3, p. 11]
The challenges of securing rail passengers are dwarfed by the challenge of securing bus
passengers. There are some 76,000 buses carrying 19 million passengers each weekday
in the United States. Some transit systems have installed video cameras on their buses,
but the number and operation characteristics of transit buses make them all but
impossible to secure. [3, p. 11]
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-
53), passed by Congress on July 27, 2007, included provisions on passenger rail and
transit security and authorized $3.5 billion for FY2008-FY2011 for grants for public
transportation security. The act required public transportation agencies and railroads
considered to be high-risk targets by DHS to have security plans approved by DHS
(§1405 and §1512). Other provisions required DHS to conduct a name-based security
background check and an immigration status check on all public transportation and
railroad frontline employees (§1414 and §1522), and gave DHS the authority to
regulate rail and transit employee security training standards (§1408 and §1517). [3, p.
11]
Part III: Mission Areas
The volume of ridership
and number of access
points make it
impractical to subject all
rail passengers to the
type of screening all
airline passengers
undergo. Consequently,
transit security
measures tend to
emphasize managing
the consequences of an
attack.
351
Conclusion
The bitter irony of protecting the transportation infrastructure from potential security
risks is that it poses one of the nation’s greatest safety hazards. In 2013 alone, 32,719
Americans were killed in motor vehicle accidents. This is more people than have ever
been killed in any single natural disaster and all acts of terrorism combined. Only the
annual death toll from disease is greater. If homeland security is about trying to
prevent the preventable, why then is there a seeming absence of similar concern about
national highway safety? The contradiction appears to support a notion of “acceptable
loss”. If this is the case regarding safety, why would it not be so regarding security?
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
Since 2001, the
Association of American
Railroads (AAR) Security
Operations Center has
provided 24/7 security
support to include
threat warning and
incident reporting. The
AAR security operations
center supports the
Railroad Alert Network
(RAN), and provides
oversight and direction
to the Surface
Transportation ISAC (ST-
ISAC).
352
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Which type of surface transportation includes service by buses, subways, trolleys and streetcars?
2. Which type of surface transportation is provided by a single carrier?
3. Which type of surface transportation is primarily maintained by State, Local, and Tribal governments?
4. Which type of surface transportation is essential to baseline electricity generation?
5. What is TSA’s general strategy for protecting the surface transportation subsector?
6. Identify two potential types of highway transportation targets, and explain how their loss could be critical.
7. Why does the freight rail system pose a potentially lethal target?
8. How does information sharing between carriers enhance surface transportation security?
9. Does it make sense to screen rail passengers the same as aviation passengers? Explain your answer.
10. What is the difference between the 3,000 deaths on 9/11 and the 30,000+ annual deaths on the nation’s roads?
Part III: Mission Areas
353
Border Security
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the purpose of border security.
Explain the competing priorities of customs and border agents.
Assess the particular difficulties of securing the nation’s borders.
Discuss trends and influences on illegal border crossings.
Chapter 22
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 22: Border Security
354
“Who knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men?”
- 1930s “The Shadow” Radio Program
Introduction
The ease in which the 9/11 attackers had in traversing the nation’s borders made
border protection a priority mission for the Department of Homeland Security. This
chapter examines how border security has been strengthened since 9/11.
Border Security Threats
The United States confronts a wide array of threats at U.S. borders, ranging from
terrorists who may have weapons of mass destruction, to transnational criminals
smuggling drugs or counterfeit goods, to unauthorized migrants intending to live and
work in the United States. Understanding border risks begins with identifying key
threats. At their roots, border-related threats are closely linked to the flow of people
(travelers) and goods (cargo) from one country to another. Any smuggled item or
individual hidden among the legitimate flows potentially constitutes a threat to U.S.
security or interests. [1, p. ii]
The intentions and actions of unauthorized travelers separate them into different
threat categories, including terrorists, transnational criminals, and other illegal
migrants. [1, p. ii]
Illegal goods are distinguished by their inherent legitimacy or illegitimacy. Certain
weapons, illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods are always illegal and categorically
prohibited, while other goods are legal under most circumstances, but become
illegitimate if they are smuggled to avoid enforcement of specific laws, taxes, or
regulations. [1, p. ii]
Border Security Agencies
After the massive reorganization of federal agencies precipitated by the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security, there are four main federal agencies charged with
securing the United States’ borders: the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
which patrols the border and conducts immigrations, customs, and agricultural
inspections at ports of entry; the U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
which investigates immigrations and customs violations in the interior of the country;
the United States Coast Guard, which provides maritime and port security; and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which is responsible for securing the
nation’s land, rail, and air transportation networks. [2, p. ii]
Part III: Mission Areas
At their roots, border-
related threats are
closely linked to the flow
of people (travelers) and
goods (cargo) from one
country to another. Any
smuggled item or
individual hidden among
the legitimate flows
potentially constitutes a
threat to U.S. security or
interests.
355
U.S. Customs and Border Protection combined portions of the previous border law
enforcement agencies under one administrative umbrella. This involved absorbing
employees from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the Border Patrol,
the Customs Service, and the Department of Agriculture. CBP’s mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the country, provide security at U.S.
borders and ports of entry, apprehend illegal immigrants, stem the flow of illegal
drugs, and protect American agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests
and diseases. As it performs its official missions, CBP maintains two overarching and
sometimes conflicting goals: increasing security while facilitating legitimate trade and
travel. [2, p. 2]
Between official ports of entry, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP)—a component of CBP—
enforces U.S. immigration law and other federal laws along the border. As currently
comprised, the USBP is the uniformed law enforcement arm of the Department of
Homeland Security. Its primary mission is to detect and prevent the entry of terrorists,
weapons of mass destruction, and unauthorized aliens into the country, and to
interdict drug smugglers and other criminals. In the course of discharging its duties the
USBP patrols over 8,000 miles of international border with Mexico and Canada and the
coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico. [2, p. 2]
At official ports of entry, CBP officers are responsible for conducting immigrations,
customs, and agricultural inspections on entering aliens. As a result of the “one face at
the border” initiative, CBP inspectors are being cross-trained to perform all three types
of inspections in order to streamline the border crossing process. This initiative unifies
the prior inspections processes, providing entering aliens with one primary inspector
who is trained to determine whether a more detailed secondary inspection is required.
[2, p. 2]
CBP inspectors enforce immigration law by examining and verifying the travel
documents of incoming international travelers to ensure they have a legal right to
enter the country. On the customs side, CBP inspectors ensure that all imports and
exports comply with U.S. laws and regulations, collect and protect U.S. revenues, and
guard against the smuggling of contraband. Additionally, CBP is responsible for
conducting agricultural inspections at ports of entry in order to enforce a wide array of
animal and plant protection laws. In order to carry out these varied functions, CBP
inspectors have a broad range of powers to inspect all persons, vehicles, conveyances,
merchandise, and baggage entering the United States from a foreign country. [2, p. 2]
Chapter 22: Border Security
As it performs its official
missions, DHS Customs
and Border Protection
(CBP) maintains two
overarching and
sometimes conflicting
goals: increasing
security while
facilitating legitimate
trade and travel.
356
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement merged the investigative functions of the
former INS and the Customs Service, the INS detention and removal functions, most
INS intelligence operations, and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). This makes ICE
the principal investigative arm for DHS. ICE’s mission is to detect and prevent terrorist
and criminal acts by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist
and criminal networks. Unlike CBP, whose jurisdiction is confined to law enforcement
activities along the border, ICE special agents investigate immigrations and customs
violations in the interior of the United States. ICE’s mandate includes uncovering
national security threats such as weapons of mass destruction or potential terrorists,
identifying criminal aliens for removal, probing immigration-related document and
benefit fraud, investigating work-site immigration violations, exposing alien and
contraband smuggling operations, interdicting narcotics shipments, and detaining
illegal immigrants and ensuring their departure (or removal) from the United States.
ICE is also responsible for the collection, analysis and dissemination of strategic and
tactical intelligence data pertaining to homeland security, infrastructure protection,
and the illegal movement of people, money, and cargo within the United States. [2, p.
3]
Border Security at Ports of Entry
About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in
FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers
and crew, and 242 million land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were
denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at
POEs on criminal warrants. [3, p. ii]
Within the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s
Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections
at America’s 329 POEs. CBP’s primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of
entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude
inadmissible aliens. Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to
facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking
admission. A fundamental question for DHS is how to balance these competing
concerns. [3, p. ii]
Part III: Mission Areas
About 362 million
travelers (citizens and
non-citizens) entered
the United States in
FY2013, including about
102 million air
passengers and crew, 18
million sea passengers
and crew, and 242
million land travelers. At
the same time about
205,000 aliens were
denied admission at
ports of entry (POEs);
and about 24,000
persons were arrested
at POEs on criminal
warrants.
357
In general, DHS and CBP rely on “risk management” to strike this balance. One part of
the risk management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the
immigration process, beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and
other departments involved in the inspections process use a number of screening tools
to distinguish between known, low-risk travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk
travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing, while
higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive secondary inspections. [3, p.
ii]
As part of its dual mission and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S.
immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit
system at POEs. Congress required DHS’ predecessor to develop an entry-exit system
beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has
proven to be an elusive goal. The current system collects and stores biographic entry
data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) from almost all non-citizens entering the
United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digital
photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a subset of land
travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit data,
the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers
and with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain
non-citizens exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not
collect data from persons exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect
any biometric exit data. The primary concern is DHS’ ability to use existing entry-exit
data to identify and apprehend visa overstayers. [3, p. ii]
The inspections process and entry-exit system continue to be perennial concern for
DHS and a number of questions persist. Moreover, the scope of illegal migration
through ports of entry, and how DHS can minimize such flows without unduly slowing
legal travel continue to challenge policymakers and agency officials. [3, p. ii]
Border Security Between Ports of Entry
In addition to securing its 329 official Ports of Entry, the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection is also responsible for securing 101,900 miles of border, including 8,000
shared land miles with Mexico and Canada. [4, p. ii] Border enforcement has been an
ongoing subject of congressional interest since the 1970s, when illegal immigration to
the United States first registered as a serious national problem; and border security
has received additional attention in the years since the terrorist attacks of 2001. [5, p.
ii]
Chapter 22: Border Security
In addition to securing
its 329 official Ports of
Entry, the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection is
also responsible for
securing 101,900 miles
of border, including
8,000 shared land miles
with Mexico and
Canada.
358
Congress created the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) within the Department of Commerce
and Labor by an appropriations act in 1924, two days after passing the first permanent
numeric immigration restrictions. Numerical limits only applied to the Eastern
Hemisphere, barring most Asian immigration; and the Border Patrol’s initial focus was
on preventing the entry of Chinese migrants, as well as combating gun trafficking and
alcohol imports during prohibition. The majority of agents were stationed on the
northern border. The Border Patrol became part of the new Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in 1933, and the INS moved from the Department of Labor
to the Department of Justice in 1940. The Border Patrol’s focus shifted to the
Southwest border during World War II, but preventing illegal migration across the
Southwest border remained a low priority during most of the 20th century. [5, p. 2]
Illegal migration from Mexico increased after 1965 as legislative changes restricted
legal Mexican immigration at the same time that social and economic changes caused
stronger migration “pushes” in Mexico (e.g., inadequate employment opportunities)
and stronger “pulls” in the United States (e.g., employment opportunities, links to
migrant communities in Mexico). Congress held hearings on illegal immigration
beginning in 1971, and after more than a decade of debate passed the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-603), which described border
enforcement as an “essential element” of immigration control and authorized a 50%
increase in funding for the Border Patrol, among other provisions. Congress passed at
least 11 additional laws addressing illegal immigration over the next two decades, 7 of
which included provisions related to the border. [5, p. 2]
Seventy years after it began operations, the Border Patrol developed its first formal
national border control strategy in 1994. The National Strategic Plan (NSP) was
developed in response to a widespread perception that the Southwest border was
being overrun by unauthorized immigration and drug smuggling, and to respond to a
study commissioned by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The study
recommended that the INS change its approach from arresting unauthorized
immigrants after they enter the United States, as had previously been the case, to
focus instead on preventing their entry. Under the new approach, the INS would place
personnel, surveillance technology, fencing, and other infrastructure directly on the
border to discourage illegal flows, a strategy that became known as “prevention
through deterrence.” According to the 1994 INS plan, “the prediction is that with
traditional entry and smuggling routes disrupted, illegal traffic will be deterred, or
forced over more hostile terrain, less suited for crossing and more suited for
enforcement.” [5, p. 3]
Part III: Mission Areas
359
As predicted, apprehensions within the San Diego and El Paso sectors fell sharply
beginning in 1994-1995, and traffic patterns shifted, primarily to the Tucson and South
Texas (Rio Grande Valley) sectors. A 1997 General Accounting Office (GAO) report was
cautiously optimistic about the strategy. [5, p. 4]
Congress supported the prevention through deterrence approach. In 1996, House and
Senate appropriators directed the INS to hire new agents and to reallocate personnel
from the interior to front line duty. And the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) expressly authorized the construction and
improvement of fencing and other barriers along the Southwest border and required
the completion of a triple-layered fence along 14 miles of the border near San Diego
where the INS had begun to install fencing in 1990. [5, p. 4]
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the USBP refocused its
priorities on preventing terrorist penetration, while remaining committed to its
traditional duties of preventing the illicit trafficking of people and contraband between
official ports of entry. Shortly after the creation of DHS, the USBP was directed to
formulate a new National Border Patrol Strategy (NBPS) that would better reflect the
realities of the post-9/11 security landscape. In March 2004, the Border Patrol unveiled
the National Border Patrol Strategy, which placed greater emphasis on interdicting
terrorists and featured five main objectives:
1. Establishing the substantial probability of apprehending terrorists and their
weapons as they attempt to enter illegally between the ports of entry;
2. Deterring illegal entries through improved enforcement;
3. Detecting, apprehending, and deterring smugglers of humans, drugs, and other
contraband;
4. Leveraging “Smart Border” technology to multiply the deterrent and enforcement
effect of agents; and
5. Reducing crime in border communities, thereby improving the quality of life and
economic vitality of those areas. [5, p. 5]
Chapter 22: Border Security
360
The NBPS was an attempt to lay the foundation for achieving “operational control”
over the border, defined by the Border Patrol as “the ability to detect, respond, and
interdict border penetrations in areas deemed as high priority for threat potential or
other national security objectives.” The strategy emphasized a hierarchical and vertical
command structure, featuring a direct chain of command from headquarters to the
field. The document emphasized the use of tactical, operational, and strategic
intelligence and sophisticated surveillance systems to assess risk and target
enforcement efforts; and the rapid deployment of USBP agents to respond to emerging
threats. Additionally, the plan called for the Border Patrol to coordinate closely with
CBP’s Office of Intelligence and other federal intelligence agencies. [5, p. 5]
In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security launched the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). SBI provided the program structure for implementing the National
Border Patrol Strategy. Under SBI, DHS announced plans to obtain operational control
of the northern and southern borders within five years. The centerpiece of the plan
was SBInet. [5, p. 5]
SBInet was to provide an electronic frontier for detecting and capturing unlawful
entries into the country. SBInet was to be comprised of a network of remote video
surveillance (RVS) systems (including cameras and infrared systems), and sensors
(including seismic, magnetic, and thermal detectors), linked into a computer network,
known as the Integrated Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database. The system
was intended to ensure seamless coverage of the border by combining the feeds from
multiple cameras and sensors into one remote-controlled system linked to a central
communications control room at a USBP station or sector headquarters. USBP
personnel monitoring ICAD screens would direct RVS cameras toward locations where
sensor alarms were tripped. Control room personnel were then to alert field agents to
the intrusion and coordinate the response. [5, p. 18]
CBP awarded the SBInet contract to Boeing who began work in September 2006. The
initial 28-mile prototype began operating in the Arizona desert in February 2008,
following months of delays and technical glitches. Initial plans developed in 2005 and
2006 called for SBInet to extend across the entire U.S.-Mexico land border. After
completing only 53 miles at a cost of $1 billion, the program was cancelled in January
2011. [6] SBInet had struggled to meet deployment timelines and failed to satisfy
delivery requirements. DHS had also faced criticism for non-competitive contracting,
inadequate oversight, and cost overruns. In announcing the cancellation, Secretary
Napolitano cited continuing cost overruns and technical problems indicating the
program would never perform to expectations. [5, p. 18]
Part III: Mission Areas
In November 2005, the
Department of
Homeland Security
launched the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI).
Under SBI, DHS
announced plans to
obtain operational
control of the northern
and southern borders
within five years.
361
Nearly half of all arrests of illegal aliens occur along the 387-mile Arizona border with
Mexico. After the cancellation of SBInet, CPB developed the Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan (ABSTP). [7] Under this plan, the Border Patrol will deploy
a mix of different surveillance technologies designed to meet the specific needs of
different border regions. As of November 2012, deployed assets included 337 Remote
Video Surveillance Systems (RVSS) consisting of fixed daylight and infrared cameras
that transmit images to a central location (up from 269 in 2006), 198 short and
medium range Mobile Vehicle Surveillance Systems (MVSS) mounted on trucks and
monitored in the truck’s passenger compartment (up from zero in 2005) and 41 long
range Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS, up from zero in 2005), 12 hand-held agent
portable medium range surveillance systems (APSS, up from zero in 2005), 15
Integrated Fixed Towers that were developed as part of the SBInet system (up from
zero in 2005), and 13,406 unattended ground sensors (up from about 11,200 in 2005).
According to CBP officials, the department’s acquisitions strategy emphasizes flexible
equipment and mobile technology that permits USBP to surge surveillance capacity in
a particular region, and off-the shelf technology in order to hold down costs and get
resources on the ground more quickly. [5, pp. 18-19]
In addition to these ground-based surveillance assets, CBP deploys manned and
unmanned aircraft as well as marine vessels to conduct surveillance. Air and marine
vessels patrol regions of the border that are inaccessible to other surveillance assets,
with unmanned aerial systems (UAS) deployed in areas considered too high-risk for
manned aircraft or personnel on the ground. In FY2012, CBP’s Office of Air and Marine
deployed 19 types of aircraft and three classes of marine vessels, for a total of 269
aircraft and 293 marine vessels operating from over 70 locations. The agency reported
81,045 flight hours and 47,742 underway hours in marine vessels. As of November
2012, CBP operated a total of 10 UAS up from zero in 2006, including 2 UAS on the
Northern border, 5 on the Southwest border, and 3 in the Gulf of Mexico. UAS
accounted for 5,737 flight hours in FY2012, up from 4,406 hours in FY2011. [5, p. 19]
While much attention has been focused on high-tech surveillance capabilities, border
security also relies on the low-tech capabilities of fences. The former INS installed the
first fencing along the U.S.-Mexican border beginning in 1990 east of the Pacific Ocean
near San Diego. Congress expressly authorized the construction and improvement of
fencing and other barriers under Section 102(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which also required the completion of a
triple-layered fence along the original 14-mile border segment near San Diego. The
Secure Fence Act of 2006 amended IIRIRA with a requirement for double-layered
fencing along five segments of the Southwest border, totaling about 850 miles. IIRIRA
was amended again by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2008. Under that
amendment, the Secretary of Homeland Security was directed to construct reinforced
fencing “along not less than 700 miles of the southwest border where fencing would
be most practical and effective and provide for the installation of additional physical
Chapter 22: Border Security
After completing only 53
miles at a cost of $1
billion, SBI was
cancelled in January
2011. SBI struggled to
meet deployment
timelines and failed to
satisfy delivery
requirements. DHS was
criticized for non-
competitive contracting,
inadequate oversight,
and cost overruns. In
cancelling SBI, Secretary
Napolitano cited
continuing cost overruns
and technical problems
indicating the program
would never perform to
expectations.
362
barriers, roads, lighting, cameras, and sensors to gain operational control of the
southwest border.” The act further specified, however, that the Secretary of Homeland
Security is not required to install fencing “in a particular location along the
international border of the United States if the Secretary determines that the use or
placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to achieve and
maintain operational control over the international border at such location.” [5, p. 16]
As of October 2014, DHS installed 352.7 miles of primary pedestrian fencing, 299 miles
of vehicle fencing (total of 651 miles), and 36.3 miles of secondary fencing. The Border
Patrol reportedly had identified a total of 653 miles of the border as appropriate for
fencing and barriers (i.e., 2 additional miles). [5, p. 17]
By themselves, fences are a very poor deterrent. They only serve to slow, not stop
unlawful border crossings. USBP agents are authorized under Federal regulations to
enforce section 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which allows them to
search, interrogate, and arrest unauthorized aliens and all others who violate
immigration laws. Federal regulations allow USBP agents to exercise their authority
within 100 air miles of the border. This distance may be increased under special
circumstances. Additionally, federal regulations state that Border Patrol agents have
the right to interrogate suspected illegal aliens anywhere inside or outside the United
States. [8, p. 3 & 30]
Congress has passed at least four laws since 1986 authorizing increased Border Patrol
personnel. USBP staffing roughly doubled in the decade after 1986, doubled again
between 1996 and the 9/11 attacks, and doubled again in the decade after 9/11. As of
September 20, 2014, the USBP had 20,863 agents, including 18,156 posted at the
Southwest border. [5, p. 14]
The USBP may also be augmented by the National Guard. National Guard troops were
first deployed to the border on a pilot basis in 1988, when about 100 soldiers assisted
the U.S. Customs Service at several Southwest border locations, and National Guard
and active military units provided targeted support for the USBP’s surveillance
programs throughout the following decade. The first large-scale deployment of the
National Guard to the border occurred in 2006-2008, when over 30,000 troops
provided engineering, aviation, identification, technical, logistical, and administrative
support to CBP as part of “Operation Jump Start.” President Obama announced an
additional deployment of up to 1,200 National Guard troops to the Southwest border
on May 25, 2010, with the National Guard supporting the Border Patrol, by providing
intelligence work and drug and human trafficking interdiction. The 2010 deployment
was originally scheduled to end in June 2011, but the full deployment was extended
twice (in June and September 2011). The Administration announced in December 2011
Part III: Mission Areas
In 2006 Congress passed
the Secure Fence Act
funding installation of a
more conventional,
double-layered fence
along 850 miles of the
Southwest border. As of
October 2014, DHS
installed 352.7 miles of
primary pedestrian
fencing, 299 miles of
vehicle fencing (total of
651 miles), and 36.3
miles of secondary
fencing.
363
that the deployment would be reduced to fewer than 300 troops beginning in January
2012, with National Guard efforts focused on supporting DHS’s aerial surveillance
operations. In December 2012, DHS and the Department of Defense announced that
the National Guard deployment would be extended through December 2013. [5, pp. 15
-16]
For 90 years, the Border Patrol has recorded the number of deportable aliens
apprehended in the United States; and alien apprehensions remain the agency’s
primary indicator of immigration enforcement. The overwhelming majority of
apprehensions take place along the Southwest border. In FY2014, the Border Patrol
apprehended 479,377 aliens along this border, an increase of 64,980 from the previous
year. The majority of these apprehensions occurred in the Rio Grande Valley Sector.
Falling apprehensions in San Diego and El Paso during the late 1990s initially were
more than offset by rising apprehensions in the Tucson, AZ, sector and other border
locations, including the Laredo and Del Rio, TX, sectors. Since FY2011, apprehensions in
Tucson have fallen back to their lowest level since 1993, but apprehensions in the Rio
Grande Valley have increased, and now account for more than a quarter of Southwest
border apprehensions. Thus, since the initiation of the prevention through deterrence
approach in the mid-1990s, it appears that success in San Diego and El Paso may have
come at the expense of Tucson and other sectors. [5, p. 20 & 22]
Apprehensions data are imperfect indicators of illegal flows because they exclude two
important groups when it comes to unauthorized migration: aliens who successfully
enter and remain in the United States (i.e., enforcement failures) and aliens who are
deterred from entering the United States (i.e., certain enforcement successes). Thus,
analysts do not know if a decline in apprehensions is an indicator of successful
enforcement, because fewer people are attempting to enter, or of enforcement
failures, because more of them are succeeding. A further limitation to apprehensions
data is that they count events, not unique individuals, so the same person may appear
multiple times in the dataset after multiple entry attempts. [5, p. 28]
Arguably the most well-developed approach to measuring unauthorized migration
focuses on the number of unauthorized migrants residing in the United States. For
many years, analysts within DHS and other social scientists have used the so-called
“residual method” to estimate this number. In essence, the method involves using
legal admissions data to estimate the legal, foreign-born population, and then
subtracting this number from the overall count of foreign-born residents based on U.S.
census data. [5, p. 29]
Chapter 22: Border Security
By themselves, fences
are a very poor
deterrent. They only
serve to slow, not stop
unlawful border
crossings.
364
The residual method provides limited information about the border per se because
many unauthorized residents enter the United States through ports of entry, lawfully
or otherwise. Nonetheless, estimates of the size of the unauthorized population may
offer several advantages over other border metrics. First, for many people, how many
unauthorized aliens reside within the United States ultimately is a more important
question than how many cross the border. After all, if illegal border flows fall to zero,
but many people continue to enter illegally through ports of entry or by overstaying
nonimmigrant visas, many people would consider such an outcome problematic.
Second, for this reason, the size of the unauthorized population more comprehensively
reflects how well immigration policy and immigration enforcement function, including
for example the effectiveness of worksite and other interior enforcement efforts as
well as how well visas meet employer and family demands. Third, estimates of the
unauthorized population offer the advantage of a nearly 30-year track record and a
relatively uncontroversial methodology. [5, p. 29]
While no single metric accurately and reliably describes border security, most analysts
agree, based on available data, that the number of illegal border crossers fell sharply
between about 2005 and 2011, with some rise in illegal flows in 2012. This conclusion
is supported by key Border Patrol enforcement data, including the drop in total
apprehensions. [5, p. 32]
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 22-1: Total Estimated Illegal Border Inflows, FY2000-FY2012 [5, p. 34]
While no single metric
accurately and reliably
describes border
security, most analysts
agree, based on
available data, that the
number of illegal border
crossers fell sharply
between about 2005
and 2011.
365
Based on available data, the estimated deterrence rates in 2000-2012 were between
20% and 40%. As depicted in Figure 1, total estimated illegal inflows fell from a high of
between 760,000 and 1.4 million in 2004 to a low of between 340,000 and 580,000 in
2009-2010. The model estimates that total illegal inflows were between 400,000 and
660,000 in 2012. Apprehension levels and survey data from the 1980s and 1990s
suggest that total illegal inflows likely were lower in 2007-2012 than at any other point
in the last three decades. [5, p. 33]
Conclusion
The embarrassing fact is that despite the best efforts to tighten control over illegal
entry into the United States, hundreds of thousands of people still manage to remain
illicitly each year. Even a cursory cost-benefit analysis would argue for an alternative
solution. If a loaded gun sits on a table in a room full of people, does it make more
sense to remove the people or remove the gun? It seems that the time and expense of
sifting through the millions who come peaceably to this country each year might be
better allocated towards a more attainable goal.
Chapter 22: Border Security
366
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What are the two things that customs and border agents are trying to keep from entering the country?
2. What are the two conflicting priorities in screening travelers and cargo?
3. What is the primary difficulty with preventing illegal border crossings?
4. Where has DHS positioned the majority of its border agents?
5. Why did the Secure Border Initiative fail?
6. Why is a conventional chain-linked fence a poor measure for stopping illegal border crossings?
7. How did the trend in illegal border crossings fare between 2005 and 2011?
8. Do you think the Great Recession from 2007-2009 helped reduce illegal border crossings? Explain.
9. Do malicious agents need to smuggle weapons into the U.S. to mount a catastrophic attack? Explain.
10. Do malicious agents necessarily have to enter the U.S. to mount a catastrophic attack? Explain.
Part III: Mission Areas
367
Immigration
Enforcement
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe how immigration has shaped the United States.
Explain how immigration is controlled in the United States.
Discuss how people may illegally remain in the United States.
Assess the difficulty of making an accurate count of illegal immigrants.
Chapter 23
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
368
“We're Americans, with a capital 'A', huh? You know what that means? Do ya? That
means that our forefathers were kicked out of every decent country in the world. We
are the wretched refuse. We're the underdog. We're mutts!”
- 1981 Bill Murray, Stripes
Introduction
We are a nation of immigrants. Thomas Jefferson thought it would take 300 years to
populate the vast interior of the American continent; it took less than 100. Throughout
the 19th century, America welcomed immigrants without question. Then, in the early
20th century, the United States began imposing quotas on who and how many could
enter. Immigration trailed off accordingly. However, in the first decade of the 21st
century the nation is experiencing a resurgent trend; at 40 million, the number of
foreign-born residents is the highest in U.S. history. This chapter will examine
immigration by the numbers, and explain who we are, where we come from, and how
we got here as a nation.
Historical Trends
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was first codified in 1952, contains
the provisions detailing the requirements for admission (permanent and temporary) of
foreign nationals, grounds for exclusion and removal of foreign nationals, document
and entry-exit controls for U.S. citizens and foreign nationals, and eligibility rules for
the naturalization of foreign nationals. Congress has significantly amended the INA
several times since 1952, most notably by the Immigration Amendments of 1965, the
Refugee Act of 1980, the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the
Immigration Act of 1990, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. [1, p. 1]
As shown in Figure 1, legal immigration encompasses permanent admissions (e.g.,
employment-based or family-based legal permanent residents) and temporary
admissions (e.g., guest workers, foreign students). Immigration control encompasses
an array of enforcement tools, policies, and practices to secure the border and to
prevent and investigate violations of immigration laws. [1, p. 1]
Immigration to the United States was peaking at the beginning of the 20th century. In
1910, foreign-born residents made up 14.8% of the U.S. population. Immigration
dropped as a result of the numerical limits and national origins quotas imposed by the
Immigration Acts in 1921 and 1924. Levels fell further during the Great Depression and
World War II. The annual number of settled immigrants, typically referred to as legal
permanent residents (LPRs), rose gradually after World War II. In 1952, the INA was
codified and, as amended, remains the governing statute. [1, p. 2]
Part III: Mission Areas
The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA),
which was first codified
in 1952, contains the
provisions detailing the
requirements for
admission (permanent
and temporary) of
foreign nationals,
grounds for exclusion
and removal of foreign
nationals, document
and entry-exit controls
for U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals, and
eligibility rules for the
naturalization of foreign
nationals.
369
The growth in immigration after 1980 is partly attributable to the total number of LPRs
entering through the preference system as well as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 enabled 2.1 million unauthorized
aliens residing in the United States as of 1982 to become LPRs. In addition, the number
of refugees admitted increased from 718,000 in the period 1966-1980 to 1.6 million
during the period 1981-1995, after the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. The
Refugee Act established permanent provisions for refugees and asylees to become
LPRs. [1, p. 2]
The Immigration Act of 1990 was the last significant revision of legal permanent
immigration. It set a statutory worldwide level of 675,000 LPRs annually, but certain
categories of LPRs, most notably immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and refugees, are
permitted to exceed the limits. The INA further holds countries to an annual numerical
limit of 7% of the worldwide level of U.S. immigrant admissions, known as per-country
limits or country caps. Immigration to the United States today has reached levels
comparable to the early years of the 20th century. In FY2013, 990,553 aliens became
LPRs through admissions (459,751) or status adjustments (530,802). [1, pp. 2-3]
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
Figure 23-1: Annual Immigration Admissions 1900-2010 [1, p. 2]
Congress has
significantly amended
the INA several times
since 1952, most
notably by the
Immigration
Amendments of 1965,
the Refugee Act of 1980,
the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA)
of 1986, the
Immigration Act of
1990, and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and
Immigrant
Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996.
370
Where We Come From
In any given period of U.S. history, a handful of countries have dominated the flow of
immigrants, but the dominant countries have varied over time. Figure 2 presents
trends in the top immigrant-sending countries (together comprising at least 50% of the
immigrants admitted) for selected decades. The Immigration Act of May 19, 1921,
imposed the first numerical limits on LPR admissions to the United States, and it set
the level of admission of aliens from specific countries to 3% of the foreign-born
persons of that nationality who lived in the United States in 1910. A few years later,
the Immigration Act of May 26, 1924, established the national origins system, which
set quotas based on the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality in the
country in 1890 and 1920. Both laws exempted Western Hemisphere countries from
the limits. The Immigration Amendments of 1965 replaced the national origins quota
system with per-country ceilings. [1, p. 3]
Figure 2 illustrates that immigration over the last few decades of the 20th century was
not as dominated by three or four countries as it was earlier in the century. Although
Europe was home to the countries sending the most immigrants during the early 20th
century (e.g., Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary, and the United Kingdom), Mexico has
been a top sending country for most of the 20th century—largely after 1970—and into
the 21st century. Other top sending countries from FY2001 through FY2010 were the
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colombia, and Cuba (Western Hemisphere); and the
Philippines, India, China, South Korea, and Vietnam (Asia). [1, p. 3]
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 23-2: Immigrant Countries of Origin 1900-2010 [1, p. 3]
In any given period of
U.S. history, a handful of
countries have
dominated the flow of
immigrants, but the
dominant countries
have varied over time.
Mexico has been a top
sending country for
most of the 20th
century—largely after
1970—and into the 21st
century.
371
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
The number of
foreign-born residents in
the United States is at
the highest level in U.S.
history. In the past 50
years, the number of
foreign-born residents of
the United States has
gone from just under 10
million in 1960 to 40
million in 2010, a 313%
increase.
These data suggest that the per-country ceilings established in 1965 had some effect.
As Figure 2 illustrates, immigrants from only three or four countries made up more
than half of all LPRs prior to 1960. By the last two decades of the 20th century,
immigrants from seven to eight countries comprised about half of all LPRs, and this
pattern has continued into the 21st century. [1, p. 4]
The number of foreign-born residents in the United States is at the highest level in U.S.
history. In the past 50 years, the number of foreign-born residents of the United States
has gone from just under 10 million in 1960 to 40 million in 2010, a 313% increase, as
Figure 3 illustrates. As part of this increase, the source regions of foreign-born
residents have shifted from Europe (74% in 1960) to Latin America and Asia (81% in
2010). Foreign-born residents made up 12.9% of the U.S. population in 2010. [1, p. 4]
More recently, between 2000 and 2010, the foreign born contributed 32% of the total
U.S. population increase. Foreign-born residents comprised most of the increase in the
prime 25-54 working age population over this decade. Almost one-third of current
foreign-born residents arrived in the United States since 2000. [1, p. 5]
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)
estimated that 13.3 million foreign-born residents were LPRs as of January 1, 2012. OIS
has also estimated that 1.9 million foreign-residents were legally present on long-term
temporary visas and about 11.4 million were aliens residing in the United States
without legal authorization. [1, p. 5]
Figure 23-3: Foreign-Born Residents by Region of Origin 1960-2010 [1, p. 4]
372
Just Visiting
The INA provides for the temporary admission of various categories of foreign
nationals, known as nonimmigrants. Nonimmigrants are admitted for a temporary
period of time and a specific purpose, including as tourists, students, and temporary
workers. There are 24 major nonimmigrant visa categories, and over 70 specific types
of nonimmigrant visas are issued currently. Most of these nonimmigrant visa
categories are defined in §101(a)(15) of the INA. These visa categories are commonly
referred to by the letter and numeral that denotes their subsection in §101(a)(15); for
example, B-2 tourists, E-2 treaty investors, F-1 foreign students, H-1B temporary
professional workers, and J-1 cultural exchange participants. Many nonimmigrant visas
are valid for multiple entries as well as multiple years. [1, p. 9]
The U.S. Department of State (DOS) consular officer who issues the visa must be
satisfied that the foreign national is entitled to a nonimmigrant status. Notably, INA
§214(b) generally presumes that all aliens seeking admission to the United States are
coming to live permanently; as a result, most aliens seeking to qualify for a
nonimmigrant visa must demonstrate that they are not coming to reside permanently.
Nonimmigrant visas issued abroad had dipped to 5.0 million in FY2004 after peaking at
7.6 million in FY2001, as Figure 4 shows. Nonimmigrant visa issuances reached 9.2
million in FY2013. Expansion of the visa waiver program (VWP), which allows nationals
from 36 countries to enter the United States as temporary visitors for business or
pleasure without obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad, has affected these
trends. [1, p. 9]
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 23-4: Nonimmigrant Visas Issued by U.S. Department of State 1987-2013 [1, p. 9]
As of 2012, the DHS
Office of Immigration
Statistics (OIS) estimates
that about 11.4 million
aliens are residing in the
United States without
legal authorization.
373
In addition to DOS consular officers interviewing aliens applying for visas, DHS Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) inspects foreign nationals when they seek to enter the
United States. CBP policy typically requires about one-quarter of nonimmigrants
entering the United States to fill out the arrival records, which are colloquially called I-
94 admissions because I-94 is the immigration form number. For example, Mexican
nationals with border crossing cards and Canadian nationals traveling for business or
tourist purposes are specifically excluded from the I-94 admission totals. I-94 data
presented in Figure 5 recorded admissions rather than persons. [1, p. 11]
As can be seen in Figure 5, I-94 admissions have generally inched upwards from FY2003
to FY2013, largely due to CBP’s expanded use of I-94 forms at land ports in FY2005. The
total nonimmigrant admissions recorded by CBP has declined somewhat over this
same period. In FY2013, the 18.3 million visitors entering under the VWP constituted
about 40% of all temporary visitors. [1, p. 11]
Visitors dominated the 61.0 million I-94 admissions in FY2013. Almost four-fifths of all I
-94 admissions were tourists in FY2013 and another 10% were business visitors. The
other substantial categories were students and exchange visitors (4%) and temporary
workers and families (5%). [1, p. 12]
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
Figure 23-5: Nonimmigrant Admissions at U.S. Ports of Entry 2003-2013 [1, p. 11]
INA allows foreigners
not seeking to
immigrate to visit the
country temporarily for
a specific purpose, such
as tourists, students,
and temporary workers.
There are 24 major
nonimmigrant visa
categories, and over 70
specific types of
nonimmigrant visas are
issued currently.
374
Not Welcome
The INA requires the inspection of all aliens who seek entry into the United States;
possession of a visa or another form of travel document does not guarantee admission
into the United States. As a result, all persons seeking admission to the United States
must demonstrate to a CBP inspector that they are a foreign national with a valid visa
and/or passport or that they are a U.S. citizen. CBP officers can permit an alien to
voluntarily withdraw their application for admission and return to their home country.
CBP officers can also summarily exclude an alien arriving through the Visa Waiver
Program and those arriving without proper documentation, unless the alien expresses
the intention to apply for asylum or has a fear of persecution or torture. Immigration
judges with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR) decide all other inadmissibility cases resulting from inspections. [1, p. 14]
As Figure 6 shows, the number of inadmissible aliens at ports of entry has not
fluctuated greatly over the nine-year period for which data are available. Reports
published by the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics indicate that CBP recorded
204,108 foreign nationals arriving at a port of entry who were inadmissible in FY2013.
[1, p. 15]
According to the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, Mexican nationals accounted for
28% of inadmissible aliens, followed by persons from Canada (14%), the Philippines
(11%), and Cuba (9%). These four countries accounted for almost two-thirds of all
aliens whom CBP deemed inadmissible in FY2013. [1, p. 15]
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 23-6: Inadmissible Aliens at Ports of Entry 2005-2013 [1, p. 15]
Possession of a visa or
another form of travel
document does not
guarantee admission
into the United States.
All persons seeking
admission to the United
States must
demonstrate to a CBP
inspector that they are a
foreign national with a
valid visa and/or
passport or that they
are a U.S. citizen.
375
Illegal Workers
All employers are currently required to participate in a paper-based employment
eligibility verification system in which they examine documents presented by every
new hire to verify the person’s identity and work eligibility. The INA states that an
employer is in compliance “if the document reasonably appears on its face to be
genuine.” The new hire must submit a document that establishes both identity and
authorization to work (e.g., U.S. passport or LPR card) or submit two documents, one
establishing identity (e.g., driver’s license) and the other establishing authorization to
work (e.g., Social Security card). Employers must retain these employment eligibility
verification (I-9) forms. [1, p. 17]
Employers may opt to participate in an electronic employment eligibility verification
program, E-Verify, which checks the new hire’s employment authorization through
Social Security Administration and, if necessary, DHS databases. E-Verify evolved from
the Basic Pilot program, one of the three employment verification pilots authorized by
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 to be
implemented and the only one still in operation. It began in November 1997 in the five
states with the largest unauthorized alien populations at the time. In December 2004,
in accordance with P.L. 108-156, the program became available nationwide. The
number of employers enrolled in E-Verify grew from 5,900 in FY2005 to 483,000 by the
end of FY2013. These data indicate that approximately 8% of U.S. employers were
participating in E-Verify by the close of FY2013. [1, pp. 16-17]
Under INA §274A, it is unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire, recruit or refer for a
fee, or continue to employ an alien who is not authorized to be so employed.
Employers who engage in unlawful employment may be subject to civil and/or criminal
penalties. If DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) believes that an
employer has committed a civil violation, the employer may receive a “Final Order” for
civil money penalties, a settlement, or a dismissal. In April 2009, ICE issued new
guidance on immigration-related worksite enforcement. The 2009 guidance
emphasized targeting criminal aliens and employers who cultivate illegal workplaces.
[1, p. 18]
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
All employers are
currently required to
participate in a paper-
based employment
eligibility verification
system in which they
examine documents
presented by every new
hire to verify the
person’s identity and
work eligibility. The INA
states that an employer
is in compliance “if the
document reasonably
appears on its face to be
genuine.”
Native Americans
The Federal government recognizes tribal nations as “domestic dependent nations” with inherent authority to
govern themselves within the borders of the United States. Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution accords citizenship to any person born in the U.S., it was generally interpreted to restrict the
citizenship rights of most Native people. In 1924, the Indian Citizenship Act was signed by President Coolidge
granting full U.S. citizenship to America’s indigenous peoples. The law was enacted partially in recognition of the
thousands of Native people who served in the armed forces during World War I.
376
According to data provided by ICE, 637 employers were subject to civil penalties in
FY2013, up from zero in FY2006. A total of $15.8 million in administrative fines were
imposed in FY2013—a figure that exceeds the level of total fines imposed from FY1999
through FY2009. [1, p. 18]
Employers convicted of having engaged in a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring or
continuing to employ unauthorized aliens may face criminal fines and/or
imprisonment. It is also a criminal offense for a person to knowingly produce, use, or
facilitate the production or use of fraudulent immigration documents. Criminal fines
peaked at $36.6 million in FY2010. [1, p. 18]
The specific grounds for which foreign nationals are removed from the United States
are found in INA §237. These grounds are comparable to the inadmissibility grounds.
They include foreign nationals who are inadmissible at time of entry or violate their
immigration status; commit certain criminal offenses (e.g., crimes of moral turpitude,
aggravated felonies, alien smuggling, high speed flight); fail to register (if required
under law) or commit document fraud; are security risks (such as aliens who violate
any law relating to espionage, engage in criminal activity that endangers public safety,
partake in terrorist activities, or genocide); become a public charge within five years of
entry; or vote unlawfully. Generally, an immigration judge determines whether an
alien is removable. [1, p. 20]
Part III: Mission Areas
Figure 23-7: Alien Formal Removals and Voluntary Returns 1990-2013 [1, p. 20]
Under INA §274A, it is
unlawful for an
employer to knowingly
hire, recruit or refer for
a fee, or continue to
employ an alien who is
not authorized to be so
employed. Employers
who engage in unlawful
employment may be
subject to civil and/or
criminal penalties.
377
Formal removals grew from 30,039 in FY1990 to 438,421 in FY2013. Since FY2001,
formal removals have increased by over 100%. The trends for direct returns at the
border and voluntary departures (i.e., permitting aliens to leave the United States on
their own recognizance and at their own expense) within the interior are depicted in
Figure 7. As can be seen, the ratio of voluntary departures to formal removals has
gone from 34:1 in FY1990 to under 1:2 by FY2013. [1, p. 20]
Illegal Immigrants
The three main components of the unauthorized resident alien population are (1)
aliens who enter the country surreptitiously without inspection, (2) aliens who
overstay their nonimmigrant visas, and (3) aliens who are admitted on the basis of
fraudulent documents. In all three instances, the aliens are in violation of the INA and
subject to removal. [1, p. 23]
Estimates derived from the Current Population Survey (CPS) based on the 2010 census
indicate that the unauthorized resident alien population rose from 8.6 million in 2000
to 11.3 million in 2013, as Figure 8 shows. The demographers at the Pew Research
Center, which produced many of the unauthorized population estimates, concluded
that the size of the unauthorized resident alien population has declined from an
estimated 12.2 million unauthorized immigrants living in the United States in March
2007. [1, p. 24]
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
Figure 23-8: Estimated Number of Unauthorized Resident Aliens [1, p. 23]
The three main
components of the
unauthorized resident
alien population are (1)
aliens who enter the
country surreptitiously
without inspection, (2)
aliens who overstay
their nonimmigrant
visas, and (3) aliens who
are admitted on the
basis of fraudulent
documents. In all three
instances, the aliens are
in violation of the INA
and subject to removal.
378
Demographers at the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration
Statistics published their estimates of the unauthorized resident alien population and
yielded results consistent with Pew Research estimates. OIS demographers drew their
estimates from the decennial censuses of 2000 and 2010, adjusted with the American
Community Survey (ACS). Although their ACS estimates tend to be lower than the Pew
estimates using the Current Population Survey, the trends are comparable. [1, p. 24]
The most recent OIS report estimated that 42% of the 11.4 million unauthorized
residents in 2012 had entered from 2000 to 2010. Although increased border security,
a record number of alien removals, and high unemployment, among other factors,
have depressed the levels of illegal migration in recent years, the estimated number of
unauthorized aliens residing in the United States has remained above 10 million for a
decade. [1, p. 24]
Conclusion
Immigration is a legitimate security concern. On November 13, 2015, seven men
armed with explosives and automatic weapons mounted coordinated attacks in Paris,
killing 130 and injuring 368 innocent victims. According to the French prime minister,
several of the gunmen had exploited Europe’s immigration crisis to enter the continent
undetected. But just as much as it is a security concern, immigration is also a political
and economic concern. Debate rages over whether immigrants are a boost or a bust to
the economy; the question remains unresolved. Immigrants can also change
traditional voting patterns, causing grave concern to those in office. Given these
considerations, it is uncertain which will weigh most in determining the future
direction of U.S. immigration policy.
Part III: Mission Areas
The most recent OIS
report estimated that
42% of the 11.4 million
unauthorized residents
in 2012 had entered
from 2000 to 2010.
379
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is a migrant?
2. How does a migrant become a legal permanent resident?
3. How is immigration screening similar to border screening?
4. How is immigration screening different from border screening?
5. Why, as a nation of immigrants, are we concerned about controlling migration?
6. What is the reigning legislation forming the foundation for U.S. immigration policy?
7. List and describe three ways people may illegally remain in this country.
8. What are the restrictions and penalties for hiring an illegal immigrant?
9. Why doesn’t DHS have a precise count of illegal immigrants?
10. Describe the circumstances attendant to your U.S. residency status.
380
381
Part IV:
Mission Components
In this section we will explore DHS components and try and describe “who’s who and what do they do”. The task is
complicated because the Department remains an organization in continual evolution. As seen in Chapter 11, some of
the restructuring was self-initiated under authorities granted in the 2002 Homeland Security Act, and some of it was
externally directed by Congress, such as the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act and 2007 Implementing the
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. All were done to better orient the Department towards its assigned
missions, or expand it to accommodate new missions. One indication of how much the Department has changed is
that the number of employees has expanded over 30% from 180,000 in 2003 to 240,000 in 2015. We understand that
the information presented in this section is perishable. Accordingly, we do not attempt to address all components
within the Department, but focus on those most directly related to its primary missions. In order to maintain a
manageable scope, we further restrict our review to higher level components consisting of agencies (e.g., USCG, FEMA,
etc.), directorates (e.g., NPPD, CBP, etc.), and offices (DNDO, I&A, etc.). In order to facilitate understanding, each
chapter is organized to 1) provide background on the component’s origin, 2) identify its specific mission, 3) outline its
internal structure, and 4) describe what it is doing.
382
Part IV: Mission Components
383
Chapter 24: NPPD
National Protection &
Programs Directorate
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 24
Learning Outcomes
384
“Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and maintain secure,
functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure – including assets, networks, and
systems – that are vital to public confidence and the Nation's safety, prosperity, and
well-being. “
- 2013 Presidential Policy Directive No. 21
Introduction
If indeed critical infrastructure offers an avenue for domestic catastrophic destruction,
then the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) may be considered one
of the most important directorates within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS).
Background
The National Protection and Programs Directorate traces its lineage to the original
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection (IA&IP) Directorate. The IA&IP was
headed by an Undersecretary supported by two Assistant Secretaries, one for
Information Analysis and the other for Infrastructure Protection. The Assistant
Secretary for Infrastructure Protection was assigned responsibility for actively
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure and developing an overall National
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). [1, pp. 8-9] Responding to Congressional
mandates imposed by the 2006 Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, and
using his own authorities under the 2002 Homeland Security Act, in 2007 Secretary
Chertoff formed NPPD, headed by an Undersecretary, to consolidate both physical and
cyber protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure. [2, p. 17]
Mission
The National Protection and Programs Directorate leads national efforts to strengthen
the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure against terrorist
attacks, cyber events, natural disasters, other large-scale incidents, and during national
security special events. To accomplish its mission, NPPD collaborates with the owners
and operators of infrastructure to maintain near real-time situational awareness of
both physical and cyber events and share information that may disrupt critical
infrastructure. Through partnerships with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial,
international, and private-sector entities, NPPD identifies and enables mitigation and
risk reduction to infrastructure and builds capacity to secure the Nation. [3, p. 77]
Part IV: Mission Components
The National Protection
and Programs
Directorate (NPPD)
leads national efforts to
strengthen the security
and resilience of the
Nation’s critical
infrastructure against
terrorist attacks, cyber
events, natural
disasters, other large-
scale incidents, and
during national security
special events.
385
NPPD works with infrastructure owners and operators, along with others in the private
sector; Federal, State, local, territorial, and tribal officials; and international partners to
ensure timely information, analysis, and assessments in order to maintain and provide
situational awareness, increase resilience, and understand and mitigate risk through its
field force and headquarters components. Through established partnerships, NPPD
leads the national unity of effort for infrastructure security and resilience and builds
capacity of partners across the nation through activities like bombing prevention,
technical assistance, training, analysis, and assessments. NPPD also directly protects
Federal infrastructure against both physical and cyber threats and responds to
incidents which threaten infrastructure at the local level. [3, p. 77]
The goal of the National Protection and Programs Directorate is to advance the
Department of Homeland Security's risk-reduction mission. Reducing risk requires an
integrated approach that encompasses both physical and virtual threats and their
associated human elements.
Organization
The NPPD is organized into five offices:
Office of Infrastructure Protection
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
Office of Biometric Identity Management
Office of Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis
Federal Protective Service
Chapter 24: NPPD
Figure 24-1: NPPD Organization Chart [4]
NPPD leads the national
effort for infrastructure
security and resilience
and builds capacity of
partners across the
nation.
386
Office of Infrastructure Protection
The Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads and coordinates national programs
and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience and has established strong
partnerships across government and the private sector. The office conducts and
facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure
owners and operators and State, local, tribal, and territorial partners understand and
address risks to critical infrastructure. IP provides information on emerging threats and
hazards so that appropriate actions can be taken. The office also offers tools and
training to partners to help them manage the risks to their assets, systems, and
networks. [5]
IP’s protection efforts are focused on 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets,
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the
United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination thereof. The 16 sectors identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-
21) include:
IP’s protection efforts are guided by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. First
introduced in 2006, the NIPP was revised in 2009 and again in 2013. The current NIPP
advocates protecting critical infrastructure through public/private partnerships
predicated on a Risk Management Framework (RMF). The RMF is a 5-step processing
for assessing risk and prioritizing countermeasures to reduce the vulnerability of the
nation’s critical infrastructure. [6]
Part IV: Mission Components
Table 24-1: Critical Infrastructure Sectors
1. Chemical Facilities 9. Financial Services
2. Commercial Facilities 10. Food & Agriculture
3. Communications Assets 11. Government Facilities
4. Critical Manufacturing Facilities 12. Healthcare and Public Health
5. Dams 13. Information Technology
6. Defense Industrial Base 14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste
7. Emergency Services 15. Transportation
8. Energy 16. Water and Wastewater Systems
Figure 24-1: NIPP Risk Management Framework [6, p. 15]
The Office of
Infrastructure Protection
(IP) leads and
coordinates national
programs and policies
on critical infrastructure
security and resilience .
387
The 2013 NIPP represents an evolution from concepts introduced in the initial versions.
It is streamlined and adaptable to the current risk, policy, and strategic environments.
It provides the foundation for an integrated and collaborative approach to achieve the
vision of: "[a] Nation in which physical and cyber critical infrastructure remain secure
and resilient, with vulnerabilities reduced, consequences minimized, threats identified
and disrupted, and response and recovery hastened." The 2013 NIPP was developed
through a collaborative process involving stakeholders from all 16 critical infrastructure
sectors, all 50 states, and from all levels of government and industry. [6]
IP actively monitors the health of the nation’s critical infrastructure through the
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). The NICC is an element of the
Department’s National Operations Center (NOC) which maintains active watch over all
homeland security threats. When an incident or event impacting critical infrastructure
occurs that requires coordination between DHS and the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure, the NICC is the national coordination hub to support the security
and resilience of physical critical infrastructure assets. The NICC collaborates with
Federal departments, State and Local governments, and private sector partners to
monitor potential, developing, and current regional and national operations of the
Nation’s critical infrastructure sectors. [7, p. 1]
Similarly, the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
stands watch for national cyber threats. It issues alerts and coordinates response
through law enforcement agencies, the Intelligence Community (IC), international
computer emergency readiness teams, domestic Information Sharing And Analysis
Centers (ISACs), and critical infrastructure partners. [7, p. 2]
Both the NICC and NCCIC maintain active relationships with Federal partners, law
enforcement, and emergency management communities. Other government agencies
also work with the NICC and NCCIC and share interest in critical infrastructure-related
information. For example, the NICC works closely with the State Department’s
Overseas Security Advisory Council, which provides information regarding threats to
physical infrastructure overseas to American organizations and can ensure this
information is available to the domestic critical infrastructure community. At the same
time, the NCCIC works on a daily basis with other Federal cyber centers to exchange
critical information and coordinate analytical and response processes. Both centers
provide reports to the National Operations Center to facilitate shared situational
awareness across the Federal community. [7, pp. 4-5]
Chapter 24: NPPD
Figure 24-1: NIPP Risk Management Framework [6, p. 15]
IP actively monitors the
health of the nation’s
critical infrastructure
through the National
Infrastructure
Coordinating Center
(NICC). Similarly, the
National Cybersecurity
and Communications
Integration Center
(NCCIC) stands watch
for national cyber
threats.
388
Important components of the NCCIC include the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) and Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT). They maintain web-based, collaborative tools to share sensitive
cybersecurity prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery information
with validated partners. They provide access to a secure portals which provides
information regarding cyber indicators, incidents, advisories, and malware digests for
critical infrastructure systems. [7, p. 3]
The Cobalt Compartment is an information hub for enterprise systems security.
The Control System Compartment provides material on industrial control systems,
limited to control system asset owners and operators.
A National Cyber Awareness System provides timely alerts, bulletins, tips, and
technical documents to those who sign up.
Cybersecurity incident reporting provides critical infrastructure partners with a
secure means to report cybersecurity incidents.
The Infrastructure Information Collection Division (IICD) within the NPPD’s Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP) leads the Department’s efforts to gather and manage
vital information regarding the nation’s critical infrastructure. The Web-based
infrastructure surveys and assessments, available through the Infrastructure Protection
(IP) Gateway, allow users to capture valuable data on a facility’s physical and
operational security and its resilience to attacks and natural hazards. The collected
data is analyzed to determine the facility’s relative security and resilience in
comparison to the national average for similar facilities. This information is used to
develop dashboards that equip the facility’s owners and operators with the knowledge
to detect and prevent physical, cyber, and natural threats, and better respond to,
recover from, and remain resilient against all hazards. [8]
To enhance information-sharing efforts among the public and private sectors, the
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) program provides congressionally
mandated protections from public disclosure to qualifying critical infrastructure
information. The success of the nation’s collaborative critical infrastructure protection
program relies on participation from critical infrastructure owners and operators. The
PCII program supports this effort by providing owners and operators with the
assurance that their sensitive information can be protected. [8]
To support the efforts of critical infrastructure planners and other IP mission partners,
IICD has integrated data visualization and mapping capabilities within the IP Gateway.
The secure, web-based, geospatial mapping tool integrates commercial and
government-owned data and imagery from multiple sources, to support complex data
analysis or provide comprehensive situational and strategic awareness. [8]
Part IV: Mission Components
The Infrastructure
Information Collection
Division (IICD) within the
NPPD’s Office of
Infrastructure Protection
(IP) leads the
Department’s efforts to
gather and manage vital
information regarding
the nation’s critical
infrastructure.
389
The OneView program is also available as an alternative visualization capability for
Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII). OneView provides a rich interface for
viewing maps of critical infrastructure, natural hazards data, and other user defined
data sources, as well as enhanced imagery, geocoding, and routing features. [8]
IICD manages infrastructure information partnerships with homeland security
geospatial stakeholders in state and local governments, as well as the private sector.
These partnerships include activities such as working to define better geospatial
information requirements and to improve data sharing, creating geospatial data sets
for partner use, assigning staff to work in the field and serve as focal points for state
and local data needs, and managing workshops to address future geospatial
information issues in homeland security and emergency response. [8]
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) is responsible for enhancing
the security, resilience, and reliability of the Nation’s cyber and communications
infrastructure. CS&C works to prevent or minimize disruptions to critical information
infrastructure in order to protect the public, the economy, and government
services. CS&C leads efforts to protect the federal “.gov” domain of civilian
government networks and to collaborate with the private sector—the “.com”
domain—to increase the security of critical networks. [9]
Within CS&C is the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC). Established in 2007 in
response to communications challenges faced during the attacks on September 11,
2001 and Hurricane Katrina, the OEC supports and promotes communications used by
emergency responders and government officials to keep America safe, secure, and
resilient. The office leads the Nation’s operable and interoperable public safety and
national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) communications efforts. OEC
provides training, coordination, tools, and guidance to help its federal, state, local,
tribal, territorial and industry partners develop their emergency communications
capabilities. OEC’s programs and services coordinate emergency communications
planning, preparation and evaluation, to ensure safer, better-prepared communities
nationwide.
CS&C coordinates national security and emergency preparedness through the
Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience (SECIR) office. CS&C
relies on SECIR to streamline coordination and engagement with external partners,
while leveraging capabilities and significant subject matter expertise in order to meet
stakeholder requirements.
Chapter 24: NPPD
The Office of
Cybersecurity and
Communications (CS&C)
is responsible for
enhancing the security,
resilience, and reliability
of the Nation’s cyber
and communications
infrastructure.
390
The Federal Network Resilience (FNR) office within CS&C is responsible for developing
metrics to drive cybersecurity risk management for Federal departments and agencies.
FNR also gathers cybersecurity requirements and develops operational policies for the
Federal government. It collaborates with, and provides outreach to, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), the Federal Chief Information Officer (CIO) Council,
and individual agency Chief Information (CIOs) and Chief Information Security Officers
(CISOs) of various Federal agencies. FNR is a clearing house for cyber best practices
and cyber lessons learned in support of Federal departments and agencies.
The CS&C Network Security Deployment (NSD) office works collaboratively with public,
private, and international entities to secure cyberspace and America’s cyber assets.
NSD serves as the cybersecurity engineering and acquisition "Center of Excellence"
within CS&C. In support of that role, NSD provides development, acquisition,
deployment, operational, and customer support to satisfy the Department’s mission
requirements under the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). [9]
Finally, CS&C operates the Enterprise Performance Management Office (EPMO),
which ensures that the Assistant Secretary’s strategic goals and priorities are reflected
across all CS&C programs. EPMO measures the effectiveness of initiatives, programs,
and projects that support those goals and priorities, and facilitates cross-functional
mission coordination and implementation between CS&C components within DHS, and
among the interagency. [9]
Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM)
The Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) is responsible for collecting,
maintaining, and sharing biometric data with the law enforcement and intelligence
communities and strategic foreign partners. As part of this mission, it maintains the
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)—DHS’s central repository for
biometric data. [10, p. 11] OBIM was created in March, 2013, replacing the United
States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, the
system used by the DHS for keeping track of all visitors to the country and checking all
of their identity through various biometric technologies. [11]
Formerly US-VISIT, the OBIM uses biometrics to help make travel simple, easy and
convenient for legitimate visitors, but virtually impossible for those who wish to do
harm or violate U.S. laws. Biometrics collected by OBIM and linked to specific
biographic information enable a person's identity to be established, then verified, by
the U.S. government. With each encounter, from applying for a visa to seeking
immigration benefits to entering the United States, OBIM:
Checks a person’s biometrics against a watch list of known or suspected terrorists,
criminals and immigration violators
Part IV: Mission Components
The Office of Biometric
Identity Management
(OBIM) is responsible for
collecting, maintaining,
and sharing biometric
data with the law
enforcement and
intelligence
communities and
strategic foreign
partners. As part of this
mission, it maintains the
Automated Biometric
Identification System
(IDENT)—DHS’s central
repository for biometric
data.
391
Checks against the entire database of all of the fingerprints the Department of
Homeland Security has collected since OBIM began to determine if a person is using an
alias and attempting to use fraudulent identification.
Checks a person’s biometrics against those associated with the identification
document presented to ensure that the document belongs to the person presenting it
and not someone else. [12]
OBIM provides the results of these checks to decision makers when and where they
need it. These services help prevent identity fraud and deprive criminals and
immigration violators of the ability to cross U.S. borders. Based on biometrics
alone, OBIM has helped stop thousands of people who were ineligible to enter the
United States. Biometrics are unique physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, that
can be used for automated recognition. Biometrics form the foundation of OBIM's
identification services because they are reliable, convenient and virtually impossible to
forge. [12]
Privacy is an integral part of the OBIM and it is essential to the program mission. OBIM
takes privacy into account from conception through planning and development, and
during the execution of every aspect of the OBIM program. Personal information
collected by OBIM is to be used only for the purposes for which it was collected, unless
specifically authorized or mandated by law. OBIM has carefully monitored systems and
security practices in place to protect the privacy of those whose data are collected and
to ensure the integrity of that data. OBIM has dedicated privacy personnel to further
ensure that the information collected is protected from misuse by anyone inside or
outside OBIM. [12]
Office of Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis
Formerly the Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division (IASD) within the Office of
Infrastructure Protection (IP), OCIA was established as an office of the NPPD in 2014.
OCIA has an important role in DHS’s efforts to implement Presidential Policy Directive
21 (PPD-21), which calls for integrated analysis of critical infrastructure, and Executive
Order 13636, identifying critical infrastructure where cyber incidents could have
catastrophic impacts to public health and safety, the economy, and national security.
OCIA builds on the recent accomplishments of the Department’s Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) and manages the National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) to advance understanding of
emerging risks crossing the cyber-physical domain. OCIA represents an integration and
enhancement of DHS’s analytic capabilities, supporting stakeholders and interagency
partners.
Chapter 24: NPPD
The Office of Cyber &
Infrastructure Analysis
(OCIA) performs
integrated analysis of
critical infrastructure,
and identifies critical
infrastructure where
cyber incidents could
have catastrophic
impacts. To assist with
these responsibilities,
the OCIA manages the
National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis
Center (NISAC) on
Kirtland Air Force Base
in Albuquerque, NM.
392
Federal Protective Service
The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the National Protection and Programs
Directorate is responsible for the protection and security of federal property,
personnel, and federally owned and leased buildings. In general, FPS operations focus
on security and law enforcement activities that reduce vulnerability to criminal and
terrorist threats. FPS protection and security operations include all-hazards based risk
assessments; emplacement of criminal and terrorist countermeasures, such as vehicle
barriers and closed-circuit cameras; law enforcement response; assistance to federal
agencies through Facility Security Committees; and emergency and safety education
programs. FPS also assists other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Secret Service (USSS)
at National Special Security Events (NSSE), with additional security. FPS is the lead
“Government Facilities Sector Agency” for the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP). There are more than 1,300 Law Enforcement Officers, Security Specialists,
Special Agents and Mission Support Staff protecting federal facilities and tenants (4)
along with approximately 13,000 contract security guards. [10, p. 10]
The Federal Protective Service provides integrated security and law enforcement
services to more than 9,500 federal facilities nationwide. These services include:
conducting facility security assessments; responding to crimes and other incidents to
protect life and property; and detecting, investigating, and mitigating threats.
[13] Protective services of the FPS also include:
Designing countermeasures for tenant agencies
Maintaining uniformed law enforcement presence
Maintaining armed contract security guards
Performing background suitability checks for contract employees
Offering special operations including K-9 explosive detection
Monitoring security alarms via centralized communication centers
Sharing intelligence among local/state/federal
Protecting special events
Training federal tenants in crime prevention and occupant emergency planning
Part IV: Mission Components
In the spring of 2013, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) implemented a new directive entitled
the Prohibited Items Program (FPS Directive 15.9.3.1. (Rev. 1). The Prohibited Items Program
sets forth FPS’ policy for applying security force countermeasures to mitigate prohibited item
entry at Federal properties. The intent of the policy is to provide risk-based recommendations
to Facility Security Committees regarding security screening, visitor processing, and the
development of prohibited items lists and accommodation policies as well as establishing FPS
policies and procedures for addressing prohibited items. The Facility Security Committee is
responsible for determining the security countermeasures and prohibited item list for a
particular Federal facility. FPS is responsible for implementing the security countermeasures
and enforcing the prohibited items list developed by the Facility Security Committee.
The Federal Protective
Service (FPS), within
NPPD is responsible for
the protection and
security of federal
property, personnel, and
federally owned and
leased buildings.
393
Within the Federal Protective Service, the Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) leads
the DHS’s efforts to implement the National Policy for Countering Improvised Explosive
Devices (IED) and enhance the nation’s ability to prevent, protect against, respond to,
and mitigate the use of explosives against critical infrastructure; the private sector; and
federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities. OBP was born of terrorism events,
such as Lockerbie, Oklahoma City, 9/11, Madrid, and London through its mission to
protect life and critical infrastructure by building capabilities within the general public
and across the public and private sectors to prevent, protect against, respond to, and
mitigate bombing incidents. [14]
The FPS also has other specialized capabilities. FPS Explosive Detection Canine (EDC)
teams conduct searches for a variety of explosive materials near building exteriors,
parking lots, office areas, vehicles, packages, and people in and around Federal
facilities. They also provide a strong visible and psychological deterrent against
criminal and terrorist threats. The teams are available to assist federal, state, and local
law enforcement partners. EDC teams play a critical role in FPS’ comprehensive
preventive security measures by supporting strategic explosive detection
activities. They also provide immediate and specialized response to bomb threats and
unattended packages or other such dangerous items. Most often, these detection
activities allow the EDC teams to detect or quickly rule out the presence of dangerous
materials and allow the business of the government to continue with minimal or no
interruption. FPS has also initiated a Personnel Screening Detection (PSD)
program. PSD canines are specially trained to detect explosives carried by people or in
moving containers, such as luggage or backpacks. [13]
FPS mobile command vehicles (MCV) are deployed to enhance or reestablish
communication and coordination during emergency incidents and special security
events nationwide. These assets leverage satellite and internet access, as well as
interoperable radios and video capabilities to enhance communication between FPS
assets and other federal and local response and support assets. The MCVs can rapidly
deploy to any location in the continental United States where the communications
infrastructure is inadequate or has been disrupted, or where enhanced interoperability
among law enforcement agencies is needed.
Chapter 24: NPPD
Within the Federal
Protective Service, the
Office for Bombing
Prevention (OBP) leads
the DHS’s efforts to
implement the National
Policy for Countering
Improvised Explosive
Devices (IED).
394
Conclusion
While, arguably, NPPD may have the most important job in DHS, without doubt it also
has one of the most challenging jobs in DHS. Critical infrastructure protection remains
a work in progress. Although DHS has succeeded in engaging owners and operators in
a dialog about critical infrastructure protection, it has made little progress in actually
reducing vulnerabilities as the Department was tasked to do by the 2002 Homeland
Security Act. In part, the predicament is the result of an absence of workable
solutions. Critical infrastructure protection is a job easier said than done. This
assessment is evidenced by 1) the Department’s inability to compile a definitive list of
critical infrastructure, 2) develop a transparent and
Part IV: Mission Components
395
Chapter 24: NPPD
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the National Protection and Programs Directorate?
2. Which NPPD component has primary responsibility for critical infrastructure protection?
3. Which NPPD component monitors the nation’s infrastructure?
4. Which NPPD component stands watch for national cyber threats?
5. Which NPPD component collects and manages information about critical infrastructure?
6. Which NPPD component is responsible for protecting the “.gov” Internet domain?
7. Which NPPD component collects and manages law enforcement biometric data?
8. Which NPPD component performs integrated analysis of critical infrastructure?
9. Which NPPD component performs modeling and simulation of critical infrastructure?
10. Which NPPD component works to counter improvised explosive devices?
396
Part IV: Mission Components
397
Chapter 25: S&T
Science & Technology
Directorate
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 25
Learning Outcomes
398
“Just as science and technology have helped us defeat past enemies overseas, so too
will they help us defeat the efforts of terrorists to attack our homeland and disrupt our
way of life.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Introduction
As the 1995 Tokyo Subway Attacks raised the prospect of domestic WMD attack by non
-state actors, the United States found that its traditional methods of deterring WMD
attack by nation states were no longer effective. New means had to be discovered to
prevent and protect against this new threat. Accordingly, the Department of
Homeland Security was given the means and the mandate to harness the nation’s
research and development capacity to deliver innovative technologies that would
render the country less vulnerable to WMD attack.
Background
The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). DHS S&T is headed by
an Under Secretary for Science and Technology. The Homeland Security Act gave the
Under Secretary a wide-ranging list of responsibilities and authorities, chief among
them the objective of developing countermeasures to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats.
Mission
In general, DHS S&T conducts basic and applied research, development, testing, and
evaluation to:
Deliver new capabilities and knowledge products;
Enhance processes and efficiencies;
Provide acquisition support; and
Help understand homeland security risks and opportunities. [1, pp. 1-2]
DHS S&T’s current approach emphasizes research and development (R&D) deliverables
with high impact, the ability to rapidly transition products to use in the field, and a high
return on investment. [1, p. 2]
Part IV: Mission Components
The Department of
Homeland Security
Science and Technology
Directorate (DHS S&T)
was established by the
200 Homeland Security
Act to develop
countermeasures to
chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear
threats.
399
Organization
The statutory language creating DHS did not define the structure of the S&T
Directorate; the Under Secretary has discretion to reorganize as needed. Each Under
Secretary has had a different vision for the organization and activities of the S&T
Directorate and has organized or reorganized the S&T Directorate accordingly. The
current structure, since 2010, organizes the S&T Directorate into four groups, each
headed by a Director. The groups are:
Support to the Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders Group (FRG),
which is responsible for technology interoperability and compatibility, transfers
technologies to first responders, and oversees the National Urban Security
Technology Laboratory (formerly the Environmental Measurements Laboratory);
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), which contains
six technical divisions that manage R&D in different topical areas and the Special
Projects Office that oversees the directorate’s classified R&D; [1, p. 3]
Chapter 25: S&T
Figure 25-1: DHS S&T Organization [3]
400
The Capability Development Support (CDS) Group works closely with the DHS
components to ensure programs and systems reduce or mitigate the challenges in
the safest, most efficient and most cost-effective manner. CDS responds to DHS
component needs for standards, test and evaluation, operations and requirements
analysis and systems engineering. [2]
Research and Development Partnerships (RDP) Division, which serves as the
primary external interface for the S&T Directorate, coordinates work with the DHS
University Centers of Excellence, oversees several DHS laboratories, and manages
the relationship between the S&T Directorate and the Department of Energy
national laboratories. [1, p. 3]
In addition to these groups, the 2010 reorganization created a Chief Scientist position
reporting to the Under Secretary.
First Responders Group
FRG works in close partnership with first responders at all levels to identify, validate,
and facilitate the fulfillment of needs through the use of existing and emerging
technologies, knowledge products and standards. Prioritized areas of FRG focus and
initiatives include:
1. Making First Responders Safer
2. Helping First Responders Share Data and Critical Information
3. Helping First Responders Communicate Through Interoperability
4. Engaging, Communicating and Partnering with First Responders [4]
FRG is comprised of four divisions:
National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL): NUSTL tests, evaluates
and analyzes homeland security capabilities while serving as a technical authority
to first responder, state and local entities in protecting our cities. NUSTL leads and
provides independent federal oversight for test programs, pilots, demonstrations
and other forms of evaluations of homeland security capabilities both in the field
and in the laboratory.
Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC): OIC provides local, tribal, state
and federal stakeholders with the tools, technologies, methodologies and guidance
to enable improved communications interoperability at all levels of government.
OIC manages a comprehensive research, development, testing, evaluation and
standards program to enhance emergency interoperable communications and
improve alerts and warnings.
Part IV: Mission Components
DHS is currently
organized into four
groups: 1) First
Responders Group, 2)
HSARPA, 3) Capability
Development Support
Group, and 4) Research
and Development
Partnerships Division.
401
First Responder Technologies (R-Tech): R-Tech rapidly disseminates technology
information on products and services to local, tribal, state and federal agencies
and private sector entities in order to encourage technological innovation and
facilitate the mission of DHS. R-Tech provides information, resources and
technology solutions that address mission capability gaps identified by the
emergency response community.
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER): DHS
established the SAVER program to assist first responders in making procurement
decisions. The SAVER program conducts objective assessments and validations of
commercial equipment and systems and provides those results along with other
relevant equipment information to the response community. [4]
HSARPA
When Congress established DHS, it created within the S&T Directorate the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was to administer a newly
established Acceleration Fund for Research and Development of Homeland Security
Technologies. The scope of HSARPA has evolved since Congress created it. Initially, it
was unclear how the S&T Directorate would implement HSARPA. Given the similarity
of its name to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), some policy
makers and experts in the scientific community believed that, like DARPA, it would
fund high-risk, high-reward R&D. Instead, the S&T Directorate initially used HSARPA to
conduct essentially all of its extramural activities, most of which were conventional
R&D with only moderate risk. To be fair, the strategy was intentionally devised to
accumulate rapid success. An attempt to make HSARPA more like DARPA was
unsuccessful because HSARPA doesn’t have the organizational capacity of DARPA.
Today, HSARPA is more focused on transitioning technology to the field. A
consequence of this change has been a reduction in the number of projects and
programs, from 250 in 2010 to 75 in 2012. While the number of projects rose to 100 in
2014, the challenge for S&T is maintaining a number of programs and projects
sufficient to cover the range of homeland security threats while also providing each
program and project with sufficient resources to achieve meaningful progress or
success. [1, p. 17]
Capability Development Support
CDS provides an innovative, systems-based approach to help operators define their
needs and develop technologies and solutions that can be quickly deployed to frontline
operators. CDS’ analytic and systems engineering approach assesses the operational
environment and fiscal limitations to ensure the best solutions are chosen. CDS’
expertise includes systems engineering, operations analysis, test and evaluations,
standards and acquisition. CDS focuses on accuracy and analysis to make smart
investment decisions that deliver enhanced capabilities to the Homeland Security
Enterprise. CDS does this in a variety of ways:
Chapter 25: S&T
Given its name
association, many
believed that, like
DARPA, HSARPA would
fund high-risk, high-
reward R&D. Attempts
to make HSARPA more
like DARPA were
unsuccessful because
HSARPA doesn’t have
the organizational
capacity of DARPA.
Today, HSARPA is more
focused on transitioning
technology to the field.
402
Office of Test and Evaluation. Through delegation by the Secretary of Homeland
Security under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, CDS acts as the principal
advisor on operational test and evaluation and oversees test and evaluation for
DHS major acquisitions, ensuring homeland security technologies are reliable,
interoperable and effective. CDS provides test and evaluation (T&E) oversight for
135 major DHS acquisition programs totaling about $150 billion. The Office of Test
and Evaluation includes the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) specializing in
evaluating screening and contraband detection technologies.
Standards. CDS develops and oversees DHS standards that ensure reliable,
interoperable and effective technologies and processes. This includes coordination
and representation on a number of standard-setting bodies and organizations.
Operations and Requirements Analysis. Established in 2012, CDS’ Operations and
Requirements Analysis uses technical and analytic expertise to identify and
prioritize cross-DHS capability gaps and find solutions for DHS component
operations. The goal is to save money and time while meeting DHS critical missions
and to support S&T with transitioning technologies to operational use. The office
also supports the DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC), a DHS component-led
body designed to identify and prioritize cross-department capability gaps and
recommend investments to address those gaps. CDS supports the JRC by providing
capabilities and requirements analysis enabling DHS leadership to address the
gaps, overlaps and duplications at the enterprise-level rather than at the individual
component level.
