

Dayton, and added to this graceful stories about Belgrade, where he and Brooke had spent two years while he was with *Time* magazine and she was writing for *The Christian Science Monitor* and *The Sunday Times* of London. At the head table, the mood was spirited and relaxed. The two Presidents, still enjoying the absence of Tudjman, told each other jokes—jokes from Izetbegovic!—and tested Brooke's language abilities. The mood, almost giddy at times, even produced a rare moment of consensus.

The issue that created the good feeling, ironically, was sanctions—but this time with a twist. In the harsh Balkan winter, Belgrade was facing an energy crisis. Milosevic requested permission to import oil to his capital immediately. The humanitarian agencies supported part of Milosevic's request—twenty-three thousand tons of heavy heating oil into Belgrade. In addition, Milosevic asked for help on natural gas, and permission from the U.N. sanctions committee to export a limited amount of grain to pay for the fuel. According to the agreement that accompanied the cease-fire in October, when the gas went on in Sarajevo it was also supposed to have gone on in Belgrade. However, the Russians had not allowed the gas to reach Belgrade, claiming that the United States had blocked them in the U.N. sanctions committee.

These requests kicked off another round of intense discussions between Dayton and Washington. Leon Fuerth, still the main engine in Washington on sanctions, believed that Milosevic's requests far exceeded Belgrade's needs. He estimated that Milosevic's "grain-for-fuel" proposal would give him a profit of between \$20 million and \$80 million. Still, Fuerth concluded that the problem was real. After a protracted discussion, we reached a common position: we should not let people freeze in Belgrade—but at the same time we should not let the Serbs turn a humanitarian gesture into a profit-making arrangement.

Izetbegovic and Silajdzic told Strobe that the October 5 cease-fire agreement had been intended to permit "unrestricted natural gas flow" to both Bosnia and Serbia. "Millions of people are freezing in both countries," Silajdzic said emotionally, "and with the fighting over, this should be stopped." Milosevic was clearly relieved. It may have been sunny in Dayton that day, he said, but it was already below zero in Belgrade.

It was the first time Izetbegovic and Milosevic had found common ground on any issue. Little surprise then, that we ended dinner hopeful that Dayton's spirit was permeating the drab rooms at Wright-Patterson. Strobe and Brooke left for Washington impressed.

We could not realize it then, but the dinner Strobe and Brooke co-hosted was Dayton's high-water mark in terms of good feelings. Never again would there be such a friendly atmosphere among the warring leaders, and never again would Dayton feel as promising.

DAY SEVEN: TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 7

"All going well," Don Kerrick reported that morning to Washington. "Just unclear where all is going. No evidence anyone—parties or Euros—want to close deal. [Holbrooke] intends to ratchet up pressure today."

At our 8:00 A.M. staff meeting, we agreed that while the spirit of the previous evening was encouraging, the parties still seemed to be enjoying themselves too much. We still hoped to end the conference at the end of the following week, but we had no idea how to get there.

The Weak Police. Even some of the annexes remained a problem with the Europeans. The most important was Annex 11, regarding the international police. Bob Gallucci commuted from Washington to negotiate a deal. NATO continued to refuse to accept any responsibility for arresting people. We could not leave this responsibility solely to the local police, who represented, in all three communities, the worst and most extreme elements. In my view, therefore, it was essential to have a strong international police task force with the authority to arrest people who violated the agreements. The three Balkan Presidents were not opposed to this: since they distrusted one another, they would have accepted an external force to impose compliance with the agreement.

Regrettably, the problem with the police annex came from within our own ranks, from both NATO and the Europeans. Pauline Neville-Jones, supported by her E.U. colleagues, took the strongest position, saying that British tradition and the legacy of Northern Ireland precluded her government from allowing police officers to make arrests on foreign soil. The connection between Ireland and Bosnia was not clear to us. Supporting the position the JCS had taken in the White House meetings in late October, NATO also opposed giving the international police enforcement power, on the grounds that if they got into trouble the military would have to come to their aid.

