CHAPTER 15

Decisions with Consequences

(October 25–31)

> . . . our theories, like the weather,
> Veer round completely every day,
> And all that we can always say
> Is: true democracy begins
> With free confessions of our sins.
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> —W. H. AUDEN, *New Year Letter*

> Now the man who has risen to the top [of the military] finds himself with new concerns, political and diplomatic. He is not simply directing the Army or Navy or Air Force. He is consulting with his colleagues and advising his civilian superiors. . . . He is advising them on matters having to do with the goals and ends of peace and war. For this he has certainly not been trained.
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> —BERNARD BRODIE, *War and Politics*

AS DAYTON APPROACHED, THE PRESSURE INCREASED. It was the most brutal bureaucratic effort I had ever been involved in. Some bureaucratic bruises were made in the process that did not heal quickly. But in retrospect, the amazing thing was not how tough it was to get ready for Dayton, but how hard everyone worked to make it happen. The State Department was swarming with activity. Conference rooms had been turned into messy drafting rooms, where people drawn from various parts of the government were working together, minus most of the normal bureaucratic wrangling. There seemed to be a certain air of destiny, as if everyone working on the preparations for Dayton felt they might be part of a decisive moment in American foreign policy.

The Role of IFOR. However, the Administration remained divided over the most important question it faced: if we got an agreement in Dayton, what would the NATO-led Implementation Force, IFOR, do? Of course, if Dayton failed to produce a peace agreement, such deliberations would be inconse-

quential. Assuming success in Dayton, however, they would define the most important action in the history of NATO—its first deployment outside its own area, its first joint operation with non-NATO troops, and its first post–Cold War challenge.

There was no disagreement over the first two tasks of IFOR personnel: first, to use whatever force or other means was necessary to protect themselves; and, second, to separate the warring parties and enforce the cease-fire.

But aside from separating the forces and protecting themselves, what else should the peacekeepers do? The disagreement on this critical issue between the "maximalists," like myself, and the "minimalists," mainly at the Pentagon, was profound. With Dayton days away, and our NATO allies sending military representatives to Washington to work out a common position, two high-level White House meetings were scheduled for October 25 and 27 to resolve these questions.

The military did not like civilian interference "inside" their own affairs. They preferred to be given a limited and clearly defined mission from their civilian colleagues and then decide on their own how to carry it out. In recent years, the military had adopted a politically potent term for assignments they felt were too broad: "mission creep." This was a powerful pejorative, conjuring up images of quagmires. But it was never clearly defined, only invoked, and always in a negative sense, used only to kill someone else's proposal.

The debate over mission creep raised an extremely important issue: the role of the American military in the post–Cold War world. The Pentagon did not want to fragment its forces in the pursuit of secondary objectives, especially in the twilight zone between war and peace. Given budgetary constraints, the Chiefs did not think they could pursue these objectives and fulfill their primary missions as well.

America's modern fighting force, primarily the creation and pride of the Reagan era, had handled challenges in Iraq, Panama, Grenada, and elsewhere with courage, skill, and low casualties. But two less pleasant memories still hung like dark clouds over the Pentagon. Phrases like "slippery slope" and "mission creep" were code for specific events that had traumatized the military and the nation: Mogadishu, which hung over our deliberations like a dark cloud; and Vietnam, which lay further back, in the inner recesses of our minds.

Vietnam had affected almost every American who had lived through the 1960s and early 1970s, including myself. But the "lessons of Vietnam" divided people almost as much as the war itself had. The leaders of the military establishment in the 1990s, all of whom had been company or field-grade officers in Vietnam, had derived a lesson substantially different from that of opponents of the war, including Bill Clinton. Colin Powell spoke eloquently for

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the military in his memoir. "Many of my generation," he wrote, "the career captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in half-hearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support."[1]

The power of that distant yet living memory was visible on the right shoulder of General John Shalikashvili. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he was entitled to wear the patch of any military unit on his uniform. He chose the insignia of MACV—the long-decommissioned Military Assistance Command Vietnam. When I first commented on the powerful emotions the once-ubiquitous MACV shield evoked in me, Shalikashvili said he was "surprised a civilian recognized" the symbol. "I spent three years in Vietnam," I explained, "part of it living in a MACV compound in the Mekong Delta." He wore the patch, he said, as a silent tribute to the Americans who served and died in that faraway war.

