8881

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administration December 1, 2016

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism Challenges Facing the Next Administrat ion

Bruce Hoffrman

CTC Sentinel

Vol. 9, No. 11 (Nov-Dec 2016) published November 30, 2016

Abstract: Although the Islamic State poses the most serious, imminent terrorist threat today, al-Qa` ida has been quietly rebui lding and marshal ing its resources to reinvigorate the war against the United States declared 20 years ago by its founder and leader, Usama bin Ladin. The result is that both groups have enmeshed the United States and the West in a debil i tat ing war of attr i t ion, with al l i ts deleterious consequences. The Islamic State has bui lt an external operations capabil i ty that wil l l ikely survive its loss of terr i tory in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Meanwhile, the threat from al-Qa` ida persists and may become more serious as it attempts to capital ize on the Islamic State’s fal l ing star alongside the enhancement of i ts own terrorist str ike capabil i t ies.

“Light up the f ire on the f lowing crowd, pour grenades on the crusader’s head. Don’t have mercy unti l he’s broken.” This was the encrypted message that a Moroccan-born Islamic State operative in Italy received from his commanders in the Middle East via WhatsApp last Apri l . Although Ital ian authorit ies were able to thwart the series of attacks planned for that country,1 their French, Belgian, and Turkish counterparts were not successful in preventing the succession of Islamic State-inspired or -directed incidents that convulsed Paris in November 2015, Istanbul and Brussels the fol lowing March, Istanbul’s international airport in June, and Nice last July.2 Indeed, according to one compilat ion, the Islamic State to date has carr ied out nearly 150 attacks in over two dozen countries that, excluding the ongoing carnage in Syria and Iraq, have claimed the l ives of more than 2,000 persons.3 This art icle assesses the scope and nature of the terrorist threat today, i ts l ikely future trajectory, and the counterterrorism strategy needed to counter i t .

There was a t ime not so long ago when the conventional wisdom was that the Islamic State’s violence would somehow remain confined to the perennial ly volati le and sanguinary Levant and Iraq and that the only threat to the West was in the form of random, isolated attacks by “lone wolves” str iking independently of any organizational imperative or direction.4 That wishful thinking was dramatical ly swept aside on November 13, 2015, by the biggest terrorist attack on a Western city in over a decade, which occurred with no advance warning and in defiance of the prevai l ing analyt ical assumption that the Islamic State was not even interested in mounting external attacks and moreover lacked the capabil i ty to do so. The fact

Follow matthewaid

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

1 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

most wanted men in Europe5 should make us very circumspect about any conception we may have of ful ly understanding the Islamic State’s capabil i t ies and intentions—much less the threat that i t wi l l continue to pose after Mosul fal ls and its cal iphate constr icts and eventual ly col lapses. In this context, i t is worth recal l ing, too, that just two weeks before the Paris attacks, the Islamic State was able to perpetrate the single most signif icant attack against commercial aviat ion in over a decade. Over 200 persons perished when a bomb exploded short ly after takeoff aboard a Russian passenger jet in Egypt.

The Trump administrat ion, accordingly, wi l l be confronted with arguably the most parlous international security environment since the period immediately fol lowing the September 11, 2001, attacks—with serious threats emanating from not one but two terrorist movements and a counterterrorism strategy and approach that has fai led.

The Islamic State Post-Caliphate: A Continuing International Terrorist Threat

The Islamic State, alas, is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. However much the world may hope for i ts complete demise after the fal l of Sirte, loss of Dabiq, impending col lapse of i ts reign over Mosul, and hoped-for eventual defeat in Raqqa, i t wi l l continue to pose an international terrorist threat.

The Islamic State bui lt an external operations network in Europe that completely escaped notice at least two years prior to the Paris attacks. The secretive Islamic State unit that serves as the external operations arm is known as Amn al-Kharj i ,6 which is overseen by the amniyat, the Islamic State’s “security” service that is also responsible for internal security.a It appears to function somewhat independently of the group’s waning mil i tary and terr i torial fortunes. According to U.S. intel l igence and defense off icials quoted by Rukmini Cal l imachi in her reveal ing August 2016 New York Times art icle, the Islamic State has already deployed “hundreds of operatives” into the European Union with “hundreds more” having been dispatched to Turkey as well . This investment of operational personnel thus ensures that the Islamic State wil l retain an effective international terrorist str ike capabil i ty irrespective of i ts batt lef ield reverses in Iraq and Syria for two reasons.7 First is the obvious point that fol lowing its expulsion from Afghanistan, al-Qa` ida required very l i t t le terr i tory between 2004 and 2014 to support i ts external operations from its comparatively modest bases in Wazir istan and the North West Frontier Province (where a succession of Brit ish al-Qa`ida operatives were trained and deployed back to the U.K. to carry out terrorist attacks).8 And second, the Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has already instructed9 potential foreign f ighters who are unable to travel to the cal iphate to emigrate to other wilayats (where other Islamic State branches are located).This suggests that these other branches could develop their own external operations capabil i t ies independent of the parent organization.

