

corporated this proposal into the draft agreements, although it was clearly not sufficient for Germany.

Late in the afternoon, Tudjman left for Zagreb to preside over the opening of the new Croatian Parliament. He promised to return in a few days. In our last meeting before his departure, he again asked that an American general officer be put in charge of the United Nations Transitional Authority in eastern Slavonia—a request I promised to support strongly.

We reached agreement that day on another important issue: the relationship between the IFOR commander and the High Representative—although it was not, to my mind, a good agreement. From his headquarters in Belgium, General Joulwan had called Clark and me repeatedly since the beginning of the negotiations to warn that he “would never accept” any arrangement, no matter how weak, that institutionalized a relationship between the IFOR commander and Bildt, who was slated to be the first High Representative. Because, as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Joulwan was not part of the American military chain of command, he had the authority to reject “guidance” from Washington on any issue involving his own command arrangements. His veto of any formal ties between the two senior people in Bosnia was to leave an unfortunate legacy, as Pauline Neville-Jones wrote later:

Either the High Representative should have been given more authority, or civilian implementation should have been made considerably less ambitious. . . . Much acrimony had surrounded the role played by the senior UN official in theatre, who had come in some quarters to signify civilian interference in the military chain of command. This situation led US negotiators in Dayton to resist including in the implementation structures any sort of body which would provide a forum for the civilian administrator and military commander to discuss and find solutions to problems and issues which spanned their separate responsibilities. . . . Preventing interference should not be confused with promoting cooperation.¹

Buildup and Build-down. On this, the fifteenth day of negotiations, there was a White House principals' meeting to settle the last outstanding internal issues. Clark, Kornblum, and Gallucci attended by secure video. A decision was also reached on the most controversial and criticized aspect of our policy: whether we should train and arm the Federation, or try to reduce the overall level of armaments in Bosnia.

This was one of our greatest dilemmas. In an ideal world, the several armies of Bosnia-Herzegovina should have been sharply reduced in size and merged into a single force controlled by the central government. However, NATO refused to accept implementation of such a policy as part of its mission. This eliminated any hope, as Pauline Neville-Jones wrote later, “of getting the par-

ties to agree at Dayton to share military power."² Sadly, we would have to allow each entity within a single country to maintain its own military force—a fundamental flaw in our postwar structure, but nonetheless inevitable, given the self-imposed constraints on what the outside powers were willing to do.

Thus the most controversial of all programs for Bosnia—to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims—resurfaced. The version under discussion was a postwar variant of the original proposal to arm the Muslims, which had been championed by a powerful group of Senators led by Republican Majority Leader Bob Dole and two senior Democrats, Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and Joe Biden of Delaware. Some bitter Washington debates had been fought over their proposal, which the Administration had opposed on the grounds that it would have violated the United Nations arms embargo.* Facing a defeat in Congress on this issue, President Clinton had pledged that in the event of a peace agreement, the United States would lead an effort to equip and train the Federation in order to "level the playing field" so that it could defend itself. The military hated this idea, which they believed would increase the chances of another war and undermine their desire to be "evenhanded" in enforcing a peace agreement. They also feared that if the United States took part in "Equip and Train," as the program was renamed, its peacekeepers would become targets for Serb reprisals. Our European allies took an even stronger position against Equip and Train.

Despite the commitment of the President, the Pentagon continued in every internal policy debate to oppose military assistance to the Federation. Led by Shalikhvili and Slocombe, they gained agreement during the November 15 White House meeting for a series of measures that did not kill the program but limited American visibility and involvement in it. Specifically, the principals agreed that there would be no active American involvement by American military personnel in Equip and Train, and that the weapons should come from other nations.