Systems Engineering. CDS’s systems engineering promotes a rigorous systems
engineering process that transforms customer needs and requirements into
operational capabilities.
As the Component Acquisition Executive, CDS represents S&T on a number of
acquisition and policy steering committees and provides advice on acquisition issues.
[2]
Research and Development Partnerships
RDP was created in November 2010 to develop, foster and leverage innovative
partnerships and serve as a primary resource in establishing and managing world class
Centers of Excellence and federal laboratories. RDP manages the Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee, International Cooperative Programs
Office, the Office of National Laboratories, Public-Private Partnership Offices, and
Office of University Programs. [5]
The Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC)
serves as a source of independent expert advice to the Under Secretary for Science
and Technology. [6] The HSSTAC provides independent, consensus scientific and
technical advice and recommendations to the Under Secretary for Science and
Technology. Its activities focus on the S&T mission to strengthen America’s
Part IV: Mission Components
RDP was created in
November 2010 to
develop, foster and
leverage innovative
partnerships and serve
as a primary resource in
establishing and
managing world class
Centers of Excellence
and federal laboratories.
403
security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology
solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise. The committee addresses science
and technology needs and trends, management processes and organizational
constructs, and other matters of special interest to the Under Secretary for S&T
and will ensure the identification of new technologies in those areas that
strengthen homeland security. It supports the priority needs of HSARPA and First
Responders Group. [7]
The International Cooperative Programs Office (ICPO) develops partnerships with
foreign governments and international organizations to enhance scientific and
technical knowledge for the Homeland Security Enterprise. These partnerships
provide the HSE with access to innovative research and development knowledge,
funding and other unique capabilities and resources. ICPO was established in
accordance with Title 6 U.S. Code Section 195c (“Promoting antiterrorism through
international cooperation program”). [8]
The Office of National Laboratories (ONL) oversees a coordinated network of the
five DHS laboratories listed in Table 1. DHS also coordinates homeland security
research at the 13 Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories listed in Table
2. [9]
Chapter 25: S&T
Table 25-1: DHS Laboratories [9]
1. Chemical Security Analysis Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD
2. National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, Manhattan, KS
3. National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, Fort Detrick, MD
4. National Urban Security Technology, Manhattan, NY
5. Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Orient Point, NY
Table 25-2: DOE Laboratories [10]
1. Ames Lab, Ames, IA
2. Argonne National Lab, Argonne, IL
3. Brookhaven National Lab, Upton, NY
4. Idaho National Lab, Idaho Falls, ID
5. Los Alamos National Lab, Los Alamos, NM
6. National Energy Technology Lab, Albany, OR
7. National Renewable Energy Lab, Golden, CO
8. Oak Ridge National Lab, Oak Ridge, TN
9. Pacific Northwest National Lab, Richland, WA
10. Princeton Plasma Physics Lab, Plainsboro, NJ
11. Sandia National Labs, Albuquerque, NM
12. Savannah River National Lab, Aiken, SC
13. Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility, Newport News, VA
RDP oversees research
projects at five DHS
laboratories, thirteen
DOE laboratories, and
manages sixteen
academic Centers of
Excellence.
404
Part IV: Mission Components
Table 25-3: DHS Centers of Excellence [16]
1. Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence (ADAC), led by the University of Alaska Anchorage,
develops and transitions technology solutions, innovative products, and educational programs to improve situational awareness and crisis response capabilities related to emerging maritime challenges posed by the dynamic Arctic environment.
2. Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment (CAMRA), co-led by Michigan State University and Drexel
University and established jointly with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, fills critical gaps in risk assessments for mitigating microbial hazards.
3. Center for Borders, Trade, and Immigration Research (CBTIR), led by the University of Houston, develops
technology-based tools, techniques, and educational programs for border management, immigration, trade facilitation, and targeting and enforcement of transnational borders.
4. Center for Maritime, Island and Remote and Extreme Environment Security (MIREES), co-led by the
University of Hawaii and Stevens Institute of Technology, focuses on developing robust research and education programs addressing maritime domain awareness to safeguard populations and properties in geographical areas that present significant security challenges.
5. Center for Visualization and Data Analytics (CVADA), co-led by Purdue University (visualization sciences – VACCINE) and Rutgers University (data sciences – CCICADA), creates the scientific basis and
enduring technologies needed to analyze large quantities of information to detect security threats to the nation.
6. Center of Excellence for Awareness and Localization of Explosives-Related Threats (ALERT), led by
Northeastern University, develops new means and methods to protect the nation from explosives-related threats.
7. Center of Excellence for Zoonotic and Animal Disease Defense (ZADD), co-led by Texas A&M University
and Kansas State University, protects the nation’s agriculture and public health sectors against high- consequence foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic disease threats.
8. Coastal Hazards Center of Excellence (CHC), co-led by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and
Jackson State University, performs research and develops education programs to enhance the nation’s ability to safeguard populations, properties and economies from catastrophic natural disasters.
9. Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence (CRC), led by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
conducts research and education to enhance the Nation’s ability to safeguard people, infrastructure, and economies from catastrophic coastal natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes.
10. Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute (CIRI), led by the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
conducts research and education to enhance the resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and its owners and operators.
11. Food Protection and Defense Institute (FPDI), led by the University of Minnesota, defends the safety and
security of the food system by conducting research to protect vulnerabilities in the food supply chain. FPDI was formerly named the National Center for Food Protection and Defense (NCFPD).
12. Maritime Security Center of Excellence (MSC), led by Stevens Institute of Technology, enhances Maritime
Domain Awareness and develops strategies to support Marine Transportation System resilience and educational programs for current and aspiring homeland security practitioners.
13. National Center for Border Security and Immigration (NCBSI), co-led by the University of Arizona and the
University of Texas at El Paso, develops novel technologies, tools and advanced methods to balance immigration and commerce with effective border security.
14. National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic Event Response (PACER), led by Johns
Hopkins University, optimizes the nation’s medical and public health preparedness, mitigation and recovery strategies in the event of a high-consequence natural or man-made disaster.
15. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), led by the
University of Maryland, provides policy makers and practitioners with empirically grounded findings on the human elements of the terrorist threat and informs decisions on how to disrupt terrorists and terrorist groups.
16. National Transportation Security Center of Excellence (NTSCOE) was established in accordance with
H.R.1, Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, in August 2007. NTSCOE is a seven-institution consortium focused on developing new technologies, tools and advanced methods to defend, protect and increase the resilience of the nation’s multi-modal transportation infrastructure.
405
RDP manages a number of incentive programs and program offices designed to
promote innovation within the private sector. RDP manages the InnoPrize
Program which elicits ideas directly from citizens. [11] The Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) program provides grants to foster small business
research. [12] The Office of SAFETY Act Implementation oversees provisions of the
2002 Homeland Security Act that protects manufacturers or sellers of effective anti
-terrorism technologies from undue litigation. [13] The Technology Transfer
Program Office expedites technology transition from DHS laboratories to
commercial markets. [14] And the Long-Range Broad Agency Announcement
(LBRAA) program manages a standing, open invitation to the scientific and
technical communities to fund pioneering research and development in support of
the nation’s security. [15]
The Office of University Programs manages the Centers of Excellence Program,
Minority Serving Institutions Program, and Workforce Development Initiatives.
The Center of Excellence Program awards three-year grants to colleges and
universities conducting research on priority topics of interest as listed in Table 3.
[16] The Minority Serving Institutions Program is designed to build a diverse
homeland security science and engineering workforce through the Centers of
Excellence. And Workforce Development Initiatives educate and train homeland
security science and engineering students and professionals for the current and
future workforce. [17]
Program Priorities
Funding for the S&T Directorate fell in FY2012 to its lowest level since Congress began
appropriating funding for DHS. The reductions reflected several competing priorities
within the S&T Directorate. One is establishing the appropriate balance between long-
term R&D investments and near-term operational needs. [1, p. 5]
In contrast to other R&D organizations in DHS, the S&T Directorate has a broad scope.
The S&T Directorate bases its priority-setting on DHS mission areas as articulated in the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), the Administration’s National Security
Strategy, and first responder requirements. The directorate derives its priorities and
requirements from assessing near- and long-term threats, national needs, and
operational vulnerabilities. In addition, the S&T Directorate attempts to identify
technical areas suitable for development. [1, p. 7]
Identifying specific priorities, based on these general principles, and then planning and
executing integrated R&D activities to accomplish those priorities remain formidable
tasks. Among the approaches the S&T Directorate has taken toward meeting this
challenge are strategic planning, a portfolio review process, and partnerships with DHS
operational components to identify high priority activities. [1, p. 7]
Chapter 25: S&T
Funding for the S&T
Directorate fell in
FY2012 to its lowest
level since Congress
began appropriating
funding for DHS. The
reductions reflected
several competing
priorities within the S&T
Directorate. One is
establishing the
appropriate balance
between long-term R&D
investments and near-
term operational needs.
406
A significant change in the S&T Directorate’s R&D strategy was the creation in 2011 of
what DHS calls Apex projects. Apex projects aim to solve urgent problems identified by
the head of a DHS operational component. As a consequence, the S&T Directorate
designates Apex projects as high-priority investments. S&T had two Apex projects in
FY2013, and has capacity for a total of three or four simultaneous Apex projects. One
Apex project with the U.S. Secret Service was successfully completed. The other Apex-
like project with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was terminated by mutual
agreement. [1, pp. 12-13]
R&D Projects
S&T projects fall under six primary commodity areas that directly support DHS
component missions and fulfill S&T’s statutory responsibility to support federal, state,
and local first responders:
1. First Responders. These programs expand first responder capabilities and improve
their effectiveness, efficiency, and safety.
2. Borders and Maritime Security. These programs enhance security at the nation’s
borders and upon its waterways without impeding the flow of commerce.
3. Chemical and Biological Defense. These programs develop new and improved
means for detecting, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from
chemical and biological incidents.
4. Cybersecurity. These programs contribute to a safe, secure, and resilient cyber
environment.
Part IV: Mission Components
Figure 25-2: DHS S&T Annual Funding [1, p. 5]
A significant change in
the S&T Directorate’s
R&D strategy was the
creation in 2011 of what
DHS calls Apex projects.
Apex projects aim to
solve urgent problems
identified by the head of
a DHS operational
component.
407
5. Explosives. These programs help protect people and infrastructure from the
devastating effects of explosives.
6. Resilience. These programs improve the nation’s preparedness for natural and
man-made catastrophes. [18, p. 6]
DHS S&T currently manages over 100 R&D projects. The following sections summarize
some of those highlighted in the 2014 S&T Portfolio Review.
First Responder Projects
Multi-Band Radio. Handheld radio that can communicate across several
frequencies and thus enable seamless communications among agencies operating
on different channels.
Land Mobile Radio Bridging System. Recognizing that budget limitations will delay
the integration of a nationwide public safety broadband network in some
communities, this project is developing solutions to maintain interoperability
between older land mobile radio systems and broadband systems.
Wireless Emergency Alerts. Sends geographically targeted notices to mobile
devices notifying citizens of imminent threats and significant events based on their
location.
Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency Response (FINDER). Uses
microwave radar to detect a human heartbeat buried beneath 30 feet of crushed
materials, or 20 feet of solid concrete, or from a distance of 100 feet in open
space.
Virtual USA. Provides First Responders with latest status of power outages, road
closures, traffic incidents, hospitals, shelters, and weather conditions, graphically
depicted on an active map display.
Improved Firefighting Structure Gloves. Firefighter gloves made from new
materials affording enhanced dexterity, water repellency, and fire resistance.
Wildland Firefighter Advanced Personal Protection System. Enhanced gear to
improve heat protection, reduce heat stress, and provide better form, fit, and
function for wildland firefighters.
Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment (EDGE). Multiplayer video game
providing realistic firefighter training in lieu of more expensive full-scale exercises.
Radiological Emergency Management System (REMS). A fixed-site network of
gamma radiation sensors designed for response and recovery after a radiological
or nuclear incident.
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER). The SAVER
program conducts objective assessments of First Responder equipment and
validates that technologies meet responder requirements. [18, pp. 16-21]
Chapter 25: S&T
S&T had two Apex
projects in FY2013, and
has capacity for a total
of three or four
simultaneous Apex
projects.
408
Borders and Maritime Security Projects
Reusable Electronic Conveyance Security Devices (RECONS). Technology to detect
unauthorized intrusion into cargo containers and provide real-time tracking of
cargo through the supply chain.
Mobile Surveillance System Upgrade (MSS-U). Improved automated target
detection and tracking to reduce false alarms up to 97 percent in winds greater
than 15 mph, thereby allowing operation in inclement weather.
Pollen Forensics. Rapid and cost-effective means for identifying pollen samples to
help determine a cargo’s country of origin to better enforce trade compliance.
Coastal Surveillance System (CSS). Advanced detection, identification, and tracking
capabilities along the maritime borders for rapid, coordinated response to
maritime anomalies and threats. [18, pp. 27-28]
Chemical and Biological Defense Projects
Biological Terrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA). Develop improved means for
assessing biological threats and recommending mitigation strategies.
Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment (CTRA). Provide comprehensive analysis of
homeland security risks associated with a broad range of chemical threat agents.
Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment (ITRA). A management tool to help maintain
the quality and availability of essential drugs in the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS).
Detect-to-Protect (D2P) Program. Develop advanced bio-sensors capable of
rapidly identifying harmful biological organisms and determining their rate of
spread.
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) Vaccine Project. Develop improved FMD vaccine
that doesn’t carry the risk of current vaccines made from live FMD virus. [18, pp.
29-31]
Cybersecurity Projects
Defense Technology Experimental Research (DETER). A testbed for evaluating
emerging and advanced cybersecurity technologies.
Rapid Prototyping. The Cyber Forensics Working Group works with law
enforcement to rapidly prototype forensic analysis tools useful for cyber crime
investigations.
Transition to Practice (TTP). Assists with rapidly deploying cybersecurity
technologies developed in Federal research laboratories. [18, pp. 32-33]
Part IV: Mission Components
409
Explosive Countermeasures
Homemade Explosive Emulators. Simulated explosive devices to assist with safely
training canine detection teams.
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint (NexGen). Development of phase-based
imaging and X-ray diffraction technologies for improved detection of Homemade
Explosive Devices (HMEs) and liquid-based explosives in passenger carry-on items.
[18, pp. 34-35]
Resilience Projects
Actionable Indicators and Countermeasures Project. Program to more efficiently
and accurately evaluate threats posed by violent extremists by developing an
integrated database based on analysis of terrorist disengagement, re-engagement,
and recidivism.
Resilient Tunnel Project (RTP). An inflatable balloon capable of plugging a tunnel
and making a seal to prevent flooding.
Inherently Fault Current Limiting, High Temperature Superconducting (IFCL-HTS)
Cable. A new cable that allows electric distribution networks to interconnect and
share power while eliminating the risk of cascading faults. [18, pp. 35-36]
HSARPA Apex Programs
Border Enforcement Analytics Program (BEAP). Mines multiple, disparate data sets
to generate investigative leads related to export enforcement and counter
proliferation.
Air Entry and Exit Re-Engineering (AEER). Program to develop next-generation
airport screening technology. [18, p. 26]
Chapter 25: S&T
410
Conclusion
Both congressional and executive branch policy makers assert that science and
technology play significant roles in improving homeland security. Congress established
the Directorate of Science and Technology within the Department of Homeland
Security to ensure that DHS has access to science and technology advice and research
and development capabilities. DHS supports both short- and long-term R&D activities.
However, successful R&D activities may not result in a deployable product for many
years. The S&T Directorate and other DHS offices have not developed technological
advances at the rate some Members of Congress expected. Since the establishment of
DHS, the appropriations committees have often expressed displeasure at the rate of
technology transfer, the direction of R&D efforts, and the ability of the S&T Directorate
to align its resources and mission. In a time of increasing fiscal constraint, some
Members have questioned whether S&T Directorate R&D activities should receive
priority over other non-R&D activities. [1, p. 1]
Part IV: Mission Components
411
Chapter 25: S&T
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the Science and Technology Directorate?
2. Which S&T component is developing technologies for first responders?
3. Which S&T component is focused on transitioning technology to the field?
4. Which S&T center of excellence is researching critical infrastructure resilience?
5. Which S&T center of excellence is researching plant and animal diseases?
6. Which R&D project is developing gear to reduce heat stress on wildland firefighters?
7. Which R&D project is developing devices to detect unauthorized intrusion of shipping containers?
8. Which R&D project is developing a foot-and-mouth vaccine?
9. Which R&D project is developing a next generation passenger checkpoint?
10. Which R&D project is developing a balloon to prevent tunnels from flooding?
412
Part IV: Mission Components
413
Chapter 26: DNDO
Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 26
Learning Outcomes
414
“The Office shall be responsible for coordinating Federal efforts to detect and protect
against the unauthorized importation, possession, storage, transportation,
development, or use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material, or radiological
material in the United States, and to protect against attack using such devices or
materials against the people, territory, or interests of the United States.”
- 2006 SAFE Port Act
Introduction
In 2005, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established within the
Department of Homeland Security to centralize coordination of the federal response to
an unconventional nuclear threat. The office was codified in 2006 through the passage
of the SAFE Port Act (P.L. 109-347) and given specific statutory responsibilities to
protect the United States against radiological and nuclear attack, including the
responsibility to develop a “global nuclear detection architecture.” Determining the
range of existing federal efforts protecting against nuclear attack, coordinating the
outcomes of these efforts, identifying overlaps and gaps between them, and
integrating the results into a single architecture are likely to be evolving, ongoing tasks.
[1, p. ii]
Mission
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is a jointly staffed office within the Department
of Homeland Security. DNDO is the primary entity in the U.S. government for
implementing domestic nuclear detection efforts for a managed and coordinated
response to radiological and nuclear threats, as well as integration of federal nuclear
forensics programs. Additionally, DNDO is charged with coordinating the development
of the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture, with partners from federal,
state, local, and international governments and the private sector. [2]
Organization
The Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is appointed by the President,
but reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The DNDO is comprised of seven
directorates:
Architecture and Plans Directorate - Determines gaps and vulnerabilities in the
existing global nuclear detection architecture, then formulates recommendations
and plans to develop an enhanced architecture.
Product Acquisition & Deployment Directorate - Carries out the engineering
development, production, developmental logistics, procurement and deployment
of current and next-generation nuclear detection systems.
Part IV: Mission Components
DNDO is the primary
entity in the U.S.
government for
implementing domestic
nuclear detection efforts
for a managed and
coordinated response to
radiological and nuclear
threats, as well as
integration of federal
nuclear forensics
programs.
415
Transformational & Applied Research Directorate - Conducts, supports,
coordinates, and encourages an aggressive, long-term research and development
program to address significant architectural and technical challenges unresolved by
research and development efforts on the near horizon.
Operations Support Directorate - Develops the information sharing and analytical
tools necessary to create a fully integrated operating environment. Residing in the
Operations Support Directorate is the Joint Analysis Center, which is an
interagency coordination and reporting mechanism and central monitoring point
for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
Systems Engineering & Evaluation Directorate - Ensures that DNDO proposes
sound technical solutions and thoroughly understands systems performance and
potential vulnerabilities prior to deploying those technologies.
Red Team & Net Assessments - Independently assesses the operational
performance of planned and deployed capabilities, including technologies,
procedures, and protocols.
National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center - Provides national-level stewardship,
centralized planning and integration for an enduring national technical nuclear
forensics capability. [2]
Chapter 26: DNDO
Figure 26-1: DNDO Organization [3]
The Director of the
Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office is
appointed by the
President, but reports to
the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
416
Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials
Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM), plutonium, and
certain types of uranium, is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and
to securing weapons and materials worldwide. [4, p. ii] A key research objective is to
reduce the number of “false positives” and “false negatives” inherent in current
detection devices. False positives indicating the presence of nuclear materials when
they are not there impede the flow of commerce and undermine confidence in the
devices themselves. Conversely, false negatives indicate the absence of nuclear
materials when they are present, ultimately failing in their task of thwarting the
movement of illicit agents. [4, p. 19] It is because of these shortcomings that research
and development (R&D) into improved technologies is an active and ongoing concern.
Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces suspect signatures that can be
detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons.
SNM is dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph (a picture like a medical x-
ray) when x-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden.
Using lead or other shielding to attenuate gamma rays would make that image larger.
Nuclear weapons produce detectable signatures, such as radiation or a noticeable
image on a radiograph. Other detection techniques are also available. [4, p. ii]
Eight technologies illustrate the detection portfolio:
A new scintillator material to improve detector performance and lower cost. This
project was terminated in January 2010.
GADRAS, an application using multiple algorithms to determine the materials in a
container by analyzing gamma-ray spectra. If materials are the “eyes and ears” of
detectors, algorithms are the “brains.”
A project to simulate large numbers of experiments to improve detection system
performance.
Two Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems (CAARS) to detect high-
density material based on the principle that it becomes less transparent to
photons of higher energy, unlike other material.
A third CAARS to detect material with a high atomic number (Z, number of protons
in an atom’s nucleus) based on the principle that Z affects how material scatters
photons. This project was terminated in March 2009.
A system to generate a 3-D image of the contents of a container based on the
principle that Z and density strongly affect the degree to which muons (a
subatomic particle) scatter.
Part IV: Mission Components
Nuclear weapons
contain special nuclear
material (SNM),
plutonium, and certain
types of uranium, which
produce suspect
signatures that can be
detected. SNM emits
radiation, notably
gamma rays (high-
energy photons) and
neutrons. SNM is dense,
so it produces a bright
image on a radiograph
(a picture like a medical
x-ray) when x-rays or
gamma rays are
beamed through a
container in which it is
hidden.
417
Nuclear resonance fluorescence imaging to identify materials based on the
spectrum of gamma rays a nucleus emits when struck by photons of a specific
energy.
The Photonuclear Inspection and Threat Assessment System to detect SNM up to 1
km away, unlike other systems that operate at very close range. It would beam
high energy photons at distant targets to stimulate fission in SNM, producing
characteristic signatures that may be detected.
These technologies are selected not because they are necessarily the “best” in their
categories, but rather to show a variety of approaches, in differing stages of maturity,
performed by different types of organizations, relying on different physical principles,
and covering building blocks (materials, algorithms, models) as well as systems, so as
to convey many points on the spectrum of detection technology development. [4, p. ii]
From these examples it becomes apparent that it is difficult to predict the schedule or
capabilities of new detection technologies. It is easier and less costly to accelerate a
program in R&D than in production. [4, p. ii] Making the tough choices which
technologies to back and how best to implement them is a problem for the global
nuclear detection architecture.
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
The U.S. government has implemented a series of programs to protect the nation
against terrorist nuclear attack. Some of these programs predate 9/11, while others
were established since then. Most programs are within the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission; the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State; and agencies that
became part of DHS upon its creation, and they are focused on detecting the illicit
acquisition and shipment of nuclear and radiological materials and protecting and
securing nuclear weapons. [1, p. ii]
The 2006 SAFE Port Act that created DNDO requires it to establish an “enhanced global
nuclear detection architecture.” [1, p. 3] The global nuclear detection architecture is a
multi-layered system of detection technologies, programs, and guidelines designed to
enhance the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack.
Among its components are existing programs in nuclear detection operated by other
federal agencies and new programs put into place by DNDO. The global nuclear
detection architecture as developed by DNDO in coordination with other federal
agencies implementing nuclear detection efforts and this coordination is essential to
the success of the architecture. [1, p. ii]
Chapter 26: DNDO
The 2006 SAFE Port Act
that created DNDO
requires it to establish
an “enhanced global
nuclear detection
architecture.” The global
nuclear detection
architecture is a multi-
layered system of
detection technologies,
programs, and
guidelines designed to
enhance the nation’s
ability to detect and
prevent a radiological or
nuclear attack.
418
The current global nuclear detection architecture includes programs at DHS, the
Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of
State (DOS), and other agencies. According to DHS, before the formation of DNDO
these programs were “a disparate patchwork of systems, distributed and implemented
in recent years across multiple departments, jurisdictions and locations without any
degree of coordination.” The DNDO has organized these programs into a global nuclear
detection architecture framework, a combined system of systems, which relies heavily
on its technological component. The deployment of radiation detectors at points of
entry, commercial ports, and other border crossings is key to its effectiveness. [1, p. 4]
Although much focus has been given to technologies to detect nuclear or radiological
material that have been developed or procured by DNDO, the global nuclear detection
architecture encompasses more than just these sensors. Other elements include site
security of known nuclear or radiological material, use of sensor data to inform
decision makers, effective reaction to a detection event, and interdiction following
detection. According to the Government Accountability Office, “combating nuclear
smuggling requires an integrated approach that includes equipment, proper training of
border security personnel in the use of radiation detection equipment, and intelligence
gathering on potential nuclear smuggling operations.” Other experts have concluded
that the deployment of radiation detectors needs to be highly integrated with other
federal efforts, prioritized on identified threats, configured for flexibility and efficiency,
and organized as a global approach including international institutions. [1, p. 4]
A layered, defense-in-depth approach to a global nuclear detection architecture was
recommended by the Defense Science Board when considering how to protect DOD
assets against unconventional nuclear threats. Successful application of a layered
defense provides multiple opportunities to detect and interdict threats. According to
DNDO, “It is recognized that no single layer of protection can ever be one hundred
percent successful,” and a layered defense strategy acknowledges this difficulty. If one
sublayer fails to detect a threat, the next may succeed. [1, p. 6]
This increase in the likelihood of detection occurs in two different ways. In one case, a
threat may avoid the detector in an outer layer, but then encounter a detector in an
inner layer. In this case, having more detection opportunities makes it more likely that
a detector is encountered. An example of this approach could be the use of detection
technology at U.S. borders coupled with random truck screening at weigh stations on
interstate highways. [1, p. 6]
Part IV: Mission Components
The global nuclear
detection architecture
encompasses more than
just sensors. Other
elements include site
security of known
nuclear or radiological
material, use of sensor
data to inform decision
makers, effective
reaction to a detection
event, and interdiction
following detection.
419
Accordingly, the DNDO has attempted to align existing federal programs so that their
capabilities can be compared and integrated into an organizing framework that can
help identify gaps and duplication. This framework consists of three partially
overlapping layers with nine sub-layers as shown in Figure 2. [1, p. 4]
The layers are distinguished geographically: interior, border, and exterior. The overlap
between the exterior and border layers may make analysis of priorities between and
within the layers more difficult. The sublayers correspond mainly to conceptual steps
in the transportation of a threat object to a target. [1, p. 5]
Chapter 26: DNDO
Figure 26-2: Layers of the Nuclear Detection Architecture [1, p. 5]
420
The global nuclear detection architecture has a broad, international scope, so
implementing it is difficult. Multiple agency initiatives and programs must be relied on
to achieve the architecture’s goals, and its effectiveness is dependent on many factors
outside of DNDO’s direct authority and control. [1, p. 5]
A significant advantage to establishing a global nuclear detection architecture is that it
provides a framework for analysis of the overall effectiveness of federal nuclear
detection efforts. Thus the performance of programs in each layer of the architecture
can be measured and judged within the context of the overall structure rather than in
isolation. In this way, effectiveness and efficiency can be maximized for the
architecture overall rather than for each program individually. [1, p. 7]
By categorizing existing programs in this architecture, DNDO can analyze federal
nuclear detection capabilities, identifying gaps and vulnerabilities through which a
potential adversary might be able to avoid detection. These gaps may be filled by
redirecting existing efforts, increasing existing efforts, deploying available technology,
and implementing research and development programs that develop solutions to such
gaps. [1, p. 5]
Priority Setting
Gaps and vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture, depending on
their nature, may be addressed now or in the future. In some cases, no solutions to
these gaps and vulnerabilities are currently available, and a solution will need to be
identified through research and development. The DNDO has stated that “there are
still key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection architecture that
require long-range, higher risk research programs that will need to be evaluated in
terms of risk reduction, direct and indirect costs, operational feasibility, and other
relevant decision factors.” In other cases, the available near-term solution is an
incremental improvement over existing approaches. In these cases, policymakers must
decide whether to invest in a near-term, potentially incomplete solution; accept the
presence of a gap or vulnerability and invest in a long-term program to develop a more
complete solution; or do both. Choosing between these options requires an
understanding of the risk posed by the existing vulnerabilities, the benefits available
through the near- and long-term options, and their relative costs. [1, p. 10]
Part IV: Mission Components
Gaps and vulnerabilities
in the global nuclear
detection architecture,
depending on their
nature, may be
addressed now or in the
future. In some cases,
no solutions to these
gaps and vulnerabilities
are currently available,
and a solution will need
to be identified through
research and
development.
421
Decision makers are faced with difficult choices when setting priorities for
implementing the global nuclear detection architecture. In the case of existing
programs, incremental increases in the performance of a system may be challenged on
the basis of their perceived costs and benefits. In the case of new programs, questions
may arise about whether the effort expended on a new program would have provided
more benefits if applied elsewhere. Finally, given that improvement of the global
nuclear detection architecture is a multi-year project, one must determine which
portion of the architecture to focus on at any given time. [1, p. 10]
A likely benefit of casting federal efforts at nuclear detection into the framework of a
global architecture is the ability to prioritize, in a quantitative or qualitative fashion,
across programs. Even without a rigorous method to discriminate finely between the
results of different investments, the global nuclear detection architecture may be able
to provide a rank ordering of vulnerabilities and gaps, and thus a rank ordering of
investment priorities. Thus, it may provide an interagency tool to analyze current
technology options and R&D investments relative to the federal government’s
detection needs. [1, p. 10]
Interagency Coordination
As well as developing the global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO is also
responsible for coordinating the activities of other federal agencies whose programs
make up the global nuclear detection architecture. For the architecture to be
successful, substantial interagency coordination must occur on the operational and
policy levels. [1, p. 11]
Congress recognized the need for DNDO to have access to specific talent resident in
other agencies. The SAFE Port Act authorizes the DHS Secretary to “request that the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the directors of other Federal
agencies, including elements of the Intelligence Community, provide for the
reimbursable detail of personnel with relevant expertise to [DNDO].” Under this
authority and that of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), DNDO has established
a significant interagency workforce, including personnel from DOD, DOE, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, as well as intra-agency personnel from the Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Transportation Security
Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard. [1, pp. 11-12]
Chapter 26: DNDO
As well as developing
the global nuclear
detection architecture,
DNDO is also
responsible for
coordinating the
activities of other
federal agencies whose
programs make up the
global nuclear detection
architecture.
422
The DNDO uses the detailees and IPAs as part of its coordinating function. By using
these experts as conduits back to their agencies, DNDO is able to draw on the expertise
and address the needs and concerns of these agencies. The DNDO also has established
a more senior policy coordinating body, the Interagency Coordination Council, to
address higher level policy issues and further coordinate activities between agencies,
but the extent to which this body is able to implement and develop new policy for the
participating agencies is not known. The Interagency Coordination Council was
reportedly used to develop the deployment strategy for the global nuclear detection
architecture and studies of maritime and aviation threats. [1, p. 12]
The DNDO also has implemented an Advisory Council consisting of officials from other
DHS components. The DNDO uses the Advisory Council to solicit the opinions of and
resolve intra-agency issues within DHS. [1, p. 12]
Beyond the interagency activities organized within DNDO, coordination of DNDO
activities with other portions of the federal government occurs within the White House
through the Domestic Nuclear Defense Policy Coordinating Committee. This joint policy
coordination body was created jointly by the Homeland Security Council and the
National Security Council and provides a high-level forum for the generation of
guidance and coordination among federal agencies with responsibilities for nuclear
defense, detection, and interdiction. Other interagency planning activities, such as
coordination of long-term research and development, occur through subcommittees of
the National Science and Technology Council. [1, pp. 12-13]
Part IV: Mission Components
Beyond the interagency
activities organized
within DNDO,
coordination of DNDO
activities with other
portions of the federal
government occurs
within the White House
through the Domestic
Nuclear Defense Policy
Coordinating
Committee.
423
Conclusion
The DNDO aims to improve “the probability of detection by integrating and deploying
current technologies, continually improving these technologies through both near-
term enhancements and transformational research and development, and expanding
detection capabilities at the Federal, State and local levels.” In expanding and
improving the global nuclear detection architecture, DNDO and other participating
agencies are faced with a temporal choice. Vulnerabilities and gaps identified through
the global nuclear detection architecture could be reduced by applying immediately
available technologies that provide a partial solution or by investing in research and
development to develop technologies that will provide a more complete solution in
the long-term. [1, p. 16] Determining the optimal process for creating a robust global
nuclear detection architecture, understanding the capabilities of near- and long-term
technology and their potential effect on the global nuclear detection architecture, and
assessing the adequacy of the metrics used to measure the risk reduction benefits
present significant challenges. The success of DNDO’s activities will require ongoing
evaluation and oversight into the future. [1, p. 17]
Chapter 26: DNDO
424
Part IV: Mission Components
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office?
2. Which DNDO component looks for gaps and vulnerabilities in the global nuclear detection architecture?
3. Which DNDO component conducts and supports long-term research and development?
4. Which DNDO component analyzes proposed solutions to make certain they are technically sound?
5. What is “special nuclear material” and how can it be detected?
6. Why are sensors by themselves insufficient for monitoring and detecting special nuclear material?
7. What is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and why was it created?
8. Why is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture organized into a layered defense?
9. Why is the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture incomplete?
10. Who owns and operates the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture?
425
Chapter 27: I&A
Intelligence &
Analysis
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 27
Learning Outcomes
426
“Earlier in this report we detailed various missed opportunities to thwart the 9/11 plot.
Information was not shared, sometimes inadvertently or because of legal
misunderstandings. Analysis was not pooled. Effective operations were not launched.
Often the handoffs of information were lost across the divide separating the foreign
and domestic agencies of the government.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department’s intelligence
component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance
through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR
reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis;
information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state,
local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. [1, p. ii]
Background
At the outset, the mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was to
“prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the
United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from
terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has
had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the
U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). [1, p. ii]
Following the Second Stage Review (2SR) reorganization in July 2005, former Secretary
of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff established a strengthened Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence
Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is
coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common
operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole;
and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector
partners. [1, p. ii]
After the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for
intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration;
and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. [2]
Part IV: Mission Components
The mission of the Office
of Intelligence and
Analysis is to equip the
Homeland Security
Enterprise with the
intelligence and
information it needs to
keep the homeland safe,
secure, and resilient.
427
As part of the department-wide intelligence integration initiative, I&A today serves as
the central coordinator for the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE). The DHS IE
consists of those elements within DHS that have an intelligence mission. These include
I&A, the Office of Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA), and the Intelligence Division
of the Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (all located at the DHS
headquarters), and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). [1, p. ii]
Mission
The mission of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis is to equip the Homeland Security
Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe,
secure, and resilient. [3]
Organization
I&A is led by an Under Secretary, a position subject to Senate confirmation. The Under
Secretary also serves as the department’s Chief Intelligence Officer (CINT). [1, p. 8] The
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis directly manages four major offices:
1. State & Local Program Office (SLPO). The SLPO serves in the central coordination
role for DHS interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs). [4, p. 3]
2. Enterprise & Mission Support (EMS). EMS is responsible for homeland security
intelligence integration activities; policies governing enterprise-wide production
and standardization of reports; the I&A Strategic Plan; training, and the
implementation of a comprehensive information systems architecture. [2, p. 13]
3. Analysis. The Analysis Office is responsible for the analytic mission of I&A. The
office has been focused on five “analytic thrusts” aligned with the principal threats
to the Homeland: 1) border security, including narcotics trafficking, alien and
human smuggling, and money laundering; 2) radicalization and extremism;
particular groups entering the United States that could be exploited by terrorists or
criminals; 3) critical infrastructure and key resources; and 4) weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and 5) health threats. [2, pp. 8-9]
4. Plans, Policy, & Performance Management (PPPM). PPPM is responsible for
developing an effective department-wide operations planning and coordination
capability to support DHS integration. In short, the key function of PPPM is the
application of intelligence research and analysis to conditions on the ground that
must be considered for effective planning and operations and the development of
a Common Intelligence Picture (CIP)1[2, pp. 18-19]
Chapter 27: I&A
1DHS is mute on the current internal organization of I&A. The specific responsibilities of EMS, Analysis, and PPPM are inferred from functions
ascribed to previous I&A components as cited.
Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis
directly manages four
major offices:
1. State & Local
Program Office
2. Enterprise &
Mission Support
3. Analysis Office
4. Plans, Policy, &
Performance
Management
428
Homeland Security Intelligence
Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between “domestic intelligence”—
primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States—and
“foreign intelligence”— primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected
outside the country. Today, threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are now
national security threats. Intelligence collected outside the United States is often very
relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa. [6, p. ii]
Although the activities involved in homeland security intelligence (HSINT) itself are not
new, the relative importance of state, local, and private sector stakeholders; the
awareness of how law enforcement information might protect national security; and
the importance attached to homeland security intelligence have all increased
substantially since the events of 9/11. [6, p. ii]
There are numerous intelligence collection disciplines through which the U.S.
Intelligence Community collects intelligence to support informed national security
decision-making at the national level and the allocation of tactical military and law
enforcement resources at the local level. The collection disciplines are generally
referred to as those which fall within national technical means or non-technical means.
Technical means include signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signatures
intelligence (MASINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Nontechnical means include
human intelligence (HUMINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT). Each of these
collection disciplines is source-specific—that is, a technical platform or human source,
generally managed by an agency or mission manager, collects intelligence that is used
for national intelligence purposes. [6, p. ii]
Part IV: Mission Components
Figure 27-1: DHS Office of Intelligence & Analysis Organization Chart [5]
Prior to 9/11, it was
possible to make a
distinction between
“domestic
intelligence”—primarily
law enforcement
information collected
within the United
States—and “foreign
intelligence”— primarily
military, political, and
economic intelligence
collected outside the
country.
429
HSINT, however, is generally not source specific, as it includes both national technical
and nontechnical means of collection. For example, HSINT includes human intelligence
collected by federal border security personnel or state and local law enforcement
officials, as well as SIGINT collected by the National Security Agency (NSA). Reasonable
individuals can differ, therefore, with respect to the question of whether HSINT is
another collection discipline, or whether homeland security is simply another purpose
for which the current set of collection disciplines is being harnessed. Homeland
security information, as defined by the 2002 Homeland Security Act, pertains directly
to (1) terrorist intentions and capabilities to attack people and infrastructure within the
United States, and (2) U.S. abilities to deter, prevent, and respond to potential terrorist
attacks. [6, p. ii]
I&A Intelligence Processing
To accomplish its mission, I&A participates in all aspects of the intelligence cycle“ – the
process by which information is acquired, converted into finished intelligence, and
made available to policymakers. Generally the cycle comprises five steps: planning and
direction, collection, processing, analysis, and production and dissemination.” It is an
iterative process in which collection requirements based on national security threats
are developed, and intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated to a broad
range of consumers. [1, p. 5]
Intelligence planning and direction is guided by a Program of Analysis (POA) that is
framed as Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs). I&A KIQs are organized by time frame:
Immediate and Ongoing Threat KIQs focus on short term or operational issues such
as imminent terrorist threats to the homeland. Production that addresses these
threats provides the Administration and DHS leadership with the intelligence
analysis to better inform near-term operational decision to increase the nation’s
security.
Strategic Context KIQs focus on providing context, trend, or pattern analysis.
Production that addresses these KIQs helps customers understand recent threats
in a broader, global, or historical perspective and they shape strategies to combat
the threats or address gaps in homeland security. These would include, for
example, how the evolving cartel-related violence in Mexico compares to past
cartel wars or how threats to our national infrastructure are changing.
Opportunity KIQs focus on emerging issues or topics for which reporting streams
are new or fragmentary; for example, these KIQs may describe the kinds of polices
or activities that have been effective in combating newly emerging threats. [7]
Chapter 27: I&A
Although the activities
involved in homeland
security intelligence
(HSINT) itself are not
new, the relative
importance of state,
local, and private sector
stakeholders are new.
430
Key Intelligence Questions subsequently inform Homeland Security Standing
Information Needs (HSEC SINs). These form the foundation for information collection
activities within the Department and provide other Intelligence Community and
Homeland Security Enterprise members the ability to focus their collection, analytic,
and reporting assets in support of the homeland security mission. The HSEC SINs are
updated and published annually to ensure the information needs of the Homeland
Security Enterprise are continuously collected, identified, and documented. [7]
DHS does not generally engage in traditional intelligence collection activities. For the
most part, I&A is the recipient of intelligence data received from components of the
DHS Intelligence Enterprise and the broader Intelligence Community.
DHS Intelligence Enterprise
I&A is the recipient of intelligence data collected by DHS components with an
intelligence mission integral to performing their primary function.
The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) within the DHS National
Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), formerly the Homeland Infrastructure
Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), is responsible for protecting the nation’s
critical infrastructure from both physical and cyber threats. OCIA conducts integrated
analysis of critical infrastructure to identify threats that could have catastrophic
impacts to public health and safety, the economy, and national security. Accordingly,
OCIA 1) Provides analytic support to DHS leadership, operational components, and
field personnel during steady-state and crises on emerging threats and incidents
impacting the nation’s critical infrastructure; 2) Assesses and informs national
infrastructure risk management strategies on the likelihood and consequence of
emerging and future risks; and 3) Develops and enhances capabilities to support crisis
action by identifying and prioritizing infrastructure through the use of analytic tools
and modeling capabilities. [8]
The Office of Operations Coordination manages the DHS National Operations Center
(NOC), a 24-hour center responsible for monitoring and responding to homeland
security threats against the nation. The NOC provides real-time situational awareness
and monitoring of the homeland, coordinates incidents and response activities, and, in
conjunction with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, issues advisories and bulletins
concerning threats to homeland security, as well as specific protective measures. The
NOC coordinates information sharing to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts
and to manage domestic incidents. Information on domestic incident management is
shared with Emergency Operations Centers at all levels through the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN). [9]
Part IV: Mission Components
DHS does not generally
engage in traditional
intelligence collection
activities. For the most
part, I&A is the recipient
of intelligence data
received from
components of the DHS
Intelligence Enterprise
and the broader
Intelligence Community.
431
U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP is the agency responsible for securing the
nation’s borders at and between ports of entry (POE). CBP accomplishes its various
missions by inspecting persons and goods to determine if they are authorized to enter
the United States. CBP officers and Border Patrol agents intercept illegal narcotics,
firearms, counterfeit merchandise, and other types of contraband. They also interdict
unauthorized aliens and enforce more than 400 laws and regulations at the border.
CBP intelligence operations are designed to support the full range of CBP missions,
particularly its primary mission of preventing the entry of terrorists and the
instruments of terrorism. CBP gathers and analyzes large amounts of data concerning
persons and cargo inbound to the U.S. as well as information derived from the
apprehensions of illegal aliens, drug seizures, and other border enforcement activities.
All of this data is a unique source of operational intelligence that is potentially very
useful to I&A and other Federal agencies with national security missions. CBP
coordinates its intelligence activities through its Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination (OIOC). [1, pp. 20-22]
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ICE is the largest investigative
organization within DHS. ICE’s mission is to enforce trade and immigration laws
through the investigation of activities, persons and events that may pose a threat to
the safety or security of the United States and its people. ICE also investigates illegal
trafficking in weapons (including weapons of mass destruction), the smuggling of
narcotics and other contraband, human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering
and other financial crimes, fraudulent trade practices, identity and benefit fraud, child
pornography, child sex tourism, and health and public safety dangers. ICE’s intelligence
activities are coordinated and managed within its Office of Intelligence. The office is
responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating strategic and tactical
intelligence for use by the operational elements of ICE and DHS. [1, pp. 28-29]
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). USCIS oversees lawful immigration
to the United States. USCIS is not a law enforcement agency nor a member of the IC
and the vast majority of its funding is derived from fees collected from immigration
benefit applicants and petitioners. Thus its activities are limited to adjudication of
immigration benefits, which includes conducting background checks on the individuals
and organizations who submit applications and petitions, as well as the intended
beneficiaries. As part of that process, USCIS collects biometrics, in the form of digital
photographs and fingerprints. On average each day, USCIS processes 30,000
applications for immigration benefits, issues 7,300 Permanent Resident Cards (Green
Cards), adjudicates 400 refugee applications, and naturalizes 3,400 new civilian citizens
and 30 new citizens who are member of the U.S. Armed Forces. USCIS also has the
authority to detect and combat immigration fraud. In 2004, USCIS established the
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS). Within FDNS, there is an
Intelligence Branch that manages the analysis, reporting, production, and
dissemination of immigration-based intelligence products. Those products are
Chapter 27: I&A
432
designed to focus on the identification of fraud trends or vulnerabilities that are being
exploited in the immigration benefits processes while also enhancing national security
efforts. Intelligence Research Specialists within the branch conduct research and
analysis to identify previously unknown links, associations, emerging trends,
correlations, anomalies, and indications and warnings with national security or public
security threat implications. [1, pp. 34-36]
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The TSA is most commonly known for its
aviation security role, particularly the security screening of airline passengers and their
baggage. However, TSA is also responsible for security in all modes of transportation –
aviation, maritime, mass transit, highway and motor carrier, freight rail, and pipeline.
The size of the transportation sector in the United States makes it impossible for the
Federal government to provide security for all modes. The exception is the commercial
aviation sector. But, TSA does provide threat and other intelligence information to
support security programs for each sector. In addition, TSA collaborates with industry
and government operators and other stakeholders to develop strategies, policies, and
programs to reduce security risks and vulnerabilities within each mode. Finally, it seeks
to enhance capabilities to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist attacks and respond to
and recover from attacks and security incidents, should they occur. The Assistant
Secretary for TSA is responsible “to receive, assess, and distribute intelligence
information related to transportation security and to assess threats specifically related
to transportation. The TSA intelligence function is centered in its Office of Intelligence
(TSA-OI) and led by an Assistant Administrator for Intelligence. [1, pp. 36-37]
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG is a military, multi-mission, maritime service
that is the “principal Federal agency responsible for safety, security, and stewardship
within the maritime domain. These missions are performed in any maritime region
where those interests may be at risk, including international waters and America’s
coasts, ports, and inland waterways. Given a range of complex and ambiguous threats,
the Coast Guard places a premium on knowledge and shared understanding of the
maritime domain. This knowledge and shared understanding is termed “maritime
domain awareness” and is defined as “the effective understanding of anything
associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety,
economy, or environment of the United States.” The achievement of maritime domain
awareness is, therefore, the principal objective of the USCG intelligence program. It is a
collaborative effort—especially between the USCG and U.S. Navy—and also with DHS
components, such as CBP and ICE, other Federal agencies, and the broader maritime
community. Coast Guard intelligence collection begins at the port level and
encompasses the entire maritime domain and features maritime surveillance activities
by patrol aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, shore-based radar, and shipboard sensors
including radar and passive electronic surveillance systems. The Coast Guard
Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) is the national-level coordinator for collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination of Coast Guard intelligence. It is the focal point
Part IV: Mission Components
I&A combines the
unique information
collected by DHS
components as part of
their operational
activities with foreign
intelligence from the IC;
law enforcement
information from
Federal, state, local, and
tribal sources; private
sector data about
critical infrastructure
and key resources; and
information from
domestic open sources
to develop homeland
security intelligence.
433 Chapter 27: I&A
of interaction with the intelligence components of other government entities such as
the Department of Defense and Federal law enforcement agencies at the national
level. The ICC is co-located with the U.S. Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence at the
National Maritime Intelligence Center in Suitland, Maryland. [1, pp. 43-46]
U.S. Secret Service (USSS). The USSS is best known for its responsibility to protect the
President and Vice President of the United States and visiting foreign heads of state
and government. Additionally, the USSS is responsible for maintaining the integrity of
the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems. The USSSS Protective
intelligence and Assessment Division (PID) is responsible for evaluating, disseminating,
and maintaining information concerning subjects (individuals and groups) and activities
that pose a known, potential, or perceived threat to persons, property, and events
protected by the USSS; investigating those subjects and activities; and conducting
protective intelligence ‘advances’ preceding protectee travel. The PID includes the
National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) which uses historical information,
investigative records, interviews, and other primary source material to produce long-
term behavioral research studies that leverage USSS expertise in the protection of
persons for homeland security or public safety purposes. [1, pp. 48-50]
I&A Intelligence Products
I&A combines the unique information collected by DHS components as part of their
operational activities (e.g., at airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign
intelligence from the IC; law enforcement information from Federal, state, local, and
tribal sources; private sector data about critical infrastructure and key resources; and
information from domestic open sources to develop homeland security intelligence.
This encompasses a broad range of homeland security threats. It includes border
security information to counter human smuggling and trafficking, cargo data to
prevent the introduction of dangerous items, information to protect critical
infrastructure against all hazards, information about infectious diseases, and
demographic data and other research about ‘violent radicalization. [1, p. 5]
I&A produces numerous products for its customers. In 2008, there was a realignment
and standardization of the I&A finished intelligence product line which now include:
Homeland Security Threat Assessment (HSTA). This is an annual threat assessment
that represents the analytical judgments of DHS and assesses the major threats to
the homeland for which the nation must prepare and respond. This includes the
actions, capabilities, and intentions of domestic and foreign terrorists and
extremists and the possible occurrence of systemic threats. It focuses on domestic
extremists, international terrorists operating in the homeland or directing attacks
against it, and systemic threats such as pandemics and transnational criminal
organizations. The HSTA is produced in classified and “Unclassified/For Official Use
Only” versions.
I&A produces numerous
products for its
customers.
434
Intelligence Warning. Contains urgent intelligence.
Intelligence Note. Contains timely information or analysis on a current topic.
Homeland Security Assessment. Consists of in-depth analysis on a topic.
Homeland Security Monitors. These are produced monthly in collaboration with
the components and may be classified or unclassified. Examples include:
Border Security Monitor
Cyber Security Monitor
Cuba-Gram
Reference Aids. These are less analytical and more descriptive. For example, they
might describe what an anthrax lab looks like or the latest on improvised explosive
devices (IED) and fuses. They contain photos and diagrams and inform law
enforcement and first responders what to look for and what actions to take if they
are encountered.
Joint Homeland Security Assessment/FBI Intelligence Bulletin. These are joint
reports done in conjunction with the FBI. [1, pp. 9-10]
I&A also produces Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIR) which contain information that
has yet to be fully evaluated. These are similar to the Intelligence Information Report
(IIR) produced by other IC agencies. An HIR could contain information related to border
encounters, information shared by a state or local fusion center, or other information
of homeland security interest. There are also Homeland Security Intelligence Reports
(HSIR) that are produced by the DHS component agencies. HSIR’s, however, do contain
some analysis. [1, p. 10]
I&A makes the products of its analysis available to state and local officials through
classified and unclassified intelligence networks: The Homeland Security Information
Network is a secured, web-based platform that facilitates Sensitive But Unclassified
information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, private
sector, and international partners. It is managed by the DHS Directorate of Operations
Coordination and Planning. The HSIN platform was created to interface with existing
information sharing networks to support the diverse communities of interest engaged
in preventing, protecting from, responding to, and recovering from all threats, hazards
and incidents under the jurisdiction of DHS. It provides real-time, interactive
connectivity between states and major urban areas and the National Operations
Center. [1, p. 10]
Part IV: Mission Components
I&A makes the products
of its analysis available
to state and local
officials through
classified and
unclassified intelligence
networks.
435
The Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) provides access to collateral Secret-level
terrorism related information. This includes NCTC Online, a classified repository that
serves as the counterterrorism community’s library of terrorism information. I&A has
deployed HSDN terminals to 33 state and local fusion centers and intends to install
terminals in all of the fusion centers as soon as security requirements are met. [1, p.
11]
State and Local Fusion Center Program
In an effort to strengthen intelligence and information sharing and analysis capabilities
following the 9/11 attacks, states and major urban areas established intelligence fusion
centers. Congress has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more
Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise,
or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect,
prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.” At the
end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) fusion centers. [1, p. 11]
I&A intelligence officers assigned to fusion centers are responsible for providing
intelligence support, including briefings to state and local officials; reviewing and
analyzing suspicious activity reports and writing Homeland Intelligence Reports based
on state and local information; supporting the development of state and local
intelligence products; posting material on the HSDN and the Homeland Security State
and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC) portal; and reaching back to I&A
for intelligence products and IT resources. [1, p. 12]
Fusion centers contribute to the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) through their
role in receiving threat information from the federal government; analyzing that
information in the context of their local environment; disseminating that information
to local agencies; and gathering tips, leads, and suspicious activity reporting (SAR) from
local agencies and the public. Fusion centers receive information from a variety of
sources, including SAR from stakeholders within their jurisdictions, as well as federal
information and intelligence. They analyze the information and develop relevant
products to disseminate to their customers. These products assist homeland security
partners at all levels of government to identify and address immediate and emerging
threats. [10]
Chapter 27: I&A
In an effort to
strengthen intelligence
and information sharing
and analysis capabilities
following the 9/11
attacks, states and
major urban areas
established intelligence
fusion centers.
436
Beyond serving as a focal point for information sharing, fusion centers add significant
value to their customers by providing a state and local context to help enhance the
national threat picture. Fusion centers provide the federal government with critical
state and local information and subject matter expertise that it did not receive in the
past – enabling the effective communication of locally generated threat‐related
information to the federal government. Integrating and connecting these state and
local resources creates a national capacity to gather, process, analyze, and share
information in support of efforts to protect the country. [10]
National Terrorism Advisory System
In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) replaced the color-coded alerts
of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) with the National Terrorism Advisory
System (NTAS), designed to more effectively communicate information about terrorist
threats by providing timely, detailed information to the American public. [11]
When it was launched, NTAS featured an advisory system that consisted of two types
of “Alerts”: Elevated and Imminent. An “Elevated Alert” is intended to warn of a
credible terrorist threat against the United States and its territories that is general in
both timing and potential location such that it is reasonable to recommend
implementation of protective measures to thwart or mitigate against an attack. An
“Imminent Alert” is intended to warn of a credible, specific, and impending terrorist
threat or on-going attack.
Because neither the circumstances nor threat streams rose to the required level, DHS
never issued an Alert after introducing NTAS. Accordingly, in December 2015 DHS
introduced the NTAS “Bulletin” to provide greater awareness of the general threat,
short of any specific indicators or warnings. NTAS Bulletins are designed to provide
information describing broader or more general trends and current developments
regarding threats of terrorism. They will share important terrorism-related
information with the American public and various partners and stakeholders, including
in those situations where additional precautions may be warranted, but where the
circumstances do not warrant the issuance of an “elevated” or “imminent” Alert. An
NTAS Bulletin will summarize the issue and why it is important for public awareness,
outline U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts, and offer recommendations to the
public on how it can contribute to the overall counterterrorism effort. [12]
With the introduction of the Bulletin, NTAS will now consist of two types of advisories:
Bulletins and Alerts. As under the existing system, if there is sufficient information
regarding a credible, specific terrorist threat against the United States, such that it is
reasonable to recommend implementation of protective measures to thwart or
mitigate against an attack, DHS will share an NTAS Alert – either Elevated or Imminent
Part IV: Mission Components
In 2011, the Department
of Homeland Security
(DHS) replaced the color
-coded alerts of the
Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS)
with the National
Terrorism Advisory
System (NTAS).
437
– with the American public. The Alert may include specific information, if available,
about the nature of the threat, including the geographic region, mode of
transportation, or critical infrastructure potentially affected by the threat, as well as
steps that individuals and communities can take to protect themselves and help
prevent, mitigate, or respond to the threat. [12]
NTAS advisories – whether they be Alerts or Bulletins – encourage individuals to follow
the guidance provided by state and local officials and to report suspicious activity.
Where possible and applicable, NTAS advisories include steps that individuals and
communities can take to protect themselves from the threat as well as help detect or
prevent an attack before it happens. Individuals are encouraged review the
information contained in the Alert or Bulletin, and based upon the circumstances, take
the recommended precautionary or preparedness measures for themselves and their
families. [11]
Conclusion
In 2014, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was asked to review I&A’s
analysis efforts. I&A customers had mixed views on the extent to which its analytic
products and services are useful. GAO’s interviews with representatives of I&A’s five
customer groups indicated that two groups—DHS leadership and state, local, tribal,
and territorial partners—found products to be useful, while three groups—DHS
components, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector—generally did not.
Representatives of four of the five groups said that they found other types of services,
such as briefings, to be useful. Results from surveys that are attached to I&A products
indicate that most customers were very satisfied with the products’ usefulness, but the
results are not generalizable because they reflect only the views of customers who
chose to respond. [13, p. ii] The difficult task of balancing liberty and security while
trying to prevent another 9/11 means that I&A’s job will necessarily continue to
evolve. Whether or not they will be successful remains to be seen. In the meantime,
though, they have filled an essential role that was previously absent and could have
made a significant difference before 9/11.
Chapter 27: I&A
438
Part IV: Mission Components
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the Intelligence and Analysis Office?
2. Which I&A component is responsible for the analytic mission?
3. How is foreign intelligence different from domestic intelligence?
4. How is homeland security intelligence different from both foreign and domestic intelligence?
5. Which DHS component provides I&A with threat data to critical infrastructure?
6. Which DHS component provide I&A with threat data to transportation systems?
7. Which I&A product provides an annual assessment of major threats to the United States?
8. Which I&A product contains urgent intelligence?
9. What are fusion centers and why were they created after 9/11?
10. How is the National Terrorism Advisory System different than the previous Homeland Security Advisory System?
439
Chapter 28: FEMA
FEMA
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 28
Learning Outcomes
440
“Under the President’s proposal, the Department of Homeland Security, building on the
strong foundation already laid by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
will lead our national efforts to create and employ a system that will improve our
response to all disasters, both manmade and natural.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Introduction
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates the federal
government's role in preparing for, preventing, mitigating the effects of, responding to,
and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, including
acts of terror. [1] FEMA has a major role in on-ground support of disaster response and
recovery efforts by providing state, local, and tribal governments with experts in
specialized fields and funding for relief and rebuilding efforts. FEMA also provides
funds for first responders to train throughout the United States and its territories as
part of the agency's preparedness agenda.
Background
FEMA can trace its beginnings to the Congressional Act of 1803. This act, generally
considered the first piece of disaster legislation, provided assistance to a New
Hampshire town following an extensive fire. In the century that followed, ad hoc
legislation was passed more than 100 times in response to hurricanes, earthquakes,
floods and other natural disasters. [1]
By the 1930s, when the federal approach to disaster-related events became popular,
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was given authority to make disaster loans for
repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities following an earthquake, and later,
other types of disasters. [1]
In 1934, the Bureau of Public Roads was given authority to provide funding for
highways and bridges damaged by natural disasters.
The Flood Control Act of 1965, which gave the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
greater authority to implement flood control projects, was also passed.
The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major federal
response and recovery operations by the Federal Disaster Assistance
Administration, established within the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).
In 1968, the National Flood Insurance Act created the Federal Insurance
Administration and made flood insurance available for the first time to
homeowners.
Part IV: Mission Components
The Federal Emergency
Management Agency
(FEMA) coordinates the
federal government's
role in preparing for,
preventing, mitigating
the effects of,
responding to, and
recovering from all
domestic disasters,
whether natural or man-
made.
441
The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 made the purchase of flood insurance
mandatory for the protection of property located in Special Flood Hazard Areas.
In the year following, President Nixon passed into law the Disaster Relief Act of
1974, firmly establishing the process of Presidential disaster declarations.
This piecemeal approach to disaster assistance was problematic. Accordingly, it
prompted legislation to require greater cooperation between federal agencies and
authorized the President to coordinate these activities. These events served to focus
attention on the issue of natural disasters and brought about increased legislation.
However, emergency and disaster activities were still fragmented. When hazards
associated with nuclear power plants and the transportation of hazardous substances
were added to natural disasters, more than 100 federal agencies were involved in
some aspect of disasters, hazards and emergencies. Many parallel programs and
policies existed at the state and local level, simplifying the complexity of federal
disaster relief efforts. The National Governor's Association sought to decrease the
many agencies with which state and local governments were forced to work. They
asked President Carter to centralize federal emergency functions. On April 1, 1979,
President Jimmy Carter signed Executive Order 12127 that created the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) charged with leading America to prepare for,
prevent, respond to and recover from disasters with a vision of "A Nation Prepared".
[1]
President Carter's 1979 executive order merged many of the separate disaster-related
responsibilities into the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) by absorbing
the following agencies:
The Federal Insurance Administration
The National Fire Prevention and Control Administration
The National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program
The Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration
The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD
Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the
Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 100-
707) was signed into law November 23, 1988 amending the Disaster Relief Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-288). The Stafford Act as it came to be known created the system in
place today by which a presidential disaster declaration of an emergency triggers
financial and physical assistance through FEMA. The Stafford Act gives FEMA the
responsibility for coordinating government-wide relief efforts which are designed to
Chapter 28: FEMA
The Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance
Act (Public Law 100-707)
was signed into law
November 23, 1988
amending the Disaster
Relief Act of 1974
(Public Law 93-288). The
Stafford Act as it came
to be known created the
system in place today by
which a presidential
disaster declaration of
an emergency triggers
financial and physical
assistance through
FEMA.
442
bring an orderly and systemic means of federal natural disaster assistance for state and
local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to aid citizens. Congress'
intention was to encourage states and localities to develop comprehensive disaster
preparedness plans, prepare for better intergovernmental coordination in the face of a
disaster, encourage the use of insurance coverage, and provide federal assistance
programs for losses due to a disaster. The Stafford Act constitutes the statutory
authority for most federal disaster response activities especially as they pertain to
FEMA and FEMA programs. [1]
The new agency was faced with many unusual challenges in its first few years that
emphasized how complex emergency management can be. Early disasters and
emergencies included the contamination of Love Canal, the Cuban refugee crisis, and
the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Later, the Loma Prieta
Earthquake in 1989 and Hurricane Andrew in 1992 focused major national attention on
FEMA. In 1993, President Clinton nominated James L. Witt as the new FEMA director
making him the first agency director with experience as a state emergency manager.
He initiated sweeping reforms that streamlined disaster relief and recovery operations,
insisted on a new emphasis regarding preparedness and mitigation, and focused
agency employees on customer service. The end of the Cold War also allowed Witt to
redirect more of FEMA's limited resources from civil defense into disaster relief,
recovery and mitigation programs.
As a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, in March, 2003, FEMA officially
joined 22 other federal agencies, programs, and offices in becoming the Department of
Homeland Security bringing a coordinated approach to national security from
emergencies and disasters – both natural and manmade. As part of DHS, FEMA's Office
of National Preparedness was given responsibility for helping to ensure that the
nation's first responders were trained and equipped to deal with weapons of mass
destruction. Within months, the terrorist attacks of Sept.11th focused the agency on
issues of national preparedness and homeland security, and tested the agency in
unprecedented ways. Billions of dollars of new funding were directed to FEMA to help
communities face the threat of terrorism. Just a few years past its 20th anniversary,
FEMA was actively directing its "all-hazards" approach to disasters toward homeland
security issues. [1]
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf coasts of Louisiana, Alabama,
and Mississippi resulting in severe and widespread damage to the region. The response
of the federal government, especially FEMA, in the aftermath of the storm was widely
criticized. Some of the criticism focused on the organizational arrangements involving
Part IV: Mission Components
As a result of 9/11, the
Homeland Security Act
of 2002 made FEMA a
part of the new
Department of
Homeland Security to
bring a coordinated
approach to national
security from
emergencies and
disasters – both natural
and manmade.
443
FEMA and its parent organization, DHS. On October 4, 2006, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act. The act significantly
reorganized FEMA, provided it substantial new authority to remedy gaps that became
apparent in the response to Hurricane Katrina, the most devastating natural disaster in
U.S. history, and included a more robust preparedness mission for FEMA.
Natural disasters continued to plague the U.S. and the nation’s next major storm that
impacted the operational objectives of FEMA was Hurricane Sandy, also known as
“Superstorm Sandy” hitting the New England coast on October 29, 2012. [2, pp. 3-4]
Sandy was massive in size and drove a catastrophic storm surge and subsequent
flooding into the New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut coastal areas. [2, p. 8]
Hurricane Sandy caused extensive human suffering and damage to public and private
property. In response to this catastrophic event, Congress considered legislation to
provide supplemental appropriations to federal disaster assistance programs to
include revising the Stafford Act. [3, p. i] On January 29, 2013, President Barack Obama
signed into law the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (SRIA) of 2013 and the
accompanying Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. In many ways, the passage of
SRIA represents the most significant legislative change to FEMA’s substantive
authorities since the enactment of the Stafford Act. The law authorizes several
significant changes to the way FEMA may deliver federal disaster assistance to
survivors. [4]
Mission
FEMA’s mission is to support American citizens and first responders to work together
as a nation to build, sustain and improve its capability to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards. [1] To serve disaster victims and
communities more quickly and effectively, FEMA builds on experience, applies lessons
learned and best practices from field operations, gathers feedback from many sources,
and constantly strives to improve upon its operational core competencies of service to
disaster victims, integrated preparedness, operational planning and preparedness,
incident management, disaster logistics, hazard mitigation, emergency and public
disaster communications, and continuity programs. [5, pp. 2-3]
Mission Support (MS) is organized around the following six functional offices [1]:
Office of the Chief Administrative Officer
Office of the Chief Component Human Capital Officer
Office of the Chief Information Officer
Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
Office of the Chief Security Officer
Chapter 28: FEMA
As a result of Hurricane
Katrina, the 2006 Post-
Katrina Emergency
Reform Act restored
many of the previous
functions and elevated
FEMA as a separate
agency within the
Department of
Homeland Security.
444
Organization
FEMA staff work together with tribal, state and local emergency management
personnel to prepare communities before a disaster, and to respond effectively when
needed. FEMA’s efforts at the national and regional levels are led by individuals with a
broad range of hands-on emergency management, fire, rescue, emergency medical
services, law enforcement, military and private sector experience. FEMA employees
are committed to their mission of protecting lives and communities. [5, p. 4]
In addition to its headquarters in Washington, D.C., FEMA has 10 permanent regional
offices (Figure 28-2), three permanent area offices, and various temporary disaster-
related sites that carry out the agency’s operations throughout the United States and
its territories. These offices work more closely with other federal agencies, strategic
partners and tribal, state and local officials in their regions, further supporting the
agency’s mission and core competencies. FEMA has additional facilities across the
country. [5, p. 6]
Part IV: Mission Components
Figure 28-1: FEMA Leadership Organization Chart [6]
445
FEMA Headquarters
500 C St., SW
Washington DC 20472
FEMA Region I
99 High St., 6th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
FEMA Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Suite 1337
New York, NY 10278-0002
FEMA Region III
615 Chestnut St.
One Independence Mall, 6th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19106-4404
FEMA Region IV
3003 Charublee-Tucker Rd.
Atlanta, GA 30341
FEMA Region V
536 South Clark St., 6th Floor
Chicago, IL 60605
FEMA Region VI
Federal Regional Center
800 North Loop 288
Denton, TX 76209
FEMA Region VII
9221 Ward Parkway, Suite 300
Kansas City, MO 64114-3372
FEMA Region VIII
Federal Center, Bldg. 710
P.O. Box 25267
Denver, CO 80225
FEMA Region IX
1111 Broadway
Suite 1200
Oakland, CA 94607-4052
FEMA Region X
130 228th St., SW
Bothell, WA 98021-8627
Chapter 28: FEMA
Figure 28-2: FEMA Regions [7]
FEMA is organized into
ten regions, with
headquarters in
Washington, DC.
446
Offices and Directorates
The FEMA National Advisory Council (NAC) was established by the enactment of the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 to ensure effective and
ongoing coordination of Federal preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation for natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters. The
NAC advises the FEMA Administrator on all aspects of emergency management. The
NAC incorporates state, local, and tribal governments; nonprofit, and private sector
input in the development and revision of the National Preparedness Goal, the National
Preparedness System, the National Incident Management System, and other related
plans and strategies. [1]
In 2010, FEMA established the Office of Disability Integration and Coordination (ODIC)
to lead FEMA’s commitment to achieve whole community emergency management,
inclusive of individuals with disabilities. Each of the ten FEMA regions is staffed with a
Regional Disability Integration Specialist, a third of whom are interpreters as qualified
sign language providers and certified deaf interpreters, who provide guidance, training,
and tools for facilitating disability-inclusive emergency preparedness, response,
recovery and mitigation. Regional Disability Integration Specialists work closely with
the states to ensure that their disaster planning is inclusive of people with disabilities
and others with access and functional needs. Simultaneously, they work with local
nonprofit disability groups to reach the disability community encouraging them to
participate in federal, state, local, and community emergency planning meetings. [1]
The Office of External Affairs (OAE) was created in 2007, bringing together several
independent offices and adding two new divisions to enhance a coordinated
communications program for the agency. The Office's purpose is to maintain visibility
regarding public and internal communications; coordinate routine and special
communications; ensure accurate, useful, timely, synchronized, targeted
communication; and provide continuous messaging to meet the needs of the situation.
The Office also serves as an advisor to FEMA program and support offices on decision
making, development, and maintenance of policies and programs to ensure that
activities are responsive to stakeholder, media, congressional and other audiences. [1]
As part of the Office of External Affairs, the Congressional Affairs Division is FEMA’s
primary liaison with the United States Congress. The mission is to proactively engage
and communicate with Members of Congress and their staffs to build strong working
relationships that will advance the agency's legislative and emergency management
priorities. [1] This mission is accomplished by:
Informing Congress of agency efforts to support citizens and first responders in
preparing for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating all
hazards;
Part IV: Mission Components
The FEMA National
Advisory Council (NAC)
advises the FEMA
Administrator on all
aspects of emergency
management. The NAC
was established to
ensure effective and
ongoing coordination of
Federal preparedness,
protection, response,
recovery, and mitigation
for natural disasters,
acts of terrorism, and
other manmade
disasters.
447
Responding to various Congressional inquiries related to emergency management
and disaster response/recovery issues;
Providing Members of Congress and their staffs with regular updates on key
developments in Presidentially-declared disasters; and
Advising the FEMA Administrator, and other senior agency officials, on legislative
matters pertaining to emergency management.
The Office of Policy and Program Analysis (OPPA) fosters strategic coherence; ensures
availability of critical resources; leads Agency policy, strategy, and innovation; provides
objective analysis; and drives strategy, budget, execution, performance integration and
accountability. The OPPA ensures FEMA’s strategic direction, informs sound decisions
with independent analysis, and facilitates cross-agency interactions. The Strategic
Planning and Analysis Division, the Defense Production Act Program, and the
International Affairs Division all fall under the OPPA . [1]
The Office of Response and Recovery (ORR) provides the core, coordinated Federal
operational response capability needed to save and sustain lives, minimize suffering,
and protect property in a timely and effective manner in communities that become
overwhelmed by natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other emergencies. Response
program activities encompass the coordination of all Federal emergency management
response operations, response planning and integration of Federal, state, tribal and
local disaster programs. This coordination ensures efficient and effective delivery of
immediate emergency assistance to individuals and communities impacted and
overwhelmed by these disasters, emergencies, or acts of terrorism. [1]
The Disaster Emergency Communications Division of the ORR establishes, maintains,
and coordinates effective disaster emergency communications services and
information systems critical to FEMA’s role in coordinating the Federal government’s
response, continuity efforts, and restoration of essential services before, during, and
after an incident or planned event. The DEC Division promotes and provides operable
and interoperable communications and information systems capabilities across all
levels of government to ensure mission–critical information and situational awareness
for emergency management decision makers and support elements. [1] This is
accomplished through:
Supporting effective tactical operable and interoperable voice, video, and
information systems for federal emergency response teams.
Identifying and documenting mission-critical disaster emergency communication
and information systems capabilities, requirements, solutions, and mitigation
strategies.
Developing effective command and control communications frameworks.
Chapter 28: FEMA
The Office of Response
and Recovery (ORR)
provides coordination of
all Federal emergency
management response
operations, response
planning and
integration of Federal,
state, tribal and local
disaster programs. This
coordination ensures
efficient and effective
delivery of immediate
emergency assistance to
individuals and
communities impacted
and overwhelmed by
these disasters.
448
Supporting the coordination and delivery of secure communications solutions.
Promoting communications interoperability with Federal, State, tribal, and local
emergency response providers.
The Recovery Directorate through its Disaster Survivor Assistance Program, National
Emergency Family Registry and Locator System, and Transitional Shelter Assistance
programs supports communities in rebuilding so individuals, civic institutions,
businesses, and governmental organizations can function on their own, return to
normal life, and protect against future hazards. [1]
In addition to the Response and Recovery Directorates, the ORR houses the Logistics
Management Directorate and the Office of Federal Disaster Coordination. [1]
FEMA’s Logistics Management Directorate provides an efficient, transparent, and
flexible logistics capability to procure and deliver goods and services to support
disaster survivors and communities responding to and recovering from disasters.
The primary mission of the Logistics Management Directorate is to deliver the right
resources to the right place at the right time in support of state, local, tribal
governments and territories.
The mission of the Office of Federal Disaster Coordination is to access, train, equip,
and manage FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Officers (FCO) and Federal Disaster
Recovery Coordinators (FDRC) to ensure their availability for rapid deployment in
response to any disaster; deliver training to develop and sustain FCO and FDRC
professional competencies, and coordinate both FCO and FDRC assignments to
meet the on-scene needs of FEMA and its emergency management partners.
Protection and National Preparedness (PNP) is responsible for the coordination of
preparedness and protection related activities throughout FEMA, including grants,
planning, training, exercises, individual and community preparedness, assessments,
lessons learned, continuity of government and national capital region coordination. [1]
The PNP consists of:
The Grant Programs Directorate (GPD), formally created on April 1, 2007 in
accordance with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, is to
strategically and effectively administer and manage FEMA grants to ensure critical
and measurable results for customers and stakeholders. The mission is to manage
federal assistance to measurably improve capability and reduce the risks the
Nation faces in times of man-made and natural disasters. The focus of GPD is to
provide exceptional customer service to all grantees, as well as internal and
external partners; establish and promote consistent outreach and communication
with state, local and tribal stakeholders; ensure transparency in the grant process;
and enhance the Nation's level of preparedness and the public's ability to prevent,
protect and mitigate against, and respond to and recover from all hazards.
Part IV: Mission Components
Protection and National
Preparedness (PNP) is
responsible for the
coordination of
preparedness and
protection related
activities throughout
FEMA, including grants,
planning, training,
exercises, individual and
community
preparedness,
assessments, lessons
learned, continuity of
government and
national capital region
coordination.
449
FEMA’s National Continuity Programs (NCP) is the Federal Executive Branch Lead
Agent for continuity of national essential functions. The goal of the NCP is to
minimize the disruption of essential operations in order to guarantee an Enduring
Constitutional Government in response to a full-threat spectrum of
emergencies. The scope of this mandate includes development and promulgation
of continuity directives and guidance, education, and training, as well as
coordination between the Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, and private
sectors. NCP also coordinates and participates in Federal, State, and local
continuity exercises. FEMA serves as the lead agent for coordinating continuity
operations and activities of Federal agencies and collaborating with State,
territorial, tribal, and local government jurisdictions. Viable continuity capabilities
ensure FEMA is ready to respond to a continuity event. NCP also manages the
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS), the Nation’s next generation
alert and warning capability developed by NCP in partnership with multiple Federal
Departments and Agencies. IPAWS meets the requirements of Executive Order
13407, signed by the President in 2006, which called for the development and
implementation of an “effective, reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive
system to alert and warn the American people… and to ensure under all conditions
the President can communicate with the American people.”
The National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) provides the doctrine, programs, and
resources to prepare the Nation to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to and
recover from disasters while minimizing the loss of lives, infrastructure, and
property. NPD carries out these responsibilities through the following NPD
divisions:
National Integration Center (NIC)
Individual and Community Preparedness Division (ICPD)
National Training & Education (NTE), which includes:
Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP)
Emergency Management Institute (EMI)
National Training and Education Division (NTED)
National Exercises Division (NED)
Technological Hazards Division (THD)
National Preparedness Assessment Division (NPAD)
Chapter 28: FEMA
FEMA’s National
Continuity Programs
(NCP) is the Federal
Executive Branch Lead
Agent for continuity of
national essential
functions. NCP also
manages the Integrated
Public Alert and
Warning System
(IPAWS), the Nation’s
next generation alert
and warning capability.
450
National Preparedness
National preparedness is a shared responsibility—everyone has a role to play to ensure
that the nation’s greatest risks can be addressed effectively and efficiently. The
National Preparedness Goal defines what it means for the whole community to be
prepared for all types of disasters and emergencies. [8]
The National Preparedness Goal sets the vision for preparedness nationwide and
identifies the core capabilities necessary to achieve that vision across the five mission
areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery. The goal itself is
succinct and remains unchanged:
“A secure and resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from
the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.”
