2 Papers APA-7 Style, 4 Discussion question8 Student Responses
TheMatrix
HM500AFailureofInitiativeUnit3.pdf
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE F i n a l R e p o r t o f t h e S e l e c t B i p a r t i s a n C o m m i t t e e t o I n v e s t i g a t e
t h e P r e p a r a t i o n f o r a n d R e s p o n s e t o H u r r i c a n e K a t r i n a
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate
the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
Report by the
Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response
to Hurricane Katrina
Union Calendar No. 205
109th Congress 2nd Session
Report 109-377
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
February 15, 2006. — Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U. S. G O V E R N M E N T P R I N T I N G O F F I C E K e e p i n g A m e r i c a I n f o r m e d I w w w . g p o . g o v
W A S H I N G T O N 2 0 0 6
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Offi ce Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
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COVER PHOTO: FEMA, BACKGROUND PHOTO: NASA
23950 PDF
ii A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE
TO HURRICANE KATRINA
TOM DAVIS, (VA) Chairman
HAROLD ROGERS (KY) CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (CT)
HENRY BONILLA (TX) STEVE BUYER (IN) SUE MYRICK (NC)
MAC THORNBERRY (TX) KAY GRANGER (TX)
CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING (MS) BILL SHUSTER (PA) JEFF MILLER (FL)
Members who participated at the invitation of the Select Committee
CHARLIE MELANCON (LA)
GENE TAYLOR (MS)
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON (LA)
CYNTHIA MCKINNEY (GA)
SHELIA JACKSON-LEE (TX)
David L. Marin Staff Director J. Keith Ausbrook Special Counsel Michael Geff roy Deputy Special Counsel Lawrence J. Halloran Deputy Special Counsel Robert Borden Senior Associate Special Counsel Daniel Mathews Senior Professional Staff Arthur Wu Senior Professional Staff Thomas E. Hawley Senior Professional Staff Grace A. Washbourne Senior Professional Staff Kim Kotlar Senior Professional Staff Anne Marie Turner Associate Special Counsel Charles M. Phillips Associate Special Counsel Steve Castor Assistant Special Counsel Kim Baronof Professional Staff Risa Salsburg Professional Staff Susie Schulte Professional Staff Shalley Kim Professional Staff
STAFF DESIGNATIONS
Wimberly Fair Professional Staff Chuck Turner Special Investigator Robert White Press Secretary Drew Crockett Art Editor Teresa Austin Chief Clerk Amy Laudeman Deputy Clerk Robin Butler Administrative Offi cer/Financial Administrator Michael Sazonov Staff Assistant Pat DeQuattro Coast Guard Fellow Justin Swick Law Clerk Elizabeth Ryan Law Clerk Stephen L. Caldwell GAO Detailee Bill MacBlane GAO Detailee Brooke Bennett Research Assistant Jay O’Callahan Research Assistant Michael Arkush Editorial Assistant Margaret Peterlin Speaker’s Designee
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, DC, February 15, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, I submit herewith the committee’s report to the 109th Congress.
Tom Davis, Chairman.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE iii
iv A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“Pandemonium did not reign. It poured.”
JOHN KENDRICK BANGS American author and satirist
“Five frogs are sitting on a log. Four decide to jump off . How many are left?
Answer: fi ve. Why? Because there’s a diff erence between deciding and doing.”
MARK L. FELDMAN and MICHAEL F. SPRATT American businessmen
Five Frogs on a Log
“Don’t fi nd a fault. Find a remedy.”
HENRY FORD American automobile manufacturer
“Hurricane Katrina was a force of Nature. What we’ve done after it is an Act of God.”
Banner hanging in Harrison County, MS, Emergency Operations Center
In-i-tia-tive, n. The power or ability to begin or follow through energetically with a plan or task;
enterprise and determination.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE v
F E
M A
vi A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface ix
Executive Summary of Findings 1
Investigation Overview 7
Background 29
Pre-landfall Preparation and Katrina’s Impact 59
Hurricane Pam 81
Levees 87
Evacuation 103
The National Framework for Emergency Management 131
FEMA Preparedness 151
Communications 163
Command and Control 183
The Military 201
Law Enforcement 241
Medical Care 267
Shelter and Housing 311
Logistics and Contracting 319
Charitable Organizations 343
Conclusion 359
Appendices 363
Appendix 1 Glossary of Acronyms 365
Appendix 2 HSOC Spot Report 374
Appendix 3 White House Document Review 376
Appendix 4 Emergency Grants to States 380
Appendix 5 Key Federal Law Enforcement Activities 397
Appendix 6 GAO Report 417
Appendix 7 DHS Response to GAO Report 426
Appendix 8 McKinney Supplement 435
Appendix 9 Melancon and Jefferson Supplement 507
viii A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
109th Congress
2nd Session
House of Representatives Report No.
109-377
Union Calendar No. 205
February 15, 2006 — Comitted to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, from the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for the Response to Hurricane Katrina submitted the following report:
Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE ix
It has been said civilization is a race between
education and catastrophe. With Katrina, we have had
the catastrophe, and we are racing inexorably toward the
next. Americans want to know: what have we learned?
Two months before the Committee was established,
former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich testifi ed
before a Government Reform subcommittee about the
need to move the government to an “entrepreneurial”
model and away from its current “bureaucratic” model,
so that we can get government to move with Information
Age speed and effectiveness.
“Implementing policy effectively,” Speaker Gingrich
said, “is ultimately as important as making the right
policy.”
The Select Committee fi rst convened on September 22,
2005, understanding, like Speaker Gingrich, that a policy
that cannot be implemented effectively is no policy at all.
The Select Committee was created because, in
the tragic aftermath of Katrina, America was again
confronted with the vast divide between policy creation
and policy implementation. With the life-and-death
difference between theory and practice.
The Select Committee has spent much of the past fi ve
months examining the aftermath of this catastrophic
disaster. It has become increasingly clear that local,
state, and federal government agencies failed to meet
the needs of the residents of Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. It has been our job to fi gure out why, and to
make sure we are better prepared for the future.
PREFACE
On September 15, 2005, the House of Representatives approved H. Res. 437, which created the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina (“the Select Committee”).
According to the resolution, the Committee was charged with conducting “a full and complete investigation and
study and to report its fi ndings to the House not later than February 15, 2006, regarding— (1) the development,
coordination, and execution by local, State, and Federal authorities of emergency response plans and other activities in
preparation for Hurricane Katrina; and (2) the local, State, and Federal government response to Hurricane Katrina.”
The Committee presents the report narrative and the fi ndings that stem from it to the U.S. House of Representatives
and the American people for their consideration. Members of the Select Committee agree unanimously with the report
and its fi ndings. Other Members of Congress who participated in the Select Committee’s hearings and investigation
but were not offi cial members of the Select Committee, while concurring with a majority of the report’s fi ndings, have
presented additional views as well, which we offer herein on their behalf.
First and foremost, this report is issued with our continued thoughts and prayers for Katrina’s victims. Their families.
Their friends. The loss of life, of property, of livelihoods and dreams has been enormous. And we salute all Americans
who have stepped up to the plate to help in any way they can.
Our mandate was clear: gather facts about the
preparation for and response to Katrina, at all levels of
government.
Investigate aggressively, follow the facts wherever they
may lead, and fi nd out what went right and what went
wrong. Ask why coordination and information sharing
between local, state, and federal governments was so
dismal.
• Why situational awareness was so foggy, for so
long.
• Why all residents, especially the most helpless,
were not evacuated more quickly.
• Why supplies and equipment and support were
so slow in arriving.
• Why so much taxpayer money aimed at better
preparing and protecting the Gulf coast was left
on the table, unspent or, in some cases, misspent.
• Why the adequacy of preparation and response
seemed to vary signifi cantly from state to state,
county to county, town to town.
• Why unsubstantiated rumors and uncritically
repeated press reports – at times fueled by top
offi cials – were able to delay, disrupt, and diminish
the response.
• And why government at all levels failed to react
more effectively to a storm that was predicted with
unprecedented timeliness and accuracy.
x A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
We agreed early on that the task before us was too
important for carping. This was not about politics.
Katrina did not distinguish between Republicans and
Democrats.
This was about getting the information we need to
chart a new and better course for emergency preparation
and response. The American people want the facts, and
they’ve been watching. They alone will judge whether
our review has been thorough and fair. Our fi nal exam is
this report.
Our report marks the culmination of 9 public
hearings, scores of interviews and briefi ngs, and the
review of more than 500,000 pages of documents.
Our investigation revealed that Katrina was a national
failure, an abdication of the most solemn obligation
to provide for the common welfare. At every level
– individual, corporate, philanthropic, and governmental
– we failed to meet the challenge that was Katrina. In this
cautionary tale, all the little pigs built houses of straw.
Of all we found along the timeline running from the
fi ctional Hurricane Pam to the tragically real devastation
along the Gulf coast, this conclusion stands out: A
National Response Plan is not enough.
What’s needed is a National Action Plan. Not a plan
that says Washington will do everything, but one that
says, when all else fails, the federal government must
do something, whether it’s formally requested or not.
Not even the perfect bureaucratic storm of fl aws and
failures can wash away the fundamental governmental
responsibility to protect public health and safety.
Still, no political storm surge from Katrina should
be allowed to breach the sovereign boundaries between
localities, states, and the federal government. Our system
of federalism wisely relies on those closest to the people
to meet immediate needs. But faith in federalism alone
cannot sanctify a dysfunctional system in which DHS
and FEMA simply wait for requests for aid that state and
local offi cials may be unable or unwilling to convey. In
this instance, blinding lack of situational awareness and
disjointed decision making needlessly compounded and
prolonged Katrina’s horror.
In many respects, our report is a litany of mistakes,
misjudgments, lapses, and absurdities all cascading
together, blinding us to what was coming and hobbling
any collective effort to respond.
This is not to say there were not many, many heroes,
or that some aspects of the preparation and response
were not, by any standard, successful. We found many
examples of astounding individual initiative that
saved lives and stand in stark contrast to the larger
institutional failures. Nor do we mean to focus on
assigning individual blame. Obtaining a full accounting
and identifying lessons learned does not require fi nger
pointing, instinctively tempting as that may be.
There was also an element of simple bad luck with
Katrina that aggravated the inadequate response. The
hurricane arrived over a weekend, at the end of the
month. People on fi xed incomes had little money for gas
or food or lodging, making them more likely to remain
in place and wait for their next check. Communicating
via television or radio with families enmeshed in their
weekend routines was diffi cult at best, as was fi nding
drivers and other needed volunteers.