Despite some major successes, at least three times in the twenty years since Vietnam the military had stumbled. In April 1980, the attempt to rescue the American hostages in Tehran had failed in the Iranian desert, leaving eight Americans dead and contributing heavily to Carter's defeat by Reagan. In Lebanon three years later, 241 marines had been killed when their barracks was bombed, Reagan's worst moment as President. Then, on October 3, 1993, came a new disaster, which rocked the Clinton Administration and traumatized the military. Eighteen Americans, serving as part of the U.N. force in Somalia, were killed in the streets of Mogadishu while trying to capture a Somalian clan leader, Mohammed Farah Aideed. The scars from that disaster would deeply affect our Bosnia policy. Combined with Vietnam, they had left what might be called a "Vietmalia syndrome" in Washington.

To be sure, there were fundamental differences between Bosnia and "Vietmalia." Our goals and stakes were different. The Bosnian Serbs were neither the disciplined, ruthless revolutionaries of North Vietnam nor the drunken ragtag "technicals" who raced around Mogadishu shooting people. But discussion of such distinctions was not welcome: most officials felt they already knew the meaning of Somalia and Vietnam without giving them more than cursory analysis.

In their hearts, American military leaders would have preferred not to send American forces to Bosnia. They feared that the mission would be "fuzzy" and imprecise, like Somalia. Tony Lake, who shared their concerns, argued against a "nation-building" role for the military, and worried aloud about the "slippery slope" in Bosnia. Of course, if they were ordered to go, they would do so quickly and successfully. But the leadership of the military would resist "tasking" for anything beyond self-protection and the implementation of the

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military provisions of any peace agreement. The JCS and NATO believed that these two tasks would probably absorb all their resources.

American Casualties. Basing their predictions on another misreading of the Bosnian Serbs, as had been the case throughout the war, the military viewed the Serbs as a potent military force that would threaten IFOR as it had the U.N. Our negotiating team, including its two generals, Clark and Kerrick, believed these fears were greatly exaggerated. The Bosnian Serbs were a spent force, and we were confident that Milosevic would no longer come to their aid militarily. We believed that if sent to Bosnia, the U.S. military and NATO would be able to control the situation on the ground with little difficulty or challenge from the Serbs. In any case, we would not deploy American or other NATO troops absent ironclad guarantees from all three parties concerning their safety, access, and authority.

I reflected my belief that American and NATO casualties would be low—far lower, in fact, than any official predictions—in meetings and in several interviews just before Dayton. On Friday, October 27, I told Rowland Evans and Christiane Amanpour of CNN that

> While we have to anticipate that it's not a risk-free situation, we're not going to send people into combat. This is not Somalia, and it's not Vietnam. . . . We're not anticipating the kind of casualties and body bags that your question presupposes. *There is no peace without American involvement, but to repeat, there's no American involvement without peace.*
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> EVANS: Well, I hate to belabor the issue, but this is what Americans are asking themselves. [General] Michael Rose, who ran the U.N. operation for at least a year—and you may disagree with him, but he certainly knows the situation on the ground—estimates that the casualties from this operation that you're planning will exceed the casualties from the Gulf War, which were three hundred and ninety dead. Is he crazy?
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> HOLBROOKE: He's not crazy. He's wrong. His predecessor in Bosnia, General Morillon, said, "Hit them the first time they challenge you and they won't respond again."*

The Great Debate. Our team argued that after IFOR carried out its primary missions in Bosnia it should undertake additional tasks in support of peace—

* At the end of the program, Evans accurately summarized my views:
Ambassador Holbrooke was very hardheaded on casualties, Christiane. To me at least, he indicated that, if they get what they want from the three parties, there may not be many casualties. He wouldn't say there wouldn't be any, but, Christiane, he really emphasized an aspect of this that may be getting overlooked a little bit here, that the casualties and the body bags, despite Sir Michael Rose's prediction, may not be as bad as everybody here is afraid they will be.

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including keeping roads open, assisting in the election process, and arresting war criminals. Without the backing of IFOR, the civilian parts of an agreement—the test of true peace—could not be carried out. And if the civilian provisions of a peace agreement were not carried out, then withdrawal of NATO forces would be more difficult.

In my view, this could create a self-defeating cycle: the narrower the military mission, the longer they would have to stay. But the military saw things quite differently: anticipating a huge security problem that would tie down their forces, they believed that any additional responsibilities would require additional forces, well beyond the sixty thousand troops in the plan.