To bridge the gap with the Pentagon we added another annex, one that would reduce the level of armaments on all sides—a sort of modified arms-control policy for Bosnia that we called "build-down." Like Equip and Train, build-down was in part a result of congressional pressure. It originated in discussions in late 1994 between Perry and Senators Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, and Dick Lugar, Republican of Indiana, two influential moderates who had supported the Administration's effort to defeat Dole and Lieberman. (It was an interesting feature of Bosnia policy that the congressional debate did not follow party lines.) Whether one supported Equip and Train or not, build-down was an inherently good idea, an indirect step toward disarming the

*As recounted earlier, I had advocated a variant of this idea in 1992–93.

swollen armies of Bosnia—provided it did not become a vehicle for weakening the Muslims.

In the end, after much debate in the principals' meeting on November 15, the Administration reached a compromise that confused people at first, but made sense: it decided to support *both* buildup and build-down—that is, an Equip and Train program, accompanied by an arms-control annex. These two programs would be carried out at roughly the same time, according to carefully calibrated schedules and ratios.

We thus added a new annex to the draft agreements for Dayton—Annex 1-B, "The Agreement of Regional Stabilization," commonly referred to as the "arms-control," or "build-down," annex. This annex required the parties to reduce their armaments to ratios that had been carefully calibrated by the Pentagon. Under this concept, a 5:2:2 ratio would be established among Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Bosnia, respectively. The Bosnian allotment would be further divided between the Federation and Republika Srpska, with the Federation getting twice as many armaments as the Bosnian Serbs. These ratios were designed to protect the Federation from ever again being overwhelmed by Serb military power. Unfortunately, the Pentagon once again refused to include an enforcement provision in Annex 1-B. Thus some of the most difficult of all goals—general arms reduction, "restrictions on military deployments and exercises," and the "immediate establishment of military liaison missions"—were left to the goodwill of parties who had no goodwill.

There was one provision I insisted on, over the initial objections of the Pentagon: the "withdrawal of Forces and heavy weapons to cantonment/barracks areas." The Pentagon had objected to every attempt to include cantonment in Annex 1-A, which would have made it an IFOR obligation, but they reluctantly agreed to include it in Annex 1-B, which meant that while it would be a goal it would not be an IFOR task. Months later, when IFOR was on the ground, its commanders finally saw the value of the cantonment provision, and informed the Bosnian Serbs that they would insist on it as part of their core mission. Once IFOR took this line, the Bosnian Serbs began to respond, and, although compliance was never perfect, the cantonment provision proved to be extremely useful.

To many people, these two programs—one to *build up* the strength of the Federation, the other to *build down* the overall military forces in the country—seemed contradictory. But it was the best course available to us. Under Annex 1-B, there was room to build up the Federation forces and stay within the 5:2:2 ratio. But if the Serbs did not respect the annex on build-down, the Equip and Train program was already in place to strengthen the Federation. And when it came time, in early 1996, to set up the Equip and Train program, Christopher and I chose the best possible person to head it—one of its authors, Jim Pardew.

Dinner with Haris. We were still worried about Haris Silajdzic. Menzies, who knew him well, described him as a "caged panther." Frozen out of important discussions by Izetbegovic or Sacirbey, the Bosnian Prime Minister became depressed and increasingly fatalistic. Still looking for ways to reach out to him, I invited him to dinner, and Kati returned to Dayton specifically for the event, since on her first visit Haris had talked to her several times about his dreams for his country and himself.

To emphasize the special nature of the occasion, we took him to L'Auberge, an excellent French restaurant in Dayton. As we ordered caviar and a fine meal, I tried to talk about something other than the details of the negotiation. What were his hopes—personal and political? What did he want for his country? Could he re-engage himself in the talks? Could he negotiate directly with Milosevic?

Relaxing after days of isolation within his own delegation, Silajdzic talked movingly about his family in Istanbul, his young son, and his early days as a student in Sarajevo. But when we said that the future of Bosnia depended on rebuilding multiethnic co-existence, he retreated into an unreachable pessimism. I cited Nelson Mandela as a true leader, a man who could forgive his jailers and embrace power sharing with the very people against whom he had struggled for thirty years. The connection did not seem relevant to Haris. "You don't understand," he said bleakly. "You don't understand what we have been through."