- 2015 National Preparedness Goal
These risks include events such as natural disasters, disease pandemics, chemical spills
and other man-made hazards, terrorist attacks and cyber attacks. The National
Preparedness Goal also outlines 32 activities or core capabilities that address the
greatest risks to the nation. [8]
Each of these core capabilities is tied to a capability target. These targets recognize
that everyone needs the flexibility to determine how they apply their resources, based
on the threats that are most relevant to them and their communities. A Midwestern
city, for example, may determine it is at high risk for a catastrophic tornado. As a
result, the city could set a target to have a certain number of shelters in place. The
same applies across all potential risks, understanding that each risk is different;
therefore, each target is different. [8]
The National Preparedness Goal is the cornerstone of implementing the National
Preparedness System. Several National Preparedness System components contribute
to building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the National
Preparedness Goal [9, p. 21]. These include:
A National Planning System, which supports the integration of planning across all
levels of government and the whole community to provide an agile, flexible, and
accessible delivery of the core capabilities.
Part IV: Mission Components
The National
Preparedness Goal sets
the vision for
preparedness
nationwide and
identifies the core
capabilities necessary to
achieve that vision
across the five mission
areas: Prevention,
Protection, Mitigation,
Response and Recovery.
451
A series of National Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The
National Frameworks address the roles and responsibilities across the whole
community to deliver the core capabilities. The Federal Interagency Operational
Plans address the critical tasks, responsibilities, and resourcing, personnel, and
sourcing requirements for the core capabilities.
A National Preparedness Report, which provides a summary of the progress being
made toward building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in
the Goal. The annual National Preparedness Report provides an opportunity to
measure the advancement the whole community has made in preparedness and to
identify where challenges remain.
A Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness, which provides an integrating
structure for new and existing community-based, nonprofit, and private sector
preparedness programs, research and development activities to include post-event
evaluation of the use of science and technology tools, and preparedness
assistance.
Whole Community
Preparedness is the shared responsibility of the entire nation. The whole community
contributes, beginning with individuals and communities, the private and nonprofit
sectors, faith-based organizations, and all governments (local, regional/metropolitan,
state, tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal). [9, p. 1]
A government-centric approach to emergency management is not enough to meet the
challenges posed by a catastrophic incident. Whole Community is an approach to
emergency management that reinforces the fact that FEMA is only one part of the
nation’s emergency management team; that all of the resources of the collective team
must be leveraged in preparing for, protecting against, responding to, recovering from
and mitigating against all hazards; and that collectively the needs of the entire
community in each of these areas must be met. This larger collective emergency
management team includes not only FEMA and its partners at the federal level, but
also local, tribal, state and territorial partners; non-governmental organizations like
faith-based and non-profit groups and private sector industry; and individuals, families
and communities, who continue to be the nation’s most important assets as first
responders during a disaster. Both the composition of the community and the
individual needs of community members, regardless of age, economics, or accessibility
requirements, must be accounted for when planning and implementing disaster
strategies. [10]
Chapter 28: FEMA
Preparedness is the
shared responsibility of
the entire nation. The
whole community
contributes, beginning
with individuals and
communities, the
private and nonprofit
sectors, faith-based
organizations, and all
governments (local,
regional/metropolitan,
state, tribal, territorial,
insular area, and
Federal).
452 Part IV: Mission
When the community is engaged in an authentic dialogue, it becomes empowered to
identify its needs and the existing resources that may be used to address them. Only
together can the whole community determine the best ways to organize and
strengthen community assets, capacities, and interests. This allows the nation to
expand its reach and deliver services more efficiently and cost effectively to build,
sustain, and improve the capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover
from, and mitigate all hazards. [10]
Reservist Program
FEMA Reservists are a type of Incident Management responder, hired under The
Stafford Act as temporary, intermittent employees. They are a significant FEMA
Incident Management work component, staffing Joint Field Offices and other activities.
These employees, when listed as available, can deploy to perform disaster field
activities directly related to specific disasters, emergencies, projects, or activities of a
non-continuous nature. FEMA is committed to deploy each Reservist at least annually.
However, as deployment opportunities are dictated by disaster activity and certain
limitations apply regarding their use, Reservists are not guaranteed to deploy. Rather
than serve as an alternative to permanent full-time staff, Reservists are a necessary
augmentation of permanent full-time staffing. [11]
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT)
The Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) train and organize teams of
volunteers that provide assistance to their communities before, during, and after
disasters. CERT volunteers help others following disasters when professional
responders are not immediately available to help, and supplement and support the
efforts of professional responders upon their arrival. Volunteers also support
emergency response agencies by organizing and participating in local preparedness
projects and initiatives. The CERT program educates participants about how to prepare
for hazards that may impact their communities and trains them in basic disaster
response skills, such as fire safety search and rescue, team organization, and disaster
medical operations. [12]
Urban Search and Rescue
Urban search and rescue (US&R) involves the location, rescue (extrication), and initial
medical stabilization of individuals trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse is
most often the cause for people being trapped, but individuals may also be trapped in
transportation accidents, mines, and collapsed trenches. Urban search and rescue is
considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as it may be needed for a variety of
emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms,
tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and
hazardous materials releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of
hurricanes, or sudden, as in the case of earthquakes. [13]
Community Emergency
Response Teams (CERT)
train and organize
volunteers that provide
assistance to their
communities before,
during, and after
disasters.
453
Voluntary Agency and Donations Coordination
FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons promote the interest of voluntary, faith-based, and
community-based stakeholders by advocating for them and empowering their
activities and integration across the disaster life-cycle and in every subject area in
which they engage. FEMA Voluntary Agency Liaisons (VALs) and Donations Specialists
build relationships among Federal, State, and tribal governments and voluntary, faith-
based, and community-based organizations by reporting to and from FEMA and other
government agencies on programs of voluntary organizations active during disasters,
providing information and guidance to organizations, and helping strengthen National
and State Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (VOADs). [14]
Disaster Recovery Centers
A Disaster Recovery Center is a readily accessible facility or mobile office where
survivors may go for information about FEMA’s programs or other disaster assistance
programs, and to ask questions related to their case. [15] Some of the services may
include:
Guidance regarding disaster recovery
Clarification of any written correspondence received
Housing Assistance and Rental Resource information
Answers to questions, resolution to problems and referrals to agencies that may
provide further assistance
Status of applications being processed by FEMA
Small Business Administration (SBA) program information
Crisis Counseling Program
Disaster Legal Services
Disaster Unemployment
Funeral Assistance - Individuals and Households Program
Ready.gov
Launched in February 2003, Ready is a national public service advertising (PSA)
campaign designed to educate and empower Americans to prepare for and respond to
emergencies including natural and man-made disasters. The goal of the campaign is to
get the public involved and ultimately to increase the level of basic preparedness
across the nation.
Chapter 28: FEMA
FEMA Voluntary Agency
Liaisons (VALs) and
Donations Specialists
build relationships
among Federal, State,
and tribal governments
and voluntary, faith-
based, and community-
based organizations by
reporting to and from
FEMA and other
government agencies on
programs of Voluntary
Organizations Active in
Disaster (VOADs).
454
Ready and its Spanish language version Listo ask individuals to do three key things: 1)
build an emergency supply kit, 2) make a family emergency plan and 3) be informed
about the different types of emergencies that could occur and their appropriate
responses.
FEMA has also worked with a variety of public and private sector organizations to
develop tailored preparedness information for specific Americans. The Department
worked with American Kennel Club, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, American Veterinary Medical Association and The Humane Society of the
United States to create materials that highlight the key steps pet owners should take
to prepare themselves and their animals. FEMA also worked with American Association
of Retired Persons, the American Red Cross, the National Organization on Disability,
and the National Fire Protection Association to create emergency information for
seniors and Americans with disabilities and special needs.
In 2008, The Ready Campaign added a section on their web site for military families.
The entire Department highlights emergency preparedness through National
Preparedness Month (NPM), a nationwide effort held each September to encourage
Americans to take simple steps to prepare for emergencies in their homes, businesses
and schools. [16]
Conclusion
The Congressional Act of 1803 was the earliest effort to provide disaster relief on a
federal level after a fire devastated a New Hampshire town. From that point forward,
assorted legislation provided disaster support. In 1979, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) was established by an executive order, which merged
many of the separate disaster-related responsibilities into a single agency. Since then,
FEMA has dedicated itself to the mission of helping communities nationwide prepare
for, respond to and recover from natural and manmade disasters – a mission
strengthened when the agency became part of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in 2003. [5, p. 2]
To serve disaster victims and communities more quickly and effectively, FEMA builds
on experience, applies lessons learned and best practices from field operations,
gathers feedback from many sources, and constantly strives to improve upon its
operational core competencies of service to disaster victims, integrated preparedness,
operational planning and preparedness, incident management, disaster logistics,
hazard mitigation, emergency communications, public disaster communications, and
continuity programs. [5, pp. 2-3]
Part IV: Mission Components
455 Chapter 28: FEMA
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency?
2. Under what authority does FEMA coordinate Federal assistance to States?
3. Why was FEMA made part of DHS?
4. How did FEMA’s position within DHS change after Hurricane Katrina?
5. The U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are part of which FEMA region?
6. Which FEMA component provides the core operational response capability?
7. Which FEMA component helps communities rebuild following a disaster?
8. Which FEMA component awards grants to improve emergency preparedness?
9. What is the purpose of the National Preparedness Goal?
10. What FEMA program helps organize and train volunteers to assist with emergency management?
456 Part IV: Mission Components
457 Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 29
Learning Outcomes
458
“Semper Paratus. Stand a taut watch.”
- 2014 Doctrine for the U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is one of the most unique organizations within
the Department of Homeland Security. Implemented in 1790 as the “Revenue Marine”
and renamed the U.S. Revenue Cutter Service in 1894, it is the oldest defense
organization in the U.S. and served as the nation’s sole armed maritime presence until
the Naval Act of 1794 declared it a standing naval force. [1, pp. 1-2] It was not until
1915 upon merging with the U.S. Life Saving Service, that the U.S. Revenue Cutter
Service officially became the U.S. Coast Guard. Subsequently, the Coast Guard
incorporated the Lighthouse Service, the Steamboat Inspection Service, and the
Bureau of Navigation and Lifesaving Service all having similar missions. The Coast
Guard moved across several federal departments from the Department of the
Treasury, where it first resided, to the newly formed Department of Transportation in
1967 before finally coming to rest within the Department of Homeland Security in
2002. Initially, the Coast Guard protected the U.S. maritime ports to promote and
safeguard legal trade, as a law enforcement arm to collect taxes, and to perform
maritime rescue services. [2] Much of these mission areas have not changed and it is
this broad mission area that makes the Coast Guard unique even today.
Military Mission
The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the nation’s seven uniformed services of the United
States and the only military organization within the Department of Homeland Security.
Its mission is unique among the U.S. military services due to its defense and federal
regulatory authority. While it currently operates under the Department of Homeland
Security, it can easily be transferred to the Department of the Navy at any time under a
presidential order, particularly during times of war as it had been during both World
Wars I and II. [3] The Coast Guard has a different legal authority under the U.S. Code
than that of the other U.S. military branches. Title 14 establishes the Coast Guard as a
branch of the U.S., but it also serves simultaneously under Title 10, which outlines the
role of the armed forces allowing the Coast Guard to conduct military operations under
the Department of Defense, and Title 6 which governs domestic security allowing the
Coast Guard to enforce laws within the 3.4 million square mile exclusive economic
zone. [4] One of the most unique features of the Coast Guard is its exclusion from the
Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 that prevents other military services from conducting law
enforcement activities. As such, the Coast Guard has the legal authority to board any
vessel within U.S. jurisdiction, or to make inquiries, examinations, inspections,
searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas or waterways in which the U.S. has
Part IV: Mission Components
The U.S. Coast Guard is
one of the nation’s
seven uniformed
services of the United
States and the only
military organization
within the Department
of Homeland Security.
459
jurisdiction. [5, p. 11] The Coast Guard also has the unique capability of applying its
military mission toward guarding against the importation of illegal drugs and other
illicit goods, disrupting transnational terrorist and criminal organizations, enforcing
legal immigration laws, while also providing humanitarian support in rescue and
disaster operations. [5, p. 12]
Homeland Security Mission
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Homeland
Security and the Maritime Transportation Security Acts of 2002, and transferred the
Coast Guard to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). By law, the
U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime homeland security with eleven
specific missions:
ports, waterways, and coastal security,
drug interdiction,
aids to navigation,
search and rescue,
living marine resources,
marine safety,
defense readiness,
migrant interdiction,
marine environmental protection,
ice operations, and
other law enforcement.
The Coast Guard’s inclusion into DHS affected their priorities, but it did not alter the
fundamental goals or the importance of their work. As criminals and terrorists try to
exploit or blend in with legitimate maritime activity, maritime governance becomes a
critical component of DHS strategy to protect the homeland. As a first responder and
an integral part of the DHS–led comprehensive emergency management system, the
Coast Guard fulfilled an expanded role in response operations during Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita in 2005, the 2010 Haiti earthquake, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
and other natural and man-made disasters. The Coast Guard continues to build and
leverage relationships with federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private
sector, and international partners. [5, p. 7]
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard is
exempt from the Posse
Comitatus Act of 1878
that prevents other
military services from
conducting law
enforcement activities.
As such, the Coast
Guard has the legal
authority to board any
vessel within U.S.
jurisdiction, or to make
inquiries, examinations,
inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests
upon the high seas.
460 Part IV: Mission Components
The Coast Guard’s distinct blend of authorities, capabilities, competencies, and
partnerships provide the President, Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of
Defense, and other national leaders with the capabilities to lead or support a range of
operations to ensure safety, security, and stewardship in the maritime domain.
Maritime Safety
The U.S. government has a fundamental interest in safeguarding the lives of its people.
In the maritime realm, the Coast Guard serves this interest. They improves safety at
sea through complementary programs such as accident prevention, search and rescue,
and accident investigation, while working with other federal agencies, state, local, and
tribal governments, marine industries, and individual mariners. [5, p. 7] The Coast
Guard also provides prevention activities to include the development of standards and
regulations, various plan reviews, compliance inspections, and a number of safety
programs designed to protect mariners. In addition, they develop and enforce vessel
construction standards and domestic shipping and navigation regulations. [5, p. 7] They
are America’s voice in the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which develops
measures to improve shipping safety and security, prevent pollution, train mariners,
and standardize certifications. To ensure compliance, they review and approve plans
for ship construction, repair, and alteration. They inspect vessels, mobile offshore
drilling units, and marine facilities for safety. [5, p. 7] With regard to international
standards, the Port State Control program is aimed at ensuring vessel compliance, a
key element since the majority of the passenger and cargo ships operating in U.S.
waters are foreign flagged. The commercial fishing vessel safety programs are designed
to safeguard commercial fishermen, many of whom earn their living performing some
of the most dangerous work in the world. [5, p. 8]
The Coast Guard operates the International Ice Patrol to safeguard ships transiting the
North Atlantic shipping lanes and document U.S. flag vessels and license commercial
mariners. America has approximately 22 million recreational boats and as the National
Recreational Boating Safety Coordinator, the Coast Guard works to minimize loss of
life, personal injury, property damage, and environmental harm associated with
recreational boating. The boating safety program involves public education efforts,
regulation of boat design and construction, approval of boating safety equipment, and
vessel safety checks for compliance with federal requirements. [5, p. 8]
The Coast Guard’s
distinct blend of
authorities, capabilities,
competencies, and
partnerships provide the
President, Secretary of
Homeland Security,
Secretary of Defense,
and other national
leaders with the
capabilities to lead or
support a range of
operations to ensure
safety, security, and
stewardship in the
maritime domain.
461
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
The maritime domain is large and complex, and the sea is powerful and unforgiving.
Despite the Coast Guard’s best efforts, mariners sometimes find themselves in harm’s
way. When they do, the Coast Guard has a long heritage of providing immediate
response to save lives and property in peril. As the lead agency for maritime search
and rescue (SAR) in U.S. waters, they coordinate the SAR efforts of Coast Guard units
with those of other federal, state, and local responders. They also coordinate with the
world’s merchant fleet to rescue mariners in distress around the globe through the
Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system. [5, p. 9]
The Coast Guard’s activities in support of maritime safety are often inseparable from
those they perform to protect the marine environment or secure the U.S. Marine
Transportation System (MTS). For example, a routine inspection for safety compliance
may uncover a serious risk to the environment. In addition, Coast Guard vessel traffic
services not only reduce the risk of vessel collisions, but also provide maritime domain
awareness. Such efforts may quickly divert to a SAR activity while managing a buoy
tender working to aid navigation, for instance. [5, p. 10] The integration of all Coast
Guard missions has saved many lives, helped secure citizens, and contributed to the
nation’s economic and environmental well-being.
Maritime Security
Maritime law enforcement and border control are among the oldest of the Coast
Guard’s numerous responsibilities. In the early days of the Revenue Marine, cutters
patrolled outside the approaches to U.S. coasts and seaports, boarding ships at sea to
more effectively frustrate smuggling and enforce the customs laws of the fledgling
Republic. Over two centuries later, that early maritime security challenge has evolved
into a global obligation. The core capability to interdict ships at sea provides the
foundation for today’s broader and more complex maritime security operations.
Because their specialized capabilities are complementary, the Coast Guard is able to
leverage its military nature to project force abroad, sustain their traditional missions,
or respond to emergent national incidents that often do not involve the use of other
military forces. [5, p. 11]
The Coast Guard
maintains safety at sea
through complementary
programs such as
accident prevention,
search and rescue, and
accident investigation,
while working with
other federal agencies,
state, local, and tribal
governments, marine
industries, and
individual mariners.
462
As the Nation’s primary maritime law enforcement service, the Coast Guard enforces,
or assists in enforcing, federal laws, treaties, and other international agreements on
waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction and on the high seas. They are the designated lead
agency for maritime interdiction under the National Drug Control Strategy and the co-
lead agency for air interdiction operations with U.S. Customs and Border Protection. As
such, the Coast Guard defends the approaches to America’s maritime borders against a
torrent of illegal drugs and other illicit goods. For more than three decades, their
cutters and aircraft have forward deployed off Central and South America and in the
drug transit zones. They have disrupted trans-national terrorist and criminal
organizations by intercepting thousands of tons of contraband that otherwise would
have found its way to America’s streets, apprehended thousands of suspected narco-
terrorists and smugglers, and supported successful prosecutions in the United States
and in many other countries. [5, p. 12]
The Coast Guard’s undocumented migrant interdiction operations are law
enforcement missions with an important humanitarian dimension. Migrants often take
great risks and endure significant hardships in their attempts to flee their countries and
enter the United States. In many cases, migrant vessels interdicted at sea are
overloaded and unseaworthy, lack basic safety equipment, and are operated by
inexperienced mariners. Many of these undocumented migrant cases actually begin as
SAR incidents. [5, p. 12]
From a national security standpoint, the Coast Guard has served in all American wars,
primarily along with the U.S. Navy as a naval augmentation force providing specialized
capabilities as required for the defense of the nation. This began with the Quasi-War
with France in 1798, and continued through the Civil War, both World Wars, the
Korean Conflict, Vietnam, and Operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Iraqi Freedom
and Enduring Freedom. [5, p. 13]
Today, as a critical component of the U.S. National Fleet, the Coast Guard maintains a
high state of readiness to operate as a specialized service alongside the Navy and
Marine Corps and to provide direct support to combatant commanders. Coast Guard
competencies and resources are included in the National Military Strategy and other
national-level defense and security strategies with special emphasis on the following
Coast Guard national defense capabilities:
Maritime interception and interdiction;
Military environmental response;
Port operations, security, and defense;
Theater security cooperation;
Coastal sea control;
Part IV: Mission Components
The Coast Guard
enforces, or assists in
enforcing, federal laws,
treaties, and other
international
agreements on waters
subject to U.S.
jurisdiction and on the
high seas. They are the
designated lead agency
for maritime interdiction
under the National Drug
Control Strategy and the
co-lead agency for air
interdiction operations
with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection.
463
Rotary wing air intercept;
Combating terrorism; and
Maritime Operational Threat Response support
These support the unified combatant commanders and require that the Coast Guard to
execute essential military operations in peacetime, crisis, and war. [5, p. 13]
The Coast Guard’s domestic law enforcement and port security expertise are uniquely
valuable today as combatant commanders work to build foreign nation capacity for
security and governance. The Coast Guard has been requested to conduct at-sea
interception and anti-piracy operations, foreign liaison, and other supporting warfare
tasks in all key theaters. In addition, the Coast Guard can reduce international tension
by promoting global economic security through enhanced international capacity to
preserve sustainable fish stocks and other living marine resources. [5, p. 14]
The Coast Guard has been responsible for the security of the ports and waterways of
the United States during times of war since the enactment of the 1917 Espionage Act.
After World War II, the Magnuson Act of 1950 assigned the Coast Guard an ongoing
responsibility to safeguard U.S. ports, harbors, vessels, and waterfront facilities from
accidents, sabotage, or other subversive actions. Building on this foundation, the Coast
Guard provides expeditionary port security and harbor defense as a key component of
national defense operations. [5, p. 14]
The national security environment has changed since the end of the Cold War and
especially after the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.
Port, waterways, and coastal security took on increased importance as a result.
Denying terrorists the use of the U.S. maritime domain and the U.S. MTS to mount
attacks on American territory, population, or critical infrastructure has become a
critical objective. [5, p. 15]
Coast Guard authorities were further strengthened with the passage of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002. This designated Coast Guard Captains of the Port
as the Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC). Thus they became the lead
agency for coordinating all maritime security planning and operations in U.S. ports and
waterways. These activities encompass all efforts to prevent or respond to threats and
hazards. [5, p. 15]
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
The 2002 Maritime
Transportation Security
Act designated Coast
Guard Captains of the
Port responsibility for
coordinating all
maritime security
planning and operations
in U.S. ports and
waterways. These
activities encompass all
efforts to prevent or
respond to threats and
hazards.
464
Maritime security is a continuing theme running throughout the Coast Guard’s history
of service to America. It requires a breadth of experience and skills—seamanship,
diplomacy, legal expertise, and combat readiness. In conjunction with the other areas
of traditional Coast Guard expertise-peacetime military engagement and humanitarian
assistance-these skills have been honed for more than two centuries. No other federal
agency offers this combination of law enforcement and military capabilities, together
with the legal authorities to carry them out. [5, p. 15]
Maritime Stewardship
The Coast Guard’s efforts, however, go beyond the safety and security missions. They
respond to oil spills, provide relief supplies to victims of war or man-made and natural
disasters, ensure safe marine transportation, conduct peacetime engagement visits to
foreign countries, or work with international organizations to improve the safety of
commercial shipping. These activities add a distinctive humanitarian dimension to their
character, and help define who they are. [5, p. 11]
The U.S. waters are vital to the nation’s well-being and economy. The marine
environment of the United States is one of the most valuable natural resources on
Earth, containing one-fifth of the world’s fisheries resources. It is also a region of
extraordinary recreation, energy and mineral resources, and transportation activities.
Finally, it is an inseparable part of the national heritage and the daily fabric of life in its
coastal communities. [5, p. 16]
The Coast Guard’s role in protecting natural resources dates back to the 1820s when
Congress tasked the Revenue Marine with the protection of federal stocks of live oak
trees in Florida. These trees were deemed critical to the security of the young nation
because they provided the best wood for shipbuilding. As the exploitation of the U.S.’s
valuable marine resources—whales, fur bearing animals, and fish—increased, the
Coast Guard was given the duty to protect these living resources as well.
The Coast Guard serves as the primary federal agency for at-sea fisheries enforcement.
In coordination with other federal and state agencies, they enforce marine resource
management and protection regimes to preserve healthy and sustainable stocks of fish
and other living marine resources. Their actions also help to safeguard a multi-billion
dollar industry, preserving thousands of jobs. [5, p. 16] In 1976, the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act created an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),
extending the U.S. sovereign rights out to 200 nautical miles for fisheries and other
natural resources. The Coast Guard patrols these areas to uphold U.S. sovereignty and
protect precious resources. Today, international fisheries agreements have extended
U.S. jurisdiction to waters beyond the EEZ.
Part IV: Mission Components
The Coast Guard serves
as the primary federal
agency for at-sea
fisheries enforcement. In
coordination with other
federal and state
agencies, they enforce
marine resource
management and
protection regimes to
preserve healthy and
sustainable stocks of
fish and other living
marine resources.
465
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard stewardship role has expanded to include enforcing laws intended to
protect the environment for the common good. As a result, they safeguard sensitive
marine habitats, mammals, and endangered species. They enforce laws protecting U.S.
waters from the discharge of oil, hazardous substances, and non-indigenous invasive
species.
To do all of this, the Coast Guard conducts a wide range of activities. These include
education and prevention; law enforcement; emergency response and containment;
and disaster recovery. They also provide critical command and control support for
forces responding to environmental disasters in the maritime domain. Under the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, Coast Guard
Captains of the Port (COTPs) are the pre-designated Federal On-Scene Coordinators
(FOSC) for oil and hazardous substance incidents in all coastal and some inland areas.
The FOSC is the President’s designated on-scene representative and, as such, is
responsible for coordinating effective response operations among a diverse group of
government and commercial entities in sometimes emotionally charged and often
dangerous emergency situations. [5, p. 17]
While the health of U.S. waters and marine resources is vital to the economy, its
waterways are also an economic highway essential to the nation’s access to several
billion tons of foreign and domestic freight annually. Waterborne trade generates
millions of jobs and contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the U.S. gross
domestic product each year. The U.S. MTS and its inter-modal links support economic
prosperity, military strength, and national security. This complex system includes
international and domestic passenger services, commercial and recreational fisheries,
and recreational boating. [5, p. 17]
The Coast Guard carries out numerous port and waterways management tasks as well.
They are responsible for providing a safe, efficient, and navigable waterway system to
support domestic commerce, international trade, and military sealift requirements for
national defense. They provide short-range aids to navigation; navigation schemes and
standards; support for mapping and charting; tide, current, and pilotage information;
vessel traffic services; domestic icebreaking to facilitate commerce; and technical
assistance and advice. Finally, with increasing human activity and international interest
in the Arctic, the Coast Guard is at the forefront in protecting the U.S. northern
frontier. They train and equip their personnel to operate in the extreme Polar
environment and ensure they are ready to respond to crises in both Polar Regions.
With improved Arctic awareness, modernized maritime governance, and broadened
partnerships, their service is postured to protect national interests and promote
international cooperation. The Coast Guard’s ability to ensure maritime safety,
security, and stewardship makes them truly a unique instrument of national strategy.
They not only safeguard U.S. coasts and the maritime community, they safeguard the
nation’s economic prosperity. [5, p. 19]
The Coast Guard is
responsible for providing
a safe, efficient, and
navigable waterway
system to support
domestic commerce,
international trade, and
military sealift. They
provide short-range aids
to navigation;
navigation schemes and
standards; support for
mapping and charting;
tide, current, and
pilotage information;
vessel traffic services;
domestic icebreaking to
facilitate commerce;
and technical assistance
and advice.
466
Workforce
Mission success is made possible by the combined activities of Coast Guard operational
and support personnel. The Coast Guard’s missions are accomplished by its forces
which have evolved as they have grown and today reflect the uniqueness of its Service.
Coast Guardsmen (men and women of the Active, Reserve, Civilian, and Auxiliary) are
their most valuable resource. This teamwork is key to ensuring Coast Guard readiness,
agility, and operational excellence. They also rely on the help of its many federal, state,
local, tribal, and private sector partners. The Coast Guard’s full-time workforce is made
up of approximately 42,000 active duty military personnel and over 6,800 civilian
employees. They are augmented when necessary by small numbers of civilians working
under contract. [5, p. 20]
The Coast Guard Reserve offers the opportunity to serve in the military part-time while
maintaining a separate civilian career. The Reserve provides the Coast Guard highly
trained and well qualified personnel for active duty in times of war and national
emergency, and for augmentation of Coast Guard forces during natural or man-made
disasters or accidents. The Coast Guard Reserve, numbering nearly 8,000 members,
provides the Coast Guard surge capacity and flexibility to respond to all threats and all
hazards. [5, p. 21]
In addition, the over 32,000 men and women of the uniformed all volunteer U.S. Coast
Guard Auxiliary spend thousands of hours each year, often on their personal vessels
and aircraft, helping to carry out Coast Guard missions. On some waterways,
Auxiliarists are the principal Coast Guard personnel serving the public. They are
probably best known for their boating safety classes and courtesy vessel safety checks.
However, since 1997 they have supported all Coast Guard missions except those
Part IV: Mission Components
Figure 29-1: United States Coast Guard Organization Chart [6]
The Coast Guard’s full-
time workforce is made
up of approximately
42,000 active duty
military personnel and
over 6,800 civilian
employees.
467
involving military operations, law enforcement, and intelligence. The Coast Guard
Auxiliary is the only all-volunteer component within the Department of Homeland
Security. All together, the Coast Guard manages to carry out its missions with a
combined force of approximately 88,800 active, reserve, auxiliarist, and civilian
personnel. Figure 1 the organizational structure of the Coast Guard. By comparison,
the next smallest U.S. Armed Force is the U.S. Marine Corps with more than 180,000
active duty members alone. [5, p. 21]
Service Area
The Coast Guard grew as the nation grew providing its services across several districts
based upon the location of each station’s home port. Today, the Coast Guard is
organized across nine districts as depicted in Figure 2.
America’s enduring maritime interests—its reliance on the seas for commerce,
sustenance, and defense—has changed little since colonial days. The U.S. Coast Guard
exists to uphold and protect these interests. The United States is a maritime nation,
with extensive interests in its waters and far beyond. Having 95,000 miles of shoreline
and nearly 4.5 million square miles (3.4 million square nautical miles) of Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), the United States will always remain tied to the sea. The seas link
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
Figure 29-2: United States Coast Guard Districts [7]
Coast Guard forces
operate within nine
geographic regions
encompassing the
continental United
States, Alaska, and
Hawaii.
468
Part IV: Mission Components
the nation with world trade and commerce. Utilizing the seas allows the Coast Guard
to project military power beyond U.S. shores, protect important U.S. interests, and
assist allies and friends. Alternatively, the seas also serve as highways for criminal and
terrorist threats that honor no national borders. The Coast Guard protects the nation’s
territorial integrity; its natural and economic resources; critical infrastructure; and the
U.S. Marine Transportation System—from all threats, internal and external, natural
and man-made. The MTS is comprised of 25,000 miles of inland, intracoastal, and
coastal waterways encompassing nearly 200 locks, 361 commercial sea and river ports,
and 1,000 harbor channels; along America’s coasts; in international waters; and in any
other maritime region where they may be at risk. [5, p. 5]
Operational Force Structure
Coast Guard forces are organized into a maritime trident of forces. Shore-Based Forces
are comprised of Sector Commands and specific subordinate units that operate in
ports, waterways, and coastal regions of the U.S. and its territories. [5, p. 22] Sector
commands include a command and control element and staff (with organic mission
support and intelligence functions), and prevention and response elements. Prevention
elements conduct marine inspections, waterways management, and marine
investigations activities (e.g., aids-to-navigation, issuing safety and security zones,
inspecting regulated vessels and facilities, investigating marine casualties). Response
elements conduct incident management and enforcement activities. (e.g., SAR,
pollution investigation, security patrols, vessel boardings). Shore-based forces execute
the broad legal authorities and roles of the Sector Commander, which include:
Captain of the Port (COTP), with authority over maritime commerce and
waterways;
Federal Maritime Security Coordinator (FMSC), with authority over maritime
security;
Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection (OCMI), with authority over vessel standards
compliance;
Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC), with authority over rescue
operations; and
Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC), with authority over oil and hazardous
material spill response and preparedness.
Subordinate shore-based units include boat stations, aids to navigation teams, marine
safety units, vessel traffic services, river, construction, and buoy tenders, and harbor
and icebreaking tugs. Although Coast Guard air stations are shore-based commands, all
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft that deploy from air stations are categorized as
maritime patrol forces because of the capabilities and employment. [5, p. 22]
Coast Guard forces are
operationally organized
into 1) Shore-Based
Forces, 2) Maritime
Patrol and Interdiction
Forces, and 3)
Deployable Specialized
Forces.
469
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
Maritime Patrol and Interdiction Forces
Maritime patrol forces are comprised of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft and their
crews. These assets deploy primarily in coastal and offshore areas to conduct
prevention and response operations through patrol, presence, and at-sea operations
(e.g., interdiction, boarding, enforcement, search and rescue). Cutters provide armed,
persistent presence and command and control capabilities throughout the maritime
domain. In addition to conducting Coast Guard operations, cutters project U.S.
presence and protect U.S. sovereignty. These forces provide unique capabilities to the
Department of Defense (DoD) for joint operations, including warfighting under
combatant commander operational control. Cutters also include the polar icebreakers,
the nation’s only capability for providing access to Polar Regions when restricted by
ice. Maritime patrol forces also conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) activities in support of Coast Guard and national requirements. Maritime patrol
forces can also operate in inland areas when required, such as performing mobile
command and control, prevention and response operations following a disaster or
disruption to normal Sector operations, or when Sectors require augmenting forces. [5,
p. 23]
Deployable Specialized Forces
Deployable specialized forces (DSF) are teams of readily available and globally
deployable personnel and assets with specialized capabilities, organized into unit types
by specialty function and capabilities. [5, p. 24] DSF conduct operations across a broad
range of Coast Guard missions where their unique capabilities are required.
The DSF engage in a broad range of activities including traditional law enforcement,
short notice maritime response to threats delivered from the sea, high-end pollution
and hazardous materials response, and military diving operations. The DSF, which
include some reserve units, may be combined with other forces, both within and
outside of the Coast Guard, to form integrated, multi-agency force packages. [5, p. 25]
These forces include:
Port Security Units
Maritime Safety and Security Teams
Maritime Security Response Teams
Law Enforcement Detachments
National Strike Force
Military Divers
Coast Guard Deployable
Specialized Forces
engage in a broad range
of activities including
traditional law
enforcement, short
notice maritime
response to threats
delivered from the sea,
high-end pollution and
hazardous materials
response, and military
diving operations.
470
Part IV: Mission Components
Conclusion
The Coast Guard’s ability to fulfill its three broad roles— maritime safety, maritime
security, and maritime stewardship— makes them truly a unique instrument of
national policy and well-being. More than simply “guarding the coast,” the Coast Guard
helps safeguard the global maritime commons. To meet the challenges of the dynamic
maritime environment, the Coast Guard executes a layered, security-in-depth concept
of operations, built upon a multi-dimensional framework of authorities, capabilities,
competencies, and partnerships to apply its core operational concept of Prevention—
Response. Through this approach, the Coast Guard seeks to prevent dangerous or illicit
maritime activities, and if undesirable or unlawful events do occur—whether
deliberate or accidental—to rapidly and effectively respond in order to protect the
United States, minimize the impact, and recover.
471 Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the military mission of the United States Coast Guard
2. What is the homeland security mission of the United States Coast Guard
3. Which USCG role involves inspecting vessels, offshore drilling units, and marine facilities?
4. Which USCG role involves enforcing the nation’s laws and controlling its borders?
5. Which USCG role involves protecting the nation’s fisheries and maintaining its navigable waterways?
6. How big is the USCG in comparison to the NYPD?
7. Which USCG district might be called upon to rescue fishermen casting for king crab?
8. Which USCG district might be called upon to board and inspect the Michipicoten?
9. What is the Captain of the Port’s responsibility with respect to oil spills?
10. What can USCG Deployable Specialized Forces do?
472
Part IV: Mission Components
473
Chapter 30: TSA
Transportation &
Security Administration
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 30
Learning Outcomes
474 Part IV: Mission Components
“On November 19, 2001, the President signed into law the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001. The act established a series of challenging but important
milestones toward achieving a secure air travel system. More broadly, however, the act
fundamentally changed the way transportation security will be performed and
managed in the United States.”
2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Introduction
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in the wake of 9/11 to
strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems while ensuring the
freedom of movement for people and commerce. Within a year, TSA assumed
responsibility for security at the nation’s airports and deployed a federal workforce to
meet Congressional deadlines for screening all commercial airline passengers and
baggage. In March 2003, TSA transferred from the Department of Transportation to
the Department of Homeland Security. [1]
The TSA employs a risk-based strategy to secure U.S. transportation systems, working
closely with stakeholders in aviation, rail, transit, highway, and pipeline sectors, as well
as the partners in the law enforcement and intelligence community. The agency
continuously sets the standard for excellence in transportation security through its
people, processes, technologies and use of intelligence to drive operations.
The TSA employs over 50,000 full-time employees charged with protecting U.S.
transportation systems and the traveling public who serve on the front lines at more
than 450 U.S. airports as well as across all modes of transportation in the U.S. 100
percent of all checked and carry-on baggage is screened for explosives and the TSA
continually assesses intelligence to develop countermeasures in order to enhance its
multiple layers of security at airports and onboard aircraft. TSA also secures and
safeguards mass transit and railroad operations through a variety of programs. By
performing baseline and collaborative risk assessments in the mass transit and
passenger railroad domains, TSA is able to engage state and local partners to identify
ways to reduce vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve security efforts. [2] Ultimately,
the TSA looks for bombs at checkpoints in airports, inspects rail cars, patrols subways
with its law enforcement partners, and works to make all modes of transportation
safe.
The Transportation
Security Administration
was created in response
to the 9/11 attacks as
part of the Aviation and
Transportation Security
Act (ATSA, Public Law
107-71) passed by the
U.S. Congress and
signed into law by
President George W.
Bush on November 19,
2001 which among
other things established
the new Transportation
Security Administration
(TSA).
475 Chapter 30: TSA
Background
The Transportation Security Administration was created in response to the 9/11
attacks as part of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, Public Law 107-
71) passed by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush on
November 19, 2001 which among other things established the new Transportation
Security Administration within the Department of Transportation. Under the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, TSA transferred to DHS in March, 2003. [3]
The organization was charged with developing policies to protect U.S. transportation
to include airport security, aircraft hijacking, and other forms of transportation
including highways, railroads, buses, mass transit systems, pipelines and ports.
Mission
The TSA’s mission is to protect the nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom
of movement for people and commerce. The TSA, an agency in the Department of
Homeland Security, is responsible for protecting the nation’s transportation networks
from attack. Specifically, it safeguards airports and airplanes, mass-transit systems,
highways, seaports, railroads and buses. Ultimately, the TSA’s vision is to provide the
most effective transportation security while serving as a high performing counter-
terrorism organization. [4]
Organization
As a federal operation, the TSA is a component of the Department of Homeland
Security promoting confidence by deploying personnel to detect, deter, and defeat
hostile acts targeting all modes of transportation in the U.S. With state, local and
regional partners, the TSA oversees security for highways, railroads, buses, mass
transit systems, pipelines, ports, and over 450 U.S. airports. [1]
The TSA’s leadership and organization is comprised of the Administrator and Deputy
Administrator, along with various administrative, law enforcement, and security
operations personnel.
TSA’s mission is to
protect the nation's
transportation systems
to ensure freedom of
movement for people
and commerce.
476 Part IV: Mission Components
Given that the bulk of the TSA's efforts are in aviation security, the TSA employs
Transportation Security Officers, colloquially known as screeners, as well as Federal Air
Marshals, Transportation Security Specialists and Transportation Security Inspectors,
and oversees the training and testing of explosives detection canine teams with very
specific job responsibilities:
The Transportation Security Officer (TSO), also known as a screener, performs
security screening of persons and property and controls entry and exit points
within an airport. They also practice surveillance of several areas before and
beyond the checkpoints with specialized programs. [5, p. 6]
Behavioral Detection Officers are personnel who, as part of the Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, are trained to serve as an
additional layer of security in airports by providing a non-intrusive means of
identifying individuals who may pose a risk of terrorism or criminal activity. In
behavior-based screening, trained personnel attempt to identify anomalous
behaviors by observing passengers and comparing what they see to an established
behavioral baseline of other passengers developed in the same general location
and within the same timeframe. [5, p. 17]
The Federal Air Marshal (FAM) is a federal law enforcement officer who, while
blending in with passengers, are tasked with detecting, deterring, and defeating
terrorist or other criminal hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports,
passengers, crew, and when necessary, other transportation modes within the
U.S.'s general transportation systems. [6]
Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs) have the authority to enforce security
regulations and to help stakeholders improve their security in the surface modes,
which include the mass transit, freight rail, highway, and pipeline sectors. [7, p. 2]
The TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program prepares dogs and
handlers to serve as mobile teams that can quickly locate and identify dangerous
materials that may present a threat to transportation systems. [8, p. 15]
After the 2004 Madrid train bombings, which killed 191 people and wounded 1,800
more, TSA developed the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program
to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location within the
United States. These teams are comprised of people from each of the above areas,
where applicable, that are deployed at the request of local, state and federal law
enforcement to support their efforts and enhance the security presence during specific
alert periods or major high-profile events. [5, p. 17]
TSA employs
Transportation Security
Officers (TSOs), Federal
Air Marshals (FAMs),
Transportation Security
Specialists (TSSs) and
Transportation Security
Inspectors (TSIs), and
oversees the training
and testing of explosives
detection canine teams.
477 Chapter 30: TSA
Operations
The U.S. transportation systems accommodate: approximately 660 million domestic
and international aviation passengers per year; 751 million passengers traveling on
buses each year; more than 10 billion passenger trips on mass transit per year; 24
million students daily on school buses traveling more than 4 million miles annually;
nearly 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials transported every day (95 percent by
truck); more than 140,000 miles of railroad track; 3.9 million miles of roads; 604,000
bridges each spanning over 20 feet; 366 highway tunnels each over 300 feet in length;
and nearly 2.6 million miles of pipeline. [10, p. 57]
The focus of the TSA is to identify, prioritize, and mitigate risks, ultimately minimizing
the impact of potential incidents. Information sharing among agencies and
stakeholders – including intelligence information – is a cornerstone of the risk
management model.
The TSA recognizes the unique attributes of each transportation mode and works to
ensure passenger and cargo security and to preserve public confidence in the security
of the U.S. transportation system overall. The TSA’s specific responsibilities include:
Ensuring a thorough and efficient screening of all aviation passengers and baggage;
Promoting confidence by deploying Federal Air Marshals to detect, deter, and
defeat hostile acts targeting air carriers;
Figure 30-1: TSA Organization Chart 2010 [9]
The focus of the TSA is
to identify, prioritize,
and mitigate risks,
ultimately minimizing
the impact of potential
incidents. Information
sharing among agencies
and stakeholders –
including intelligence
information – is a
cornerstone of the risk
management model.
478
Part IV: Mission Components
Managing security risks of the surface transportation systems by establishing clear
lines of communication and collaborative working relationships with federal, local,
and private stakeholders, providing support and programmatic direction,
conducting on-site inspections, and developing security programs; and
Developing and implementing more efficient, reliable, integrated, and cost
effective terrorist-related screening programs. [10, pp. 57-58]
Service to the Public
The TSA’s responsibilities, which span all modes of transportation, ensure the provision
of proactive security measures and a quick and efficient response to any threat,
including terrorist incidents and natural disasters. Public confidence in the security of
the nation’s transportation systems ensures the continued success and growth of the
industry. TSA engages the public in the security of the transportation system by
encouraging them to report suspicious behavior. TSA also strives to provide excellent
customer service to all travelers. TSA provides information to all travelers through its
TSA Contact Center, Customer Service Managers in airports nationwide, the TSA
website and blog, and Twitter and other social media outlets. Additionally, TSA Cares is
a dedicated toll free number established to assist passengers or their loved ones with
disabilities, medical conditions, or other special circumstances to prepare for the
screening process.
Aviation Security
The TSA employs several programs and initiatives to achieve its goal of security in all
modes of transportation. Using the layered security approach to ensure the security of
the traveling public and the nation’s transportation system, the TSA not only uses
passenger checkpoints at airports, but includes intelligence gathering and analysis,
checking passenger manifests against watch lists, random canine team searches at
airports, federal air marshals, federal flight deck officers and more security measures
both visible and not visible to the public.
As an additional layer of security, the TSA Secure Flight program conducts passenger
watch list matching for 100 percent of covered U.S. aircraft operator and foreign air
carrier flight. The program is designed to identify any passengers who may pose a
threat to aviation or national security and designate them for enhanced screening or,
as appropriate, prohibit them from boarding an aircraft. This program identifies
individuals who may pose a threat to aviation or national security and designates them
for enhanced screening or, as appropriate, prohibits them from boarding an aircraft.
Although the TSA does not conduct passenger screening abroad, it requires airports
that serve as the last point of departure to the U.S. to meet stringent security
standards. The TSA assesses the security programs of all U.S. and foreign air carriers
that serve last points of departure. [11]
TSA uses a layered
approach for airport
security, beginning with
passenger checkpoints,
and including
intelligence gathering
and analysis, checking
passenger manifests
against watch lists,
random canine team
searches at airports,
federal air marshals,
federal flight deck
officers and more
security measures both
visible and not visible to
the public.
479 Chapter 30: TSA
Security Screening
TSA has evolved from a one-size-fits-all security screening approach to a risk-based,
intelligence-driven strategy designed to improve both security and the passenger
experience. This approach permits the TSA to provide expedited screening for trusted
travelers and to focus on high-risk and unknown passengers at security checkpoints.
TSA officers may use risk-based security measures to identify, mitigate and resolve
potential threats at the airport security checkpoint. These officers may ask questions
about passengers’ travel to include identity, travel itinerary and property. The TSA may
use a variety of screening processes, including random screening, regardless of
whether an alarm is triggered. In addition, the TSA uses random and unpredictable
security measures throughout the airport and no individual is guaranteed expedited
screening.
TSA Pre® is an expedited security screening program connecting travelers departing
from the United States with smarter security and a better air travel experience.
Passengers considered low-risk who qualify for the program can receive expedited
screening either as a member of the program or another specific trusted traveler
group.
TSA SPOT
A 2012 article in the New York Times criticized the Transportation Security Administration’s behavior
detection program as one of racial profiling. The article stated that over 30 federal officers from Boston
Logan International Airport reportedly expressed concerns that the program targets Middle Easterners,
blacks, Hispanics, and other minorities as a race-based program rather than a behavioral-based program.
The TSA responded by stating that the agency “in no way encourages or tolerates profiling and bans
singling out passengers based on nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.” Yet, officers indicated that
minorities are frequently targeted in response to the pressure from management to attain a certain
threshold of referrals to law enforcement agencies and to demonstrate that the program is producing
results. The TSA indicated that the behavioral detection program is designed to assess passengers “for
unusual activity, but also to speak individually with each passenger and gauge their reactions while asking
about their trip or for other information. The assessors look for inconsistencies in the answers and other
signs of unusual behavior, like avoiding eye contact, sweating or fidgeting…a passenger considered to be
acting suspiciously can be pulled from the line and subjected to more intensive questioning”. [5]
TSA began deploying the SPOT program in fiscal year 2007—and has since spent about $900 million—to
identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security through the observation of behavioral
indicators. In May 2010, GAO concluded, among other things, that TSA deployed SPOT without validating
its scientific basis and SPOT lacked performance measures. The GAO recommended that Congress should
consider the absence of scientifically validated evidence for using behavioral indicators to identify threats
to aviation security when assessing the potential benefits and cost in making future funding decisions for
aviation security. GAO included this matter because DHS did not concur with GAO’s recommendation that
TSA limit future funding for these activities until it can provide such evidence, in part because DHS
disagreed with GAO’s analysis of indicators. [6]
TSA has evolved from a
one-size-fits-all security
screening approach to a
risk-based, intelligence-
driven strategy designed
to improve both security
and the passenger
experience.
480 Part IV: Mission Components
Screening Technology
TSA uses millimeter wave advanced imaging technology and walk-through metal
detectors to screen passengers. Millimeter wave advanced imaging technology safely
screens passengers without physical contact for metallic and non-metallic threats,
including weapons and explosives, which may be concealed under clothing. Passengers
have the option to request a pat-down as an alternative. The advanced imaging
technology is considered safe and meets national health and safety standards. This
technology uses non-ionizing radio-frequency energy in the millimeter spectrum with
no known adverse health effects. It does not use X-ray technology. The TSA has strict
privacy standards when using advanced imaging technology to protect passengers’
privacy. Advanced imaging technology uses automated target recognition software
that eliminates passenger-specific images and instead auto-detects potential threats
by indicating their location on a generic outline of a person. [12]
Pat-down Screening
If a passenger cannot or chooses not to be screened by advanced imaging technology
or a walk-through metal detector, they will undergo a pat-down procedure instead.
Passengers may also undergo a pat-down procedure if they alarm the screening
equipment and/or at random. [12]
DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP)
The Department of Homeland Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) is
a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding
difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs—like
airports and train stations—or crossing U.S. borders. This includes:
watch list issues;
screening problems at ports of entry; or
situations where travelers believe they have been unfairly or incorrectly delayed,
denied boarding or identified for additional screening at U.S. transportation hubs.
DHS TRIP is part of an effort by the departments of State and Homeland Security to
welcome legitimate travelers while still securing the nation from those who want to do
harm. People who have been denied or delayed airline boarding; have been denied or
delayed entry into or exit from the U.S. at a port of entry or border crossing; or have
been repeatedly referred to additional (secondary) screening can file an inquiry to seek
redress. [13]
TSA uses millimeter
wave advanced imaging
technology and walk-
through metal detectors
to screen passengers.
Millimeter
wave advanced imaging
technology safely
screens passengers
without physical
contact for metallic and
non-metallic threats,
including weapons and
explosives, which may
be concealed under
clothing.
481 Chapter 30: TSA
Aviation Training Programs
The TSA provides flight crew training programs to prepare them for potential threat
conditions that may occur onboard an aircraft. These programs include the Federal
Flight Deck Officer Program which authorizes flight crew members to use firearms to
defend against an act of criminal violence and air piracy while attempting to gain
control of an aircraft; the Crew Member Self Defense Training Program which provides
4-hours of training to prepare active crew members of all domestic scheduled carriers
for potential physical altercations both on and off the aircraft; and the Federal Air
Marshal Service provides training of armed security officers required on approved
flights associated with restoration of general aviation and charter flight operations at
Washington Reagan National Airport (DCA). The training is designed to better prepare
the qualified active, retired and former law enforcement officer to react within the
unique general aircraft environment in the event of an in-flight crisis on approved
flights into DCA. [14]
Alien Flight Student Program
The TSA conducts Security Threat Assessments (STA) on individuals who are not U.S.
citizens or nationals and other individuals designated by TSA seeking flight instruction
or recurrent training from Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-certified flight training
providers to ensure that aliens and other individuals designated by TSA seeking such
training do not pose a threat to aviation or national security. [15, p. 1]
Cargo Screening
Securing the global supply chain, while ensuring its smooth functioning, is essential to
national security and economic prosperity. This vital system provides the goods that
feed the nation’s domestic critical infrastructures and supports the American way of
life. The Department of Homeland Security uses a multi-layered approach to air cargo
security, including enhanced screening requirements for known and established
shippers, explosive detection canine teams, and covert tests and no-notice inspections
of cargo operations in order to promote the efficient and secure movement of goods.
[16]
Other nations worldwide also rely upon the goods transported by the global supply
chain system – in that sense it is a global asset that all stakeholders must
collaboratively work to strengthen. The international community has also made
significant progress in protecting the global supply chain through Program Global
Shield, which was launched in 2011 in collaboration with the World Customs
Organization, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and Interpol. [16]
TSA uses a multi-layered
approach to air cargo
security, including
enhanced screening
requirements for known
and established
shippers, explosive
detection canine teams,
and covert tests and no-
notice inspections of
cargo operations in
order to promote the
efficient and secure
movement of goods.
482 Part IV: Mission Components
In conjunction with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Container Security
Initiative (CSI), the TSA is responsible for ensuring the security of cargo placed aboard
airplanes and particularly focuses on passenger-carrying planes. As required by the
9/11 Act, 100 percent of all cargo transported on passenger aircraft departing U.S.
airports is now screened commensurate with screening of passenger checked baggage
and international inbound air cargo is more secure than it has ever been, with 100
percent of identified high risk cargo being screened. [16]
Mass Transit and Rail Security
The Transportation Security Administration is responsible for security in all modes of
transportation, including mass transit and passenger rail systems. The U.S. passenger
rail network is critical to the American way of life, transporting more than 12 million
commuters each day. Passenger rail systems face a dynamic landscape of potential
natural disasters, accidents, and terrorist attacks. Since 1995, there have been more
than 250 terrorist attacks worldwide against rail targets, resulting in nearly 900 deaths
and more than 6,000 injuries. The Transportation Security Administration, the Federal
Transit Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency share responsibilities, programs, and resource
investments to mass transit and passenger rail emergencies. [17, p. 1]
The Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement (BASE) program is a voluntary
program implemented by Transportation Security Inspectors in the Office of
Security Operations. Inspectors review documents, question passenger rail
personnel, and observe security measures within the transit system. The BASE
program seeks to identify program gaps or weaknesses and develop best practices
applicable to all passenger rail systems. [17, p. 3]
The Public Transportation Emergency Preparedness Workshops (Connecting
Communities) integrate mass transit and passenger rail security, operations, and
emergency management officials with law enforcement and emergency response
partners in their operating areas. The goal of the workshops is to unite passenger
rail stakeholders from a variety of organizations, including first responders, to
foster dialogue, improve planning efforts, review past experiences, analyze best
practices, and identify assets and resources to enhance overall interoperability and
response during passenger rail incidents. [17, p. 3]
The Transportation
Security Administration
is responsible for
security in all modes of
transportation,
including mass transit
and passenger rail
systems.
483 Chapter 30: TSA
The Training Matrix and Recommended Courses List is coordinated by the Office of
Transportation Sector Network Management to support mass transit and
passenger rail agencies’ security and emergency management training. The list
includes recommended instruction in security awareness, behavior recognition,
immediate-emergency response, the National Incident Management System, and
Operations Control Center Readiness. The TSGP provides funds to owners and
operators of mass transit and passenger rail systems to protect the critical surface
transportation infrastructure and the traveling public from acts of terrorism, major
disasters, and other emergencies. [17, p. 4]
The Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) is designed to
improve the intermodal transportation industry’s ability to prepare for and
respond to transportation security incidents by increasing awareness, improving
processes, creating partnerships, and delivering training exercises to mass transit
and passenger rail stakeholders. Through the I-STEP, TSA employs multi-phased
workshops, table top exercises, and working groups to integrate mass transit and
passenger rail agencies with regional law enforcement and emergency response
partners to expand and enhance coordinated deterrent and incident management
capabilities. [17, p. 4]
Conclusion
Established in 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employs a
layered, risk-based approach to secure U.S. transportation systems, working closely
with stakeholders in aviation, rail, transit, highway, and pipeline sectors, as well as the
partners in the law enforcement and intelligence community. The agency continuously
sets the standard for excellence in transportation security through its people,
processes, technologies and use of intelligence to drive operations. The TSA is
committed to evolving its systems to enhance the safety of the traveling public as well
as individual passenger experiences whenever possible. The agency’s risk-based,
intelligence-driven approach to aviation security is evolving from what may have
seemed like a one-size-fits-all approach and is establishing TSA as a high performing
counterterrorism agency. The TSA is now focusing resources on those the agency
knows the least about, and using intelligence in better ways to inform the screening
process. This risk-mitigation strategy makes both good business and security sense. [1]
484
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the Transportation Security Administration?
2. Which TSA personnel, commonly known as “screeners”, perform security checks at airport entrances and exits?
3. Which TSA personnel have law enforcement authority, yet travel incognito and try to avoid recognition?
4. List and describe the different layers of security found at an airport.
5. List and describe two benefits and two risks of the TSA Pre® program.
6. What is the primary advantage of using advanced imaging technology at airports compared to magnetometers?
7. What can you do if you are unfairly or incorrectly delayed or denied boarding at an airport?
8. What methods does TSA generally employ to screen air cargo?
9. Which TSA program performs voluntary security assessments for passenger rail owners/operators?
10. Which TSA program conducts workshops uniting passenger rail stakeholders from different organizations?
Part IV: Mission Components
485
U.S. Customs &
Border Protection
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 31
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 31: CBP
486 Part IV: Mission Components
“The border and immigration system of the United States must remain a visible
manifestation of our belief in freedom, democracy, global economic growth, and the
rule of law, yet serve equally well as a vital element of counterterrorism.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), is responsible for facilitating international trade while keeping terrorists
and weapons of mass destruction from entering the United States.
Background
CBP traces its origins to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
originally stipulated in the 2002 Homeland Security Act. In late January 2003, as
components of DHS were being transferred to the department’s operational control,
President George W. Bush modified his original reorganization plan for DHS to
reconfigure the functions of certain border security agencies into two new
components — the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement — within the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate. As part of his Second Stage Review (2SR), Secretary Chertoff
dismantled BTS to form a new Office of Operations Coordination (OOC). As a
consequence, CBP became an independent bureau reporting directly to the Secretary
of Homeland Security. [1]
Mission
CBP is the primary agency charged with monitoring, regulating, and facilitating the flow
of goods through U.S. ports of entry (POEs), and protecting the nation’s borders. CBP’s
policies are designed to (1) ensure the smooth flow of imported cargo through U.S.
POEs; (2) enforce trade and customs laws designed to protect U.S. consumers and
business and to collect customs revenue; and (3) prevent weapons of mass
destruction, illegal drugs, and other contraband from entering the United States—a
complex and difficult mission. [2, p. ii]
CBP is the primary
agency charged with
monitoring, regulating,
and facilitating the flow
of goods through U.S.
ports of entry (POEs),
and protecting the
nation’s borders.
487
Chapter 31: CBP
International trade is a critical component of the U.S. economy, with U.S. goods trade
amounting to about $4 trillion in 2014, with merchandise imports of $2.4 trillion and
exports of $1.6 trillion. The efficient flow of legally traded goods in and out of the
United States is thus a vital element of the country’s economic security. While U.S.
trade in imports depends on the smooth flow of legal cargo through U.S. ports of
entry, the goal of trade facilitation often competes with two additional goals:
enforcement of U.S. trade laws and import security. How to strike the appropriate
balance among these three goals is a fundamental question at the heart of U.S. import
policies. [2, p. 1]
Striking the appropriate balance among competing import policy goals is made more
difficult due to the volume and complexity of trade inflows. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the agency charged with managing the import process at the border,
admitted about 30.4 million import entries per year through over 300 U.S. POEs, in
fiscal year (FY) 2013. The largest volume of imports comes through land (truck and rail)
and maritime flows, which together account for over 25 million shipping containers per
year. Air cargo consists mainly of lower volume, higher value goods. [2, p. 1]
CBP’s current import strategy emphasizes a risk management approach that segments
importers into higher and lower risk pools and focuses trade enforcement and import
security procedures on higher-risk imports, while expediting lower-risk flows. CBP’s
“multi-layered” risk management approach means that security screening and
enforcement occur at multiple points in the import process, beginning before goods
are loaded in foreign ports (pre-entry) and continuing long after the time goods have
been admitted into the United States (post-entry). [2, p. ii]
Border enforcement is a core element of the Department of Homeland Security’s effort
to control unauthorized migration and importation of contraband, with the U.S. Border
Patrol (USBP) within the U.S. Customs and Border Protection as the lead agency along
most of the border. Border enforcement has been an ongoing subject of congressional
interest since the 1970s, when illegal immigration to the United States first registered
as a serious national problem and received additional attention after the terrorist
attacks of 2001. [3, p. ii]
International trade is a
critical component of
the U.S. economy, with
U.S. goods trade
amounting to about $4
trillion in 2014, with
merchandise imports of
$2.4 trillion and exports
of $1.6 trillion. The
efficient flow of legally
traded goods in and out
of the United States is
thus a vital element of
the country’s economic
security.
488
Part IV: Mission Components
Organization
CBP is headed by a Commissioner who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Working for the Commissioner are 14 assistant commissioners who oversee CBP law
enforcement, regulatory, intelligence, technology, and other support efforts. The
office of the commissioner also oversees executive offices that provide an array of
expertise from policy and planning to trade relations and privacy and civil rights. [4]
Office of Administration. The Office of Administration is headed by an Assistant
Commissioner, who is the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Chief Administrative
Officer (CAO) for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. This office is responsible for
administering the broad range of financial management activities delineated under the
CFO Act of 1990, including accounting, budgeting, procurement, logistics, financial
systems, policy, planning, and audit oversight. An annual Accountability Report is
prepared and submitted to the Department of Homeland Security Pursuant to the CFO
Act, the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), and the
Government Management Reform Act of 1994 (GMRA), this report includes the annual
audited financial statements and auditors' opinion. The report also includes: financial
analysis; a description of the effectiveness of management controls; program
performance results related to agency mission, goals, and objectives; and an
assessment of data validity and reliability in support of performance measures. [5]
Figure 31-1: CBP Organization Chart [6]
489
Chapter 31: CBP
Air and Marine Operations. The mission of Air and Marine Operations is to protect the
American people and Nation's critical infrastructure through the coordinated use of
integrated air and marine forces to detect, interdict and prevent acts of terrorism and
the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other contraband toward or across
the borders of the United States. [5]
United States Border Patrol. The United States Border Patrol, headed by the Chief, U.S.
Border Patrol, is the headquarters of the primary federal law enforcement organization
responsible for preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United
States between official U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of entry. Their
traditional mission is to enforce immigration laws and to detect, interdict and
apprehend those who attempt to illegally enter or smuggle people or contraband
across U.S. borders between official ports of entry. The Border Patrol has a workforce
of over 21,000 agents assigned to patrol the more than 6,000 miles of America's land
borders. The Border Patrol has an operating budget of $1.4 billion, which provides for
operations coordinated by 20 sector offices. [5]
Office of Congressional Affairs. The Office of Congressional Affairs, headed by an
Assistant Commissioner, is responsible for advising CBP managers on legislative and
congressional matters; and for assisting members of Congress and their staffs in
understanding current and proposed CBP programs. [5]
Office of Field Operations (OFO). The Office of Field Operations is the largest
component in CBP and is responsible for border security—including antiterrorism,
immigration, anti-smuggling, trade compliance, and agriculture protection—while
simultaneously facilitating the lawful trade and travel at U.S. ports of entry. OFO is
headed by an Assistant Commissioner who is responsible for overseeing the operations
of 20 major field offices, 328 ports of entry, and 70 locations in over 40 countries
internationally, with a staff of more than 28,000 employees, and an operating budget
of $3.2 billion. [5]
Office of Human Resources Management. The Office of Human Resources
Management is responsible for providing human resources support within CBP. It
promotes and enables mission accomplishment through human capital planning and
utilization; strategic leadership to CBP employees; efficient processes and practices
which meet customer's operational needs; a safe work environment; advocacy for fair
treatment; effective delivery of services (including filling positions, providing employee
services and benefits, processing personnel actions and facilitating workforce
effectiveness). [5]
The U.S. Border Patrol,
headed by the Chief,
U.S. Border Patrol, is the
headquarters of the
primary federal law
enforcement
organization responsible
for preventing terrorists
and terrorist weapons
from entering the
United States between
official U.S. Customs and
Border Protection ports
of entry.
490
Part IV: Mission Components
Office of Information and Technology (OIT). The Office of Information and Technology,
headed by an Assistant Commissioner, is responsible for implementation and support
of information technology, research and development functions, and automation and
technological strategies for meeting mission-related needs. Specifically, the Office is
responsible for automated information systems, management of the research and
development functions and all forensic and laboratory support of the agency. OIT
personnel manage all computer and related resources including all operational aspects
of the Computer Security Program; establish requirements for computer interfaces
between U.S. Customs and Border Protection and various trade groups and
government agencies; and manage matters related to automated import processing
and systems development. OIT personnel are responsible for managing all aspects of
tactical communications, including the 24x7 operations of the National Law
Enforcement Communications Center. [5]
Office of Intelligence (OI). The Office of Intelligence is a coordinating facilitator that
integrates U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s diverse intelligence capabilities into a
single cohesive intelligence enterprise. OI supports CBP’s mission through a multi-
layered approach that includes an intelligence field support capability, a strategic
analysis capability focusing on terrorist, geo-political and economic threats, a daily CBP
executive leadership briefing capability and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities as such pertain to the National Border Geospatial
Intelligence Strategy, the Law Enforcement Technical Collections (LETC) initiative and
the Confidential Human Source (CHS) initiative. [5]
Office of Internal Affairs (IA). Office of Internal Affairs, headed by an Assistant
Commissioner, has oversight authority for all aspects of CBP operations, personnel and
facilities. IA is responsible for ensuring compliance with all CBP-wide programs and
policies relating to corruption, misconduct, or mismanagement and for executing the
internal security, integrity, and management inspections program. Through the
national headquarters in Washington, D.C., and strategically located regional field
offices, IA investigates criminal and serious administrative misconduct by CBP
employees. IA also screens potential CBP employees for suitability; educates
employees concerning ethical standards and integrity responsibilities; evaluates
physical security threats to CBP employees, facilities, and sensitive information; and
inspects CBP operations and processes for managerial effectiveness and
improvements. [5]
Office of International Affairs (INA). The Office of International Affairs is responsible for
coordinating and supporting foreign initiatives, programs and activities within CBP. INA
strives to extend U.S. borders by implementing programs and initiatives that promote
anti-terrorism, global border security, non-proliferation, export controls, immigration
and capacity building. INA focuses on international cooperation and strengthening
The Office of Intelligence
is a coordinating
facilitator that
integrates U.S. Customs
and Border Protection’s
diverse intelligence
capabilities into a single
cohesive intelligence
enterprise.
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Chapter 31: CBP
multi- and bi-lateral relationships to achieve international agreements and joint efforts
that both facilitate and secure legitimate trade. INA promotes expansion of the World
Customs Organization (WCO) Framework of Standards for supply chain security and
facilitation by providing targeted countries with training and advisory support through
programs such as, Capacity Building and Export Control and Border Security (EXBS). INA
provides in-country advisory support for broad-based customs reform and
modernization and ensures CBP is represented at overseas posts and influencing policy
throughout the world. [5]
Office of International Trade (OT). The Office of International Trade consolidates the
trade policy, program development, and compliance measurement functions of CBP
into one office. The Office provides uniformity and clarity for the development of CBP’s
national strategy to facilitate legitimate trade and manages the design and
implementation of results-driven strategic initiatives of trade compliance and
enforcement. It directs national enforcement responses through effective targeting of
goods crossing the border as well as strict, swift punitive actions against companies
participating in predatory trade practices. Through coordination with international
partners and other U.S. government agencies it directs the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, the identification of risks to detect and prevent the importation of
contaminated agricultural or food products and the enforcement of free trade
agreement eligibility. By promoting trade facilitation through partnership programs,
the Office of Trade will streamline the flow of legitimate shipments and foster
corporate self-governance as a means of achieving compliance with trade laws and
regulations. A risk-based audit program is used to respond to allegations of commercial
fraud and to conduct corporate reviews of internal controls to ensure importers
comply with trade laws and regulations. Finally, the Office of Trade provides the legal
tools to promote facilitation and compliance with customs, trade and border security
requirements through the issuance of all CBP regulations, legally binding rulings and
decisions, informed compliance publications and structured programs for external CBP
training and outreach on international trade laws and CBP regulations. [5]
Office of Public Affairs (OPA). The Office of Public Affairs, headed by an Assistant
Commissioner, communicates CBP’s mission and operations. OPA continually informs
the agency’s chief stakeholders, the American public, through media outreach and
public awareness campaigns conducted via media events, news, video and
photography as well as the public website CBP.gov, informational brochures, and a
national customer service call center to address public questions and complaints. OPA
also provides continual information to the CBP workforce through an intranet site and
frequent leadership messages. A regular news magazine, Frontline, is developed for
CBP personnel and stakeholders throughout the nation and abroad. OPA acts as a
conduit for information to and guidance from the Department of Homeland Security.
[5]
The Office of
International Affairs
promotes expansion of
the World Customs
Organization (WCO)
Framework of Standards
for supply chain
security.
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Part IV: Mission Components
Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA). The Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition is responsible for two major functions essential to the
future effectiveness of CBP. First, it ensures all of CBP’s technology efforts are properly
and innovatively focused on the mission and are well integrated across CBP. Secondly,
it strengthens CBP’s expertise and effectiveness in acquisition and program
management of contractor-delivered products and services. The office provides the
necessary training to its acquisition workforce, administers policy and acquisition
oversight for all program management offices (including those established to manage
Level 1, 2 and 3 acquisition programs) across CBP, and develops standard requirements
coordination processes for CBP. OTIA is also exploring innovation and its critical role in
inspiring and catalyzing a culture of innovation across all of CBP. [5]
Office of Training and Development (OTD). The Office of Training and Development is
responsible for centralized leadership and direction of all Customs and Border
Protection training programs. OTD ensures that all training efforts support the CBP
mission and strategic goals, meet the needs of a diverse and dispersed workforce, and
contribute to measurable outcomes and results. OTD establishes standards and
policies for designing, developing, delivering, and evaluating training. The Office
directly executes career development programs, basic and advanced training to all
occupations (e.g., anti-terrorism training to CBP Officers, Border Patrol Agents, and
other occupations), and management and executive development programs. OTD
develops and implements the annual training plan for the agency. OTD defines and
implements evaluation measures, data collection processes, and inspection methods
for ongoing assessment of all CBP training programs. OTD is responsible for the
continuous improvement and expansion of CBP learning capabilities. To accomplish its
organizational mission and strategic plan, OTD has eight divisions – Training Production
and Standards Division, Use of Force Policy Division, Leadership and Organization
Development Division, Advanced Training Center, Operations Division, U.S. Border
Patrol Academy, CBP Field Operations Academy, and the CBP Canine Program
Headquarters. [5]
Office of Chief Counsel. The Chief Counsel is the chief legal officer of CBP and reports
to the General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security through the Assistant
General Counsel, Borders and Transportation Security. The Chief Counsel serves as the
Ethics Officer for the organization and is the principal legal advisor to the CBP
commissioner and its officers. The Office of the Chief Counsel provides legal advice to,
and legal representation of, CBP officers in matters relating to the activities and
functions of CBP. The office is also responsible for reviewing proposed actions to
ensure compliance with legal requirements, preparing formal legal opinions, preparing
or reviewing responses in all court actions, civil or criminal, involving CBP, and
developing, implementing, and evaluating nationwide programs, policies, and
procedures within its functional areas. The office has both a headquarters and a field
structure. The headquarters office is located in Washington, D.C. and its activities are
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Chapter 31: CBP
divided broadly into three functional areas: Ethics, Labor and Employment,
Enforcement, and Trade and Finance, under the supervision of Associate Chief
Counsels. The field structure consists of Associate and Assistant Chief Counsels located
in major cities across the U.S. who advise CBP field managers in their geographic areas.
[7]
Office of Non-Government Organization Liaison. The Non-Government Office (NGO)
Liaison is the agency’s principal liaison to non-governmental organizations to include
faith-based and advocacy groups. Responsibilities of the NGO Liaison include
facilitating dialogue on behalf of CBP to the NGO community in close collaboration
with DHS components, and other federal agencies as appropriate. Formalizing this
position is a critical step toward building and enhancing the agency’s relationship with
this important community. [7]
Office of Policy and Planning. The Office of Policy and Planning is responsible for
assisting CBP leadership in defining and advancing U.S. Customs and Border Protection
mission priorities through the effective development, review and implementation of
key policy and planning initiatives. In partnership and coordination and with other CBP
offices, the Department of Homeland Security and other governmental agencies, the
office develops policy, provides oversight of the CBP policy function and ensures a
common framework and alignment to CBP strategic intent. This team acts as the
commissioner’s executive agent for CBP policy and aligns CBP policy across offices.
Additionally, in collaboration with other CBP offices, the office promotes an integrated
approach toward strategic planning for CBP by formalizing the use of the planning,
programming, budgeting, and accountability process to align out-year planning with
budget priorities. [7]
Office of State, Local and Tribal Liaison. The CBP State, Local and Tribal Liaison is
responsible for advising the commissioner, deputy commissioner and program offices
on the impact of CBP policies and initiatives with regard to state, local and tribal
stakeholders. To accomplish this mission, the liaison office strives to maintain open
communication and build effective relationships with state, local and tribal
governments. The office assists these stakeholders through regular, transparent and
proactive communication by maintaining partnerships through active outreach. [7]
Office of Trade Relations. The Office of Trade Relations is responsible for managing
CBP’s outreach and communications with the international trade community. The
office ensures that the trade community and the public understand that trade is an
integral part of CBP’s mission: making America safer, stronger, more prosperous, and
economically competitive. The office's mission is to continually improve relations
between CBP and the trade community by enhancing collaboration, cooperation, and
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Part IV: Mission Components
inform decision making at all levels including operational, legislative, and political. The
office also is responsible for organizing and presenting formal CBP outreach efforts to
the trade community, including CBP’s annual Trade Symposium, monthly trade day
meetings, trade roundtable meetings, and webinars. The office manages the Advisory
Committee on Commercial Operations of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (COAC),
a congressionally mandated trade advisory group. Finally, the office is the designated
regulatory fairness representative for the agency with responsibility for promoting
compliance with the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act. [7]
Privacy and Diversity Office. The Privacy and Diversity Office is responsible for
developing and implementing the policies, procedures and internal controls necessary
to: Create a culture of privacy by ensuring and safeguarding all personally identifiable
information (PII) pursuant to the Privacy Act; process Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests; ensure that CBP respects and protects the civil rights and civil liberties
of the trade and traveling public; comply with Limited English Proficiency (LEP)
requirements; receive and process equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints
filed by applicants and current CBP employees; advance CBP’s Diversity and Inclusion
initiatives; and to ensure compliance with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). [7]
The Import Process
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) as amended in 2003, CBP is
the lead agency charged with enforcing the trade laws under the Mod Act and the
security measures under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), the SAFE
Port Act, and the other post-9/11 laws. CBP’s trade strategy emphasizes risk
management, which means that CBP collects advance information about shippers,
importers, and cargo to evaluate cargo for potential import security and trade
enforcement risks, and focuses enforcement efforts primarily on cargo and shippers
identified as relatively high risk. Conversely, those deemed lower-risk imports
(including, e.g., shipments of “trusted traders”) are less likely to be targeted for CBP
enforcement and may be eligible for expedited processing— thus advancing CBP’s
trade facilitation goal and freeing up resources for targeting higher-risk imports. [2, p.
16]
CBP’s trade strategy also emphasizes layered enforcement, meaning that risk
assessment and risk-based enforcement happen at a number of different points in the
import process, beginning well before cargo arrives at a U.S. port of entry, and
continuing long after cargo has been formally admitted to the United States. CBP
attempts to target high-risk flows as early as possible in the import process, but its
ability to conduct enforcement activities at different stages of the import process is
designed to create multiple opportunities to interdict illegal imports. [2, p. 16]
CBP’s trade strategy
emphasizes risk
management, which
means that CBP collects
advance information
about shippers,
importers, and cargo to
evaluate cargo for
potential import security
and trade enforcement
risks,
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Chapter 31: CBP
The import process includes three main stages, as illustrated in Figure 2. First, prior to
entry at a U.S. POE, importers and carriers file paperwork and provide advance
electronic cargo information, and all imports are subject to risk-based screening. Based
on the results of this screening, certain goods are subject to import security scanning
and inspection in foreign ports and/or upon arrival at a U.S. port. Second, importers
file “entry documents” when cargo reaches a U.S. port, and cargo may be subject to
additional scanning and inspection for import security and trade enforcement
purposes. Admissible cargo is released from the port, and importers file an additional
set of “entry summary” documents, which CBP uses to calculate customs duties and to
make an initial assessment of taxes, fees, and duties owed. Third, following cargo
entry, importers may challenge the assessment for up to a year, or longer under
certain circumstances, until the final assessment of taxes and fees, a process known as
liquidation. Trade enforcement activities may continue through audits and other post-
entry investigations. [2, pp. 16-17]
The import process begins well before cargo arrives at a U.S. port of entry (POE).
During the pre-entry stage of the process, importers of record submit electronic cargo
manifests and other shipment data to CBP. This information may be submitted through
CBP’s Automated Customs System (ACS) or its Automated Customs Environment (ACE).
CBP uses these advanced filing data to pre-clear cargo for admission, facilitate inflows,
and target certain cargo for import security and trade enforcement. Cargo may be
subject to import security scanning and inspections in foreign ports prior to being
loaded on U.S.-bound ships and/or upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry (POE). [2, p. 17]
Figure 31-2: The U.S. Import Process [2, p. 17]
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Part IV: Mission Components
One of CBP’s primary tools for risk management is the use of trusted trader programs,
including the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), which was
established in November 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, and subsequently authorized as
part of the SAFE Port Act of 2006. Trusted trader programs are voluntary public-private
partnership programs that permit certain import-related businesses to register with
CBP, follow instructions prescribed by the agency to secure their supply chains, and
thereby become recognized as low-risk actors and become eligible for expedited
processing and other benefits. [2, p. 18]
The SAFE Port Act of 2006 also authorizes a pair of programs to conduct radiation
detection and NII scanning in foreign ports: the Secure Freight Initiative and the
Container Security Initiative.
The Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) is a pilot program to test CBP’s ability, working
with international partners, to conduct radiation detection and NII scanning of
100% of cargo containers being loaded on U.S.-bound ships in certain ports. The
SFI employs an integrated scanning system consisting of radiation portal monitors
(provided by the Department of Energy) and NII imaging systems (provided by CBP)
in a single location. CBP officers review the scanning data to determine which
One of CBP’s primary
tools for risk
management is the use
of trusted trader
programs, including the
Customs-Trade
Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT).
Import Security and Trade Enforcement Terminology and Procedures
Cargo being imported to the United States may be subject to multiple and varied types of import security
and trade enforcement reviews, including the following:
Screening: A risk assessment based on an analysis of data elements (e.g., cargo manifest, country of
origin, shipper and consignee information) provided by an importer or carrier.
Scanning: An analysis of container contents based on non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies,
including x-ray and gamma ray imaging systems and other technologies. NII scanning produces a high
-resolution image of container contents that is reviewed by law enforcement officers to detect
hidden cargo and other anomalies that suggest container contents do not match reported manifest
data. If an officer detects an abnormality, containers may be “cracked open” for a physical
examination. Scanning may also refer to radiation detection.
Radiation detection: An analysis of container contents based on radiation portal monitors, handheld
radiation detection monitors, and/or other radiation detection technology to detect nuclear material
that may be part of a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb.
Examination: A physical examination of container contents (requires that the container be opened
and, in some cases, unpacked).
Primary inspection: A review of entry documents to determine whether cargo may be admissible to
the United States.
Secondary inspection: A review of container contents to confirm that cargo is admissible to the
United States. Secondary inspections may include NII scanning and/or a physical examination of
container contents.
Liquidation: The final assessment of import-related taxes and fees; typically occurs a year or more
after cargo enters the United States. [2, p. 16]
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Chapter 31: CBP
containers should be subject to secondary inspections. Secondary inspections,
when called for, are conducted by host-state law enforcement agencies.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a partnership program among CBP,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and law enforcement agencies in CSI
countries. Under the program, CBP officers and other federal agents at the
National Targeting Center–Cargo (NTC-C) in Herndon, VA, review advanced sea
cargo data and identify high-risk containers. High-risk containers are targeted for
radiation detection and NII scanning within CSI ports. Host state law enforcement
agents typically conduct physical scans in the foreign ports, and CBP personnel
located in the port or in the United States evaluate the scan results. When an
abnormality is detected, host state law enforcement agents conduct a physical
inspection before the container is loaded on a U.S.- bound ship. CBP officers and
ICE agents participate in such inspections either remotely or as partners within
foreign ports. [2, pp. 21-23]
Imported goods are not legally entered until after the shipment has arrived within the
port of entry, entry of the merchandise has been authorized by CBP, and all estimated
duties have been paid. The importer of record (i.e., the owner, purchaser, or a licensed
customs broker) has the option to enter the goods for consumption, enter them into a
bonded warehouse at the port of entry, or to transport the cargo in-bond to another
port of entry for processing. [2, p. 23]
If goods are being entered for consumption (e.g., going directly into U.S. commerce)
importers are typically required to file entry documents within 15 calendar days of a
shipment arriving at a U.S. port of entry. These documents may include an entry
manifest or other form of merchandise release, evidence of the right to make entry,
commercial invoices, packing lists, and other documents necessary to determine
admissibility. Since most cargo is released electronically, however, packing lists and
invoices are rarely requested. [2, p. 23]
Importers also must provide evidence that a bond has been posted with CBP to cover
estimated duties, taxes, and charges that may accrue. If the goods are to be released
from CBP custody, an entry summary must be filed and estimated duties deposited at
the port within 10 days of the entry of the merchandise. [2, p. 23]
Based on screening of the cargo and a review of the entry documents, CBP officers at
the port make a preliminary determination about cargo admissibility and either release
or challenge the shipment. For cargo that is challenged, importers may be required to
provide additional documents or take other steps to prove admissibility. [2, p. 23]
The Container Security
Initiative (CSI) is a
partnership program
among CBP,
Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
and law enforcement
agencies in CSI
countries.
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Part IV: Mission Components
Cargo that is found to be admissible and cleared through security and trade
enforcement inspections is formally released into U.S. commerce. In these cases,
importers must file additional entry summary documentation within 10 days to provide
detailed information about the shipment (including customs classification, weight, and
duty rates) that CBP will use to determine that all import requirements have been
satisfied. Importers must pay storage and transportation costs during the cargo release
period, and must pay initial customs duties and fees assessed prior to taking
possession of imported goods. [2, pp. 27-28]
CBP responsibilities do not end when a product has entered the United States.
Importers have up to 180 days from the date of entry to challenge CBP’s assessment of
duties owed, after which CBP makes a final determination of the rate and amount of
duty owed, a process known as liquidation, and importers pay additional duties or
receive refunds to reconcile any differences between estimated and final duties owed.
CBP trade specialists and other federal agencies involved in trade enforcement may
conduct additional enforcement activities in the period after cargo enters the United
States, including audits of importers’ records to ensure compliance with U.S. trade
laws. [2, pp. 30-31]
As a general rule, CBP requires that all records regarding imports of merchandise be
kept for a period of five years after the date of entry. These documents must be made
available to CBP officials if they request an audit to determine if any additional duties,
fees, and taxes are owed, or to insure that the importer is in compliance with laws
administered by CBP. [2, pp. 31-32]
Border Patrol
In the decade following 9/11 the USBP saw its budget and manpower more than triple.
This expansion was the direct result of congressional concerns about illegal
immigration and the agency’s adoption of “Prevention Through Deterrence” as its chief
operational strategy in 1994. The strategy called for placing USBP resources and
manpower directly at the areas of greatest illegal immigration in order to detect, deter,
and apprehend aliens attempting to cross the border between official points of entry.
Post 9/11, the USBP refocused its strategy on preventing the entry of terrorists and
weapons of mass destruction, as laid out in its recently released National Strategy. In
addition to a workforce of over 20,000 agents, the USBP deploys vehicles, aircraft,
watercraft, and many different technologies to defend the border. [8, p. ii]
In addition to a
workforce of over
20,000 agents, the USBP
deploys vehicles,
aircraft, watercraft, and
many different
technologies to defend
the border.
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Chapter 31: CBP
In the course of discharging its duties, the USBP patrols 8,000 miles of American
international borders with Mexico and Canada and the coastal waters around Florida
and Puerto Rico. However, there are significant geographic, political, and immigration-
related differences between the northern border with Canada and the Southwest
border with Mexico. Accordingly, the USBP deploys a different mix of personnel and
resources along the two borders. Due to the fact that approximately 98.7% of
unauthorized migrant apprehensions by the USBP occur along the Southwest border,
the USBP deploys over 85% of its agents there to deter illegal immigration. The
northern border is more than two times longer than the Southwest border, and
features far lower numbers of aliens attempting to enter illegally, but may be more
vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. As a consequence of this, the USBP has focused its
northern border efforts on deploying technology and cooperating closely with
Canadian authorities through the creation of International Border Enforcement Teams.
[8, p. ii]
Across a variety of indicators, the United States has substantially expanded border
enforcement resources over the last three decades. Particularly since 2001, such
increases include border security appropriations, personnel, fencing and infrastructure,
and surveillance technology. In addition to increased resources, the USBP has
implemented several strategies over the past several decades in an attempt to thwart
illegal migration. [3, p. ii]
Since 2005, CBP has attempted to discourage repeat illegal migrant entries and disrupt
migrant smuggling networks by imposing tougher penalties against certain
unauthorized aliens, a set of policies eventually described as “enforcement with
consequences.” Most people apprehended at the Southwest border are now subject to
“high consequence” enforcement outcomes. [3, p. ii]
The Border Patrol collects data on several different border enforcement outcomes
such as border apprehensions, recidivism, and estimated “got aways” and “turn
backs”. Yet none of these existing data are designed to measure illegal border flows or
the degree to which the border is secured. But a range of evidence suggests a
substantial drop in illegal inflows in 2007-2011, followed by a slight rise in 2012 and a
more dramatic rise in 2013. Enforcement, along with the economic downturn in the
United States, likely contributed to the drop in unauthorized migration, though the
precise share of the decline attributable to enforcement is unknown. [3, p. ii]
USBP patrols 8,000
miles of American
international borders
with Mexico and Canada
and the coastal waters
around Florida and
Puerto Rico.
500
Part IV: Mission Components
Conclusion
How effectively CBP has performed its import policy mission is a matter of some
debate. Some participants in CBP’s “trusted trader” programs argue that the
concessions (e.g., expedited processing; fewer container inspections) CBP provides at
the border do not adequately justify the effort and expense to certify their supply
chains. Questions have also been raised about CBP’s management of trade facilitation,
especially the means through which the Automated Commercial System trade data
management system is being phased out in favor of the newer Automated Commercial
Environment. Some critics also assert that CBP has not adequately fulfilled its trade
enforcement role, especially its duties for preventing illegal transshipments, protecting
U.S. intellectual property rights, and collecting duties. Still others criticize CBP’s
performance of its security functions, especially because it does not yet physically scan
100% of maritime cargo as mandated by the SAFE Port Act of 2006, as amended. [2, p.
ii]
The results from increased border security are also mixed. To the extent that border
enforcement successfully deters illegal entries, such enforcement may reduce border-
area violence and migrant deaths, protect fragile border ecosystems, and improve the
quality of life in border communities. But to the extent that aliens are not deterred,
the concentration of enforcement resources on the border may increase border area
violence and migrant deaths, encourage unauthorized migrants to find new ways to
enter illegally and to remain in the United States for longer periods of time, damage
border ecosystems, harm border-area businesses and the quality of life in border
communities, and strain U.S. relations with Mexico and Canada. [3, p. ii]
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Chapter 31: CBP
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection?
2. What is the essential difficulty of screening every traveler and cargo container transiting a port of entry?
3. What is the essential difficulty of preventing smuggling between ports of entry?
4. What illicit good provides an indicator how well CBP is thwarting smugglers?
5. Which CBP component enforces immigration law and apprehends smugglers between ports of entry?
6. Which CBP component enforces immigration law and apprehends smugglers at ports of entry?
7. List and describe the three stages of the import process.
8. How is CBP’s risk management strategy applied to the import process?
9. How do trusted trader programs support CBP’s risk management strategy?
10. What three conditions must be met before a cargo can be cleared through a port of entry?
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Part IV: Mission Components
503
Chapter 32: Secret Service
U.S. Secret Service
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 32
Learning Outcomes
504
Part IV: Mission Components
“Your main objective is to restore public confidence in the money of the country.”
- Treasury Secretary Hugh McCulloch, July 5, 1865
Introduction
Most are familiar with the protection mission provided by the U.S. Secret Service to
the President, Vice President, visiting dignitaries and their families. The Secret Service
has been providing this protection for over 100 years. Fewer are familiar, though, with
the Service’s investigation mission, protecting the nation’s currency and financial
institutions. The Secret Service has been providing this protection for the past 150
years. The missions and history of the U.S. Secret Service are the subject of this
chapter.
Background
The U.S. Secret Service traces its origins to the American Civil War. By 1865, an
estimated half of all U.S. currency in circulation was counterfeit. As a result of this
currency crisis, the Secretary of Treasury established a Secret Service Division (SSD) to
investigate counterfeiting under authority given to it by Congress in the 1863 National
Currency Act. At the request of President Grover Cleveland, Secret Service agents
provided security to him and his family at their vacation home in the summer of 1894.
President William McKinley also received SSD protection during the Spanish-American
War and limited protection following the end of the war. Three SSD agents were
present when President McKinley was assassinated in Buffalo, NY, but reportedly they
were not fully in charge of the protection mission. Accordingly, Congress assigned SSD
with protecting the President following the assassination of President McKinley in
1901. The USSS pretty much maintained its investigative and protection roles within
the Treasury Department for the next 100 years until 9/11. [1, pp. 5-8] In 2002, as part
of his proposal, President Bush recommended adding the U.S. Secret Service to the
new Department of Homeland Security. [2, p. 3] In March 2003, the USSS was
transferred to DHS under authority of the 2002 Homeland Security Act.
The U.S. Secret Service
has two missions—
criminal investigations
and protection. Criminal
investigation activities
encompass financial
crimes, identity theft,
counterfeiting,
computer fraud, and
computer-based attacks
on the nation’s financial,
banking, and
telecommunications
infrastructure.
505
Chapter 32: Secret Service
Mission
The U.S. Secret Service has two missions—criminal investigations and protection.
Criminal investigation activities encompass financial crimes, identity theft,
counterfeiting, computer fraud, and computer-based attacks on the nation’s financial,
banking, and telecommunications infrastructure. The protection mission is the more
publicly visible of the two, covering the President, Vice President, their families, former
Presidents, and major candidates for those offices, along with the White House and the
Vice President’s residence (through the Service’s Uniformed Division). Protective duties
of the Service also extend to foreign missions (such as embassies, consulates, and
foreign dignitary residences) in the District of Columbia and to designated individuals,
such as the Homeland Security Secretary and visiting foreign dignitaries. Separate from
these specific mandated assignments, USSS is also responsible for security at
designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs) which include presidential
inaugurations, national political conventions, major international conferences, and the
Super Bowl. [1]
Organization
The USSS employs approximately 3,500 special agents, 1,350 Uniformed Division
officers, and more than 1,800 other technical, professional, and administrative support
personnel. They work at the headquarters in Washington, D.C. and in 142 field offices
and units within the United States and its territories and 22 offices in 18 foreign
countries. The USSS is organized into seven offices: Investigations, Protective
Operations, Protective Research, Professional Responsibility, Government and Public
Affairs, Human Resources and Training, and Administration. The two principal
operational offices are Investigations and Protective Operations. [3, p. 49]
Figure 32-1: U.S. Secret Service Organization Chart [4]
The USSS employs
approximately 3,500
special agents, 1,350
Uniformed Division
officers, and more than
1,800 other technical,
professional, and
administrative support
personnel. They work at
the headquarters in
Washington, D.C. and in
142 field offices and
units within the United
States and its territories
and 22 offices in 18
foreign countries.
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Part IV: Mission Components
The USSS also operates the National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC). The NTAC was
established in 1998 as an effort to dedicate resources to better understand, and find
ways to prevent targeted violence; to share this knowledge with others; and to
continue to provide leadership in the field of threat assessment. The premise for NTAC
was developed in the wake of an original assassination research study, the Exceptional
Case Study Project (ECSP), conducted in collaboration with the Department of Justice.
The ECSP was a study of individuals who had assassinated, attacked, or approached
with lethal means, public officials or public figures from 1949-1996 in the United
States. One major product from this study was a guidebook on protective intelligence
and threat assessment investigations. NTAC uses historical information, investigative
records, interviews, and other primary source material to produce long-term
behavioral research studies that leverage USSS expertise in the protection of persons
for homeland security or public safety purposes. Through the Presidential Threat
Protection Act of 2000, Congress formally authorized NTAC to provide assistance to
Federal, state, and local law enforcement, and others with protective responsibilities,
on training in the area of threat assessment; consultation on complex threat
assessment cases or plans; and research on threat assessment and the prevention of
targeted violence. [3, p. 50]
Investigative Mission
The original mission of the Service was to investigate the counterfeiting of United
States currency. This mission has been expanded throughout the agency’s history
through presidential, departmental, and congressional action. At times, early in the
agency’s history, Secret Service agents conducted investigations that were not related
to financial system crimes. [1, p. 2] In 1889, the Service was directed to investigate
espionage activities during the Spanish- American War, and again during World War I.
These missions were phased out at the end of each war. Additionally, in the early
1900s, the Service was directed to investigate land fraud in the western United States;
another area outside its purview. [1, p. 6]
In the first half of the 20th Century, Congress continued to authorize the Treasury
Secretary to “direct and use” the Secrete Service to “detect, arrest, and deliver into
custody of the United States marshal having jurisdiction any person or persons
violating” counterfeit laws. In 1948, the Service was also authorized to investigate
crimes against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, federal land banks, joint-
stock land banks, and national farm loan associations. As throughout USSS’s history,
Congress continued to amend the Service’s investigation mission from 1950 to 1984.
Among the provisions, the USSS was authorized to confiscate and purchase counterfeit
currency. [1, p. 6]
The USSS also operates
the National Threat
Assessment Center
(NTAC). NTAC uses
historical information,
investigative records,
interviews, and other
primary source material
to produce long-term
behavioral research
studies that leverage
USSS expertise in the
protection of persons for
homeland security or
public safety purposes.
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Chapter 32: Secret Service
Due to the increased use of computers and electronic devices in financial crime,
Congress, in 1984, authorized the USSS to investigate violations related to credit card
and computer fraud. In the 1990s, Congress continued to amend laws affecting the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of crimes against United States financial
systems. One such amendment authorized USSS investigation of crimes against
financial systems by authorizing the Service to conduct civil or criminal investigations
of federally insured financial institutions. Another law was the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322), which made international
manufacturing, trafficking, and possession of counterfeit United States currency a
crime as if it were committed in the United States. Congress also enacted laws related
to telemarketing fraud (P.L. 105-184) and identity theft (P.L. 105-318), both of which
are used in committing financial fraud and crime. [1, p. 7]
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the USA
PATRIOT Act. Among numerous provisions addressing the protection of the United
States financial systems and electronic device crimes, the act authorized the Service to
establish nationwide electronic crime task forces to assist law enforcement, private
sector, and academic entities in detecting and suppressing computer-based crimes. [1,
p. 7]
Today, USSS conducts criminal investigations into counterfeiting and financial crimes.
Within the investigative mission area is the USSS’s forensic services division. USSS
forensic services personnel conduct analyses of evidence, some of which includes
documents, fingerprints, false identification documents, and credit cards, to assist in
USSS investigations. USSS’s investigative support is also responsible for developing and
implementing a criminal and investigative intelligence program. One of the
components of this program is the Criminal Research Specialist Program, which
provides intelligence analysis related to infrastructure protection, conducts forensic
financial analysis, and provides research and analytical support to USSS criminal
investigations. Additionally, in 1994, Congress mandated that USSS provide forensic
and technical assistance to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. [1,
p. 2]
Protection Mission
Following the assassination of President McKinley, in 1901, congressional leadership
asked that the Secret Service Division protect the President. Five years later Congress,
for the first time, appropriated funds for the protection of the President with the
passage of the Sundry Civil Expenses Act for 1907 (enacted in 1906). [1, pp. 7-8]
The original mission of
the Service was to
investigate the
counterfeiting of United
States currency. The
2001 USA PATRIOT Act
expanded the Secret
Service’s responsibilities
for protecting the U.S.
financial system and
investigating electronic
device crimes. It also
authorized the Service
to establish nationwide
electronic crime task
forces to assist in
detecting and
suppressing computer-
based crimes.
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Part IV: Mission Components
In 1908, SSD’s protection mission was expanded to include the President-elect. In that
same year, President Theodore Roosevelt transferred a number of SSD agents to the
Department of Justice, which served as the foundation for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Annual congressional authorization of the mandate to protect the
President and President-elect began in 1913. [1, p. 8]
During World War I threats against the President began to arrive at the White House,
which resulted in a 1917 law making it a crime to threaten the President. Additionally,
later that same year, Congress authorized SSD to protect the President’s immediate
family. [1, p. 8]
In addition to the expansion of the protection of the President and the President’s
family, the White House Police Force was created in 1922 to secure and patrol the
Executive Mansion and grounds in Washington, DC. Initially, the White House Police
Force was not supervised or administered by SSD; but rather by the President or his
appointed representative. In 1930, however, Congress mandated that the White House
Police Force be supervised by the SSD. [1, p. 8] In 1970 the White House Police Force
was renamed the Executive Protection Service (EPS). The EPS is responsible for
protection of
The Executive Mansion and grounds in the District of Columbia;
Any building with presidential offices;
The President and immediate family;
Foreign diplomatic missions located in the metropolitan DC area; and
Foreign diplomatic missions located in the United States, its territories, and its
possessions—as directed by the President. [1, p. 9]
For the first time, Congress, in 1943, appropriated funding for both the investigation
and protection missions. The appropriation was specifically for “suppressing”
counterfeiting and “other” crimes; protecting the President, the President-elect, and
their immediate families; and providing funding for the White House Police Force.
Similarly, in 1951, Congress permanently authorized the “U.S. Secret Service” to
protect the President, his immediate family, the President-elect, and the Vice
President—if the Vice President so desired. In 1954, Congress used the title “U.S.
Secret Service” in an appropriation act for the first time. [1, p. 8]
USSS protection includes
not only the presence of
agents in close proximity
to the protectee, but
also advance security
surveys of locations to
be visited, coordination
with state and local
enforcement entities,
and intelligence analysis
of present and future
threats.
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Chapter 32: Secret Service
Over the ensuing decades, the list of Secret Service protectees continued to evolve and
grow. Today, the following individuals are authorized USSS protection:
President, Vice President, President- and Vice President-elect;
The immediate families of those listed above;
Former Presidents and their spouses;
Former Presidents’ children under age 16;
Visiting heads of foreign states or governments;
Distinguished foreign visitors and official United States representatives on special
missions abroad;
Major presidential and vice presidential candidates, within 120 days of the general
presidential elections, their spouses; and
Former Vice Presidents, their spouses, and their children under the age of 16. [5]
The form of protection has also evolved. Originally, USSS protection entailed agents
being, what could be described as “bodyguards.” Now protection includes not only the
presence of agents in close proximity to the protectee, but also advance security
surveys of locations to be visited, coordination with state and local enforcement
entities, and intelligence analysis of present and future threats. The USSS protection
mission uses human resources and physical barriers, technology, and a review of
critical infrastructures and their vulnerabilities to increase security to meet evolving
threats. [1, pp. 3-4]
On December 19, 2000, President Clinton signed P.L. 106-544, the Presidential Threat
Protection Act of 2000, authorizing the USSS—when directed by the President—to
plan, coordinate, and implement security operations at special events of national
significance. The special events were designated National Special Security Events
(NSSEs). Some events categorized as NSSEs include presidential inaugurations, major
international summits held in the United States, major sporting events, and political
party nominating conventions. [1, p. 11]
On December 19, 2000,
President Clinton signed
P.L. 106-544, the
Presidential Threat
Protection Act of 2000,
authorizing the USSS—
when directed by the
President—to plan,
coordinate, and
implement security
operations at National
Special Security Events
(NSSEs).
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Part IV: Mission Components
Reform
On March 26, 2015, Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) introduced House Resolution
1656 titled “The Secret Service Improvement Act of 2015”. The bill was motivated by a
series of security breaches and scandals that had undermined confidence in the agency
over the preceding years. In April 2012, during a Presidential trip to Columbia, several
USSS agents reportedly hired prostitutes and took them back to their hotel rooms.
Several of the agents were subsequently fired. In September 2014, a person carrying a
knife gained unauthorized entrance into the White House after climbing the perimeter
fence. In January 2015, an unmanned aerial drone flew over the White House fence
and landed within the grounds. In March 2015, it became public knowledge that senior
-ranking Secret Service officials, including an agent on President Obama’s personal
detail, crashed a government car into a barrier at the White House after drinking. H.R.
1656 provides resources and creates new performance and accountability measures in
an attempt to better enable the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) to carry out its mission. [5]
Improved Security and Safety—the bill clarifies that it is a federal crime to
knowingly cause, with the intent to impede or disrupt the orderly conduct of
Government business or official functions, any object to enter restricted buildings
or grounds, including the White House and the Vice President’s residence. The bill
requires the USSS to evaluate ways technology at the White House can be used to
improve safety and counter threats posed by unmanned aerial systems or
explosive devices. The bill also requires the USSS to evaluate the use of additional
weaponry, including non-lethal weapons. The bill amends current law to permit
the USSS to investigate threats against former Vice Presidents. [5]
Enhanced Evidence Evaluation and Reporting Requirements—the bill requires the
USSS to evaluate how it retains evidence and to report its findings to Congress. [5]
Enhanced Training Requirements–the bill requires the Director of the USSS to
increase the number of hours spent training, and directs the agency to provide
joint training between Uniformed Division officers and Special Agents. The bill also
authorizes the Director to construct facilities at the Rowley Training Center
necessary to improve the training of USSS officers. [5]
Increased Uniformed and Plain Clothing Agents—the bill authorizes the hiring of no
fewer than 200 additional Uniformed Division officers and 80 additional Special
Agents. [5]
Senate Confirmation of the USSS Director —the bill requires the Director of the
USSS to be confirmed by the Senate. [5]
On July 27, 2015, H.R. 1656 was passed by the House of Representatives and
forwarded to the Senate. Upon receiving the bill, it was read twice in the Senate and
referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. [6]
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Chapter 32: Secret Service
Conclusion
Both the U.S. Secret Service Investigation and Protection missions have distinctive
characteristics and histories, and each has been affected by informal decisions and
congressional action. [1, p. 5] Since 9/11, though, there have been consistent and
continuing questions regarding the Secret Service’s two missions and whether they are
compatible. The recent lapses in security and scandals have convinced some that the
Protection mission is not receiving the attention it should. Some are even questioning
whether the Department of Homeland Security is the appropriate home for the Secret
Service. [1, p. ii] Whether or not the Secret Service will retain both its Investigation and
Protection missions, and whether or not the Secret Service will remain in the
Department of Homeland Security will be determined, as it has for the past 150 years,
by Congress.
512
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why was the U.S. Secret Service originally formed?
2. What are the two missions of the U.S. Secret Service?
3. Which USSS component uses historical information, investigative records, and interviews to produce long-term
behavioral research studies to prevent targeted violence?
4. Which USSS component provides investigative support by analyzing fingerprints, forged documents, and stolen
credit cards?
5. Which USSS program provides intelligence analysis related to infrastructure protection?
6. List and describe three measures the USSS employs to protect assigned individuals.
7. Which of the following individuals are not USSS protectees?
a. Former President’s children under age 16.
b. Current National Security Advisor and statutory members of the National Security Council.
c. Distinguished foreign visitors and official U.S. representatives on special missions abroad.
8. Which of the following are not National Special Security Events?
a. Super Bowl
b. Air Force Academy Graduation
c. Democratic National Convention
9. List and describe two different presidential assassination attempts in the last 50 years.
10. Did the attempted assassins harbor terrorist motives?
Part IV: Mission Components
513
U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 33
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 33: ICE
514
Part IV: Mission Components
“Our investigation showed that two systemic weaknesses came together in our border
system’s inability to contribute to an effective defense against the 9/11 attacks: a lack
of well-developed counterterrorism measures as a part of border security, and an
immigration system not able to deliver on its basic commitments, much less support
counterterrorism.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency was created in 2003
through a merger of the investigative and interior enforcement elements of the former
U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. ICE now has
more than 20,000 employees in more than 400 offices in the United States and 48
foreign countries. [1] ICE is the largest investigative agency in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and one of three agencies charged with administering the
nation's immigration system, together with Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and
the U.S. Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS). [2]
Mission
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement enforces federal laws governing border
control, customs, trade and immigration to promote homeland security and public
safety. [1] This mission is executed through the enforcement of more than 400 federal
statutes and focuses on smart immigration enforcement, preventing terrorism and
combating the illegal movement of people and goods. [3]
Organization
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is organized into three directorates: 1)
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI); 2) Enforcement and Removal Operations
(ERO); and 3) Management and Administration (M&A). [1]
1. Homeland Security Investigations. The HSI directorate is responsible for
investigating a wide range of domestic and international activities arising from the
illegal movement of people and goods into, within and out of the United States. [1]
2. Enforcement and Removal Operations. ERO enforces the nation's immigration laws
in a fair and effective manner. It identifies and apprehends removable aliens,
detains these individuals when necessary and removes illegal aliens from the
United States. This unit prioritizes the apprehension, arrest and removal of
convicted criminals, those who pose a threat to national security, fugitives and
recent border entrants. Individuals seeking asylum also work with ERO. [1]
3. Management and Administration. M&A provides professional management and
mission support to advance the ICE mission. [1]
ICE is the largest
investigative agency in
the Department of
Homeland Security
(DHS), and one of three
agencies charged with
administering the
nation's immigration
system, together with
Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and
the U.S. Customs and
Immigration Service
(USCIS).
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Chapter 33: ICE
Investigating Illegal Movement of People and Goods
ICE special agents, officers and attorneys enforce provisions of approximately 400
federal statutes. This large and diverse body of laws is reflected in the wide array of
offices, programs and projects that make up ICE. People are smuggled and trafficked,
while children are sexually exploited at home and abroad. Illegal trade, in a very
general sense, predominately involve guns, money and drugs, but ICE’s responsibilities
extend much further into all kinds of illegal and counterfeit merchandise coming into
the country. For instance, ICE’s responsibilities include the repatriation of cultural
treasures out of the country to original owners abroad, and combatting the trade of
child pornography and much more. [3]
Human trafficking is one of the most heinous crimes that ICE investigates. In its worst
manifestation, human trafficking is akin to modern-day slavery. Victims pay to be
illegally transported into the United States only to find themselves in the thrall of
traffickers. They are forced into prostitution, involuntary labor and other forms of
servitude to repay debts – often incurred during entry into the United States. In certain
cases, the victims are mere children. They find themselves surrounded by an unfamiliar
culture and language without identification documents, fearing for their lives and the
Figure 33-1: ICE Organization Chart [4]
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Part IV: Mission Components
lives of their families. [5] ICE has embarked on an ambitious strategy to dismantle
organized human smuggling networks:
First, ICE pursues intelligence-driven investigations to target large-scale smuggling
organizations regardless of where they operate. Particular emphasis is placed on
smuggling rings that pose a national security risk, jeopardize lives or engage in
violence, abuse, hostage-taking or extortion.
Second, ICE coordinates with partners at U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
ensure aggressive investigation and prosecution of smuggling cases along the
border.
Third, ICE targets all links in the smuggling chain, beyond the immediate smugglers.
For example, ICE seeks to target the overseas recruiters and organizers, the
fraudulent document vendors, and the transportation and employment networks
that benefit from alien smuggling within the United States.
Finally, ICE pursues legislation to increase penalties against organized smugglers
and provide additional criminal offenses to better address spotters who assist
criminals with smuggling aliens and contraband. [6]
In recent decades, U.S. law enforcement has encountered an increasing number of
major financial crimes, frequently resulting from the needs for drug trafficking
organizations to launder large sums of criminal proceeds through legitimate financial
institutions and investment vehicles.
Cornerstone is ICE's initiative to detect and close down weaknesses within U.S.
financial, trade and transportation sectors that can be exploited by criminal
networks. Law enforcement entities share criminal typologies and methods with
businesses and industries that manage the very systems that terrorists and
criminal organizations seek to exploit. This sharing of information allows the
financial and trade community to take precautions in order to protect themselves
from exploitation.
The El Dorado Task Force consists of more than 260 members from more than 55
law enforcement agencies in New York and New Jersey – including federal agents,
state and local police investigators, intelligence analysts and federal prosecutors.
The El Dorado Task Force is headquartered at the New York Special Agent in
Charge Office and at other locations in the New York/New Jersey Metropolitan
area. The El Dorado Task Force targets financial crime at all levels. Task force
agents educate the private financial sector to identify and eliminate vulnerabilities
and promote anti-money laundering legislation through training and other
outreach programs. Prosecutors use a full range of criminal and civil laws to
prosecute targets and forfeit the proceeds of their illicit activity. The El Dorado
Task Force uses a systems-based approach to investigating financial crimes by
targeting vulnerabilities such as the Black Market Peso Exchange and commodity-
based money laundering.
Human trafficking is one
of the most heinous
crimes that ICE
investigates. In its worst
manifestation, human
trafficking is akin to
modern-day slavery.
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Chapter 33: ICE
Many developing nations are plagued by corrupt foreign officials who plunder
state coffers for personal gain and then attempt to place those funds in the U.S.
financial system. ICE leads investigations against corrupt foreign public officials
who have used U.S. financial institutions and other investment vehicles to facilitate
criminal acts involving the laundering of proceeds emanating from foreign public
corruption, bribery or embezzlement.
Trade-based money laundering is an alternative remittance system that allows
illegal organizations the opportunity to earn, move and store proceeds disguised as
legitimate trade. Value can be moved through this process by false-invoicing, over-
invoicing and under-invoicing commodities that are imported or exported around
the world. Criminal organizations frequently exploit global trade systems to move
value around the world by employing complex and sometimes confusing
documentation associated with legitimate trade transactions. ICE established the
Trade Transparency Unit initiative to target trade-based money laundering
worldwide. [7]
The Homeland Security Investigations’ National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
identifies, investigates and disrupts bulk cash smuggling activities around the
world. The center is located at the ICE Law Enforcement Support Center in
Williston, Vt. [8]
HSI and its law enforcement partners target the illegal movement of U.S. origin
firearms, ammunition, and explosive weapons with the ultimate goal of preventing the
procurement of these items by drug cartels, terrorists, human rights violators, foreign
adversaries, and other transnational criminal organizations and individuals that utilize
these weapons to facilitate criminal activity and commit acts of violence. HSI’s
investigative strategy includes the identification and prosecution of criminal networks
and individuals responsible for the acquisition and movement of firearms and other
dangerous weapons from the United States, as well as the seizure and forfeiture of
money and valuable property derived from or used to facilitate this criminal activity.
[9]
In 2005, in response to the significant increase in violence along the Southwest Border
in Mexico, the U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security
Investigations, in partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, as well as other
federal, state, local, and international law enforcement officials created the Border
Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) in Laredo, Texas. ICE partners with more than
100 fellow law enforcement agencies in BEST teams across 16 states. Each team
focuses on disrupting criminal smuggling and trafficking operations and on denying
criminal organizations the opportunity to transport their illicit funds. Since its creation
in 2005, BEST has initiated more than 9,000 cases. [10]
HSI and its law
enforcement partners
target the illegal
movement of U.S. origin
firearms, ammunition,
and explosive weapons
with the ultimate goal of
preventing the
procurement of these
items by drug cartels,
terrorists, human rights
violators, foreign
adversaries, and other
transnational criminal
organizations .
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Part IV: Mission Components
Federal importation laws give HSI the authority to take a leading role in investigating
crimes involving the illicit importation and distribution of cultural property and art.
Customs laws allow HSI to seize cultural property and art that are brought into the
United States illegally, especially when objects have been reported lost or stolen.
Specially trained investigators assigned to domestic and international offices partner
with federal, state and local agencies; private institutions; and foreign governments to
conduct investigations. These entities share HSI's mission to protect these objects and
preserve cultural heritage. Since 2007, HSI special agents have participated in a
training program to learn the latest techniques and trends for conducting criminal
investigations of cultural property. As part of this program, the Smithsonian
Institution's Museum Conservation Institute provides HSI special agents with on-site
training on how to handle, store, photograph and authenticate cultural property and
works of art. [11]
The Homeland Security Investigations’ Forensic Laboratory (HSI-FL) provides a broad
range of forensic, intelligence and investigative support to ICE, DHS and many other
U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies. The Latent Print (LP) Section provides
finger and palm print services and support across all investigative disciplines. These
services include, but are not limited to, processing evidence for latent prints (e.g., drug
packaging and paraphernalia, firearms, computers, currency, compact discs), latent
print comparison, inked print comparison, searching automated fingerprint
identification system databases, and providing crime scene assistance. The Questioned
Document (QD) Section specializes in determining the authenticity of documents and
identifying the presence of alterations within those documents. Specialized equipment
may be used during the examination process that will not affect or damage the original
document. [12]
One of HSI's top priorities is to combat criminal activity conducted on or facilitated by
the Internet. HSI's Cyber Crimes Center (C3) delivers computer-based technical services
to support domestic and international investigations into cross-border crime. C3 is
made up of the Cyber Crimes Unit, the Child Exploitation Investigations Unit and the
Computer Forensics Unit. C3 offers cyber-crime support and training to federal, state,
local and international law enforcement agencies. C3 also operates a fully equipped
computer forensics laboratory, which specializes in digital evidence recovery, and
offers training in computer investigative and forensic skills. [13]
As part of ICE’s Cyber Crimes Center, the Child Exploitation Investigations Unit (CEIU)
uses cutting edge investigative techniques to bring justice to consumers, producers and
distributors of child pornography, as well as to predators engaging in child sex tourism.
Collaborating with law enforcement partners around the country and the world,
Operation Predator brings together an array of resources to target these child
predators. As part of the effort:
One of HSI's top
priorities is to combat
criminal activity
conducted on or
facilitated by the
Internet. HSI's Cyber
Crimes Center (C3)
delivers computer-based
technical services to
support domestic and
international
investigations into cross-
border crime.
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Chapter 33: ICE
HSI participates on all 61 Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Forces
across the United States, which are led by state and local law enforcement
agencies.
HSI established a National Victim Identification Program at its Cyber Crimes Center,
combining the latest technology with traditional investigative techniques to rescue
child victims of sexual exploitation.
HSI is the U.S. representative to the Interpol working group that locates new child
sexual abuse material on the Internet and refers cases to the country that the
abuse is believed to be occurring in for further investigation. Also, HSI special
agents stationed internationally work with foreign governments, Interpol and
others to enhance coordination and cooperation on crimes that cross borders.
HSI works in partnership with the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children
and other federal agencies to help solve cases and rescue sexually exploited
children.
HSI is a founding member and current chair of the Virtual Global Taskforce, joining
law enforcement agencies, non-governmental organizations and private sector
partners around the world to fight child exploitation information and images that
travel over the Internet. [14]
Preventing Terrorism
Most ICE offices and programs have a role in preventing terrorism. Several are on the
front lines of this effort, either identifying dangerous persons before they enter the
U.S. or finding them as they violate immigration or customs laws. ICE also works to
prevent the illegal export of U.S. technology that could be used or repurposed to do
harm. [3]
The National Security Unit (NSU) serves as a comprehensive unit to provide for the
complete integration of national security investigations and counterterrorism efforts
within the National Security Investigations Division. NSU has programmatic oversight
of HSI’s participation on the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), serves in a
leadership position on the National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and works directly with
the National Security Council and senior leadership throughout the interagency to
develop, facilitate, and implement unified interagency policy in support of the
counterterrorism mission. [15]
The Counterterrorism Section (CTS) within NSU provides programmatic oversight and
investigative support to HSI’s Special Agents assigned to every JTTF nationwide. CTS
ensures that HSI Special Agents assigned to the JTTF program are engaged in every
investigation where our unique immigration or trade-based authorities may be used to
disrupt terrorist networks and prevent attacks against the homeland. [15]
As part of ICE’s Cyber
Crimes Center, the Child
Exploitation
Investigations Unit
(CEIU) uses cutting edge
investigative techniques
to bring justice to
consumers, producers
and distributors of child
pornography, as well as
to predators engaging in
child sex tourism.
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Part IV: Mission Components
The National Security Threat Section (NSTS) within NSU is co-located with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, National Targeting Center – Passenger. NSTS provides
ongoing reviews of individuals who are possibly of national security concern as well as
any threats to national security and U.S. interests overseas, and notifies HSI Special
Agents both domestically and abroad when this information is received. [15]
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CCEU) is part of ICE's Homeland
Security Investigations' National Security Investigations Division. The unit prevents
terrorists and other criminals from exploiting the nation's immigration system through
fraud. It investigates non-immigrant visa holders who violate their immigration status
and places a high priority on scrutinizing the activities of known or suspected terrorists
and terrorist associations. It also combats criminal exploitation of the student visa
system. [16]
The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is also part of the National Security
Investigations Division and acts as a bridge for government organizations that have an
interest in information on nonimmigrants whose primary reason for coming to the
United States is to be students. SEVP manages schools and nonimmigrant students in
the F and M visa classifications and their dependents. The Department of State (DoS)
manages Exchange Visitor Programs, nonimmigrant exchange visitors in the J visa
classification and their dependents. Both SEVP and DoS use the Student and Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) to track and monitor schools; exchange visitor
programs; and F, M and J nonimmigrants while they visit the United States and
participate in the U.S. education system. [17]
Homeland Security Investigations’ Counter-Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Program,
also within the National Security Investigations Division, prevents sensitive U.S.
technologies and weapons from reaching terrorists, criminal organizations and foreign
adversaries. The CPI program combats the trafficking and illegal export of the following
commodities and services:
Weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems
Conventional military weaponry, equipment and technology
Controlled dual-use commodities and technology
Firearms and ammunition
Financial and business transactions with sanctioned / embargoed countries and
terrorist organizations. [18]
Homeland Security
Investigations’ Counter-
Proliferation
Investigations (CPI)
Program prevents
sensitive U.S.
technologies and
weapons from reaching
terrorists, criminal
organizations and
foreign adversaries.
521
Chapter 33: ICE
The CPI Export Enforcement Coordination Center (EECC) serves as the primary forum
within the federal government for executive departments and agencies to coordinate
and enhance their export control enforcement efforts. [19]
Project Shield America is an industry and academic outreach program, the intent of
which is to obtain the assistance and cooperation of those companies involved in the
manufacture and export of U.S. origin strategic goods, technologies, and munitions
items as well as academic researchers who study and research these and other
strategic fields. The focus of Project Shield America is to prevent the proliferation of
export-controlled technology and components, the acquisition of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons, and the unlawful exportation of weapon systems and
classified or controlled technical data. [20]
The Visa Security Program (VSP) deploys HSI special agents with immigration law
enforcement expertise to diplomatic posts worldwide to conduct visa security
activities, such as:
Examining visa applications for fraud,
Initiating investigations,
Coordinating with law enforcement partners, and
Providing law enforcement training and advice to Department of State consulates.
[21]
The Illicit Pathways Attack Strategy (IPAS) is aimed against Transnational Organized
Crime (TOC). IPAS elements include:
Extended operating borders.
Prioritized networks and pathways.
Maintaining robust interagency engagement.
Coordinating with foreign partners in specific regions.
Supporting efforts to combat crime through laws and policy. [22]
The CPI Export
Enforcement
Coordination Center
(EECC) serves as the
primary forum within
the federal government
for executive
departments and
agencies to coordinate
and enhance their
export control
enforcement efforts.
522 Part IV: Mission Components
Immigration Enforcement
Immigration enforcement is the largest single area of responsibility for ICE. While
certain responsibilities and close cooperation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and others require significant
ICE assets near the border, the majority of immigration enforcement work for ICE takes
place in the country’s interior. ICE special agents strive to help businesses secure a
lawful workforce and enforce immigration laws against those who encourage and rely
on unauthorized workers, sometimes taking advantage of their situation to offer low
pay and inadequate conditions. Multiple programs help ICE focus and improve on
stated priorities to find and remove illegal aliens who are criminals, fugitives or recent
arrivals. Immigration enforcement entails cracking down on those who produce
fraudulent documents to enable unlawful activity. Additionally, several robust efforts
seek to continue improving the safe and humane detention and removal of persons
subject to those actions. [3]
ICE's role in the immigration enforcement system is focused on two primary missions:
(1) the identification and apprehension of criminal aliens and other removable
individuals located in the United States; and (2) the detention and removal of those
individuals apprehended in the interior of the U.S., as well as those apprehended by
CBP officers and agents patrolling our nation's borders. In executing these
responsibilities, ICE has prioritized its limited resources on the identification and
removal of criminal aliens and those apprehended at the border while attempting to
unlawfully enter the United States. [23]
Undocumented workers secure jobs through fraudulent means such as presenting
false documents, completing fraudulent benefit applications and stealing someone’s
identity. To combat unlawful employment and reduce vulnerabilities that help illegal
aliens gain such employment, ICE announced the Mutual Agreement between
Government and Employers (IMAGE) program in July 2006. Employers enrolling in the
IMAGE program obtain access to E-Verify, an Internet-based system that compares
information from an employee's Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to data
from U.S Department of Homeland Security and Social Security Administration records.
Through this cross-check, E-Verify can confirm employment eligibility status. [24]
ICE works with the private sector to educate employers about their responsibilities to
hire only authorized workers and how to accurately verify employment eligibility.
However, ICE will also investigate employers to verify that they comply with U.S. law
and are not themselves exploiting unauthorized workers. Worksite enforcement
investigations often involve egregious violations of criminal statutes by employers and
widespread abuses. Such cases often involve additional violations such as alien
smuggling, alien harboring, document fraud, money laundering, fraud or worker
exploitation. ICE also investigates employers who employ force, threats or coercion
ICE's role in the
immigration
enforcement system is
focused on two primary
missions: (1) the
identification and
apprehension of
criminal aliens and other
removable individuals
located in the United
States; and (2) the
detention and removal
of those individuals
apprehended in the
interior of the U.S.
523
Chapter 33: ICE
(for example, threatening to have employees deported) in order to keep the
unauthorized alien workers from reporting substandard wage or working conditions.
An effective worksite enforcement strategy must address both employers who
knowingly hire illegal workers, as well as the workers themselves. In worksite cases, ICE
investigators adhere to high investigative standards, including the following:
ICE will look for evidence of the mistreatment of workers, along with evidence of
trafficking, smuggling, harboring, visa fraud, identification document fraud, money
laundering and other such criminal conduct.
ICE will obtain indictments, criminal arrests or search warrants, or a commitment
from a U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute the targeted employer before arresting
employees for civil immigration violations at a worksite. [25]
Apprehended aliens may be placed in secure custody or released on their own
recognizance until their case can be heard in immigration court. ERO keeps track of
both “detained” and “non-detained” aliens until their case is decided. The exception is
children. Unaccompanied alien minors are turned over to the Department of Health
and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement until their cases can be heard.
[26]
The removal of criminal aliens from the US is a national priority. The National Fugitive
Operations Program (NFOP) helps complete this task by identifying, locating and
arresting removable criminal aliens. A fugitive alien is a person who has failed to leave
the United States after he or she receives a final order of removal, deportation or
exclusion, or who has failed to report to ICE after receiving notice to do so. The NFOP’s
"Absconder Apprehension Initiative" uses data available from National Crime
Information Center databases to help find fugitive aliens who have also committed
crimes. As part of the Alien Absconder Initiative, ERO developed and coordinated the
"ICE ERO Most Wanted" program. This program publicizes the names, faces and other
identifying features of the 10 most wanted fugitive criminals by ERO. In FY2012, NFOP
efforts resulted in more than 37,000 arrests. [27]
Fugitive criminal aliens are also pursued under the Criminal Alien Program (CAP). CAP
provides ICE-wide direction and support in the biometric and biographic identification,
arrest, and removal of priority aliens who are incarcerated within federal, state, and
local prisons and jails, as well as at-large criminal aliens that have circumvented
identification. It is incumbent upon ICE to ensure that all efforts are made to
investigate, arrest, and remove individuals from the United States that ICE deems
priorities by processing the alien expeditiously and securing a final order of removal for
an incarcerated alien before the alien is released to ICE custody. The identification and
processing of incarcerated criminal aliens, before release from jails and prisons,
decreases or eliminates the time spent in ICE custody and reduces the overall cost to
Apprehended aliens may
be placed in secure
custody or released on
their own recognizance
until their case can be
heard in immigration
court. ERO keeps track
of both “detained” and
“non-detained” aliens
until their case is
decided.
524
Part IV: Mission Components
the Federal Government. Additionally, integral to the effective execution of this
program is the aggressive prosecution of criminal offenders identified by ERO officers
during the course of their duties. ERO, in conjunction with the Offices of the United
States Attorneys, actively pursues criminal prosecutions upon the discovery of offenses
of the nation's criminal code and immigration laws. This further enhances public safety
and provides a significant deterrent to recidivism. [28]
ICE also investigates fraud perpetrated by immigrants seeking to become naturalized
citizens. ICE places a high priority on investigating document and benefit fraud. These
types of fraud pose a severe threat to national security and public safety because they
create a vulnerability that may enable terrorists, other criminals and illegal aliens to
gain entry to and remain in the United States. Document and benefit fraud are
elements of many immigration-related crimes, such as human smuggling and human
trafficking, critical infrastructure protection, worksite enforcement, visa compliance
enforcement and national security investigations.
Document fraud, also known as identity fraud, is the manufacturing,
counterfeiting, alteration, sale, and/or use of identity documents and other
fraudulent documents to circumvent immigration laws or for other criminal
activity. Identity fraud in some cases also involves identity theft, a crime in which
an imposter takes on the identity of a real person (living or deceased).
Benefit fraud is the willful misrepresentation of a material fact on a petition or
application to gain an immigration benefit. Benefit fraud can be an extremely
lucrative form of white-collar crime, often involving sophisticated schemes and
multiple co-conspirators. These schemes can take years to investigate and
prosecute. [29]
Figure 33-2: ICE Removal Statistics [30]
ICE also investigates
fraud perpetrated by
immigrants seeking to
become naturalized
citizens. ICE places a
high priority on
investigating document
and benefit fraud.
525
Chapter 33: ICE
In 2015, ICE deported 96,045 non-criminal aliens, and 139,368 criminal violators. The
decreasing trend in deportations seen in Figure 33-2 is attributed to changing
immigration enforcement directives and priorities. [30]
The Identity and Benefit Fraud Unit is charged with investigating and disrupting
document and benefit fraud schemes. It coordinates its investigative efforts with other
U.S. Department of Homeland Security components, such as U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, as well as other federal
agencies such as the U. S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Labor. The unit
also develops and advances policy initiatives and proposes legislative changes to
address vulnerabilities in the immigration process to deter fraud and reduce the
incentives for committing document and benefit fraud. [29]
Performance Analysis
Congress has a long-standing interest in seeing that immigration enforcement agencies
identify and deport criminal aliens. The expeditious removal of such aliens has been a
statutory priority since 1986, and the Department of Homeland Security and its
predecessor agency have operated programs targeting criminal aliens since 1988.
These programs have grown substantially since FY2005, and deportations of criminal
aliens—along with other unauthorized immigrants— have grown proportionally. [31, p.
ii]
Despite the interest in criminal aliens, inconsistencies in data quality, data collection,
and definitions make it impossible to precisely enumerate the criminal alien
population, all noncitizens ever convicted of a crime. The Congressional Research
Service (CRS) estimates the number of noncitizens incarcerated in federal and state
prisons and local jails—a subset of all criminal aliens—at 183,830 in 2011 (the most
recent year for which complete data are available), with state prisons and local jails
each accounting for somewhat more incarcerations than federal prisons. The overall
proportion of noncitizens in prisons and jails corresponds closely to the proportion of
noncitizens in the total U.S. population. [31, p. ii]
While consensus exists on the overarching goal of identifying and removing serious
criminal aliens, these programs have generated controversy, in part because many of
the aliens identified by ICE have never been convicted of a crime, or have been
convicted only of minor criminal offenses. Thus, the programs focus attention on
questions about when—if ever—DHS should exercise “prosecutorial discretion” by not
asserting its full enforcement authority in certain cases. ICE and DHS officials have
Congress has a long-
standing interest in
seeing that immigration
enforcement agencies
identify and deport
criminal aliens. Despite
the interest in criminal
aliens, inconsistencies in
data quality, data
collection, and
definitions make it
impossible to precisely
enumerate the criminal
alien population, all
noncitizens ever
convicted of a crime.
526 Part IV: Mission Components
testified that resource constraints mean that the department can deport only about
400,000 aliens per year—far fewer than the total number of potentially removable
aliens identified. Officials have released a series of memoranda describing criteria to
prioritize certain aliens for removal, and to consider exercising discretion in other
cases. [31, p. ii]
Another area of concern is ICE’s performance in worksite enforcement. ICE’s worksite
enforcement program is focused primarily on critical infrastructure facilities and cases
involving employers who commit “egregious” violations of criminal statutes and
engage in worker exploitation. Various measures are available to examine the
performance of ICE’s worksite enforcement program. They include Final Orders for civil
monetary penalties, administrative fines, administrative arrests, criminal arrests,
criminal indictments, criminal convictions, and criminal fines and forfeitures. In
addition to examining annual changes and trends in the various performance measure
data, these data can be considered in relation to the estimated size of the
unauthorized workforce or the potential number of employers employing these
workers. When considered in this context, ICE’s worksite enforcement program can
seem quite limited. [32, p. ii]
Conclusion
ICE promotes homeland security and public safety through the strategic and wide-
ranging criminal and civil enforcement of hundreds of federal laws governing border
control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE primarily consists of two operational
programs: Enforcement and Removal Operations and Homeland Security
Investigations. Guided by ICE’s prioritized enforcement principles, ERO identifies and
apprehends convicted criminals and other individuals deemed removable, detains or
places these individuals in alternatives to detention programs, and removes individuals
determined to be illegally present (or otherwise subject to removal) from the United
States. HSI is responsible for a wide range of domestic and international criminal
investigations arising from the illegal movement of people and merchandise into,
within, and out of the United States, often in coordination with other Federal agencies.
[33]
527 Chapter 33: ICE
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency?
2. How is the ICE mission similar to CBP?
3. How is the ICE mission different from CBP?
4. How is financial crime related to ICE’s mission?
5. Which ICE component investigates and disrupts bulk cash smuggling around the world?
6. How is cyber crime related to ICE’s mission?
7. Which ICE component investigates and targets purveyors of child pornography?
8. How is counterproliferation related to ICE’s mission?
9. Which ICE program aims to prevent the export of sensitive U.S. technology, weapons, and ammunition?
10. What happens to illegal aliens apprehended by ICE?
528
Part IV: Mission Components
529
Chapter 34: USCIS
U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the mission of the organization.
Describe some key components of the organization.
Discuss some of the work of the organization.
Chapter 34
Learning Outcomes
530 Part IV: Mission Components
“The Administration will complete reform of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), separating the agency’s enforcement and service functions within, as the
President has proposed, the new Department of Homeland Security.”
- 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
Introduction
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates immigration and
naturalization petitions, considers refugee and asylum claims and related humanitarian
and international concerns, and provides a range of immigration-related services, such
as issuing employment authorizations and processing nonimmigrant change-of-status
petitions. Processing immigrant petitions remains USCIS’s leading function. In FY2014,
it handled roughly 6 million petitions for immigration-related services and benefits. [1,
p. ii] USCIS currently funds over 95% of its budget by charging user fees to petitioners
for its services. [1, p. 1]
Background
USCIS was established with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and assumed
responsibility for the immigration service functions of the federal government on
March 1, 2003. [1, p. 2] USCIS replaced the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), whose authorities and responsibilities were split among USCIS,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection
(CBP). [2]
Mission
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services is the federal agency that oversees lawful
immigration to the United States. [3]
Services
Citizenship. Individuals who wish to become U.S. citizens through naturalization
submit their applications to USCIS. USIS determines eligibility, processes the
applications and, if approved, schedules the applicant for a ceremony to take the
Oath of Allegiance. USCIS also determines eligibility and provide documentation of
U.S. citizenship for people who acquired or derived U.S. citizenship through their
parents.
Immigration of Family Members. USCIS manages the process that allows current
permanent residents and U.S. citizens to bring close relatives to live and work in
the United States.
U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services is
the federal agency that
oversees lawful
immigration to the
United States.
531
Chapter 34: USCIS
Work Authorization. USCIS manages the process that allows individuals from other
countries to work in the United States. Some of the opportunities are temporary,
and some provide a path to a green card (permanent residence).
Work Verification. USCIS manages the E-Verify system that allows participating
employers to electronically verify the employment eligibility of their newly hired
employees.
Humanitarian Programs. USCIS administers humanitarian programs that provide
protection to individuals inside and outside the United States who are displaced by
war, famine and civil and political unrest, and those who are forced to flee their
countries to escape the risk of death and torture at the hands of persecutors.
Adoption. USCIS manages the first step in the process for U.S. citizens to adopt
children from other countries. Approximately 20,000 adoptions take place each
year.
Civic Integration. USCIS promotes instruction and training on citizenship rights and
responsibilities and provides immigrants with the information and tools necessary
to successfully integrate into American civic culture.
Genealogy. Eligible historical records are placed online and otherwise made
publicly available to assist in genealogical research. [3]
Figure 34-1: USCIS Organization Chart [4]
532
Part IV: Mission Components
Organization
USCIS has over 200 offices around the world and employs roughly 19,000 employees
and contractors within its directorates and program offices. Processing petitions and
applications, which is most of the agency’s workload, occurs in four major USCIS
Service Centers and 83 Field Offices in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Guam. [1, p.
2]
USCIS Directorates
The Customer Service and Public Engagement Directorate provides clear, accurate, and
timely response to customer concerns and questions, and engage the public through
transparent dialogue that promotes participation and feedback.
The Customer Service Division (CSD) is dedicated to proactively providing
information and guidance to USCIS applicants, petitioners and advocates regarding
immigration benefits.
The Public Engagement Division (PED) develops and maintains collaborative
relationships with community-based and faith-based organizations, and advances
outreach and communication to state, local, territorial, and tribal partners. [5]
The Field Operations Directorate ensures the integrity of the immigration system and
lends assistance to applicants, petitioners, and beneficiaries through field offices and
the National Benefits Center.
83 field offices and field support offices deliver immigration benefit services
directly to applicants and petitioners in communities across the United States and
its territories.
The National Benefits Center (NBC) performs centralized front-end processing of
applications and petitions that require field office interviews (primarily, family-
based I-485s and N-400s). In addition, the NBC adjudicates some form types to
completion including I-765s, I-131s, immigration benefits associated with the LIFE
Act, legalization-related applications and international adoption cases.
A headquarters office, four regional offices and 26 district offices provide
oversight, direction and support to the field offices, field support offices and the
NBC. [6]
The Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate (FDNS) determines whether
individuals or organizations filing for immigration benefits pose a threat to national
security, public safety, or the integrity of the nation’s legal immigration system. FDNS
officers resolve background check information and other concerns that surface during
Processing petitions and
applications, which is
most of the agency’s
workload, occurs in four
major USCIS Service
Centers and 83 Field
Offices in the United
States, Puerto Rico, and
Guam.
533
Chapter 34: USCIS
the processing of immigration benefit applications and petitions. Resolution often
requires communication with law enforcement or intelligence agencies to make sure
that the information is relevant to the applicant or petitioner at hand and, if so,
whether the information would have an impact on eligibility for the benefit. FDNS
officers are located in every USCIS Center, District, Field, and Asylum Office. FDNS
officers are also located in other government agencies. [7]
The Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (RAIO) provides
immigration, protection, and humanitarian services for people who are fleeing
oppression, persecution, or torture; facing urgent humanitarian situations; and military
members and overseas residents who need replacement documents to return to the
U.S.
The Refugee Affairs Division provides resettlement benefits to people who are
outside their countries and cannot or are unwilling to return to their homes
because they fear serious harm.
The Asylum Division manages the U.S. affirmative asylum process, which allows
individuals who are already in the U.S. (or at a port of entry), to remain here
because they have been persecuted or fear persecution. The individual must not
be in removal proceedings to apply under affirmative asylum procedures.
The International Operations Division, with offices around the world, is the face of
USCIS abroad. These offices reunite families, enable adoptive children to come to
join permanent families in the U.S., consider parole requests from individuals
outside the U.S. for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit, and
provide information services and travel documents to people around the world. [8]
The Service Center Operations Directorate (SCOPS) provides services to people seeking
immigration benefits while ensuring the integrity of the immigration system. SOPS
provides decisions to individuals who want to receive immigration benefits, and
supports components at headquarters and service centers. Work performed by the
service centers is organized by these distinct product lines:
Business services process Immigrant (Permanent) and Nonimmigrant (Temporary)
classifications for individuals of extraordinary ability; outstanding researchers and
professors; executives and managers; advanced degree professionals; athletes,
entertainers; skilled and unskilled workers; individuals working in specialty
occupations; religious workers; agricultural workers and temporary and seasonal
workers, among others.
Family services process petitions for immediate family members and fiancés.
The Fraud Detection and
National Security
Directorate (FDNS)
determines whether
individuals or
organizations filing for
immigration benefits
pose a threat to
national security, public
safety, or the integrity
of the nation’s legal
immigration system.
534
Part IV: Mission Components
Humanitarian services process benefit requests filed by refugees and asylees and
their accompanying family members, individuals seeking consideration of deferred
action for childhood arrivals (DACA), and individuals seeking temporary protected
status (TPS); relief for victims of abuse, crimes, and severe forms of trafficking;
waivers of inadmissibility; and posthumous naturalization based on death in active
military service, among other humanitarian benefits.
Students services process requests for practical training in a field of study and
waivers for medical doctors to enable them to work in medically underserved
areas. [9]
USCIS Offices
The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) conducts administrative review of immigrant
appeals to ensure consistency and accuracy in the interpretation of immigration law
and policy. AAO generally issues “non-precedent” decisions, which apply existing law
and policy to the facts of a given case. After review by the Attorney General, AAO may
also issue “precedent” decisions to provide clear and uniform guidance to adjudicators
and the public on the proper interpretation of law and policy. AAO exercises appellate
jurisdiction over approximately 50 different immigration case types. [10]
The Office of Intake and Document Production designs, prints, and distributes USCIS
forms; manages the paper (USCIS Lockbox facilities) intake system; troubleshoots
intake issues, adjudicates fee waivers and resolves problems with applications; and
produces and delivers secure benefit documents and cards, such as Permanent
Resident Cards. [11]
The Office of Citizenship engages and supports partners to welcome immigrants,
promote English language learning, and education on the rights and responsibilities of
citizenship. The office supports national and community-based organizations that
prepare immigrants for citizenship by providing grants, educational materials, and
technical assistance; and conducts training workshops for educators and organizations
preparing immigrants for citizenship. [12]
The Office of Communications (OCOMM) oversees and coordinates official USCIS
communications to both internal and external audiences. OCOMM manages
communications and messaging to external audiences; and informs the public
regarding USCIS immigration services and benefits. [13]
The Office of Citizenship
engages and supports
partners to welcome
immigrants, promote
English language
learning, and education
on the rights and
responsibilities of
citizenship.
535
Chapter 34: USCIS
The Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) maintains relationships with Congress by
ensuring prompt replies to constituent concerns; reaching out on issues of interest;
and providing ongoing educational activities for Congressmen and staff. [14]
The Office of Privacy maintains privacy protections for individuals and promotes
transparency of USCIS operations. [15]
The Office of Transformation Coordination manages and oversees the development of
the USCIS Electronic Immigration System (USCIS ELIS) to move the agency from a paper
-based application and adjudication process to an electronic one. [16]
USCIS Functions
Three major activities dominate USCIS functions: adjudication of immigration petitions,
adjudication of naturalization petitions, and consideration of refugee and asylum
claims and related humanitarian and international concerns. USCIS also provides a
range of immigration-related services, such as employment authorizations and change-
of-status petitions. [1, p. 2]
Immigration Adjudication. USCIS processes roughly 6 million petitions each year,
including about 1 million for permanent status and 5 million for temporary
nonimmigrant status. USCIS adjudicators determine the eligibility of immediate
relatives and other family members of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents
(LPRs); employees that U.S. businesses have demonstrated that they need (and their
immediate family members); and other foreign nationals who meet specified criteria.
They also must determine whether a foreign national in the United States on a
temporary visa (i.e., a nonimmigrant) is eligible to change to another nonimmigrant
status or adjust to LPR status. [1, p. 3]
Work Authorization. USCIS adjudicates work authorizations for aliens who meet certain
conditions. [1, p. 3]
Employment Verification. USCIS is responsible for the Electronic Employment Eligibility
Verification (E-Verify) program used by employers to ensure that their employees
possess lawful status to work in the United States. Since FY2007, congressional
appropriations have supported the E-Verify program. [1, p. 3]
Three major activities
dominate USCIS
functions:
1. Adjudication of
immigration
petitions;
2. Adjudication of
naturalization
petitions; and
3. Consideration of
refugee and asylum
claims and related
humanitarian and
international
concerns.
536
Part IV: Mission Components
International Services. The USCIS Office of International Affairs adjudicates refugee
applications and conducts background and record checks related to some immigrant
petitions abroad. The largest component of this program is the asylum officer corps, a
small but occasionally high-profile part of USCIS’s workload, whose members interview
and screen asylum applicants. [1, p. 3]
Fraud Detection and National Security. USCIS must confirm that all applicants are
eligible for the particular immigration status they are seeking, or alternatively,
determine they should be rejected because they fail to meet other legal requirements.
USCIS established the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security at the agency’s
inception in 2003 to work with the appropriate law enforcement entities to handle
foreign nationals whose applications and petitions trigger national security and
criminal database notifications and to identify systemic fraud in the application
process. Many such duties formerly performed by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service enforcement arm are now the responsibility of DHS’s Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). [1, pp. 3-4]
Civic Integration. USCIS promotes instruction and training on citizenship rights and
responsibilities and provides immigrants with the information and tools necessary to
successfully integrate into American civic culture. This includes maintaining a
Citizenship Resource Center website and managing the Immigrant Integration Grants
Program, which assists public or private nonprofit organizations that provide
citizenship instruction and naturalization application services to Lawful Permanent
Residents. [1, p. 4]
Naturalization. USCIS is responsible for naturalization, a process that grants U.S.
citizenship to LPRs who fulfill the related requirements established by Congress in the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). Adjudicators must determine whether
aliens have continuously resided in the United States for a specified period; possess
good moral character, are able to read, write, speak, and understand English; and
possess a basic knowledge of U.S. civics and history. [1, p. 4]
USCIS Operations
USCIS funds the processing and adjudication of immigrant, nonimmigrant, refugee,
asylum, and citizenship benefits through its user fees deposited into the Immigration
Examination Fee Account (IEFA). This account is not subject to annual congressional
approval. The INA states that user fees be set at a level that ensures recovery of the
full costs of providing adjudication and naturalization services, including similar
services to those people who are not charged, such as asylum applicants. User fees can
also be set at levels to cover “costs associated with the administration of the fees
collected.” [1, p. 6]
USCIS is responsible for
naturalization, a process
that grants U.S.
citizenship to Legal
Permanent Residents
(LPRs) who fulfill the
related requirements
established by Congress
in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952.
537
Chapter 34: USCIS
In 1998, Congress passed the American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement
Act (ACWIA), which, among other provisions, temporarily increased the number of
temporary skilled H-1B workers admitted to the United States. To provide training for
American workers and thus reduce employer reliance on immigrant workers, the act
established the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee Account to fund training and
education programs administered by the Department of Labor and the National
Science Foundation, thereby establishing an affirmative role for U.S. employers to
assist with education and training efforts for U.S. workers. The statutorily set H-1B
Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee is currently $1,500 ($750 if the employer has 25 or fewer
full-time equivalent employees). USCIS receives 5% of the fees paid into the account by
all employers participating in the H-1B program. In FY2014, the USCIS share of funding
in this account was $13 million, representing 0.07% of the USCIS budget. [1, p. 7]
On December 8, 2004, Congress passed the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004, which
established the Fraud Prevention and Detection Account. This account receives funds
for fraud detection and prevention activities from a “Fraud Fee” (currently $500) that
must be submitted with a petition seeking an initial grant of H-1B, H-2B, or L visa
classification to foreign nationals or by an employer seeking to change an alien’s
employer within those classifications. USCIS receives 33% of the Fraud Detection and
Prevention Account fees. As with the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee, the Fraud
Prevention and Detection Fee is set by statute, and DHS has no authority to adjust it. In
FY2014, the USCIS share of funding in this account was $41 million, representing 1.36%
of the USCIS budget. [1, pp. 7-8]
USCIS customers who seek immigration services and benefits often face challenges as
they navigate the complexity of U.S. immigration laws and regulations. Obtaining
answers to questions and resolving issues may require visits to USCIS offices that can
be time-consuming and inconvenient. For many services, USCIS customers must apply
for most benefits by mail. USCIS employees then review submitted paper files and ship
documents between offices to complete their adjudication. [1, p. 12]
According to the DHS Inspector General’s office, USCIS was relying on paper-based
processes to manage the filing and adjudication of immigration benefits as recently as
2011. [1, p. 12] This mode of operation generates complaints of lost files. Many
observers comment that it is entirely outmoded to meet the growing workload and
challenges facing the agency. [1, p. 4]
As part of a comprehensive set of initiatives to modernize the agency, USCIS embarked
on an agency-wide investment referred to as “transformation” that began transitioning
the agency from a fragmented, paper-based operational environment to a centralized
and consolidated environment facilitating electronic processing of the adjudication
USCIS customers who
seek immigration
services and benefits
often face challenges as
they navigate the
complexity of U.S.
immigration laws and
regulations. Obtaining
answers to questions
and resolving issues may
require visits to USCIS
offices that can be time-
consuming and
inconvenient. According
to the DHS Inspector
General’s office, USCIS
was relying on paper-
based processes to
manage the filing and
adjudication of
immigration benefits as
recently as 2011.
538
Part IV: Mission Components
function. In 2012, USCIS formally launched the first two phases of its electronic
immigration application system, known as ELIS. Under ELIS, eligible individuals can
establish an account and apply online to extend or change their nonimmigrant status
for certain visa types. ELIS enables USCIS officers to review and adjudicate filings
online. It also includes tools to combat fraud and identify national security concerns.
Nevertheless, ELIS still possesses limited features and must expand substantially before
USCIS can move to an entirely electronic platform. [1, p. 13]
Capacity
USCIS regularly faces concerns from immigration observers about the agency’s ability
to manage adjudication workloads, particularly during surges in application volume
that result from changes in immigration policy or other major events. Such an event
occurred in November 2014 when President Obama announced the Immigration
Accountability Executive Action deferring removals on certain classes of unauthorized
aliens. The executive order encompassed nearly 5 million unauthorized aliens,
sparking a surge in new applications. The move was unprecedented, but not unusual,
as USCIS processed roughly 2.7 million additional applications between 1987 and 1989
following passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA, P.L. 99-
603), which, by most accounts, was successfully administrated. However, the
Government Accountability Office noted that when the 3 million individuals legalized
under IRCA in 1986 became eligible for naturalization in 1995, the application backlog
increased markedly. Processing backlogs may affect processing times for other
petitions as resources within the agency are reconfigured to address urgent needs. This
latter concern has been raised by some who argue the agency is diverting resources
used to process petitions of those immigrating to the United States legally in order to
process petitions that benefit the unauthorized alien population. [1, p. 14]
Critics also describe a processing system that continues to rely primarily on paper
applications and postal mail and argue that other agency services will suffer from the
diversion of USCIS resources to attend to the pressing caseload caused by the 2014
executive action. After it was announced in November 2014, the agency made plans to
hire over 1,000 full and part-time personnel to handle the workload. Costs for the new
hires were to be covered by other petition fees. [1, pp. 14-15]
As part of a
comprehensive set of
initiatives to modernize
the agency, USCIS
embarked on an agency-
wide investment
referred to as
“transformation” that
began transitioning the
agency from a
fragmented, paper-
based operational
environment to a
centralized and
consolidated
environment facilitating
electronic processing.
539
Chapter 34: USCIS
Conclusion
For several years, some Members of Congress have favored “comprehensive
immigration reform” (CIR), a label that commonly refers to omnibus legislation that
includes increased border security and immigration enforcement, expanded
employment eligibility verification, revision of nonimmigrant visas and legal permanent
immigration, and legalization for some unauthorized aliens residing in the country.
Other Members of Congress prefer incremental revisions to the Immigration and
Nationality Act that would address some but not all of these elements, and with
sequential reforms that would tackle border security and interior enforcement
provisions prior to revising legal immigration or enacting legalization pathways. [17, p.
ii] In 2013, the Senate passed S. 744 calling for comprehensive immigration reform.
After the bill was blocked by the House, President Obama undertook executive action
that inflamed both legislative branches. Unfortunately, while everybody agrees
immigration reform is needed, nobody agrees how to accomplish it.
540
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the mission of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services?
2. Which USCIS component has 83 field offices to process applications for citizenship and other benefits?
3. Which USCIS component determines if people applying for citizenship pose a threat to national security?
4. Which USCIS component assists people seeking asylum from persecution or have urgent humanitarian needs?
5. What is the difference between a U.S. immigrant, nonimmigrant, refugee, asylee, and naturalized citizen?
6. Which of the following is not a naturalization requirement under the 1952 Immigration and Nationalization Act?
a. Understanding of the English language.
b. A knowledge and understanding of U.S. government.
c. A profession or trade capable of providing a living wage.
7. List and describe the three major activities that dominate USCIS functions.
8. How are USCIS operations funded?
9. What countermeasure did Congress enact in 1998 when it lifted the quota on temporary workers in the U.S.?
10. Should the U.S. increase or decrease immigration quotas? Explain your answer.
541
Part V:
Mission Partners
This section examines selected partners in the Homeland Security Enterprise. It is beyond the scope of this book to
address all partners identified in Chapter 13. For the sake of brevity, we have tried to address those who play a larger
role within the context of DHS missions. Congress is integral to DHS funding and oversight; The National Security
Council is the central coordinating body for all Federal interagency planning and execution; DHS is a member of the
Intelligence Community, both as a recipient and contributor; DoD is a supporting agency for all Emergency Support
Functions, and an essential partner for large-scale incident response; the National Guard under command of their State
Governors are exempt from Posse Comitatus restrictions on law enforcement, and typically the first military units on-
scene following disaster; While the FBI remains the Lead Federal Agency for counterterrorism, they work closely with
DHS to develop leads and issue alerts; Through its Fusion Center program, DHS maintains a communications pathway
for sharing intelligence data between the Federal government and State and Local law enforcement; and, of course,
DHS continues to help First Responders become better prepared through the National Preparedness System. Though
some of the material here was seen in earlier chapters, in this section we try to give the partners more comprehensive
treatment with respect to their roles and responsibilities in working with DHS to safeguard the U.S. from domestic
catastrophic destruction.
542
Part V: Mission Partners
543
Chapter 35: Congress
Congress
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the relationship between Congress and DHS.
Explain the purpose of congressional oversight.
Discuss different means for conducting oversight.
Evaluate current oversight of DHS.
Chapter 35
Learning Outcomes
544
Part V: Mission Partners
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men,
neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next
place, oblige it to control itself.”
- James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 1788
Introduction
Congress created the Department of Homeland Security. Congress funds the
Department. Congress also maintains oversight of its activities. This chapter examines
the oversight role of Congress and how it has been applied to the Department of
Homeland Security.
Background
Power in American national government is decentralized, divided, dispersed, and
limited. This distribution of power derives in part from the Constitution, through
limitations imposed on the government, the system of checks and balances among the
three branches, and independent bases of support and authority for each branch. [1, p.
1]
Congress, the President, and the Supreme Court have separate and distinct political
bases under the Constitution, to foster each branch’s independence and integrity. The
ultimate purpose behind this separation, James Madison argued in the Federalist
Papers, is to prevent a “faction” — that is, a group “adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interest of the community” — from
gaining control over the entire government. [1, p. 2]
Under the Constitution, the three branches have both enumerated and implied powers
that reinforce their institutional independence and political power. Accompanying
these, however, is shared responsibility for public policy and a system of checks and
balances. These “auxiliary precautions,” as Madison called them in the Federalist
Papers, are designed so that the “several constituent parts may, by their mutual
relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places ... [and] may be a
check on the other.” [1, p. 5]
Congress created the
Department of
Homeland Security.
Congress funds the
Department. Congress
also maintains oversight
of its activities.
545
Chapter 35: Congress
The key function of lawmaking is shared, with the President able to veto legislation
passed by both chambers of Congress; to override his veto requires a two-thirds vote
in each house. Further, the Supreme Court, through its implied power of judicial
review, can declare a statute or a part of it unconstitutional, as it did initially, two
centuries ago, in Marbury v. Madison. [1, p. 5]
Control of national security policy is also divided. While the President is commander in
chief of the armed forces, Congress has authority to declare war, raise and support
armies, and make rules governing the land, air, and naval forces. While the President
holds the sword, as commander in chief, Congress holds the purse strings, through the
appropriations process. The Supreme Court too can affect the military capacity of the
United States, as the Court did when it overturned the President’s seizure of the steel
mills during the Korean War. [1, p. 5]
Although “executive power is vested in a President” by the Constitution (Article II,
Section 1), he shares official responsibility for enforcing, implementing, and
administering public law and policy with other officers and offices. Individual agencies
and subordinate officers in the executive branch and elsewhere have been delegated
duties and authority directly by statute. [1, p. 6]
The Constitution does not establish specific departments or agencies; these are
created and sustained by legislation. As a result, a wide range and variety of
organizations administer public policy. These include not only the cabinet departments
— which now number 15, with the new Department of Homeland Security — but also
other executive branch agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency and the
Central Intelligence Agency. [1, p. 6]
The constitutional system — through its founding premise of limited government and
an intricate system of separated institutions, checks and balances, and shared
responsibilities — strives to meet two core values of democracy. One is to ensure
majority rule, through, for instance, the popular election of officials who make public
policy; the other is to protect individual rights and civil liberties, through specific
constitutional safeguards and indirectly through restraints on and competition among
the three branches. [1, p. 6]
Control of national
security policy is also
divided. While the
President is commander
in chief of the armed
forces, Congress has
authority to declare
war, raise and support
armies, and make rules
governing the land, air,
and naval forces. While
the President holds the
sword, as commander in
chief, Congress holds the
purse strings.