The disagreement with the military was not personal. My respect for the senior military officers with whom we worked was enormous, especially General Shalikashvili, a friend whose support of the negotiating team had been exemplary. His unusual background added to his charm. He was born in Warsaw of Georgian parents three years before Hitler invaded Poland. English was his fourth language. Once, when several Americans were describing their first memories of Berlin, Shalikashvili quieted the others by recalling his first visit there—in 1943! He and his family came to the United States in 1954 when he was sixteen years old, and he learned English from American movies (especially, according to legend, John Wayne's). His military career had begun in the enlisted ranks, not at West Point.* Low-key but forceful, he was less imposing than Powell, and far less of a public figure. But, like Powell, he conveyed confidence and trust. With a quick smile and a disarming manner—"Call me Shali," he would say to anyone stumbling over his five-syllable surname—he was open and friendly, and universally liked by his civilian colleagues. He never tried to strong-arm or overwhelm civilians in a discussion, but simply stated his position and held his ground as long as possible. That we had good personal relations was important, since we had to work together closely, whatever happened.

With only a year to go until the presidential election, public opinion was heavily opposed to deployments—at that time some 70 percent of the American public did not want troops in Bosnia under any circumstances. The White House was understandably averse to a direct confrontation with the military. If the military openly opposed the deployment, our political difficulties would be vastly increased. We had to have their backing to get congressional and public support for the mission, which meant that they had the upper hand in the debate over what their mission would be.

* It was unusual for the nation's top military officer not to have gone to one of the service academies, but it was also true of two of Shalikashvili's three immediate predecessors, General Powell, an ROTC student at City College of New York, and General John Vessey, who won a battlefield commission on the Anzio beach during World War II.

So the lines were drawn, although not precisely, between two points of view concerning the mission of the peacekeepers: on one side, a narrow approach, backed by the JCS and NATO; on the other side, a broader, more ambitious maximalist approach in which IFOR would support the civilian aspects of a peace agreement if and when it had completed its primary missions.

Less than a week before Dayton, the battle lines were clear. Even after Sandy Berger's Deputies' Committee had resolved many secondary issues, there were still eleven major disagreements between State and the JCS. Some of them were fundamental, as identified in a study by Sandy Vershbow:

1. The JCS wanted to locate IFOR headquarters in Zagreb or Naples, rather than Sarajevo. Quarters suitable for a four-star admiral did not exist in Sarajevo, they said, and they worried about the security of their headquarters. We argued that if the senior American were not in Sarajevo the entire operation would be fatally weakened.
2. They wanted to deploy IFOR only in the Federation, and not in Republika Srpska. State argued that this would turn the Inter-Entity Boundary Line between the two parts of Bosnia into the equivalent of the DMZ in Korea—and effectively partition the country.
3. The Pentagon did not want to place IFOR troops on Bosnia's international borders, despite a strong request from Izetbegovic. We argued that troops had to be placed on the international border to support our position that Bosnia was a single country.
4. The JCS opposed "requiring" that the parties withdraw all heavy weapons from a "heavy weapons exclusion zone." Instead, it proposed that the peace agreement simply "encourage" the parties to withdraw their heavy weapons "on a voluntary basis." We found this position incomprehensible from the military's own point of view. The word "voluntary" did not exist in the Balkan lexicon, and leaving heavy weapons near the IFOR troops would only increase their vulnerability.
5. The Pentagon opposed the cantonment of weapons—that is, the stockpiling in isolated areas open to NATO inspection—by the two sides on the grounds that it was unenforceable. We argued that cantonments would protect IFOR and reduce the chances of incidents.
6. They opposed giving IFOR the authority to investigate "past incidents of attacks, atrocities or human rights violations." We said this was essential.
7. The Pentagon resisted any obligation to respond to "over the horizon" reports of attacks on international civilian personnel or gross

violations of human rights, on the grounds that this would "lead to mission creep and increase force requirements." In plain English, this meant that the Pentagon did not want to go to the aid of international civilian aid workers if a problem arose outside their immediate line of sight. We argued that it was inconceivable that the military could stand by if civilians, some of whom might be Americans, were endangered.