Distressed over the deadlock on the police annex, I called Tom Donilon and told him that to get the annex right, we would have to "foot more of the bill." Such a commitment, I said, would allow us to insist on a robust police. A day later, Tom called back with bad news. He had discussed the issue with the White House, he said, and, in light of the crisis over the entire federal budget—the Gingrich assault had reached its height and a shutdown of most of the government was imminent—they felt we could put up no more than \$50 million. This meant we could not write the rules. Gallucci had to yield, agreeing to an International Police Task Force (IPTF) consisting of advisers and "monitors"—a favorite Euro-word that could mean almost anything. In addition, the IPTF was put under the United Nations, a change from our previous

decision not to let the U.N. play any role in implementation. In the final draft of Annex 11, the IPTF was given responsibility for an "assistance program" restricted to:

- (a) monitoring, observing, and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities; (b) advising law enforcement personnel and forces; (c) training law enforcement personnel.

Article V of the same annex further limited the IPTF's effectiveness by imposing on it a convoluted appeal system that did not involve IFOR:

[In the event of a] failure [by the Parties] to cooperate with the IPTF, the IPTF Commissioner may request that the High Representative take appropriate steps, including calling such failures to the attention of the Parties, convening the Joint Civilian Commission, and consulting with the United Nations, relevant states, and international organizations on further responses.

I worried about the police annex from the beginning. Even without Washington's support, I should have fought harder against it, and rejected the compromise with the Europeans. As Clark, who openly disagreed with his own military colleagues on this point, observed, "We are leaving a huge gap in the Bosnia food chain." Events were to prove him right.

That afternoon, Clark, Kerrick, Pardew, and I drove across the base to the national intelligence headquarters of the U.S. Air Force to participate, by closed-circuit television, in a two-hour White House meeting. Milosevic was fuming over the continued delays in getting heating oil and gas into Serbia; he thought the dinner with Strobe Talbott had resolved the problem, and he did not understand why we were still blocking fuel for the freezing people of Belgrade. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic had raised the issue again, in effect on Belgrade's behalf, and urged us to withdraw our "hold" in the U.N. Sanctions Committee on heating fuel for Serbia. Kerrick told the White House the situation was "explosive."

As we watched from Dayton the discussion seemed distant and strange. Twenty of the top people in the U.S. government were debating the amount of heating oil and natural gas Belgrade needed during the winter. None of them knew enough to form an opinion, let alone a policy, yet the argument in the Situation Room became intense. Tony Lake, trying futilely to control the meeting, actually banged his head on the oak table in frustration. To break the impasse, Fuerth finally recommended that we offer Serbia significantly less oil and gas than Milosevic had asked for, and, desperate to move on to some other issue, everyone agreed. But after the meeting Lake put another personal hold on the decision so that he could consider its ramifications again.

The Prince of Darkness. After a week of confusion, the Bosnians finally took a close look at Annex 1-A, the military annex that would govern the role of IFOR. They did not like what they saw. From their point of view, the annex seemed to imply that IFOR would enforce partition rather than create a single state.

The Bosnians had a point. As Don Kerrick put it in a terse message late that night, "[They] will not accept [Annex 1-A] without change. Surprise is length of time it took Bosnians to recognize [the problem]."

To deal with Annex 1-A the Bosnians turned for advice to an unusual source—former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, the Prince of Darkness, as he had been called by critics and friends alike during the Reagan Administration. When Washington heard that Perle was advising the Bosnians, reactions ranged from controlled concern (Strobe Talbott) to outright horror (Tony Lake and many of Perle's former associates at the Pentagon).

Richard Perle, originally a conservative Democrat, first came to prominence in the 1970s while a foreign policy advisor to Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, the conservative Democrat from Washington State. Joining the government as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the 1980s under Caspar Weinberger, Perle became the leader of the arms-control hard-liners within the Administration.