546
Part V: Mission Partners
Congressional Oversight
Oversight is an implicit constitutional obligation of Congress. According to Historian
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the framers believed it was not necessary to make specific
reference to “oversight” in the Constitution. “[I]t was not considered necessary to
make an explicit grant of such authority,” wrote Schlesinger. “The power to make laws
implied the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.” The Constitution also
granted Congress an array of formal powers—the purse strings, lawmaking,
impeachment, among others—to hold the president and the administration
accountable for their actions or inactions. In short, oversight plays a key role in our
system of checks and balances. [2, p. 5]
There is a large number of overlapping purposes associated with oversight. This array
can be divided into three basic types: programmatic, political, and institutional.
Programmatic purposes include such objectives as making sure agencies and programs
are working in a cost-effective and efficient manner; ensuring executive compliance
with legislative intent; evaluating program performance; improving the economy of
governmental performance; investigating waste, fraud, and abuse in governmental
programs; reviewing the agency rulemaking process; acquiring information useful in
future policymaking; or determining whether agencies or programs are fulfilling their
statutory mission. [2, p. 5]
There are also political purposes associated with oversight, such as generating
favorable publicity for lawmakers, winning the electoral support of constituents and
outside groups, or rebutting criticisms of favorite programs or agencies. After all,
oversight occurs in an ever-present political context in which Congress’s relationship
with administrative entities can range from cooperation to conflict. There are,
moreover, inherent constitutional and political tensions between Congress and the
President even during periods of unified government (one party in charge of the
House, Senate, and White House). Partisan and inter-branch conflicts are not
uncommon in the conduct of the legislative review function. [2, pp. 5-6]
In addition, there are institutional oversight purposes that merit special mention,
because they serve to protect congressional prerogatives and strengthen the American
public’s ability to evaluate and reevaluate executive activities and actions. Three
institutional purposes include checking the power of the executive branch;
investigating how a law is being administered; and informing Congress and the public.
[2, p. 6]
A fundamental objective
of congressional
oversight is to hold
executive officials
accountable for the
implementation of
delegated authority.
547
Chapter 35: Congress
A fundamental objective of congressional oversight is to hold executive officials
accountable for the implementation of delegated authority. This objective is especially
important given the huge expansion of executive influence in the modern era. If the
Founding Fathers returned to observe their handiwork, they would likely be surprised
by such developments as the creation of a “presidential branch” of government (the
Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and the like) and the
establishment of so many federal departments and agencies. From three departments
in 1789 (State, Treasury, and War, renamed Defense in 1947), a dozen more have been
added to the cabinet. [2, p. ii]
Clearly, given the role and scope of the federal establishment, the importance of
Congress’s review function looms large in checking and monitoring the delegated
authority that it grants to federal departments and agencies. [2, p. ii]
Oversight Mechanisms
In carrying out its oversight responsibilities, Congress may choose from a variety of
techniques to hold agencies accountable, so that if one technique proves to be
ineffective, committees and Members can employ others singly or in combination.
Most of these techniques are utilized by the committees of Congress: standing,
subcommittee, select, or special. [2, p. 9]
A traditional method of congressional oversight is hearings and investigations into
executive branch operations. Legislators need to know how effectively federal
programs are working and how well agency officials are responding to legislative or
committee directives. And they want to know the scope and intensity of public support
for government programs to assess the need for statutory changes. Although the
terms “hearings” and “investigations” overlap (“investigative hearings,” for example)
and they may look alike in their formal setting and operation, a shorthand distinction is
that hearings focus generally on the efficiency and effectiveness of federal agencies
and programs. Investigations, too, may address programmatic efficiency and
effectiveness, but their primary focus—triggered by widespread public interest and
debate—is often on allegations of wrongdoing, lack of agency preparedness or
competence, fraud and abuse, conflicts of interest, and the like. Famous examples
include investigations so well-known that a few words are often enough to trigger the
attentive public’s recollection, such as the 1972 Watergate break-in, the 1987 Iran-
Contra affair, or the Hurricane Katrina debacle of 2005. [2, p. 9]
A traditional method of
congressional oversight
is hearings and
investigations into
executive branch
operations.
548
Part V: Mission Partners
Congress can pass authorizing legislation that establishes, continues (a
reauthorization), or abolishes (a de-authorization) a federal agency or program. It can
enact “statutes authorizing the activities of the departments, prescribing their internal
organization and regulating their procedures and work methods.” Once an agency or
program is created, the reauthorization process, which typically occurs on an annual or
multiyear cycle, can be an important oversight tool. Significant issues are often raised
during the authorization or reauthorization process. Lawmakers may ask such
questions as: Can the agency be made smaller? If this program or agency did not exist,
would it be created today? Should functions that overlap several agencies be merged
or consolidated? What fundamental changes need to be made in how the department
operates? [2, p. 10]
Congress probably exercises its most effective oversight of agencies and programs
through the appropriations process. As James Madison wrote in The Federalist Papers
No. 58: “The power of the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives
of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect
every just and salutary measure.” By cutting off or reducing funds, Congress can
effectively abolish agencies or curtail federal programs. For example, in its various
committee reports to accompany FY2010 appropriations measures, the House
Appropriations Committee includes “a three-part list of terminations, program
reductions and White House initiatives that have been denied.” By increasing funds,
appropriators can build up neglected program areas. In either case, the appropriating
panels in each chamber have formidable power to shape ongoing federal agencies and
programs. A noted, congressional budget expert remarked that the appropriating
process as an oversight method is comparable to a Janus (after the mythical Roman
god)-like weapon: “The stick of spending reductions in case agencies cannot
satisfactorily defend their budget requests and past performance, and the carrot of
more money if agencies produce convincing success stories or the promise of future
results.” [2, p. 11]
Congress has created statutory offices of inspectors general (IGs) in nearly 70 major
federal entities and departments. The IGs, for example, are located in all fifteen
cabinet departments, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the independent
regulatory commissions. Granted substantial independence by the Inspectors General
Act of 1978, as amended in 1988 and again in 2008, these officials are authorized to
conduct investigations and audits of their agencies to improve efficiency, end waste
and fraud, discourage mismanagement, and strengthen the effectiveness and economy
of agency operations. Appointed in various ways—in most cases either by the
President subject to Senate confirmation or by agency heads—IGs report their findings
and recommendations to (1) the Attorney General in cases of suspected violations of
federal criminal law, (2) semiannually to the agency head, who must transmit the IG
report to Congress within thirty days with no changes to the report but with his or her
Congress probably
exercises its most
effective oversight of
agencies and programs
through the
appropriations process.
549
Chapter 35: Congress
suggestions; and (3) in the case of “particularly serious or flagrant problems,”
immediately to the agency head who must send the report to Congress within seven
days unaltered but with his or her recommendations. Inspectors generals, said a
Senator, are “the government’s first line of defense against fraud.” [2, p. 11]
The Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly titled the General Accounting
Office until the name change in 2004, was established by the Budget and Accounting
Office of 1921. With about 3,100 employees, GAO functions as Congress’s investigative
arm, conducting financial and program audits and evaluations of executive activities,
operations, and programs. For example, in one study, GAO reported “that 19 of 24
Federal agencies … could not fully explain how they had spent taxpayer money
appropriated by Congress.” The head of GAO is the Comptroller General (CG), who is
nominated by the President (following a recommendation process involving the
bipartisan leaders of the House and Senate) and subject to the advice and consent of
the Senate for a non-renewable 15-year term. The GAO conducts field investigations of
administrative activities and programs, prescribes accounting standards for the
executive branch, prepares policy analyses, adjudicates bid protests, makes
recommendations for legislative action, evaluates programs, and provides legal
opinions on government actions and activities. The office submits hundreds of reports
to Congress annually, describing ways to root out waste and mismanagement in
executive branch programs and to promote program performance. One of its
traditional reports to Congress is on government programs and activities that are “high
risk,” that is, they require significant improvements in their operations and
performance. [2, p. 12]
Numerous laws require executive agencies to submit reports periodically, and as
required by specific events or certain conditions, to Congress and its committees.
Generally the report requirement encourages self-evaluation by the executive branch
and promotes agency accountability to Congress. Reporting requirements involve
weighing Congress’s need for information and analysis to conduct evaluations of
agencies and programs against the imposition of burdensome or unnecessary
obligations on executive entities. (Recall, too, that IGs regularly report to Congress.) [2,
p. 12]
Each lawmaker’s office handles thousands of requests each year from constituents
seeking help in dealing with executive agencies. The requests range from inquiries
about lost Social Security checks or delayed pension payments to disaster relief
assistance and complicated tax appeals to the Internal Revenue Service. “Constituents
perceive casework in nonpolitical terms,” wrote two scholars. “They expect their
representatives to provide [this service].” Casework, an ombudsman-like function, has
the positive effect of bringing quirks in the administrative machinery to Members’
attention. Solutions to an individual constituent’s problems can suggest legislative
The Government
Accountability Office
(GAO), formerly titled
the General Accounting
Office until the name
change in 2004, was
established by the
Budget and Accounting
Office of 1921. With
about 3,100 employees,
GAO functions as
Congress’s investigative
arm, conducting
financial and program
audits and evaluations
of executive activities,
operations, and
programs.
550
Part V: Mission Partners
remedies on a broader scale. On occasion, constituents’ casework requests may be
used in oversight hearings by Members to highlight and lend support to a problem or
shortcoming in the operations of a program or agency. [2, p. 13]
Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security
For all the reasons cited, congressional oversight is an important and necessary
function of the legislative branch to ensure the will of the people are maintained by
the executive branch of U.S. government. Congress, however, must maintain a
balance to ensure its oversight functions don’t become overly burdensome and
impede the functions of the executive agencies invested with the authority to perform
their designated role. It was with this in mind that the 9/11 Commission originally
recommended that “Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight and
review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what
committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But we believe
that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the
Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing committee with a
nonpartisan staff.” [3, p. 421] Unfortunately, this view did not prevail, and ten years
later it was seen as the most important unfulfilled recommendation of the 9/11
Commission. [4, p. 37]
According to a retrospective analysis on the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 Commission
Report (July 2014), the Annenberg Public Policy Center found:
“Ninety-two committees and subcommittees of Congress now exercise some
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security. Every former Secretary
of Homeland Security as well as current high-level DHS officials report—as they
have for a decade—that this fragmented oversight is a significant impediment
to the department’s successful development. This Balkanized system of
oversight detracts from the department’s mission and has made Americans
less safe. It is long past time for Congress to oversee the department as a
cohesive organization rather than a collection of disparate parts. Only a
committee with responsibility for all DHS components will be able to provide
the department with useful strategic guidance. Reducing jurisdictional
overlap.” [4, p. 37]
The 9/11 Commission saw agility as an essential capability required to counter a
nimble enemy. In its 2004 report, the 9/11 Commission observed that Congress, as a
whole, adjusted slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism as a threat to national
security. In the years before September 11, terrorism seldom registered as important,
and Congress did not reorganize itself after the end of the Cold War to address new
threats. Committee jurisdiction over terrorism was splintered in both the House and
Ninety-two committees
and subcommittees of
Congress now exercise
some jurisdiction over
the Department of
Homeland Security.
Every former Secretary
of Homeland Security as
well as current high-
level DHS officials
report—as they have for
a decade—that this
fragmented oversight is
a significant impediment
to the department’s
successful development.
551
Chapter 35: Congress
Senate. The 9/11 Commission assessed Congress’s treatment of terrorism before 9/11
as episodic and inadequate; its overall attention level was low. It regarded Congress’s
oversight of intelligence and terrorism as “dysfunctional.” [4, p. 20]
An oppressive bureaucracy impedes agility, which is why the 9/11 Commission
recommended streamlining congressional oversight. They foresaw, though, it would
not be easy. According to the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, few things were more
difficult to change in Washington than congressional committee jurisdiction and
prerogatives. To a member, these assignments are almost as important as the map of
their own congressional district. [3, p. 419] Unfortunately, we were right. While the
executive branch has undergone historic change and institutional reform, Congress has
proved deeply resistant to needed change. It has made some minor adjustments, but
not the necessary structural changes in oversight and appropriations for homeland
security and intelligence. [4, p. 20]
As the Department of Homeland Security was assembled from various components of
22 existing Federal agencies, instead of consolidating oversight, Congress chose to
leave oversight with their original committees. [5] More than 90 committees and
subcommittees have some jurisdiction over DHS, nearly three times the number that
oversee the Defense Department. And that doesn’t count nearly 30 other
congressional bodies such as task forces and commissions. [6] The cost is significant.
DHS must divert crucial resources to answer the varied committees’ requests. Between
2009 and 2010, for example, DHS conducted over 3,900 briefings and testified before
Congress more than 285 times. The cost of such oversight to the Department is
estimated in the tens of millions of dollars, with thousands of lost work hours that DHS
could have spent executing its mission. [5]
There is wide consensus among former DHS officials, former congressional leaders, and
homeland security experts that simplifying congressional oversight of DHS is necessary
if the department is to do its part to ensure the prosperity, safety and security of the
United States. [7] In its tenth anniversary review of the 9/11 Commission Report, the
Annenberg Public Policy Center reiterated the original recommendation:
“Congress should oversee and legislate for DHS through one primary
authorizing committee. The Department of Homeland Security should receive
the same streamlined oversight as the Department of Defense. At the very
minimum, the next Congress should sharply reduce the number of committees
and subcommittees with some jurisdiction over the department.” [4, p. 38]
As the Department of
Homeland Security was
assembled from various
components of 22
existing Federal
agencies, instead of
consolidating oversight,
Congress chose to leave
oversight with their
original committees.
552
Part V: Mission Partners
Conclusion
The Founding Fathers established Congress to express the will of the people in
governing themselves. As the nation grew and faced new challenges, the executive
branch expanded to deal with new threats and complexities faced by the nation as a
whole. Accordingly, Congress expanded its oversight to ensure executive agencies
acted according to the will of the people it represented. Unfortunately, Congress was
too slow to change to the evolving terrorist threat manifested by 9/11. Despite the
lessons learned and recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission, Congress
remains resistant to change. The result is that the Department of Homeland Security
has been burdened with excessive oversight that detracts from its primary mission,
and Congress is no more agile than it was before 9/11 to counter the threat of a nimble
enemy.
553
Chapter 35: Congress
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the relationship between Congress and DHS?
2. List and describe two elements of national security delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
3. What is the basic purpose of congressional oversight?
4. Which oversight method is often triggered by public concern over agency competency and preparedness?
5. Which oversight method is employed to make a determination on program continuation?
6. Which oversight method is employed to make a determination on program funding?
7. Which congressional agency conducts financial and program audits of executive agencies?
8. How many congressional committees and subcommittees exercise oversight of DHS?
9. What is the cost of so much congressional oversight?
10. As a member of Congress, why would you not want to relinquish your oversight authority?
554 Part V: Mission Partners
555
Chapter 36: NSC
National Security Council
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the purpose and organization of the National Security Council.
Identify key components of the NSC system.
Analyze the NSC system.
Chapter 36
Learning Outcomes
556
Part V: Mission Partners
“Yet a subtler and more serious danger is that as the NSC staff is consumed by these
day-to-day tasks, it has less capacity to find the time and detachment needed to advise
a president on larger policy issues.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
The National Security Council (NSC) was established by statute in 1947 to create an
interdepartmental body to advise the President with respect to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable
the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to
cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security. Currently,
statutory members of the Council are the President, Vice President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, and, since 2007, the Secretary of Energy; but, at the
President’s request, other senior officials participate in NSC deliberations. The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of National Intelligence are
statutory advisers. [1, p. ii]
Background
Throughout most of the history of the United States, until the twentieth century, policy
coordination centered on the President, who was virtually the sole means of such
coordination. The Constitution designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces (Article II, Section 2) and grants him broad powers in the areas of foreign
affairs (Article II, Section 2), powers that have expanded considerably in the twentieth
century through usage. Given limited U.S. foreign involvements for the first hundred or
so years under the Constitution, the small size of the armed forces, the relative
geographic isolation of the Nation, and the absence of any proximate threat, the
President, or his executive agents in the Cabinet, provided a sufficient coordinative
base. [1, p. 2]
However, the advent of World War I, which represented a modern, complex military
effort involving broad domestic and international coordination, forced new demands
on the system that the President alone could not meet. In 1916, the Council of
National Defense was established by statute (Army Appropriation Act of 1916). It
reflected proposals that went back to 1911 and consisted of the Secretaries of War,
Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The statute also allowed the
President to appoint an advisory commission of outside specialists to aid the Council.
The Council of National Defense was intended as an economic mobilization
Throughout most of the
history of the United
States, until the
twentieth century, policy
coordination centered
on the President, who
was virtually the sole
means of such
coordination.
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Chapter 36: NSC
coordinating group, as reflected by its membership—which excluded the Secretary of
State. His inclusion would have given the Council a much wider coordinative scope.
Furthermore, the authorizing statute itself limited the role of the Council basically to
economic mobilization issues. The Council of National Defense was disbanded in 1921,
but it set a precedent for coordinative efforts that would be needed in World War II.
[1, p. 2]
The President remained the sole national security coordinator until 1938, when the
prewar crisis began to build in intensity, presenting numerous and wide-ranging
threats to the inadequately armed United States. The State Department, in reaction to
reports of Axis activities in Latin America, proposed that interdepartmental
conferences be held with War and Navy Department representatives. In April 1938,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt, formally
proposed the creation of a standing committee made up of the second ranking officers
of the three departments, for purposes of liaison and coordination. The President
approved this idea, and the Standing Liaison Committee, or Liaison Committee as it
was also called, was established, the members being the Under Secretary of State, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Standing Liaison
Committee was the first significant effort toward interdepartmental liaison and
coordination, although its work in the area was limited and uneven. The Liaison
Committee largely concentrated its efforts on Latin American problems, and it met
irregularly. Although it did foster some worthwhile studies during the crisis following
the fall of France, it was soon superseded by other coordinative modes. It was more a
forum for exchanging information than a new coordinative and directing body. [1, pp. 2
-3]
An informal coordinating mechanism, which complemented the Standing Liaison
Committee, evolved during weekly meetings established by Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson, who took office in June 1940. Stimson arranged for weekly luncheons with his
Navy counterpart, Frank Knox, and Cordell Hull. These meetings grew into a significant
coordinative body by 1945, with the formal creation of the State, War, Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). SWNCC had its own secretariat and a number of
regional and topical subcommittees; its members were assistant secretaries in each
pertinent department. The role of SWNCC members was to aid their superiors “on
politico-military matters and [in] coordinating the views of the three departments on
matters in which all have a common interest, particularly those involving foreign policy
and relations with foreign nations....” SWNCC was a significant improvement in civilian-
military liaison, and meshed well with the military Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). [1, pp. 3-4]
The President remained
the sole national
security coordinator
until 1938, when the
prewar crisis began to
build in intensity. An
informal coordinating
mechanism evolved
during weekly meetings
established by Secretary
of War Henry L. Stimson.
with his Navy
counterpart, Frank
Knox, and Cordell Hull.
These meetings grew
into a significant
coordinative body by
1945, with the formal
creation of the State,
War, Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC).
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Part V: Mission Partners
The creation of SWNCC, virtually at the end of the war, and its continued existence
after the surrender of Germany and Japan reflected the growing awareness within the
Federal Government that better means of coordination were necessary. The World
War II system had largely reflected the preferred working methods of President
Roosevelt, who relied on informal consultations with various advisers in addition to the
JCS structure. However, the complex demands of global war and the post-war world
rendered this system inadequate, and it was generally recognized that a return to the
simple and limited prewar system would not be possible if the United States was to
take on the responsibilities thrust upon it by the war and its aftermath. [1, p. 4]
National Security Council
The NSC was created by the National Security Act, which was signed by the President
on July 26, 1947. The NSC appears in Section 101 of Title I, Coordination for National
Security, and its purpose is stated as follows:
(a) ... The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security
so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the
Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.
(b) In addition to performing such other functions as the President may direct, for the
purpose of more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments
and agencies of the Government relating to the national security, it shall, subject to the
direction of the President, be the duty of the Council
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United
States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of
national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the
President in connection there with; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and
agencies of the Government concerned with the national security, and to make
recommendations to the President in connection therewith. . . .
(d) The Council shall, from time to time, make such recommendations, and such other
reports to the President as it deems appropriate or as the President may require. [1, p.
6]
The following officers were designated as members of the NSC: the President; the
Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force; and the Chairman of the
National Security Resources Board. The President could also designate the following
officers as members “from time to time:” secretaries of other executive departments
and the Chairmen of the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board.
Any further expansion required Senate approval. The NSC was provided with a staff
headed by a civilian executive secretary, appointed by the President. [1, p. 6]
The National Security
Council (NSC) was
created by the National
Security Act of 1947. The
function of the Council
was to advise the
President with respect
to the integration of
domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating
to the national security
so as to enable the
military services and the
other departments and
agencies of the
Government to
cooperate more
effectively in matters
involving the national
security.
559
Chapter 36: NSC
The National Security Act also established the Central Intelligence Agency under the
NSC, but the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not designated as an NSC
member. The act also created a National Military Establishment (NME), with three
executive departments (Army, Navy, and Air Force) under a Secretary of Defense. [1, p.
6] In 1949 the NME was re-designated the Department of Defense (DOD).
The creation of the NSC was a definite improvement over past coordinative methods
and organization, bringing together as it did the top diplomatic, military, and resource
personnel with the President. The addition of the CIA, subordinate to the NSC, also
provided the necessary intelligence and analyses for the Council so that it could keep
pace with events and trends. The changeable nature of its organization and its
designation as an advisory body to the President also meant that the NSC was a
malleable organization, to be used as each President saw fit. Thus, its use, internal
substructure, and ultimate effect would be directly dependent on the style and wishes
of the President. [1, p. 7]
NSC Organization
The National Security Council is the principal forum for consideration of national
security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. It is chaired by the
President and is called into session at the President’s discretion. Today, its statutory
members are the President, Vice President, and the Secretaries of State, Defense and
Energy. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the
Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. [2, p. 12]
The National Security Advisor is the President’s personal advisor responsible for the
daily management of national security affairs, and advises the President on the
entirety of national security matters and coordinates the development of interagency
policies. The President alone decides national security policy, but the National Security
Advisor is responsible for ensuring that the President has all the necessary information,
that a full range of policy options have been identified, that the prospects and risks of
each option have been evaluated, that legal and funding considerations have been
addressed, that potential difficulties in implementation have been identified, and that
all NSC principals have been included in the policy development and recommendation
process. [2, p. 13]
The professionals who work directly for the President under the National Security
Advisor’s direction constitute the National Security Staff. the NSS is charged with
running a proactive and rigorous interagency policy process, consisting of Interagency
Policy Committees (IPCs), chaired by a Senior Director and consisting primarily of
interagency Assistant Secretaries; Deputies Committees (DCs), chaired by either the
Deputy National Security Advisor or the Assistant to the President for Homeland
The National Security
Council is the principal
forum for consideration
of national security
policy issues requiring
Presidential
determination. It is
chaired by the President
and is called into session
at the President’s
discretion. Today, its
statutory members are
the President, Vice
President, and the
Secretaries of State,
Defense and Energy. The
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is the
statutory military
advisor to the Council,
and the Director of
National Intelligence is
the intelligence advisor.
560
Part V: Mission Partners
Security and Counterterrorism and consisting primarily of interagency Deputy
Secretaries; and Principals Committees (PCs), chaired by either the National Security
Advisor or, at times, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism and consisting primarily of interagency Secretaries. The IPCs, DC, and
PCs can all make decisions, but must do so by consensus of its interagency members.
The chair, including the NSA, cannot make decisions or “break ties.” [2, p. 14]
NSS staff members handling substantive issues include political appointees (frequently
experts from think tanks and academia), senior professionals on detail from Executive
Branch departments, and military officers. The expertise of career Foreign Service
Officers in foreign affairs, for example, often means that the senior positions of the NSS
regional directorates are assigned to State Department personnel. This staff conducts
the day-to-day management of national security affairs for the White House and
currently numbers approximately 320, with around 175 policy positions and the
remainder support positions (including the White House Situation Room staffed by
approximately 35 watch officers and 35 technical/communications staffers). However,
the NSC and its staff also are able to rely on a network of former NSC members,
staffers, and other trusted policy experts, if needed, when reviewing policy issues. [2,
p. 14]
Figure 36-1: National Security Council Organization [2, p. 69]
The National Security
Advisor is the
President’s personal
advisor responsible for
the daily management
of national security
affairs, and advises the
President on the entirety
of national security
matters and coordinates
the development of
interagency policies.
561
Chapter 36: NSC
The most senior interagency group is the Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The PC for all
practical purposes is the membership of the NSC without the President and Vice
President. The PC is called into session and chaired by the National Security Advisor. In
addition to the National Security Advisor, the other principal members of the PC are
the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and Energy, the
National Security Advisor, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, the Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of National Intelligence,
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [2, p. 15]
Other key Executive Branch officials may be invited to attend Principals Committee
meetings when issues related to their areas of responsibility are discussed. Regularly
invited attendees include the White House Chief of Staff, Counsel to the President, and
the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs. Topic area invitees may
include the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy when international economic issues are
on the Agenda. Topic area invitees for homeland security or counterterrorism related
issues usually include the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism (who also serves as the PC chair on homeland security topics). Topic
area invitees for science and technology related issues might include the Director of
the Office of Science and Technology Policy. Similar to NSC meetings, the heads of
other executive departments and agencies, along with additional senior officials, may
be invited to PC meetings as appropriate. [2, p. 15]
Subordinate to the Principals Committee is the Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). As the
senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum, the DC is responsible for directing the work of
interagency working groups and ensuring that issues brought before the PC or the NSC
have been properly analyzed and prepared for high-level deliberation. Historically, the
DC is where the bulk of the government’s policy decisions are made in preparation for
the PC’s review and the President’s decision. Issues decided above the DC level either
are the most sensitive national security decisions, are very contentious within the
interagency, or both. In some circumstances (e.g., crisis situations) a significant portion
of interagency policy development and coordination may be done at the DC level
rather than at lower levels. [2, pp. 15-16]
The DC is composed of the deputy or relevant undersecretaries to the cabinet
secretaries. The DC is chaired by the Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor (AP/DNSA) or the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism. The regular members of the DC include the Deputy Secretary of
The most senior
interagency group is the
Principals Committee
(NSC/PC). The PC for all
practical purposes is the
membership of the NSC
without the President
and Vice President. The
PC is called into session
and chaired by the
National Security
Advisor.
562
Part V: Mission Partners
State (who in practice sometimes may be represented by the Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs), Under Secretary of the Treasury (who sometimes may be
represented by the Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs), Deputy
Secretary of Defense (who sometimes may be represented by the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy), Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of Energy, Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Deputy to the United States
Representative to the United Nations, Deputy Director of National Intelligence (or
sometimes the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center if counterterrorism
issues are being considered), Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Assistant to
the Vice President for National Security Affairs. [2, p. 16]
Like the PC, other senior executive branch officials may participate in DC meetings
when appropriate for the substantive issues on the agenda. The Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and Deputy National Security
Advisor chairs DC meetings when homeland security or counterterrorism related issues
are on the agenda, and attends meetings on other topics as appropriate. Likewise, the
Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for
International Economics will attend DC meetings when international economic issues
are on the agenda and may be directed to chair the meeting at the discretion of the
AP/DNSA. [2, pp. 16-17]
Subordinate to the DC are a variety of interagency working groups called Interagency
Policy Committees (NSC/IPCs). These interagency committees are composed of
substantive experts and senior officials from the departments and agencies
represented on the DC. Although bounded by how much control is exerted over policy
issues by the PC and DC groups, IPC-type committees historically are the main forum
for interagency coordination. These groups conduct the day-to-day interagency
analysis, generation of courses of action, policy development, coordination, resource
determination, and policy implementation planning. Sometimes events may affect this
traditional role, as when crisis situations or other high level national security
developments warrant considerable attention by the PC or NSC. [2, p. 17]
Contingent upon the scope of their responsibilities, some IPCs may meet regularly
(weekly or even several times daily in a crisis situation) while others meet only when
developments or planning require policy synchronization. They are responsible for
managing the development and implementation of national security policies when
they involve more than one government agency. IPCs provide policy analysis for
consideration by the more senior committees of the NSC system (e.g., the DC and PC)
Subordinate to the
Principals Committee is
the Deputies Committee
(NSC/DC). As the senior
sub-Cabinet interagency
forum, the DC is
responsible for directing
the work of interagency
working groups and
ensuring that issues
brought before the PC or
the NSC have been
properly analyzed and
prepared for high-level
deliberation.
Historically, the DC is
where the bulk of the
government’s policy
decisions are made in
preparation for the PC’s
review and the
President’s decision.
563
Chapter 36: NSC
and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The role of each IPC
in policy development and implementation has tended to vary from administration to
administration according to the amount of authority and responsibility delegated to
them by the DC and PC. In the Obama administration, IPCs are expected whenever
possible to find consensus before elevating issues to DCs. They are organized around
either regional or functional issues. [2, p. 17]
Regional IPCs normally are headed by Assistant Secretaries of State while functional
IPCs are headed by senior department officials or NSS Senior Directors. [2, p. 17]
9/11
In February 2001, President George W. Bush issued National Security Presidential
Directive-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.” NSPD-1 indicated
that the NSC system was to advise and assist the President and “coordinate executive
departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation” of
national security policies. [1, p. 22] However, the advent of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 resulted in numerous changes to the original intentions for the
Bush administration in the conduct of national security affairs. [2, p. 10]
One of the major findings of both the 9/11 Commission, and the congressional Joint
Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 (JIICATAS911) was that there were significant signals of a looming
terrorist attack in different parts of the intelligence community, but information and
analysis sharing and synthesis was inadequate. One result of these findings was the
creation of the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). These institutions brought new organizational responsibilities and
perspectives to the consideration of national security affairs. The increased concern
with domestic as well as foreign terrorist threats raised a range of new policy issues
including debates over what constitutes “national” versus “homeland” security,
separate and overlapping staff responsibilities (as reflected in the number of officials
who were members both of the NSC and HSC), and the involvement of state and local
governments as considerations in national policy making. National security policy
development and coordination was heavily influenced by the Global War on Terrorism,
Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and by the significant
concentration of operational imperatives and resources in the Department of Defense
and U.S. Central Command. [2, pp. 10-11]
Subordinate to the DC
are a variety of
interagency working
groups called
Interagency Policy
Committees (NSC/IPCs).
These interagency
committees are
composed of
substantive experts and
senior officials from the
departments and
agencies represented on
the DC.
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Part V: Mission Partners
Another significant change was instituted by the 2004 Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) creating a new Director of National Intelligence
(DNI). The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was given enhanced
authorities over the entire Intelligence Community, providing centralized oversight of
the U.S. National Intelligence Program. Accordingly, the Director of National
Intelligence replaced the Director of Central Intelligence on the NSC to become the
new principal intelligence advisor to the President. [1, p. 23]
President Obama, shortly after taking office in 2009, promulgated Presidential Policy
Directive-1 (PPD-1), “Organization of the National Security Council System,” which
established the procedures for assisting the President in carrying out his
responsibilities in the area of national security. As part of this policy, he merged the
Homeland Security Council Staff and the National Security Council Staff into a single
National Security Staff (NSS). While the National Security Advisor remained in charge of
the new NSS, the former position of Homeland Security Advisor was re-designated the
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. Today, this
assistant serves as the chair for Principal Committees responsible for homeland
security topics. [2, p. 14]
NSC Reform
The increasing difficulties in separating national security issues from law enforcement
and international economic concerns has led some observers to urge that the lines
separating various international staffs at the White House be erased and that a more
comprehensive policymaking entity be created. It is argued that such reforms could
Executive Office of the President
The National Security Advisor is a senior aide in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). Since 1939,
federal agencies immediately assisting the President have been located in the EOP. Within these entities
are many, if not most, of the President’s closest advisers and assistants on matters of policy, politics,
administration, and management. Some of these EOP components have been creations of the President;
others have been established by Congress. While some have endured, others have been brief
experiments; some have been transferred to other quarters of the executive branch, others have been
abolished with no successor. In large measure, the tenure and durability of an Executive Office agency is
dependent upon its usefulness to the President — as a managerial or coordinative auxiliary, a national
symbol, or a haven of political patronage, among other considerations. [3, pp. CRS-1]
The Executive Office of the President represents an institutional response to needs felt by every occupant
of the Oval Office, beginning with George Washington, who, of course, served before there even was a
White House. Primarily, these were, and remain, needs for advice and assistance. Undoubtedly, there
have always been many who are ready and more than willing to offer the President their advice. However,
what has probably always been desired by Presidents in this regard were a few loyal and intelligent
individuals who would offer counsel when asked and would keep such consultations confidential. Loyalty,
competence, and ability to keep confidences were also qualities to be sought in individuals providing
immediate assistance — with correspondence and records maintenance, appointments and scheduling,
bookkeeping, and, in time, many more sophisticated tasks. [3, pp. CRS-1]
Following 9/11,
President Bush created a
Homeland Security
Council to focus on
homeland security
issues. Shortly after
taking office in 2009,
President Obama re-
integrated the HSC into
the NSC to ensure more
effective coordination.
the former Homeland
Security Advisor became
the Assistant to the
President for Homeland
Security and
Counterterrorism.
565
Chapter 36: NSC
most effectively be accomplished without legislation. President Obama’s move to
combine the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council was
considered only a first step. Such initiatives, though, raise complex questions, including
the role of congressional oversight. Whereas Congress has traditionally deferred to
White House leadership in national security matters, to a far greater extent than in
international economic affairs, there might be serious questions about taking formal
steps to place resolution of a wide range of international policies, including economic
and law enforcement issues, in the hands of officials who receive little congressional
oversight. [1, p. 31]
The Project for National Security Reform (PNSR) was established with congressional
support to study the adequacy of the organization of the government for dealing with
national security issues. Its membership was initially comprised of former officials with
extensive national security experience, including former National Security Adviser
Brent Scowcroft. A November 2008 report, Forging a New Shield, addressed the
functions of the NSC along with other parts of the “national security system.” PNSR
argued that the current organizational structure is ill coordinated and is placing the
nation at risk in an international environment that requires agile and coordinated
efforts by all instruments of power. To replace the National Security Council and the
Homeland Security Council, PNSR recommended the creation of a President’s Security
Council and a Senate-confirmed Director of National Security who would have broader
responsibilities than the existing National Security Adviser. The Director would “direct
the implementation of national security missions identified by the present as
inherently interagency.” The office of the new Director of National Security would be
comprised of some 500 people. A number of members of the PNSR effort joined the
Obama Administration, including National Security Adviser James Jones and DNI
Dennis Blair although both subsequently departed. Some of the principal PNSR
initiatives would require legislative changes, but, as yet, a broad consensus has not
emerged that would result in substantial realignments of organizational authorities in
the executive branch or committee jurisdictions in the legislative branch. [1, p. 31]
Conclusion
While the Secretary of Homeland Security reports directly to the President, the
programs and activities of the Department of Homeland Security must be closely
coordinated with those of other departments and agencies within the Executive
Branch of Federal government. This coordination is conducted within the auspices of
the National Security Council. Allegations that the NSC failed to anticipate 9/11 fuel
concerns that it is inadequate to the task of preventing future such attacks. Reform,
however, is not easy, and as seen with the split and then merger of the National
Security Council and Homeland Security Council, highly dependent upon the
temperament and style of the incumbent President.
566
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. For most of U.S. history, who was the single individual who coordinated national security?
2. Why was the National Security Council formed after World War II?
3. Who are the statutory members of the National Security Council?
4. Who is the chief military advisor to the President?
5. Who is the chief intelligence advisor to the President?
6. What is the function of the National Security Advisor?
7. What is the function of the National Security Staff?
8. What is the designation of the NSC senior policy group?
9. What is the designation of the NSC policy groups that are the main forum for interagency coordination?
10. List and describe at least two potential pitfalls of the NSC system.
Part V: Mission Partners
567
Intelligence Community
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Define the term “intelligence”.
Discuss the purpose and performance of the CIA prior to 2004.
Compare the authorities of the ODNI and CIA.
Identify different members of the Intelligence Community.
Identify different intelligence disciplines.
Describe the intelligence cycle.
Explain the necessary predicate for conducting surveillance of U.S. citizens.
Chapter 37
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 37: Intel
568
Part V: Mission Partners
“Since the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941, the intelligence community has devoted
generations of effort to understanding the problem of forestalling a surprise attack.”
- 2004 9/11 Commission Report
Introduction
The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) is a coalition of 17 agencies and organizations,
within the Executive Branch that work both independently and collaboratively to
gather and analyze the intelligence necessary to conduct foreign relations and national
security activities. [1]
Background
Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities. [2] The
United States has carried out intelligence activities since the days of George
Washington, but only since World War II have they been coordinated on a government
-wide basis. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed New York lawyer and war hero,
William J. Donovan, to become first the Coordinator of Information, and then, after the
U.S. entered World War II, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1942. The
OSS had a mandate to collect and analyze strategic information. After World War II,
however, the OSS was abolished along with many other war agencies and its functions
were transferred to the State and War Departments. [3]
At about the time the OSS was being disbanded, a study commissioned by Navy
Secretary James Forrestal and chaired by private businessman Ferdinand Eberstadt
was published. While the report dealt principally with the issue of military unification,
it also recommended coordination of the intelligence function through the
establishment of a National Security Council (NSC) and a Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). The NSC would coordinate the civilian and military national security policy for
the President. The CIA, under the auspices of the NSC, would serve "to coordinate
national security intelligence." [4]
On July 27, 1947, President Truman signed into law the National Security Act of 1947,
creating a postwar national security framework. A National Security Council was
created to coordinate national security policy. The Act created the position of
Secretary of Defense and unified the separate military departments (the Army, the
Navy, and the newly-created Air Force) under this position. The Act also established
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as the principal military advisers to the President and
the Secretary of Defense. Finally, a Central Intelligence Agency was established with
the Director of Central Intelligence as its head. [4]
The United States has
carried out intelligence
activities since the days
of George Washington,
but only since World
War II have they been
coordinated on a
government-wide basis.
569
Chapter 37: Intel
As the head of the CIA, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as the principal
adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to national security. According
to the 1947 National Security Act, such national intelligence was to be timely,
objective, independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources available
to the Intelligence Community. To coordinate the efforts of the Intelligence
Community, the DCI was given authority over a National Intelligence Council (NIC),
comprised of senior analysts from the Intelligence Community and substantive experts
from the public and private sector. The focus of the National Intelligence Council was
to produce National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for the Government. To enforce
cooperation among the Intelligence Community, the National Security Act of 1947
made the DCI the “Head of the Intelligence Community” responsible for 1) developing
and presenting the annual budget for National Foreign Intelligence Programs; 2)
establishing requirements and priorities for the collection of intelligence by elements
of the IC; and 3) approving collection priorities for national collection assets. [5]
The establishment of the CIA was borne out of a collective failure to anticipate Japan’s
attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor that led to America’s entry into World
War II. Now engaged in a Cold War to contain further expansion of the Soviet Union, a
primary objective of the CIA was to prevent an “Atomic Pearl Harbor” that could lead
to World War III. A number of significant “intelligence failures” over the ensuring
decades led some to question whether the CIA had the requisite authority to
effectively coordinate the efforts of the Intelligence Community.
In April 1961, a CIA-planned effort by Cuban exiles to overthrow Fidel Castro’s
regime and replace it with a non-communist, U.S.-friendly government went
horribly awry when an aerial attack on Cuba’s air force flopped and the 1,400-
strong “Assault Brigade 2506” came under heavy fire from the Cuban military after
landing off the country’s southern coast. The botched invasion poisoned U.S.-
Cuban relations.
On Jan. 31, 1968, during the Tet holiday in Vietnam, North Vietnam’s communist
forces stunned the United States by launching a massive, coordinated assault
against South Vietnam. While the communist military gains proved fleeting, the Tet
Offensive was arguably the most decisive battle of Vietnam. Americans grew
disillusioned with the war, prompting U.S. policymakers to shift gears and focus on
reducing America’s footprint in Vietnam.
While the CIA accurately analyzed the Six-Day War between Israel and neighboring
Arab states in 1967, it was caught flat-footed only six years later when Egyptian
and Syrian forces launched coordinated attacks on Israeli forces in the Sinai Desert
and the Golan Heights during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The conflict, which
ended with a ceasefire in October 1973, tested U.S.-Soviet relations and pushed
the Arab-Israeli conflict to the top of Washington’s foreign-policy agenda.
The establishment of the
CIA was borne out of a
collective failure to
anticipate Japan’s
attack on the U.S. Pacific
Fleet at Pearl Harbor
that led to America’s
entry into World War II.
Now engaged in a Cold
War to contain further
expansion of the Soviet
Union, a primary
objective of the CIA was
to prevent an “Atomic
Pearl Harbor” that could
lead to World War III.
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In August 1978, six months before the U.S-backed Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
fled Iran, the CIA infamously concluded that “Iran is not in a revolutionary or even
a pre-revolutionary situation.” Subsequently, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rose
to power in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, opening up a rift between Iran and the
United States that persists to this day.
The Soviet Union’s military incursion into Afghanistan, which began in December
1979 and devolved into a bloody, nine-year occupation, took the Carter
administration by surprise. The U.S. intelligence community had assumed that the
specter of a costly quagmire would deter the Soviets from invading Afghanistan.
Former CIA official Douglas MacEachin recalls that in the days after the invasion, a
dark joke began circulating around the agency that “the analysts got it right, and it
was the Soviets who got it wrong.”
Conventional wisdom holds that the U.S. intelligence community failed to predict
the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991, presaged as it was by President Mikhail
Gorbachev’s reforms, the deteriorating Soviet economy, the collapse of
communism in east-central Europe, and the moves toward independence by
several Soviet republics. As the BBC recently noted, “the Soviet example illustrates
the problem that intelligence gatherers are great counters: they can look at
missiles, estimate the output of weapons factories, and so on. But the underlying
political and social dynamics in a society are much harder to read.” [6]
Many outside observers, Members of Congress, and various commissions over the
years argued that the DCI position was unworkable. They contended that DCIs,
frustrated by the challenges involved in managing the entire intelligence community,
focused narrowly on the CIA, and that the result was an ill-coordinated intelligence
effort that poorly served the nation. Some also asserted that DCIs lacked adequate
legal authorities to establish priorities and to ensure compliance by intelligence
agencies beyond the CIA. In particular, it was suggested that major intelligence
agencies in the Department of Defense (DOD)—the National Security Agency (NSA),
the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA)—had been more responsive to the needs of the military services than to
the requirements of national policymakers. And, finally, some observers, while
conceding that DCI authorities under the National Security Act were limited,
nevertheless contended that DCIs failed to fully assert their authorities, particularly
when their priorities conflicted with those of the Secretary of Defense, viewed by
many as the dominant voice in the intelligence community because of the Secretary’s
control over an estimated 85% of the intelligence budget. [7, p. 1]
Given a number of high-
profile intelligence
failures over the years,
many outside observers
argued that the DCI
position was
unworkable. They
contended that DCIs,
frustrated by the
challenges involved in
managing the entire
intelligence community,
focused narrowly on the
CIA, and that the result
was an ill-coordinated
intelligence effort that
poorly served the
nation.
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Chapter 37: Intel
Ultimately, it was the failure to anticipate 9/11 that prompted Congress to enact
reform. In its report on the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the 9/11 Commission
noted that the Intelligence Community, assailed by “an overwhelming number of
priorities, flat budgets, an outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries,” had failed
to pin down the big-picture threat posed by “transnational terrorism” throughout the
1990s and up to 9/11. [6] In response, Congress approved significantly larger
intelligence budgets and, in December 2004, passed the most extensive reorganization
of the intelligence community since the National Security Act of 1947. The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) created a new Director of
National Intelligence to head the Intelligence Community, and serve as the principal
intelligence adviser to the President, and oversees and directs the acquisition of major
collections systems. [8, p. 1]
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act was designed to address the findings of the 9/11
Commission that there had been inadequate coordination of the national intelligence
effort and that the Intelligence Community, as then organized, could not serve as an
agile information gathering network in the struggle against international terrorists. [8,
p. 1] The resulting Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was
consequently commissioned to improve information sharing, promote a strategic,
unified direction, and ensure integration across the U.S. Intelligence Community. The
ODNI stood up on April 21, 2005. [9, p. 15]
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act assigned to the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) two of the three principal responsibilities formerly performed by the Director of
Central Intelligence. The DNI would provide intelligence to the President, other senior
officials, and Congress, and the DNI would head the Intelligence Community. But,
unlike the DCI, the DNI would not oversee the CIA. Rather, the act renamed the DCI the
DCIA, and subordinated their position to the DNI. [8, p. 2]
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act further strengthened the DNIs authority by providing
enhanced budget authorities that were unavailable to the DCI.
First, it provides that at the DNI’s exclusive direction, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) shall “apportion,” or direct, the flow of
congressionally appropriated funds from the Treasury Department to each of the
Cabinet level agencies containing intelligence community elements. This change is
designed to strengthen the DNI’s control over intelligence community spending. If,
for example, an agency fails to comply with certain of the DNI’s spending priorities,
the DNI can withhold that agency’s funding. DCIs had no such authority.
The 2004 Intelligence
Reform Act assigned to
the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) two of
the three principal
responsibilities formerly
performed by the
Director of Central
Intelligence. The DNI
would provide
intelligence to the
President, other senior
officials, and Congress,
and the DNI would head
the Intelligence
Community. The 2004
Intelligence Reform Act
further strengthened the
DNIs authority by
providing enhanced
budget authorities that
were unavailable to the
DCI.
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Part V: Mission Partners
Second, the DNI is authorized to “allot” or “allocate” appropriations directly at the
sub-Cabinet agency and department level, providing the DNI additional control
over spending. If a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a
DNI spending directive, the law requires that the DNI notify Congress of such
refusal. The DCI had no such authority or reporting obligation.
Third, the DNI is authorized to “develop and determine” the National Intelligence
Program (NIP; former “NFIP”) budget. By contrast, DCIs were authorized to
“facilitate the development” of the intelligence community’s annual budget.
Fourth, the DNI is authorized to “ensure the effective execution of the budget,”
and to monitor its implementation and execution. Except in the case of the CIA,
DCIs had no such authority.
Fifth, the DNI is authorized to provide budget guidance to those elements of the
Intelligence Community not falling within the NIP. Again, DCIs had no such
authority. [8, p. 6]
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act also authorized the DNI to “manage and direct the
tasking of, collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence ...
by approving requirements and resolving conflicts.” Although DCIs were authorized to
exercise certain collection authorities, statutory authorities did not explicitly address
analysis, production, and dissemination authorities. [8, p. 8]
To assist with accomplishing its mission, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act gave ODNI
statutory authority over the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX),
and the National Intelligence Council. [9, p. 15]
The National Counterterrorism Center has primary responsibility within the U.S.
Government for counterterrorism intelligence analysis and counterterrorism strategic
operational planning. NCTC’s components are the Directorate of Intelligence,
Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, Directorate of Operations Support,
Directorate of Terrorist Identities, and the Office of National Intelligence Management.
Their functions are:
Directorate of Intelligence leads the production and integration of
counterterrorism analysis for the U.S. Government.
Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning directs the U.S. Government’s
planning efforts to focus all elements of national power against the terrorist threat.
Directorate of Operations Support provides the common intelligence picture for
the counterterrorism community with 24 hours a day/7 days a week situational
awareness; terrorism threat reporting; management and incident information
tracking; and support for worldwide, national, and international special events.
To assist with
accomplishing its
mission, the 2004
Intelligence Reform Act
gave ODNI statutory
authority over the
National
Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), National
Counterproliferation
Center (NCPC), the
National
Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX), and
the National Intelligence
Council.
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Chapter 37: Intel
Directorate of Terrorist Identities maintains a consolidated repository of
information on international terrorist identities and ensures Federal agencies can
access the information they need through the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE).
Office of National Intelligence Management provides strategic management of all
national intelligence related to the IC’s counterterrorism mission to set analytic
and collection priorities; advance analytic tradecraft and training; and lead
strategic planning, evaluation, and budgeting. [9, p. 16]
The National Counterproliferation Center is the bridge from the IC to the policy
community for activities within the U.S. Government associated with countering the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). NCPC conducts strategic
counterproliferation planning for the IC to support policy efforts to prevent, halt, or
mitigate the proliferation of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials and
technologies. This includes both states of concern and, in partnership with the National
Counterterrorism Center, non-state actors. NCPC achieves this by drawing on the
expertise of counterproliferation professionals in the IC, the U.S. Government,
industry, and academia. These relationships foster an atmosphere of collaboration and
intelligence sharing in order to protect the U.S.’s interests at home and abroad. [9, pp.
16-17]
The National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) serves as the head of national
counterintelligence and security for the U.S. Government. Per the Counterintelligence
Enhancement Act of 2002, the NCIX is charged with promulgating an annual strategy
for all counterintelligence elements of the U.S. Government. The Office of the NCIX is
charged with integrating the activities of all counterintelligence programs to make
them coherent and efficient. They also coordinate counterintelligence policy and
budgets to the same end. It is also responsible for evaluating the performance of the
counterintelligence community against the strategy. NCIX’s Special Security Division is
responsible for security policy and uniformity across the U.S. Government. [9, p. 17]
The National Intelligence Council (NIC), a Congressionally-mandated council, is a
component of the ODNI that conducts mid- and long-term strategic analysis through
the use of all-source intelligence. Since its formation in 1979, the NIC has been a
source of deep substantive expertise on intelligence matters and a facilitator of
integrated, IC coordinated strategic analysis on issues of key concern to senior U.S.
policymakers. Some of the NIC’s core functions are to:
Produce National Intelligence Estimates — the IC’s most authoritative written
assessments on national security issues, as well as a broad range of other
Community coordinated products.
The National
Counterproliferation
Center is the bridge
from the IC to the policy
community for activities
within the U.S.
Government associated
with countering the
proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction
(WMD).
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Part V: Mission Partners
Foster outreach to nongovernmental experts in academia and the private sector to
broaden the IC’s perspective.
Articulate substantive intelligence priorities to guide intelligence collection and
analysis. [9, p. 17]
The core mission of the ODNI is to lead the IC in Intelligence Integration, forging a
community that delivers the most insightful intelligence possible. Intelligence
Integration is the key to ensuring that the highest quality of intelligence is delivered
with the right inputs, at the right time, in defense of the Homeland. [9, p. 15]
The Intelligence Community
The Director of National Intelligence is responsible for coordinating the combined
efforts of the Intelligence Community. The IC is defined in 50 U.S.C. 401a(4) as
consisting of the following:
1. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)
2. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
3. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State (INR)
4. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
5. National Security Agency (NSA)
6. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
7. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)
8. The National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
9. Army Intelligence
10. Navy Intelligence
11. Air Force Intelligence
12. Marine Corps Intelligence
13. Coast Guard Intelligence
14. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of the Treasury
15. The Office of Intelligence, Department of Energy
16. The Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA)
17. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security [8, p. 2]
The core mission of the
ODNI is to lead the IC in
Intelligence Integration,
forging a community
that delivers the most
insightful intelligence
possible.
575
Chapter 37: Intel
Except for the CIA, intelligence offices or agencies are components of Cabinet
departments with other roles and missions. The intelligence offices/agencies, however,
participate in intelligence community activities while supporting the other efforts of
their departments. [8, p. 2]
The CIA remains the keystone of the analytic efforts of the intelligence community. It
has all-source analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside U.S. borders. It
produces a range of studies that address virtually any topic of interest to national
security policymakers. The CIA also collects intelligence with human sources and, on
occasion, undertakes covert actions at the direction of the President. (A covert action
is an activity or activities of the U.S. government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the U.S. role will not be apparent
or acknowledged publicly.) [8, p. 2]
Three major national-level intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense—the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—absorb the larger part of the national intelligence
budget. NSA is responsible for signals intelligence and has collection sites throughout
the world. The NRO develops and operates reconnaissance satellites. The NGA
prepares the geospatial data—ranging from maps and charts to sophisticated
computerized databases—necessary for humanitarian operations and for targeting in
an era in which military operations are dependent upon precision-guided weapons. In
addition to these three agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is responsible
for defense attachés and for providing DOD with a variety of analytical products. It
serves as the premier all-source analytic unit within DOD. Although the Intelligence
Reform Act provides extensive budgetary and management authorities over these
agencies to the DNI, it does not revoke the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense
for these agencies. [8, pp. 2-3]
The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) is one of the smaller
components of the intelligence community but is widely recognized for the high quality
of its analysis. INR is strictly an analytical agency; diplomatic reporting from embassies,
though highly useful to intelligence analysts, is not considered an intelligence function
(nor is it budgeted as one). [8, p. 3]
The key intelligence functions of the FBI relate to counterterrorism and
counterintelligence. The former mission has grown enormously in importance since
September 2001, many new analysts have been hired, and the FBI has been
reorganized in an attempt to ensure that intelligence functions are not subordinated to
traditional law enforcement efforts. Most importantly, law enforcement information,
including counterterrorism and counterintelligence information, is now expected to be
The CIA remains the
keystone of the analytic
efforts of the
intelligence community.
It has all-source
analytical capabilities
that cover the whole
world outside U.S.
borders. It produces a
range of studies that
address virtually any
topic of interest to
national security
policymakers. The CIA
also collects intelligence
with human sources
and, on occasion,
undertakes covert
actions at the direction
of the President.
576
Part V: Mission Partners
forwarded to other intelligence agencies for use in all-source products. The intelligence
organizations of the four military services concentrate largely on concerns related to
their specific missions. Their analytical products, along with those of DIA, supplement
the work of CIA analysts and provide greater depth on key military and technical
issues. [8, p. 3]
The intelligence organizations of the four military services concentrate largely on
concerns related to their specific missions. Their analytical products, along with those
of DIA, supplement the work of CIA analysts and provide greater depth on key military
and technical issues. [8, p. 3]
The Homeland Security Act (P.L. 107-296) provided the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) responsibilities for fusing law enforcement and intelligence information
relating to terrorist threats to the homeland. The Office of Intelligence and Analysis in
DHS participates in the inter-agency counterterrorism efforts and, along with the FBI,
has focused on ensuring that state and local law enforcement officials receive
information on terrorist threats from national level intelligence agencies. [8, p. 3]
Figure 37-1: The U.S. Intelligence Community [9]
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Chapter 37: Intel
The Coast Guard, as part of DHS, deals with information relating to maritime security
and homeland defense. The Energy Department analyzes foreign nuclear weapons
programs as well as nuclear nonproliferation and energy-security issues. It also has a
robust counterintelligence effort. The Treasury Department collects and processes
information that may affect U.S. fiscal and monetary policies. Treasury also covers the
terrorist financing issue. [8, p. 3]
The Intelligence Cycle
The Intelligence Cycle is the process of developing raw information into finished
intelligence for use by policymakers, military commanders, and other consumers in
decision making. This six-step cyclical process is highly dynamic, continuous, and never-
ending. The sixth step, evaluation (which includes soliciting feedback from users) is
conducted for each of the other five steps individually and for the Intelligence Cycle as
a whole. [9, p. 10]
Step 1: Planning and Direction. The planning and direction step sets the stage for the
Intelligence Cycle. It is the springboard from which all Intelligence Cycle activities are
launched. Oftentimes, the direction part of the step precedes the planning part.
Generally, in such cases, the consumer has a requirement for a specific product. That
product may be a full report, a graphic image, or raw information that is collected,
processed, and disseminated, but skips the analysis and production step. Given the
customer’s requirement, the intelligence organization tasked with generating the
product will then plan its Intelligence Cycle activities. [9, p. 11]
Step 2: Collection. Data collection is performed to gather raw data related to the five
basic intelligence sources: 1) GEOINT, 2) HUMINT, 3) MASINT, 4) OSINT, and 5) SIGINT.
The sources of the raw data may include, but are not limited to, news reports, aerial
imagery, satellite imagery, and government and public documents. [9, p. 11]
Step 3: Processing and Exploitation. The processing and exploitation step (see the
Glossary of Terms for a definition of “exploitation”) involves the use of highly trained
and specialized personnel and technologically sophisticated equipment to turn the raw
data into usable and understandable information. Data translation, data decryption,
and interpretation of filmed images and other imagery are only a few of the processes
used for converting data stored on film, magnetic, or other media into information
ready for analysis and production. [9, p. 11]
The Intelligence Cycle is
the process of
developing raw
information into finished
intelligence for use by
policymakers, military
commanders, and other
consumers in decision
making. This six-step
cyclical process is highly
dynamic, continuous,
and never-ending.
578
Part V: Mission Partners
Step 4: Analysis and Production. The analysis and production step also requires highly
trained and specialized personnel (in this case, analysts) to give meaning to the
processed information and to prioritize it against known requirements. Synthesizing
the processed information into a finished, actionable intelligence product enables the
information to be useful to the customer. Note that, in some cases, the Intelligence
Cycle may skip this step (for example, when the consumer needs only specific reported
information or products such as raw imagery). This was the case during the Cuban
Missile Crisis (October 1962) when President Kennedy needed only the actual number
of pieces of Soviet equipment in Cuba and facts concerning reports on observed Soviet
activity with no analysis of that information. [9, p. 12]
Step 5: Dissemination. The consumer that requested the information receives the
finished product, usually via electronic transmission. Dissemination of the information
typically is accomplished through such means as websites, email, Web 2.0
collaboration tools, and hardcopy distribution. The final, finished product is referred to
as “finished intelligence.” After the product is disseminated, further gaps in the
intelligence may be identified, and the Intelligence Cycle begins all over again. [9, p.
12]
Step 6: Evaluation. Constant evaluation and feedback from consumers are extremely
important to enabling those involved in the Intelligence Cycle to adjust and refine their
activities and analysis to better meet consumers’ changing and evolving information
needs. [9, p. 12]
Intelligence Sources
There are six basic intelligence sources, or collection disciplines:
1. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery,
imagery intelligence (IMINT) (see the Glossary of Terms), and geospatial
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and
geographically referenced activities on the earth. [9, p. 54]
2. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is the collection of information—either orally or via
documentation— that is provided directly by a human source. It is the only type of
intelligence for which collectors speak directly to the sources of information,
control the topic of discussion, and direct the source’s activities. Human sources
can obtain access to information that is not obtainable any other way. [9, pp. 53-
54] The Director of the CIA serves as the National HUMINT Manager, but has
delegated the day-to-day responsibilities of this position to the Director of the
National Clandestine Service (D/NCS). [10]
3. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) is intelligence produced
through quantitative and qualitative analysis of the physical attributes of targets
and events to characterize and identify those targets and events. [9, p. 53]
There are six basic
intelligence sources, or
collection disciplines:
1. GEOINT
2. HUMINT
3. MASINT
4. OSINT
5. SIGINT
6. IMINT
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Chapter 37: Intel
Examples of this might be the distinctive radar signatures of specific aircraft
systems or the chemical composition of air and water samples. The Directorate for
MASINT and Technical Collection (DT), a component of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, is the focus for all national and Department of Defense MASINT matters.
[10]
4. Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) is intelligence produced from publicly available
information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an
appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence
requirement. [9, p. 54]
5. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence gathered from data transmissions,
including Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT),
and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). SIGINT includes both raw
data and the analysis of that data to produce intelligence. [9, p. 54] The National
Security Agency is responsible for collecting, processing, and reporting SIGINT. The
National SIGINT Committee within NSA advises the Director, NSA, and the DNI on
SIGINT policy issues and manages the SIGINT requirements system. [10]
6. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) includes representations of objects reproduced
electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other
media. Imagery can be derived from visual photography, radar sensors, and electro
-optics. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is the manager for all imagery
intelligence activities, both classified and unclassified, within the government,
including requirements, collection, processing, exploitation, dissemination,
archiving, and retrieval. [10]
Counterintelligence
Counterintelligence (CI) is the business of identifying and dealing with foreign
intelligence threats to the United States and its interests. Its core concern is the
intelligence services of foreign states and similar organizations of non-state actors,
such as transnational terrorist groups. Counterintelligence has both a defensive
mission - protecting the nation's secrets and assets against foreign intelligence
penetration - and an offensive mission - finding out what foreign intelligence
organizations are planning to better defeat their aims. [10]
As defined in Executive Order 12333 (and amended on 30 July 2008),
"counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted to identify,
deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers,
organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or
activities." [10]
Counterintelligence (CI)
is the business of
identifying and dealing
with foreign intelligence
threats to the United
States and its interests.
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Part V: Mission Partners
The Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), under the leadership
of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), was created to serve as the head
of national counterintelligence for the USG and provide strategic direction to the
counterintelligence community. [10]
ONCIX, through established programs, coordinates counterintelligence outreach
efforts and the dissemination of warnings to the private sector on intelligence threats
to the U.S. Visit the ONCIX website at www.ncix.gov for an in-depth look into the
counterintelligence vision and mission for preserving our national security. [10]
Domestic Surveillance
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees “The right of people to be
secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.” In practice, U.S. law affords Fourth
Amendment protection to all within the United States, citizen or not, and to all U.S.
citizens everywhere, in the U.S. or not. Accordingly, “probable cause” must be
demonstrated in order to obtain a warrant before conducting surveillance on
somebody in the U.S., or a U.S. citizen abroad. For matters of national security,
domestic surveillance warrants may be sought under provisions of the 1978 Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). [11]
In 2013, Edward Snowden, a former contractor employee working as a computer
system administrator at an NSA facility in Hawaii, was charged with leaking top secret
documents related to certain NSA programs to the Guardian and Washington Post
newspapers. [12, p. 7]
The first program collected in bulk the phone records—including the number that was
dialed from, the number that was dialed to, and the date and duration of the call—of
customers of Verizon and possibly other U.S. telephone service providers. It did not
collect the content of the calls or the identity of callers. The data was collected
pursuant to Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT, which amended the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Section 215 allowed the FBI, in this case on behalf
of the NSA, to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for an order
compelling a person to produce “any tangible thing,” such as records held by a
telecommunications provider, if the tangible things sought are “relevant to an
authorized investigation.” Some commentators expressed skepticism regarding how
such a broad amount of data could be said to be “relevant to an authorized
In practice, U.S. law
affords Fourth
Amendment protection
to all within the United
States, citizen or not,
and to all U.S. citizens
everywhere, in the U.S.
or not. Accordingly,
“probable cause” must
be demonstrated in
order to obtain a
warrant before
conducting surveillance
on somebody in the U.S.,
or a U.S. citizen abroad.
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Chapter 37: Intel
investigation,” as required by the statute. In response to these concerns, the Obama
Administration subsequently declassified portions of the FISC order authorizing the
program and issued a “whitepaper” describing the Administration’s legal reasoning.
[13, p. ii]
The second program, called PRISM, targeted the electronic communications, including
content, of foreign targets overseas whose communications flow through American
networks. These data were collected pursuant to Section 702 of FISA, which was added
by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. This program acquired information from
Internet service providers, as well as through what NSA termed “upstream” collection
that appeared to acquire Internet traffic while it was in transit from one location to
another. Although the program targeted the communications of foreigners who were
abroad, the Administration acknowledged that technical limitations in the “upstream”
collection resulted in the collection of some communications that were unrelated to
the target or that could take place between persons in the United States.
Notwithstanding these technical limitations, the FISC held that this program was
consistent with the requirements of both Section 702 and the Fourth Amendment
provided that there were sufficient safeguards in place to identify and limit the
retention, use, or dissemination of such unrelated or wholly domestic communications.
[13, p. ii]
The revelations prompted several lawsuits challenging the NSA programs. Congress
also conducted hearings over their legitimacy. Following a contentious debate, the
USA FREEDOM Act was finally passed and signed into law on June 2, 2015. Among its
provisions, the USA FREEDOM Act restricted the use of FISA Section 215, effectively
ending the NSA bulk collection programs. [14]
Conclusion
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has focused considerable attention on how
intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland
against terrorist threats. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between
“domestic intelligence”—primarily law enforcement information collected within the
United States—and “foreign intelligence”— primarily military, political, and economic
intelligence collected outside the country. Today, threats to the homeland posed by
terrorist groups are now national security threats. Intelligence collected outside the
United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States
and vice versa. [15, p. ii]
Following a contentious
debate, the USA
FREEDOM Act was
finally passed and
signed into law on June
2, 2015. Among its
provisions, the USA
FREEDOM Act restricted
the use of FISA Section
215, effectively ending
the NSA bulk collection
programs.
582
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is national intelligence?
2. Why was the CIA formed after World War II?
3. List and describe two high-profile intelligence failures over the last 30 years.
4. How did the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act enhance the authorities of the DNI compared to the DCI?
5. What is the purpose and function of the National Counterterrorism Center?
6. List and describe three different members of the Intelligence Community.
7. List and describe the six steps of the Intelligence cycle.
8. List and describe three different intelligence disciplines.
9. What is the necessary predicate to conduct surveillance of U.S. citizens?
10. Do you think Edward Snowden’s actions were of benefit or harm to the nation? Explain your answer.
Part V: Mission Partners
583
Department of Defense
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain the difference between active and reserve military forces.
Describe the unique capabilities of the National Guard.
Discuss the homeland defense mission.
Discuss defense support of civil authorities.
Explain the purpose and authority of a dual-status commander.
Identify unique roles and responsibilities of USNORTHCOM.
Chapter 38
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 38: DOD
584
Part V: Mission Partners
“Demonstrate to the world there is ‘No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy’ than a U.S.
Marine.”
- 2003, Major General James Mattis, USMC
Introduction
We previously described the Department of Defense’s role in counterterrorism and
countering weapons of mass destruction. In this chapter we will examine DoD’s
missions in Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.
Background
In order to understand the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) role in Homeland Defense
(HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA), it is necessary to examine DoD’s
combatant organization and legal authorization with respect to protecting United
States territory.
DoD is a very large and complex organization. Three service departments organize,
train, and equip four services: Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force. The United States
Marine Corps (USMC) is part of the Navy Department. The United States Coast Guard
(USCG) is also an arm of the United States Navy (USN); the USCG, however, is
organized, trained, and equipped by the Department of Homeland Security. Each
service has both an active and reserve component: United States Army Reserve
(USAR), United States Navy Reserve (UNSR), United States Marine Corps Reserve
(USMCR), and United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR). Active forces serve and are
paid full-time; reserve forces serve and are paid part-time. The Reserve Component
(RC) provides cost-effective military capability and a ready means to rapidly expand the
Active Component (AC) during times of crisis. Both active and reserve components
serve under Title 10 U.S. law at the direction of the President of the United States. In
addition to having both an active and reserve component, the United States Army and
United States Air Force also have National Guard components. Both the Army National
Guard (ARNG) and Air National Guard (ANG) serve at the direction of their respective
State Governors, either in State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status. Under Title 32,
the Feds pay, while under SAD, the State pays. The Feds also pay when the National
Table 38-1: Organization of U.S. Military Forces
Departments Army Air Force Navy
Services Army Air Force Navy Marines Coast Guard
Components Active Active Active Active Active
Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve Reserve
National Guard National Guard
Combat Units Division Air Force Fleet Expeditionary Force Task Force
Brigade Wing Strike Group Expeditionary Brigade
Battalion Squadron Wing Expeditionary Unit
Company Squadron Specialized Task Force
Platoon
U.S. military forces are
drawn from active and
reserve components of
the Army, Air Force,
Navy, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard.
585
Chapter 38: DOD
Guard is called up to serve the President under Title 10 status. The National Guard
units are descended from the original State militias, but today serve to 1) maintain
State civil order, 2) provide State disaster support, and 3) perform assigned Federal
military missions. When serving in either SAD or Title 32 status, NG forces are exempt
from Posse Comitatus. This 1878 law, as interpreted, precludes the use of Federal
military forces to enforce domestic law. As Congress has chosen to continue upholding
this law, it means that the National Guard can perform in domestic roles prohibited to
Federal active duty forces. On the other hand, the United States Coast Guard is
specifically authorized to enforce U.S. laws under Title 14 of United States Code. This
allows the USCG to also perform unique roles prohibited to Federal active duty forces.
Posse Comitatus and other laws affect how and when Federal military forces can be
used for HD and DSCA compared to the USCG and National Guard. [1]
The DoD is also a matrix organization. Though Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force units
are organized, trained, and equipped by their separate service departments, they fight
together as a team under the direction of a single combatant commander. Army,
Navy, Marine, and Air Force units may be assigned to one of nine Combatant
Commands (COCOMs) specified in the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP was
created in 1946 based on the command relationships formed in the European and
Pacific theaters during World War II. Today, the concept of theater command has
evolved into six Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) plus three Functional
Combatant Commands (FCCs) listed in Table 3. Each COCOM is commanded by a four-
star general or admiral appointed by the President. Each combatant commander has
direction over military forces assigned to their Area of Responsibility (AOR). For the six
geographic commands, the AOR encompasses a specific region of the world as
delineated in Figure 1. For the three functional commands, the AOR is the entire
world. The operational chain of command for authorizing and directing military action
begins with the President and runs directly to the four-star combatant commander
Table 38-2: National Guard Direction, Payment, & Authorities
President Commander
Governor Commander
Feds Pay T10 T32
States Pay SAD
Table 38-3: U.S. Combatant Commands
Command Designation Type Headquarters
1. U.S. Africa Command USAFRICOM GCC Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
2. U.S. Central Command USCENTCOM GCC MacDill Air Force Base, FL
3. U.S. European Command USEUCOM GCC Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
4. U.S. Northern Command USNORTHCOM GCC Peterson Air Force Base, CO
5. U.S. Pacific Command USPACOM GCC Camp H. M. Smith, HI
6. U.S. Southern Command USSOUTHCOM GCC Miami, FL
7. U.S. Special Operations Command USSOCOM FCC MacDill Air Force Base, FL
8. U.S. Cyber Command 1 USCYBERCOM FCC Fort Meade, MD
9. U.S. Strategic Command USSTRATCOM FCC Offutt Air Force Base, NE
10. U.S. Transportation Command USTRANSCOM FCC Scott Air Force Base, IL 1USCYBERCOM is a subunified command of USTRATCOM
U.S. military forces are
operationally assigned
to four-star Combatant
Commanders with Areas
of Responsibility (AORs)
assigned by the Unified
Command Plan (UCP).
586
Part V: Mission Partners
who directs assigned forces to achieve assigned objectives according to their assigned
missions. Because their AOR encompasses U.S. territorial possessions, United States
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM)
are responsible for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. [1]
Homeland Defense
The U.S. homeland is the physical region that includes the continental United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, U.S. territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. [2, p.
vii]
Homeland Defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic
population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression,
or other threats as directed by the President. [2, pp. I-1]
Put more succinctly, HD is about defending U.S. territory from direct attack by State
and Non-State actors. [3, p. 9]
Figure38- 1: Geographic Combatant Commands' Areas of Responsibility
The Homeland Defense
Mission is assigned to
the Commanders of U.S.
Pacific Command and
U.S. Northern Command
whose AORs include all
U.S. territory.
587
Chapter 38: DOD
According to the 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities, homeland defense relies on an active, layered global defense. [3, p. 9] This
defense strategy integrates U.S. capabilities in the forward regions of the world, in the
geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland. [2, pp. I-9]
The forward regions essentially encompass all foreign territories around the world.
In the forward regions, the objective is to detect, deter, prevent, or when
necessary, defeat threats to the U.S. Actions may include combat operations,
military engagement activities, peace operations, or preemptive measures such as
direct action missions, cyberspace operations, or global strike. [2, p. ix]
The approaches extend from U.S. territorial boundaries to the forward regions. The
primary objective of actions within the approaches is to locate threats as far from
the homeland as possible and defeat them at a safe distance. [2, p. ix]
The homeland encompasses all U.S. territory and territorial possessions. The DoD
strategy to prevent terrorist attacks on the homeland is predicated on supporting
State, Local, and Federal law enforcement. [3, p. 11]
In most forward regions around the world, prevention is the predominate strategy.
Prevention is facilitated regionally through military exchanges and collaborative
ventures between the Geographic Combatant Commands and their foreign military
counterparts. Prevention is facilitated globally by United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) who maintains the alert posture and readiness status of U.S. nuclear
forces. Direct actions continue in United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s)
AOR where U.S. forces remain actively engaged in combat missions in Afghanistan and
other parts of the region to prevent terrorist organizations from gaining safe havens as
they had before 9/11.
In the approaches, USPACOM and USNORTHCOM are responsible for countering air
and maritime threats at a safe distance from U.S. territory. Both commands work
closely with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to identify potential air threats
and scramble interceptors as necessary. Air defense within the USNORTHOM AOR is
conducted in partnership with Canada through the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD). [3, pp. 9-10] NORAD, though, is designed to counter military
threats, and was unprepared to intercept civilian airliners on 9/11. To safeguard U.S.
airspace from the expanded threat posed by suicide hijackings, USNORTHCOM
performs additional air surveillance and patrols under the aegis of Operation NOBLE
EAGLE. [4] In the maritime domain, USPACOM and USNORTHCOM work closely with
the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate intercepts of suspected hostile
agents by vessels belonging to the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally,
USNORTHCOM works with Canada Command to coordinate intercepts by vessels
belonging to the Royal Canadian Navy. Coordination is accomplished through a formal
process called the Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) plan, facilitated by
the Global MOTR Coordination Center (GMCC). [5] Homeland Defense in the
Homeland Defense is
about defending U.S.
territory from direct
attack by state and non-
state actors.
588
Part V: Mission Partners
approaches depends upon 1) persistent air and maritime domain awareness, 2)
capable and responsive air defense forces, and 3) capable and responsive maritime
forces. [3, p. 9]
In the homeland, the DoD strategy is to prevent terrorist attacks by supporting law
enforcement. As mentioned previously, federal military forces are expressly
prohibited from conducting law enforcement under Posse Comitatus. Because it is not
subject to the constraints imposed by Posse Comitatus, the National Guard can be
used to conduct law enforcement and has been used extensively to augment the U.S.
Border Patrol. Even though Posse Comitatus prevents federal military forces from
directly conducting law enforcement, it has been generally interpreted as not
preventing them from acting in a support capacity. Thus, when National Guard forces
were deployed in support of U.S. Border Patrol, they were accompanied by active
Army personnel who filled administrative positions to help field more border agents.
Similarly, federal military forces may lend equipment and personnel to operate in a
supporting capacity when requested by local law enforcement. [6, p. x] Because of its
extensive experience countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan
and Iraq, the DoD is specifically prepared to lend counter-IED support when requested
by law enforcement. Additionally, the DoD shares foreign intelligence with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation specifically, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
in general. [3, pp. 12-13] While both the Army and Marines maintain Quick Reaction
Forces (QRFs), the chances they would be deployed to confront armed terrorist attacks
in the United States are very small since State and Federal law enforcement have
significant tactical capability within their own jurisdictions. However, both USPACOM
and USNORTHCOM maintain organizational structures and contingency plans to
defend U.S. territory in the highly unlikely event of invasion.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Recall that Federal support in response to a serious incident is provided under
authority of the Robert T. Stafford Act following procedures laid out in the National
Response Framework (NRF). Also recall that incident response is a bottom-up process
whereby assistance is requested from the next higher authority only when all local
resources are exhausted. Assistance is provided in Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) that are integrated into the local Incident Command System (ICS) applying
organizational concepts described in the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). The entire process is facilitated between the State Coordinating Officer (SCO)
representing the State Governor and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO)
representing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Under provisions
of the Robert T. Stafford Act, the State may be reimbursed upwards to 75% of any
incurred costs for Federal assistance, meaning the State still has to pay a 25% balance
which can still be significant, and why the SCO is cautious when requesting Federal
assistance. [7]
Working by themselves
or together with other
Combatant Commands,
USPCACOM and
USNORTHCOM can
project military force
into the forward regions
and approaches to deter
and defeat potential
adversaries.
589
Chapter 38: DOD
Emergency Support Functions are maintained by a Federal ESF Coordinator designated
by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Coordinator oversees the preparedness
activities for a particular ESF by working with its Primary and Support agencies. ESF
Primary Agencies (PAs) have significant authorities, roles, resources, and capabilities
for a particular ESF. ESF Support Agencies (SAs) have specific capabilities or resources
that support the Primary Agency in executing its ESF mission. According to the 2013
National Response Framework, there are fifteen ESFs, even though ESF #14 (Long Term
Community Recovery) has been superseded by the National Disaster Recovery
Framework. Of the fifteen ESFs, the Department of Defense is both the ESF
Coordinator and PA for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. [7, pp. 31-36]
Additionally, according to the ESF Annex, DoD is also the Primary Agency for ESF #9,
Search and Rescue, and the Supporting Agency for all other ESFs. This means the DoD
can potentially be called in for any incident in which Federal assistance is requested.