Over the past several months, we have become more
than familiar with the disaster declaration process
outlined in the Stafford Act. We understand the goals,
structure and mechanisms of the National Response
Plan. We’ve digested the alphabet soup of “coordinating
elements” established by the Plan: the HSOC
(Homeland Security Operations Center) and RRCC
(Regional Response Coordination Center); JFOs (Joint
Field Offi ces) and PFOs (Principal Federal Offi cials); the
IIMG (Interagency Incident Management Group); and
much more.
But the American people don’t care about acronyms
or organizational charts. They want to know who was
supposed to do what, when, and whether the job got
done. And if it didn’t get done, they want to know how
we are going to make sure it does the next time.
This report is a story about the National Response
Plan, and how its 15 Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) were implemented with Katrina. We offer details
on how well the ESFs were followed. Where there
were problems, we’ve asked why. Where even fl awless
execution led to unacceptable results, we’ve returned to
questioning the underlying plan.
We should be clear about the limitations of our
investigation and the parameters of this report. We
focused on the preparation for and response to Katrina,
for the most part paring down the timeline to one week
before and two weeks after the storm. We did not, at
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE xi
least intentionally, delve into important, longer-term
rebuilding and recovery issues that will continue to have
a central place on the congressional agenda for months
and years to come. In many areas — housing, education,
health, contracting — “response” bleeds into “recovery,”
and the distinctions we’ve made are admittedly diffi cult
and somewhat arbitrary.
Further, this report is only a summary of our work.
We are hopeful that – indeed, certain that – more
information will arise. The Select Committee has
constrained its narrative and fi ndings to those that can
shed the most light, make the biggest difference, and
trigger the most obvious near-term actions. Readers will
note that we focus considerable attention on a handful
of “key events” – evacuation plans and the execution
of them; conditions and events at the Superdome,
Convention Center, and highways; nursing homes and
hospitals – as a means of illustrating what went right
and wrong in countless other locales.
What this Select Committee has done is not rocket
science.
We’ve gathered facts and established timelines based
on some fairly rudimentary but important questions
posed to the right people in both the public and private
sectors.
• What did you need and what did you get?
• Where were you in the days and hours right
before, during, and after the storm?
• Who were you talking to?
• What were you doing?
• Does that match what you were supposed
to be doing? Why or why not?
In other words, the Select Committee has matched
what was supposed to happen under federal, state, and
local plans against what actually happened.
Our fi ndings emerged from this process of matching.
Too often there were too many cooks in the kitchen,
and because of that the response to Katrina was at
times overdone, at times underdone. Too often, because
everybody was in charge, nobody was in charge.
Many government offi cials continue to stubbornly
resist recognizing that fundamental changes in disaster
management are needed. This report illustrates that we
have to stop waiting for the disaster that fi ts our response
plan and instead design a scalable capacity to meet
whatever Mother Nature throws at us. It’s not enough
to say, “We wouldn’t be here if the levees had not
failed.” The levees did fail, and government and other
organizations failed in turn – in many, many ways.
It remains diffi cult to understand how government
could respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was
anticipated for years, and for which specifi c dire
warnings had been issued for days. This crisis was not
only predictable, it was predicted.
If this is what happens when we have advance
warning, we shudder to imagine the consequences when
we do not. Four and a half years after 9/11, America is
still not ready for prime time.
This is particularly distressing because we know we
remain at risk for terrorist attacks, and because the 2006
hurricane season is right around the corner. With this
report we hope to do our part to enhance preparation
and response.
With Katrina, there was no shortage of plans. There
were plans, but there was not enough plan-ning.
Government failed because it did not learn from
past experiences, or because lessons thought to be
learned were somehow not implemented. If 9/11 was a failure of imagination, then Katrina was a failure of initiative. It was a failure of leadership.
Tom Davis
Harold Rogers
Christopher Shays
Henry Bonilla
Steve Buyer
Sue Myrick
Mac Thornberry
Kay Granger
Charles W. “Chip” Pickering
Bill Shuster
Jeff Miller
xii A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
F E
M A
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 1
The Select Committee identifi ed failures at all levels of
government that signifi cantly undermined and detracted
from the heroic efforts of fi rst responders, private
individuals and organizations, faith-based groups, and
others.
The institutional and individual failures we have
identifi ed became all the more clear when compared to
the heroic efforts of those who acted decisively. Those
who didn’t fl inch, who took matters into their own
hands when bureaucratic inertia was causing death,
injury, and suffering. Those whose exceptional initiative
saved time and money and lives.
We salute the exceptions to the rule, or, more
accurately, the exceptions that proved the rule. People
like Mike Ford, the owner of three nursing homes who
wisely chose to evacuate his patients in Plaquemines
Parish before Katrina hit, due in large part to his close
and long-standing working relationship with Jesse St.
Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness.
People like Dr. Gregory Henderson, a pathologist
who showed that not all looting represented lawlessness
when, with the aid of New Orleans police offi cers, he
raided pharmacies for needed medication and supplies
and set up ad hoc clinics in downtown hotels before
moving on to the Convention Center.
But these acts of leadership were too few and far
between. And no one heard about or learned from them
until it was too late.
The preparation for and response to Hurricane
Katrina show we are still an analog government in a
digital age. We must recognize that we are woefully
incapable of storing, moving, and accessing information
– especially in times of crisis.
Many of the problems we have identifi ed can be
categorized as “information gaps” – or at least problems
with information-related implications, or failures to act
decisively because information was sketchy at best. Better
information would have been an optimal weapon against
Katrina. Information sent to the right people at the
right place at the right time. Information moved within
agencies, across departments, and between jurisdictions of
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
government as well. Seamlessly. Securely. Effi ciently.
Unfortunately, no government does these things well,
especially big governments.
The federal government is the largest purchaser of
information technology in the world, by far. One would
think we could share information by now. But Katrina
again proved we cannot.
We refl ect on the 9/11 Commission’s fi nding that
“the most important failure was one of imagination.”
The Select Committee believes Katrina was primarily
a failure of initiative. But there is, of course, a nexus
between the two. Both imagination and initiative – in
other words, leadership – require good information. And
a coordinated process for sharing it. And a willingness to
use information – however imperfect or incomplete – to
fuel action.
With Katrina, the reasons reliable information did
not reach more people more quickly are many, and these
reasons provide the foundation for our fi ndings.
In essence, we found that while a national emergency
management system that relies on state and local
governments to identify needs and request resources
is adequate for most disasters, a catastrophic disaster
like Katrina can and did overwhelm most aspects of the
system for an initial period of time. No one anticipated
the degree and scope of the destruction the storm would
cause, even though many could and should have.
The failure of local, state, and federal governments
to respond more effectively to Katrina — which had
been predicted in theory for many years, and forecast
with startling accuracy for fi ve days — demonstrates that
whatever improvements have been made to our capacity
to respond to natural or man-made disasters, four and
half years after 9/11, we are still not fully prepared. Local
fi rst responders were largely overwhelmed and unable
to perform their duties, and the National Response
Plan did not adequately provide a way for federal assets
to quickly supplement or, if necessary, supplant fi rst
responders.
The failure of initiative was also a failure of agility.
Response plans at all levels of government lacked
fl exibility and adaptability. Infl exible procedures often
2 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
delayed the response. Offi cials at all levels seemed to
be waiting for the disaster that fi t their plans, rather
than planning and building scalable capacities to
meet whatever Mother Nature threw at them. We
again encountered the risk-averse culture that pervades
big government, and again recognized the need for
organizations as agile and responsive as the 21st century
world in which we live.
One-size-fi ts-all plans proved impervious to clear
warnings of extraordinary peril. Category 5 needs
elicited a Category 1 response. Ours was a response that
could not adequately accept civilian and international
generosity, and one for which the Congress, through
inadequate oversight and accounting of state and local
use of federal funds, must accept some blame.
In crafting our fi ndings, we did not guide the facts. We let the facts guide us. The Select Committee’s report elaborates on the following fi ndings, which are summarized in part here, in the order in which they appear:
The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life
The Hurricane Pam exercise refl ected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a catastrophic hurricane striking New Orleans
■ Implementation of lessons learned from
Hurricane Pam was incomplete.
Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes
■ Responsibilities for levee operations and maintenance
were diffuse.
■ The lack of a warning system for breaches and other
factors delayed repairs to the levees.
■ The ultimate cause of the levee failures is under
investigation, and results to be determined.
The failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief
■ Evacuations of general populations went relatively
well in all three states.
■ Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall,
Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a
mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours
before landfall.
■ The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations,
Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the
remaining population, and decisions of individuals
led to an incomplete evacuation.
■ The incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to
deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible
conditions for those who remained.
■ Federal, state, and local offi cials’ failure to anticipate
the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall
evacuation and support.
Critical elements of the National Response Plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all
■ It does not appear the President received adequate
advice and counsel from a senior disaster
professional.
■ Given the well-known consequences of a major
hurricane striking New Orleans, the Secretary should
have designated an Incident of National Signifi cance
no later than Saturday, two days prior to landfall,
when the National Weather Service predicted
New Orleans would be struck by a Category 4 or
5 hurricane and President Bush declared a federal
emergency.
■ The Secretary should have convened the Interagency
Incident Management Group on Saturday, two
days prior to landfall, or earlier to analyze Katrina’s
potential consequences and anticipate what the
federal response would need to accomplish.
■ The Secretary should have designated the Principal
Federal Offi cial on Saturday, two days prior to
landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 3
completed the required training, unlike then-FEMA
Director Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was
caused by the Secretary’s PFO decisions.
■ A proactive federal response, or push system, is not a
new concept, but it is rarely utilized.
■ The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic
Incident Annex to direct the federal response posture
to fully switch from a reactive to proactive mode of
operations.
■ Absent the Secretary’s invocation of the Catastrophic
Incident Annex, the federal response evolved into a
push system over several days.
■ The Homeland Security Operations Center failed
to provide valuable situational information to the
White House and key operational offi cials during the
disaster.
■ The White House failed to de-confl ict varying
damage assessments and discounted information that
ultimately proved accurate.
■ Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees
of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities
under the National Response Plan and National
Incident Management System.
■ Once activated, the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact enabled an unprecedented level
of mutual aid assistance to reach the disaster area in a
timely and effective manner.
■ Earlier presidential involvement might have resulted
in a more effective response.
DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event
■ While a majority of state and local preparedness
grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this
does not preclude a dual use application.
■ Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was
not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of
Hurricane Katrina.
■ DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and
experienced staff for the Katrina response.
■ The readiness of FEMA’s national emergency response
teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of
the federal response.
Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness
■ Massive inoperability had the biggest effect on
communications, limiting command and control,
situational awareness, and federal, state, and local
offi cials’ ability to address unsubstantiated media
reports.
■ Some local and state responders prepared for
communications losses but still experienced
problems, while others were caught unprepared.
■ The National Communication System met many of
the challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina, enabling
critical communication during the response, but
gaps in the system did result in delayed response and
inadequate delivery of relief supplies.
Command and control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief
■ Lack of communications and situational awareness
paralyzed command and control.
■ A lack of personnel, training, and funding also
weakened command and control.
■ Ineffective command and control delayed many relief
efforts.
The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking
■ The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident
Annex as written would have delayed the active duty
military response, even if it had been implemented.
■ DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during
Hurricane Katrina.
■ DOD, FEMA, and the state of Louisiana had diffi culty
coordinating with each other, which slowed the
response.
■ National Guard and DOD response operations were
comprehensive, but perceived as slow.
4 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
■ The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but
coordination with other responders could improve.
■ The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical
resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts
were not adequate.
■ DOD has not yet incorporated or implemented
lessons learned from joint exercises in military
assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed
for a more effective response to Katrina.
■ The lack of integration of National Guard and active
duty forces hampered the military response.
■ Northern Command does not have adequate insight
into state response capabilities or adequate interface
with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual
understanding and trust during the Katrina response.
■ Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-
landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower
response.
■ DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that
would have enhanced joint situational awareness and
communications between all military components.
■ Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked
joint training, which contributed to the lack of
coordination between active duty components.
■ Joint Task Force Katrina, the National Guard,
Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed
communications equipment and the interoperability
required for seamless on-the-ground coordination.
■ EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and
Guard equipment packages need improvement.
■ Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected
the National Guard response.
■ Search and rescue operations were a tremendous
success, but coordination and integration between
the military services, the National Guard, the Coast
Guard, and other rescue organizations was lacking.
The collapse of local law enforcement and lack of effective public communications led to civil unrest and further delayed relief
■ A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence
in hurricane stricken areas.
■ The New Orleans Police Department was ill-prepared
for continuity of operations and lost almost all
effectiveness.
■ The lack of a government public communications
strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated
public concerns and further delayed relief.
■ EMAC and military assistance were critical for
restoring law and order.
■ Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to
restoring law and order and coordinating activities.
Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and diffi culties coordinating efforts
■ Deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not
proactive.
■ Poor planning and pre-positioning of medical
supplies and equipment led to delays and shortages.
■ New Orleans was unprepared to provide evacuations
and medical care for its special needs population
and dialysis patients, and Louisiana offi cials lacked a
common defi nition of “special needs.”
■ Most hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center
emergency plans did not offer concrete guidance
about if or when evacuations should take place.
■ New Orleans hospitals, Veterans Affairs Medical
Center, and medical fi rst responders were not
adequately prepared for a full evacuation of medical
facilities.
■ The government did not effectively coordinate private
air transport capabilities for the evacuation of medical
patients.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 5
■ Hospital and Veterans Affairs Medical Center
emergency plans did not adequately prepare for
communication needs.
■ Following Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans Veterans
Affairs Medical Center and hospitals’ inability to
communicate impeded their ability to ask for help.
■ Medical responders did not have adequate
communications equipment or operability.
■ Evacuation decisions for New Orleans nursing homes
were subjective and, in one case, led to preventable
deaths.
■ Lack of electronic patient medical records contributed
to diffi culties and delays in medical treatment of
evacuees.
■ Top offi cials at the Department at Health and Human
Services and the National Disaster Medical System
do not share a common understanding of who
controls the National Disaster Medical System under
Emergency Support Function-8.
■ Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead
bodies.
■ Deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission
assignments, and government red tape delayed
medical care.
Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing
■ Relocation plans did not adequately provide
for shelter. Housing plans were haphazard and
inadequate.
■ State and local governments made inappropriate
selections of shelters of last resort. The lack of a
regional database of shelters contributed to an
ineffi cient and ineffective evacuation and sheltering
process.
■ There was inappropriate delay in getting people out
of shelters and into temporary housing – delays that
offi cials should have foreseen due to manufacturing
limitations.
■ FEMA failed to take advantage of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s expertise in large-
scale housing challenges.
FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities
■ FEMA management lacked situational awareness of
existing requirements and of resources in the supply
chain. An overwhelmed logistics system made it
challenging to get supplies, equipment, and personnel
where and when needed.
■ Procedures for requesting federal assistance raised
numerous concerns.
■ The failure at all levels to enter into advance contracts
led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud as
acquisitions were made in haste.
■ Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of
suffi ciently trained procurement professionals. DHS
procurement continues to be decentralized and
lacking a uniform approach, and its procurement
offi ce was understaffed given the volume and dollar
value of work.
■ Ambiguous statutory guidance regarding local
contractor participation led to ongoing disputes over
procuring debris removal and other services.
■ Attracting emergency contractors and corporate
support could prove challenging given the scrutiny
that companies have endured.
Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process
6 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“We were abandoned. City offi cials did nothing to protect us. We were
told to go to the Superdome, the Convention Center, the interstate bridge
for safety. We did this more than once. In fact, we tried them all for
every day over a week. We saw buses, helicopters and FEMA trucks, but
no one stopped to help us. We never felt so cut off in all our lives. When
you feel like this you do one of two things, you either give up or go into
survival mode. We chose the latter. This is how we made it. We slept
next to dead bodies, we slept on streets at least four times next to human
feces and urine. There was garbage everywhere in the city. Panic and
fear had taken over.”
Patricia Thompson
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 20051
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When Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the Louisiana-
Mississippi border on the morning of August 29, 2005, it
set in motion a series of events that exposed vast numbers
of Americans to extraordinary suffering. Not only would
Katrina become the most expensive natural disaster in U.S.
history, it would also prove to be one of the deadliest.
From the marshes of Louisiana’s Plaquemines Parish
to the urban center of New Orleans to the coastal
communities of Mississippi and Alabama, Katrina cut an
enormous swath of physical destruction, environmental
devastation, and human suffering.
With the overtopping and breaching of the New
Orleans levees, the vast majority of the city became
submerged, requiring the emergency evacuation of tens
of thousands of residents who had not left prior to the
storm. Lifted off roofs by helicopters or carried to safety in
boats, they were taken to the Superdome, the Convention
Center, a piece of high ground known as the Cloverleaf, or
any other dry spot in the city.
At these locations, they were subjected to unbearable
conditions: limited light, air, and sewage facilities in the
Superdome, the blistering heat of the sun, and in many
cases limited food and water. They feared for their safety
and survival — and the survival of their city.
“You had people living where people aren’t supposed
to live,” said Dr. Juliette Saussy, Director of New Orleans
Emergency Medical Services, referring to the dire
situations in the Superdome and Convention Center. “In
general, people were just trying to survive. Some people
acted badly. But most just wanted something to eat and
drink, and wanted to feel safe.”2
At least 1,100 Louisianans died as a result of Katrina.
Mississippians have understandably felt slighted that the
devastation to their state has received less national public
attention than New Orleans. Mississippi experienced a
different storm than Louisiana — in essence, a massive,
blender-like storm surge versus the New Orleans fl ooding
caused by breached and overtopped levees.
By the end of the day on August 29, due largely to
a storm surge that reached 34 feet in the western parts
of the state — and extended inland as far as 10 miles
— more than half of Mississippi was without power and
had suffered serious wind and water damage. In addition
to the surge, high winds and tornadoes left thousands of
homes damaged and destroyed, and as many as 66,000
Mississippians were displaced from their homes.
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Katrina completely fl attened entire neighborhoods in
communities such as Waveland, Bay St. Louis, and Pass
Christian, but its damage was not limited to those who
lived closest to the Gulf of Mexico. Even well inland, there
is no debate over whether homes may be habitable or
not. They just aren’t there anymore. In these towns, brick
walkways and front porches lead up to . . . nothing. Just a
concrete slab where a house used to stand.
The storm careened upwards through the entire state
with hurricane force winds and tornados, reaching
Jackson, the state capital, and its northern most counties,
and transforming 28,000 square miles — or 60 percent of
the state — into a catastrophic disaster area. By the time
the storm had passed, at least 230 people were dead and
nearly 200,000 people were displaced from their homes.
Agricultural, forestry, gaming, and poultry industries were
severely damaged. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) reports estimate Veterinary Medical Assistant
Teams disposed of over three million chickens that were
destroyed by the storm.
While winds upon landfall
were not as powerful as those
of Hurricane Camille in
1969, Katrina was in many
ways the “perfect storm”
for coastal Mississippi.
The combination of high
winds, extraordinarily low
barometric pressure, and
arrival during a high tide resulted in a storm surge nearly
twice that of Camille’s. Wind-whipped water fl ooded
towns not only from the south, but from the north — not
just from the Gulf, but from the bayous.
This was not a tsunami-like, single wave of destruction.
This was a sustained, ever-growing high tide, one that
kept coming for hours. And when the water did roar back
toward the Gulf, it took everything with it — furniture,
pool tables, refrigerators, 30-foot boats, countless
household items. Everything that was once inside was
suddenly outside.
“Even the very accurate forecasts didn’t capture the
magnitude and devastation,” said Eddie Favre, Mayor of
Bay St. Louis. “It was the in and out of the surge that killed
us. The out, in particular. It carried everything away.”3
“Our infrastructure was devastated,” Gulfport Mayor
Brent Warr said. “The water came in, blew off manhole
covers, then receded and caused a vacuum, sucking gators
and DVD players and lots and lots of sand into water and
sewer pipes. You couldn’t have backed a truck up to a
manhole cover and dumped it in more effectively.”4
Out on his converted shrimp boat on the evening
following Katrina’s landfall, Rep. Gene Taylor, whose
home was destroyed, recalls seeing complete and utter
devastation on the ground and a telling sight in the air.
“Birds were so tired all they could do was hold their wings
out and soar on the wind,” he said. “Our seagulls, if I had
to guess, ended up in Arkansas.”5
Very little wildlife remains evident in the storm-ravaged
areas. National Guardsman stationed in Louisiana said
they rarely see any pelicans or alligators any more. There
are few shrimp boats working the Gulf, and elected
offi cials in Mississippi guess it will take two years for the
state’s oyster industry to begin to recover.