"Perhaps we *don't* understand what you have been through," I replied, "but it was your request that we create a single country, and we are well on the way to accomplishing this. You were one of its chief proponents. Why are we trying to do this if you don't think it can work? Unless you and Izetbegovic reach out to your adversaries, both Serb and Croat, you will isolate yourselves and fail."

Haris did not dispute that he and Izetbegovic had both asked us to negotiate a single country. Instead, he returned to the horrors of 1992. "What you want would have been easier in 1992 or even 1993," he said, "but now it may be too late. Where was the world then? Where was the United States?"

More deaths would not honor the dead—only create more dead, I said passionately. We wanted the war criminals brought to justice, and would not compromise on this issue, but if the Muslims wanted a central government for Bosnia—again, I stressed, *their* own choice—they had to find a way to work with some of the Croats and Serbs, hard though that would be.

These were bleak thoughts, in sharp contrast to the surroundings. Haris was somewhere else, far away. But he had calmed down, and our arguments turned out to have a positive effect on him. Moreover, the evening helped make him feel that he still had an important role to play.

DAY SIXTEEN: THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16

How much longer could we continue without significant progress on the key territorial issues? The question hung over us during a particularly gloomy 8:00 A.M. staff meeting. Having worked on Silajdzic the previous evening, I decided the next target should be Milosevic, and shortly after 10:00 A.M. Chris Hill and I invited him to take a walk.

It was a clear, dry day—and extremely cold. Dressed in bulky ski jackets and overcoats, we paced the perimeter of the base, trailed discreetly by security guards, for almost two hours. Chris and I put it to Milosevic bluntly: Secretary Christopher was returning to Dayton the next day, and we had no progress to report. Rather than ask for specific concessions, we called for a major gesture of “goodwill” from Milosevic to show he was serious about an agreement. I offered Milosevic two models for Dayton. In one, he could “play Sadat,” and show the Bosnians he was ready to make major concessions to get peace. In the other, we could shut down without an agreement, in which case the sanctions on his country would remain in place and the war might resume. Milosevic, in a thoughtful mood, said he would consider “what kind of gesture” he could make.

By a long and roundabout route we arrived at the Wright-Patterson Officers’ Club around noon and went to the table that was always reserved for Milosevic. I called Rosemarie, who had taken Silajdzic on a similar walk. She decided to bring him to the club for lunch. Arriving fifteen minutes later, she led Silajdzic and John Menzies to a table at the opposite end of the large central dining room, as far from Milosevic as possible.

Thus the stage was set for an unusual diplomatic effort that was later termed the “napkin shuttle.” Leaving Milosevic, I walked across the long dining room to greet Silajdzic. “Are you ready to negotiate right now?” I asked him. “Milosevic is willing to talk about Gorazde.” Haris was interested, but when I invited him to join our table, he refused.

I returned to Milosevic, who was eating his steak with Chris Hill. “Silajdzic is ready to discuss Gorazde,” I reported. Taking out a napkin, Milosevic started drawing a rough map of the area between Sarajevo and the beleaguered enclave. “We can offer safe conduct along these two roads,” he said, indicating the two existing routes between the cities, both now under Serb control. Hill and I objected, saying that the Bosnians would not feel that “safe conduct” would be very safe in light of the last four years. “They will need a genuine, defensible corridor,” I said. “Okay, then I will give them a kilometer on each side of the road,” Milosevic replied.

Carrying Milosevic’s napkin sketch across the room, I sat down with Silajdzic, who, after a moment’s thought, replied with a countersketch showing a

much wider corridor and substantially more land for the Muslims. As the other diners looked on in astonishment, I walked rapidly across the room carrying the two precious napkin sketches, and sat down again with Milosevic.

This scene was repeated half a dozen times over the next hour. Neither man would move to the other's table, but they eyed each other carefully across the room. Bit by bit, Milosevic yielded land and territory, until the gap between the two men was fairly narrow. Haris went to a phone and called Izetbegovic, who told him to keep negotiating. Finally, I said to Silajdzic, "Don't you realize that you are gaining something important here? You have to sit down with him. If you come over to Milosevic's table now you might get what you need." Reluctantly, Haris followed me to Milosevic's table. The two men greeted each other in characteristic fashion—Milosevic clapping Silajdzic on the back with false camaraderie, Silajdzic unwilling to look Milosevic in the eye.