[8]
DoD assistance can be highly specialized and very expensive. That is why a Defense
Coordinating Officer (DCO) supported by a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) is
assigned to each of the ten FEMA Regions to help the SCO and FCO make informed
decisions when requesting DoD support. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers
(EPLOs) are also assigned within each FEMA Region to advise State and Local
authorities with requesting DoD support. When DoD support does indeed become
necessary, the Federal Coordinating Officer will submit a Request For Assistance (RFA)
to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). If SecDef agrees to fulfill the request, the RFA
will be made into a Mission Assignment (MA) and forwarded to the appropriate
Geographic Combatant Commander, either at USPACOM or USNORTHCOM. [6]
Before a Mission Assignment ever arrives at USPACOM or USNORTHCOM, they will
start forming their command organization and build a Joint Task Force (JTF). The JTF
commander will be a National Guard officer specially trained and given temporary
authority as a Dual-Status Commander (DSC) to command both National Guard and
active duty Federal forces. Theoretically, the DSC works simultaneously for both the
Governor and President. To assist the DSC with this complex task, they may be
supported by an active duty Army Deputy Commander (CD). Together, the DSC and CD
will organize and direct assigned forces comprising the Joint Task Force. The JTF will
perform tasks compatible with the original Mission Assignment, and complimentary to
the Incident Action Plan (IAP) formulated by the civilian Incident Commander (IC).
While DoD forces remain under military command at all times, their actions are
similarly governed at all times by civilian authorities. [6, pp. C-1 - C-9]
Inside U.S. territorial
boundaries, USPACOM
and USNORTHCOM
work within the
strictures of Posse
Comitatus to support
law enforcement, and
stand ready to provide
Defense Support of Civil
Authorities (DSCA)
following disaster, either
natural or manmade.
590
Part V: Mission Partners
Sometimes there just isn’t enough time to wait for a formal request for Defense
Support of Civil Authorities. In accordance with Department of Defense Document
(DODD) 3025.18, commanders have Immediate Response Authority (IRA) to render
local assistance at their own discretion. However, such assistance must be 1)
requested by civil authorities, and must be necessary to 2) save lives, 3) prevent
human suffering, or 4) mitigate great property damage, under 5) imminently serious
conditions within the United States. [6, pp. I-7]
United States Northern Command
USNORTHCOM was established after 9/11 in 2002. Before 9/11, there was no single
unified command directly responsible for the United States. USNORTHCOM is
headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. USNORTHCOM’s AOR includes
the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and surrounding waters out to
approximately 500 nautical miles, including the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of
Florida. USNORTHCOM’s mission is to “anticipate and conduct Homeland Defense and
Civil Support operations within the assigned area of responsibility to defend, protect,
and secure the United States and its interests.” The USNORTHCOM Commander also
commands NORAD. [9, pp. CRS-1]
USNORTHCOM has no permanently assigned forces. Forces are assigned to
USNORTHCOM by SecDef when necessary to perform assigned missions. Assigned
units are released back to their corresponding service departments when the missions
are done. While USNORTHCOM has no assigned forces, it does have assigned
subordinate commands and Joint Tasks Forces ready to direct forces when assigned.
[9, pp. CRS-2]
Figure 38-2: Dual-Status Commander Chain of Command
Unless otherwise
provided, Title 10 active
duty military forces will
work at the discretion of
the State Governor in
support of the
designated Incident
Commander at the
direction of a National
Guard appointed Dual-
Status Commander.
591
Chapter 38: DOD
Army North (ARNORTH). Based at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 5th Army assumed
responsibility for its USNORTHCOM mission in October 2005. Commanded by an active
duty three-star general, this organization shed its traditional role of training reservists
to focus on supporting civil authorities. It assigns Defense Coordinating Officers to all
ten FEMA regional offices to streamline DSCA coordination. [9, pp. CRS-2]
Air Force North (AFNORTH). First Air Force is headquartered at Tyndall Air Force Base,
Florida, and in February 2006, it was designated as USNORTHCOM’s air component or
AFNORTH. The organization is commanded by an Air National Guard two-star general
who also serves as commander of the Continental NORAD Region encompassing the
airspace over the continental United States (not including Alaska or Hawaii). [9, pp. CRS
-2]
Marine Forces North (MARFORNORTH). In the fall of 2004, DOD designated Marine
Forces Reserve Command in New Orleans, Louisiana, as a USNORTHCOM component.
The reserve three-star Marine commander is responsible for force-protection of
Marine installations and coordinating Marine forces assigned to USNORTHCOM.
Additionally, to assist USNORTHCOM DSCA planning, the command has 32 Emergency
Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) assigned to the 10 FEMA regions. [9, pp. CRS-3]
Joint Task Force North (JTF-N). Established in September 2004, JTF-N aids law
enforcement agencies protecting U.S. borders. The Fort Bliss, Texas-based unit
inherited 15 years of interagency experience from its predecessor JTF-6. Whereas JTF-6
assisted with counter-drug operations on the southern border, JTF-N now has a
broader Homeland Defense focus as it integrates military capabilities with Federal,
State and Local law enforcement. In addition to exercises and planning, JTF-N
operations include reconnaissance, surveillance, detection, and infrastructure
construction missions that often leverage military units training for overseas
deployment. [9, pp. CRS-3]
Joint Task Force Alaska (JTF-AK). JTF-AK is headquartered at Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson, Alaska, and is tasked to coordinate land defense and Defense Support of
Civil Authorities in Alaska. [9, pp. CRS-4]
Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS). Headquartered at Fort Eustis, outside Newport
News Virginia, this JTF assists lead federal agencies managing the consequences of a
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive incident in the United
States or its territories and possessions. It was established in 1999 under U.S. Joint
Forces Command, and its coordination with agencies like FEMA is more mature. The
JTF is also works with state National Guard civil support teams. [9, pp. CRS-4]
Figure 38-2: Dual-Status Commander Chain of Command
Joint Task Force Civil
Support (JTF-CS). assists
lead federal agencies
managing the
consequences of a
chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or
high-yield explosive
incident in the United
States or its territories
and possessions.
592
Part V: Mission Partners
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR). Activated in June 2003,
this JTF is located at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, D.C. It facilitates planning,
training, and exercising among four local service components. Additionally, it
coordinates with Coast Guard District 5, the DHS Office of National Capitol Region, and
other Federal, State, and Local agencies to ensure unity of effort in the event of
manmade or natural catastrophes. [9, pp. CRS-4]
In order to maintain readiness for its DSCA mission, USNORTHCOM must be prepared
to work with many other agencies at the State, Local, and Federal levels of
government. As such, USNORTHCOM participates in the Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG) and maintains strong relationships with the Department of
Homeland Security and the National Guard. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is an active
participant in National Level Exercises (NLE) and integral component of the National
Exercise Plan. [9, pp. CRS-4]
In order to perform its HD mission, USNORTHCOM must work closely with both Canada
and Mexico. In addition to the NORAD agreement, USNORTHCOM and Canada
Command are the acting agencies for a Civil Assistance Plan (CAP) that allows the
military from one nation to support the armed forces of the other nation during a civil
emergency. Cooperation with Mexico is less robust, but still evolving. For the most
part, USNORTHCOM works with Mexico in counter-drug support through JTF-N. [9, pp.
CRS-6 - CRS-7]
Conclusion
In addition to its counterterrorism and counter-WMD missions, the Department of
Defense is also responsible for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil
Authorities. HD operations are limited to supporting law enforcement within U.S.
territory. In the approaches, HD operations are hampered by the ability to
differentiate friend from foe in both the maritime and air domains. In the forward
regions, HD is mostly facilitated by diplomatic engagement, backed up by a credible
nuclear deterrent and unprecedented capability to project conventional force
anywhere in the world. Unfortunately, all this is not enough to prevent disaster back
home, either natural or manmade. Accordingly, DoD is also prepared to assist civil
authorities as requested following disaster. While military forces remain under
military command at all time, their actions remain at all times under the direction of
the Incident Commander.
593
Chapter 38: DOD
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the primary advantage of maintaining a Reserve Component?
2. How is the National Guard uniquely positioned compared to the Active Component?
3. What is the purpose and advantage of a Combatant Command?
4. What is homeland defense?
5. Which two Combatant Commands are responsible for homeland defense?
6. List and describe the three different layers of homeland defense.
7. What is DoD’s strategy for preventing terrorist attack on the homeland?
8. What is Defense Support of Civil Authorities?
9. How are Title 10 forces coordinated together with National Guard responding to a disaster?
10. Which Combatant Command coordinates DSCA within the continental United States and Alaska?
594
Part V: Mission Partners
595
Chapter 39: National Guard
National Guard
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the different missions of the National Guard.
Discuss how the National Guard uniquely contributes to homeland security and homeland defense.
Explain the different command and control arrangements for National Guard under State and Federal authorities.
Chapter 39
Learning Outcomes
596
Part V: Mission Partners
“The National Guard has served America as both a wartime force and the first military
responders in times of domestic crisis. Hundreds of times each year, the nation's
governors call upon their Guard troops to respond to fires, floods, hurricanes and other
natural disasters.”
- LTG Russell Honore, Commander, JTF-Katrina
Introduction
Historically, the National Guard has served as a critical resource in emergencies and
can be an effective force multiplier to civil authorities in responding to acts of
terrorism at the state, local, and federal levels. In the wake of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks, the National Guard has expanded its traditional role in homeland
defense and homeland security and readily supports Local, Territorial, State, and
Federal response agencies with needed equipment, facilities, and personnel. National
Guard activities such as conducting vulnerability assessments; planning, training, and
exercising with civilian emergency responders; and securing strategic facilities, such as
airports, pharmaceutical labs, nuclear power plants, communications towers, and
border crossings, have been a cornerstone in protecting our citizens from domestic
acts of terrorism. Unless and until activated for Federal service, the National Guard is
under the control of the Governor as Commander-in-Chief. [1, pp. 3-4]
The National Guard
The National Guard is descended from the colonial militias which existed prior to the
adoption of the Constitution. With the adoption of the Constitution, the Federal
government acquired authority to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to call
the militia into Federal service in order to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress
insurrection, and to repel invasion. Additionally, Federal laws passed in the early 20th
century designated part of the militia — now called the National Guard — as a Federal
reserve of the Army, thereby enhancing Federal authority over the Guard in certain
respects. As a result of this history, the National Guard is neither a purely State nor a
purely Federal organization. Rather, it is both a State and Federal organization. [2, pp.
6-7]
The National Guard of the United States is made up of 54 separate National Guard
organizations: one for each state, and one each for Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and the District of Columbia. While the District of Columbia National Guard is
an exclusively Federal organization and operates under Federal control at all times, the
other 53 National Guards operate as State or Territorial organizations most of the time.
In this capacity, each of these 53 organizations is identified by its state or territorial
name (e.g. ,the California National Guard or the Puerto Rico National Guard), and is
controlled by its respective Governor. [2, p. 7]
Historically, the National
Guard has served as a
critical resource in
emergencies and can be
an effective force
multiplier to civil
authorities in
responding to acts of
terrorism at the state,
local, and federal levels.
597
Chapter 39: National Guard
The National Guard is comprised of both an Army National Guard (ARNG) and Air
National Guard (ANG). Both elements consist mainly of part-time personnel,
supplemented by a small cadre of full-time staff. The Army National Guard is
authorized approximately 358,000 soldiers. The Air National Guard is authorized
approximately 105,000 airmen. Each state’s National Guard forces have a dual role in
both Federal and State missions. [3, pp. 4-5]
Federal Mission
According to Title 10 Section 10102 of United States Code, the purpose of the National
Guard is to “provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the
armed forces in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the
national security may require.” The National Guard together with the Federal Reserve
make up the Reserve Component (RC) of the United States military. Together with the
Active Component (AC), the three components comprise the Total Force of the United
States military. The basic advantage of maintaining a Reserve Component is that it is
much cheaper than the Active Component. The Army National Guard comprises 32% of
the Total Force, yet incurs less than 13% of the total cost. Likewise, the Air National
Guard comprises 20% of the Total Force, yet incurs less than 7% of the total cost. [3, p.
5] This cost differential has played an important role shaping the mix of AC and RC
forces over time.
From the founding of the nation to the Cold War era, the bulk of force structure was
maintained in the Reserve Component, especially the militia/National Guard, except in
times of major conflicts. When major conflicts arose—such as the Civil War, World War
I, and World War II—the comparatively small active component was expanded through
the activation of militia and federal reserves, recruitment of additional volunteers for
the AC, and the use of conscription. At the end of the conflict, active force levels were
dramatically reduced. For example, in 1939, there were fewer than 350,000 active duty
personnel in all branches of the U.S. armed forces. During World War II, this number
grew enormously, reaching over 12 million service members on duty by 1945. With the
end of World War II, the United States radically reduced the size of its active armed
forces to about 1.5 million in 1947-1950. [4, p. 3]
This approach changed with the onset of the Cold War. With the advent of the Korean
War in 1950, the United States doubled the size of its active forces by 1951 to
approximately 3.2 million. This increase included a major reserve mobilization, with
over 850,000 members of the National Guard and Reserves called to active duty.
However, with the end of the war in 1953, the size of the active component did not
decrease nearly as much as it would have in earlier eras. For the next decade, it
remained roughly between 2.5 million and 3 million for all services, while the size of
the reserve component hovered around 1 million. In response to the Vietnam War, the
size of the active component was increased again to about 3.5 million (1968), but there
The National Guard
together with the
Federal Reserve make
up the Reserve
Component (RC) of the
United States military.
Together with the Active
Component (AC), the
three components
comprise the Total Force
of the United States
military. The basic
advantage of
maintaining a Reserve
Component is that it is
much cheaper than the
Active Component.
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Part V: Mission Partners
was no major reserve mobilization. Thus, since the Korean War and continuing to the
present, the United States has maintained most of its force structure in the AC. [4, p. 3]
This shift to an AC-centric force structure model in the aftermath of World War II
began to ebb somewhat starting in the 1970s. The downsizing that followed the
Vietnam War, the end of the comparatively inexpensive manpower provided by
conscription, budgetary pressures, and dissatisfaction with the negative consequences
of not using reserve forces more extensively during Vietnam led to a renewed focus on
using RC forces to supplement the AC. The Total Force Policy, established in 1973 by
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger on the basis of the 1970 Total Force Concept
developed by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, sought to integrate “the Active, Guard
and Reserve forces into a homogenous whole” and emphasized that, instead of
draftees, “Guard and Reserve forces will be used as the initial and primary
augmentation of active forces.” [4, pp. 3-4]
General Creighton Abrams, the Chief of Staff of the Army from 1972-74, implemented
this policy for the Army by instituting changes which deeply integrated reserve forces
into the active force structure. This deeper integration helped General Abrams rebuild
the Army to 16 divisions while staying within budgetary limits; it also effectively
ensured that the Army could not be sent to war again without the Guard and Reserve,
as had occurred in Vietnam. The most notable manifestation of this increased active-
reserve integration was the roundout brigade program, which involved restructuring of
certain AC divisions to include an RC brigade. Normally, an AC division would have
three AC brigades assigned to it. At Abrams’ direction, some AC divisions were assigned
two AC brigades, along with a “roundout” National Guard brigade; other AC divisions
kept three AC brigades but had some of their AC battalions replaced with “roundout”
RC battalions. Congress passed a new law in 1976 to make it easier for the President to
activate RC personnel and units. [4, pp. 4-5] The President can call up RC personnel
under provisions in Title 10 United States Code listed in Figure 1.
Figure 39-1: Reserve Component Mobilization Authorities [4, p. 5]
For most of U.S. history,
its military forces were
comprised of a small
core of full-time military
supplemented during
war with part-time
militia. This model was
reversed following
WWII, when the ability
to attack across
continents shrunk from
weeks to hours.
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Chapter 39: National Guard
Other initiatives to improve active-reserve integration in the 1970s and 1980s included
more modernized equipment for the RC, greater overseas training opportunities, and
rotations at the newly established National Training Center. [4, pp. 4-5]
The first major test of this greater active-reserve integration came during the 1990-91
Persian Gulf War, which saw the activation of over 238,000 RC personnel, including
about 60,000 members of the Army National Guard and some 88,000 members of the
Army Reserve. In many respects, RC performance in this conflict strengthened support
for the Total Force Policy among defense policymakers. However, there were areas of
RC readiness identified as needing improvement. This was most apparent with respect
to the roundout brigades. Three ARNG roundout brigades were mobilized, somewhat
belatedly, and deployed to the National Training Center for post-mobilization training.
Amid claims of serious readiness deficiencies, however, they were not certified as
combat ready until the war was over. [4, p. 5]
The Persian Gulf War experience led Congress to address identified readiness
shortcomings through passage of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform
Act of 1992 (also known as “Title XI,” in reference to its location within the 1993
National Defense Authorization Act). The reforms focused primarily, though not
exclusively, on ARNG combat units. Title XI contained 19 provisions which sought to
improve the readiness of Army Guard units and their compatibility with AC units by:
increasing experience and leadership levels in the ARNG by recruiting more prior-
service personnel, Service Academy graduates, and ROTC graduates; revising the
training focus for combat units; providing for a more robust medical and dental
evaluation process; ensuring the compatibility of personnel, supply, maintenance and
finance systems across the AC, ARNG, and USAR; reforming the Army’s readiness
system for USAR and ARNG units; directing the Secretary of the Army to conduct
inspections to ensure that ARNG units met deployability standards; and mandating
that the Army provide greater funding to deploying ARNG and USAR units. [4, p. 6]
Although the Department of Defense effectively ended the roundout brigade program
in 1993, the disintegration of the Soviet Union gave further impetus to the ongoing
integration of the AC and RC. With the demise of the United States’ main military
competitor, the requirement for large numbers of ground forces at a high state of
readiness was considered less critical for national security. Subsequently, AC force
structure was substantially reduced in the 1990s. [4, p. 6]
The post-Cold War drawdown was followed by the increased employment of RC forces
in Iraq (low-intensity conflict with Iraq, 1998-2003), Bosnia (1995-2004), Kosovo (1999-
present), and Haiti (1994-1996). As the use of RC units increased and they gained
experience through repetitive deployments, the distinction between components
In the 1970s, General
Creighton Abrams
conceived the “Total
Force” concept, and
began to more actively
integrate the Reserve
Component into active
duty military missions.
With minor exceptions,
the concept passed its
first major test in the
1990-91 Persian Gulf
War. Since then, the
Reserve Component,
including the National
Guard, have played an
increasingly larger role
in U.S. military
engagements, including
both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
600
Part V: Mission Partners
faded somewhat, and RC units began to be more seriously considered as suitable
substitutes for AC units—provided they received necessary personnel, equipment,
training and preparation time prior to being deployed. This perspective was further
reinforced by the large-scale and continuing mobilizations of RC forces for the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which led many public officials and policy analysts to conclude
that the performance of the RC in these conflicts largely validated the Total Force
Policy. Some Army officials argued, however, that AC and RC units were not
interchangeable, with one senior Army officer indicating that this was the reason RC
BCTs were used for less complex missions in Iraq and Afghanistan than their AC
counterparts. RC advocates countered that they had no control over the missions they
were assigned in Iraq and Afghanistan, that they were effective in all the missions they
were given, and that they could have successfully completed combined arms
maneuver missions if they had been given the opportunity. [4, p. 7]
In addition to the large scale mobilization of RC units during the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Congress authorized significant expansions of the active Army and Marine
Corps. This led to an increase in the ratio of AC to RC forces in those Services. However,
with the end of the war in Iraq and the ongoing reduction of forces in Afghanistan, a
multi-year drawdown of AC forces is underway in these Services. This drawdown has
rolled back the war-time increases in AC strength and will likely end at a level lower
than existed prior to the war. As such, the proportion of AC to RC forces will also likely
decline in those Services. [4, p. 7]
State Mission
The National Guard is located in all 54 states and territories. It is typically a major state
emergency responder and a vital part of the state’s ability to protect its people and
property from disaster and to recover after disaster has struck. [5, p. 55]
Normally, the National Guard operates under the control of State and Territorial
governors. In response to disasters and civil disorders, governors can order National
Guard personnel to perform full-time duty, commonly referred to as “state active
duty.” In this state capacity, National Guard personnel operate under the control of
their Governor, are paid according to state law, can perform typical disaster relief tasks
and are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. [2, p. 7]
“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the
Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”
- Title 18, United States Code, Section 1385
The National Guard is
located in all 54 states
and territories. It is
typically a major state
emergency responder
and a vital part of the
state’s ability to protect
its people and property
from disaster and to
recover after disaster
has struck.
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Chapter 39: National Guard
The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of Title 10 Army and Air Force personnel as
enforcement officials to execute State or Federal law or to perform direct law
enforcement functions. The Navy and Marine Corps are included in this prohibition as
a result of Department of Defense (DOD) policy articulated in DODD 3025.21, Defense
Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. [3, pp. III-1]
When activated under Title 10 status, the National Guard also becomes subject to
Posse Comitatus and cannot perform law enforcement. However, there are exceptions
provided by the Constitution and Congress. The Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-
335) allows the President to call the National Guard into Federal service to suppress
insurrection against a State government (10 U.S.C. § 331), enforce Federal laws and
suppress rebellion against the authority of the United States (10 U.S.C. §332), and
prevent interference with State and Federal laws, if that interference deprives a class
of people of rights, privileges, immunities, or protections named in the Constitution (10
U.S.C. § 333). Similar authority is contained in 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits the
President to call members and units of the National Guard into Federal service to repel
invasion, suppress rebellion, or execute the laws of the United States. [2, p. 9]
Another way in which National Guard personnel can be activated and remain under
the control of their Governor is under the authority of 32 U.S.C. 502(f). This provision
of Federal law provides that “a member of the National Guard may...without his
consent, but with the pay and allowances provided by law...be ordered to perform
training or other duty in addition to [inactive duty for training or annual training].” The
advantage of using this authority is that the National Guard personnel called will
receive Federal pay and benefits and are entitled to certain legal protections as though
they were in Federal service, but they remain under the control of their Governor and
are therefore not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act. This is the
provision of law which was used to provide federal pay and benefits to the National
Guard personnel who provided security at many of the nation’s airports in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. [2, p. 7]
As the chief executives of their states, governors are vested with a primary
responsibility to protect the life and property of their citizens, and are the senior
civilian officials in charge of most emergency preparedness and disaster response
efforts in our nation. As the commanders in chief of their respective state National
Guard units, governors have a major interest in how their state National Guard units
and personnel are trained, equipped, and utilized. And as commanders in chief, they
are responsible for their Guard before and after its use, whether the units are
deployed on a state mission, a federal mission, or a combination of both. [5, p. 55]
Normally, the National
Guard operates under
the control of State and
Territorial governors. In
response to disasters
and civil disorders,
governors can order
National Guard
personnel to perform
full-time duty,
commonly referred to as
“state active duty.”
602
Part V: Mission Partners
National Guard forces are commanded by The Adjutant General (TAG) of each State. In
49 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands, the Adjutant
General is appointed by the Governor. The exceptions are Vermont, where the
Adjutant General is appointed by the legislature; and the District of Columbia, where a
commanding general is appointed by the President of the United States. [7]
The Adjutant General commands their respective Army National Guard and Air
National Guard forces from a Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). JFHQ-State evolved
from predecessor ARNG and ANG headquarters in each state that were established in
the 1980s. In 2003, at the direction of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, the
predecessor headquarters were combined into the 54 Joint Force Headquarters-State.
This arrangement was formally recognized by DOD in 2011 with the issuance of DOD
Instruction 5105.83. The state Joint Force headquarters each consist of a Joint staff
element, Army staff element, and Air staff element. These headquarters are
responsible for coordinating the planning, training, and execution of National Guard
homeland defense, civil support, and other domestic emergency missions within the
United States. They also manage the National Guard’s readiness and prepare National
Guard units for federal mobilization. [3, pp. 8, 54]
JFHQ-State is supported by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB is the National
Guard representative to DOD. The NGB works with the Army and Air Force staffs to
provide for the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units.
While the NGB is not an operational command, it does provide an important
communication between DOD and the states during national emergencies. The
National Guard Bureau is headed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB). In
2011, the CNGB was elevated to a 4-star position and made a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The NGB, in turn, is supported by the Army National Guard Directorate
and the Air National Guard Readiness Center. [3, p. 51]
The Army National Guard Directorate assists the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau with carrying out the functions as they relate to the Army National Guard.
Most of these functions involve providing for equipment, maintenance, and
training of Army National Guard forces. [3, p. 51]
The Air National Guard Readiness Center, likewise, assists the Chief of the National
Guard with carrying out their functions as they relate to the Air National Guard.
Similarly, these functions involve providing for equipment, maintenance and
training of Air National Guard forces. However, they also include rotating alert
sites for air defense interceptors; managing airlift and aeromedical evacuations;
and arranging weather flights and search and rescue missions. [3, p. 51]
The Adjutant General
commands their
respective Army
National Guard and Air
National Guard forces
from a Joint Force
Headquarters (JFHQ).
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Chapter 39: National Guard
When disaster strikes, State governors may mobilize their National Guard to support
incident response under the direction of Local Incident Commanders within their State.
If additional National Guard forces are required for the task, State governors may call
upon their neighbors to lend assistance under provisions of the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). [6, p. 17] EMAC was established by
Congress and signed into law in 1996 (Public Law 104-321). All 54 States and
Territories are covered under its authorities. EMAC provides the means for States to
assist each other on a cost-reimbursable basis with potential Federal assistance. The
advantage of EMAC is that it resolves liability issues in advance, allowing States to
expeditiously lend assistance to one another. [9] EMAC resulted in the largest
deployment of military forces within the U.S. since the Civil War after it was activated
in response to Hurricane Katrina.
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was the costliest natural disaster ($108 billion) and one of
the five deadliest (1,245 fatalities) hurricanes in U.S. history. Katrina caused severe
destruction along the Gulf coast from central Florida to Texas, much of it due to storm
surge and levee failure. It was New Orleans, however, that sustained the most damage
when Katrina came ashore as a Category 3 hurricane and passed directly over the city
on August 29. The rain swollen canals quickly overtopped the levees and flooded 80%
of the city. [10] Within four hours of landfall, Army National Guard helicopters were
airborne and actively performing rescue missions, with other National Guard personnel
joining the effort on the ground. [6, p. 38]
Guardsmen performed a range of missions, including search and rescue, security,
evacuations, and distribution of food and water. In Mississippi, National Guard forces
prepared Camp Shelby as a staging point for incoming forces and also engaged in law
enforcement support, debris removal, shelter support and other vital operations.
Guardsmen from Texas and Pennsylvania supplied satellite phone communications to
the response. When a group of Pennsylvania Guardsmen arrived to fix a Louisiana
woman’s roof, she told the group: “That’s a long way to come to help us. We’re really
grateful … you boys are going to heaven, I tell you.” By August 29, sixty-five National
Guard helicopters were positioned throughout the Gulf Coast. By September 2, nearly
22,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen had deployed to the region —including
6,500 in New Orleans alone—breaking the National Guard’s previous record for the
largest response to a domestic emergency. Eventually, over 50,000 National Guard
members from fifty-four States, Territories, and the District of Columbia deployed to
the Gulf Coast. Active duty military and National Guard personnel provided critical
emergency response and security support to the Gulf Coast during the height of the
crisis. State active duty and Title 32 National Guard forces that deployed to Louisiana
and Mississippi operated under the command of their respective Governors. The
robust National Guard response played a crucial role in the effort to bring stability to
the areas ravaged by Hurricane Katrina. [8, pp. 42-43] But all did not go well.
In the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, the
National Guard
performed a range of
missions, including
search and rescue,
security, evacuations,
and distribution of food
and water.
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Part V: Mission Partners
A fragmented deployment system and lack of an integrated command structure for
both active duty and National Guard forces exacerbated communications and
coordination issues during the initial response. Deployments for Title 32 National
Guard forces were coordinated State-to-State through EMAC agreements and also by
the National Guard Bureau. Title 10 active duty force deployments were coordinated
through U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM). Once forces arrived in the Joint
Operations Area, they fell under separate command structures, rather than one single
command. The separate commands divided the area of operations geographically and
supported response efforts separately. [6, p. 43]
For the first two days of Katrina response operations, USNORTHCOM did not have
situational awareness of what forces the National Guard had on the ground. Joint Task
Force Katrina (JTF-Katrina) simply could not operate at full efficiency when it lacked
visibility of over half the military forces in the disaster area. Neither the Louisiana
National Guard nor JTF-Katrina had a good sense for where each other’s forces were
located or what they were doing. For example, the JTF-Katrina Engineering Directorate
had not been able to coordinate with National Guard forces in the New Orleans area.
As a result, some units were not immediately assigned missions matched to on-the-
ground requirements. Further, FEMA requested assistance from DOD without knowing
what State National Guard forces had already deployed to fill the same needs. [6, p.
55]
Also, the Commanding General of JTF-Katrina and the Adjutant Generals of Louisiana
and Mississippi had only a coordinating relationship, with no formal command
relationship established. This resulted in confusion over roles and responsibilities
between National Guard and Federal forces and highlighted the need for a more
unified command structure. [6, p. 55]
In the years following the divided military response to Katrina, State governors and
DOD officials realized the urgent need for policy changes and the requirement for an
improved coordination mechanism between State and Federal Government, and
National Guard and Federal military forces. Unable to legislate an agreeable command
arrangement, in 2010 the Council of Governors and Secretary of Defense (SecDef)
signed a Joint Action Plan agreeing to employ Dual-Status Command (DSC) when
Federal forces are deployed to a State. In 2012, the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) made DSC the law as the “usual and customary command and control
arrangement”. [12, pp. 14-17]
The Government Accountability Office defines a Dual-Status Commander as a “Military
officer who serves as an intermediate link between the separate chains of command
for state and federal forces—has authority over both National Guard forces under
Unfortunately, the
National Guard’s
response to Hurricane
Katrina was not well
coordinated with Title
10 forces working under
Task Force Katrina, nor
with FEMA. The Dual-
Status Commander
concept was
subsequently developed
to improve coordination
between the National
Guard, Title 10 forces,
and FEMA in future
large-scale disasters.
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Chapter 39: National Guard
state control and active duty forces under federal control during a civil support
incident or special event.” More simply stated, a DSC is “responsible for performing
two separate and distinct but related jobs with two separate and distinct teams for
two separate and distinct bosses, all at the same time.” [11, p. 7] The DSC concept was
first put to the test during Hurricane Sandy in 2012.
Hurricane Sandy was the largest and most damaging Atlantic hurricane on record and
the second most costly in U.S. history, eclipsed only by Hurricane Katrina. At the peak
of the October-November 2012 military response to Hurricane Sandy in New York,
more than 4,000 National Guard personnel, along with Active and Reserve Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, and Marines were engaged in supporting civil authorities as part of
Joint Task Force Sandy (JTF-Sandy). [11, p. 1]
In October 2012, Hurricane Sandy came ashore along one of the most densely
populated regions in the country. Even though Sandy was downgraded to tropical
storm status prior to landfall, it was a massive storm that affected east coast cities
from Washington, DC, to New York City. As was the case with Katrina, the storm’s
magnitude overwhelmed State and Local responders. Requests for military support
were widespread, resulting in an over-convergence of military forces inside the region
within days of the storm’s arrival. Again, like Katrina, National Guard forces in both
State Active Duty and Title 32 status operated alongside Title 10 Federal forces in
support of civil authorities responding to the storm’s damage. Unlike Katrina, however,
this response effort was a historical first for the U.S. military. For the first time,
National Guard and Federal military forces executed unplanned civil support
operations under the tactical command of Dual-Status Commanders. [12, p. 2]
As the storm approached the coast on October 28, 2012, President Barack Obama
signed Stafford Act emergency declarations for Connecticut; Washington, DC;
Maryland; Massachusetts; New Jersey; and New York. Over the next 24 hours,
Hurricane Sandy weakened from a category 1 hurricane to a tropical storm. The storm
made landfall slightly north of Atlantic City near Brigantine, NJ, at approximately 11:30
p.m. on October 29, 2012. That same day, President Obama signed additional disaster
declarations for Delaware, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania; and declared major
disaster areas in New Jersey and New York following massive storm surges along each
coast. [12, p. 28]
With the new disaster declarations approved, the Secretary of Defense, through the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a standing execution order directing
USNORTHCOM to provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) to the affected
states. Owing to the Joint Action Plan, State governors had the option to request a
Dual-Status Commander for the pending DSCA response. Ultimately, six states received
For the most part, the
Dual-Status Commander
concept proved itself
well after Hurricane
Sandy came ashore in
New Jersey and flooded
much of New York City
in October 2012.
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Part V: Mission Partners
authorization to employ a DSC: New York, New Jersey, Maryland, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Of the six states receiving DSC authorizations, only
two—New York and New Jersey—actually activated a DSC to lead the military response
efforts. [12, pp. 28-29]
Brigadier General Bud Grant from the New Jersey Army National Guard and Brigadier
General Michael Swezey from the New York Army National Guard were each given
Title 10 and Title 32 orders authorizing them to command both State National Guard
and Federal military forces. [12, p. 29] On the one hand they reported to their State
Governor who remained Commander-in-Chief over their State National Guard. On the
other hand they reported to the President of the United States who remained
Commander-in-Chief over Federal military forces assigned through USNORTHCOM.
These two National Guard officers became the coordinating point for Defense Support
of Civil Authorities within their respective states.
Hurricane Sandy caused a great deal of damage in the New York metropolitan area.
However, Sandy was only a Category 1 storm when it made landfall and quickly
dissipated after coming ashore. While the storm surge was one of the most significant
in New York’s history, the storm could have been worse. [12, p. 53]
Hurricane Sandy demonstrated that Dual-Status Command could provide effective
coordination of National Guard and Title 10 forces through the successful integration
of liaison officers (LNOs), and a strategic forward-leaning approach to the operation,
including pre-positioning Title 10 assets. However, while the DSC concept proved
sound, the execution during Sandy was flawed. Lessons learned from this incident can
help refine the concept further and help improve coordination in future such disasters
[12, pp. 54, 113]
Homeland Missions
In addition to providing for Federal military capability and State disaster response, the
National Guard has specific roles assigned for Homeland Defense and Homeland
Security.
Homeland Defense (HD) is defined in the 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security
as “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical
defense infrastructure against external threats or aggression, or other threats as
directed by the President.” Protecting the sovereignty of U.S. airspace is a key HD
mission assigned to the National Guard. [13, pp. B-1]
The National Guard also
supports the Homeland
Defense mission. First
Air Force is commanded
by an Air National
Guard two-star general
responsible for
protecting the airspace
over the Continental
United States and
Alaska.
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Chapter 39: National Guard
First Air Force at Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida, is the designated air component to
USNORTHCOM, called AFNORTH. AFNORTH is commanded by an Air National Guard
two-star general responsible for protecting the airspace over the Continental United
States and Alaska. AFNORTH maintains joint surveillance of U.S. airspace together with
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). U.S. airspace is protected by Air National
Guard squadrons flying the F-22 Raptor, F-15 Eagle, and F-16 Falcon. In the event of
unknown or suspicious radar tracks, fighters can be vectored from patrol or launched
from alert to investigate. Since 9/11, the Commander of UNORTHCOM has been
authorized to shoot down suspicious or hostile aircraft. That authority is delegated to
the AFNORTH Commander. Homeland Defense missions are designated Operation
NOBLE EAGE to distinguish them from NORAD missions flown by the same units.
National Guard aircraft maintain continuous and constant watch over U.S airspace. [14,
pp. 2-3]
Border security remains a core mission of homeland security. The U.S. Border Patrol
within the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Directorate of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has primary responsibility for detecting and preventing illegal
entry across nearly 7,000 miles of border with Mexico and Canada, and over 2,000
miles of coastline. It is DOD’s role to support DHS in this responsibility. Since the 1980s,
DOD, including the National Guard, as authorized by Congress, has conducted a wide
variety of counterdrug support missions along the borders of the United States. Since
9/11, DOD’s support role in counterdrug and counterterrorism has increased its profile
in border security. [15, p. 1]
In 2006, in response to requests for support enforcing federal immigration laws from
the governors of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas, President George W.
Bush announced the deployment of up to 6,000 National Guard troops along the
southern border to support the Border Patrol. During 2006–2008, more than 30,000
individuals participated in the mission “Operation Jump Start.” The troops provided
engineering, aviation, and entry identification teams, as well as technical, logistical,
and administrative support. The Guard units, serving pursuant to Title 32 of the U.S.
Code, remained under the control of the respective governors, but were fully funded
by the Federal government and were not involved in direct law-enforcement activities.
Throughout Operation Jump Start, the federal government continued to recruit and
train thousands of additional Border Patrol agents, thereby reducing the number of
National Guard troops required to support the southern border. Operation Jump Start
officially concluded on July 15, 2008. [15, p. 1]
In response to increasing drug traffic and murders along the U.S.-Mexico border, in
2010 President Obama sent 1,200 National Guard troops to support Border Patrol
along the southern border. A year later the number of troops was drawn down and
the remaining 300 relegated mostly to conducting aerial surveillance. [15, p. 1]
Since the 1980s, DOD,
including the National
Guard, as authorized by
Congress, has conducted
a wide variety of
counterdrug support
missions along the
borders of the United
States.
608
Part V: Mission Partners
Because of their unique legal status, the National Guard remains a ready manpower
reserve to draw on for border security during times of crisis or emergency.
And while the National Guard actively protect against enemy intrusion on sovereign
U.S. territory, they are also prepared to respond in the event a WMD attack employing
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents.
Congress in 1998 approved the development of Federally funded, State controlled,
National Guard WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs). The CSTs’ principal mission is to
assist civil authorities in the United States in responding to incidents involving WMD or
catastrophic terrorism, including the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
or high-yield explosive weapons and agents. The CSTs are to identify these agents and
substances, assess current or projected consequences, advise civil authorities on
response measures, and assist with requests for additional support. Like traditional
National Guard units, the CSTs are under the control of the governors of their
respective states and territories, unless they are activated for Federal service, at which
time they would fall under the control of the Department of Defense. However, unlike
traditional National Guard units, these highly specialized teams are each composed of
22 members who are on full-time duty. The teams include both Army and Air National
Guard personnel who are divided into six sections, including command, operations,
administration/logistics, medical science, communications, and survey. The teams
possess highly technical mobile laboratory and communications equipment to
accomplish their mission. [16, p. 1] There are 58 full-time teams: one in every U.S.
state, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, Germany, Guam and the US Virgin Islands, and an
additional team each in California, Florida and New York. [17]
In the event of large-scale employment of WMD anywhere in the nation, the National
Guard is ready to deploy Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) to the scene of the
incident. A HRF is comprised of around 570 National Guard personnel trained in CBRN
response. There are 10 designated HRFs, one for each FEMA region. Eight are hosted
in WA, CA, UT, TX, MO, GA, OH, and PA. In Region I, HRF units are stationed in VT, MA,
and CT. Region II elements are shared between NY and NJ. The Adjutant General may
activate a HRF in response to an incident within their State, or to support the Governor
of another State under the provisions of EMAC. Once activated, HRFs can assemble
within 6-12 hours, and deploy in less than 24 hours. Once on-scene, HRFs are capable
of conducting command and control; casualty assistance; search and extraction;
decontamination; medical triage and stabilization, fatality search and recovery; and
otherwise save lives and mitigate human suffering. HRFs provide a rapid response
capability when Local jurisdictions are overwhelmed and Federal assistance is still on
its way. [18]
Congress in 1998
approved the
development of
Federally funded, State
controlled, National
Guard WMD Civil
Support Teams (CSTs).
The CSTs’ principal
mission is to assist civil
authorities in the United
States in responding to
catastrophic terrorism,
including the use of
chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or
high-yield explosive
weapons and agents.
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Chapter 39: National Guard
International Diplomacy
In addition to its many roles protecting the nation, the National Guard also serves as an
international ambassador under the State Partnership Program (SPP). SPP is a
Department of Defense security cooperation program designed to build defense
relationships with foreign military partners, develop allied and friendly military
capabilities, and foster international relations through peaceful engagement. [19, p. 1]
The SPP evolved from an effort begun in 1992 to use professional contacts between
the U.S. military and the militaries of the newly independent nations of the former
Soviet Union to help reform the defense establishments of those nations. The program
has expanded greatly since then. Today, it is a significant component of DOD’s security
cooperation efforts, linking state and territorial National Guards in 63 partnerships
with 70 partners nations. Nearly every state National Guard participates in the SPP, as
do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of
Columbia. [19, p. 1]
The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations. The focus of SPP
activities varies depending on the needs of the partner nation, the capabilities of the
state National Guard, the goals of the respective U.S. ambassador and the combatant
commander, and statutory authorities and restrictions. According to National Guard
Bureau, the typical SPP event is a week-long subject matter expert exchange, with
three to five National Guard subject matter experts participating. Examples of
different types of exchanges are listed here.
Subject Matter Expert Exchanges. During these events, National Guard personnel
with expertise in a certain area share their knowledge with partner nation
personnel.
Familiarizations. These are demonstrations of certain capabilities that the Army or
Air National Guard has, or discussions of policy issues related to those capabilities.
Senior Leader Visits. These are visits between senior leaders of the state National
Guard, such as the adjutant general, and senior leaders of the partner nation’s
armed forces.
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams
(OMLTs) provide mentoring and training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and
serve as liaisons between the ANA and the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. They are composed of 13-30 personnel from one or more
countries. National Guard personnel have embedded with their partner nation’s
OMLTs and accompanied them throughout their deployments to Afghanistan (they
have also conducted similar embedded operations with partner nation forces in
Iraq and Kosovo). [19, pp. 4-6]
In addition to its many
roles protecting the
nation, the National
Guard also serves as an
international
ambassador under the
State Partnership
Program (SPP).
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Part V: Mission Partners
One unique aspect of the SPP is the ability to forge relationships between particular
individuals over a long period of time. For active component personnel, a duty
assignment that includes regular contact with the military of a foreign nation would
typically last for about two to three years. At the end of the tour of duty, the U.S.
service member would normally be reassigned as part of his or her career progression.
In contrast, National Guard personnel participating in the SPP may well participate in
engagements with partner nation military personnel repeatedly throughout their
career. This is due to both the duration of the state National Guard and foreign nation
partnership—some of which have been in existence for nearly two decades—and the
frequency with which National Guard personnel serve their entire reserve careers
within one state National Guard. Thus, for example, individuals who joined the
Michigan National Guard in 1993 and continued to serve to the present would have
had the opportunity to participate in SPP activities with Latvia numerous times over
the past 18 years. In that time, both the Guard personnel and the foreign military
personnel with whom they engaged will have been promoted to higher ranks,
potentially providing for strong relationships between the now fairly senior National
Guard and foreign military personnel. The ability to develop such long-term
relationships is rare for active component personnel because of career assignment
policies. An additional benefit of an enduring relationship is that it provides National
Guard personnel with the opportunity to develop cultural knowledge, and potentially
even language skills, based on their recurring contacts with the partner nation. [19, pp.
6-7]
Another aspect of the SPP that distinguishes it from similar engagements by active
component forces stems from the National Guard’s dual status as both a state and a
federal organization. In its federal status, the National Guard is a reserve component of
the Army and the Air Force and is trained, organized, and equipped to conduct a wide
spectrum of military activities. However, the National Guard is also the organized
militia of each state and in that capacity it routinely operates under the control of its
state governor, typically to respond to disasters and civil disorders. National Guard
personnel in a “Title 32 status” have also conducted counterdrug, border security, and
airport security missions. The practical expertise the National Guard has acquired in
these areas may be complemented by the skills that National Guard personnel develop
in their civilian occupations. For example, a National Guard soldier may serve as an
infantryman in his Guard unit, but may be a state trooper, paramedic, or emergency
dispatcher in his civilian job. [19, p. 7]
One unique aspect of
the SPP is the ability to
forge relationships
between particular
individuals over a long
period of time. For
active component
personnel, a duty
assignment typically last
for about two to three
years. In contrast,
National Guard
personnel participating
in the SPP may well
participate in
engagements with
partner nation military
personnel repeatedly
throughout their career.
611
Chapter 39: National Guard
The expertise that National Guard units have acquired in conducting these types of
operations are often in demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a
major role in their nation’s disaster response plans, and which may play significant
roles in their nation’s border security, civil disorder, or counterdrug operations.
Although active component forces have significant expertise in these areas—as
evidenced, for example, by the role played by active component personnel in
responding to the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan in 2010—it is typically
not exercised with the frequency of National Guard forces and, in certain cases, is
intentionally limited by law. [19, p. 7]
A final area in which the SPP differs from active component security cooperation
activities lies in the role of individual states in the relationship. Active component
security cooperation activities are purely Federal in nature; there is no connection with
any U.S. state. SPP activities have both a Federal and a State connection, and this latter
relationship can be important from several perspectives. For the State and the foreign
nation, the SPP provides a link between senior State and foreign nation officials. The
Adjutant General is typically a senior official in his or her State government, normally
heading up the state department of military affairs, and sometimes leading the state
department of emergency management or homeland security. This can provide a
conduit for the State and the foreign nation to develop relationships beyond that with
the state National Guard—for example, enhancing economic ties or conducting
educational exchanges. From the Federal perspective, a strong relationship between a
state and a foreign nation could potentially contribute to a stronger relationship
between the United States and the foreign nation. [19, p. 8]
Conclusion
Among homeland security partners, the National Guard may be considered the most
versatile. They provide an effective combat force that comprises a significant yet cost-
effective proportion of the nation’s total military might. Because of their unique
status, they stand ready to maintain civil order and respond to Local disasters within
each State. Moreover, they are available to assist their neighbors in the most
expeditious manner under the worst conceivable circumstances. And finally, they are
agents of diplomacy, helping reduce global tensions and improve U.S. relations
internationally.
612
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What are the two types of National Guard forces?
2. What is the Federal mission of the National Guard?
3. Under what circumstances may the President call up the National Guard?
4. What is the State mission of the National Guard?
5. How is the Washington DC National Guard different from all other State National Guard?
6. How was the National Guard deployed for Hurricane Katrina?
7. What was the motivation behind the dual-status commander concept?
8. List and describe two roles the National Guard perform in homeland defense.
9. What capability can the National Guard bring in response to a WMD incident?
10. How does the National Guard uniquely contribute to international diplomacy?
Part V: Mission Partners
613
Federal Bureau
of Investigation
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Describe the primary homeland security mission of the FBI.
Identify legal and procedural changes that expanded FBI investigative authorities after 9/11.
Explain why it is difficult to identify dangerous radicals.
Discuss how external factors influence FBI tactics and techniques.
Explore the boundaries between freedom and security.
Chapter 40
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 40: FBI
614
Part V: Mission Partners
“A tension between order and liberty is inevitable in any society.”
-1976 Church Commission
Introduction
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law
enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since 9/11, the FBI
has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely
reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a
more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of
terrorism. [1, p. ii]
Post-9/11 Transformation
The FBI is the lead agency for investigating the federal crime of terrorism, which is
defined under law as “an offense that is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct.”
This includes terrorist acts committed within and outside U.S. national boundaries. [1,
p. 1]
The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been called a major security, law enforcement, and
intelligence failure. Prior to 9/11, the FBI was largely a reactive law enforcement
agency—pursuing suspects after they had allegedly committed crimes. Since 9/11, the
Bureau has arguably taken a much more proactive posture, particularly regarding
counterterrorism. It now views its role as both “predicting and preventing” the threats
facing the nation, drawing upon enhanced resources. [1, p. 1]
The FBI’s post-9/11 transformation is particularly evident in four areas: 1) The USA
PATRIOT Act provided the FBI additional authorities and enhanced investigative tools;
2) The FBI and DOJ altered the way the Bureau investigated terrorism with the 2008
revision of The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations; 3) The FBI
expanded operationally via a proliferation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across
the United States; and 4) In so doing, it also increased its cooperation with state, local,
and federal agencies. [1, p. 3]
The FBI is the lead
agency for investigating
the federal crime of
terrorism, which is
defined under law as
“an offense that is
calculated to influence
or affect the conduct of
government by
intimidation or coercion,
or to retaliate against
government conduct.”
This includes terrorist
acts committed within
and outside U.S.
national boundaries.
615
Chapter 40: FBI
USA PATRIOT Act
Shortly after the 9/11, Congress provided the FBI new investigative tools and expanded
its authority to monitor and search suspects in terrorism-related investigations. Many
of these tools and authorities were contained in the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56)
signed by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001. The act amended several
existing statutes, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 (P.L.
95-511), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-508), and the
various National Security Letter (NSL) statutes. These changes enhanced the FBI’s
investigative abilities by:
Dismantling “the Wall” that inhibited the sharing of information between
intelligence and criminal investigators;
Facilitating roving wiretaps;
Expanding the use of devices that record the sources of incoming and outgoing
communications;
Accommodating “Sneak and Peek” search warrants;
Increasing access to business records; and
Expanding use of National Security Letters. [1, p. 3]
FISA regulates intelligence collection directed at foreign powers and agents of foreign
powers in the United States to include those engaged in international terrorism. FISA
required the government to certify that “the purpose” of surveillance was to gather
foreign intelligence information. Prior to the USA PATRIOT Act, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) turned the “primary purpose” standard into written policy that had the
effect of limiting the coordination between intelligence and criminal investigators. This
came to be known as “the Wall” between intelligence and law enforcement and the
“unfortunate consequences” of this barrier to information sharing were noted in the
9/11 Commission Report. Section 218 of the USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to
replace the phrase “the purpose” with the phrase “a significant purpose.” As one legal
scholar described it, by moving the FISA requirement from the purpose to a significant
purpose, the USA PATRIOT Act “knocked out the foundation for ‘the Wall.’” This
removed impediments to the exchange of information about terrorism or other
national security threats between intelligence and law enforcement personnel. [1, p. 4]
Federal law enforcement officers have the authority, subject to court approval, to
conduct wiretaps and electronic surveillance on persons suspected of committing
federal crimes. A “roving” wiretap allows law enforcement officers to “follow” a
subject and lawfully intercept that person’s communications with a single court order
even if the target attempts to evade surveillance by changing telephones or other
communications devices. According to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, “Prior to roving
wiretaps, law enforcement agents and federal prosecutors had to invest substantial
Shortly after the 9/11,
Congress provided the
FBI new investigative
tools and expanded its
authority to monitor
and search suspects in
terrorism-related
investigations. Many of
these tools and
authorities were
contained in the USA
PATRIOT Act .
616
Part V: Mission Partners
time and resources in obtaining a separate wiretap order for each additional telephone
used by a subject during an investigation … [Q]uite often this resulted in a loss of
valuable evidence through missed wiretap conversations relating to the criminal
activity being monitored.” Before the USA PATRIOT Act, the concept behind roving
wiretaps did not apply to FISA. The USA PATRIOT Act amended the electronic
surveillance portion of FISA to allow government agents to continue surveillance when
“the target of the surveillance switches from a facility (e.g., a telephone) associated
with one service provider (e.g., a telephone company) to a different facility associated
with a different provider. [1, p. 5]
A trap and trace device shows all incoming phone numbers to a particular telephone. A
pen register shows all outgoing phone numbers a particular telephone has called. Prior
to 2001, FISA allowed law enforcement officers to collect incoming and outgoing
numbers on a telephone line. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the law to permit the
capture of comparable information related to other forms of communication including
the Internet, electronic mail, web surfing, and all other forms of electronic
communications. [1, pp. 5-6]
In general, police officers serving a warrant must “knock and announce”—that is, give
the subject notice that they are the police and are serving a warrant. They may enter
and search even if the subject is not present at the premises to be searched, but they
must leave a copy of the warrant and an inventory of what was seized, giving notice
that the premises was searched. The USA PATRIOT Act amended Title 1833 to allow
federal law enforcement officers to request from the courts a delayed-notice (so-called
“sneak and peek”) search warrant allowing officers to enter and search a premises
without immediately notifying the owner when such notice may have an adverse result
(e.g., tipping off a suspect or co-conspirators). This authority has been used rarely in
terrorism cases. [1, p. 6]
The USA PATRIOT Act amended FISA to authorize the FBI to seek an order from the
FISA Court for the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers,
documents, and other items) in a terrorism or counterintelligence investigation
provided that such investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon
the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. [1, p. 6]
National Security Letters (NSL) are regularly used in FBI counterterrorism investigations
and are roughly comparable to administrative subpoenas. They have been described as
“form letters signed by an FBI agent” used to request and collect non-content
consumer records and related information from “telephone companies, Internet
service providers, consumer credit reporting agencies, banks, and other financial
institutions.” According to the FBI, “NSLs are indispensable investigative tools that
A trap and trace device
shows all incoming
phone numbers to a
particular telephone. A
pen register shows all
outgoing phone
numbers a particular
telephone has called.
Prior to 2001, FISA
allowed law
enforcement officers to
collect incoming and
outgoing numbers on a
telephone line. The USA
PATRIOT Act expanded
the law to permit the
capture of comparable
information related to
other forms of
communication
including the Internet,
electronic mail, web
surfing, and all other
forms of electronic
communications.
617
Chapter 40: FBI
serve as building blocks in many counterterrorism and counterintelligence
investigations.” The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the circumstances under which an NSL
could be applied. For one thing, the USA PATRIOT Act allowed the FBI to issue NSLs for
full consumer credit reports. Additionally, it widened the number of FBI officials who
could issue NSLs. [1, p. 7]
Revised Attorney General Guidelines
The FBI and DOJ also emphasized their forward-leaning approach with the September
29, 2008, revision of the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations,
which they claim “make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by
providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.” Referred to
as the “Mukasey Guidelines” after Michael B. Mukasey, who was Attorney General at
the time of their release, this is the latest in a series of guidelines stretching back to
1976 that govern the FBI’s investigative activities. The Mukasey Guidelines went into
effect on December 1, 2008. [1, p. 11]
The Mukasey Guidelines consolidated a number of previous standalone directives into
a single modified volume called the Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
(DIOG). One of the most significant changes brought about by this consolidation was
the expanded use of “assessments.” Previously, investigations could only be initiated if
the FBI had some level of factual predication. Preliminary investigations required an
“allegation or information indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to national
security.” A full investigation required an “articulable factual basis of possible criminal
or national threat activity.” The revised guidelines allowed for an “assessment”
without any factual predication. Assessments allow the FBI to look into a broader
range of potential criminal activities, subject to First Amendment protections, that
might otherwise escape detection. [1, pp. 11-12]
The Bureau has incorporated assessments into its investigative processes. According to
numbers made publicly available in March 2011, the FBI initiated 11,667 assessments
to check leads on individuals, activities, groups, or organizations between December
2008 and March 2009. These, in turn, led to 427 preliminary or full investigations.
Officials noted that about one-third of the assessments resulted from vague tips.
Reportedly, between March 2009 and March 2011, the Bureau opened 82,325
assessments. About half of the assessments from this time frame focused on
determining whether specific groups or individuals were spies or terrorists. This pool of
42,888 assessments produced just under 2,000 full or preliminary investigations. [1, p.
12]
The Mukasey Guidelines
consolidated a number
of previous standalone
directives into a single
modified volume called
the Domestic
Investigations and
Operations Guide
(DIOG). One of the most
significant changes
brought about by this
consolidation was the
expanded use of
“assessments.”
Assessments allow the
FBI to look into a
broader range of
potential criminal
activities, subject to First
Amendment
protections, that might
otherwise escape
detection.
618
Part V: Mission Partners
Enhancing State and Local Cooperation
JTTFs are locally based, multi-agency teams of investigators, analysts, linguists, SWAT
experts, and other specialists who investigate terrorism and terrorism-related crimes.
Seventy-one of the more than 100 JTTFs operated by DOJ and the FBI were created
since 9/11. Over 4,400 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents—
more than four times the pre-9/11 total— work in them. These officers and agents
come from more than 600 state and local agencies and 50 federal agencies. [1, p. 12]
The FBI considers the JTTFs “the nation’s front line on terrorism.” They “investigate
acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including
those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.” As this suggests, their
operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources
(informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots. [1, pp. 13-14]
JTTFs also offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI
-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies and state and local law
enforcement. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists
has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police
working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009. [1, p. 14]
There is also a National JTTF, which was established in July 2002 to serve as a
coordinating mechanism with the FBI’s partners. Some 40 agencies are now
represented in the National JTTF, which has become a focal point for information
sharing and the management of large-scale projects that involve multiple partners. [1,
p. 14]
Intelligence Reform
The FBI’s post-9/11 transformation has placed greater emphasis on intelligence and
analysis in order to prevent future such attacks. One of the most visible manifestations
of this transformation was creation of a Directorate of Intelligence (DI) at FBI
headquarters. The DI was also made party to a new National Security Branch which
integrated the FBI’s Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions with the
Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, and Terrorist Screen Center. Perhaps more
fundamentally, the FBI established Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) at each of its 56
field offices. FIGs improve the Bureau’s intelligence capacity by combining its
intelligence and investigative capabilities. Comprised of agents, analysts, linguists, and
surveillance specialists, a FIG’s principal mission is to identify intelligence gaps, obtain
and analyze raw intelligence from FBI investigations and sources, and generate
intelligence products and disseminate them to the intelligence and law enforcement
communities in order to help guide investigations, programs, and policy. Arguably, the
mission of the FIGs is nothing less than to “drive,” or inform the direction of, the FBI’s
JTTFs are locally based,
multi-agency teams of
investigators, analysts,
linguists, SWAT experts,
and other specialists
who investigate
terrorism and terrorism-
related crimes. Seventy-
one of the more than
100 JTTFs operated by
DOJ and the FBI were
created since 9/11.
619
Chapter 40: FBI
counterterrorism effort by identifying, assessing, and attacking emerging threats
“before they flourish.” [1, pp. 14-15]
The transformation has not been easy. Historically, investigative agents have garnered
more resources and promotions than intelligence agents at the Bureau. Despite efforts
to instill institutional changes across the Bureau, critics in both the FBI and Congress
contend that it is “still a work in progress”. [1, p. 16]
Tactics and Techniques
Stopping terrorists before they strike is no easy task. The new proactive posture
entails new challenges for the Bureau—especially in determining when individuals
move from radical activity involving First Amendment-protected behavior to violent
extremism. Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single radicalization roadmap on
their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement faces the task of discerning exactly
when radicalized individuals become real threats. [1, p. 19]
As suggested, timing is everything. To preemptively stop terrorists, law enforcement
requires accurate and timely intelligence. The FBI generates terrorism cases from a
number of sources. Information about terrorist threats or suspicious incidents is
brought to the attention of the FBI by the public; other government agencies
(particularly those in the intelligence community); state and local law enforcement;
ongoing FBI investigations (including sources, surveillance, financial analysis, and
tactical analysis); and FBI Legal Attachés stationed abroad. Most FBI investigations
develop from information or leads generated by pre-existing FBI investigations, or
casework and liaison with other federal agencies or international counterparts. A
handful of leads stem from information generated by local or state law enforcement
and filtered up to the FBI via intelligence fusion centers. [1, p. 19]
To counter violent plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have
been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent
provocateurs.” The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to
terrorist plots on lesser, nonterrorism- related offenses such as immigration violations.
In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover
operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone”
moniker suggests, historically these tactics have been employed against many types of
targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While
these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance
(especially in and around mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing
terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities. [1, p.
19]
Stopping terrorists
before they strike is no
easy task. The new
proactive posture entails
new challenges for the
Bureau—especially in
determining when
individuals move from
radical activity involving
First Amendment-
protected behavior to
violent extremism.
Because not all terrorist
suspects follow a single
radicalization roadmap
on their way to
executing plots, U.S. law
enforcement faces the
task of discerning
exactly when radicalized
individuals become real
threats.
620
Part V: Mission Partners
Lying to an FBI Special Agent is a charge reminiscent of the Capone approach. An
example from 2010 stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and
Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood’s wife,
Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband’s
case. By early 2010, while living in King Salmon, AK, Paul Rockwood had developed a
list of 15 people he planned to kill, believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had
also researched explosives and shared with others ideas about mail bombs or using
firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors did not pursue a case based on
more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a threat—someone
apparently preparing to kill people—by using a false statement charge. [1, p. 20]
Lesser charges against a suspect in a terrorism case may also act as a placeholder until
evidence to support a more serious charge is gathered. The utility of this preventative
technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by the FBI in its case
against Najibullah Zazi. He arrived in New York on September 10, 2009, with explosive
material and plans to detonate bombs in New York’s subway system. Zazi feared
authorities had caught up with him and returned to Denver on September 12. Between
September 10 and 19, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with
searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also
agreed to interviews with the FBI in Denver. Then, on September 19 FBI special agents
arrested Zazi in Aurora, CO, for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this
was done because he might flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more
substantive one-count indictment against him on weapons of mass destruction
charges. [1, pp. 20-21]
Agent provocateur cases—sting operations—rely on expert determination by law
enforcement that a specific individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk
and engage in violence or terrorist plotting. The ultimate goal is to catch a suspect
committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial trigger but on a dud
weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad evidence
against suspects. [1, p. 21]
One FBI investigation exemplifies this approach. On November 26, 2010, Mohamed
Osman Mohamud was arrested after he attempted to set off what he believed was a
vehicle bomb at an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR.
Mohamud thought he had plotted with terrorists to detonate the bomb. In actuality,
the device was a dud assembled by his coconspirators, who were FBI undercover
operatives. Mohamud offered the target for the strike, provided components for
assembly of the device, gave instructions for the operation, and mailed passport
photographs for his getaway plan to FBI undercover operatives. What specifically
caused the FBI to begin its sting operation against Mohamud is unclear from publicly
available sources. At some point, someone from the local Muslim community alerted
Agent provocateur
cases—sting
operations—rely on
expert determination by
law enforcement that a
specific individual or
group is likely to move
beyond radicalized talk
and engage in violence
or terrorist plotting.
621
Chapter 40: FBI
the FBI to Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. Media reports
have suggested that a family member, perhaps Mohamud’s father, relayed concerns
about the young man to officials. [1, p. 21]
In a number of FBI terrorism sting operations, defense attorneys have alleged that the
FBI had entrapped defendants. Ten defendants charged with terrorism-related crimes
formally argued the entrapment defense in six trials between 9/11 and early December
2011. However, since 9/11 this defense has been unsuccessful in federal courts. In at
least some investigations, FBI undercover employees test suspects to ascertain the
depth of their intent to do harm. For example, the FBI evaluated Mohamud’s resolve
on a number of occasions. Two stand out. Mohamud’s first meeting with an
undercover FBI operative entailed a discussion in which the would-be violent jihadist
was told that he could help “the cause” in “a number of ways … ranging from simply
praying five times a day to becoming a martyr.” The young man responded, saying that
he wanted to become “operational” and needed help in staging an attack. When
Mohamud suggested the Christmas tree lighting ceremony as his intended target in a
following meeting, an FBI undercover employee noted that children attend such
events. Mohamud responded by saying that he wanted a large crowd “that will … be
attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the holidays.” [1, pp. 21-
22]
Balancing Civil Liberties
As discussed, the FBI’s DIOG articulates a need to proactively gather intelligence in
counterterrorism investigations and establishes the assessment as a technique to do
so. Balancing civil liberties against the need for preventative policing to combat
terrorism is a key policy challenge. [1, p. 22]
Figure 40-1: Balancing Civil Liberties
In a number of FBI
terrorism sting
operations, defense
attorneys have alleged
that the FBI had
entrapped defendants.
Ten defendants charged
with terrorism-related
crimes formally argued
the entrapment defense
in six trials between
9/11 and early
December 2011.
However, since 9/11 this
defense has been
unsuccessful in federal
courts.
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Part V: Mission Partners
Figure 1 suggests how competing elements influence the balance between civil
liberties and security—largely defined today in terms of terrorism prevention efforts.
As a historical example, the FBI had developed intrusive domestic intelligence
collection measures and counter-radical operations stretching from the late 1930s
through the 1960s. Of course, the focus of the FBI’s efforts in this period was not
counterterrorism. These decades featured domestic security concerns during World
War II and fears of espionage and communist infiltration of American institutions
during the Cold War. The FBI worked to prevent this activity. For much of this period, a
national consensus suggested that serious threats were posed by foreign agents,
revolutionaries, or outside agitators operating in the United States. Within this context,
the FBI had broad authority for investigation of and intelligence collection regarding
domestic subversive activity from Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The Bureau developed a number
of programs to combat what it saw as internal threats. [1, p. 23]
During this period, the FBI engaged in what can be described as preventive, covert,
intelligence-based efforts to target and contain people, groups, or movements
suspected by the Bureau to be ‘“rabble rousers,’ ‘agitators,’ ‘key activists,’ or ‘key black
extremists.’” A hallmark was the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO),
which lasted from 1956 to 1971. Subjects investigated by the FBI under its domestic
intelligence programs did not have to be suspected of criminal activity. Instead of
bringing criminal cases to court, the Bureau acted outside of legal processes and relied
on illegal means to curb constitutionally protected activity it deemed threatening to
national security. [1, pp. 23-24]
By the 1970s, as Cold War fears ebbed, the balance between civil liberties and
prevention tipped in the other direction—favoring concerns over civil liberties. This is
highlighted by the development of the original set of Attorney General guidelines.
Issued in 1976 and known as the Domestic Security Investigation Guidelines, these
responded to FBI abuses embodied in programs such as COINTELPRO. These first
guidelines were intended to prevent the FBI’s monitoring of groups that had unpopular
or controversial public views and greatly circumscribed the Bureau’s domestic
intelligence gathering capabilities and investigations related to national security-
related issues. [1, p. 24]
Since the 1976 guidelines, and especially after 9/11, the balance has shifted in favor of
security and terrorism prevention efforts. As suggested, the Mukasey Guidelines and
FBI DIOG offer more investigative flexibility to proactively counter terrorist actors.
Critics have stated that subsequent guidelines have excessively loosened the
constraints on FBI intelligence collection and investigation. In essence, these critics
suggest that concerns over terrorism and security have outweighed fears of systemic
abuse by investigators. [1, pp. 24-25]
Balancing civil liberties
and security is not easy.
The FBI’s tactics and
techniques remain
subject to scrutiny based
on an immeasurable
perception of the
national threat.
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Chapter 40: FBI
The balance remains tenuous and the task uneasy. The FBI’s tactics and techniques are
subject to scrutiny based on an immeasurable perception of the national threat. While
the Mukasey Guidelines and FBI DIOG address these competing forces, their
implementation understandably raise concerns among civil liberties groups.
Conclusion
Confronted with the intelligence failures that failed to prevent 9/11, the FBI has taken
measures to transform itself into a more proactive, intelligence-focused agency. Four
major changes have helped facilitate this transformation: 1) The USA PATRIOT Act
removed the “wall” between law enforcement and intelligence investigations; 2) The
Mukasey Guidelines have streamlined internal procedures and made it easier to
initiate terrorist “assessments”; 3) A proliferation of Joint Terrorism Task Forces have
expanded the FBI’s intelligence collection abilities, as well as 4) increased cooperation
with State and Local agencies. The FBI’s more proactive approach has been further
accommodated by organizational changes designed institutionalize the increased
emphasis on intelligence and analysis. Still, the FBI faces a fundamental challenge of
discerning real threats from protected First Amendment rights of expression. To help
distinguish the difference, the FBI has adopted tactics that were instrumental in
capturing a number of terrorists before they could strike. The tactics are not without
their critics, particularly with regard to protecting civil liberties. Balancing security
needs against civil liberties is a justifiable concern given past indiscretions, and one
that will continue to challenge the FBI as it seeks to prevent future catastrophic
attacks.
624
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. What is the primary homeland security mission of the FBI?
2. How did the USA PATRIOT Act expand FBI authorities to conduct terrorism investigations?
3. How did the Mukasey Guidelines expand FBI authorities to conduct terrorism investigations?
4. What is the purpose of a Joint Terrorism Task Force?
5. Why is it difficult to identify dangerous radicals?
6. Explain why an FBI sting operation might be considered entrapment.
7. How do external factors influence FBI tactics and techniques?
8. Do you think the FBI COINTELPRO was justified by the communist threat? Explain.
9. As an innocent citizen, would you feel comfortable with the FBI collecting your phone contacts?
10. As an innocent citizen, would you feel comfortable with the FBI browsing your Facebook® page?
Part V: Mission Partners
625
State & Local
Law Enforcement
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain why State and Local law enforcement are bound up into homeland security.
Describe the purpose and function of State and Local fusion centers.
Discuss the potential risks associated with fusion centers.
Evaluate the cost benefit proposition of fusion centers.
Chapter 41
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 41: State & Local LE
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Part V: Mission Partners
“In a free country we punish men for the crimes they commit but never for the opinions
they have.”
- President Truman, 1950
Introduction
Improving intelligence gathering and information sharing at all levels of government
has been a major concern and priority since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. To promote greater information sharing and collaboration among Federal, State,
and Local intelligence and law enforcement entities, State and Local authorities
established fusion centers throughout the country. These centers are a collaborative
effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to
the center with the goal of maximizing its ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and
respond to criminal and terrorist activity. [1, p. 1]
Background
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and charged it with coordinating activities and improving information sharing
efforts among Federal, State, Local, and Tribal government agencies and the private
sector. Furthermore, the 9/11 Commission concluded that a lack of information
sharing contributed to the inability to prevent the attacks. Moreover, in its 2004 final
report, the 9/11 Commission promoted the value of State and Local agencies in the
information sharing process and recommended that DHS have the responsibility of
coordinating these efforts. [1, p. 2]
Although the Commission did not refer to fusion centers in its recommendations,
advocates of the centers, including DHS, interpreted the panel’s recommendations to
improve information-sharing as a call for Federal support for fusion centers. [2, p. 11]
The Commission’s report spurred Congress and the White House to action, passing bills
and issuing executive orders which reorganized U.S. government agencies’ roles and
responsibilities in fighting terrorism. Those moves boosted the importance of federal-
state-local information-sharing efforts. They also all but shifted responsibility for
facilitating information sharing, integrating intelligence, and analyzing threat
information at the federal level from DHS to a new federal interagency body, the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), part of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. [2, p. 11]
Improving intelligence
gathering and
information sharing at
all levels of government
has been a major
concern and priority
since the terrorist
attacks of September
11, 2001. To promote
greater information
sharing and
collaboration among
Federal, State, and Local
intelligence and law
enforcement entities,
State and Local
authorities established
fusion centers
throughout the country.
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Chapter 41: State & Local LE
The 2004 Intelligence Reform Act gave the NCTC responsibility for integrating and
analyzing terrorist threat intelligence from all sources, as well as the job of assessing
the terrorist threat to the United States. That law, and Executive Order 13356, also
created a new office, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment
(PM-ISE), to help Local, State and Federal agencies better share terrorism-related
information. [2, p. 12]
As other federal agencies and offices took the lead in compiling and analyzing
counterterrorism information at the federal level, DHS’s intelligence operations began
to focus on a responsibility that received less attention in subsequent reform laws and
executive orders: information sharing with State, Local and Tribal partners. [2, p. 12]
At that time, DHS was working with 18 state and local intelligence and fusion centers
to share threat-related information, and officials were working on how to best develop
a coordinated effort to build their capabilities. [2, p. 12]
In 2006, DHS’s then intelligence chief, Charles E. Allen, submitted a detailed fusion
center plan to his superior, then DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, which highlighted
fusion centers’ potential to aid federal counterterrorism efforts. [2, p. 12]
DHS Secretary Chertoff approved the plan in June 2006. [2, p. 13] Secretary Chertoff
signed the DHS Support Implementation Plan for State and Local Fusion Centers and
designated the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) as its executive agent for
managing the department’s role in the nationwide fusion center Initiative. The
implementation plan identified state and local governments among DHS’ primary
partners. It also explained DHS’ role in supporting and developing state and local
partnerships and highlighted domestic information gathering and analysis as DHS’
“unique contribution to the national-level mission” to protect the Nation. [1, p. 5] By
the end of that year, at least 37 fusion centers had begun operations in states including
Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Maine, and North Carolina. [2, p. 13]
The following year, both Congress and the White House took steps to bolster DHS’s
involvement with fusion centers. Congress passed the “Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which explicated DHS’s role
in sharing information with state and local agencies, even as it called the Department’s
outreach to those state and local officials “haphazard and often accompanied by less
than timely results.” In the law, legislators directed DHS to provide support and
coordinate federal involvement with fusion centers. [2, p. 13]
In 2004, DHS was
working with 18 state
and local intelligence
and fusion centers to
share threat-related
information, and
officials were working
on how to best develop
a coordinated effort to
build their capabilities.
In 2006, DHS’s then
intelligence chief,
Charles E. Allen,
submitted a detailed
fusion center plan to his
superior, then DHS
Secretary Michael
Chertoff, which
highlighted fusion
centers’ potential to aid
federal counterterrorism
efforts.
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Part V: Mission Partners
In the law, Congress established a DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center
Initiative. The law directed DHS to provide to fusion centers “operational and
intelligence advice;” conduct exercises with them; provide management assistance;
and “review information . . . including homeland security information, terrorism
information, and weapons of mass destruction information that is gathered by State,
local, and regional fusion centers; and to incorporate such information, as appropriate,
into the Department’s own such information.” [2, p. 13]
To underscore the point, Congress urged DHS to “increase its involvement with State
and Local fusion centers] and appropriately incorporate their non-Federal information
into the Department’s intelligence products.” [2, p. 14]
The law also directed DHS to detail intelligence personnel to the centers if the centers
met certain criteria, several of which required a center to demonstrate a focus on and
commitment to a counterterrorism mission. Among the criteria the law suggested
were “whether the fusion center . . . focuses on a broad counterterror approach,”
whether the center has sufficient personnel “to support a broad counterterrorism
mission,” and whether the center is appropriately funded by non-federal sources “to
support its counterterrorism mission.” [2, p. 14]
Also in 2007, the Bush Administration focused on improving how officials at all levels of
government shared terrorism-related information. That October, President Bush
released his “National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in
Improving Terrorism- Related Information Sharing,” in which he called for fusion
centers to be “the focus . . . within the State and local environment for the receipt and
sharing of terrorism information, homeland security information, and law enforcement
information related to terrorism.” [2, p. 14]
President Bush’s 2007 report also directed the Federal government to develop for the
first time a set of minimum operational standards for fusion centers, which would
allow officials to determine whether a fusion center had “achieved a baseline level of
capability.” [2, p. 14]
In response, in September 2008, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security
published “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” The
document outlined the basic “structures, processes and tools” fusion centers needed
to have in place in order to functionally participate in sharing counterterrorism
From the 2007
Implementing
Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission
Act, Congress
established the DHS
State, Local, and
Regional Fusion Center
Initiative. The law
directed DHS to support
fusion centers with
training, personnel, and
materiel.
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Chapter 41: State & Local LE
intelligence information with the federal government. The capabilities included having
a governance structure, a staffing plan, and a privacy policy; installing sufficient
physical security; developing a funding strategy; having a plan to provide training to
intelligence analysts; and having processes and protocols in place to share relevant
information with federal agencies. [2, p. 14]
Since then, hundreds of millions of dollars have been poured into State and Local
fusion centers to develop their capabilities, and make them an effective partner in the
nation’s counterterrorism strategy.
Fusion Centers
State and major urban area fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and
local environment for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related
information between the federal government and State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT)
and private sector partners. [3]
Fusion centers are state-created entities largely financed and staffed by the States, and
there is no one “model” for how a center should be structured. State and local law
enforcement and criminal intelligence seem to be at the core of many of the centers.
Although many of the centers initially had purely counterterrorism goals, for numerous
reasons, they have increasingly gravitated toward an all-crimes and even broader all-
hazards approach. [4, p. II]
The Federal role in supporting fusion centers consists largely of providing financial
assistance, the majority of which has flowed through the Homeland Security Grant
Program; sponsoring security clearances; providing human resources; producing some
fusion center guidance and training; and providing congressional authorization and
appropriation of national foreign intelligence program resources, as well as oversight
hearings. [4, p. II]
There are currently 78 fusion centers located around the country. DHS classifies them
as either a “primary” or “recognized” facility. There are 53 primary fusion centers. A
primary fusion center serves as the focal point within the State and Local environment
for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information. Primary
fusion centers also receive the highest priority for the allocation of available Federal
resources, including the deployment of DHS personnel and connectivity with Federal
data systems. Any fusion center not designated as “primary” is otherwise referred to
as “recognized”. There are 25 recognized fusion centers across the country. [4]
State and major urban
area fusion centers
serve as focal points
within the state and
local environment for
the receipt, analysis,
gathering, and sharing
of threat-related
information between
the federal government
and State, Local, Tribal,
Territorial (SLTT) and
private sector partners.
Fusion centers are state-
created entities largely
financed and staffed by
the States
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Part V: Mission Partners
A fusion center is defined as a “collaborative effort of two or more agencies that
provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of
maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and
terrorist activity.” Among the primary focuses of fusion centers are the intelligence and
fusion processes, through which information is collected, integrated, evaluated,
analyzed, and disseminated. [5, p. 3]
The value proposition for fusion centers is that by integrating various streams of
information and intelligence, including that flowing from the federal government,
state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, a more accurate
picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure, and communities can be developed
and translated into protective action. The ultimate goal of fusion is to prevent
manmade (terrorist) attacks and to respond to natural disasters and manmade threats
quickly and efficiently should they occur. [6, p. ii]
It has been argued that State, Local, Tribal law enforcement, first responders, and
other public and private sector entities are uniquely positioned to collect information
to identify emerging threats and assist in the development of a more comprehensive
threat assessment. Many would agree that the 800,000 plus law enforcement officers
across the country know their communities most intimately and, therefore, are best
placed to function as the “eyes and ears” of an extended national security community.