Areas presumed to be fl ood-proof, like the
Diamondhead community — built after Hurricane Camille,
miles north Bay of St. Louis — suffered fl ood damage.
Wind shifts “caused a lot of areas considered safe to
be fl ooded, like the town of DeLisle, where my district
director’s brother lives,” Taylor said on a tour bus with
Select Committee Members in January. “His house was
pancaked. When he came home and tried to crawl in to
see what he could salvage, he ended up face to face with
an alligator. He ended up shooting the thing. People got
mad because they were hungry and he let the alligator rot
in his front yard.”6
“It was the in and out of the surge that killed us. The out, in particular. It carried everything away.”
STAFF PHOTO
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While only two hurricane-related deaths were reported
in Alabama, Katrina caused signifi cant damage along its
coast with a wave surge of 13.5 feet, exceeding the 100-
year fl ood level of 12 feet, despite the fact that the state
did not suffer a direct hit from the hurricane. Bayou La
Batre and Dauphin Island received the brunt of the storm
in Alabama, losing 800 and 200 homes, respectively. The
storm caused wind damage as far north as Tuscaloosa
County. Mobile Bay spilled into downtown and fl ooded
large sections of the city, destroying hundreds of homes.
The sheer power of the storm dislodged a nearby oil
drilling platform, which became caught under the U.S.
Highway 98 bridge.
The overall toll from the devastation is still being
tallied. At the time this report was issued, more than
3,000 people from storm-affected states remained
unaccounted for.
During the most recent fact-fi nding trip to the Gulf
coast in late January 2006, Members and staff of the Select
Committee were shocked by the level of devastation and
slow pace of cleanup. So many towns, cities, and parishes
remain almost entirely empty.
A throbbing metropolis of 470,000 before the storm,
New Orleans had become at the time of our writing a
struggling city that is home to barely 100,000 people—
although offi cials say that fi gure almost doubles for now
during the daytime, when contractors and employees
come into the city to work.
Signifi cant portions of the city and region
remain uninhabitable. In St. Bernard Parish,
a few miles east of downtown New Orleans,
only four houses did not suffer catastrophic
damage from wind, rain, or the sudden fl ood
that resulted from the breaking of the levees
of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal
(MR-GO). The parish, once home to nearly
70,000 people, has seen its population dip to
about 7,000, with nearly all of those people
living in temporary housing.
In all of the affected communities, the
local economies remain on the brink of
disaster, fearful of another punch that
would surely be the knockout blow. In
Mississippi, Hancock County lost 64 percent
of its real property value. In Bay St. Louis
and Waveland, the fi gure is estimated to be
closer to 90 percent.
Investigative context: an overview
It’s been said that experience is the best teacher. The
unfortunate thing is that the learning process is sometimes
such a painful one.
This report is the result of a fi ve-month journey by the
Select Committee to gather information from all those
who learned painful lessons during Katrina. It examines
how well local, state, and federal offi cials worked with
each other and with private entities to alleviate the
suffering of so many of our fellow citizens.
In crafting an investigative plan, the Select Committee
faced and overcame several challenges. We had to
appoint Members quickly and rely on other committees
to detail staff to the Select Committee. We had to move
quickly, while memories and evidence were fresh. We had
to gather as much information as we could while leaving
time to write and design a consensus report before our
February 15, 2006 deadline. We had to remain focused
on our prescribed “right-before-and-right-after-the-
storm” timeframe, despite signifi cant interest in longer-
term issues and challenges. Like juggling with knives,
we had to keep multiple investigative elements in play
simultaneously — preparing for and holding high-profi le
public hearings; requesting, receiving, and reviewing
documents; and conducting interviews and briefi ngs.
And all this had to be done in a less-than-ideal
political atmosphere.
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The Select Committee remains grateful to those
Democrats who chose to participate in our investigation
in defi ance of their leadership’s decision not to appoint
Members offi cially to the panel. The refusal by the
Minority Leader was self-defeating, given that the Select
Committee’s composition and minority subpoena
authority would have given the Democrats more clout
than they enjoy on any standing committee of the House.
Despite this strategy, the Select Committee’s review and
the creation of this report have been bipartisan endeavors
in spirit and in fact.
On September 15, before the Select Committee was
established by a bipartisan House vote, the Government
Reform Committee held a hearing on the early lessons
learned from Katrina. At that hearing, the Committee’s
Ranking Member, Rep. Henry Waxman, said there were
“two steps we should take right away.”7
First, he said, we should request basic documents from
the agencies. And second, he said, “We need to hear from
Michael Brown and Michael Chertoff. These are the two
government offi cials most responsible for the inadequate
response, and the Committee should call them to testify
without delay.”8
The Select Committee did not delay. We met and
exceeded those goals. While many who so urgently called
on Congress to swiftly investigate refused to participate
and instead prejudged our efforts, we investigated
aggressively what went wrong and what went right.
The Select Committee continuously invited any and
all interested Democrats to join our hearings, giving
them full and equal opportunity to make statements and
question witnesses and help guide the direction of our
inquiry, including identifying and inviting witnesses. Five
Democratic members did just that: Representative Charlie
Melancon, Representative Gene Taylor, Representative
Bill Jefferson, Representative Cynthia McKinney, and
Representative Sheila Jackson Lee. Document requests
submitted to federal, state, and local agencies were signed
by both Chairman Davis and Rep. Melancon.
In addition to direct
member participation,
Democratic Members
and staff were
assigned to travel
with Republican
Members and staff to
the affected locales,
and Rep. Waxman’s
top Government
Reform Committee
investigative staff
assisted Democratic
participants. Finally,
Democratic members were repeatedly invited to offer
narrative text and fi ndings for inclusion in this report.
The Select Committee, beyond extending these
courtesies, remained focused on the job of Congress.
In our system of checks and balances, the Congress has
both the duty and the obligation to ask tough questions.
We did not believe it was appropriate to outsource our
congressional oversight responsibility. The American
people did not want us to punt. They wanted answers,
and they wanted them quickly. If there is a consensus
down the road to establish an outside commission, which
some purportedly wanted, so be it. The two were not and
are not mutually exclusive. However, a commission will
take months to set up, and an eternity to fi nish its work.
We needed to begin immediately, while evidence and
memories were fresh.
News reports and other statements suggested many
Democrats felt the same. For example, Bloomberg News
reported in November that “Some House Democrats Want
[a] Larger Role in Katrina Investigation.”9 In that report,
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Rep. Gene Taylor said, “It’s really important that we’re
there. I certainly wish more of my colleagues who are
interested in this would participate . . . . Mr. Davis, to his
credit, has been extremely fair.”
Rep. Maxine Waters, who had told Chairman Davis she
wanted to participate but later said she could not, told
Bloomberg, “I feel a certain void and a great absence from
these discussions. I was hoping that our leaders could a
fi nd a way . . . so we could participate.”10
Rep. Neil Abercrombie said he unsuccessfully expressed
interest in serving on the committee. “The position of
Ms. Pelosi and the leadership is pretty clear,” he said.
“I have a different view.”11
Democrats who did
buck their leadership
have acknowledged
both the value of their
participation and the
eagerness of the Select
Committee to have
them participate. Rep.
Cynthia McKinney
expressed her regret
about the Democrats’
failure to offi cially
appoint Members to
the Committee while
thanking Chairman Davis
for convening a hearing
on December 6th featuring testimony from African-
American residents and evacuees:
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
allowing us to have this day. Because were it left up
to — I will get in trouble now. But were it left up
to the Democratic leadership, we would not have
had this day, because we wouldn’t be here. The
Democratic leadership has instructed us to boycott
this panel…. So I would like to thank my Chairman
for giving us the opportunity to invite people who
don’t have the opportunity to come and testify
before Congress…. We are here to serve all of the
people of this country, and too rarely do we hear
from all of the people.12
Regardless of who did or did not participate in our
investigation, the Select Committee had a job to do, and
we were determined to do it right.
Hearing chronology: an overview
The Select Committee held nine hearings over the course
of approximately three months. Select Committee
Members and staff simultaneously conducted scores
of interviews and received dozens of briefi ngs from
local, state, and federal offi cials; non-governmental
organizations; private companies and individuals who
provided or offered external support after Katrina; and
hurricane victims. Select Committee Members and staff
traveled numerous times to the Gulf Coast. The Select
Committee also requested and received more than
500,000 pages of documents from a wide array of sources.
The information gleaned from our investigation
is provided in detailed, narrative form in subsequent
chapters. What follows here is a brief synopsis of the topics,
questions, and themes raised at each of our hearings:
“Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina and When” September 22, 2005 Select Committee hearing
The Select Committee began at a logical place: a hearing
to establish a record of who was told what, and when,
about the nature of the hurricane in the days immediately
before the storm. We explored the timeline of Katrina
progressing from a tropical depression to a major
hurricane, and asked when warnings were issued to
the public and to federal, state, and local offi cials. We
reaffi rmed what we already suspected — at least two
federal agencies passed Katrina’s test with fl ying colors:
the National Weather Service (NWS) and the National
Hurricane Center.
Many who escaped the storm’s wrath owe their lives to
these agencies’ accuracy. This hearing provided a backdrop
for the remainder of our inquiry. We repeatedly tried to
determine how government could respond so ineffectively
to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.
How accurately?
■ Storm-track projections released to the public 56 hours before Katrina came ashore were off by only 15 miles. The average 48-hour error is 160 miles, and the average 24-hour error is 85 miles.
■ The Hurricane Center’s predicted strength for Katrina
at landfall, two days before the storm hit, was off the mark by only 10 miles per hour.
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■ NWS Director Max Mayfi eld personally spoke by
telephone with the governors of Mississippi and
Louisiana and the mayor of New Orleans two days
prior to landfall to warn them of what was coming.
He also gave daily pre-storm video briefi ngs to
federal offi cials in Washington, including top Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DHS
brass.
■ The day before Katrina hit, the NWS offi ce in
Slidell, Louisiana issued a warning saying, “MOST
OF THE AREA WILL BE UNINHABITABLE FOR
WEEKS…PERHAPS LONGER…HUMAN SUFFERING
INCREDIBLE BY MODERN STANDARDS.”
The Select Committee determined — despite more
recently revised reports that Katrina was actually a strong
Category 3 storm at landfall, not a Category 4 — that
Katrina’s strength and the potential disaster it could bring
were made clear well in advance through briefi ngs and
formal advisories. Inadequate response could not be
blamed on lack of advance warning.
“Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency” September 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing
This hearing featuring former FEMA Director Michael
Brown attempted to construct a timeline of what FEMA
did and did not do before, during, and after Katrina made
landfall.
Fair or not, by the time of this hearing, FEMA in general
and Brown in particular had become the symbol of all that
went wrong with the government’s response to Katrina.
By the September 27 hearing date, with the emergence
of Hurricane Rita, the Select Committee had the ability to
compare and contrast disaster response actions after the
two storms. While Rita was predicted to be a very different
storm from Katrina — a mere size Large compared to a size
XXXL, and a storm that struck a far less densely populated
area — it was immediately clear that governments at all
levels did things differently this time around.
More supplies were stockpiled on the ground prior to
Rita’s arrival. The federal government declared Rita an
“incident of national signifi cance” two days before landfall,
triggering our most thorough response, and named a
federal offi cer in charge. These steps occurred two days after
Katrina. Ten thousand National Guardsmen were called
to Texas in advance of Rita; Louisiana summoned 1,500
We repeatedly tried to determine how government could respond so ineffectively to a disaster that was so accurately forecast.
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before Katrina.
Search and Rescue
operations were far
better coordinated.
Even if a little
rough around
the edges, the
massive pre-
storm evacuation
of Houston and
surrounding locales
showed improved
foresight from state and local offi cials — and how lives
can be saved when people pay attention to a coordinated
message from their government.
We also attempted to clarify FEMA’s role in disaster
response. We were faced with the problematic reality
that many Americans — and perhaps even some state
and local offi cials — falsely viewed FEMA as some sort
of national fi re and rescue team. An important task for
the Select Committee moving forward was defi ning what
FEMA is — what it can and cannot do based on what it is
actually charged with doing by statute.
We noted that FEMA is not a fi rst responder agency with the resources to assume principal responsibility
for overwhelmed state and local governments during a
disaster. This is the real world, not the reel world. There
is no Tommy Lee Jones character that comes in and takes
charge of…well…everything.
But we also attempted to contextualize that discussion.
In other words, before getting to what FEMA cannot do,
we wanted to understand what they simply did not do.
Just because they are not “fi rst responders” does not mean
they should be a second thought.
We explored the possible causes of FEMA’s inadequate
response, which are covered exhaustively in subsequent
chapters. Among those discussed at the hearing:
Inadequacies in the Stafford Act. Organizational or
budgetary or grant-making shortcomings. State and
local governments that didn’t know how to ask for
help, or simply didn’t. A bureaucratic mindset that now
emphasizes terrorism to the exclusion of natural disaster
planning. We looked at these possibilities, and more.
We also examined why FEMA seemed unable to
implement lessons that should have been learned well
in advance of Katrina. There were the lessons of previous
hurricanes. Further, FEMA offi cials participated in the
now-widely-known exercise called Hurricane Pam in
July 2004, an exercise that predicted with eerie similarity
Katrina’s impact on New Orleans, including an evacuation
of a million people, overfl owing levees, and the
destruction of hundreds of thousands of buildings.
“Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security” October 19, 2005 Select Committee hearing
Although by this date
FEMA and Michael
Brown had received the
most attention from
Members of Congress,
state and local offi cials,
and the news media
in Katrina’s wake, the
Select Committee
sought to recognize
that DHS and Secretary
Michael Chertoff have
primary responsibility
for managing the
national response to a catastrophic disaster, according to
the National Response Plan (NRP).
Therefore, three weeks after hearing from Michael
Brown, we turned to his boss, the man who ultimately
fi red him.
We needed to fi nd out if Michael Brown had it right
when he testifi ed that FEMA had been under-funded and
under-staffed, that it had become “emaciated,” and that
Congress had undermined FEMA’s effectiveness when the
agency was folded into DHS.
Michael Brown testifi ed that he asked the Department
for funding to implement the lessons learned from the
Hurricane Pam exercise and that those funds were denied.
He also testifi ed about brain drain, diminished fi nancial
resources, and “assessments” of $70 to $80 million by
DHS for department-wide programs. He said he had
written memos to Secretary Ridge and Secretary Chertoff
regarding the inadequacy of FEMA’s resources. We asked
Secretary Chertoff about those assertions.
We also sought to establish the Department’s role
and responsibilities in a disaster. What resources can the
Secretary bring to bear? What triggers the decision to
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deploy those resources? During Katrina, how personally
involved was Secretary Chertoff in seeking, authorizing, or
deploying specifi c resources?
Under the National Response Plan, the DHS Secretary
is the federal offi cial charged with declaring an Incident
of National Signifi cance. Part of that declaration entails
naming a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), to manage the
response.
The government’s pre-landfall decision to declare an
Incident of National Signifi cance with Rita suggested
awareness that the call came too late with Katrina. And,
based on some of Brown’s emails, we knew that he resented
being named the PFO by the Secretary. We needed to ask
Secretary Chertoff what he thought about that, and what
those comments said about the underlying NRP.
Finally, we asked Secretary Chertoff what we asked
all offi cials during our investigation: Where were you
in the days and hours right before, during, and after the
hurricane? What were you doing? Who were you talking to?
New York University Professor Paul Light wrote shortly
after Katrina that, “Mr. Chertoff is just about the only
offi cial in Washington who can say ‘I told you so’ about
FEMA,” based on some of the reforms he outlined in
July 2005 in his Second Stage Review. We asked Secretary
Chertoff if he believed FEMA’s response to Katrina would
have been better if the reforms had been in place on
August 29.
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama” October 27, 2005 Select Committee hearing
At this hearing we
examined Department of
Defense responsibilities,
procedures, and
coordination with
the Department of
Homeland Security in the
event of a catastrophic
disaster.
We looked at the roles of the National Guard and U.S.
Northern Command in disaster response as the operational
arms of DOD and the states, and we reviewed the role of
the Coast Guard, a unique national asset with both military
capabilities and domestic law enforcement authorities.
We sought to establish a timeline of the military’s
actions — what they were asked to do, when they were
asked, and whether the jobs actually got done.
We acknowledged the heroic efforts that DOD, National
Guard, and Coast Guard personnel made, efforts that saved
many, many lives. The mobilization was massive and, at
least once the call went out, swift and effective.
But we also discussed problems with the military
response. The Select Committee believed even some
of the successes occurred despite less-than-optimal
planning, and too often offi cers were planning in a crisis
environment.
There were problems: With situational awareness and
damage assessments. With coordinating search and rescue
operations. With the effective use of Defense Coordinating
Offi cers by FEMA. With an early and persistent disconnect
between DOD and state and local authorities. With
inadequate telecommunications that prevented effective
coordination. And, once again, with failing to learn as
much as possible from previous disasters.
While we continued to emphasize that local fi rst
responders are best suited for handling local emergencies,
the recurring question was: What happens when fi rst
responders are overwhelmed, as they clearly were in
Katrina?
As a result, we asked whether DOD anticipated these
circumstances, what preparations were made, and what
actions were taken with regard to the National Response
Plan’s “Catastrophic Incident Annex” — the annex that
authorizes federal agencies to act when state and local
capacity even to know what they need is compromised by
the sheer size of the calamity.
Our hearing came amid growing debate over an
expanded military role in future disasters. President Bush
prompted the discussion in a nationally televised address
from New Orleans on September 15, saying, “It is now
clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal
authority and a broader role for the armed forces — the
institution of our government most capable of massive
logistical operations on a moment’s notice.”
Two witnesses — Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, and Admiral Timothy
J. Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace
Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command — had
indicated prior to the hearing that DOD was considering
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training and equipping an active duty force specifi cally for
disaster response.
Those remarks led to some confusion over specifi cs,
and even to some outright opposition.
On October 13, the National Governors Association
issued a statement reasserting their authority. “Governors
are responsible for the safety and welfare of their citizens
and are in the best position to coordinate all resources to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters,” the
association wrote.
An October 21 statement by Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, who
is leading President Bush’s examination of the federal
response to Katrina, also spawned negative reactions
from state offi cials. Townsend reportedly said she was
considering whether there is “a narrow band of cases” in
which the President should seize control when a disaster
strikes.13 A spokesperson for Louisiana Gov. Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco responded by saying she could not
think of an instance in which the President should be able
to unilaterally take control. “We don’t believe Katrina was
the time, and I don’t know what another time would be,”
Denise Bottcher told the Times-Picayune.14
The Select Committee, therefore, began addressing this
basic tension. On the one hand, we heard understandable
caution from our Members and witnesses against over-
reacting to Katrina with sweeping changes to laws or
processes, caution against deviating too wildly from the
locals-as-fi rst-responders paradigm. None of us believed
the best lesson to be learned from Katrina was that all
answers can be found in Washington.
On the other hand, the call for increasing the military’s
role in domestic affairs is easy to grasp. Who else can
respond the way the military can? Who else can stand up
when others have fallen?
This tension was refl ected in the National Response
Plan before Katrina. The Catastrophic Incident Annex
assumes that local response capabilities may be
“insuffi cient,” as they will be “quickly overwhelmed.”
But the NRP plan states federal resources will only be
integrated into the response effort upon a request by state
and local authorities and assumes state and local offi cials
will be able to do the integrating themselves.
The Select Committee was left wondering if the plan
as written tried to have its cake and eat it too. How can
we rely on the overwhelmed to acknowledge they are
overwhelmed, and then expect them to direct and manage
the process of coming to their rescue?
We agreed we needed a closer evaluation of existing
procedures for DOD under the National Response Plan,
paying particular attention to DOD’s role when fi rst
responders are wiped out or otherwise incapable of
providing the initial response.
We agreed that Incidents of National Signifi cance
require a response on a national scale. But we also agreed
the devil is in the details. We cannot expect the Marines
to swoop in with MREs every time a storm hits. We train
soldiers to fi ght wars. You can’t kill a storm.
So what is the threshold? When can or should the
Stafford Act’s assumption that states will be able to “pull”
needed federal resources to meet their needs give way to
the operational imperative that federal agencies “push”
assets to those who need them? What would spur the kind
of enhanced or heightened military role that some have
been promoting in the aftermath of Katrina? When would
we pull that trigger? And fi nally, would it have made a
difference in the response to Katrina?
The fact is, military resources are not infi nite. It seems
the kind of standing humanitarian force that would be
needed to provide this sort of immediate assistance at
a moment’s notice would either threaten readiness or
require an expansion of the active force and a signifi cant
boost in how well they are equipped.