Moreover, in addit ion to the presumed sleeper cel ls that the Islamic State has already successful ly seeded across Europe, there is the further problem of at least some of the thousands of European foreign f ightersb serving in the Islamic State eventual ly returning home. They are only a fraction of the nearly 40,000 persons10

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

2 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

experience to plan and execute attacks in the West.” Cit ing the November 2015 Paris attacks as an example, he also warned “involvement of returned foreign fighters in terrorist plott ing increases the effectiveness and lethal ity of terrorist attacks.12

What this means is that in approximately four years, the Islamic State’s international cadre has surpassed even the most lavish estimates of the number of foreign f ighters that the U.S. Intel l igence Community bel ieves journeyed to Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s.c In other words, far more foreign nationals have been trained by the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq than were by al- Qa` ida in the years preceding the 9/11 attacks.d This cadre of trained f ighters thus recreates the same constel lat ion of organizational capabil i t ies and trained operatives that made al-Qa` ida so dangerous 15 years ago. The 9/11 Commission’s assessment of al-Qa` ida’s capabil i ty in this respect is part icularly noteworthy. “Thousands f lowed through” bin Ladin’s camps before the September 11th attacks, i ts report states, but “no more than a few hundred seem to have become al Qaeda members.” This small number, hand-picked from the larger crop, were subsequently screened, vetted, and then provided with special ized terrorist training.13 As Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger argue in their book, ISIS: The State of Terror , “the soaring numbers of foreign f ighters in Syria general ly, and in ISIS specif ical ly, point … to an increased r isk of terrorism that could l inger for years.”14 And, unl ike the comparatively narrow geographical demographics of the al-Qa`ida recruits two decades ago, both the Islamic State’s and al-Qa`ida’s current foreign f ighters cadre includes hitherto unrepresented national it ies, such as hundreds of Latin Americans along with cit izens from Mali , Benin, and Bangladesh, among other tradit ional ly atypical j ihadist recruit ing grounds.15

Meanwhile, the danger from so-cal led lone wolf attacks remains. In September 2014, the late Islamic State commander Abu Muhammad al-Adnani famously cal led on the group’s far-f lung adherents, active fol lowers, and wannabes to commit random, independent acts of violence on the group’s behalf.16 According to the previously cited compilat ion of international Islamic State attacks, al- Adnani’s summons has proven far more effective than al-Qa` ida’s longstanding efforts similar ly to animate, motivate, and inspire individuals across the globe to engage in violence in support of i ts aims.17

Al-Qa`ida Über Alles

While the Islamic State has dominated the headlines and preoccupied the United States’ attention for the past four years, al-Qa` ida has been quiet ly rebui lding and marshal ing its resources for the continuation of i ts 20-year-long struggle against the United States. Indeed, i ts presence in Syria should be regarded as just as dangerous as and even more pernicious than that of the Islamic State.18

“The terr itory in the Middle East that al-Qaeda covets most is of course Saudi Arabia,” the former radical Islamist Ed Husain explains, “but Syria is next on the l ist.”19 Syria or “al-Sham” is revered by al-Qa` ida as sacred land, cited in early Muslim scripture and history and referred to by the group in enormously evocative “end t imes” prophetic overtones. It also was once ruled under Islamic law as a

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

3 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

al-Haram al-Sharif – the Holy Precinct of Jerusalem, the Dome of the Rock (from which the Prophet is reputed to have ascended to Heaven), and the al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam’s third hol iest shrine, are located. Moreover, some seven centuries ago, Ibn Taymiyah, among the j ihadis’ most venerated theologians, specif ical ly commanded his Sunni fol lowers to batt le the revi led “Nusayris”—the Shi `a minority sect today known as Alawites, to which Bashar al-Assad and Syria’s rul ing cl ique belongs.20 “For Sunni j ihadist f ighters,” Husain notes, “the confl ict in Syria is rel igiously underwritten by their most important teacher.” And, unl ike al-Qa`ida’s longstanding South Asian base in Afghanistan, which, though part of the ummah is distant from Arab lands, Syria provides the group with a geographical ly central operational platform from which power, inf luence, and external attacks can be useful ly projected in mult iple directions.21 Syria’s proximity to both neighboring Jordan and Israel also real izes an al-Qa` ida dream: bringing it to the borders of precisely the pro-Western, apostate monarchies that the organization has long despised as wel l as to the very gates of i ts hated Zionist enemy.22