8. The military wanted little or no role in any aspect of civilian implementation, including elections and securing freedom of movement; we argued that its visible presence would be essential for the first series of elections after the war.
9. The Pentagon not only rejected any police functions for themselves, but also opposed giving the International Police Task Force (IPTF) a strong mandate and authority to arrest people. This, they said, would constitute the most dangerous form of "mission creep." If the IPTF got into trouble, the military argued, this could "lead to the assumption by IFOR of police functions throughout the country." I argued that this would weaken the chain of enforcement. Either the military should have arrest authority or else the IPTF should be given such powers.
10. The Pentagon wanted to exclude eastern Slavonia from the IFOR area of responsibility on the grounds that it would require more troops and raise more problems with Congress. We argued that eastern Slavonia, small, adjacent to Bosnia, and directly on the route that U.S. troops would travel to resupply their forces in Bosnia, was an integral part of the region, and would be easy to place under IFOR.
11. Finally, the Pentagon opposed any mandate or obligation to arrest indicted war criminals. Needless to say, I disagreed.

Over the last few days before Dayton we contested every one of these issues, winning some, losing many others. The implementation of Dayton, as it turned out, was determined in these meetings, with decidedly mixed results.

I appealed privately to Perry and Shalikashvili for a more robust IFOR mission. After personal review, Perry and Shalikashvili reversed two of the Pentagon's positions. The first was the location of IFOR headquarters; they realized that it had to be in Sarajevo rather than in Zagreb—a bizarre suggestion that had come up through the chain of command.

They also agreed that IFOR had to deploy some forces in the Serb portion of Bosnia; otherwise we would divide the country instead of unifying it. Perry also agreed to deploy IFOR forces on the international borders, although the number was smaller than we wanted or Izetbegovic had requested.

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The first of the two White House meetings on the State-Pentagon disagreement took place on October 25. The JCS agreed to a *required* twenty-kilometer heavy-weapons-free zone adjusted to fit the demarcation of territory, and a four-kilometer zone of separation free of all weapons. This was a significant step forward from the original JCS-NATO plan. (I argued unsuccessfully for a ten-kilometer weapons-free zone.)

Two days later, with the European military representatives already arriving in Washington, we returned to the Situation Room to resolve the rest of our differences. Despite its significance, the debate on October 27 was never personal or tense. In our private meetings, Shalikashvili had promised to look for ways to reduce the gap between State and the JCS. Nonetheless, there were still serious disagreements.

"The issues before us are the ones that will determine the success or failure of the mission," I said. "Elections and the right of refugees to return may not be in IFOR's mandate, but they may be the key. We are deciding here whether or not we will end up with partition or a single country. If we succeed at Dayton, we will then face very tough real-life cases, such as people who want to return to their homes, say Muslims who once lived in Banja Luka—"

Shalikashvili broke in. "That's not IFOR's mission. We can't get every bus through. We should not sign a document we can't implement. I hope police will do their utmost to provide security for returning refugees. If there is an incident and the police are overwhelmed, then the IFOR commander has the authority to assist. But there could be days when he can't do this because his resources are stretched too thin."

Finally, Shalikashvili offered a compromise. "Supposing we accept the 'authority' to do additional tasks," he said, "but not the 'obligation.' " There was some confusion until Shali explained the distinction, which had a clear meaning to the military: if IFOR completed its required missions, it would have the *authority, but not the obligation,* to undertake the additional tasks. "For example, we do not wish to be obligated to arrest war criminals," he explained, "but we will accept the authority to arrest them if we get the chance." This was a big step forward from the military's opening position, which had opposed any widening of IFOR's role. But the meaning of this finely crafted compromise would not be determined until the commanders on the ground decided how to use their "authority."

This compromise was swiftly accepted by Christopher, Perry, and Lake. I did not object. It gave us a unified American position, which was essential for the weekend meetings with our European allies and the NATO Council, and in Dayton.

But had I known then how reluctant IFOR would be to use its "authority," I would have fought harder for a stronger mission statement, although I would

probably have lost. But, like all the civilians in the meetings, I believed that IFOR would do more than it did, especially in the critical first year.

The "Silver Bullet." I still did not feel that IFOR's mandate was sufficient. Clark agreed, and he and his staff added a "silver bullet" clause to the military annex. Although phrased in bureaucratese, it gave the IFOR commanders freedom to use force whenever they felt it was necessary, without recourse to civilian authorities. In its final form, it read:

> The Parties understand and agree that the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all the Commander judges necessary and proper. . . . The violating Party shall be subject to military action by the IFOR, including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with the Annex.