Legal questions also arose. Were we talking about
statutory changes? Should we revisit Posse Comitatus,
the 127-year-old law that bars federal troops from
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assuming domestic law enforcement duties? Did Katrina
demonstrate a need for a new exception to Posse
Comitatus, one to be utilized after major disasters?
The Select Committee ultimately refocused the
discussion by simplifying the question: Do we need a
larger DOD role — or just a smarter one?
The Select Committee tried hard to acknowledge at
this hearing what an incredible job the Coast Guard did,
and recognize the National Guard’s clear sense of urgency.
We noted for the record that Northern Command had
prepared for this storm, deploying Defense Coordinating
Offi cers to the three states before landfall and placing
units on alert.
But we also had to recognize that it was unclear how
much “real” support was in place before the storm arrived,
and that Secretary McHale himself had acknowledged
prior to our hearing the DOD response was too slow.15
“Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government’s Use of Contractors to Prepare and Respond” November 2, 2005 Select Committee hearing
Local, state, and federal governments
rely heavily on contractor support to
prepare for and response to disasters.
This hearing examined the contracts
in place prior to Katrina’s landfall,
and procurement planning efforts
that took place in anticipation of
a large-scale catastrophic event.
We also reviewed the rationale
and process for awarding disaster
relief and recovery contracts in the
immediate aftermath of Katrina.
The Select Committee asked
about the internal controls in place
to ensure that federal acquisition
laws were followed; the terms
and performance of Katrina relief
contracts; and the ways in which
the management and oversight of
disaster-related contracting can be
strengthened.
A great deal of taxpayer money went out the door to
private fi rms to help prepare for and respond to Katrina.
Part of our job was to ask whether it’s been money well
spent. And part of that inquiry was asking what contracts
should have been in place before the storm arrived,
based on what everyone knew — or should have known
— would be needed.
Was the contracting
system up to the task?
Were we able to get what
we needed, when and
where we needed it? By
any measure, this was
an enormous storm,
described as one of
“Biblical” proportions.
In the face of the
massive destruction
caused by Katrina,
acquisition personnel
acted to meet pressing
humanitarian needs,
contacting fi rms in an effort to provide immediate relief to
survivors and to protect life and property. And thankfully,
many fi rms responded.
Do we need a larger DOD role — or just a smarter one?
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It is true that several companies were called into action
on a sole-source basis under acquisition provisions that
allow the government to acquire urgently needed goods
and services in emergency situations. It’s also true that,
contrary to many media reports, some of the immediate
response efforts were provided through existing contracts
that had been previously awarded through full and open
competition.
Nevertheless, concerns were raised with respect to how
FEMA awarded contracts in Katrina’s immediate aftermath
and regarding what contract vehicles were in place before
landfall. These were legitimate concerns that affect not
only our fi ndings relative to the preparation for and
response to Katrina, but also how well prepared we’ll be
the next time — and how willing contractors will be to
step up to the plate the next time they’re called.
The indirect result of ineffi cient contracting and
misdirected, even baseless charges against contractors
could be a government left with more than it can manage
in-house.
In the weeks following Katrina, more than 80 percent
of the $1.5 billion in initial contracts awarded by FEMA
were awarded on a sole-source basis or pursuant to
limited competition. Many of the contracts awarded were
incomplete and included open-ended or vague terms. In
addition, numerous news reports questioned the terms of
disaster relief agreements made in haste.
Under the Stafford Act, prime contractors are to give
preference to local subcontractors, but reports indicated
that not enough local businesses were being hired.
Questions were also raised about the Corps of Engineers’
use of a limited competition to award contracts for debris
removal and clean up.
Undoubtedly, FEMA before Katrina suffered from
something Congress has grappled with government-wide
for many years: a lack of suffi ciently trained procurement
professionals.
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the DHS Offi ce of Inspector
General (IG) had repeatedly cited the lack of consistent
contract management for large, complex, high-cost
procurement programs. DHS procurement continues to
be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach. DHS
has seven legacy procurement offi ces that continue to serve
DHS components, including FEMA. Notably, FEMA was not
reporting or tracking procurements undertaken by disaster
fi eld offi ces, and the procurement offi ce remains to this day
understaffed given the volume and dollar value of its work.
The Chief Procurement Offi cer (CPO) had established
an eighth offi ce called the Offi ce of Procurement Operations
to meet the procurement needs of the rest of DHS. After
Katrina, however, the CPO reassigned its staff to assist
FEMA’s procurement offi ce.
At this hearing, we learned errors were made in the
contracting process before and after Katrina. The contract
oversight process is not always pretty, and decisions made
under life-and-death pressure are not always as lucid as
those made under less complicated conditions. But there are
lessons to be learned about effi cient and effective contracting,
even from this, hopefully, once in a lifetime event.
That there were and will be disagreements with
contractors over pricing and payment schedules
should come as no surprise to anyone familiar with
the administration of complex contracts in diffi cult
circumstances.
The good news is, DHS has begun establishing a
rigorous oversight process for each and every federal
contract related to Katrina. Now the process needs to be
fully implemented.
Shortly after the emergency needs arose, DHS’s Chief
Procurement Offi cer asked the DHS Inspector General’s
Offi ce to begin overseeing the acquisition process. The
DHS IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, and inspectors
and planned to hire thirty additional oversight personnel.
The staff is reviewing the award and administration of all
major contracts, including those awarded in the initial
efforts, and will monitor all contracting activities as the
government develops its requirements and as the selection
and award process continues to unfold.
Undoubtedly, FEMA before Katrina suffered from something Congress has grappled with government-wide for many years: a lack of suffi ciently trained procurement professionals.
18 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
To further ensure that any payments made to
contractors are proper and reasonable, FEMA engaged
the Defense Contract Audit Agency to help monitor and
oversee any payments made — and pledged not to pay on
any vouchers until each one is audited and cleared.
The Select Committee has no patience with waste,
fraud, or abuse. We expect that any such instances that
are proven will result in harsh punishment for the
perpetrators. We also expect that, as the conditions on the
ground have improved, the next generation of contracts
have been and will be awarded and administered in
accordance with standard acquisition procedures.
Emergency procedures are for emergencies only.
FEMA said it continues to revisit non-competitive
arrangements made immediately after the storm.
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama” November 9, 2005 Select Committee hearing
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi” December 7, 2005 Select Committee hearing
“Hurricane Katrina: Preparation and Response by the State of Louisiana” December 14, 2005 Select Committee hearing
The three state-focused hearings we held were arguably
the most important in terms of fact-gathering. After all, we
understood that in the event of an emergency, state and
local government offi cials bear primary responsibilities
under both the National Response Plan and their own laws
and directives. Throughout federal, state and local planning
documents the general principle is for all incidents to
be handled at the lowest possible organizational and
jurisdictional level. Police, fi re, public health and medical,
emergency management, and other personnel are
responsible for incident management at the local level.
For federally declared emergencies or major disasters, DHS
provides operational and/or resource coordination for
federal support to on-scene incident command structures.
Our goal was to better understand the responsibilities
and actions of state and local offi cials before, during, and
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. We explored state
laws, policies, procedures, and how state and local offi cials
interfaced with DHS and FEMA when they confronted
Katrina — and how DHS interfaced with them.
The National Response Plan and the National
Incident Management System were crafted to provide
the framework and template, respectively, for the federal
government to work with state and local authorities to
prepare for and respond to crises. In turn, states, localities,
tribal governments, and nongovernmental organizations
are asked to align their plans and procedures with federal
guidelines and procedures.
Did this coordinated alignment occur? By the time of
these hearings, we knew in large part it had not. We sought
to understand, from a state and local perspective, why.
“Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm” December 6, 2005 Select Committee hearing
In mid-November, Rep. Cynthia McKinney asked Select
Committee Chairman Tom Davis to focus a hearing on
the “African-American voice” related to Hurricane Katrina.
With that request in mind, and having already planned
a hearing featuring testimony from storm victims, the
Select Committee sought to better understand the
experiences of Gulf coast residents, including those forced
AP PHOTO/SUSAN WALSH AP PHOTO/HARAZ N. GHANBARI AP PHOTO/SUSAN WALSH
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 19
to evacuate, during the catastrophe. Only by hearing
from those most directly affected by Katrina could we
determine where, how, and why the government response
at all levels was so terribly inadequate.
There was little question that Katrina had sparked
renewed debate about race, class, and institutional
approaches toward vulnerable population groups in
the United States. In the aftermath of the storm, a wide
array of media reports, public statements, and polls
underscored this reality.
In his September 15 speech to the nation, President
Bush touched on the issue. “As all of us saw on television,
there is also some deep, persistent poverty in this region
as well. And that poverty has roots in a history of racial
discrimination, which cut off generations from the
opportunity of America,” the President said.
Since then the debate had become increasingly heated.
In media interviews, Jesse Jackson compared New Orleans’
shelters to the hold of a slave ship, and Louis Farrakhan
suggested New Orleans’ levees were intentionally blown
up to destroy primarily African-American neighborhoods.
While not all the commentary has necessarily been
constructive, substantiated, or fair, the Select Committee
believed the issue warranted further discussion, especially
within the context of understanding the experiences of
those caught inside the storm, and in hopes of making sure
the governmental response is more effective the next time.
We knew from government e-mails and other
documents that offi cials were almost immediately sensitive
to public perceptions of race as a factor in the inadequate
response. An aide to Louisiana Governor Blanco cautioned
colleagues about how to respond to a request from Rep.
Maxine Waters, an African-American, for security escorts
in New Orleans shortly after the storm. “Please handle
this very carefully,”
aide Johnny
Anderson wrote in
an e-mail. “We are
getting enough bad
national press on
race relations.”16
E-mails from aides
to former FEMA
Director Michael
Brown refl ected
similar concerns
about public relations
and racial politics. And Alabama offi cials discussed similar
sensitivities about a proposal to conduct background
checks on out-of-state evacuees being housed in state parks.
A CNN-Gallup poll from September 8 to 11 reported
60 percent of African-Americans, but only 12 percent of
whites, believed race was a factor in the slow response to
Katrina. Another poll by the Pew Research Center found
that 7 in 10 blacks believed the disaster showed that
racial inequality remains a major problem in America. A
majority of whites disagreed.
A November survey of 46 Katrina evacuees published
by the Natural Hazards Center at the University of
Colorado-Boulder concluded that “issues of race and
class were central to evacuation experiences.”17 For many,
the evacuation process was complicated by age, mental
or physical disability, the need to care for dependents, or
material possessions they were trying to take with them.