When the Bosnians approached Perle for advice, he called to ask if I had any objection if he came to Dayton. It was an odd situation, rich in irony: Perle had been a vociferous and influential critic of the Clinton Administration's policies in Bosnia, which he regarded as weak. Only a month earlier he had told a House committee that the American mission in Bosnia was "hopelessly ill-defined." He had been a supporter of proposals to give the Bosnians enough military equipment and training so they could defend themselves—an idea to which both the Pentagon and the Europeans strongly objected. His rise to public attention had been greatly aided by Strobe Talbott, whose 1984 book, *Deadly Gambits*, celebrated Perle as one of the leading figures in the shaping of Reagan's arms-control policy. Our relationship—we had known each other for twenty years—had been strained because we were usually on different sides of the political and ideological fence. Yet, to the surprise of most of my colleagues and the press, I urged Perle to come to Dayton immediately. "Richard, the Bosnians need you desperately," I said. "They do not know how to read or interpret a military document, and they are completely disorganized." Perle took the first available plane to Dayton and, with the help of Douglas Feith, a lawyer who had worked for him in the Pentagon, started analyzing the military annex, whose bureaucratic language the Bosnians had been unable to decode. Within a few minutes of his arrival in Dayton, he closed himself with the Bosnians, showing them the real, often hidden meaning of the jargon in Annex 1-A.

Well after midnight, Pardew, Clark, Kerrick, and I sat down with Richard Perle in the bleak surroundings of the small conference room next door to my suite. Stale pizza and empty Diet Coke cans littered the room after a day of continuous meetings by others. After listening impatiently to our comments, Perle said he would encourage the Bosnians to put the maximum possible pressure on us to make the role of IFOR stronger. In its current form, Perle said, he considered Annex 1-A a "pathetic evasion of responsibility by the Pentagon." He had already begun to identify scores of changes that would strengthen the role of IFOR; I agreed with most of them, but it was not clear how many could be sold to a Washington and NATO bureaucracy that had already gone through a difficult negotiating process and that deeply distrusted Perle. The White House feared he might denounce the Pentagon publicly, which gave him a certain leverage, as long as he did not push it too far. My goal was to use Perle's presence to improve the military annex while keeping him from criticizing the Administration publicly—another subplot of the increasingly complex proceedings at Dayton.

Late that evening, Milosevic asked me to come to his room. When I arrived, he said, "This time you must join me in a drink—because your American journalist, Mr. Rohde, will be released in the morning and sent across the border. This was very difficult."

DAY EIGHT: WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8

We awoke to learn that David Rohde was safe in Belgrade. His relatives, many of whom had stayed in Dayton, were euphoric, and asked to convey their appreciation to Milosevic. Christopher also sent his thanks to Milosevic. It was interesting to watch Milosevic turn the Rohde affair into a public plus for himself by presenting himself as the problem solver, the indispensable peacemaker.

President Clinton, Christopher, and I all spoke to Rohde by phone. He said he hoped he had not "screwed up" the negotiations. A few months later, he sent me a gracious handwritten letter of appreciation from Tuzla which concluded,

I apologize if my detention complicated your efforts in Dayton. The last thing I wanted was to be an obstacle to peace. You made me a priority when you didn't have to, and I thank you. I saw two survivors here recently. One told me I was a hero. The other told me I was a fool. I think the latter got it right. My family and I cannot thank you enough. I am a very, very lucky person.*

* Rohde won a Pulitzer Prize in 1996 for his articles on Srebrenica, and later joined the staff of *The New York Times*. His book *Endgame* describes the fall of Srebrenica in impressive detail.

The Map—at Last. “Intensive U.S.-led face-to-face negotiations begin in earnest Wednesday,” General Kerrick reported to Washington. With progress on the Federation, with political and constitutional discussions moving forward, and with Rohde released, we thought it was time to plunge into the most difficult issue: territory. We called a large meeting of all three sides in the B-29 Room and assembled large maps for discussion.