The other diners gradually left, and by three in the afternoon we were alone in the large room, Milosevic, Silajdzic, Hill, and myself. Rosemarie and Menzies, having delivered their man, had silently slipped away. The two men argued, in English and in their common tongue, over every detail of the area between Sarajevo and Gorazde. The road, the hydroelectric plants, the destroyed mosques, the small village along the road where General Mladic came from—all were discussed with passion and anger.

They did not resolve their differences, and the meeting ended without agreement. *But for the first time the two sides had actually negotiated on a territorial issue.* Our long talks with each man had had an effect; there was a noticeable change in tone. For the first time, Milosevic accepted the need to create a secure land corridor to Gorazde. Once we had crossed this mini-Rubicon—"actually, the Drina," Hill joked—we were, in essence, arguing over the location and width of the corridor. These were negotiable. Although we did not resolve the Gorazde issue in the "napkin shuttle," the meeting marked the first time anyone on either side had shown a readiness to look for territorial compromises.

During the day, Federation President Zubak again threatened to resign. This time his anger was aimed at Tudjman and his fellow Croats, who, he felt, were selling out the Posavina, his home area. He did not feel he could go home again if the territorial agreements at Dayton did not include a Serb "giveback" of some of this land. He felt that the land negotiations were, so far, effectively conceding the Posavina to the Serbs. If this happened, he said, he would have to resign and leave Dayton immediately.

My first instinct was to let him depart. Zubak had been nothing but trouble at Dayton. Susak had always told us to ignore him. But Izetbegovic and Sacirbey both said we should help retain Zubak. After several emotional meetings

and a pledge from both Tudjman and Izetbegovic not to ignore the Posavina, Zubak again backed off, and agreed to stay.

It was time for our next high-level visitor from Washington, Tony Lake. Accompanied by Sandy Vershbow, he arrived in the midafternoon at the base. After a briefing at the Hope Center, Tony and I called on the two Presidents. Tony had decided not to try to negotiate during his short visit, but rather to send a strong message, in President Clinton's name, to reinforce our effort.

The meeting with Izetbegovic was fairly routine, but the Lake-Milosevic meeting set off some sparks. Milosevic began with a typical ploy. "I hear you're the most anti-Serb official in Washington," he said. Tony was pleased by what he considered an implicit compliment. At my request, Tony stayed for an early dinner at the Officers' Club so that we could discuss sanctions. Milosevic came right at Tony, making an all-out effort to change American policy, but Tony held his ground, telling Milosevic that while initialing at Dayton would result in suspension, lift could come only with full implementation. This set off a heated debate over what constituted implementation. But Milosevic knew that in real terms suspension of the sanctions would give him what he needed most, immediate relief for his people.

After two brief calls, one on Izetbegovic and the other on Silajdzic, Tony left for Washington. His trip had conveyed the urgency we attached to the negotiations. I summarized his core message late that evening in a memorandum to Warren Christopher: "Tony said there was no second chance for the U.S.; that this was our last, best shot and that Congress was going south on us; that if they didn't reach agreement when you get here we will turn them over to Carl, Pauline, Jacques, and Wolfgang, and our role will greatly diminish."

It had also given Tony and Sandy Vershbow a sense of Dayton. At one point, as we walked alone through the parking lot, Tony leaned toward me and said, "This is the craziest zoo I've ever seen." This was, in fact, exactly what we hoped our colleagues in Washington would remember; it helped if they understood the special weirdness of Dayton.