The Washington Post, the Kaiser Family Foundation, and
Harvard University also conducted face-to-face interviews
with 680 randomly selected adult evacuees residing in
Houston.18 When asked, “Has your experience made you
feel like the government cares about people like you, or
has it made you feel like the government doesn’t care?”
61 percent reported they felt the government doesn’t
care. Additionally, the evacuees suggested an intersection
between race and class: 68 percent of respondents thought
the federal government would have responded more
quickly if more people trapped in the fl oodwaters were
“wealthier and white rather than poorer and black.”
At an early November forum at Emerson College,
Louis Elisa — a former regional director for the Federal
Emergency Management Agency under President Clinton
— reportedly suggested that race had to be a factor in the
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inadequate response. “I am telling you, as a professional,
that you could not have had a mistake of this nature…if
something else was not afoot,” the Boston Globe quoted
Elisa.19
Whether or not one believed racist charges were well-
founded (and clearly a majority of our members did not),
the Select Committee agreed it should recognize and
discuss the socioeconomic and racial backdrop against
which Katrina unfolded.
As the Brookings Institution reported in October,
New Orleans, which once had economically and
demographically diverse neighborhoods, had grown
extremely segregated by both race and income by the time
of the storm. “As a result,” Brookings concluded, “blacks
and whites were living in quite literally different worlds
before the storm hit.” 20
At the very least, the Select Committee determined it
should further explore at this hearing how socioeconomic
factors contributed to the experiences of those directly
affected by the storm. The UC-Boulder survey found
that “almost all interviewees described the evacuation
process as disorderly and disorganized, with minimal
communication about where evacuees were heading and
when the next transportation would arrive. This created
a state of uncertainty and insecurity…. [P]redominantly
working-class African-Americans did not evacuate because
they did not have the fi nancial resources to do so.”21
The Select Committee sought to learn more about
whether government messages to Gulf coast residents
regarding the dangers of the coming hurricane could have
been presented in a more effective manner, a question
which also carried racial and socioeconomic implications.
“If you don’t hear the message from someone you
trust, you tend to be skeptical,” Margaret Sims, vice
president of the Joint Center for Political and Economic
Studies, told Public Relations Strategist magazine. “If you
get confl icting information from people you’re not sure
of, then inaction may be, from your perspective, the most
prudent form of action.” 22
The same magazine article noted that disaster
response may have been hampered by not taking the
“circumstances” of area residents fully into account. “The
people creating the verbal or image measures don’t take
into account access or physical barriers to opportunities in
certain communities,” said Linda Aldoory, director of the
Center for Risk Communication Research at the University
of Maryland. “With Katrina, people knew the importance
of storm warnings and the need to evacuate, but didn’t
have the physical access to do so.”23
In other words, the Select Committee agreed it should
examine to what extent response inadequacies stemmed
from the messengers — and the message. We wanted to
further explore the possibility that different people may
hear different things when their elected offi cials are telling
them to evacuate.
Document request, production, and review: an overview
Within a week of its September 15, 2005 creation, the
Select Committee held its fi rst hearing. By the end of the
month, Chairman Davis and Rep. Charlie Melancon,
on behalf of the Select Committee and in cooperation
with the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, had submitted 19 offi cial and
comprehensive requests for documents to relevant federal
agencies and state governments.
By the beginning of January 2006, 67 formal requests
for documents had been issued by the Select Committee
and the Senate Committee to 29 federal agencies as
well as the governments of Alabama, Mississippi, and
Louisiana and their subdivisions.
“If you get confl icting information from people you’re not sure of, then inaction may be, from your perspective, the most prudent form of action.”
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In response to those formal requests and numerous
other staff requests, the Select Committee received
hundreds of thousands of documents.
The responses by the federal agencies and state
governments inundated the Select Committee. A constant
stream of boxes containing responsive documents arrived
daily at the Select Committee’s door. Select Committee
staff worked around the clock to organize and review
this stream of documents. Aggressive follow-up by the
Select Committee, detailed below, ensured the document
production was responsive to the Select Committee’s
requests.
To fulfi ll its mission, the Select Committee needed to
do more than hold hearings. We requested and received
more than half a million pages of documents from
governmental organizations at all levels: federal, state,
and local. The information gleaned from these documents
played a critical role in helping the Select Committee
paint a picture of what happened and why.
Below is a brief overview of what was requested and
what was received. Most of the governmental organizations
complied with our requests in a timely and complete
fashion. Efforts by others to comply unfortunately were
neither timely nor complete. This is discussed below as well.
In September 2005, the Senate Committee, chaired by
Senator Susan Collins, began its Katrina investigation.
In many cases, the two committees desired the same or
similar information. To facilitate both investigations,
and to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication of
efforts, the Select Committee simply asked to receive all
documents requested by the Senate.
Federal
The Select Committee sent request letters to all 15
cabinet-level departments as well as many independent
federal deparments including: the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the United States Postal Service
(USPS), the Agency for International Development (AID),
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the Small Business
Administration (SBA), the Social Security Administration
(SSA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Offi ce
of Personnel Management (OPM), and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We also
requested information from the White House and the
Offi ce of the Vice President.
In particular, the Select Committee requested extensive
information from the Department of Homeland Security,
particularly from two of its constituent agencies, FEMA
and the U.S. Coast Guard. We requested documents and
communications from before August 23 related to the
threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or the
Gulf Coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. We also sought
documents and communications from between August
23 and August 29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. And we requested
documents and communications from between August
29 and September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses.
In addition, we requested information about the
different elements of DHS and individuals holding
key positions. We wanted to know the different roles
and responsibilities of those components, as well as
the actions they took before, during, and after Katrina.
We asked for information regarding the activation of
the National Response Plan and National Incident
Management System, and any discussions about the
use of the armed forces. We also requested relevant
communications, specifi cally any requests for assistance,
communications with local and state authorities, and
communications that revealed any plans to prepare for
the hurricane, or communications that demonstrated
possible vulnerabilities to a hurricane. We also wanted any
documents containing authorities, regulations, plans, and
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procedures of the agency, weather reports, information
about medical response assets, and information about
DHS and FEMA funding and budgeting.
We requested an employee directory and organization
chart for FEMA, as well as the individuals in key position
during the hurricane in the affected regions. We asked
for documents referring to risks posed by hurricanes or
fl ooding of New Orleans, and documents indicating
whether offi cials knew of those risks. We also requested
documents and communications regarding the levee system
in New Orleans, including plans, risk assessments, and
knowledge of the levees’ failure, particularly documents
and communications with the Army Corps of Engineers.
We sought documents and names of key individuals
related to the Hurricane Pam exercise, and information
about FEMA’s chain of command during the storm
and FEMA’s authorities, plans, and policies relevant
to Hurricane Katrina. In addition, we requested after-
action reports for past hurricanes; information about the
activation of the National Response Plan; qualifi cations of
key FEMA personnel; and contributions of contractors and
subcontractors.
Finally, we requested a description of the Coast Guard’s
role with respect to the National Response Plan and other
domestic emergencies, specifi cally Hurricane Katrina. We
wanted to know what components will act, who they will
cooperate with, and in what capacity. We also requested
information about search and rescue, such as command
structures, regulations, and assets available. We also
requested details about when the Coast Guard learned of
certain key information before, during, and after Katrina.
DHS responded to most of these requests from the
Select Committee, including requests addressed to Secretary
Chertoff, Acting Undersecretary Paulison, and Assistant
Secretary Robert Stephan. The Department produced in
total well over 200,000 pages of documents including:
(1) Briefi ng books, reports and communication from the
Secretary’s offi ce; (2) Communications from the Deputy
Secretary’s offi ce; (3) E-mails from Undersecretary Brown’s
offi ce; (4) E-mails from FEMA personnel involved in
planning and response efforts; (5) the National Response
Plan, Hurricane plans, New Orleans and Mobile area plans,
Incident Action Plans, Operation Manuals and planning
worksheets, and Katrina specifi c plans; (6) Mission
assignments, task requests and logs, action requests,
tracking reports, and situation reports; (7) tasking logs and
requests; (8) briefi ngs; (9) grant program documents; (10)
planned shipments; resource tracking reports, commodity
maps, and staging areas; (11) audits; (12) Katrina maps and
graphics; and (13) organizational charts.
The Select Committee sent specifi c requests to the
Department of Defense as well. We sent request letters
to the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, the National
Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), and
Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
Specifi cally, we requested documents and
communications from before August 23 by offi cials of the
Department of Defense or any constituent agencies related
to the threat posed by a hurricane striking New Orleans or
the Gulf coast, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses. We requested
documents and communications from between August 23
and August 29, by offi cials of the Department of Defense
or any constituent elements related to the threat posed
by Hurricane Katrina, mitigation measures or projects,
emergency preparations, or emergency responses. And,
we requested documents and communications, including
internal communications from between August 29 and
September 15 by offi cials of the Department of Defense
or any DOD elements related to the impact of Hurricane
Katrina, mitigation measures or projects, emergency
preparations, or emergency responses.
We also requested information about DOD’s role and
legal authority with respect to domestic emergencies and
Hurricane Katrina. We wanted organizational charts,
after-action reports, and plans with respect to national
catastrophes. We requested information about DOD and
the events of Hurricane Katrina, such as any guidance
provided by the Secretary of Defense before landfall, the
preparations made, specifi c actions taken, and personnel
involved. We asked for information about Joint Task Force
Katrina and on actions taken during Hurricane Katrina,
specifi cally those of active duty troops and National
Guard units; requests for assistance; and information on
DOD’s chain of command during the incident.
The Select Committee initially received responses
from the Department of Defense on behalf of Secretary
Rumsfeld that only partially complied with the various
requests. On November 18, the Select Committee received
a production from the Department containing: execution
orders; requests for forces; correspondence regarding
National Guard authorization; daily update briefi ngs; and
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 23
daily executive summaries. On December 14, the Select
Committee received further production containing the
Joint Staff Director of Operations’ (J-3) Redacted Timeline,
outlining the Department’s response actions to Hurricane
Katrina and the Joint Task Force Katrina Commander’s
Assessment Briefi ngs.