The meeting was a disaster. Putting the principal actors together in front of maps brought out the worst in all of them. Milosevic participated only after predicting that it would be either a waste of time or a mess. He sat relatively silent most of the time, enjoying the spectacle, which he knew would strengthen his hand. After a six-hour meeting, we had accomplished nothing, and perhaps even set ourselves back. As Kerrick described the ordeal:

In scene reminiscent of *The Godfather*, two families (don Sloba and outcast Serbs; don Izzy and Federation) held truly remarkable six-hour map marathon. Despite hours of heated, yet civil exchanges, absolutely nothing was agreed. Astonishingly, at one moment parties would be glaring across table, screaming, while minutes later they could be seen smiling and joking together over refreshments. Bosnians presented country-wide 60% map proposal—rejected by Serbs. Serbs will present map Thursday. Saga continues.

Instead of offering an “American map,” we invited each side to make an opening proposal. This approach only widened the differences between the sides. The Federation team was composed of Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, who argued continually with one another. As he had many times before—but never directly to the Bosnian Serb delegation—Izetbegovic demanded a unified Sarajevo. This led to one of the most remarkable scenes of the entire Dayton negotiations: the explosive response of the senior Bosnian Serb at Dayton, Speaker of the Bosnian Serb Assembly Momcilo Krajisnik.

As everyone who met him noted, Krajisnik had only one long and extraordinarily bushy eyebrow, which spanned his forehead, creating what looked like a permanent dark cloud over his deep-set eyes. Although Krajisnik had not been indicted by the War Crimes Tribunal—and could therefore participate in Dayton—it was hard to distinguish his views from those of his close friend Radovan Karadzic. Milosevic had often said that Krajisnik was “more difficult” than Karadzic, but we had little basis on which to make an independent judgment. Krajisnik had participated in our epic twelve-hour meeting outside Belgrade on September 13–14, but had said little.

He and Izetbegovic knew each other well, from lengthy meetings in the Bosnian Assembly before the war. Krajisnik owned a five-hectare farm on the edge of Sarajevo, in an area that would probably revert to the Muslims in any settlement, and we often made bitter jokes that the war was really over “Krajisnik’s five hectares.”

Enraged at the idea of a united Sarajevo, Krajisnik rose from the table, and strode to the huge map of Sarajevo on the easel in front of us. "I've lived here all my life," he shouted, hitting the map with his fist, "and I will never give it up. This land is ours. We cannot lose it." We thought he had hit the map at the point where his own farm was, although we were not sure.

It was evident we could not make progress in such a forum, and we never again assembled so many people in a single meeting. And from that point on, Krajisnik and his Bosnian Serb colleagues were truly nonpersons at Dayton.

Milosevic enjoyed reminding us that he had predicted the failure of the map session. "I told you not to bring those idiots to any meeting," he said. He had frequently told us that the Bosnian Serbs were a breed apart from the more "civilized" Serbs of the big cities in Serbia itself. "They have more in common with the Bosnian Muslims than with us," he said.

Meanwhile, Steiner reported gains in his efforts to build a new Federation structure that could run the Croat-Muslim half of Bosnia. His agreement defined which powers would be assigned to the central government and which to the two entities, the Federation and Republika Srpska. It split customs revenues between the Federation and the Serbs, and created a new structure for Mostar, which we hoped would eventually become the capital of the Federation in order to make the distinction between the central government in Sarajevo and the Federation government. To this end, we invited to Dayton the two mayors of Mostar—one Croat, one Muslim—and the courageous European Union chief representative in Mostar, Hans Koschnik, who had survived several attempts on his life. Tudjman would return to Dayton the next day, and his approval of these arrangements was essential. Then, we hoped, Christopher would return to Dayton one day later to announce the Federation agreement.