Hence, al-Qa` ida’s attraction to Syria is nothing less than irresist ible. After the group fai led to intervene or assert i tself in the seismic events that init iated the Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011, and saw itself init ial ly relegated to only a supporting role in Libya, al-Qa` ida’s senior leadership seized on the Syrian civi l war as a golden opportunity with which to demonstrate the group’s relevance and reestabl ish itself at the forefront of the j ihadist movement. The priority that i t attached to Syria may be seen in the special messages conveyed in February and June 2012 respectively by al-Zawahir i and the late Abu Yahya al-Libi, a Libyan bin Ladin confidant, in support of the uprising against the Assad regime, which cal led on Musl ims in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon to do everything within their power to assist in the overthrow of the Alawites.23 Al-Qa`ida’s spear-carr ier in Syria was init ial ly i ts Iraqi franchise, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.24 But in Apri l 2013, al-Baghdadi uni lateral ly absorbed Jabhat al-Nusra (which, despite the anodyne-sounding “Support Front” moniker, was al-Qa`ida’s Syrian franchise) into his Islamic State of Iraq ( ISI) . Al-Baghdadi also announced that he was changing the name of the newly amalgamated organization to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.25 Jabhat al-Nusra rejected the merger and appealed to al-Zawahir i to intervene and order i ts reversal.26 The confl ict intensif ied as al-Zawahir i ’s efforts to mediate the dispute col lapsed. The former ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra now found themselves locked in a bitter internecine struggle, prompting al-Zawahir i to formally expel ISI from the al-Qa`ida network.27 A predictably febri le r ivalry fol lowed, which al-Qa`ida effectively exploited to endow itself with an image of comparative moderation—at least in contrast to the wanton bloodshed and unmitigated violence favored by the Islamic State.

In a bid to further insulate Jabhat al-Nusra from the negative consequences of i ts int imate association with al-Qa`ida, in July 2016 the group announced that i t was severing “external t ies”—as dist inct from a complete break—with al-Qa`ida and re- branding itself , Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (“The Front for the Conquest of the Levant”).28 This is, in fact, nothing more than a well-establ ished al-Qa`ida gambit to portray its satraps as more independent than they are and thereby avoid the pejorative implications that a more blatant relat ionship raises.29 Al-Qa`ida has

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

4 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

Shabaab, Ansar al-Din, and the variety of Ansar al-Shariah entit ies that emerged fol lowing the Arab Spring. The fact that Jabhat al-Nusra, regardless of what i t cal ls i tself , is even more capable than the Islamic State and a more dangerous long-term threat seems completely immaterial to those across the region who not only support and assist i t , but actively seek to partner with what they perversely regard as a more moderate and reasonable r ival to the Islamic State.30

These del iberate obfuscations, both to eschew the al-Qa` ida name and to portray its most important franchise in a more benign l ight than the Islamic State, is a ref lection of a calculated strategic choice taken by al-Zawahir i at a pivotal moment in al-Qa`ida’s history. In 2013, he specif ical ly instructed the movement’s f ighters to avoid mass-casualty operations in order not to cause the death of Muslim civi l ians and innocent women and chi ldren.31 The legacy of this edict is evident in a tweet from a Dutch Jabhat al-Nusra f ighter who eagerly reminded his fol lowers that, unl ike the Islamic State, “Al Qaeda focuses mostly on pol it ical & mil i tary targets instead of civi l ians.” This development may be seen as f i tt ing neatly into al-Zawahir i ’s apparent broader strategy of lett ing the Islamic State take al l the heat and absorb al l the blows from the coal it ion arrayed against i t whi le al- Qa` ida quiet ly rebui lds its mil i tary strength and basks in i ts ironic cachet as “moderate extremists.”32 Anyone incl ined to be taken in by this ruse would do well to heed the admonit ion of Theo Padnos (Peter Theo Curt is), the American journal ist who spent two years in Syria as a hostage of Jabhat al-Nusra. Padnos relates how “the Nusra Front higher-ups were invit ing Westerners to the j ihad in Syria not so much because they needed more foot soldiers—they didn’t—but because they want to teach the Westerners to take the struggle into every neighborhood and subway back home.”33