They have the experience to recognize what constitutes anomalous behavior in their
areas of responsibility and can either stop it at the point of discovery (a more
traditional law enforcement approach) or follow the anomaly or criminal behavior,
either unilaterally or jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to extract
the maximum intelligence value from the activity (a more intelligence-based approach)
[4, p. 7]
The fusion process turns information into actionable intelligence. The fusion process
supports the implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, response,
and consequence management programs. At the same time, it supports efforts to
address immediate or emerging threat-related circumstances and events. [5, p. 3]
Data fusion involves the exchange of information from different sources—including
law enforcement, public safety, and the private sector—and, with analysis, turning this
information into actionable intelligence. Fusion also allows for continuous reevaluation
of existing data in context with new data in order to provide constant updates. [5, p. 3]
The value proposition
for fusion centers is that
by integrating various
streams of information
and intelligence,
including that flowing
from the federal
government, state,
local, and tribal
governments, as well as
the private sector, a
more accurate picture of
risks to people,
economic infrastructure,
and communities can be
developed and
translated into
protective action.
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Chapter 41: State & Local LE
The public safety and private sector components are integral in the fusion process
because they provide fusion centers with crime-related information, including risk and
threat assessments, and subject-matter experts who can aid in threat identification. [5,
p. 3]
However, the potential fusion center use of private sector data, the adoption of a more
proactive approach, and the collection of intelligence by fusion center staff and
partners has led to questions about possible civil liberties abuses. Arguments against
fusion centers often center around the idea that such centers are essentially pre-
emptive law enforcement — that intelligence gathered in the absence of a criminal
predicate is unlawfully gathered intelligence. The argument is that the further law
enforcement, public safety and private sector representatives get away from a criminal
predicate, the greater the chances that civil liberties may be violated. [4, p. 11]
Because of the need to protect civil liberties, it is not the intent of fusion centers to
combine federal databases containing personally identifiable information with State,
Local, and Tribal databases into one system or warehouse. Rather, when a threat,
criminal predicate, or public safety need is identified, fusion centers will allow
information from all sources to be readily gathered, analyzed, and exchanged, but only
in connection with a specific case and only within the confines of criminal predicate. [5,
p. 3]
The ultimate goal is to provide a mechanism through which government, law
enforcement, public safety, and the private sector can come together with a common
purpose and improve the ability to safeguard the homeland and prevent criminal
activity. [5, p. 3]
DHS Program Management
As the executive agent for managing DHS’ fusion center program, Intelligence &
Analysis is responsible for coordinating among its federal, state, local, tribal, and
private sector partners to ensure the program’s success. Each I&A division has a
specific mission that in some way relates to the program. I&A is headed by an Under
Secretary, who also serves as the department’s Chief Intelligence Officer. The State and
Local Program Office, which coordinates the fusion center program, is directed by a
program manager. The State and Local Program Office contains three divisions:
State and Local Fusion Center Program Management Office;
Information Sharing Fellows Program; and
Law Enforcement Liaison Team. [1, p. 6]
However, the potential
fusion center use of
private sector data, the
adoption of a more
proactive approach, and
the collection of
intelligence by fusion
center staff and
partners has led to
questions about possible
civil liberties abuses.
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Part V: Mission Partners
The Program Management Office directs the day-to-day operations of DHS’ fusion
center program, including the management and coordination of deployed officers and
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) access. Through the Information Sharing
Fellows Program, state or local representatives are detailed temporarily to I&A to
familiarize state and local entities with DHS missions, capabilities, roles, and programs,
and to promote information sharing among federal, state, and local entities. Law
Enforcement Liaison Team representatives liaise with state and local law enforcement
entities to advise them about DHS’ role in the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative,
promote state and local use of DHS systems and databases such as the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN), and improve information sharing. [1, p. 6]
Program Objectives
The State & Local Fusion Center (SLFC) program aims to enhance the lawful sharing of
information consistent with DHS’ statutory mission as defined by the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Success is dependent upon five essential elements:
Communication, Collaboration, Understanding, Coordination, and Management
Support. [7, p. 9]
Communication. DHS must ensure that communication with SLFCs is efficient and
effective. The Department has created the Single Point of Service (SPS) for DHS
information and intelligence support to State and local fusion centers to ensure that all
inquiries are responded to expeditiously by the appropriate elements within DHS. The
SPS will not preclude the SLFCs from interacting with DHS components directly. The
SPS is responsible for identifying the appropriate DHS resources to address requests,
providing transparency across DHS entities, and tracking requests through to
completion. DHS will continue to enhance its relationships with the SLFCs, by providing
mechanisms to improve visibility to the appropriate stakeholders of DHS activities,
such as analysts’ conferences and regular DHS representative visits to the fusion
centers. The Department will continue to develop other communications tools,
including the Homeland Secure Data Network, the Homeland Security Information
Network and the HSIN-Intelligence portal —to improve communications with fusion
centers. DHS will develop Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) to determine the
specific organizations within DHS associated with specific types of SLFC interactions.
These SOPs will address coordination of interactions across the Department in greater
detail. [7, p. 9]
Collaboration. To enhance the partnership with SLFCs and deepen connections
between DHS and SLFC analysts, DHS will expand existing collaborative analysis,
assessment, and planning capabilities. DHS will continue to develop mechanisms to
more effectively identify opportunities to collaborate to include the Fire Service, Public
Health, and Emergency Management. DHS and SLFCs will expand the development of
joint products and explore tools to improve the collaborative environment. The
The DHS State & Local
Fusion Center (SLFC)
program seeks to
enhance lawful sharing
of information through
1) efficient and effective
communication; 2)
collaborative analysis,
assessment, and
planning; 3) better
understanding of both
side’s capabilities; 4)
quicker coordination
through increased
transparency; and 5)
improved management
through implementation
of Global Fusion Center
Guidelines.
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Chapter 41: State & Local LE
Department will also continue to support and develop collaborative bodies like the
Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest (HS-SLIC).
Operational components, in concert with the SLPO and other components, will conduct
strategic planning, including resource projections, necessary to support field
interactions with SLFCs. [7, p. 9]
Understanding. As partnerships expand and are strengthened, DHS and the SLFCs will
enhance their understanding of each other’s capabilities and needs. DHS will enhance
support to SLFCs on three critical dimensions of information support: 1) Response to
the SLFCs' requests for information; 2) SLFC Priority Information Needs (PINS) that
align with I&A analytic production to SLFC needs; and 3) Training and technical
assistance tailored to the needs of the SLFC analytic cadre. The Department will
expand its active engagement of SLFCs to understand their needs. SLFCs will better
understand how information can be combined at the Federal level, and what types of
DHS support are available and appropriate to meet their needs. Further, DHS will
continue to work with the fusion centers to maintain an open dialogue about needs
and capabilities and will educate the fusion centers on DHS headquarters and
component capabilities. DHS will also provide SLFCs feedback on information received,
and identify the types of information most useful for integration into DHS products. [7,
p. 10]
Coordination. DHS will continue to develop processes and tools to increase the
transparency of activities and information exchanged with the fusion centers. All DHS
components will be able to quickly view the recent and planned activities, such as
conferences or site visits. The SPS will continue to facilitate coordination among the
DHS components and ensure requests are responded to in a timely manner. The DHS
Homeland Security Intelligence Council’s Integrated Intelligence Board (HIIB), a body
composed of the heads of intelligence functions from all DHS components and chaired
by the Chief Intelligence Officer, will ensure mechanisms are in place to coordinate
across DHS on analytic collaboration with SLFCs. Similar mechanisms will be
implemented to provide visibility into products distributed to or available to the fusion
centers, as well as training opportunities or assistance to increase awareness of what
information and resources fusion centers have access to. [7, p. 10]
Management Support. In an effort to establish a baseline level of capability in all
fusion centers through the implementation of the Global Fusion Center Guidelines and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence – Information Sharing Environment
Implementation Plan, DHS will continue to provide an integrated suite of support
programs. DHS may revise the Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance as needed
to enable the full implementation of the fusion process. In addition, the joint DHS/
Department of Justice Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program will continue to
support the establishment of baseline capabilities through the following activities:
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Part V: Mission Partners
Fusion Process Technical Assistance Services;
Fusion Center Exchange Program;
Fusion Center Fellowship Program;
Online Fusion Process Resource Center; and
Other Specialized Fusion Process Support Services. [7, p. 11]
Program Risks
There are several potential risks associated with fusion center development. Risks
focus on factors that could ultimately diminish political and popular support for fusion
centers, and ultimately result in their demise or marginalized contribution to the
national homeland security mission. [4, p. 9]
Violations of Civil Liberties.
One of the risks to the fusion center concept is that individuals who do not necessarily
have the appropriate law enforcement or broader intelligence training will engage in
intelligence collection that is not supported by law. The concern is to what extent, if at
all, First Amendment protected activities may be jeopardized by fusion center
activities. [4, p. 11]
For purposes of criminal intelligence systems, most fusion centers operate under
Federal regulations, in addition to any applicable State policies, laws or regulations. At
the Federal level, the authorities which guide the FBI in collection of intelligence are
the Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign
Intelligence Collection. At the state and local levels, if there is any analogue to the
Attorney General’s guidelines for multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems, it is
28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) (Judicial Administration), Chapter 1 (Department
of Justice), Part 23 (criminal intelligence systems operating policies). Many centers cite
28 CFR, Part 23 as the guiding legal mechanism for their criminal intelligence
operations. By its terms, 28 CFR, Part 23, applies to “all criminal intelligence systems
operating through support under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, as amended.” From the perspective of intelligence collection, the 28 CFR, Part 23
standard is reasonable suspicion. One of the operating principles of 28 CFR, Part 23 is
that:
“A project shall collect and maintain criminal intelligence information concerning an
individual only if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is involved in criminal
conduct or activity and the information is relevant to that criminal conduct or
activity.” [4, p. 13]
There are several
potential risks
associated with fusion
center development.
Risks focus on factors
that could ultimately
diminish political and
popular support for
fusion centers, and
ultimately result in their
demise or marginalized
contribution to the
national homeland
security mission.
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Chapter 41: State & Local LE
Reasonable Suspicion or Criminal Predicate is established when information exists
which established sufficient facts to give a trained law enforcement or criminal
investigative agency officer, investigator, or employee a basis to believe that there is a
reasonable possibility that an individuals or organization is involved in a definable
criminal activity or enterprise. [4, p. 14]
The question of how to balance civil liberties with security remains an open issue the
country often weighs. The balancing is, arguably, a moving target driven by the
country’s collective sense of security and safety. The nation cannot necessarily have
absolute security, nor absolute liberty; a pendulum swings between relative amounts
of each of these “public goods.” The question, to which there is no definitive answer,
raised here is how aggressive should fusion centers be in proactively collecting and
analyzing intelligence that may go beyond that which may be entered into criminal
intelligence systems that fall under federal law? Which entity at the Federal level is
auditing the activities of fusion centers to ensure civil liberties are not violated? Given
that these centers are creations of State and Local governments, should an entity of
the federal government be the ultimate arbiter of civil liberties protection? [4, p. 14]
Time
Some homeland security observers suggest that the rush to establish and enhance
state fusion centers is a post-9/11 reaction and that over time some of the centers may
dissolve. It could be argued that in the absence of another terrorist attack or
catastrophic natural disaster, over the course of the next 5 to 10 years, state and
regional fusion centers may be eliminated and/or replaced by regional fusion
organizations. The state fusion regional representation organizations may be an entity
to facilitate future center consolidation efforts. Issues that may lead to state and
regional fusion center consolidation into regional organizations include:
Perceived lack of need by state leaders;
State and federal financial constraints;
Duplication of effort without showing tangible products and services within a given
center; and
Reduction of risks to a given geographic location. [4, p. 14]
Alternatively, if there are additional terrorist attacks or natural disasters in the near
future and fusion centers can demonstrate their tangible value by serving as proactive,
analytic and/or operational information/intelligence hubs, it is plausible that
substantial additional federal, state, and local funds may flow to these centers. [4, p.
14]
One of the risks to the
fusion center concept is
that individuals who do
not necessarily have the
appropriate law
enforcement or broader
intelligence training will
engage in intelligence
collection that is not
supported by law.
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Part V: Mission Partners
Funding
Another potentially time-related risk is the threat diminished or eliminated federal
and/or state funding poses to fusion center development. If the United States is not
the target of a successful terrorist attack, homeland security funding, arguably, may
decrease. If overall federal funding levels for homeland security decrease, it is possible
that there will be some level of decrease in Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)
funding. Such a decrease might force states to re-prioritize funds for those programs
deemed the most critical to their jurisdiction. Specific federal programs that fund and/
or support fusion centers (i.e. DHS and FBI detailee programs) could potentially also
suffer under funding cuts. It is unclear how fusion centers would fare in such a
situation. It is likely that the fate of fusion centers would differ drastically from state to
state, depending on a range of factors, to include, their level of maturity, buy-in from
other agency partners, their resource needs, and noted successes, balanced with other
critical issues and programs within the jurisdiction. [4, p. 15]
One fusion center official stated that if federal funding went away, his fusion center
would continue to operate, albeit with less staff and possibly with a more limited
scope. It could be argued in some states that fusion centers would not be able to
continue long after federal dollars and support ceases to exist. Others might disagree,
believing it is quite possible that many fusion centers would survive despite dwindling
federal support. It is even possible that many fusion centers would survive even after
drastic decline in state and local funding because states and localities would be in a
difficult position to officially dismantle these centers. [4, p. 15]
Performance Analysis
Sharing terrorism-related information between State, Local and Federal officials is
crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this
objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of
millions of taxpayer dollars in support of dozens of State and Local fusion centers
across the United States. However, a 2012 Senate investigation found that DHS’s
support of fusion centers yielded little, if any, benefit to federal counterterrorism
intelligence efforts. [2, p. 1]
After reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from
2009 to 2010, the Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees
forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – often times shoddy, rarely timely,
sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally
taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to
terrorism. [2, p. 27]
A 2012 Senate
investigation found that
DHS’s support of fusion
centers yielded little, if
any, benefit to federal
counterterrorism
intelligence efforts.
637
Chapter 41: State & Local LE
According to a former DHS Senior Reports Officer, “A lot of [the reporting] was
predominantly useless information.” “You had a lot of data clogging the system with
no value.” Overall, the former official estimated 85 percent of reports coming out of
the Reporting Branch were “not beneficial” to any entity, from Federal intelligence
agencies to State and Local fusion centers. [2, p. 27]
Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010
assessment of State and Local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found
widespread deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing
capabilities. The findings of the 2010 assessment and another done in 2011
contradicted public statements by DHS officials who described fusion centers as “one
of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy,” and “a major force multiplier in
the counterterrorism enterprise.” [2, p. 2]
Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from
April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no
reporting which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such
fusion center reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. [2, p. 2]
Conversely, obtaining information from DHS is also problematic. Many state and local
fusion center officials praised I&A’s efforts on the nationwide Fusion Center Initiative.
However, fusion center officials remain concerned that I&A has not developed an
action plan to ensure that it understands and can meet the centers’ evolving and
unique needs. Such needs include:
Receiving adequate and timely information from DHS;
Assistance in navigating DHS’ complex organization, and
Obtaining initial and ongoing training for state and local analysts. [1, p. 8]
Fusion centers have experienced difficulty receiving adequate and timely information
from DHS. Many fusion center officials said that they received irrelevant or outdated
information in the past. In addition, center officials could not determine whether the
information was adequately processed through all relevant systems or coordinated
with other intelligence or law enforcement entities. However, according to I&A
officials, I&A is striving to meet the needs of fusion centers. In an April 2008 speech,
the Under Secretary for I&A recognized that state and local authorities have been
analyzing and acting on information for years and the federal government must
aggressively support these endeavors. As a result, I&A plans to increase its support to
state and local partners in three main areas: standing information needs, Requests for
Information, and use of open source information. [1, p. 8]
Despite reviewing 13
months’ worth of
reporting originating
from fusion centers from
April 1, 2009 to April 30,
2010, the Subcommittee
investigation could
identify no reporting
which uncovered a
terrorist threat, nor
could it identify a
contribution such fusion
center reporting made
to disrupt an active
terrorist plot.
638
Part V: Mission Partners
Many fusion center officials reported frustrations when navigating DHS’ complex
organization, and are confused by the department’s structure. As a result, state and
local officials rely on their assigned I&A officer for fast, efficient, and adequate
responses to their information needs. In response, I&A officials said that I&A continues
to identify ways to improve the Request for Information process. For example, one I&A
representative said that when there is an administrative request, such as a Request for
Information about security clearances, the representative refers the request to I&A’s
State and Local Program Office, who could be immediately and appropriately tasked.
In another example, should a request involve an analytical product, the representative
refers the request to one of I&A’s analytical branches for resolution. To discourage the
practice of several fusion center officials contacting multiple DHS components directly
for information, another I&A representative suggested creating a single email address
to receive requests from fusion center officials and provide one “DHS answer.” DHS is
taking steps to facilitate efficient and coordinated communications between it and the
fusion centers by enhancing I&A’s Request for Information process and by requesting
that each state that has multiple fusion centers designate one of its centers as the
primary point of contact with DHS. [1, p. 12]
Fusion center officials reported benefits from DHS communications, training, and
outreach efforts, as these efforts enhance state and local officials’ understanding of the
federal intelligence community and their role within the community. However, fusion
center officials expressed a need to obtain more structured and formalized analytical
training to improve their ability to generate products for the intelligence community,
and to facilitate coordination and communication between DHS and the fusion centers.
Fusion center officials also reported that budget constraints limit their ability to send
personnel to out-of-state training. One fusion center director said funds are not
routinely available to send personnel to off-site training or conferences, and it can be
difficult convincing state governments to fund such travel. A number of fusion center
officials suggested that DHS conduct training outside of the Washington, DC,
metropolitan area and explore the feasibility of online training modules to provide low
- or no-cost training to state and local field personnel. [1, p. 13]
Conversely, obtaining
information from DHS is
also problematic. Fusion
centers have
experienced difficulty
receiving adequate and
timely information from
DHS. Many fusion center
officials reported
frustrations when
navigating DHS’
complex organization,
and are confused by the
department’s structure.
639
Chapter 41: State & Local LE
Conclusion
Fusing foreign intelligence with a wide spectrum of domestic information is the stated
primary purpose of most fusion centers. Locally gathered information collected from a
broad array of law enforcement, public health and safety, as well as private sector
sources, is fused with intelligence collected and produced by the Federal Intelligence
Community to better understand threat and assist in directing national security
resources. The same benefit also works in reverse. For example, when a bombing
occurs overseas, it can be very helpful for modus operandi and other tactical
information surrounding that bombing to be communicated to states and localities in a
timely fashion so they may align their protective resources accordingly. The fusion
centers, through their connectivity with the federal Intelligence Community via either
systems and/or federal personnel collocated at the centers, can serve as the single
focal point for timely dissemination of that information. [4, pp. 5-6] While the system
remains unproven and continues to mature, the lessons from 9/11 attest to the
criticality of the function and the need to continue fostering development of the
nation’s fusion centers.
640
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. How are State and Local law enforcement bound up into homeland security?
2. What is the value proposition of fusion centers?
3. How are fusion centers similar to JTTFs?
4. How are fusion centers different from JTTFs?
5. What risks do fusion centers pose to civil liberties?
6. What support does DHS lend to fusion centers?
7. What is the State and Local view of DHS support to fusion centers?
8. How is DHS working to make fusion centers more effective?
9. How have fusion centers contributed to counterterrorism?
10. As a taxpayer, do you think fusion centers provide an adequate return on investment? Explain.
Part V: Mission Partners
641
First Responders
Careful study of this chapter will help a student do the following:
Explain why first responders are the “first line of defense” against domestic catastrophic destruction.
Discuss what was different about 9/11 that necessitated improved emergency preparedness.
Describe the relationship between the NPG, NPS, HSGP, and THIRA.
Assess the state of national emergency preparedness today.
Chapter 42
Learning Outcomes
Chapter 42: First Responders
642
Part V: Mission Partners
“Every day, first responders put their own lives on the line to ensure our safety. The
least we can do is make sure they have the tools to protect and serve their
communities.”
- Senator Joe Lieberman
Introduction
America’s first line of defense in the aftermath of any terrorist attack is its first
responder community—police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers,
public works personnel, and emergency management officials. Nearly three million
state and local first responders regularly put their lives on the line to save the lives of
others and make our country safer. These individuals include specially trained
hazardous materials teams, collapse search and rescue units, bomb squads, and
tactical units. [1, p. 41]
Background
On September 11, the nation suffered the largest loss of life—2,973—on its soil as a
result of hostile attack in its history. The Fire Department of New York (FDNY) suffered
343 fatalities— the largest loss of life of any emergency response agency in history.
The Port Authority Police Department (PAPD) suffered 37 fatalities—the largest loss of
life of any police force in history. The New York Police Department (NYPD) suffered 23
fatalities—the second largest loss of life of any police force in history, exceeded only by
the number of PAPD officers lost the same day. [2, p. 311]
The emergency response to the attacks on 9/11 was necessarily improvised. In New
York, the FDNY, NYPD, the Port Authority, World Trade Center (WTC) employees, and
the building occupants themselves did their best to cope with the effects of an
unimaginable catastrophe—unfolding furiously over a mere 102 minutes—for which
they were unprepared in terms of both training and mindset. [2, p. 315]
The National Institute of Standards and Technology has estimated that between
16,400 and 18,800 civilians were in the WTC complex as of 8:46 am on September 11.
At most 2,152 individuals died at the WTC complex who were not (1) fire or police first
responders, (2) security or fire safety personnel of the WTC or individual companies,
(3) volunteer civilians who ran to the WTC after the planes’ impact to help others, or
(4) on the two planes that crashed into the Twin Towers. Out of this total number of
America’s first line of
defense in the aftermath
of any terrorist attack is
its first responder
community—police
officers, firefighters,
emergency medical
providers, public works
personnel, and
emergency
management officials.
643
Chapter 42: First Responders
fatalities, the workplace location of 2,052 individuals, or 95.35 percent can be
accounted. Of this number, 1,942 or 94.64 percent either worked or were supposed to
attend a meeting at or above the respective impact zones of the Twin Towers; only
110, or 5.36 percent of those who died, worked below the impact zone. While a given
person’s office location at the WTC did not definitively indicate where that individual
died that morning or whether he or she could have evacuated, the data strongly
suggests that the evacuation was a success for civilians below the impact zone. [2, p.
316]
First responders played a significant role in the success of the evacuation. Some
specific rescues are quantifiable, such as an FDNY company’s rescue of civilians
trapped on the 22d floor of the North Tower, or the success of FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD
personnel in carrying non-ambulatory civilians out of both the North and South
Towers. In other instances, intangibles combined to reduce what could have been a
much higher death total. It is impossible to measure how many more civilians who
descended to the ground floors would have died but for the NYPD and PAPD personnel
directing them—via safe exit routes that avoided jumpers and debris—to leave the
complex urgently but calmly. It is impossible to measure how many more civilians
would have died but for the determination of many members of the FDNY, PAPD, and
NYPD to continue assisting civilians after the South Tower collapsed. It is impossible to
measure the calming influence that ascending firefighters had on descending civilians
or whether but for the firefighters’ presence the poor behavior of a very few civilians
could have caused a dangerous and panicked mob flight. But the positive impact of the
first responders on the evacuation came at a tremendous cost of first responder lives
lost. [2, pp. 316-317]
The lesson of 9/11 for civilians and first responders can be stated simply: in the new
age of terror, they—we—are the primary targets. The losses America suffered that day
demonstrated both the gravity of the terrorist threat and the commensurate need to
prepare ourselves to meet it. [2, p. 323]
The first responders of today live in a world transformed by the attacks on 9/11.
Because no one believes that every conceivable form of attack can be prevented,
civilians and first responders will again find themselves on the front lines. We must
plan for that eventuality. A rededication to preparedness is perhaps the best way to
honor the memories of those we lost that day. [2, p. 323]
The first responders of
today live in a world
transformed by the
attacks on 9/11.
Because no one believes
that every conceivable
form of attack can be
prevented, civilians and
first responders will
again find themselves
on the front lines. We
must plan for that
eventuality. A
rededication to
preparedness is perhaps
the best way to honor
the memories of those
we lost that day.
644
Part V: Mission Partners
National Preparedness Goal
Americans responded with great skill and courage on 9/11. However, in 2001 there
were too many seams and gaps in the nation’s response plans and capabilities. At the
time, at least five different plans—the Federal Response Plan, the National
Contingency Plan, the Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, and a nascent bioterrorism response
plan—governed the Federal government’s response. Those plans and the
government’s overarching policy for counterterrorism were based on a distinction
between “crisis management” and “consequence management.” In addition, different
organizations at different levels of the government put in place different incident
management systems and communications equipment. All too often, those systems
and equipment do not function together well enough. [1, p. 42]
Furthermore, many areas of the country had little or no capability to respond to a
terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. Even the best prepared States and
localities did not possess adequate resources to respond to the full range of terrorist
threats we face. Many did not have mutual aid agreements to facilitate cooperation
with their neighbors in time of emergency. Federal support for domestic preparedness
efforts was relatively small and disorganized, with eight different departments and
agencies providing money in a tangled web of grant programs. [1, p. 42]
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Emergency Preparedness and
Response (EPR) Directorate within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
consolidate and coordinate emergency management for the nation. [3, p. 1]
Within months of enactment of the Homeland Security Act, President Bush issued
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) directing the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System
(NIMS) and a National Response Plan (NRP). These two documents were to be used to
“enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing
a single, comprehensive national incident management system.” [4, p. 1]
The NIMS was meant to fix the absence of standardized procedures, operating
systems, and terminology that complicated response efforts at the World Trade Center
on 9/11. Released in March 2004, NIMS introduced the Incident Command System
(ICS) and described a system for integrating response agencies from across jurisdictions
into a unified whole, and coordinating their actions towards a single purpose. The
NIMS established standard operational components and procedures to ensure that
first responders could communicate and cooperate to achieve the most efficient and
effective response to a disaster. [4, p. 19]
Within months of
enactment of the
Homeland Security Act,
President Bush issued
Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 5
(HSPD-5) directing the
Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop and
administer a National
Incident Management
System (NIMS) and a
National Response Plan
(NRP).
645
Chapter 42: First Responders
The NRP consolidated various Federal plans into a single document. Released in
January 2005, the NRP introduced Emergency Support Functions for providing Federal
support, and procedures for requesting Federal support under the terms of the 1988
Robert T. Stafford Act. [4, pp. 22-23]
Both NIMS and the NRP provided a foundation allowing first responders from across
the nation to work together according to standard principals of organization and
operation. Still, work needed to be done to enhance their capabilities, particularly with
respect to a potential WMD attack. Accordingly, President Bush issued HSPD-8
directing development of a National Preparedness Goal (NPG). Released in December
2005, the NPG established an objective for guiding the nation’s emergency
preparedness efforts, and target capabilities for attaining it. [4, p. 3]
The 2005 National Preparedness Goal established an objective “To engage Federal,
State, local, and tribal entities, their private and nongovernmental partners, and the
general public to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the
impact on lives, property, and the economy.” [5, p. 1]
The 2005 National Preparedness Goal established 36 target capabilities deemed
essential to reduce losses and successfully respond to disaster. The Target Capabilities
List (TCL) was drawn from a much larger Universal Task List (UTL). The UTL identified
operations and tasks that would be necessary to successfully respond to the 15
National Planning Scenarios. The National Planning Scenarios identified potential
worst case disasters, both natural and manmade, encompassing all forms of WMD. [4,
pp. 7-14]
What was absent from this scheme was a system for driving incremental but
continuous improvement. Emergency preparedness is a cycle. It begins with planning
to establish goals. It proceeds with organization, equipping, and training to attain
those goals. Then a series of exercises and evaluations are necessary to assess
progress towards those goals. Then the cycle must begin anew to set new goals and
attain them. [6, pp. I-4] In September 2007, DHS belatedly introduced a National
Preparedness System as part of its National Preparedness Guidelines [7, p. 22], only to
be trumped a month later by the Homeland Security Management System advocated
in the 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security prepared by the White House
Homeland Security Council. [7, p. 42] Neither survived to maturity as events, both
natural and manmade, would change the direction of homeland security.
Both NIMS and the NRP
provided a foundation
allowing first responders
from across the nation
to work together
according to standard
principals of
organization and
operation. Still, work
needed to be done to
enhance their
capabilities, particularly
with respect to a
potential WMD attack.
646
Part V: Mission Partners
Reports issued by committees of the 109th Congress, the White House, federal offices
of Inspector General, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO), among others,
concluded that the losses caused by Hurricane Katrina were due, in part, to
deficiencies such as questionable leadership decisions and capabilities, organizational
failures, overwhelmed preparation and communication systems, and inadequate
statutory authorities. As a result, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
of 2006 revised federal emergency management policies vested in the President;
reorganized the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and enhanced and
clarified the mission, functions, and authorities of the agency, as well as those of its
parent, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). [9, p. ii]
Effective March 31, 2007, the Post-Katrina Reform Act restored to FEMA all its former
authorities, taken away by the 2002 Homeland Security Act, subsumed the former DHS
EPR Directorate within its organization, and made the FEMA Administrator a direct-
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Post-Katrina Act reorganized DHS
with a reconfigured FEMA with consolidated emergency management functions, and
elevated status within DHS. [9, p. 5]
As a result of the Post-Katrina Reform Act, FEMA gained control over the majority of
grants and training provided by DHS. These included the State Homeland Security
Grant Program (HSGP), the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program, and the
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI); all essential to enhancing first responder
preparedness. [9, p. 27]
Figure 42-1: Emergency Preparedness Cycle [6, pp. I-4]
Accordingly, President
Bush issued HSPD-8
directing development
of a National
Preparedness Goal
(NPG). Released in
December 2005, the
NPG established an
objective for guiding the
nation’s emergency
preparedness efforts,
and target capabilities
for attaining it.
647
Chapter 42: First Responders
Also as part of the Post-Katrina Reform Act, the FEMA Administrator was given
responsibility for the National Preparedness Goal and National Preparedness System.
The act further amended the Stafford Act to require that all emergency preparedness
grants awarded by FEMA to the States be based upon plans consistent with the NPG,
NIMS, and NRP. [9, p. 28]
The National Response Plan was released in January when Hurricane Katrina struck at
the end of August 2005. Few people knew about the plan, let alone its contents. Still,
it took a beating in the post-disaster recriminations, and was subsequently replaced by
the National Response Framework (NRF) in 2008; same plan, different wrapper,
slimmer package. By the same token, the National Incident Management System was
also revised in 2008.
In March 2011, President Obama issued Presidential Policy Directive No. 8 (PPD-8)
overriding the previous HSPD-8 and calling for a new National Preparedness Goal: “A
secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community
to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and
hazards that pose the greatest risk.” [10, p. 1]
The new NPG placed emphasis on resilience, the ability to rapidly recover from
disaster. Additionally, PPD-8 replaced Target Capabilities with Core Capabilities, and
called for a family of frameworks to compliment the National Response Framework.
The new frameworks were to propose preparedness measures across the spectrum of
integrated emergency management: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and
Recovery. [11]
In November 2011, FEMA released a new National Preparedness System to support
implementation of its new National Preparedness Goal. In accordance with the 2006
Post-Katrina Reform Act, the new NPS was not only capabilities-based, it was much
more process focused. In order to compete for funds from the Homeland Security
Grants Program, States would have to complete a Threat and Hazard Identification and
Risk Assessment (THIRA) demonstrating progress towards the NPG Core Capabilities. In
2015 the Core Capabilities were revised, but otherwise remain the measure for
assessing a State’s progress towards the National Preparedness Goal. [12, pp. 1-2]
Figure 42-1: Emergency Preparedness Cycle [6, pp. I-4]
In March 2011,
President Obama issued
PPD-8 overriding HSPD-
8 and enunciating a new
National Preparedness
Goal. To see to its
implementation, FEMA
released a new National
Preparedness System in
November 2011. HSGP
funding is now tied to
attainment of NPG Core
Capabilities, as
determined by State
assessments using the
FEMA Threat and
Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment
(THIRA) system.
648
Part V: Mission Partners
Conclusion
Before 9/11, Federal support to first responders was minimal and fragmented. On
9/11 the nation’s finest in the FDNY, PAPD, and NYPD paid the price for this
vulnerability. In the wake of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was given
the mission of consolidating Federal support and preparing first responders for future
catastrophes, including those employing WMD. Both the National Incident
Management System and National Response Plan were unprecedented for fostering
first responder integration across the nation. And while the National Preparedness
Goal and National Preparedness System matured more slowly, today they underpin a
systematic and continuous improvement process to ensure that first responders are
prepared to meet all hazard challenges of the future.
649
Chapter 42: First Responders
Challenge Your Understanding
The following questions are designed to challenge your understanding of the material presented in this chapter. Some
questions may require additional research outside this book in order to provide a complete answer.
1. Why are first responders recognized as the “first line of defense” against domestic catastrophic destruction?
2. What was different about 9/11 that necessitated improved emergency preparedness?
3. What is the National Preparedness Goal?
4. What is the relationship between the NPG and core capabilities?
5. What is the relationship between the NPG and the National Preparedness System?
6. List and describe the five steps of the preparedness cycle.
7. What is the purpose of the Homeland Security Grant Program?
8. How do first responders apply for HSGP funding?
9. How is HSGP funding related to the preparedness cycle?
10. Overall, do you think DHS has improved national emergency preparedness? Explain.
650
651
Appendix A:
DHS Budgets
652
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
The Department of Homeland was established by the Homeland Security Act, signed
into law by President Bush on November 25, 2002. Former Pennsylvania Governor
Tom Ridge was appointed the first Secretary of Homeland Security. Between
November 2002 and January 2003, Secretary Ridge consolidated 180,000 personnel
from twenty-two Federal agencies to form the new Department of Homeland Security.
On January 23, 2003, President Bush issued Executive Order 13284 activating the new
Department.
As with all Federal agencies, the Department of Homeland Security is funded by
Congress and must compete for limited taxpayer dollars together with other Federal
agencies. The Federal budget process is managed according to the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974. The process starts in February when the President submits a
detailed budget request for the coming fiscal year which begins October 1st. The
budget request is developed through an interactive process between Federal agencies
and the President’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB) that begins the previous
spring or earlier.
653
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
This appendix provides a summary of DHS budgets from FY03 to FY16. The numbers
were drawn from the corresponding DHS Budget in Brief1, submitted annually to OMB
for the President’s Budget. These budgets represent what was requested from
Congress and not what was actually spent, but otherwise provide a reasonable
approximation2. The specific request for each fiscal year is cited together with any
accompanying justification. Also, where available, table summaries were included
indicating how DHS planned to allocate its budget.
FY03, Oct 02 - Sep 03
Thomas Ridge, Secretary
Title: Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation
"The President's Budget for 2003- the Federal government's first post-September 11
budget- reflects his absolute commitment to achieving a more secure homeland. The
FY 2003 Budget directs $37.7 billion to homeland security, up from $19.5 billion in
20023. This mass infusion of Federal resources reflects the priority the President has
attached to the homeland security agenda."
1Copies of these budgets may be found at www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget. 2Listed US Budget data excerpted from www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals 3Refers to funds requested for homeland security missions in 2002, before DHS was formed.
Figure A-1: FY03 DHS Budget Allocation
654
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY04, Oct 03 - Sep 04
Thomas Ridge, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
"The President's 2004 Budget provides the necessary resources for the Department to
succeed. The budget includes a total of $36.2 billion, 7.4 percent more than the 2003
level and over 64 percent more than the FY 2002 level for these activities. The
President’s 2004 budget supports a new Department whose primary mission is to
protect the American people and the homeland. In addition, it unifies principal border
and transportation security agencies; further coordinates a cohesive network of
disaster response capabilities; creates a central point for analysis and dissemination of
intelligence and other information pertaining to terrorist threats to protect America’s
critical infrastructure; and unites research and development efforts to detect and
counter potential terrorist attacks and recognize the multi-missions of so many of our
agencies. "
Figure A-2: FY04 DHS Budget Allocation
655
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY05, Oct 04 - Sep 05
Thomas Ridge, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The Fiscal Year 2005 budget for the Department of Homeland Security builds upon
the significant investments to date that improve our safeguards against terrorism,
while also sustaining the many important departmental activities not directly related
to our fight against terrorism. The President's budget clearly demonstrates the
continuing priority placed on Homeland Security in requesting total new resources for
FY 2005 of $40.2 billion. This is an increase of 10% above the comparable FY 2004
resource level. This includes all sources of funding, such as discretionary and
mandatory appropriations, offsetting collections from user fees, and trust funds.”
Figure A-3: FY05 DHS Budget Allocation
656
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY06, Oct 05 - Sep 06
Michael Chertoff, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The President’s FY 2006 budget request includes a total of $41.1 billion for the
Department of Homeland Security. This is an increase in total budgetary authority of 7
percent over the enacted FY 2005 funding, excluding Project BioShield, and clearly
demonstrates the Administration’s continued commitment to making further
improvements in the nation’s homeland security. Among the operating entities with
significant budgetary increases are Immigration and Customs Enforcement (a 13.5
percent increase) and the U.S. Coast Guard (an increase of more than 9 percent,
adjusting for transferred programs). The budget also streamlines screening programs,
increasing resources for these activities under a new screening office by 68 percent.”
Figure A-4: FY06 DHS Budget Allocation
657
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY07, Oct 06 - Sep 07
Michael Chertoff, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The implementation of 2SR instituted a fundamental reform of policies and
procedures critical to achieving the mission of the Department. As a result, the FY 2007
budget proposal for the Department of Homeland Security is driven by a mission and
risk-based approach to allocating the Department’s resources, requesting $42.7 billion
in funding, an increase of 6 percent over FY 2006. The Department’s FY 2007 gross
discretionary budget is $35.4 billion, an increase of 6 percent. Gross Discretionary
funding includes appropriated budget authority and discretionary fee collections such
as funding for the Federal Protective Service; aviation security passenger and carrier
fees; and premium collections. It does not include funding such as Coast Guard’s
retirement pay accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The Department’s FY
2007 net discretionary budget is $30.9 billion.”
Figure A-5: FY07 DHS Budget Allocation
658
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY08, Oct 07 - Sep 08
Michael Chertoff, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“As the Department reflects on the fifth anniversary of the tragic events that occurred
on September 11, 2001, we remain committed to our duty of securing our homeland,
directing our resources toward the greatest risks, and being flexible to changing
threats. The FY 2008 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security
represents an eight percent increase over FY 2007, with a total request of $46.4 billion
in funding. The Department’s FY 2008 gross discretionary budget is $37.7 billion, an
increase of eight percent. Gross Discretionary funding does not include funding such as
Coast Guard’s retirement pay accounts and fees paid for immigration benefits. The
Department’s FY 2008 net discretionary budget is $34.3 billion, which does not include
fee collections such as funding for the Federal Protective Service (ICE), aviation security
passenger and carrier fees (TSA), credentialing fees (such as TWIC - TSA), and premium
collections (National Flood Insurance Fund, FEMA). It should also be noted that the FY
2008 President’s Budget request reflects the Notice of Implementation of the Post–
Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295) and of Additional Changes
Pursuant to Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, provided to Congress on
January 18, 2007. The Department continues to be disciplined in its use of resources,
and has structured its budget request to target the Secretary’s five highest priorities.”
Figure A-6: FY08 DHS Budget Allocation
659
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY09, Oct 08 - Sep 09
Michael Chertoff, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The Department remains dedicated to fulfilling our duty to protect our country. Six
years after September 11, 2001 we are moving beyond operating as an agency in
transition to an agency diligently working to protect our borders and critical
infrastructure, prevent dangerous people and goods from entering our country, and
recover from natural disasters effectively. The total FY 2009 budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security is $50.5 billion in funding; a 7 percent increase over
the FY 2008 enacted level excluding emergency funding. The Department’s FY 2009
gross discretionary budget request is $40.7 billion, an increase of 8 percent over the FY
2008 enacted level excluding emergency funding. Gross Discretionary funding does not
include funding such as Coast Guard’s retirement pay accounts and fees paid for
immigration benefits. The Department’s FY 2009 net discretionary budget request is
$37.6 billion, which does not include fee collections such as funding for the Federal
Protective Service (ICE), aviation security passenger and carrier fees (TSA),
credentialing fees (such as TWIC - TSA), and premium collections (National Flood
Insurance Fund, FEMA). In pursuit of our five priorities established in 2007, the
Department continues to efficiently align resources to lead a unified national effort in
securing America.”
Figure A-7: FY09 DHS Budget Allocation
660
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY10, Oct 09 - Sep 10
Janet Napolitano, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The total FY 2010 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security is $55.1
billion in funding; a 4.9 percent increase over the FY 2009 enacted level excluding
supplemental funding. The Department’s FY 2010 gross discretionary budget request1
is $45.7 billion, an increase of 5.9 percent over the FY 2009 enacted level excluding
emergency funding. The Department’s FY 2010 net discretionary budget request is
$42.7 billion.”
Figure A-8: FY10 DHS Budget Allocation
661
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY11, Oct 10 - Sep 11
Janet Napolitano, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The total FY 2011 budget request for the Department of Homeland Security is $56.3
billion in total funding; a 2 percent increase over the FY 2010 enacted level. The
Department’s FY 2011 gross discretionary budget request1 is $47.1 billion, an increase
of 2 percent over the FY 2010 enacted level. The Department’s FY 2011 net
discretionary budget request is $43.6 billion2, an increase of 3 percent over the FY
2010 enacted level. For purposes of comparison the Overseas Contingency Operation
funding and transfer from the National Science Foundation are not included in the FY
2010 enacted level.”
Figure A-9: FY11 DHS Budget Allocation
662
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY12, Oct 11 - Sep 12
Janet Napolitano, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The demands on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have never been
greater and the threats we face pose new challenges that require an innovative and
focused response. Today’s threat picture features an adversary who evolves and
adapts quickly and who is determined to strike us here at home – from the aviation
system and the global supply chain to surface transportation systems, critical
infrastructure, and cyber networks. The Department’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget
allows us to continue to meet these evolving threats and challenges by prioritizing our
essential operational requirements – while reflecting an unprecedented commitment
to fiscal discipline that maximizes the effectiveness of every security dollar we receive.
The FY 2012 budget request for DHS is $57.0 billion in total funding, $47.4 billion in
gross discretionary funding, and $43.2 billion in net discretionary funding.”
Figure A-10: FY12 DHS Budget Allocation
663
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY13, Oct 12 - Sep 13
Janet Napolitano, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The FY 2013 Budget for DHS is $59.0 billion in total budget authority, $48.7 billion in
gross discretionary funding, and $39.5 billion in net discretionary funding. Net
discretionary budget authority is 0.5 percent below the FY 2012 enacted level. An
additional $5.5 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is provided separately,
pursuant to the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). Ten years after the September 11th
attacks, America is stronger and more secure today, thanks to the strong support of
the President; Congress; the work of the men and women of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and local, State and Federal partners across the homeland
security enterprise. While we have made significant progress, threats from terrorism –
including, but not limited to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda related groups – persist and
continually evolve, and the demands on DHS continue to grow.”
Figure A-11: FY13 DHS Budget Allocation
664
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY14, Oct 13 - Sep 14
Janet Napolitano, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The FY 2014 Budget for DHS is $60.0 billion in total budget authority, $48.5 billion in
gross discretionary funding, and $39.0 billion in net discretionary funding. An
additional $5.6 billion for the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is provided separately,
pursuant to the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA). This year marks the 10th anniversary
of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the largest
reorganization of the U.S. Government since the formation of the Department of
Defense (DOD). After 10 years of effort, DHS has transformed 22 agencies from across
the Federal Government into a single integrated Department, building a strengthened
homeland security enterprise and a more secure America better equipped to confront
the range of threats we face.”
Figure A-12: FY14 DHS Budget Allocation
665
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY15, Oct 14 - Sep 15
Jeh Johnson, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The FY 2015 Budget for DHS is $60.9 billion in total budget authority, $49.0 billion in
gross discretionary funding, $38.2 billion in net discretionary funding, and $4.4 billion
in discretionary fees. As part of total DHS funding, $6.4 billion for the Disaster Relief
Fund (DRF) is provided separately from discretionary amounts, pursuant to the Budget
Control Act of 2011 (BCA). The Budget focuses resources on key capabilities in each of
the Department’s mission areas. The basic missions of the Department of Homeland
Security are preventing terrorism and enhancing security; securing and managing our
borders; enforcing and administering our immigration laws; safeguarding and securing
cyberspace; and, preparing for and responding to disasters. In addition, the
Department’s request also includes proposals for funding a portion of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) and National Protection and Programs
Directorate’s (NPPD) activities through the President’s Opportunity, Growth, and
Security Initiative.”
Figure A-13: FY15 DHS Budget Allocation
666
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
FY16, Oct 15 - Sep 16
Jeh Johnson, Secretary
Title: Department of Homeland Security Budget in Brief
“The FY 2016 Budget for DHS is $64.9 billion in total budget authority, $51.9 billion in
gross discretionary funding, $41.2 billion in net discretionary funding, and $4.0 billion
in discretionary fees. As part of total DHS funding, $6.7 billion for the Disaster Relief
Fund (DRF) is provided separately from discretionary amounts, pursuant to the Budget
Control Act of 2011. The Budget focuses resources on key capabilities in each of the
Department’s mission areas: prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and
manage our borders, enforce and administer our immigration laws, safeguard and
secure cyberspace, and strengthen national preparedness and resilience.”
Figure A-14: FY16 DHS Budget Allocation
667
Appendix A: DHS Budgets
668
669
Appendix B:
Glossary
670
2SR Second Stage Review
AAO Administrative Appeals Office
AAR Association of American Railroads
AASHTO American Association of State and Highway
Transportation Officials
ABSTP Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan
AC Active Component
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and
Reporting System
ACE Automated Customs Environment
ACFD Arlington County Fire Department
ACPD Arlington County Police Department
ACS American Community Survey
ACS Automated Customs System
ACWIA American Competitiveness and Workforce
Improvement Act
ADAC Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
AEER Air Entry and Exit Re-Engineering
AFDX Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet
AFNORTH Air Force North
AIT Advanced Imaging Technology
ALERT Center of Excellence for Awareness and
Localization of Explosives-Related Threats
AMOC Air and Marine Operations Center
AMOSS Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System
AMRA Aviation Model Risk Assessment
AMVER Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue
ANA Afghan National Army
ANG Air National Guard
AOR Area of Responsibility
AP/DNSA Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor
APHIS Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
APIS Advance Passenger Information System
APSS Agent Portable Surveillance System
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ARNG Army National Guard
ARNORTH Army North
ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATC Air Traffic Control
ATON Aids to Navigation
ATR Automated Targeting Recognition
ATS Air Transportation System
ATSA Aviation and Transportation Security Act
ATS-C Advance Targeting System-Cargo
AVC Arms Control Verification and Compliance
AWWA American Water Works Association
BASE Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement
BDO Behavior Detection Officer
BEAP Border Enforcement Analytics Program
BEST Border Enforcement Security Task Force
BTRA Biological Terrorism Risk Assessment
BTS Border and Transportation Security
BUR Bottom-Up Review
C3 Cyber Crimes Center
CAARS Cargo Advanced Automatic Radiography
CAMRA Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment
CAO Chief Administrative Officer
CAP Criminal Alien Program
CAP Civil Assistance Plan
CAPPS Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening
System
CAPTA Costing Asset Protection Guide
CARMA Cyber Assessment Risk Management Approach
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
CBTIR Center for Borders, Trade, and Immigration
Research
CCEU Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
CCTG CBRN Counterterrorism Group
CD Army Deputy Commander
CDP Center for Domestic Preparedness
CDS Capability Development Support
CEIU Child Exploitation Investigations Unit
CEM Comprehensive Emergency Management
CERT Community Emergency Response Teams
Appendix B: Glossary
671
CFO Chief Financial Officer
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG Comptroller General
CHC Coastal Hazards Center of Excellence
CHEMTREC Chemical Transportation Emergency Center
CI Counterintelligence
CIA Catastrophic Incident Annex
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CINT Chief of Intelligence
CIO Chief Information Officer
CIP Common Intelligence Picture
CIR Comprehensive Immigration Reform
CIRG Critical Incident Response Group
CIRI Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute
CISO Chief Information Security Officer
CM Consequence Management
CMF Cyber Mission Force
CMT Combat Mission Team
CNCI Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
CNGB Chief of the National Guard Bureau
COAC Committee on Commercial Operations of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection
COCOM Combatant Command
COINTELPRO Counterintelligence Program
COM Chief of Mission
COMINT Communications Intelligence
COTP Captain of the Port
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf
CP Counterproliferation
CPB Coastal Patrol Boat
CPI Counter-Proliferation Investigations
CPRC Counterproliferation Program Review Committee
CPS Current Population Survey
CPT Cyber Protection Team
CRC Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence
CRS Congressional Research Service
CS&C Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
CSD Customer Service Division
CSG Counterterrorism Security Group
CSI Container Security Initiative
CSS Coastal Surveillance System
CSSP Control Systems Security Program
CST Civil Support Team
C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
CTRA Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment
CTS Counterterrorism Section
CVADA Center for Visualization and Data Analytics
CWMD Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
CXPST Cross-Plane Session Termination
D/NCS Director of the National Clandestine Service
D2P Detect-to-Protect
DACA Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DC Deputies Committee
DCE Defense Coordinating Element
DCI Director of Central Intelligence
DCO Defense Coordinating Officer
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DEST Domestic Emergency Support Team
DETER Defense Technology Experimental Research
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DHS IE DHS Intelligence Enterprise
DI Directorate of Intelligence
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIOG Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DNS Domain Name Service
DOC Department of Commerce
DoD Department of Defense
DoDD Department of Defense Directive
DoE Department of Energy
Appendix B: Glossary
672
DOI Department of the Interior
DoJ Department of Justice
DoS Department of State
DOT Department of Transportation
DPS Defense Protective Service
DSC Dual-Status Commander
DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DSF Deployable Specialized Force
DSL Digital Service Link
DST Direct Support Team
DT Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection
DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency
ECC Emergency Communications Center
ECIP Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection
ECSP Exceptional Case Study Project
EDC Explosive Detection Canine
EDGE Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment
EECC Export Enforcement Coordination Center
EEO Equal Employment Opportunity
EEZ Economic Exclusion Zone
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EFB Electronic Flight Bag
ELINT Electronic Intelligence
ELIS Electronic Immigration System
EM Emergency Manager
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMI Emergency Management Institute
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
EMS Emergency Medical Service
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EMS Enterprise & Mission Support
EO Executive Order
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOIR Executive Office for Immigration Review
EOP Executive Office of the President
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer
EPMO Enterprise Performance Management Office
EPR Emergency Preparedness and Response
EPS Executive Protection Service
ERO Enforcement and Removal Operations
ESF Emergency Support Function
ESU Emergency Service Units
E-Verify Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification
EXBS Export Control and Border Security
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAM Federal Air Marshal
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Functional Combatant Command
FCO Federal Coordinating Officer
FDNS Office of Fraud Detection and National Security
FDNS Fraud Detection and National Security
Directorate
FDNY Fired Department New York
FDRC Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FIG Field Intelligence Group
FINDER Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency
Response
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISC Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
FISINT Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FMD Foot-and-Mouth Disease
FMSC Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
FNR Federal Network Resilience
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FOSC Federal On-Scene Coordinator
FPDI Food Protection and Defense Institute
FPS Federal Protective Service
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
FRC Fast Response Cutter
FRG First Responders Group
Appendix B: Glossary
673
FTA Federal Transit Administration
FY Fiscal Year
G8 Group of Eight
GAO Government Accountability Office
GCC Geographic Combatant Command
GDP Grant Programs Directorate
GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence
GII Geospatial Information Infrastructure
GMCC Global MOTR Coordination Center
GMRA Government Management Reform Act
GPC General-Purpose Controller
GPRA Government Performance and Results Act
GPS Global Positioning System
HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HD Homeland Defense
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
HIIB Homeland Security Council’s Integrated
Intelligence Board
HIR Homeland Intelligence Report
HIS Homeland Security Investigations
HITRAC Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis
Center
HM-232 Hazardous Materials Transportation Security
Requirements
HMC Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier
HME Homemade Explosive Device
HRF Homeland Response Force
HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects
Agency
HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System
HSC Homeland Security Council
HSDN Homeland Secure Data Network
HSEC SIN Homeland Security Standing Information Needs
HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation
Program
HSIC Homeland Security Intelligence Council
HSI-FL Homeland Security Investigations’ Forensic
Laboratory
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network
HSINT Homeland Security Intelligence
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HS-SLIC Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence
Community of Interest
HSSTAC Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee
HSTA Homeland Security Threat Assessment
HTUA High Threat Urban Area
HUD Housing and Urban Development
HUMINT Human Intelligence
HUMS Health and Usage Monitoring System
I&A Information and Analysis
I&A Intelligence and Analysis
IA Office of Internal Affairs
IA&IP Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
IAP Incident Action Plan
IASD Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division
IBSGP Intercity Bus Security Grant Program
IC Intelligence Community
IC Incident Commander
ICAC Internet Crimes Against Children
ICAD Integrated Computer Assisted Detection
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers
ICC Intelligence Coordination Center
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICP Incident Command Post
ICPD Individual and Community Preparedness Division
ICPO International Cooperative Programs Office
ICS Incident Command System
ICS Industrial Control System
ICS-CERT Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency
Response Team
ICSJWG Industrial Control System Joint Working Group
ICW Intercostal Waterway
IDENT Automated Biometric Identification System
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IEFA Immigration Examination Fee Account
Appendix B: Glossary
674
IFCL-HTS Inherently Fault Current Limiting, High
Temperature Superconducting Cable
IFE Inflight Entertainment System
IG Inspector General
IICD Infrastructure Information Collection Division
IICS infrastructure Information Collection System
IIR Intelligence Information Report
IIRIRA Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act
IMAGE Mutual Agreement Between Government and
Employers
IMAT Incident Management Assistance Team
IMF International Monetary Fund
IMINT Imagery Intelligence
IMO International Maritime Organization
INA Immigration and Nationality Act
INA Office of International Affairs
INA Immigration Nationality Act
IND Improvised Nuclear Device
INR Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department
of State
INS Immigration and Naturalization Service
IP Infrastructure Protection
IPA Intergovernmental Personnel Act
IPAS Illicit Pathways Attack Strategy
IPAWS Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
IPC Interagency Policy Committee
IRA Immediate Response Authority
IRCA Immigration Reform and Control Act
IS Islamic State
ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISE Information Sharing Environment
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence
ISN Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation
ISP Internet Service Provider
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IST Incident Support Team
ISTEP Intermodal Security Training and Exercise
Program
IT Information Technology
ITRA Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment
ITSRA IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment
IT-SSP IT Sector Specific Plan
IXP Internet Exchange Point
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFHQ Joint Force Headquarters
JFHQ-NCR Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region
JFO Joint Field Office
JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JIC Joint Information Center
JIICATAS911 Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001
JOC Joint Operations Centers
JOC Joint Operations Center
JRC Joint Requirements Council
JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller
JTF Joint Task Force
JTF-AK Joint Task Force Alaska
JTF-CS Joint Task Force Civil Support
JTF-N Joint Task Force North
JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force
KIQ Key Intelligence Questions
KSM Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
LA Lead Agency
LAX Lost Angeles International Airport
LBRAA Long-Range Broad Agency Announcement
LEDET Law Enforcement Detachment
LEP Limited English Proficiency
LETC Law Enforcement Technical Collections
LNO Liaison Officer
LP Latent Print
LPR Legal Permanent Resident
LPR Lawful Permanent Resident
LRS Long Range Surveillance
Appendix B: Glossary
675
M&A Management and Administration
MA Mission Assignment
MAA Mutual Aid Agreement
MAK Maktab al-Khidamat
MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defense System
MARFORNORTH Marine Forces North
MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence
MCV Mobile Command Vehicle
MDW Military District of Washington
MIREES Center for Maritime, Island and Remote and
Extreme Environment Security
MOTR Maritime Operational Threat Response
MRR Medium Range Response
MS Mission Support
MSC Maritime Security Center of Excellence
MSD Marine Safety Detachment
MSRT Maritime Security Response Team
MSST Maritime Safety and Security Team
MSS-U Mobile Surveillance System Upgrade
MSU Marine Safety Unit
MTB Mobile Training Branch
MTS Maritime Transportation System
MTSA Maritime Transportation Safety Act
MVSS Mobile Vehicle Surveillance System
MWAA Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
NAC Nebraska Avenue Complex
NAC National Advisory Council
NADB National Asset Database
NAS National Airspace System
NBC National Benefits Center
NBPS National Border Patrol Strategy
NCBSI National Center for Border Security and
Immigration
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center
NCIPP National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization
Program
NCIRP National Cyber Incident Response Plan
NCIX National Counterintelligence Executive
NCP National Continuity Programs
NCPC National Counterproliferation Center
NCRAL National Cyber Risk Alert Level
NCRS National Capital Response Squad
NCSC National Cyber Security Center
NCSD National Cyber Security Division
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
NED National Exercise Division
NEP National Exercise Program
NERT Nuclear Emergency Response Team
NexGen Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint
NFIP National Foreign Intelligence Program
NFOP National Fugitive Operations Program
NG National Guard
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGB National Guard Bureau
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NHSA National Homeland Security Agency
NHSD National Homeland Security Department
NIC National Integration Center
NIC National Intelligence Council
NICC National Incident Coordinating Center
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NII Non-Intrusive Inspection
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIP National Intelligence Program
NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis
Center
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NLE National Level Exercise
nm Nautical Mile
NMCC National Military Command Center
NME National Military Establishment
NMF National Mission Force
NMSZ New Madrid Seismic Zone
Appendix B: Glossary
676
NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration
NOC National Operations Center
NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command
NP Nonproliferation
NPAD National Preparedness Assessment Division
NPD National Preparedness Directorate
NPG National Preparedness Goal
NPM National Preparedness Month
NPPD National Protection and Program Directorate
NPRM Notice of Proposed Rule Making
NPS National Preparedness System
NPT Nonproliferation Treaty
NRCC National Response Coordination Center
NRF National Response Framework
NRO National Reconnaissance Office
NRP National Response Plan
NS/EP National Security and Emergency Preparedness
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Cutter
NSC National Security Council
NSD Network Security Deployment
NSF National Strike Force
NSL National Security Letter
NSP National Strategic Plan
NSS National Security Staff
NSSE National Special Security Event
NST National Support Team
NSTA National School Transportation Association
NSTS National Security Threat Section
NSU National Security Unit
NTAC National Threat Assessment Center
NTAS National Terrorism Advisory System
NTC-C National Targeting Center-Cargo
NTE National Training & Education
NTED National Training and Education Division
NTSCOE National Transportation Security Center of
Excellence
NUSTL National Urban Security Technology Laboratory
NYPD New York Police Department
OAE Office of External Affairs
OBIM Office of Biometric Identity Management
OCC National Operations Control Center
OCIA Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis
OCMI Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection
OCOMM Office of Communications
ODIC Office of Disability Integration and Coordination
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence
ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness
OEM Office of Emergency Management
OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness
OFO Office of Field Operations
OHS Office of Homeland Security
OI Office of Intelligence
OIC Office for Interoperability and Compatibility
OIOC Office of Intelligence and Operations
Coordination
OIS Office of Immigration Statistics
OIT Office of Information Technology
OLA Office of Legislative Affairs
OMB Office of Management and Budget
OMLT Operational Mentor and Liaison Team
ONCIX Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive
ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy
ONL Office of National Laboratories
OOC Office of Operations Coordination
OPA Office of Public Affairs
OPC Offshore Patrol Cutter
OPPA Office of Policy and Program Analysis
ORR Office of Response and Recovery
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSI Open System Interconnection
OSINT Open Source Intelligence
OSS Office of Strategic Services
OT Office of International Trade
OTD Office of Training and Development
Appendix B: Glossary
677
OTIA Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition
P.L. Public Law
PA Primary Agency
PACER National Center for the Study of Preparedness
and Catastrophic Event Response
PAPD Port Authority Police Department
PC Principals Committee
PCC Policy Coordination Committee
PCII Protected Critical Infrastructure Information
PDD Presidential Decision Directive
PED Public Engagement Division
PFO Principal Federal Official
PHMSA Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration
PID Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division
PINS Priority Information Needs
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
PLE Principal Level Exercise
PM Bureau of Political-military Affairs
PM-ISE Program Manager for the Information Sharing
Environment
PMTL Protected Measures Target List
PN Partner Nation
PNP Protection and National Preparedness
PNSR Project for National Security Reform
POA Program of Analysis
POE Port of Entry
POTUS President of the United States
PPD Presidential Policy Directive
PPPM Plans, Policy, & Performance Management
PREA Prison Rape Elimination Act
PSA Protective Security Advisor
PSA Public Service Advertising
PSD Personnel Screening Detection
PSU Port Security Unit
PT-ISAC Public Transportation Information Sharing and
Analysis Center
PTN Public Telecommunications Network
PWCS Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security
QD Questioned Document
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
QRF Quick Reaction Force
R&D Research and Development
RAIO Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations
Directorate
RAMCAP Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset
Protection
RAM-W Risk Assessment Methodology-Water
RAN Railroad Alert Network
RC Reserve Component
RDD Radiological Dispersal Device
RDL Regional Dive Locker
RDP Research and Development Partnerships
RDT&E Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RECONS Reusable Electronic Conveyance Security Devices
REMS Radiological Emergency Management System
RFA Request for Assistance
RMA Risk Mitigation Activity
RMF Risk Management Framework
RRAP Regional Resiliency Assessment Program
RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center
RSC Rail Security Coordinator
RSCN Rail Security Coordinator Network
RSSM Rail Security-Sensitive Materials
R-Tech First Responder Technologies
RTP Resilient Tunnel Project
RVS Remote Video Surveillance
RVSS Remote Video Surveillance System
S&T Science and Technology Directorate
SA Support Agency
SAC Special Agent-in-Charge
SAD Special Activities Division
SAD State Active Duty
SAI Security Action Item
SAR Search and Rescue
SAR Suspicious Activity Report
SAV Site Assistance Visit
Appendix B: Glossary
678
SAVER System Assessment and Validation for Emergency
Responders
SBA Small Business Administration
SBI Secure Border Initiative
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCC Sector Coordinating Council
SCO State Coordinating Officer
SCOPS Service Center Operations Directorate
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SECIR Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber
Infrastructure Resilience
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center
SEVIS Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SEVP Student and Exchange Visitor Program
SFI Secure Freight Initiative
SGLCP State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness
SHSGP State Homeland Security Grant Program
SHSS State Homeland Security Strategy
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIOC Strategic Information Operations Center
SLFC State and Local Fusion Center
SLPO State & Local Program Office
SLTT State, Local, Tribal, Territorial
SMC Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator
SMES Security and Environmental Management System
SNM Special Nuclear Material
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOP Standing Operating Procedure
SPOT Screening Passengers by Observational
Techniques
SPP State Partnership Program
SPS Single Point of Service
SRIA Sandy Recovery Improvement Act
SRR Short Range Response
SSA Supervisory Special Agent
SSA Sector-Specific Agency
SSD Secret Service Division
SSP Sector Security Plan
STA Security Threat Assessments
START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Response to Terrorism
ST-ISAC Surface Transportation ISAC
SWNCC State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee
T&E Test and Evaluation
TACLET Tactical Law Enforcement Team
TAG The Adjutant General
TCL Target Capabilities List
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
THD Technological Hazards Division
THIRA Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessment
TIC Toxic Industrial Chemical
TIDE Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment
TIH Toxic Inhalation Hazard
TLD Top-Level Domain
TMC Thrust Management Computer
TOC Transnational Organized Crime
TPS Temporary Protected Status
TREAS Department of Treasury
TRIP Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
TRT Technical Rescue Team
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSA-FRSD TSA Freight Rail Security Division
TSA-OI TSA Office of Intelligence
TSDP Terrorist Screening Database
TSI Transportation Security Inspector
TSL Transportation Security Laboratory
TSO Transportation Security Officer
TSSRA Transportation Systems Sector Security Risk
Assessment
TSWG Transportation Sector Working Group
TTP Transition to Practice
TWIC Transportation Worker Identification Credential
UAE United Arab Emirates
UAS Unmanned Aerial System
Appendix B: Glossary
679
UASI Urban Area Security Initiative
UCP Unified Command Plan
UDP User Datagram Protocol
US&R Urban Search and Rescue
USA Unites States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USAFR Unites States Air Force Reserve
USAR United States Army Reserve
USBP U.S. Border Patrol
USC United States Code
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
US-CERT U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team
USCG United States Coast Guard
USCIS U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
USFA United States Fire Administration
USG U.S. Government
USMC United States Marine Corps
USMCR United States Marine Corps Reserve
USN United States Navy
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USNR United States Navy Reserve
USPACOM United States Pacific Command
USSS United States Secret Service
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
UTL Universal Task List
VAL Voluntary Agency Liaison
VBIED Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device
VIPR Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
VOAD Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster
VSAT Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool
VSP Visa Security Program
VTS Vessel Traffic Services
VWP Visitor Waiver Program
WBI Whole Body Imaging
WCO World Customs Organization
WFO Washington Field Office
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTC World Trade Center
ZADD Center of Excellence for Zoonotic and Animal
Disease Defense
Appendix B: Glossary
680
681
Appendix C:
Index
682
A
Active Component, 584, 597, 610, 611
Administrative Appeals Office, 534
Advance Passenger Information System, 318
Advance Targeting System-Cargo, 314
Advanced Imaging Technology, 201, 315, 480
Afghan National Army, 609
Africa Command, 255, 585
Aids to Navigation, 331, 333, 334, 459, 465, 468
Air and Marine Operations Center, 311
Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System, 311
Air Entry and Exit Re-Engineering, 409
Air Force Intelligence, 574
Air Force North, 591
Air National Guard, 584, 591, 597, 602, 607, 608, 609
Air Traffic Control, 37, 38, 41, 43, 310
Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System, 322
al Qaeda, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 96, 100,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 141, 143, 279, 280, 314
American Association of State and Highway Transportation Officials,
347
American Community Survey, 378
American Competitiveness and Workforce Improvement Act, 537
American Public Transportation Association, 343
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 247
American Water Works Association, 247
Ames Lab, 403
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, 153, 155
Arctic Domain Awareness Center of Excellence, 404
Area of Responsibility, 522, 590
Argonne National Lab, 403
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, 361
Arlington County Fire Department, 73, 85
Arlington County Police Department, 79
Armey, 153
Army Deputy Commander, 589
Army Intelligence, 574
Army National Guard, 584, 597, 599, 602, 603, 606
Army North, 591
Ashcroft, 140
Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor, 561,
562
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, 291, 560, 561, 562, 564
Association of American Railroads, 349
Automated Biometric Identification System, 390
Automated Customs Environment, 496
Automated Customs System, 496
Automated Mutual Assistance Vessel Rescue, 461
Automated Targeting Recognition, 315
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, 156, 166, 313, 344, 474,
475
Avionics Full Duplex Switched Ethernet, 321
B
Baseline Assessment and Security Enhancement, 482
Behavior Detection Officer, 201, 317
Bin Laden, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 96, 100, 101, 102,
103, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 279, 280, 290, 291, 652,
654
Biological Agents, 11
Biological Terrorism Risk Assessment, 408
Border and Transportation Security, 153, 155, 156, 166, 169, 170,
173, 175, 486
Border Enforcement Analytics Program, 409
Border Enforcement Security Task Force, 517
Bottom-Up Review, 181, 199
Bremer Commission, 14, 138
Brookhaven National Lab, 403
Buffer Zone Protection Plan, 247
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, 574
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, 256
Bureau of Political-military Affairs, 256
Bush, 20, 23, 34, 100, 102, 103, 119, 120, 122, 124, 137, 140,
141, 142, 150, 151, 154, 160, 164, 169, 170, 172, 180, 241,
258, 289, 302, 304, 443, 475, 486, 504, 563, 607, 615, 628,
644, 645, 652
Appendix C: Index
683
C
Capability Development Support, 400, 401
Captain of the Port, 331, 468
Catastrophic Incident Annex, 123
CBRN, 10, 12, 16, 155, 169, 170, 180, 181, 198, 199, 203, 253,
254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 608
CBRN Counterterrorism Group, 256
CBRNE, 334
Center for Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment, 404
Center for Borders, Trade, and Immigration Research, 404
Center for Domestic Preparedness, 449
Center for Maritime, Island and Remote and Extreme Environment
Security, 404
Center for Visualization and Data Analytics, 404
Center of Excellence for Awareness and Localization of Explosives-
Related Threats, 404
Center of Excellence for Zoonotic and Animal Disease Defense, 404
Central Command, 142, 255, 563, 585, 587
Central Intelligence Agency, 154, 256, 545, 548, 559, 568, 574
Chemical Agents, 10
Chemical Terrorism Risk Assessment, 408
Chemical Transportation Emergency Center, 347
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear, 10, 168, 188, 253,
398
Cheney, 140, 150
Chief Administrative Officer, 443, 488
Chief Financial Officer, 158, 488
Chief Information Officer, 158, 390, 443
Chief Information Security Officer, 390
Chief of Mission, 286
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, 602
Child Exploitation Investigations Unit, 518
Civil Assistance Plan, 592
Civil Support Team, 591, 608
Coast Guard Intelligence, 432, 574
Coastal Hazards Center of Excellence, 404
Coastal Patrol Boat, 333
Coastal Resilience Center of Excellence, 404
Coastal Surveillance System, 408
Code of Federal Regulations, 311, 634
Combat Mission Team, 273
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 252, 253
Combatant Command, 254, 255, 585, 586, 587
Committee on Commercial Operations of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, 494
Common Intelligence Picture, 427, 572
Communications Intelligence, 579
Community Emergency Response Teams, 233, 452
Comprehensive Emergency Management, 174, 257, 459
Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 539
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, 390
Comptroller General, 549
Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, 34
Congressional Research Service, 342, 525, 652, 653
Consequence Management, 13, 253, 630, 644
Container Security Initiative, 257, 482, 497
Control Systems Security Program, 271, 322
Costing Asset Protection Guide, 347
Counter-Proliferation Investigations, 520
Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 268
Counterintelligence, 228, 284, 312, 572, 573, 575, 577, 579, 580,
616, 617, 618, 622
Counterintelligence Program, 573, 622
Counterproliferation, 228, 253, 255, 256, 258, 572, 573
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, 253
counterterrorism, 13, 14, 29, 103, 104, 105, 166, 167, 170, 171,
202, 224, 225, 228, 253, 255, 256, 257, 277, 278, 279, 280,
281, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 291, 297, 302, 311, 334,
435, 436, 475, 483, 486, 514, 519, 520, 560, 561, 562, 564,
572, 573, 575, 576, 584, 588, 592, 607, 614, 616, 617, 618,
619, 621, 622, 626, 627, 628, 629, 636, 637, 644
Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit, 520
Counterterrorism Section, 519
Criminal Alien Program, 523
Critical Incident Response Group, 85
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, 197, 228, 241, 244, 287,
427, 433
Critical Infrastructure National Annual Report, 247
Appendix C: Index
684
Critical Infrastructure Resilience Institute, 404
Cross-Plane Session Termination, 270
Current Population Survey, 378
Customer Service Division, 532
Customs and Border Protection, 156, 173, 257, 287, 311, 314,
330, 337, 354, 355, 356, 357, 373, 406, 421, 427, 431, 462,
482, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 492, 493, 494, 514, 516, 517,
520, 522, 525, 530, 607
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, 496
Cyber Assessment Risk Management Approach, 270
Cyber Attack, 93, 94, 96, 165, 180, 214, 262, 268, 269, 272,
273, 275, 305, 320, 322, 323, 324, 450
Cyber Command, 585
Cyber Crimes Center, 518, 519
Cyber Mission Force, 273
Cyber Protection Team, 273
Cybersecurity, 176, 180, 181, 183, 199, 214, 228, 240, 241, 242,
261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273,
274, 275, 320, 321, 322, 323, 385, 387, 388, 389, 390, 406,
408
D
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 401
Defense Coordinating Element, 589
Defense Coordinating Officer, 589, 591
Defense Intelligence Agency, 256, 574, 575, 579
Defense Protective Service, 73, 81
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 584, 586, 587, 588, 590, 591,
592, 605, 606
Defense Technology Experimental Research, 408
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 254
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, 534
Department of Commerce, 257, 312, 358
Department of Defense, 13, 72, 73, 102, 103, 107, 124, 125,
126, 150, 158, 181, 188, 226, 253, 273, 286, 290, 312, 330,
363, 418, 433, 458, 469, 551, 559, 563, 570, 575, 579, 583,
584, 589, 590, 592, 599, 601, 608, 609
Department of Energy, 13, 228, 253, 255, 262, 294, 348, 400,
403, 418, 497, 574
Department of Health and Human Services, 13, 123, 203, 227, 523
Department of Homeland Security, 109, 122, 123, 137, 150, 152,
153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 164, 167, 169, 170, 174, 182,
183, 184, 188, 224, 234, 241, 243, 244, 253, 257, 262, 270,
271, 278, 283, 286, 294, 306, 310, 314, 322, 324, 328, 342,
354, 355, 356, 360, 372, 378, 384, 385, 391, 398, 410, 414,
426, 436, 440, 442, 454, 458, 459, 467, 474, 475, 480, 481,
486, 487, 488, 491, 492, 493, 504, 511, 514, 522, 525, 530,
544, 545, 550, 551, 552, 563, 565, 574, 576, 584, 587, 592,
607, 626, 644, 646, 648, 653, 654
Department of Justice, 13, 73, 127, 226, 258, 283, 294, 311, 358,
374, 506, 508, 615, 633, 634
Department of State, 102, 226, 253, 255, 283, 286, 312, 319,
335, 372, 373, 418, 421, 520, 521, 525, 574
Department of the Interior, 227, 229
Department of Transportation, 129, 153, 311, 344, 458, 474, 475
Deployable Specialized Force, 330, 331, 334, 469
Deputies Committee, 13, 291, 559, 561
Detect-to-Protect, 408
DHS Centers of Excellence, 404
DHS Intelligence Enterprise, 287, 427, 430
DHS Laboratories, 400, 403, 405
Digital Service Link, 266
Direct Support Team, 273
Director of Central Intelligence, 104, 140, 559, 563, 568, 569, 571
Director of National Intelligence, 227, 253, 256, 288, 291, 556,
559, 561, 562, 563, 571, 574, 626, 633
Director of the National Clandestine Service, 578
Directorate for MASINT and Technical Collection, 579
Directorate of Intelligence, 572, 618
Distributed Denial of Service, 270
DOE Laboratories, 403
Domain Name Service, 268
Domestic Emergency Support Team, 14, 155, 294
Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide, 617
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, 176, 258, 413, 414
Drug Enforcement Administration, 226, 574
Dual-Status Commander, 589, 590, 591, 604, 605
E
e-enabled, 320, 321
E-Verify, 210, 375, 522, 531, 536
Economic Exclusion Zone, 330
Electromagnetic Pulse, 12
Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification, 375, 536
Appendix C: Index
685
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 13, 75, 154, 224, 226, 257, 278,
283, 311, 421, 508, 574, 588, 613, 614, 630, 652
Federal Coordinating Officer, 114, 302, 448, 588, 589
Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator, 448
Federal Emergency Management Agency, 13, 77, 114, 137, 153,
157, 171, 173, 174, 175, 233, 257, 294, 440, 441, 454, 482,
588, 646
Federal Highway Administration, 347
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, 155, 156
Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, 331, 463, 468
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 347
Federal Network Resilience, 390
Federal On-Scene Coordinator, 331, 465, 468
Federal Protective Service, 155, 171, 356, 385, 392, 393
Federal Railroad Administration, 343, 344, 482
Federal Transit Administration, 343, 344, 482
Field Intelligence Group, 618
Finding Individuals for Disaster and Emergency Response, 407
First Responder Technologies, 401
First Responders Group, 399, 400, 403
Fiscal Year, 138, 168, 210, 245, 343, 479, 487
Food Protection and Defense Institute, 404
Foot-and-Mouth Disease, 408
Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence, 579
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 284, 580, 615
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 580
Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate, 212, 533
Freedom of Information Act, 494
G
General-Purpose Controller, 271
Geographic Combatant Command, 254, 255, 586, 587
Geospatial Information Infrastructure, 389
Geospatial Intelligence, 490, 578
Gilmore, 4, 14, 15, 138, 152
Gilmore Commission, 4, 14, 15, 138, 152
Gilmore Panel, 14
Global MOTR Coordination Center, 587
Global Positioning System, 320, 322
Appendix C: Index
Electronic Flight Bag, 321
Electronic Immigration System, 535
Electronic Intelligence, 579
Emergency Communications Center, 75, 79
Emergency Management Assistance Compact, 113, 301, 603
Emergency Management Institute, 449
Emergency Manager, 232, 300, 442
Emergency Medical Service, 56
Emergency Medical Services, 79, 232, 444
Emergency Operations Center, 78, 114, 298, 300, 301, 430
Emergency Preparedness and Response, 153, 155, 157, 166, 168,
169, 188, 189, 196, 198, 199, 216, 217, 294, 644
Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer, 589, 591
Emergency Service Units, 51
Emergency Support Function, 227, 295, 298, 301, 588, 589, 645
Enforcement and Removal Operations, 514, 526
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection, 245
Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment, 407
Enterprise & Mission Support, 427
Enterprise Performance Management Office, 390
Environmental Protection Agency, 13, 228, 404, 545
Equal Employment Opportunity, 494
European Command, 255, 585
Exceptional Case Study Project, 506
Exclusive Economic Zone, 158, 458, 464, 467
Executive Office for Immigration Review, 374
Executive Office of the President, 14, 160, 164, 247, 564
Executive Order, 137, 151, 160, 164, 169, 189, 200, 227, 241,
286, 289, 391, 441, 449, 454, 538, 579, 626, 627
Executive Protection Service, 508
Explosive Detection Canine, 393, 481
Export Control and Border Security, 491
Export Enforcement Coordination Center, 521
F
Fast Response Cutter, 333
fatwa, 21, 22, 96, 652
Federal Air Marshal, 104, 311, 476, 477, 478, 481
Federal Aviation Administration, 101, 310, 311, 320, 481, 587,
607
686
Goldwater-Nichols Act, 183
Government Accountability Office, 174, 188, 244, 317, 418, 437,
538, 549, 604, 646
Government Management Reform Act, 488
Government Performance and Results Act, 247, 488
Graham, 152
Grant Programs Directorate, 448
Group of Eight, 255
H
Hamilton, 178
Hart, 14, 15, 136, 137, 150, 152
Hart-Rudman Commission, 14, 15, 136, 137, 150, 152
Hastings, 152
Hazardous Material, 152, 228, 229, 241, 299, 334, 338, 347, 348,
452, 468, 469, 477, 642
Hazardous Materials Transportation Security Requirements, 347
Health and Usage Monitoring System, 321
High Threat Urban Area, 349
Highly Enriched Uranium, 12
Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier, 345, 346
Homeland Defense, 577, 584, 586, 587, 590, 591, 592, 596, 602,
606, 607
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, 391, 430
Homeland Intelligence Report, 434, 435
Homeland Response Force, 255, 608
Homeland Secure Data Network, 435, 632
Homeland Security Act, 150, 154, 155, 158, 160, 169, 170, 172,
175, 188, 241, 270, 286, 288, 294, 295, 384, 394, 398, 402,
405, 426, 429, 442, 475, 486, 494, 504, 530, 576, 626, 632,
644, 646
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, 399, 401
Homeland Security Advisor, 151, 152, 160, 169, 291, 563
Homeland Security Advisory System, 166, 436
Homeland Security Council, 150, 151, 160, 175, 183, 184, 422,
563, 564, 565, 645, 652, 654
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 302, 304
Homeland Security Grant Program, 294, 295, 302, 303, 304, 629,