David Lipton and the Central Bank. One of our main goals at Dayton was to create the framework for a single currency and a central bank. When the Europeans first heard that we wanted to create a single currency, most thought we were wholly unrealistic. In the fall of 1995, the Croat portions of the Federation used Croatian currency, the Serb parts used their own currency or Yugoslav dinars, and the Bosnians also had their own money. Everywhere the German mark was the real benchmark currency. But a single country needed a single currency and a central bank—otherwise it would be a fraud from the outset.

No one on our core team—in fact, no one in the State Department—knew enough to negotiate these goals. We turned to David Lipton, then a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. Lipton was one of the most talented young government officials I had ever met. A former Harvard faculty member, he

was an expert in the brave new field of converting communist economies to free-market economies. In one of the most satisfying moments of my government career, I had taken him and Dan Fried of the NSC staff to Budapest in the spring of 1995 to present Hungary with a strong, single American voice to urge them to carry out a controversial new austerity plan. Senior Hungarian officials told us later that our meetings had been critical in Prime Minister Gyula Horn's decision to back the unpopular program, which was ultimately successful. Remembering how persuasive Lipton's presentations during that trip had been, I asked Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and his deputy, Larry Summers, if Lipton could come to Dayton, and they agreed. In the final two weeks of Dayton, he would visit us four times, and spend a total of ten days with us.

Lipton flew directly to Dayton from Mexico City, where he had been working on the problems of another shaky currency far more important to the American economy, the Mexican peso. It was the day before his birthday, but he said he would delay his celebration in order to help us. "It will be good to deal with a currency that does not end in a vowel," he joked. As soon as he landed, we went to dinner with Milosevic.

Milosevic, who prided himself on his experience as a banker, enjoyed the discussion with Lipton but said that he did not see how there could be a single central bank. There would be a constant struggle over the ethnicity of its head, and over who got loans. We suggested that the head of the bank be from a Western European country, probably France. Lipton also proposed that the central bank not make loans directly, but restrict its activities to buying and selling foreign currencies. This arrangement, which Lipton called a "currency board," would prevent the Federation from taking loans and imposing the inflation on the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic, who was familiar with the concept of a currency board from the dying days of Yugoslavia, was delighted with Lipton's proposal. Slapping me on the back, he said, "I like this guy. You diplomats talk bullshit, but this guy talks sense. He is a real banker. I can talk to him." Nonetheless Milosevic expressed doubt that the Bosnians would agree. (He was wrong; Lipton persuaded them over the next few days.)*

Lipton remained in Dayton for another day. He met with Tudjman and Silajdzic, whose understanding of economic issues was better than that of any other Bosnian. Silajdzic was obsessed with the question of his country's debt to the international financial institutions. Although it amounted to only \$400 million, he feared that after Dayton the financial institutions would, in effect, foreclose on Sarajevo and bring it to its knees economically. Lipton said this

* Lipton's subsequent rise through Treasury was rapid and well deserved: after two quick promotions, he became the Undersecretary for International Affairs. He continued to play an important role in Bosnia, where his proposals, originally regarded as completely unrealistic, gradually were implemented.

would never happen. If there was a viable peace at Dayton and the central banking institutions put into place, he said, then Bosnia would have no trouble recycling the old debt into new lending facilities.

Lipton returned to Dayton after his birthday. He became an important part of the core team. In the close quarters of Wright-Patterson, we included him in small meetings that normally did not involve Treasury officials, and the payoff was enormous.

Nothing was more important to peace in the former Yugoslavia than rebuilding economic ties that transcended ethnic divisions. Shortly before Dayton, the World Bank had drawn up a \$5 billion economic reconstruction plan designed to bring the per capita income in the country up to two thirds of its prewar levels by the year 2000. It had, of course, suspended negotiations on the program pending the outcome of the Dayton talks. Lipton and I both called James Wolfensohn, the President of the World Bank, who promised to support our efforts; his representative, Christine Wallich, was already inside the compound at Dayton.