After Tony left, Hill and I went to see Izetbegovic, hoping he would be encouraged by the progress Silajdzic had made on Gorazde. Instead, I encountered more tension and disarray within the Bosnian camp. The immediate cause was an article by Roger Cohen in that day's *New York Times* in which unnamed "western diplomats" said that Silajdzic, whom Cohen described as "a brilliant, whimsical man with a Hamlet-like tendency to speak in riddles," had emerged as "the key figure—or 'swing vote' in the Bosnian delegation." Seated next to Izetbegovic, Sacirbey began reading excerpts from Cohen's article in a voice dripping with anger and sarcasm. After he finished, Sacirbey

paused. "There is only one 'swing vote' in this delegation," he almost shouted, "and that is Mr. President, sitting right here." Throughout this charade Izetbegovic sat motionless, with a slight smile playing across his face. What had happened seemed all too clear: Izetbegovic had been unnerved by Tony Lake's private call on Silajdzic and the direct Milosevic-Silajdzic talks. Encouraged by Sacirbey, he had slapped Haris down—hard.

The Clark Corridor. During the meal with Tony Lake, I had suggested to Milosevic that we resume the negotiation over Gorazde after dinner. After his humiliation, Silajdzic could not continue the negotiation, so we invited Milosevic to our building. We hoped to find a route between Sarajevo and Gorazde that would satisfy the Bosnians. To do this, we decided to introduce Milosevic to PowerScene.


General Clark had brought to Dayton a special unit of the Defense Mapping Agency, personally headed by Major General Philip Nuber. Among other tasks, the map experts were supposed to compute the exact percentage of land that each map proposal gave the sides. They brought with them a highly classified \$400,000 imaging system, called PowerScene, first used during Desert Storm. The entire country of Bosnia had been filmed and stored in this extraordinary "virtual reality" machine, visible in three dimensions, accurate down to two yards. Simply by manipulating an ordinary joystick, the viewer could "fly" fast or slow, look straight down, straight ahead, or sideways at any angle. PowerScene was impressive. To foreigners especially, it was a vivid reminder of America's technological prowess.

The Mapping Agency installed its large computers in a room directly across from my bedroom, with a huge sign warning all unauthorized personnel to stay out. Only a handful of people had access to the American building to begin with, so this sign—the only one of its sort inside the compound—naturally attracted endless visitors, who found "flying" the roads and mountains of Bosnia even more enjoyable than Packy's All-Sports Bar. As visitors dropped in, noise from this accidental video arcade often went on late into the night. But the video game would play an important role in the resolution of the Gorazde problem.

Clark and his colleagues had prepared well for the meeting. Flying the land between Sarajevo and Gorazde endlessly on PowerScene, they had found a route that could link the two cities. It was a small dirt track located halfway between the two roads, both now controlled by the Serbs, that had once connected the two cities.

Milosevic arrived alone at the room containing the PowerScene computers around 11:00 P.M. He was fascinated by the technology and spent some time playing with the joystick, "visiting" portions of Bosnia. Then we began an in-

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tense examination of the dirt track that Clark thought we might upgrade. Milosevic began by offering a three-kilometer corridor through the mountainous terrain. This was far too narrow, we told him, and demonstrated the point by showing him, on PowerScene, that the ridgelines had a clear line of sight on the road and his proposed corridor was therefore too narrow to defend.

For almost two hours we examined the maps and "traveled" across the hills and valleys of the Gorazde area, courtesy of PowerScene. The session was made far livelier, even raucous, by the substantial amount of scotch consumed by some of the participants. This later led people to say that Milosevic had made some key concessions under the influence. But, as usual, I saw no evidence that the alcohol affected him. Milosevic knew what he was doing, and he remembered every detail of the discussion the next morning.

Using maps and an old-fashioned technology—crayons—Clark sketched a corridor that cut a wider swath through the hills east of Sarajevo. As he drew the connector, it was no longer simply a narrow, indefensible road. Instead, its width now averaged 8.3 kilometers, and stretched from ridgelines to hilltops so as to minimize the areas in which the road was vulnerable to direct fire from the high ground. After hours of argument, Milosevic offered us a substantially revised, widened version of this route between Gorazde and Sarajevo. It was after 2:00 A.M. We shook hands, and Milosevic drained his glass again, saying, "We have found our road."