On the day between the two White House meetings, October 26, Christopher took the Dayton team and a number of senior officials, including Madeleine Albright, to a government training center in the Virginia hills near Warrenton for a strategy session. By now our team had expanded substantially. Warrenton was a dress rehearsal for Dayton, and we walked through every detail of the talks, presenting to Christopher and his team a ninety-two-page draft peace agreement and volumes of backup material. We agreed on a basic concept: Christopher would open the talks, then return to Washington, where he would remain available for visits whenever his presence might make a difference. After five hours of discussion, Christopher pronounced himself "satisfied and impressed" and we drove back to Washington.

The Consultations Intensify. The Europeans waited impatiently. The civilian implementation structure would be headed by Carl Bildt, and the military force would be at least two-thirds European—yet we had spent almost no time talking to the Europeans while our internal debate proceeded. When the consultations with the Europeans finally began, time was short, and the agenda massive. A visitor to the sixth floor of the State Department that weekend would have seen an unusual sight—dozens of people from at least seven countries wandering up and down a long corridor arguing in small groups over hundreds of pages of draft agreements and backup papers. Kornblum and I moved from room to room, encouraging and guiding the process.

I wish that cynics about government service had observed these meetings. It was one of those lovely Washington fall weekends that make the capital seem invigorating, but inside, oblivious to the weather, dozens of bureaucrats and military officers from many countries sweated through intense, seemingly

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endless meetings. By late Sunday afternoon, they had resolved many issues, especially those involving the deployment and role of IFOR. But we could not finish work on several key matters, including the authority of the senior civilian in Bosnia, and the role of the International Police Task Force. We agreed to complete our discussions in Dayton.

As the meetings continued, Owen, O'Brien, Menzies, and Jack Zetkulic of the Balkan desk flew to New York with me to talk to the Bosnians. Despite our pleas, they had done nothing to prepare for Dayton. Six weeks earlier, on September 18, I had raised my concern over this issue with Muhamed Sacirbey over a late-night conversation at the Inter-Continental Hotel in Zagreb. "Mo, I'm concerned that your government isn't ready for a peace conference," I had said. "Every time we try to discuss the key issues, you guys disagree with each other. You can't go into a big conference like that."

"We need help," he had replied. One of Sacirbey's charming qualities was his ability to admit, when he was alone, the mess in his government. "You're the Foreign Minister," I had said. "You are going to have to keep your team focused." I remembered his reply: "I know, I know. But it won't be easy." A few days later, Owen gave Sacirbey a list of fifteen international legal experts, but the Bosnians ignored the list and the idea until the last moment. On the eve of the talks, the Bosnians still had serious internal divisions within their government, few clear positions, and no qualified international legal experts, except one overworked and underconsulted international lawyer, Paul Williams.

The meeting in New York was intended to help the Bosnians prepare for Dayton. "Think strategically about what you want to achieve in Dayton," I said. Sacirbey, however, told us his government would not negotiate with the Serbs until we had forced the Croats into a new and better Federation agreement. This threatened our original scenario for Dayton, but Sacirbey had a point.

Negotiating requires flexibility on tactics but a constant vision of the ultimate goal. Sacirbey's demand would slow Dayton down and could even sink the conference, but there was no alternative. Putting the Federation first would give the Sarajevo delegation a chance to settle down, while pressuring us to produce a better Federation agreement.

On Monday, October 30, I flew to Dayton for my first look at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Dozens of workmen swarmed over the site in preparation. The Air Force, working closely with Pat Kennedy and Rosemarie Pauli, had repainted and rebuilt parts of the five facing visiting officers' quarters so that the three Balkan delegations, the United States, and the Europeans each had its own building. The Air Force had knocked walls out and created "presidential suites" for some of the participants. They turned over to us the

Hope Conference Center, a two-hundred-room hotel (which we filled completely with administrative and security personnel) with conference rooms. The Air Force had built a high barbed-wire fence around the entire area and had secured the entrances with heavy concrete barricades, which were heavily guarded by military police and security personnel.

With large areas for private walks, many private rooms, and even tennis courts, the final result was close to our dreams for Site X. The Air Force had even built, in the words of Tom Shoup, the deputy director of the 88th Civil Engineer Group that readied the site, a "very lovely meandering walkway, complete with lighting, so that delegates could walk this peaceful path from their quarters to the meeting rooms."* When Donilon saw the facilities, he was impressed. "This is as close as it gets to a perfect setup," he said. "Now all we have to do is get a deal."