Meanwhile, Perle spent the day with the Bosnians producing a long list of requested changes in the military annex. It ultimately ran to over one hundred suggestions, ranging from tiny word corrections to major changes. In several places Perle simply caught errors in the draft that the rest of us had missed. Elsewhere he and the Bosnians, now following his advice closely, sought significant revisions in the mission of IFOR. Ironically, Perle's proposed changes moved the military annex back toward State's original goals.

Most senior officials in Washington were still unhappy that Perle was in Dayton. Donilon warned me that the Washington consensus was to tell the Bosnians they had to accept Annex 1-A as originally written, and reject all of their proposed changes. "Tell Perle to shove his goddamn changes up his ass," one angry Pentagon official said when I warned him what to expect. "Let's see what they propose," I replied. "We can't reject them all, and some of them make sense."

Perle would depart after three days in Dayton, on November 11, leaving behind the official Bosnian response to the military annex. Although he kept in touch with us by phone, he did not return. When he finished the work on November 11, Clark, Kerrick, Pardew, and I began a careful review of each suggestion, trying to decide how to deal with both the substance and the politics of his proposals.

In Brussels that day, Defense Secretary Bill Perry and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev watched as General Joulwan and General Shevstov signed an agreement that would place Russian troops under the commanding general

in the American Sector of Bosnia. As previously agreed, Joulwan signed the agreement with the Russians wearing his hat as the commanding general of U.S. forces in Europe, and not as NATO Supreme Commander. It was, Perry said, "a truly historic moment." This agreement not only made possible the Russian role in Bosnia but also went a long way to ameliorating Russian antagonism toward NATO enlargement.

Every meeting with Milosevic that day turned into an argument about sanctions. "Talbot promised action on the heating oil and gas for Belgrade," he said angrily. "Why hasn't it happened yet?" On this issue, everyone at Dayton was in accord, and Kerrick spent much of the day on the phone with Washington trying to get it done. Finally, late that evening, Lake agreed that the United States would accept the flow of a limited amount of natural gas and heating oil to Belgrade for home use.

Late that night, President Tudjman returned to Dayton. We hoped that his reappearance would lead to breakthroughs on the two matters whose immediate resolution was essential—the Federation and eastern Slavonia. Driving from the airstrip to Tudjman's quarters, I told him that when Warren Christopher returned to Dayton in two days, we had to present him with completed agreements on both issues.

DAY NINE: THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 9

It was one of those days when, despite intense activity on all fronts, nothing significant happened. We used Christopher's impending trip as pressure for concessions from all parties, but with little success. Over lunch at the Officers' Club, Milosevic accepted the new American position on heating fuel with undisguised annoyance, pointing out that it fell short of what even the Bosnian Muslims had supported. On the "D.C. model" for Sarajevo, he remained elusive, neither accepting nor rejecting it. He still sought political equality among the ethnic groups in Sarajevo, a proposal we rejected because it would disadvantage the Muslims, who would be vulnerable to a Serb-Croat coalition or Serb obstructionism. "We will not even submit this to Izetbegovic," I told Milosevic. "It would raise questions about your sincerity." So the question of Sarajevo remained at ground zero.

During the lunch, Milosevic sought to appeal to Kerrick as a professional soldier. With Rabin's funeral fresh in everyone's mind, Milosevic switched from his normal role as the boss of the Serbs to that of a man taking risks for peace. "General Kerrick," he said, "you are a military man, and while America's prestige is on the line, my head and life are at stake, literally." The ex-

change was fascinating, but it was more theater than substance. Although they often disagreed vehemently, Milosevic controlled the political situation in Belgrade and dominated the Pale Serbs.