633, 636, 646
Homeland Security Information Network, 288, 430, 434, 632
Homeland Security Intelligence, 154, 287, 427, 428, 433, 434, 633
Appendix C: Index
Homeland Security Intelligence Council, 287, 633
Homeland Security Investigations, 514, 517, 518, 520, 526
Homeland Security Investigations' Forensic Laboratory, 518
Homeland Security Presidential Directive, 180, 189, 241, 283, 644
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee,
402
Homeland Security Standing Information Needs, 430
Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of
Interest, 435, 633
Homeland Security Strategy, 138, 164, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182,
183, 184, 302
Homeland Security Threat Assessment, 288, 433
Homemade Explosive Device, 409
Housing and Urban Development, 229, 440
HSPD-5, 283, 295, 299, 644
HSPD-7, 241, 242, 243, 244, 275
HSPD-8, 302, 304, 645, 647
Human Intelligence, 287, 428, 429, 578
I
Illicit Pathways Attack Strategy, 521
Imagery Intelligence, 287, 428, 578, 579
Immediate Response Authority, 590
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 156, 173, 210, 258, 287,
376, 427, 431, 486, 497, 514, 517, 530, 536
Immigration and Nationality Act, 362, 368, 536, 539
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 105, 106, 144, 152, 155,
355, 358, 514, 530, 536
Immigration Examination Fee Account, 537
Immigration Reform and Control Act, 358, 368, 369, 538
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 359, 361,
368, 375
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, 138,
178, 205, 244, 287, 288, 336, 350, 426, 627
Improvised Explosive Device, 346, 347, 393, 434, 588
Improvised Nuclear Device, 12, 305, 336
Incident Action Plan, 301, 589
Incident Command Post, 56, 77, 81, 299, 300, 301
Incident Command System, 73, 86, 109, 294, 295, 300, 306, 336,
588, 644
Incident Commander, 52, 56, 66, 73, 77, 78, 81, 300, 301, 589,
592, 603
687
Incident Management Assistance Team, 298
Incident Support Team, 84
Individual and Community Preparedness Division, 449
Industrial Control System, 271, 272, 322, 388
Industrial Control System Joint Working Group, 271, 322
Inflight Entertainment System, 321
Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection, 169, 170, 171,
384
Information and Analysis, 549, 563
Information Sharing and Analysis Center, 248, 270, 345, 347, 387
Information Sharing Environment, 435, 627, 633
Information Technology, 91, 93, 158, 173, 189, 206, 207, 218,
228, 264, 270, 271, 274, 288, 386, 490
Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division, 391
Infrastructure Information Collection Division, 388
infrastructure Information Collection System, 245
Infrastructure Protection, 13, 96, 97, 153, 155, 157, 167, 169,
170, 171, 173, 176, 180, 189, 197, 198, 199, 204, 214, 224,
225, 229, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 249,
262, 270, 275, 287, 310, 323, 328, 342, 347, 356, 384, 385,
386, 388, 391, 392, 394, 507, 524, 653
Inspector General, 174, 189, 199, 244, 317, 538, 646, 652
Integrated Computer Assisted Detection, 360
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, 449
Integrated Terrorism Risk Assessment, 408
Intelligence and Analysis, 173, 178, 287, 426, 427, 430, 559, 574,
576, 618, 623, 627
Intelligence Community, 101, 106, 107, 173, 227, 255, 256, 257,
272, 278, 286, 287, 288, 387, 390, 421, 426, 428, 430, 435,
437, 474, 483, 563, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 574, 575,
576, 619, 633, 638, 639
Intelligence Coordination Center, 432
Intelligence Information Report, 434
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, 332, 469
Inter-Services Intelligence, 144
Interagency Policy Committee, 291, 559, 562
Intercity Bus Security Grant Program, 347
Intercity Bus Security Grants, 247
Intergovernmental Personnel Act, 421
Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program, 483
International Cooperative Programs Office, 402, 403
International Maritime Organization, 460
International Monetary Fund, 74
International Security Assistance Force, 609
Internet, 29, 91, 93, 94, 95, 180, 214, 228, 262, 263, 264, 265,
266, 267, 268, 270, 271, 274, 275, 283, 316, 322, 393, 518,
519, 522, 581, 616
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, 268
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, 267
Internet Crimes Against Children, 519
Internet Exchange Point, 267, 270
Internet Service Provider, 266, 270, 274, 581, 616
Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act, 279
Islamic State, 279, 280
IT Sector Baseline Risk Assessment, 270
IT Sector Specific Plan, 270
J
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 253, 556, 557, 559, 561, 562, 568, 602, 605
Joint Field Office, 114, 298, 299, 300, 452
Joint Force Headquarters, 592, 602
Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region, 592
Joint Information Center, 298
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 563
Joint Interagency Coordination Group, 592
Joint Operations Center, 14, 78, 297
Joint Requirements Council, 402
Joint Task Force, 589, 591, 604, 605
Joint Task Force Alaska, 591
Joint Task Force Civil Support, 591
Joint Task Force North, 591
Joint Terminal Attack Controller, 290
Joint Terrorism Task Force, 78, 284, 345, 519, 614, 623
JTF-Katrina, 596, 604
JTF-Sandy, 605
K
Kean, 178
Key Intelligence Questions, 429, 430
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 24, 144
Appendix C: Index
688
L
Latent Print, 518
Law Enforcement Detachment, 334, 469
Law Enforcement Technical Collections, 490
Lawful Permanent Resident, 535, 536
Lead Agency, 240, 241, 330, 461, 462, 463, 487, 494, 614
Legal Permanent Resident, 368
Liaison Officer, 589, 591, 606
Lieberman, 152, 153, 154, 642
Limited English Proficiency, 494
Long Range Surveillance, 333
Long-Range Broad Agency Announcement, 405
Lugar, 4, 5, 254
M
Man-Portable Air Defense System, 319
Management and Administration, 514
Marine Corps Intelligence, 574
Marine Forces North, 591
Marine Safety Detachment, 331
Marine Safety Unit, 331, 468
Maritime Operational Threat Response, 336, 463, 587
Maritime Safety and Security Team, 334, 469
Maritime Security Center of Excellence, 404
Maritime Security Response Team, 334, 469
Maritime Transportation System, 328, 329, 339
mass killing, 279
Measurement and Signatures Intelligence, 287, 428, 578
Medium Range Response, 333
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, 76
Military District of Washington, 73, 76
Mission Assignment, 298, 299, 302, 589
Mission Support, 184, 331, 333, 334, 392, 427, 443, 468, 514
Mobile Command Vehicle, 393
Mobile Surveillance System Upgrade, 408
Mobile Training Branch, 335
Mobile Vehicle Surveillance System, 361
MOTR, 336, 587
Mueller, 140
Mutual Agreement Between Government and Employers, 522
Mutual Aid Agreement, 112, 113, 231, 272, 294, 301, 644
N
National Advisory Council, 446
National Airspace System, 229, 310
National Asset Database, 244
National Benefits Center, 532, 533
National Border Patrol Strategy, 359, 360
National Capital Response Squad, 76, 78
National Center for Border Security and Immigration, 404
National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic
Event Response, 404
National Continuity Programs, 449
National Coordinator, 14
National Counterintelligence Executive, 228, 572, 573, 580
National Counterproliferation Center, 228, 256, 572, 573
National Counterterrorism Center, 224, 225, 228, 256, 257, 288,
291, 297, 562, 572, 573, 588, 626
National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program, 245
National Cyber Incident Response Plan, 214, 271
National Cyber Risk Alert Level, 271, 272
National Cyber Security Center, 180
National Cyber Security Division, 270
National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, 271,
387
National Defense Authorization Act, 599, 604
National Disaster Medical System, 123, 294
National Exercise Division, 304
National Exercise Program, 151, 304
National Foreign Intelligence Program, 569, 629
National Fugitive Operations Program, 523
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 570, 574, 575, 579
National Guard, 113, 116, 117, 118, 120, 124, 126, 255, 301,
362, 363, 584, 585, 588, 589, 591, 592, 595, 596, 597, 598,
599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610,
611
National Guard Bureau, 126, 602, 604, 609
National Homeland Security Agency, 15, 137, 150, 152
Appendix C: Index
689
National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act, 153
National Homeland Security Department, 152
National Incident Coordinating Center, 270
National Incident Management System, 73, 168, 172, 295, 303,
446, 483, 588, 644, 647, 648
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 167, 204, 225, 241, 243,
244, 247, 248, 270, 310, 323, 328, 342, 347, 384, 386, 392
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 391
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 107, 642
National Integration Center, 449
National Intelligence Council, 569, 572, 573
National Intelligence Estimate, 569, 573
National Intelligence Program, 227, 563, 572
National Level Exercise, 304, 592
National Military Command Center, 297
National Military Establishment, 559
National Mission Force, 273
National Nuclear Security Administration, 255
National Operations Center, 288, 297, 387, 430, 434
National Operations Control Center, 311
National Preparedness Assessment Division, 449
National Preparedness Directorate, 449
National Preparedness Goal, 302, 303, 304, 446, 450, 644, 645,
647, 648
National Preparedness Month, 454
National Preparedness System, 303, 304, 446, 450, 645, 647, 648
National Reconnaissance Office, 570, 574, 575
National Response Coordination Center, 233, 297
National Response Framework, 216, 225, 228, 257, 295, 300, 304,
336, 588, 589, 647
National Response Plan, 123, 124, 172, 216, 295, 303, 644, 647,
648
National School Transportation Association, 347
National Security Agency, 106, 291, 429, 570, 574, 575, 579
National Security and Emergency Preparedness, 389
National Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 574
National Security Council, 13, 15, 140, 150, 183, 184, 225, 227,
291, 305, 422, 519, 547, 555, 556, 558, 559, 560, 563, 564,
565, 568
National Security Cutter, 332
National Security Letter, 615, 616
National Security Staff, 225, 559, 563
National Security Threat Section, 520
National Security Unit, 519
National Special Security Event, 158, 349, 392, 505, 509
National Strategic Plan, 358
National Strategy for Homeland Security, 137, 164, 169, 177, 179,
182, 241, 294, 398, 440, 474, 530, 606, 645
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 253
National Strike Force, 334, 469
National Support Team, 273
National Targeting Center-Cargo, 497
National Terrorism Advisory System, 436
National Threat Assessment Center, 433, 506
National Training & Education, 449
National Training and Education Division, 449
National Transportation Security Center of Excellence, 404
National Urban Security Technology, 399, 400, 403
National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, 399, 400
Nautical Mile, 330, 464, 467, 590
NCTC, 228, 256, 257, 288, 291, 297, 435, 572, 588, 626, 627
Nebraska Avenue Complex, 159
Network Security Deployment, 390
New Madrid Seismic Zone, 305
New York Police Department, 51, 60, 69, 642
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint, 409
Non-Governmental Organization, 451, 493, 519
Non-Intrusive Inspection, 495
Nonproliferation, 4, 5, 253, 254, 255, 256, 281, 577, 652
Nonproliferation Treaty, 4, 5
North American Aerospace Defense Command, 101, 587
North Tower, 39, 44, 45, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 107, 108, 643
Northern Command, 254, 585, 586, 590, 604
Nuclear Emergency Response Team, 255
Nunn, 4, 5, 254
Nunn-Lugar, 5, 254
Appendix C: Index
690
O
Oak Ridge National Lab, 403
Obama, 138, 145, 179, 181, 183, 242, 273, 289, 303, 304, 315,
362, 443, 510, 538, 539, 562, 563, 564, 565, 581, 605, 607,
647
Office for Interoperability and Compatibility, 400
Office of Biometric Identity Management, 385, 390
Office of Communications, 535
Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, 287, 430
Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, 270, 385, 389
Office of Disability Integration and Coordination, 446
Office of Domestic Preparedness, 156, 157
Office of Emergency Management, 51, 52, 58, 62, 64
Office of Emergency Preparedness, 127
Office of External Affairs, 446
Office of Field Operations, 356, 489
Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, 212, 431, 536
Office of Homeland Security, 137, 151, 152, 153, 160, 164, 169,
183, 241, 654
Office of Immigration Statistics, 372, 375, 378
Office of Intelligence, 173, 287, 345, 360, 426, 427, 428, 430,
431, 432, 490, 574, 576, 627
Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland
Security, 574
Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, 431
Office of Internal Affairs, 490
Office of International Affairs, 169, 490, 536
Office of International Trade, 491
Office of Legislative Affairs, 174, 535
Office of Management and Budget, 390, 547, 561, 571
Office of National Drug Control Policy, 152, 358
Office of National Laboratories, 402, 403
Office of National Security Intelligence, Drug Enforcement
Administration, 574
Office of Operations Coordination, 173, 287, 427, 430, 486
Office of Policy and Program Analysis, 447
Office of Public Affairs, 491
Office of Response and Recovery, 447
Office of Strategic Services, 568
Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, 492
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 227, 253, 256, 563,
571, 574, 626, 633
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, 580
Office of Training and Development, 492
Officer in Charge of Marine Inspection, 331, 468
Offshore Patrol Cutter, 332
Oklahoma City, 8, 9, 13, 92, 136, 240, 278, 279, 280, 346, 393
On-Scene Commander, 14, 78
Open Source Intelligence, 287, 428
Open System Interconnection, 264
Operational Mentor and Liaison Team, 609
P
Pacific Command, 255, 585, 586
Pacific Northwest National Lab, 403
Partner Nation, 257, 283, 286, 609, 610
PDD-39, 13, 283
PDD-63, 240, 241, 242, 243, 275
Personnel Screening Detection, 393
Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 347
Plans, Policy, & Performance Management, 427
Plum Island Animal Disease Center, 155
Policy Coordination Committee, 13
Port Authority Police Department, 51, 56, 58, 65, 69, 642
Port of Entry, 156, 375, 480, 494, 496, 497, 533
Port Security Grants, 247
Port Security Unit, 334, 469
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, 329, 459
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, 175, 176, 178,
295, 304, 384, 446, 448, 646
Powell, 140, 319
PPD-1, 563
PPD-8, 303, 647
PPD-21, 242, 243, 275, 391
Predator, 289, 290, 518
President of the United States, 20, 225, 291, 433, 584, 602, 606
Presidential Decision Directive, 13, 73, 240, 262, 280
Appendix C: Index
691
Presidential Policy Directive, 242, 310, 328, 342, 384, 386, 391,
563, 647
Primary Agency, 227, 228, 229, 486, 589
Princeton Plasma Physics Lab, 403
Principal Federal Official, 295
Principal Level Exercise, 304
Principals Committee, 13, 291, 560, 561
Priority Information Needs, 633
Prison Rape Elimination Act, 494
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, 627
Program of Analysis, 429
Programmable Logic Controller, 271
Project for National Security Reform, 565
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information, 388
Protected Measures Target List, 244
Protection and National Preparedness, 448
Protective Intelligence and Assessment Division, 433
Protective Security Advisor, 245
Public Engagement Division, 532
Public Law, 138, 154, 175, 176, 228, 441, 475, 545, 603
Public Service Advertising, 453
Public Telecommunications Network, 91
Q
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 138, 178, 179, 184, 199,
224, 257, 405
Questioned Document, 518
Quick Reaction Force, 588
R
Radiological Dispersal Device, 11
Radiological Emergency Management System, 407
Rail and Transit Security Grants, 247
Rail Security Coordinator, 349
Rail Security Coordinator Network, 349
Rail Security-Sensitive Materials, 349
Railroad Alert Network, 349
Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate, 533
Regional Dive Locker, 334
Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, 245
Regional Response Coordination Center, 297, 298, 299
Remote Video Surveillance, 360, 361
Remote Video Surveillance System, 361
Request for Assistance, 122, 589
Research and Development, 93, 228, 230, 398, 400, 401, 402,
403, 405, 410, 415, 416, 420, 422, 423, 451, 490, 558
Research and Development Partnerships, 400, 402
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, 15
Reserve Component, 584, 597, 598, 610
Resilient Tunnel Project, 409
Reusable Electronic Conveyance Security Devices, 408
Rice, 20, 76, 85, 140, 141
Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection, 247
Risk Assessment Methodology-Water, 246
Risk Management Framework, 241, 243, 244, 247, 248, 270, 386,
387
Risk Mitigation Activity, 242, 347
Rudman, 14, 15, 136, 137, 150, 152
S
SAFE Port Act, 176, 414, 417, 421, 494, 496, 497, 500
Sandia National Lab, 403
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, 443
Savannah River National Lab, 403
Science and Technology Directorate, 157, 170, 398, 421
Screening Passengers by Observational Techniques, 317
Search and Rescue, 77, 113, 117, 120, 125, 126, 128, 229, 232,
299, 332, 452, 459, 460, 461, 468, 469, 589, 602, 603, 642
Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator, 468
Second Stage Review, 172, 175, 287, 426, 486
Secret Service Division, 504, 507
Secretary of Defense, 73, 136, 140, 226, 421, 460, 556, 559, 561,
568, 570, 575, 589, 598, 604, 605
Sector Coordinating Council, 243, 248, 270, 310, 323, 328, 342
Sector-Specific Agency, 227, 228, 241, 242, 243, 310, 328, 342
Secure Border Initiative, 206, 207, 360
Secure Freight Initiative, 209, 497
Security Action Item, 349
Appendix C: Index
692
Security and Environmental Management System, 246
Security Threat Assessments, 338, 481
Service Center Operations Directorate, 534
Short Range Response, 333
Signals Intelligence, 287, 428, 575, 579
Single Point of Service, 632
Site Assistance Visit, 245, 246, 248
Small Business Administration, 453
Small Business Innovation Research, 405
South Tower, 40, 44, 45, 48, 53, 55, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 108, 643
Southern Command, 255, 585
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, 4
Special Activities Division, 142, 290
Special Nuclear Material, 416
Special Operations Command, 254, 585
Special Operations Forces, 142, 290
Stafford Act, 113, 175, 296, 299, 301, 302, 441, 442, 443, 452,
588, 605, 645, 647
Stakeholder Engagement and Cyber Infrastructure Resilience, 389
Standing Operating Procedure, 632
State & Local Program Office, 427
State Active Duty, 113, 584, 600, 603, 605
State and Local Fusion Center, 427, 435, 627, 628, 629, 631, 632,
636, 637
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, 172
State Coordinating Officer, 114, 301, 588
State Emergency Operations Center, 114, 298, 301
State Homeland Security Grant Program, 302, 303, 646
State Partnership Program, 609
State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, 224, 384, 389, 629
State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, 557
Strategic Command, 254, 585, 587
Strategic Information Operations Center, 14, 297
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, 520
Student and Exchange Visitor Program, 520
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, 94, 271
Supervisory Special Agent, 76
Support Agency, 298, 589
Surface Transportation ISAC, 349
Suspicious Activity Report, 435
System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders, 401,
407
T
Tactical Law Enforcement Team, 334
Target Capabilities List, 216, 645
Technical Rescue Team, 84
Technological Hazards Division, 449
Temporary Protected Status, 534
Tenet, 106, 140
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, 573
Terrorist Screening Database, 318
Test and Evaluation, 400, 401, 402
The Adjutant General, 602, 604, 608, 609, 611
Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility, 403
Thornberry, 152, 153
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, 303, 647
Thrust Management Computer, 321
Tier 1 ISP, 266
Tier 2 ISP, 266
Tier 3 ISP, 266
Title 10, 458, 584, 585, 597, 598, 601, 604, 605, 606
Title 14, 257, 329, 458, 585
Title 32, 113, 584, 585, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 610
Tokyo Subway Attack, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 92, 136, 252, 398
Top-Level Domain, 268
Toxic Industrial Chemical, 10
Toxic Inhalation Hazard, 348, 349
Transition to Practice, 408
Transmission Control Protocol, 264
Transnational Organized Crime, 521
Transportation Command, 585
Transportation Sector Working Group, 322
Transportation Security Administration, 153, 155, 156, 171, 173,
287, 310, 311, 312, 328, 342, 343, 347, 354, 421, 427, 432,
474, 475, 479, 482, 483
Appendix C: Index
693
Transportation Security Inspector, 345, 476, 482
Transportation Security Laboratory, 402
Transportation Security Officer, 476
Transportation Systems Sector Security Risk Assessment, 246
Transportation Worker Identification Credential, 208, 337
Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, 480
TSA Freight Rail Security Division, 349
TSA Office of Intelligence, 345
Twin Towers, 24, 29, 34, 48, 49, 107, 108, 109, 642, 643
U
U.S. Border Patrol, 355, 358, 487, 489, 492, 588, 607
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 158, 287, 427, 431, 522,
525, 530
U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 214, 272
U.S. Government, 4, 9, 13, 14, 15, 30, 100, 102, 106, 137, 138,
139, 150, 220, 227, 228, 256, 257, 258, 272, 279, 280, 286,
290, 310, 312, 328, 342, 390, 414, 417, 436, 460, 491, 550,
572, 573, 575, 626
Unified Command Plan, 585
United Arab Emirates, 141
United States Air Force, 584
United States Army Reserve, 584
United States Central Command, 587
United States Coast Guard, 158, 169, 257, 328, 329, 339, 354,
458, 466, 467, 584, 585
United States Code, 8, 90, 96, 278, 585, 597, 598, 600
United States Fire Administration, 176
United States Marine Corps, 584
United States Marine Corps Reserve, 584
United States Navy, 289, 584
United States Navy Reserve, 584
United States Northern Command, 254, 586, 590
United States Pacific Command, 586
United States Secret Service, 158, 169, 171
United States Strategic Command, 254, 587
Universal Task List, 303, 645
Unmanned Aerial System, 361, 510
Urban Area Security Initiative, 247, 288, 435, 646
Urban Search and Rescue, 77, 452
USA FREEDOM ACT, 581
USA PATRIOT ACT, 241, 244, 283, 284, 507, 580, 614, 615, 616,
617, 623
User Datagram Protocol, 265
V
Vessel Traffic Services, 331, 461, 465, 468
Visa Security Program, 206, 207, 521
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, 344, 476
Voluntary Agency Liaison, 453
Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool, 246
Washington Field Office, 76
W
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4, 8, 13, 14, 90, 136, 137, 144,
152, 155, 157, 165, 170, 183, 252, 253, 281, 354, 355, 356,
427, 431, 442, 486, 499, 520, 573, 584, 618, 620, 628, 644,
652, 653, 654
WHEC, 332
Whole Body Imaging, 315
Wireless Local Area Network, 321
WMD, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 92, 136, 138, 170, 227,
251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 281, 286, 294, 302,
305, 306, 339, 398, 427, 573, 592, 608, 645, 648, 652
WMD Terrorism, 9, 10
WMEC, 332
World Customs Organization, 481, 491
World Trade Center, 8, 9, 25, 28, 34, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45, 48, 58,
72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 86, 92, 100, 107, 136, 240, 294,
346, 642, 644, 653
WPB, 333
XYZ
Appendix C: Index
694
695
Appendix D:
Works Cited
696
Part I: Hard Lessons
Chapter 1: Turning Point
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[8] Homeland Security Council, "Planning Scenarios: Executive
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Chapter 2: Lost Opportunities
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Appendix D: Works Cited
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Chapter 3: We Have Some Planes
[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," US Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
Chapter 4: And They Saved Many
[1] National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "Staff Statement No. 13: Emergency Preparedness and
Response," Washington, DC, 2004.
Chapter 5: Not By Chance
[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United
States, "Staff Statement No. 14: Crisis Management,"
Washington, DC, 2004.
[2] Wikipedia Contributors, "The Pentagon," Wikipedia, The Free
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[3] Titan Systems Corporation, "Arlington County After Action
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Chapter 6: Surpassing Disproportion
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Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2004.
[2] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary,"
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[3] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[4] J. D. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
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[5] President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
"Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures,"
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[8] Wikipedia Contributors, "2008 Mumbai Attacks," Wikipedia, The
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August 2015].
[9] Police Executive Research Forum, "Critical Issues in Policing: The
Police Response to Active Shooter Incidents," Police Executive
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[10] US Department of Homeland Security, "Ammonium Nitrate
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[11] Wikipedia Contributors, "1993 World Trade Center Bombing,"
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[12] Wikipedia Contributors, "Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and
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[13] Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
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the Threat," RAND Corporation, Washington, DC, 1999.
[14] Wikipedia Contributors, "Chernobyl Disaster," Wikipedia, The
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[15] Wikipedia Contributors, "Bhopal Disaster," Wikipedia, The Free
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[16] The White House, "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,"
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[17] Wikipedia Contributors, "1995 Chicago Heat Wave," Wikipedia,
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Appendix D: Works Cited
698
[18] Wikipedia Contributors, "2003 European Heat Wave,"
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[19] The White House, "The National Strategy for the Physical
Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets," The White
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Chapter 7: Failure of Imagination
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[2] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "Entry of the 9/11 Hijackers into the United Stats: Staff
Statement No. 1," Washington, DC, 2004.
Chapter 8: Failure of Initiative
[1] Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for
the Response to Hurricane Katrina, "A Failure of Initiative,"
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2006.
[2] Wikipedia Contributors, "Hurricane Katrina," Wikipedia, The
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Part II: HS, DHS, & HS Enterprise
Chapter 9: Homeland Security
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Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, "First Annual
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[2] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, "Road Map
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[4] U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, "Seeking a
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Promoting Freedom," Washington, DC, 2000.
[5] The White House, "EO 13228: Establishing the Office of
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council," The
White House, Washington, DC, 2001.
[6] Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," Washington, DC, 2007.
[7] The White House, "National Security Strategy," Washington, DC,
2010.
[8] The White House, "National Security Strategy," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2015.
[9] Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure
Homeland," Washington, DC, 2010.
[10] Department of Homeland Security, "The 2014 Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2014.
Appendix D: Works Cited
699
[11] US Commission on National Security/21st Century; the Hart-
Rudman Commission, "New World Coming: American Security in
the 21st Century," Washington, DC, 1999.
[12] National Commission on Terrorism, "Report of the National
Commission on Terrorism," US Congress, Washington, DC, 2000.
[13] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[14] The Telegraph, "Bush Gives Taliban Ultimatum," [Online].
Available: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1341196/Bush-
gives-Taliban-ultimatum.html. [Accessed 10 September 2015].
[15] The Guardian, "Taliban Defy Bush Ultimatum," [Online].
Available: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/
september11.usa15. [Accessed 10 September 2015].
[16] Wikipedia Contributors, "Taliban," Wikipedia, The Free
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[Accessed 10 September 2015].
[17] Wikipedia Contributors, "War in Afghanistan (2001 - Present),"
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 4 September 2015. [Online].
Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=War_in_Afghanistan_(2001%E2%80%93present)
&oldid=679372417. [Accessed 10 September 2015].
[18] Wikipedia Contributors, "Osama bin Laden," Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, 7 September 2015. [Online]. Available: https://
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title=Osama_bin_Laden&oldid=679848439. [Accessed 10
September 2015].
[19] Wikipedia Contributors, "Zacarias Moussaoui," Wikipedia, The
Free Encyclopedia, 7 September 2015. [Online]. Available:
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title=Zacarias_Moussaoui&oldid=679829362. [Accessed 10
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[20] Wikipedia Contributors, "Khalid Sheikh Mohammed," Wikipedia,
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10 September 2015].
Chapter 10: DHS Formation
[1] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[2] The White House, "Executive Order 13228 Establishing the
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council," Washington, DC, 2001.
[3] Scardaville, Michael, "Principles for Creating an Effective Dept.
of Homeland Security," 12 June 2002. [Online]. Available: http://
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creating-an-effective-dept-of-homeland-security. [Accessed 13
September 2015].
[4] White House Press Office, "President to Propose Department of
Homeland Security," The White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[5] CONGRESS.GOV, "H.R. 5005 - Homeland Security Act of
2002," [Online]. Available: https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th
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[6] Wikipedia Contributors, "United States Department of
Homeland Security," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 21
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[7] Arms Control Center, "DHS Countdown: Play-by-Play
Archive," [Online]. Available: http://
www.armscontrolcenter.org/terrorism/playbyplay/archive.html.
[Accessed 4 December 2004].
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Performance and
Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2003," Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2004.
[9] The White House, "Reorganization Plan for the Department of
Homeland Security," Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 2002.
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "History: Who Became
Part of the Department?," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/dhspubli/display?
theme=59&content=4081&print=true. [Accessed 7 April 2005].
[11] The White House, "The Department of Homeland Security," The
White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[12] United States Congress, "Public Law 107-296: Homeland
Security Act," Washington, DC, 2002.
[13] J. Frittelli, "Transportation Security: Issues for the 109th
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2005.
[14] H. C. Relyea, "Organizing for Homeland Security: The Homeland
Security Council Reconsidered," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2008.
[15] J. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2011.
Appendix D: Works Cited
700
Chapter 11: DHS Evolution
[1] Drucker Institute, "Peter Drucker's Life and Legacy," Drucker
Institute, [Online]. Available: http://www.druckerinstitute.com/
peter-druckers-life-and-legacy/. [Accessed 28 September 2015].
[2] The White House, "Executive Order 13228 Establishing the
Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security
Council," Washington, DC, 2001.
[3] Office of Homeland Security, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," The White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Performance and
Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2003," Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2004.
[5] H. C. Relyea and H. B. Hogue, "Department of Homeland
Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2005.
[6] The White House, "The Department of Homeland Security," The
White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[7] General Services Administration, "U.S. Department of Homeland
Security Nebraska Avenue Complex Master Plan: Draft
Environmental Impact Statement," General Services
Administration, Washington, DC, 2014.
[8] J. Markon, "Planned Homeland Security Headquarters, Long
Delayed and Over Budget, Now in Doubt," 20 May 2014.
[Online]. Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
planned-homeland-security-headquarters-long-delayed-and-
over-budget-now-in-doubt/2014/05/20/d0df2580-dc42-11e3-
8009-71de85b9c527_story.html. [Accessed 15 September
2015].
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Brief Documentary
History of the Department of Homeland Security," Department
of Homeland Security History Office, Washington, DC, 2009.
[10] United States Congress, "Public Law 107-296: Homeland
Security Act," Washington, DC, 2002.
[11] Wikipedia Contributors, "Tom Ridge," Wikipedia, The Free
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2015].
[12] Wikipedia Contributors, "Michael Chertoff," Wikipedia, The Free
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September 2015].
[13] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Performance and
Accountability Report: Fiscal Year 2006," Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2006.
[14] K. Bea, "Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After
Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2007.
[15] Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," Washington, DC, 2007.
[16] B. W. Blanchard, "Guide to Emergency Management and
Related Terms, Definitions, Concepts, Acronyms, Organizations,
Programs, Guidance & Legislation," Emergency Management
Institute, Emmetsburg, MD, 2008.
[17] Wikipedia Contributors, "9/11 Commission," Wikipedia, The
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September 2015].
[18] Govtrack.us, "H.R. 1 (110th): Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007," Govtrack.us, [Online].
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[Accessed 27 September 2015].
[19] Public Law 110-53, "Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007," US Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 2007.
[20] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Organization Chart,"
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2008.
[21] Wikipedia Contributors, "Janet Napolitano," Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, 13 August 2015. [Online]. Available: https://
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title=Janet_Napolitano&oldid=675914533. [Accessed 27
September 2015].
[22] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Bottom-Up Review
Report," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2010.
[23] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure
Homeland," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2010.
[24] National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies,
"Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity
Terminology," [Online]. Available: https://niccs.us-cert.gov/
glossary#letter_c. [Accessed 2 October 2015].
[25] President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
"Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructures,"
Washington, DC, 1997.
[26] The White House, "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,"
The White House, Washington, DC, 2003.
[27] List 25, "25 Biggest Cyber Attacks in History," [Online]. Available:
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[Accessed 2 October 2015].
Appendix D: Works Cited
701
[28] Wikipedia Contributors, "United States Secretary of Homeland
Security," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 2 September 2015.
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9043607. [Accessed 2 October 2015].
[29] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "The 2014 Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2014.
[30] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Organizational Chart,"
Department of Homeland Security, 13 July 2015. [Online].
Available: http://www.dhs.gov/organizational-chart. [Accessed 2
October 2015].
[31] Google, [Online]. Available: https://www.google.com/?
gws_rd=ssl#q=definition+strategy. [Accessed 2 October 2015].
[32] S. S. Hsu, "Obama Combines Security Councils, Adds Offices for
Computer and Pandemic Threats," 27 May 2009. [Online].
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article/2009/05/26/AR2009052603148.html. [Accessed 11
November 2011].
[33] United States Congress, "Public Law 99-433, "Goldwater-Nichols
Act"," Washington, DC, 1986.
[34] The White House, "National Security Strategy," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2010.
[35] The White House, "National Security Strategy," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2015.
Chapter 12: DHS Progress
[1] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of
Mission and Management Functions," Government
Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 2007.
[2] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in
Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11,"
Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 2011.
[3] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Department of
Homeland Security: Progress Made, but More Work Remains in
Strengthening Management Functions," Government
Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 2015.
Chapter 13: HS Enterprise
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure
Homeland," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2010.
Part III: Mission Areas
Chapter 14: Critical Infrastructure Protection
[1] J. D. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2014.
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Interim National
Preparedness Goal," Washington, DC, 2005.
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "NIPP 2013: Partnering
for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience," Department
of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2013.
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Progress in Developing
the National Asset Database," Department of Homeland
Security Office of Inspector General, Washington, DC, 2006.
[5] Public Law 110-53, "Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007," US Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, 2007.
[6] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Critical Infrastructure
Protection: DHS List of Priority Assets Needs to be Validated and
Reported to Congress," Government Accountability Office,
Washington, DC, 2013.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Infrastructure
Protection Gateway," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
ipgateway. [Accessed 11 October 2015].
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Protective Security
Advisors," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/protective-
security-advisors. [Accessed 11 October 2015].
[9] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Critical Infrastructure
Protection: DHS Could Better Manage Security Surveys and
Vulnerability Assessments," Washington, DC, 2012.
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Water Sector-Specific
Plan," US Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2010.
[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Transportation Systems
Sector-Specific Plan," US Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Energy Sector-Specific
Plan," US Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2010.
[13] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Infrastructure
Protection Plan," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2006.
[14] American Water Works Association, "RAMCAP Standard for Risk
and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater
Systems," American Water Works Association, Denver, CO,
2010.
Appendix D: Works Cited
702
[15] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "The National CI/KR
Protection Annual Report," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2006.
[16] United States Congress, "Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993," Washington, DC, 1993.
Chapter 15: Counter WMD Strategy
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October 2015].
[2] Wikipedia Contributors, "Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,"
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7. [Accessed 13 October 2015].
[3] Wikipedia Contributors, "Chemical Weapons in World War I,"
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[4] Wikipedia Contributors, "Chemical Weapons Convention,"
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 14 October 2015. [Online].
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[Accessed 15 October 2015].
[5] Wikipedia Contributors, "Biological Weapons Convention,"
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 18 August 2015. [Online].
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title=Biological_Weapons_Convention&oldid=676666937.
[Accessed 15 October 2015].
[6] Wikipedia Contributors, "Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 8 October
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Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons&oldid=684687461.
[Accessed 15 October 2015].
[7] Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, "Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation and NBC
Terrorism, Vol 1, Executive Summary," Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, 2011.
[8] The White House, "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction," Washington, DC, 2002.
[9] Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, "Report on
Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation of NBC
Terrorism," Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2013.
[10] U.S. Department of Defense, "DoDD 2060.02, DoD Combating
WMD Policy," Department of Defense, Washington, DC, 2007.
[11] U.S. Department of Defense, "DoD Strategy for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction," Department of Defense,
Washington, DC, 2014.
[12] U.S. Department of Defense, "Unified Command Plan," [Online].
Available: http://www.defense.gov/Sites/Unified-Combatant-
Commands. [Accessed 14 October 2015].
[13] National Guard Bureau, "Homeland Response Force," National
Guard Bureau, Washington, DC, 2014.
[14] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-40:
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," Washington, DC,
2014.
[15] National Nuclear Security Administration, "Emergency
Response," [Online]. Available: http://nnsa.energy.gov/aboutus/
ourprograms/emergencyoperationscounterterrorism. [Accessed
14 October 2015].
[16] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "Radiation Portal Monitors
Safeguard America from Nuclear Devices and Radiological
Materials," [Online]. Available: http://www.cbp.gov/border-
security/port-entry/cargo-security/cargo-exam/rad-portal1.
[Accessed 15 October 2015].
[17] Business Insider, "The Staggering Cost of the Last Decade's US
War in Iraq - In Numbers," [Online]. Available: http://
www.businessinsider.com/the-iraq-war-by-numbers-2014-6.
[Accessed 15 October 2015].
Chapter 16: Cybersecurity
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Death Toll," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 8 October 2015.
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[2] US-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, "Final Report on
the Implementation of Task Force Recommendations," 2006.
[3] G. B. Anderson and M. L. Bell, "Lights Out: Impact of the August
2003 Power Outage on Mortality in New York, NY,"
Epidemiology, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 189-193, 2012.
[4] Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, "Securing
the US Electrical Grid," Center for the Study of the Presidency &
Congress, Washington, DC, 2014.
[5] North American Electric Reliability Corporation, "High-Impact,
Low-Frequency Risk to the North American Bulk Power System,"
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Appendix D: Works Cited
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[7] Wikipedia Contributors, "Chernobyl Disaster," Wikipedia, The
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October 2015].
[8] Wikipedia Contributors, "Stuxnet," Wikipedia, The Free
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Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology," National
Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies, [Online].
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16 October 2015].
[11] Rutgers University, "Internet Technology: Understanding
Autonomous Systems," [Online]. Available: https://
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autonomous_systems.html. [Accessed 14 December 2014].
[12] Akamai, "The Internet from 100,000 feet," [Online]. Available:
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Object_Delivery.html. [Accessed 14 December 2014].
[13] DrPeering International, "Who are the Tier 1 ISPs?," [Online].
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[15] Middle East Network Operations Group, "Promoting the Use of
Internet Exchange Points," 2012.
[16] Kalliola, Aapo, "Network Security: Routing Security," Aalto
University, 2012.
[17] Internet Society, "Internet Ecosystem: Naming and addressing,
shared global services and operations, and open standards
development," 2014.
[18] Wikipedia Contributors, "Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,"
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[Accessed 18 October 2015].
[19] O. A. Hathaway, R. Crootof, P. Levitz, H. Nix, A. Nowlan, W.
Perdue and J. Spiegel, "The Law of Cyber-Attack," California Law
Review, 2012.
[20] Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Net Losses:
Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime," McAffee, Santa Clara,
CA, 2014.
[21] J. R. McCumber, "Information Systems Security: A
Comprehensive Model," in Proceedings of the 14th National
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[22] R. N. Charette, "Why Software Fails," IEEE Spectrum, [Online].
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[23] C. Simmons, C. Ellis, S. Shiva, D. Dasgupta and Q. Wu, "AVOIDIT:
A Cyber Attack Taxonomy," 2009.
[24] P. L. 107-296, "Homeland Security Act of 2002," Washington,
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[25] The White House, "The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,"
The White House, Washington, DC, 2003.
[26] Wikipedia Contributors, "Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
on Root Nameservers," Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 27
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[27] US Department of Homeland Security, "Information Technology
Sector Specific Plan," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[28] US Department of Homeland Security, "Securing Voice and Data
Systems in the Emergency Services Sector," Department of
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[29] Transportation Sector Working Group, "Roadmap to Secure
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[30] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Interim National Cyber
Incident Response Plan," Department of Homeland Security,
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[31] U.S. Department of Defense, "The Department of Defense Cyber
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[32] U.S. Department of Defense, "Mission Analysis for Cyber
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Appendix D: Works Cited
704
[33] J. D. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2014.
[34] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "White Paper: DHS
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[35] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Framework for
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Chapter 17: Counterterrorism
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[5] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 3-26:
Counterterrorism," Department of Defense, Washington, DC,
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[6] The White House, "National Strategy for Counterterrorism,"
White House, Washington, DC, 2011.
[7] The White House, "HSPD-5, Management of Domestic
Incidents," The White House, Washington, DC, 2003.
[8] Bjelopera, Jerome P., "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Terrorism Investigations," Congressional Research Service,
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[9] P. L. 107-296, "Homeland Security Act of 2002," Washington,
DC, 2002.
[10] Randol, Mark A., "The Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight
Challenges for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
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[11] M. J. Garcia, "Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on
Torture," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
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[15] R. A. Best Jr. and A. Feickert, "Special Operations Forces (SOF)
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[16] Wikipedia Contributors, "Taliban," Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, 1 November 2015. [Online]. Available: https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Taliban&oldid=688546297.
[Accessed 4 November 2015].
[17] Wikipedia Contributors, "General Atomics MQ-1 Predator,"
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 3 October 2015. [Online].
Available: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=General_Atomics_MQ-1_Predator&oldid=683971612.
[Accessed 4 November 2015].
[18] Air Force Historical Support Division, "Operation Enduring
Freedom," [Online]. Available: http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18634. [Accessed 4 November
2015].
[19] Wikipedia Contributors, "Osama bin Laden," Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia, 2 November 2015. [Online]. Available: https://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Osama_bin_Laden&oldid=688606671. [Accessed 4
November 2015].
[20] . A. Best Jr., "The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) -
Responsibilities and Potential Congressional Concerns,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2011.
[21] The White House, "National Security Strategy," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2015.
Chapter 18: Emergency Preparedness & Response
[1] Office of Homeland Security, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," The White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[2] P. L. 107-296, "Homeland Security Act of 2002," Washington,
DC, 2002.
Appendix D: Works Cited
705
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "History: Who Became
Part of the Department?," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
theme=59&ontent=4081&print=true. [Accessed 7 April 2005].
[4] The White House, "HSPD-5, Management of Domestic
Incidents," The White House, Washington, DC, 2003.
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Response
Framework," Washington, DC, 2008.
[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Response
Plan," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2004.
[7] B. R. Lindsay, "The National Response Framework: Overview and
Possible Issues for Congress," 2008, Washington, DC, November.
[8] F. X. McCarthy and J. T. Brown, "Congressional Primer on
Responding to Major Disasters and Emergencies," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2015.
[9] S. Maguire and S. Reese, "Department of Homeland Security
Grants to State and Local Governments: FY2003 to FY2006,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2006.
[10] K. Bea, "The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2005.
[11] The White House, "PPD-8, National Preparedness," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2011.
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
Goal," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2011.
[13] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
System," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2011.
[14] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Overview of the
National Planning Frameworks," Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC, 2014.
[15] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Information Sheet:
National Preparedness Goal, Second Edition - What's New,"
Washington, DC, 2015.
[16] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program," Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC, 2007.
[17] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)," Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2013.
[18] The White House, "HSPD-8, National Preparedness," The White
House, Washington, DC, 2003.
[19] E. R. Petersen, B. R. Lindsay, L. Kapp, E. C. Liu and D. R.
Peterman, "Homeland Emergency Preparedness and the
National Exercise Program: Background, Policy Implications, and
Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2008.
[20] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National Exercise
Program," Washington, DC, 2011.
[21] CNN, "National Exercise Program Fast Facts," CNN, [Online].
Available: http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/us/operation-
topoff-national-level-exercise-fast-facts/. [Accessed 11
November 2015].
Chapter 19: Aviation Security
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Transportation Systems
Sector-Specific Plan," US Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[2] B. Elias, D. R. Peterman and J. Frittelli, "Transportation Security:
Issues for the 114th Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2015.
[3] Transportation Sector Working Group on Secure Control
Systems, "Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the
Transportation Sector," US Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC, 2012.
[4] K. Zetter, "Is It Possible for Passengers to Hack Commercial
Aircraft?," 26 May 2015. [Online]. Available: http://
www.wired.com/2015/05/possible-passengers-hack-
commercial-aircraft/. [Accessed 14 November 2015].
[5] D. D. P. Johnson, "Civil Aviation and Cybersecurity," Honeywell,
2013.
[6] DrPeering International, "Who are the Tier 1 ISPs?," [Online].
Available: http://drpeering.net/FAQ/Who-are-the-Tier-1-
ISPs.php . [Accessed 14 December 2014].
Chapter 20: Maritime Security
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Transportation Systems
Sector-Specific Plan," US Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[2] United States Coast Guard, "CGP-3.0 Operations," United States
Coast Guard, Washington, DC, 2012.
[3] United States Coast Guard, "CGP 1.0 Doctrine for the U.S. Coast
Guard," United States Coast Guard, Washington, DC, 2014.
[4] B. Elias, D. R. Peterman and J. Frittelli, "Transportation Security:
Issues for the 114th Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2015.
Appendix D: Works Cited
706
Chapter 21: Surface Transportation Security
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Transportation Systems
Sector-Specific Plan," US Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[2] U.S. Department of Transportation, "Federal Transit
Administration," [Online]. Available: http://www.fta.dot.gov/
about/14103.html. [Accessed 19 November 2015].
[3] B. Elias, D. R. Peterman and J. Frittelli, "Transportation Security:
Issues for the 114th Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2015.
Chapter 22: Border Security
[1] M. R. Rosenblum, J. P. Bjelopera and K. M. Finklea, "Border
Security: Understanding Threats at U.S. Borders," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2013.
[2] C. C. Haddal, "Border Security: Key Agencies and Their
Missions," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2010.
[3] L. Seghetti, "Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Ports of
Entry," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2015.
[4] U.S. Customs and Border Protection, "SBInet Program,"
Washington, DC, 2009.
[5] L. Seghetti, "Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between
Ports of Entry," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2014.
[6] A. Lipowicz, "Boeing's SBInet Contract Gets The Axe,"
Washington Technology, 14 January 2011. [Online]. Available:
https://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2011/01/14/dhs-
cancels-rest-of-sbinet-and-plans-mix-of-new-technologies-at-
border.aspx. [Accessed 22 November 2015].
[7] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan," Washington, DC, 2014.
[8] C. C. Haddal, "Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border
Patrol," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2010.
Chapter 23: Immigration Enforcement
[1] W. A. Kandel, "U.S. Immigration Policy: Chart Book of Key
Trends," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.
Part IV: Mission Components
Chapter 24: National Protection & Programs Directorate
[1] The White House, "Reorganization Plan for the Department of
Homeland Security," Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 2002.
[2] J. D. Moteff, "Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and
Implementation," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2015.
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Budget-in0-Brief; Fiscal
Year 2016," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2015.
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "NPPD Organization
Chart," 12 December 2014. [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publication/nppd-or-chart-
12122014.pdf. [Accessed 8 December 2015].
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: Office of Infrastructure
Protection," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/office-
infrastructure-protection. [Accessed 8 December 2015].
[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Infrastructure
Protection Plan: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security
and Resilience," US Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2013.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Supplemental Tool:
Connecting to the NIC and NCCIC," Washington, DC, 2015.
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: Infrastructure Information Collection
Division," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/about-
infrastructure-information-collection-division. [Accessed 8
December 2015].
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
office-cybersecurity-and-communications. [Accessed 8
December 2015].
[10] W. L. Painter, J. D. Moteff, S. A. Lister, B. R. Lindsay, F. X.
McCarthy and L. G. Kruger, "DHS Appropriations FY2016:
Protection, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2015.
[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/national-protection-and-programs-directorate.
[Accessed 8 December 2015].
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: Office of Biometric Identity
Management Identification Services," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/obim-biometric-identification-services. [Accessed
8 December 2015].
Appendix D: Works Cited
707
[13] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: The Federal Protective
Service," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/topic/federal-
protective-service. [Accessed 8 December 2015].
[14] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Protection
and Programs Directorate: Office for Bombing
Prevention," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/obp.
[Accessed 8 December 2015].
Chapter 25: Science & Technology Directorate
[1] D. A. Shea, "The DHS S&T Directorate: Selected Issues for
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2014.
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "About Capability
Development Support," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/about-cds. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "S&T Organizational
Chart," 22 November 2015. [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/publication/st-organizational-chart. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "About the First
Responders Group," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/about-first-responders. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "About Research and
Development Partnerships," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/about-research-and-
development-partnerships. [Accessed 21 January 2016].
[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee," [Online].
Available: The Homeland Security Science and Technology
Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) serves as a source of. [Accessed
21 January 2016].
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Homeland Security
Science and Technology Advisory Committee Charter," [Online].
Available: http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/
homeland-security-science-and-technology-advisory-committee
-charter. [Accessed 21 January 2016].
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "International
Cooperative Programs Office," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/st-icpo. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "About the Office of
National Laboratories," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/office-national-laboratories. [Accessed
21 January 2016].
[10] Energy.Gov, "Department of Energy National
Laboratories," [Online]. Available: http://energy.gov/maps/doe-
national-laboratories. [Accessed 22 January 2016].
[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS InnoPrize Program
- Prize Competitions," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/prize-competitions. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Small Business
Innovation Research Program," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/sbir. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[13] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "The Office of SAFETY
Act Implementation," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/safety-act. [Accessed 21 January 2016].
[14] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Technology Transfer
Program," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/science-and-
technology/technology-transfer-program. [Accessed 21 January
2016].
[15] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Long-Range Broad
Agency Announcement," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/st-lrbaa. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[16] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Welcome to the
Centers of Excellence," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
science-and-technology/centers-excellence. [Accessed 21
January 2016].
[17] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Office of University
Programs," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/science-and
-technology/office-university-programs. [Accessed 21 January
2016].
[18] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Science and
Technology Directorate Review 2014," Washington, DC, 2014.
Chapter 26: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
[1] D. A. Shea, "The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture: Issues
for Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2009.
[2] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
domestic-nuclear-detection-office. [Accessed 23 January 2016].
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office Organizational Chart," 8 August 2015. [Online].
Available: http://www.dhs.gov/publication/dndo-organizational-
chart. [Accessed 23 January 2016].
[4] J. Medalia, "Detection of Nuclear Weapons and Materials:
Science, Technologies, Observations," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2010.
Appendix D: Works Cited
708
Chapter 27: Intelligence & Analysis
[1] M. A. Randol, "The Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight
Challenges for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[2] M. A. Randol, "The Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight
Challenges for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2009.
[3] "Office of Intelligence and Analysis," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/office-intelligence-and-analysis. [Accessed 23
January 2016].
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Department of
Homeland Security Interaction with State and Local Fusion
Centers; Concept of Operations," Washington, DC, 2008.
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Office of Intelligence
and Analysis Organizational Chart," 7 June 2011. [Online].
Available: http://www.dhs.gov/publication/office-intelligence-
and-analysis-organizational-chart. [Accessed 23 January 2016].
[6] M. A. Randol, "Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions,
Statutory Definitions, and Approaches," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2009.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Office of Intelligence
and Analysis Mission," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
office-intelligence-and-analysis-mission. [Accessed 25 January
2016].
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Office of Cyber &
Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA)," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/office-cyber-infrastructure-analysis. [Accessed 25
January 2016].
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Office of Operations
Coordination," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/office-
operations-coordination. [Accessed 26 January 2016].
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Network of
Fusion Centers Fact Sheet," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet.
[Accessed 26 January 2016].
[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Terrorism
Advisory System," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
national-terrorism-advisory-system. [Accessed 26 January 2016].
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Fact Sheet: Update to
the National Terrorism Advisory System," [Online]. Available:
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/12/16/update-national-
terrorism-advisory-system. [Accessed 26 January 2016].
[13] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "DHS Intelligence
Analysis: Additional Actions Needed to Address Analytic
Priorities and Workforce Challenges," Washington, DC, 2014.
Chapter 28: FEMA
[1] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "About the
Agency," [Online]. Available: https://www.fema.gov/about-
agency. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[2] E. S. Blake, T. B. Kimberlain, R. J. Berg, J. P. Gangialosi and J. L.
Beven II, "Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Sandy," National
Hurricane Center, 2013.
[3] J. T. Brown, F. X. McCarthy and E. C. Liu, "Analysis of the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act of 2013," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2013.
[4] Federal Emergency Management Act, "Sandy Recovery Act of
2013," 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/sand-
recovery-improvement-act-2013. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[5] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "FEMA: Prepared.
Responsive. Committed.," 2008. [Online]. Available: http://
www.fema.gov/pdf/about/brochuer.pdf. [Accessed 22
December 2015].
[6] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "FEMA Leadership
Organizational Structure," [Online]. Available: https://
www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/28183.
[Accessed 27 February 2016].
[7] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Regional Contact
Information," [Online]. Available: https://www.fema.gov/
regional-contact-information. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[8] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "National
Preparedness," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/media
-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/
National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. [Accessed 22
December 2015].
[9] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
Goal: Second Edition," Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, 2015.
[10] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Whole
Community," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/whole-
community#. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[11] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Reservist
Program," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/reservist-
program. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[12] Federal emergency Management Agency, "Community
Emergency Response Teams," [Online]. Available: http://
www.fema.gov/community-emergency-response-teams.
[Accessed 22 December 2015].
[13] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Urban Search and
Rescue," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/urban-
search-rescue. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
Appendix D: Works Cited
709
[14] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Voluntary, Faith
Based, & Community-Based Organizations," [Online]. Available:
http://www.fema.gov/voluntary-faith-based-community-based-
organizations . [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[15] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Disaster Recovery
Centers," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/disaster-
recovery-centers. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[16] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "About the Ready
Campaign," [Online]. Available: http://www.ready.gov/about-us.
[Accessed 22 December 2015].
[17] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Climate
Change," [Online]. Available: http://www.fema.gov/climate-
change. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[18] The White House, "Executive Order 13653: Recommendations
to the President," [Online]. Available: https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
task_force_report_0.pdf. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
Chapter 29: U.S. Coast Guard
[1] R. I. Johnson, "Guardians of the Sea, History of the United States
Coast Guard," Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 1988.
[2] United States Coast Guard, "U.S. Coast Guard History," [Online].
Available: http://www.Coast Guard.mil/history/articles/
h_COAST GUARDhistory.asp. [Accessed 3 October 2015].
[3] United States Coast Guard, "Timeline of the Coast Guard
History," [Online]. Available: http://www.Coast_Guard.mil/
history/faqs/when.asp. [Accessed 3 October 2015].
[4] United States Coast Guard, "Historic Missions," [Online].
Available: http://www.Coast_Guard.mil/history/
Missionindex.asp. [Accessed 3 October 2015].
[5] United States Coast Guard, "Coast Guard Publication 1: Doctrine
for the U.S. Coast Guard," 2014.
[6] United States Coast Guard, "Organization," [Online]. Available:
http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/organization.asp. [Accessed 3
October 2015].
[7] United States Coast Guard, "Units," [Online]. Available: http://
www.uscg.mil/top/units/. [Accessed 3 October 2015].
[8] T. Coburn, "A Review of the Department of Homeland Security's
Missions and Performance," 2015.
Chapter 30: Transportation Security Administration
[1] Transportation Security Administration, "Transportation Security
Overview," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
transportation-security-overview. [Accessed 22 December
2015].
[2] Transportation Security Administration, "Transportation Security
Results," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/
transportation-security-results. [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[3] "Public Law 107-71: Aviation and Transportation Security Act,"
Washington, DC, 2001.
[4] Transportation Security Administration, "Mission," [Online].
Available: https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mission. [Accessed 22
December 2015].
[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Transportation Security
Administration has strengthened planning to guide investments
in key aviation security programs, but more work remains,"
Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC, 2008.
[6] M. Grabell, "Federal Air Marshal Service," Pro Publica, 2008.
[7] Office of Inspector General, "Effectiveness of TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors," Transportation Security
Administration, Washington, DC, 2009.
[8] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "TSA's explosives
detection canine program: Status of increasing the number of
canine teams," Government Accountability Office, Washington,
DC, 2008.
[9] All America Auto Transport, "What is TSA?," [Online]. Available:
https://www.aaat.com/transport-security-administration.cfm.
[Accessed 27 February 2016].
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Budget in Brief
FY2016," Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC,
2015.
[11] Transportation Security Administration, "Aviation
Security," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/aviation-
security . [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[12] Transportation Security Administration, "Security
Screening," [Online]. Available: http://www.tsa.gov/travel/
security-screening . [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[13] Department of Homeland Security, "DHS Traveler Redress
Inquiry Program (TRIP)," [Online]. Available: http://
www.dhs.gov/dhs-trip . [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[14] Transportation Security Administration, "Training," [Online].
Available: https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/training . [Accessed
22 December 2015].
[15] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Privacy Impact
Assessment for the Alien Flight Student Program," Department
of Homeland Security, Washington, DC, 2014.
Appendix D: Works Cited
710
[16] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Cargo
Screening," [Online]. Available: http://www.dhs.gov/cargo-
screening . [Accessed 22 December 2015].
[17] Office of the Inspector General, "TSA's preparedness for mass
transit and passenger rail emergencies," Transportation Security
Administration, Washington, DC, 2010.
Chapter 31: U.S. Customs & Border Protection
[1] H. C. Relyea and H. B. Hogue, "Department of Homeland
Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2005.
[2] V. C. Jones and L. Seghetti, "U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Trade Facilitation, Enforcement, and Security," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2015.
[3] L. Seghetti, "Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between
Ports of Entry," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2014.
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "U.S. Customs and
Border Protection: Leadership/Organization," [Online].
Available: http://www.cbp.gov/about/leadership-organization.
[Accessed 27 January 2016].
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "U.S. Customs and
Border Protection: Assistant Commissioners' Office," [Online].
Available: http://www.cbp.gov/about/leadership/assistant-
commissioners-offices. [Accessed 27 January 2016].
[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "CBP Organization
Chart," 9 April 2015. [Online]. Available: http://www.cbp.gov/
document/publications/cbp-organization-chart. [Accessed 27
January 2016].
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "U.S. Customs and
Border Protection," [Online]. Available: http://www.cbp.gov/
about/leadership/commissioners-staff-offices. [Accessed 27
January 2016].
[8] C. C. Haddal, "Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border
Patrol," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2010.
Chapter 31: U.S. Secret Service
[1] S. Reese, "The U.S. Secret Service: History and Missions,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2014.
[2] White House Press Office, "President to Propose Department of
Homeland Security," The White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[3] M. A. Randol, "The Department of Homeland Security
Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight
Challenges for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2010.
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "U.S. Secret Service
Organization Chart," 7 June 2011. [Online]. Available: https://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/org-chart-usss.pdf. [Accessed 29
January 2016].
[5] GOP.gov, "House Republicans: Legislative Digests," [Online].
Available: http://www.gop.gov/bill/h-r-1656-secret-service-
improvements-act-of-2015-as-amended/. [Accessed 29 January
2016].
[6] CONGRESS.GOV, "H.R. 1656 - Secret Service Improvements Act
of 2015," [Online]. Available: https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1656. [Accessed 29 January
2016].
Chapter 33: U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement
[1] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Who We
Are," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/about. [Accessed
28 February 2016].
[2] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "History," [Online].
Available: https://www.ice.gov/history. [Accessed 29 February
2016].
[3] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "What We
Do," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/overview#wcm-
survey-target-id. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[4] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement," [Online]. Available: https://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/org-chart-ice.pdf. [Accessed 28
February 2016].
[5] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Human
Trafficking," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/human-
trafficking. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[6] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Human
Smuggling," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/human-
smuggling. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[7] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Money
Laundering," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/money-
laundering. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[8] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Bulk Cash
Smuggling Center," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/
bulk-cash-smuggling-center. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[9] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Firearms,
Ammunition, and Explosives Smuggling Investigations," [Online].
Available: https://www.ice.gov/firearms-explosives-smuggling.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
[10] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Border
Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)," [Online]. Available:
https://www.ice.gov/best. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
Appendix D: Works Cited
711
[11] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Cultural Property,
Art and Antiquities Investigations," [Online]. Available: https://
www.ice.gov/cultural-art-investigations. [Accessed 28 February
2016].
[12] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "HSI Forensic
Laboratory," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/hsi-fl.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
[13] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Cyber Crimes
Center," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/cyber-crimes.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
[14] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Child Exploitation
Investigations Unit," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/
predator. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[15] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "National Security
Unit," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/national-security
-unit. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[16] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Counterterrorism
and Criminal Exploitation Unit," [Online]. Available: https://
www.ice.gov/counterterrorism-and-criminal-exploitation-unit.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
[17] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Student and
Exchange Visitor Program," [Online]. Available: https://
www.ice.gov/sevis. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[18] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Counter-
Proliferation Investigations Program," [Online]. Available:
https://www.ice.gov/cpi. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[19] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Export
Enforcement Coordination Center," [Online]. Available: https://
www.ice.gov/eecc. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[20] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Project Shield
America," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/project-
shield-america. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[21] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Visa Security
Program," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/visa-security
-program. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[22] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Illicit Pathways
Attack Strategy," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/ipas.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
[23] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Enforcement and
Removal Operations," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/
ero. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[24] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "IMAGE," [Online].
Available: https://www.ice.gov/image. [Accessed 28 February
2016].
[25] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Worksite
Enforcement," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/
worksite. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[26] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Detention
Management," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/
detention-management. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[27] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Fugitive
Operations," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/fugitive-
operations. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[28] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Criminal Alien
Program," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/criminal-
alien-program. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[29] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Identity and
Benefit Fraud," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/identity
-benefit-fraud. [Accessed 28 February 2016].
[30] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "ICE Enforcement
and Removal Operations Report," Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC, 2015.
[31] M. R. Rosenblum and W. A. Kandel, "Interior Immigration
Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2013.
[32] A. Bruno, "Immigration-Related Worksite Enforcement:
Performance Measures," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2015.
[33] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Written testimony of
CBP Deputy Commissioner Keven McAleenan and ICE Deputy
Director Daniel Ragsdale," [Online]. Available: https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2014/04/08/written-testimony-cbp-and-ice
-house-homeland-security-subcommittee-border-and. [Accessed
29 February 2016].
[34] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Joint Terrorism
Task Force," [Online]. Available: https://www.ice.gov/jttf.
[Accessed 28 February 2016].
Chapter 34: U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services
[1] W. A. Kandel, "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
Functions and Funding," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2015.
[2] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Our
History," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
our-history. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[3] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "What We
Do," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/what-
we-do. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[4] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "USCIS Organizational
Chart," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
uscis-organizational-chart. [Accessed 2 March 2016].
Appendix D: Works Cited
712
[5] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of Public
Engagement to Customer Service and Public engagement
Directorate," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/directorates-and-program-offices/customer-service-and-
public-engagement-directorate/office-public-engagement-
customer-service-and-public-engagement-directorate.
[Accessed 3 March 2016].
[6] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Field Operations
Directorate," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/directorates-and-program-offices/field-operations-
directorate. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[7] U.S. Citizenship and immigration Services, "Fraud Detection and
National Security Directorate," [Online]. Available: https://
www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/
fraud-detection-and-national-security/fraud-detection-and-
national-security-directorate. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[8] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Refugee, Asylum,
and International Operations Directorate," [Online]. Available:
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-
offices/refugee-asylum-and-international-operations-
directorate. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[9] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Service Center
Operations Directorate," [Online]. Available: https://
www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/
service-center-operations-directorate/service-center-operations
-directorate. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[10] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "The Administrative
Appeals Office (AAO)," [Online]. Available: https://
www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/
administrative-appeals-office-aao/administrative-appeals-office-
aao. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[11] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of Intake and
Document Production," [Online]. Available: https://
www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/
lockbox-intake/office-intake-and-document-production.
[Accessed 3 March 2016].
[12] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of
Citizenship," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-
us/directorates-and-program-offices/office-citizenship.
[Accessed 3 March 2016].
[13] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of
Communications," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/
about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/office-
communications. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[14] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of Legislative
Affairs," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
directorates-and-program-offices/office-legislative-affairs.
[Accessed 3 March 2016].
[15] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of
Privacy," [Online]. Available: https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/
directorates-and-program-offices/office-privacy-0. [Accessed 3
March 2016].
[16] U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, "Office of
Transformation Coordination," [Online]. Available: https://
www.uscis.gov/about-us/directorates-and-program-offices/
office-transformation-coordination. [Accessed 3 March 2016].
[17] M. R. Rosenblum and R. E. Wasem, "Comprehensive
Immigration Reform in the 113th Congress: Major Provisions in
Senate-Passed S. 744," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2013.
Part V: Mission Partners
Chapter 35: Congress
[1] F. M. Kaiser, "American National Government: An Overview,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2004.
[2] W. J. Oleszek, "Congressional Oversight: An Overview,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2010.
[3] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report," Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[4] The Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of
Pennsylvania, "Reflections on the Tenth Anniversary of the 9/11
Commission Report," Annenberg Public Policy Center,
Philadelphia, PA, 2014.
[5] J. Zuckerman, "Politics Over Security: Homeland Security
Congressional Oversight in Dire Need of Reform," Heritage
Foundation, September 2012. [Online]. Available: http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/homeland-
security-congressional-oversight-in-dire-need-of-reform/.
[Accessed 12 January 2016].J. Markon, "Department of
Homeland Security has 120 Reasons to Want Streamlined
Oversight," The Washington Post, 25 September 2014. [Online].
Available: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-
eye/2014/09/25/outsized-congressional-oversight-wighting-
down-department-of-homeland-security/. [Accessed 12 January
2016].
[6] H. H. Willis, "Streamlining Congressional Oversight of DHS," The
Rand Corporation, July 2014. [Online]. Available: HTTP://
WWW.RAND.ORG/BLOG/2014/07/STREAMLINING-
CONGRESSIONAL-OVERSIGHT-OF-DHS.HTML. [Accessed 12
January 2016].
Appendix D: Works Cited
713
Chapter 36: National Security Council
[1] J. R. A. Best, "The National Security Council: An Organizational
Assessment," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2011.
[2] A. G. Whittaker, S. A. Brown, F. C. Smith and E. McKune, "The
National Security Process: The Security Council and Interagency
System," Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National
Defense University, Washington, DC, 2011.
[3] H. C. Relyea, "The Executive Office of the President: An Historical
Overview," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2008.
Chapter 37: Intelligence Community
[1] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Intelligence
Community," [Online]. Available: http://www.dni.gov/
index.php. [Accessed 20 March 2016].
[2] M. Warner, "Wanted: A Definition of "Intelligence"," Central
Intelligence Agency, 2007. [Online]. Available: https://
www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no3/article02.html.
[Accessed 20 March 2016].
[3] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "History of the CIA," 10 April
2007. [Online]. Available: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/history
-of-the-cia. [Accessed 20 March 2016].
[4] Federation of American Scientists, "The Evolution of the U.S.
Intelligence Community - An Historical Overview," 23 February
1996. [Online]. Available: http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html.
[Accessed 20 March 2016].
[5] 50 U.S.C 401, "National Security Act of 1947," Washington, DC,
1947.
[6] Foreign Policy, "The Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures,"
3 January 2012. [Online]. Available: http://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/03/the-ten-biggest-american-
intelligence-failures/. [Accessed 20 March 2016].
[7] R. A. Best Jr., "Director of National Intelligence Statutory
Authorities: Status and Proposals," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2011.
[8] M. C. Erwin, "Intelligence Issues for Congress," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, DC, 2013.
[9] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "U.S. National
Intelligence," Washington, DC, 2011.
[10] Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "ODNI
FAQ," [Online]. Available: http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/
faq?start=2. [Accessed 21 March 2016].
[11] U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, "The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978," [Online].
Available: https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/
statutes/1286. [Accessed 21 March 2016].
[12] J. K. Elsea, "Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified
Defense Information," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2013.
[13] J. W. Rollins and E. C. Liu, "NSA Surveillance Leaks: Background
and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2013.
[14] Congressional Research Service, "Legal Sidebar: USA FREEDOM
Act Reinstates Expired USA PATRIOT Act Provisions but Limits
bulk Collection," Congressional Research Service, Washington,
DC, 2015.
[15] Randol, Mark A., "Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions,
Statutory Definitions, and Approaches," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2009.
Chapter 38: Department of Defense
[1] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JP-1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States," Washington, DC, 2013.
[2] U.S. Department of Defense, "JP 3-27, Homeland Defense,"
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 2013.
[3] U.S. Department of Defense, "Strategy for Homeland Defense
and Defense Support of Civil Authorities," Washington, DC,
2013.
[4] M. J. Reents, "Operation Noble Eagle and The Use of Combat Air
Patrols for Homeland Defense," Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA, 2008.
[5] B. Wilson, "Interagency Collaboration on the High Seas,"
InterAgency Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, Winter 2011, pp. 58-65, 2011.
[6] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JP 3-28: Defense Support
of Civil Authorities," Washington, DC, 2013.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Response
Framework," Department of Homeland Security, Washington,
DC, 2013.
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Emergency Support
Function Annexes: Introduction," Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC, 2008.
[9] W. Knight, "Homeland Security: Roles and Mission for United
States Northern Command," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2008.
Appendix D: Works Cited
714
Chapter 39: National Guard
[1] National Governors' Association, "NGA Policy Statement HHS-
03, Army and Air National Guard," National Governors
Association, 2010.
[2] S. Bowman, L. Kapp and A. Belasco, "Hurricane Katrina: DOD
Disaster Response," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2005.
[3] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Defense Management:
Actions Needed to Ensure National Guard and Reserve
Headquarters Are Sized to be Efficient," GAO, Washington, DC,
2013.
[4] A. Feickert and L. Kapp, "Army Active Component (AC) / Reserve
Component (RC) Force Mix: Considerations and Options for
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2014.
[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Reserve Forces: Army
National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for 21st Century
Challenges," GAO, Washington, DC, 2006.
[6] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Second
Report to Congress," 2007.
[7] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "JP 3-28: Defense Support
of Civil Authorities," Washington, DC, 2013.
[8] Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, "State Adjutant General,"
Wikipedia Contributors, 8 March 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=State_adjutant_general&oldid=708869138. [Accessed 25
March 2016].
[9] The White House, "The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:
Lessons Learned," Washington, DC, 2006.
[10] Emergency Management Assistance Compact, "What is
EMAC?," [Online]. Available: http://www.emacweb.org/
index.php/learnaboutemac/what-is-emac. [Accessed 25 March
2016].
[11] Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, "Hurricane Katrina,"
Wikipedia Contributors, 15 March 2016. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Hurricane_Katrina&oldid=710204583. [Accessed 25 March
2016].
[12] R. Burke and S. McNeil, "Toward a Unified Military Response:
Hurricane Sandy and the Dual Status Commander," United
States Army War College Press, Carlisle, PA, 2015.
[13] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, "Final Report
to Congress and the Secretary of Defense," Washington, DC,
2008.
[14] W. Knight, "Homeland Security: Roles and Mission for United
States Northern Command," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2008.
[15] R. C. Mason, "Securing America's Borders: The Role of the
Military," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2013.
[16] U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Homeland Defense:
National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams'
Mission and address Management Challenges," GAO,
Washington, DC, 2006.
[17] Wikipedia Contributors, "Civil Support Team," Wikipedia, The
Free Encyclopedia, 29 September 2015. [Online]. Available:
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?
title=Civil_Support_Team&oldid=683234224. [Accessed 26
March 2016].
[18] National Guard Bureau, "Homeland Response Force Fact Sheet,"
NGB, Washington, DC, 2014.
[19] L. Kapp and N. Serafino, "The National Guard State Partnership
Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2011.
Chapter 40: Federal Bureau of Investigation
[1] J. P. Bjelopera, "The Federal Bureau of Investigation and
Terrorism Investigations," Congressional Research Service,
Washington, DC, 2013.
Chapter 41: State & Local Law Enforcement
[1] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "DHS' Role in State and
Local Fusion Centers is Evolving," DHS Office of Inspector
General, Washington, DC, 2008.
[2] U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, "Federal
Support For and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers,"
Washington, DC, 2012.
[3] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "State and Major Urban
Area Fusion Centers," [Online]. Available: https://www.dhs.gov/
state-and-major-urban-area-fusion-centers. [Accessed 26 March
2016].
[4] J. Rollins, "Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2008.
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Fusion Center
Locations and Contact Information," [Online]. Available: https://
www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
[Accessed 26 March 2016].
[6] U.S. Department of Justice, "Fusion Center Guidelines,"
Washington, DC, 2008.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Department of
Homeland Security Interaction with State and Local Fusion
Centers Concept of Operations," Washington, DC, 2008.
Appendix D: Works Cited
715
Chapter 42: First Responders
[1] Office of Homeland Security, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," The White House, Washington, DC, 2002.
[2] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, "The 9/11 Commission Report: Executive Summary,"
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2004.
[3] K. Bea, W. Krouse, D. Morgan, W. Morrissey and C. S. Redhead,
"Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of the
Department of Homeland Security," Congressional Research
Service, Washington, DC, 2003.
[4] K. Bea, "The National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th
Congress," Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC,
2005.
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
Goal," Washington, DC, 2005.
[6] Federal Emergency Management Agency, "CPG-101: Developing
and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans," Washington, DC,
2010.
[7] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
Guidelines," Washington, DC, 2007.
[8] Homeland Security Council, "National Strategy for Homeland
Security," Washington, DC, 2007.
[9] K. Bea, "Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After
Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2007.
[10] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
Goal," Washington, DC, 2011.
[11] J. T. Brown, "Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National
Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress,"
Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, 2011.
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Preparedness
System," Washington, DC, 2011.
Appendix D: Works Cited
Homeland Security:
Safeguarding the U.S. from domestic catastrophic destruction
What is homeland security and why do we need it? What was unique about the
9/11 attacks that prompted the largest reorganization of the Federal government
since the end of World War II? What is the difference between homeland security
and national security? Why is critical infrastructure protection so critical? Why is
emergency management an essential mission area within homeland security?
What is the relationship between homeland security and DoD, National Guard,
FBI, and State and Local law enforcement? Explore these questions and the
events that made homeland security what it is today. Find out why homeland
security is an unprecedented historical challenge requiring an unprecedented
government response. Review the homeland security mission areas and
understand not only what is being done but also why. Discover “who’s who and
what do they do” within the Department of Homeland Security and the greater
Homeland Security Enterprise. This book provides the most comprehensive
overview and most concise resource for understanding homeland security today.
Within these pages you will find insight to the most pressing challenges of the 21st
century confronting the nation, your community, and you.
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