We called it the "Clark Corridor," or, sometimes, the "Scotch Road." In his report the next day, General Kerrick said he was "still recovering from scotch exchange with Milosevic [which I drank] for my country—and I don't even drink scotch."

When the lengthy session on the Clark Corridor finally ended, I sent a long message, entitled "Closure or Closedown: The Situation as of 2:00 A.M.," to Warren Christopher, who was about to leave Osaka for the long return flight to Dayton:

The Bosnians still wish us to believe that they are getting a lousy deal. Yet they know it is not only a good deal but the best they will ever get. Logically, therefore, they should accept. But the dynamics of their delegation make this a very close call. Izetbegovic spent nine years of his life in jail, and is not a governmental leader so much as a movement leader. He has little understanding of, or interest in, economic development or modernization—the things that peace can bring. He has suffered greatly for his ideals. To him, Bosnia is more an abstraction, not several million people who overwhelmingly want peace. Haris, on the other hand, is more modern and focused heavily on economic reconstruction, something Izetbegovic never mentions. . . .

Milosevic seems to be enjoying himself at Dayton Place, although he likes to intimidate people. Standing up to him when he attacks is the key; he respects

people who act as tough as him. He is always testing us. In order to move him, we must lay down very firm markers and not move them unless we know exactly what we are getting in return. I'll see you at the airport. Have a good trip back.

DAY SEVENTEEN: FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17

When the Bosnians saw the Gorazde map early the next morning, they were impressed, but did not accept it. This did not worry us: it was standard Balkan negotiating procedure not to accept anything that came from the other side without trying to change it. (This tendency was so pronounced it had become a joke: the best way to confuse someone in the Balkans, we often said, was to accept his initial proposal without change, at which point he would change his own position.) The Bosnians wanted two things: more land south of Gorazde, and firm assurances from the United States that the dirt track would be upgraded into a paved, all-weather road. After discussions with Joulwan and the Army Corps of Engineers, Clark informed us that IFOR engineers would upgrade the road during the summer months and added a key sentence to the military annex: "a two-lane all-weather road will be constructed in the Gorazde Corridor." This satisfied the Bosnians. But they still wanted more territory around Gorazde, especially some land on the south bank of the Drina River, the river that carried so much historical and emotional importance to all former Yugoslavs.*

We planned a day of high-level visitors who would increase the pressure on the reluctant parties. Perry and Slocombe were due at 10:00 A.M., General Joulwan would arrive from Europe at noon, and Christopher would return in the late afternoon. These visits were carefully sequenced: Perry and Joulwan would symbolize American military power and determination, and set the stage for the final push when Christopher returned.

The meetings left a powerful impression on the delegations. Izetbegovic, who knew from Sacirbey and Perle that the Pentagon was opposed to the Equip and Train program, asked for Perry's personal commitment to it. After an edgy exchange, Perry gave Izetbegovic what he wanted, using words that would be cited often by the Bosnians later: "If we get a peace agreement, I will make the Equip and Train program happen." This was no more than a repetition of commitments made by Christopher, Lake, and myself, but it was important that Izetbegovic hear it directly from the Secretary of Defense.

Joulwan joined the meetings two hours later, bringing with him Major General William Nash, the blunt, cigar-smoking First Armored Division comman-

* The Yugoslav writer Ivo Andric won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1961 for his epic novel *The Bridge over the River Drina*.

der, who was scheduled to lead most of the American troops in Bosnia. It was symbolism at its best. With their straightforward warnings and uniforms bristling with medals, the generals made a powerful impression. It was Joulwan's inspired idea to bring Nash, whose no-nonsense style impressed the Balkan leaders; this was, after all, the man who would actually command the American troops on the ground in Bosnia.

With the exception of Perry, the visitors did not get into the details of the negotiations. But they sent a potent message: the physical presence of Joulwan and Nash in Dayton gave NATO a tangible reality in the eyes of the parties, and set the right tone for the final phase of the negotiations, which we planned around Christopher's return. Thirty minutes after they left, at 4:30 in the afternoon, the Secretary of State's big plane touched down from Osaka.