Final ly, the importance of Syria to al-Qa` ida’s plans may be seen in the roster of senior commanders deployed to this crit ical theater. Among them was Muhsin al- Fadhl i , another bin Ladin int imate who, unti l his death from a U.S. airstr ike in 2015, had commanded the Khorasan Group. This el i te, forward-based al-Qa`ida operational arm in Syria is wel l-posit ioned to act either on its own or on Core al- Qa` ida’s orders to str ike in the Levant, across the Middle East, and potential ly in Europe as well .34 Even before the Khorasan Group had insinuated itself into the Levant, Haydar Kirkan, a Turkish national and longstanding al-Qa`ida operative, had been ordered in 2010 to return to his homeland—presumably by bin Ladin himself. Kirkan’s mission was to faci l i tate the movement of key personnel hiding in Pakistan’s Federal ly Administered Tribal Areas to the Middle East so that they could escape the escalating American drone attack campaign.35 Described by Pentagon off icials as “a senior external terror attack planner in Syria,” Kirkan was ki l led just weeks ago in a U.S. bombing raid in Idl ib, Syria.36 And in late 2015, al- Zawahir i reportedly dispatched Saif al- `Adl, al-Qa` ida’s most experienced and batt le-hardened senior commander, to Syria after his release from detention in Iran.37 With this senior command structure in place in Syria, al-Qa` ida is thus well posit ioned to exploit the Islamic State’s weakening mil i tary posit ion and terr i torial losses. The Islamic State, in any event, can no longer compete with al-Qa`ida, whether in leadership depth, inf luence, reach, manpower, or cohesion. In only one domain is the Islamic State arguably stronger than its r ival: the abi l i ty to mount

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

5 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

group’s wing in Syria, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in an interview with Al Jazeera in May 2015 revealed al-Zawahir i had instructed him for the t ime being not to use Syria as a launching pad for attacks in the West.38 And other al-Qa` ida aff i l iates have not attempted or plotted attacks in the West for the past three years, at least as far as has been publicly disclosed. Even the January 2015 attack on the Charl ie Hebdo satir ical newspaper in Paris that was ordered by AQAP dates back to plans apparently hatched in 2011.39

Jihadi Super Group?

Looking to the future, the Islamic State’s continuing setbacks and serial weakening are creating condit ions where some type of reconci l iat ion and re- amalgamation with al-Qa`ida might yet be effected.40 Indeed, efforts to reunite have been continuous from both sides virtual ly from the t ime of the Islamic State’s expulsion from al-Qa`ida. Al-Zawahir i himself recently cal led for unity and an end to the divisiveness that has aff l icted the j ihadist movement these past couple of years, even while he continued to deride al-Baghdadi and crit icize what he derisively termed “an innovated cal iphate.” This, however, further underscores the profound personal enmity between these two men.41

For i ts part, Islamic State propaganda has often been respectful of al-Qa` ida, referr ing to its soldiers, emirs, and sheikhs in a posit ive manner and glorifying bin Ladin’s and Anwar al-Awlaki’s accomplishments. And even while profoundly crit ical of al-Zawahir i and some al-Qa`ida aff i l iates, the Islamic State st i l l appears to have continual ly kept al ive the possibi l i ty of some reconci l iat ion, albeit alongside the ongoing invective and vituperation.

Despite the acknowledged differences in ideological emphases, tone, and style between the Islamic State and al-Qa` ida, the main impediment to reconci l iat ion is the intense personal enmity between al-Baghdadi and al-Zawahir i . Al-Baghdadi’s death would doubtless pave the way for a rapprochement, producing a combined terrorist force of perhaps epic proport ions. A continual ly weakened Islamic State might also spl inter, with a rump faction either voluntari ly merging with or else being forcibly absorbed by al-Qa` ida. Regardless of how such a modus vivendi or merger might occur, any kind of reconci l iat ion between the Islamic State and al- Qa`ida or re-amalgamation would profoundly change the current confl ict and result in a signif icantly escalated threat of foreign f ighter terrorist operations in the West. I t would certainly enhance al-Qa` ida’s international reach and endow it with a robust addit ional attack capabil i ty. Regardless of whether any such modus vivendi or hosti le takeover ever comes to pass, i t is indisputable that increased pressure on the Islamic State in both Iraq and Syria wil l l ikely not result in the thousands of foreign f ighters there simply laying down their arms. Rather i f , as FBI Director James Comey argues, the 1990s Afghan exemplar provides any kind of a template for today,42 there wil l be a surfeit of trained warriors drift ing around the Middle East and North Afr ica either looking for new confl icts to embed themselves, new safe havens or sanctuaries in which to rest and regroup, or bi l l ing themselves as “guns for hire” and offering their services to a variety of eager patrons.

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

6 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

The U.S.-led war on terrorism has now lasted longer than our part icipation in both world wars. It has surpassed even our active mil i tary involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. And, l ike the Viet Cong guerri l las and People’s Army of Vietnam main force units, our j ihadist enemies have locked us into an enervating war of attr i t ion—the preferred strategy of terrorists and guerri l las the world over from time immemorial. They hope to undermine national pol it ical wi l l , corrode internal popular support, and demoral ize us and our regional partners through a prolonged, general ly intensifying and increasingly geographical diffuse campaign of terrorism and violence. In his last publicly released, videotaped statement a dozen years ago, bin Ladin described this strategy on the eve of another presidential election. “So we are continuing this pol icy in bleeding America,” he declared.