Our tour was made more poignant by the vice commander of the Air Force Materiel Command who showed us around. He was Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., Joe Kruzel's brother-in-law, whom I had last seen more than two months earlier when he spoke over Joe's grave at Arlington. He was businesslike throughout, but at the end of my visit he told me that he and his family had a special reason to pray for success at Dayton.

That same evening, October 30, the House of Representatives delivered a serious public blow to the Administration, voting three to one for a nonbinding resolution that the Administration not deploy troops to Bosnia without prior congressional approval. Gingrich called the vote "a referendum on this Administration's incapability of convincing anyone to trust them."

Mike McCurry answered immediately. "The President will live up to his responsibilities as Commander in Chief and be true to his oath of office," he said. "If he needs to act to protect America's interests in the world, he will act." While Leon Panetta predicted ultimate congressional support for a deployment, telling *The Washington Post* that "the American people are not going to walk away from a peace settlement," Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, one of our supporters, warned that "the President would lose" if it came to a vote right away. The President told the press that the resolution would have no effect on the talks, but there was no denying that if we succeeded in Dayton, the vote's damage would have to be undone.

The Last Briefing. Our last meeting before Dayton was on October 31, with President Clinton and Vice President Gore in the Cabinet Room. Trying to

* Two years after the conference, the walkway was formally dedicated and named the Wright-Patterson Peace Walk.

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start on a light note, I denied rumors that we had picked Dayton because it was Strobe Talbott's birthplace. Thin laughter. I gave the President a T-shirt from Wright-Patterson showing a dove superimposed over the map of Ohio, and he predicted it would become a collector's item. I noted that Ohio's population included people from every ethnic community of central Europe and the Balkans. "There are more Serbs and Hungarians in Cleveland than any other American city," I said. "The area is filled with Croats, Albanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and other groups who understand the tragedy of their original homelands. We hope the fact that they confine their rivalries to the football fields will send a signal to the participants."

This interested and pleased the President. He knew the area well, and spoke with feeling about the way people from different backgrounds lived in harmony in Ohio.

Regarding the talks themselves, I said we were on our own thirty-yard line. "That's not bad, considering we started on our own goal line," I said. "Dayton's a gamble, but the shuttle phase has run its course. Even if we fail, our nation can be proud that we made an all-out effort for peace. But there are practical limits to how long we can keep people cooped up at Wright-Patterson. We'll hit a wall by day ten or fifteen."

The President said that he hoped Dayton would be successful, but if it was he would face the most difficult decision any President has to make: sending thousands of young Americans into a dangerous, possibly lethal situation. "Given Somalia, we must have a clearly defined goal so that there's no mission creep," he said.

"I have especially strong feelings about Sarajevo," he went on. "It would be a mistake to divide the city. We don't want another Berlin. If you can't unify it, internationalize it." Turning to me, he said we should not be "constrained by artificial deadlines."

I said that there was one critical issue I had to raise, even though it was difficult. "If we are going to create a real peace rather than an uneasy cease-fire," I said, "Karadzic and Mladic will have to be captured. This is not simply a question of justice but also of peace. If they are not captured, no peace agreement we create in Dayton can ultimately succeed." There was silence at the Cabinet table.

"We can only go to the Hill with a full agreement," I went on. In the continuing silence, it seemed like a good time to raise some other important issues, even though they would not be resolved that day. "I know that this still concerns the military, but we cannot give up Gorazde and create sixty-five thousand more refugees. Also, there is real tension over what we are doing on the Zones of Separation. If we patrol only on the internal demarcation line, we will be partitioning the country. We must prevent Bosnia from becoming a Cyprus or a Korea.

"Finally, there is a political dilemma. The Hill sees us as replacing the U.N. in the middle of the war, although of course this is not the case. We need to explain better that we won't send troops without an agreement, and we won't participate in an operation like the U.N."

We broke up with many expressions of support. The President led us into the Roosevelt Room, where he told the press, "This is the best chance for peace we've had since the war began. It may be the last chance we have for a very long time." Then he and Vice President Gore posed for pictures with the negotiating team, wished us success, and left.

Our preparations were complete. We drove directly to Andrews and boarded an Air Force plane for Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

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