Overnight, the Croats increased the pressure by moving their military forces closer to eastern Slavonia. Tudjman hinted again that he might prefer to conquer the region outright in a military action—as he had in the other three parts of the Krajina earlier in the year—rather than make a deal with Milosevic. On the other hand, because eastern Slavonia was on the Serbian border, Tudjman could not be as confident of the outcome. Tudjman requested that some American troops and an American commanding general be part of a “transition force” that would enforce its peaceful turnover.

Putting a few American troops there as part of an international force under IFOR made sense; it would ensure the successful implementation of whatever was agreed to. And it would be easy: the route from the NATO staging area in Hungary to the bases planned for the American troops in central Bosnia actually ran through eastern Slavonia.

The Pentagon, however, had a different view. Supported by the NSC, they argued that adding a Croatian mandate to the one in Bosnia would create an insurmountable problem with Congress. The White House quickly decided not to send any American troops to eastern Slavonia, a decision I regretted; the additional forces could have been limited to only a few hundred, as in Macedonia, but they would have ensured success in a dangerous sliver of the region.

The Tennis Match. Late that afternoon, Tudjman invited Chris Hill and me to play doubles at the indoor courts at Wright-Patterson. Tudjman, in remarkable condition for a man of seventy-three, took no chances; his official delegation included an outstanding tennis player, a gynecologist from Zagreb. On the first point of the match, with the gynecologist serving, Hill fired a hard volley past Tudjman at net. I walked over to Chris, “Go easy on Tudjman; we need eastern Slavonia,” I whispered. Hill, a fine player, nodded. I served again. On my second serve Tudjman rifled a passing shot down the line past Chris. I walked over to him. “The hell with eastern Slavonia,” I said, “our national honor is at stake. Let’s beat these guys.” We lost anyway, 6–2, 6–1, 6–4. After tennis, we went to the Officers’ Club with Tudjman for a dinner with leading Croatian Americans from all over the country. On the margins of this event, which had been planned to show us that the Croats had significant domestic American support,* we continued to discuss eastern Slavonia. In

* There were about 540,000 Croatian Americans, according to the 1990 U.S. Census, with nearly half of them in the Midwest and concentrations in southern California and New York.

many ways the negotiations on eastern Slavonia reminded me of those two months earlier between Athens and Skopje; most of the details were settled, but the political will to solve the problem was still lacking, and a big final push would be essential. The main sticking point seemed to be the length of time a U.N. "transitional administration" would remain in place in eastern Slavonia. Tudjman still insisted on one year, while Milosevic was equally set on three. The obvious answer—a compromise of two years—had been rejected with equal vigor by both men.

Chris Hill stayed up until after 3:00 A.M., working with Foreign Minister Milutinovic. Using the Galbraith-U.N. paper as a starting point, he made progress, although, as usual, Milutinovic said they had to "consult" the local authorities. Meanwhile, Galbraith and Stoltenberg were pressing forward with their negotiations in the region.

We remained deeply concerned with human rights and war criminals; Dayton had to be about more than a political settlement. To this end, I asked Milosevic to extend his earlier support of Shattuck's trips into Srpska. A few days later, this request produced a strange sight: Milosevic's special military security forces escorting Shattuck into Banja Luka, which no American official had visited in several years, as he sought access to mass grave sites of massacres allegedly committed by Serbs. The trip was also designed to answer the charge that we were not sharing enough information with the International War Crimes Tribunal.

We had achieved very little in the first nine days at Dayton. Late that night I expressed my frustration to Kati, telling her I thought our chances of getting an agreement were poor. "There is simply too much work and too little time left," I said. "Milosevic is playing statesman without giving up anything important." My greatest concern that night, however, was with the Bosnians. Their internal splits, which were becoming increasingly acrimonious, were paralyzing us. "They are refusing to give us serious responses on most major issues," I said. "The Croat, Muslim, and even Serb members of the Bosnian delegation are all screaming at one another. Without clear positions from them, it will be impossible to end this negotiation."