“Allah wil l ing, and nothing is too great for Al lah… . This is in addit ion to our having experience in using guerr i l la warfare and the war of attr i t ion to f ight tyrannical superpowers, as we, alongside the mujahidin, bled Russia for 10 years, unti l i t went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat.”43

Decisively breaking this stasis in the war on terrorism must therefore be among the new presidential administrat ion’s highest priorit ies. Our current counterterrorism strategy, however, has clearly fai led to do this. The most recent elucidation of our approach is the 2015 National Security Strategy document. It explains how the U.S.:

“shifted away from a model of f ighting costly, large-scale ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which the United States—particularly our mil i tary—bore an enormous burden. Instead, we are now pursuing a more sustainable approach that priorit izes targeted counterterrorism operations, col lective action with responsible partners, and increased efforts to prevent the growth of violent extremism and radical izat ion that drives increased threats.”44

Yet, according to the National Counterterrorism Center, a year before the United States launched the ongoing effort to defeat the Islamic State, the group had a presence in only seven countries around the world. By 2015, the same year that the Obama administrat ion’s counterterrorism strategy was enunciated, that number had nearly doubled. And as recently as this past August, the NCTC reported that the Islamic State was “ful ly operational” in 18 countr ies.45 Meanwhile, al-Qa`ida is also present in more countr ies today (nearly two dozen by the author’s count) than it was in 2001—and in three t imes as many as when the Obama administrat ion began in 2009. Today, a dangerous surfeit of foreign volunteers is f ighting in Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Libya, and Mali as well as in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the three pi l lars upon which this strategy is based—leadership attr i t ion, training of local forces, and countering violent extremism—have thus far fai led to del iver a crushing blow to these terrorist groups.

Indeed, unti l the recent gains against the Islamic State, in part icular in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, a depressing pattern establ ished itself where the United States ki l led terrorist leaders while they nonetheless seized more terr i tory. Where we

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

7 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

encrypted their communications to plan and implement attacks and exploited digital and social media for propaganda and recruitment. Given this l i tany of emerging and expanding chal lenges, the most crit ical question today is whether the United States can continue to bui ld on these latest gains to ensure sustained, long-term progress.

A quarter of a century ago, Brit ish Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described publicity as the oxygen of terrorism. Today, however, i t is access to sanctuary and safe haven that sustains and nourishes terrorism. Accordingly, simply ki l l ing a small number of leaders in terrorist groups, whose ranks in any event are continual ly replenished, wil l not end the threats posed by the Islamic State and al- Qa`ida nor dislodge them from their bases of operation in the Levant and Iraq, North Afr ica, the Arabian Peninsula, and South Asia. The slow and fractured process of training indigenous government security forces in those regions wil l not do so either. The inadequacy of these training activit ies and efforts to bui ld partner capacity are evidenced by the mostly unimpeded escalation of terrorist activit ies in al l those places. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali , or Somalia, our efforts to bui ld partner capacity have al l foundered. In each, Islamist terrorist numbers grew faster than we were able to train indigenous security forces effectively; terrorist control over terr itory and the creation of new sanctuaries and safe havens expanded while governmental sovereignty contracted; and the terrorists’ operational effectiveness appreciably outpaced that of their government opponents. While there has been some recent progress in Mali , Nigeria, Syria, and Iraq, i t is not clear whether the past problems that undermined the performance of indigenous mil i tary units have been adequately addressed and reversed. The fact that Iraqi security forces remain incapable of retaking Mosul without the ground support of non-state mil i t ias such as the Kurdish peshmerga and Shi`a Popular Mobil ization Forces; that the Afghan National Army remains dependent on American intel l igence and air support and is effectively unable to contest the resurgence of Tal iban, al-Qa`ida, and Islamic State violence in that country; and that the resurgence of al-Shabaab in Somalia despite nearly a decade of training of AMISOM’s training of Somali security forces raises uncomfortable questions about the effectiveness of our host-nation training efforts. Mali , for instance, was a model of U.S. partner training from 2002-2012, and President Obama once specif ical ly cited the training of Yemen’s security forces as proof of the success of this leg of the administrat ion’s counterterrorism strategy.46

Accordingly, the new administrat ion should f irst conduct a complete reevaluation and systemic overhaul of our training and resourcing of foreign partners i f we are to prevent the further spread of the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida branches and counter their entrenchment across the mult iple regions in which they have already embedded themselves. A thoroughly new approach is needed to the current piecemeal training and uneven enhancement of host-nation counterterrorism capabil i t ies. While increased U.S. combat air support is also required—especial ly in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and in support of French forces in Mali—that alone is not the answer. American and al l ied air str ikes in coordination with local ground forces have not brought any of these counterterrorist campaigns to rapid conclusion. Therefore, in tandem with both the continued use of air power and deployment of

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

8 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

rotation into violence-plagued rural areas and urban trouble spots. They have the necessary combat experience and ski l l-sets to sequential ly el iminate terrorist strength in each of these areas and thereby enable indigenous security forces to fol low in their wake to stabi l ize and pol ice newly l iberated places. By providing more effective governance and core services—with sustained U.S. and European support—host nations could thus better prevent the recurrence of terrorism and return of terrorist forces.

The current threat environment posed by the emergence and spread of the Islamic State and the stubborn resi l ience and long-game approach of al-Qa` ida makes a new strategy and new organizational and institut ional behaviors necessary. The non-tradit ional chal lenges to U.S. national security and foreign pol icy imperatives posed by elusive and deadly irregular adversaries emphasizes the need to anchor changes that wil l more effectively close the gap between detecting irregular adversarial activity and rapidly defeating it . The effectiveness of this strategy wil l be based on our capacity to think l ike a networked enemy, in anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by different resources. This goal requires that the U.S. national security structure organize itself for maximum eff iciency, information sharing, and the abi l i ty to function quickly and effectively under new operational definit ions. With this understanding in mind, we need to craft an approach that specif ical ly takes into account the fol lowing key factors:

1. Separating the enemy from the populace that provides support and sustenance. This, in turn, entai ls three basic missions:

a. Denial of enemy sanctuary and safe haven

b. El imination of enemy freedom of movement

c. Denial of enemy resources and support;

2. Identif ication and neutral ization of the enemy;

3. Creation of a secure environment—progressing from local to regional to global;

4. Ongoing and effective neutral ization of enemy propaganda and information operations through the planning and execution of a comprehensive and integrated information operations and hol ist ic civi l affairs campaign in harmony with the f irst four tasks;

5. Interagency efforts to bui ld effective and responsible civi l governance mechanisms that el iminate the fundamental causes of terrorism and insurgency.

In sum, the adversaries we face today in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Somalia, Mali , Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere are much too resi l ient and the threats they pose too complicated to be vanquished by mere leadership decapitat ion. What is required to ensure success is a more integrated approach to a complex problem that is at once operational ly durable, evolutionary, and elusive in character. We wil l therefore need to adjust and adapt our strategy, resources, and tactics to formidable opponents that, as we have seen, are variegated,

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

9 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

the equal ly crit ical, broader strategic imperative of breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment, which have respectively sustained al-Qa`ida and fueled the Islamic State’s emergence and rapid numerical and geographical expansion. The vast numerical prol i feration and geographical expansion of foreign f ighters joining both the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida in recent years underscores the fai lure of the current strategy’s counter-messaging efforts.

The key to success wil l thus be in harnessing the overwhelming kinetic force of the U.S. mil i tary as part of a comprehensive vision to transform capabil i t ies in order to deal with irregular and unconventional threats. A successful strategy wil l therefore also be one that thinks and plans ahead with a view toward addressing the threats l ikely to be posed by terrorist and insurgent generations beyond the current one.

Bruce Hoffman is a professor at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service where he directs the Center of Security Studies and the Security Studies Masters of Arts degree program. He is also the George H. Gilmore Senior Fel low at the U.S. Mil i tary Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.

Substantive Notes [a] The Amniyat “security” service is also known simply as Enmi ( the Turkish rendering of the term) or Amni ( in Arabic).

[b] Nearly 7,000 European foreign f ighters are bel ieved to have traveled to Syria. Many, i f not most of them are bel ieved to have joined the Islamic State. See John Gatt-Rutter, director of counterterrorism division, European External Action Service (EEAS) quoted in Mart in Banks, “Returning foreign f ighters are biggest threat to EU, Parl iament warned,” The Parl iament: Pol it ics, Pol icy And People Magazine , October 12, 2016.

[c] “Estimates of the number of non-Afghan volunteers range from 4,000 to 25,000, with Arab f ighters making up the majority.” Gina Bennett, “The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous,” Weekend Edit ion: United States Department of State Bureau of Intel l igence and Research , August 21-22, 1993, pp. 1-2.

[d] “U.S. intel l igence estimates the total number of f ighters who underwent instruction in Bin Laden-supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Authorized Version (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), p. 67.

Citations [1] Sam Schechner and Benoit Faucon, “New Tricks Make ISIS, Once Easi ly Tracked, a Sophist icated Opponent,” Wall Street Journal , September 11, 2016.

[2] Tim Lister, Ray Sanchez, Mark Bixler, Sean O’Key, Michael Hogenmil ler, and Mohammed Tawfeeq, “ISIS goes global: 143 attacks in 29 countr ies have ki l led 2,043,” CNN, September 1, 2016.

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

10 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

[4] See Rukmini Cal l imachi, “How ISIS Build the Machinery of Terror Under Europe’s Gaze,” New York Times , March 29, 2016, and “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Ki l lers,” New York Times , August 3, 2016.

[5] Jim Brunsden, Michael Stothard, and Guy Chazen, “Paris attacks: Investigators trying to identify third body,” Financial Times , November 20, 2015; Raphael Satter and John-Thor Dahlburg, “Paris attacks; Belgian Abdelhamid Abaaoud identif ied as presumed mastermind,” CBC News, November 16, 2015.

[6] Scott Bronstein, Nicole Gaouette, Laura Koran, and Clarissa Ward, “ISIS planned for more operatives, targets during Paris attacks,” CNN, September 5, 2016.

[7] See Call imachi, “How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Ki l lers;” and Jean-Charles Brisard and Kévin Jackson, “The Islamic State’s External Operations And The French-Belgian Nexus,” CTC Sentinel 9:11 (2016).

[8] See, for example, the chapters by Paul Cruickshank, Bruce Hoffman and Peter Neumann, and Ryan Evans in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares eds., The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden’s Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), pp. 61-80, 192-272.

[9] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “This is what Al lah and His Messenger had Promised Us,” Islamic State Furqan Media Foundation, November 2, 2016.

[10] James R. Clapper, Director of National Intel l igence, “Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intel l igence Community,” Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016, pp. 4-6; U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Special Brief ing by Justin Siberel l , Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism,” June 2, 2016.

[11] Clapper, p. 4; Matt Bradley, “Rift Grows in Islamic State Between Foreign, Local Fighters,” Wall Street Journal , March 25, 2016.

[12] Clapper, pp. 4-5.

[13] The 9/11 Commission Report , p. 67.

[14] Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Harper Coll ins, 2015), p. 99.

[15] I am indebted to Professor Jytte Klausen of Brandeis University, who shared her research and knowledge on this subject with me. E-mail correspondence, October 21, 2016. See also Brian Dodwell , Daniel Milton, and Don Rassler, The Caliphate’s Global Workforce: An Inside Look at the Islamic State’s Foreign Fighter Paper Trai l (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, Apri l 2016), p. 9.

[16] Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State spokesman again threatens West in new speech,” Threat Matrix: A Blog Of the Long War Journal, September 21, 2014.

[17] Stern and Berger, pp. 94, 97.

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

11 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

Success In Syria Fules Al-Qa`ida’s Evolution,” CTC Sentinel 9:9 (2016).

[19] Ed Husain, “Syria; Why al Qa` ida Is Winning,” National Review , August 23, 2012.

[20] See Shaykh ul-Islaam Taqi-ud-Deen Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, The Rel igious and Moral Doctr ine of Jihad (Birmingham, U.K.: Maktabah al Ansaar Publications, 2001).

[21] Husain.

[22] See Husain; Eric Schmitt, “Sunni Extremists May Be Aiding al Qa` ida’s Ambit ions in Syria, Analysts Say,” New York Times , February 15, 2012; and Dina Temple-Raston, “Al-Qaida Eyes Opportunit ies in Syria,” Al l Things Considered —National Public Radio, March 12, 2012.

[23] “Zawahir i Issues Video in Support of Syrian Uprising,” February 11, 2012; “Libi Speaks on the Pl ight of Syrians in New Video,” June 12, 2012, text and translat ion provided by SITE Monitoring Service—Jihadist Threat. See also “Syria Uprising: al Qaeda’s al-Zawahir i lends support,” BBC News—Middle East, February 12, 2012.

[24] See, for example, Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari’s statement quoted by the Associated Press: “Iraq says al-Qaida f ighters f lowing into Syria, dangerous new element in f ight against Assad,” Washington Post , July 5, 2012; Rod Nordland, “Al Qaeda Taking Deadly New Role in Syria Confl ict, New York Times , July 24, 2012.

[25] Aaron Zel in, “Al-Qaeda Announces an Islamic State in Syria,” Washington Institute, Apri l 2013.

[26] Stern and Berger, p. 42.

[27] Ibid., p. 43.

[28] Lisa Barr ington and Suleiman Al-Khal idid, “Al Qaeda offered to break t ies with its branch in Syria as a ‘sacrif ice’ to preserve its unity,” Business Insider , July 28, 2016; Dania Akkad, “Nusra Confirms spl it with al-Qaeda ‘to protect Syrian revolution’,” Middle East Eye, July 28, 2016; Sarah El Deeb, “Syria Nusra Front leader claims to cut t ies with al-Qa’ida,” Washington Post , July 28, 2016; “Syrian Nusra Front announces spl it from al-Qaeda,” BBC News, July 29, 2016.

[29] See Pamela Engel, “A rebel group’s spl it with Al Qaeda could put i t one step closer to achieving its ult imate goal in Syria,” Business Insider , August 21, 2016, and Katherine Zimmerman and Jennifer Cafarel la, “Warning Update: al Qaeda’s Global Attack Campaign,” AEI Crit ical Threats , November 6, 2016.

[30] See Ryan Browne, “Report: Syria’s al-Nusra ‘more dangerous’ than ISIS,” CNN Polit ics, January 26, 2016; “Why the most dangerous group in Syria isn’t ISIS,” CNN Opinion, February 26, 2016; and Colin Clarke and Barak Mendelsohn, “Al Qaeda’s Ruthless Pragmatism Makes It More Dangerous Than the Islamic

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

12 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

[31] Ayman al-Zawahir i , “General Guidel ines for Jihad,” al-Sahab Media, September 14, 2013.

[32] Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger, “As U.S. Focuses on ISIS and the Tal iban, Al Qaeda Re-emerges,” New York Times , December 29, 2015; Bruce Hoffman, “Al- Qaeda’s Master Plan,” The Cipher Brief, November 18, 2016.

[33] Theo Padnos, “My Captivity,” New York Times Magazine , October 29, 2014.

[34] Mark Mazzett i et al . , “U.S. Suspects More Direct Threats Beyond ISIS,” New York Times , September 2014.

[35] See the documents at both http://www.dni.gov/f i les/documents/ubl2016 /english/Our%20respected%20Shaykh.pdf and http://www.longwarjournal.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/03/EXHIBIT-421-ENG-TRANS-EX-420-76C5764D-1.pdf.

[36] Cheryl Pel ler in, “Transregional Str ikes Hit al-Qaida Leaders in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, November 2, 2016.

[37] “Al-Quds Al-Arabi: Senior Al-Qaeda Operative Saif Al-‘Adl Arr ived In Syria To Mediate Between ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra,” MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, November 5, 2015.

[38] See “Nusra leader: Our mission is to defeat Syrian regime,” Al Jazeera, May 28, 2015, and Ryan Browne, “Report: Syria’s al-Nusra ‘more dangerous’ than ISIS,” CNN Polit ics, January 26, 2016.

[39] Presentation by Paul Cruikshank on the panel, “Global Jihad Divided: Al- Qaeda vs. ‘the Islamic State’—ICT16” at the annual International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Conference, September 13, 2016.

[40] For a more detai led discussion and substantiat ion of this argument, see Bruce Hoffman, “The Coming ISIS-al Qaeda Merger: I t ’s Time to Take the Threat Seriously,” Foreign Affairs—Snapshot , March 29, 2016.

[41] “Zawahir i Cal ls Fighter to Unite, Attacks IS for creating and Maintaining Division,” SITE Intel l igence Group, August 29, 2016.

[42] Sari Horwitz and Adam Goldman, “FBI Director: Number of Americans travel ing to f ight in Syria increasing,” Washington Post , May 2, 2014.

[43] “Ful l transcript of bin Laden’s speech,” Al Jazeera, November 1, 2004.

[44] National Security Strategy, February 2015, p. 9.

[45] Wil l iam Arkin et al . , “New Counterterrorism ‘Heat Map’ Shows ISIS Branches Spreading Worldwide,” NBC News, August 23, 2016.

[46] See, for instance, Stephen Coll inson, “Obama’s anti-terror strategic suffers setback in Yemen,” CNN Polit ics, March 26, 2015; Editorial Board, “Yemen’s turmoil exposes Mr. Obama’s crumbling ‘partners’ strategy,” Washington Post , January 22, 2015; and Eric Schmitt and Tim Arango, “Bi l l ions From U.S. fai l to

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

13 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM

2 years ago   /   0 notes

0 Comments Sort by

Facebook Comments Plugin

Newest

Add a comment...

Kala la lani Theme by Chr is Kalani

HOME ABOUT BOOKS

READ PRESS VIDEO

CONTACT TWITTER ARCHIVE

RSS

The Global Terror Threat and Counterterrorism... - Matthew Aid http://www.matthewaid.com/post/153901426821/the-global-terror-...

14 of 14 3/19/19, 12:18 PM