In further response to the letter requests, on December
22 the Select Committee received: the Assistant Secretary
for Defense for Homeland Defense’s Smart Book;
responses to Senate interrogatories of September 28;
National Guard and Northcom timelines; Execute and
Deployment orders; NORTHCOM teleconference minutes;
Captain Rick Snyder’s, XO USS Bataan, Lessons Learned
Package; Vice Admiral Fitzgerald’s e-mails, timelines,
and notes; 2nd Fleet Lessons Learned; Records of Annual
Hurricane exercises; memo to Admiral Starling regarding
Naval assets in the region; information regarding
helicopter assets; Rear Admiral Kilkenny’s Lessons Learned
brief to the Chief of Naval Operations; Northcom requests
for forces; Northcom deployment orders; Northcom
timeline; and twice-daily Joint Operations Center emails.
In addition the Department produced: Joint Forces
Command (JFCOM) timeline and logs of verbal
orders; JFCOM Standard Operating Procedures;
Unifi ed Command Plan; TOPOFF exercise paperwork;
Commander Fleet Forces command general requirement
for Humanitarian Response/Disaster Relief; National
Guard Bureau Readiness Documents; National Guard
Bureau Senior Leadership Questions; and Katrina effects
on National Guard Bureau readiness.
Despite these signifi cant productions, Chairman
Davis was concerned that the communications of senior
Defense Department offi cials — a priority in the fi rst
request to the Department — had not been produced.
Consequently, after discussions with Rep. Melancon,
he issued a subpoena to the Department of Defense on
December 14. The subpoena required the production of
the correspondence of senior DOD offi cials related to
Hurricane Katrina.
On December 22, the Select Committee received
documents responsive to the subpoena, including offi cial
correspondence from Assistant Secretary Paul McHale,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Peter Verga, Admiral
Keating, Lieutenant General Honoré, Lieutenant General
Blum, and Colonel John Jordan. On December 30, the
Select Committee received more documents responsive
to the subpoena, including DOD offi cial correspondence
from Secretary Rumsfeld, Acting Deputy Secretary
England, Colonel Daskevich, Brigadier General Scherling,
Colonel Roberson, Colonel Chavez, Colonel Young,
F E
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24 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Admiral Keating, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Verga. On January 13, the Select Committee received
further submissions of correspondence from Department
offi cials including, Brigadier General Graham, Major
General Young. And on January 17, the Select Committee
received the emails of Major General Grass and Lieutenant
General Vaughn.
The Select Committee also requested information
from the White House. Specifi cally, the Select Committee
requested documents and communications from before
August 23 related to the threat posed by a hurricane
striking New Orleans or the Gulf coast, mitigation
measures or projects, emergency preparations, or
emergency responses. We requested documents and
communications from between August 23 and August
29 related to the threat posed by Hurricane Katrina,
mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations,
or emergency responses. And we requested documents
and communications from between August 29 and
September 15 related to the impact of Hurricane Katrina,
mitigation measures or projects, emergency preparations,
or emergency responses. Initially, the White House
produced more than 4,000 documents in response to
these requests; however, the Select Committee was not
satisfi ed with this initial production of documents.
In a December 6 letter, William Kelly, White House
Deputy Counsel, said the September 30 and December 1
requests were too broad and asked the Select Committee
to narrow the request. In response, the Select Committee
insisted on briefi ngs by senior administration offi cials and
the production of certain items, including e-mails and
documents from the White House Situation Room. As a
result of our demands, a briefi ng was provided and more
than 12,000 pages of documents from the Executive Offi ce
of the President on the response to Hurricane Katrina
were delivered on December 16. The Select Committee
made similar requests to the Vice President’s offi ce, which
responded with almost 6,000 pages of documents.
While the Select Committee was disappointed and
frustrated by the slow pace and general resistance to
producing the requested documents by the White
House and the Department of Defense, at the end of the
day, the Select Committee believes it received enough
information through documents, briefi ngs, and interviews
to understand the actions and decisions of those entities,
and reach sound fi ndings on them, without implicating
executive privilege.
That’s what this was about: obtaining suffi cient
information. Getting the documents and testimony
we needed to make sure Americans are better prepared
the next time. Ultimately, our public criticism of the
Administration’s slow pace did the job. At our insistence,
the White House provided Deputy Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security Ken Rapuano for a
briefi ng with staff and Members. With the President in
Texas, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend out
of the country, and Chief of Staff Andrew Card in Maine
at the time of the storm, Rapuano offered the best view
of White House knowledge and actions right before and
right after Katrina. In fact, his briefi ng included more
acknowledgements of institutional failure than any we
had received previously.
The agreement with the White House gave us an
opportunity to understand the White House role in
Katrina while keeping the Select Committee on a parallel
track with the Senate, which had not pursued White
House subpoenas, and had not even subpoenaed DOD. A
subpoena for White House documents would have simply
derailed and delayed our inquiry, with the likelihood of
a lengthy and unproductive court battle over executive
privilege to follow.
State
The Select Committee sent request letters to governmental
components in the three states hit hardest by Hurricane
Katrina: Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In each
state, we requested information from both the offi ce of
the governor and the state’s respective agency in charge of
homeland security or emergency management.
Specifi cally, the Select Committee asked each state’s
governor’s offi ce for documents or communications,
including internal communications, received, prepared,
or sent up to the date of September 15 by state offi cials
related to the threat posed by a hurricane, mitigation
measures or projects, emergency preparations, or
emergency responses. Also, for each state’s offi ce in charge
of homeland security or emergency management, the
Select Committee requested: information about that
organization, including organization charts; the agency’s
responsibilities with respect to emergencies; regulations
and procedures; after action reports for past hurricanes;
past requests for federal grants; budgets for the agencies;
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 25
contractors and subcontractors that assisted with Katrina;
a detailed chronology of events and actions taken during,
before, and after the hurricane; key state personnel
involved with Katrina; and all communications to and
from the agencies relevant to the disaster.
The Select Committee also requested any state, county,
and local emergency plans, and the identity of state and
local agencies involved in those plans. Finally, the Select
Committee asked for documents from the past fi ve years
that evaluate the threats posed by hurricanes and any
information about exercises to prepare for hurricanes.
The Select Committee sent request letters to the
Alabama Department of Homeland Security (ADHS),
as well as the offi ce of Governor Bob Riley. The State
of Alabama answered all questions and replied to all
requests. The state provided the Alabama Emergency
Management Plan, 26 different situation reports, the
Governor’s proclamations, a timeline, and four Incident
Action Plans. The state also provided communications
such as a MOU with Mississippi, Alabama county
emergency management standards, and state emergency
procedures. In answering the Select Committee’s
questions, the state provided organization charts, key
personnel, the roles and responsibilities of ADHS and
the Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA),
state and county emergency plans and the state and local
agencies involved in the response to Katrina. The state
also provided risk assessments and after action reports
and information on exercises to prepare for disasters.
Alabama also provided information on budgets for the
past fi ve years. The state also provided timelines, a list of
actions taken by state agencies in response to Katrina and
a complete set of AEMA internal communications and
action tracking system (EM 2000) messages.
The Select Committee sent requests to both the
Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (LOHSEP) and to the offi ce of Governor
Kathleen Blanco. After asking for a 90 day extension
on October 26 due to the need to address immediate
hurricane relief, the Governor fully responded on
December 1 with tens of thousands of documents on their
response and preparation for Hurricane Katrina including:
an overview of the Governor’s actions, Executive Orders
and declarations, emergency preparedness plans, the LA
Citizen Awareness and Disaster Evacuation Guide, offi cial
correspondence, organization charts, notes and internal
communications. Included was the response of the Acting
Deputy Director of LOHSEP based on “the best available
information” in that agency’s possession at that time,
including specifi c responses to the committee’s questions
in the original Senate Committee letter.
The Louisiana Attorney General’s Offi ce responded
with additional information on January 11 and also
informed us there would be a slight delay in sending two
CDs containing e-mails of the Louisiana National Guard
due to technical problems. Those CDs arrived February 2.
The Select Committee sent request letters to both the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and
the Offi ce of Governor Haley Barber. MEMA provided
organization charts, and a listing of key personnel. MEMA
produced state plans including the MS Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan (CEMP Vol. II), Contra-
Flow Plan of August 2005, as well as many inter-agency
state plans such as plans from Louisiana, transportation
evacuation plans, and parish/city plans. MEMA provided
risk assessments for hurricanes, fl oods, surges, and
economic impacts. MEMA also included all Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) maps of the state and local
jurisdictions. MEMA provided information on plans and
training exercises such as Hurricane Pam and Lifesaver
2004. Other items provided: timeline of events and
communications such as director briefs, news releases,
media advisories, MEMA situation reports, Incident Action
Plans, EM 2000 messages, and mission assignments.
The documents produced by all three states and the
federal government allowed the Select Committee to
gain important insights into the workings of government
entities stressed to the breaking point by a terrible disaster.
They helped reveal the true nature of the relationship
of state emergency management operations to the
system of federal emergency management support.
These documents allowed the Select Committee to reach
conclusions about what worked well and what did not.
Those conclusions will help improve preparation and
response for the next disaster, protect the public, save
lives, and reduce suffering. We don’t pretend to have the
entire universe of information related to the preparation
for and response to Katrina. But we had more than
enough to do our job. ■
26 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from inside the Storm Before Select Comm., (Dec. 6, 2005) at 28 (statement of Patricia Thompson) [hereinafter Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Juliette Saussy, Director, New Orleans Emergency Medical Services, in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006). 3 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Eddie Favre, Mayor of Bay St. Louis, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006). 4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Brent Warr, Mayor of Gulfport, in Waveland, MS (Jan. 20, 2006). 5 Rep. Gene Taylor, comments to Select Comm. Members and Staff during bus tour of coastal MS (Jan. 20, 2006). 6 Rep. Gene Taylor, comments to Select Comm. Members and Staff during bus tour of coastal MS (Jan. 20, 2006). 7 Hearing on Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons Learned from Katrina Before House Gov’t Reform Committee, 109th Cong. (Sept. 15,
2005) at 11 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman) [hereinafter Sept. 15, 2005 Gov’t Reform Hearing]. 8 Sept. 15, 2005 Gov’t Reform Hearing at 12 (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 9 Nicholas Johnston, Some House Democrats Want Larger Role in Katrina Investigation, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 2, 2005. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voice from Inside the Storm Before the Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2005). 13 Bill Walsh, Plan would let president take control in disasters; Proposal may be seen as slap at Blanco, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 22, 2005
[hereinafter Plan Article]. 14 Plan Article. 15 See, e.g., George C. Wilson, Suiting Up for the Next Katrina, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 17, 2005 at 5. 16 E-mail correspondence from Johnny Anderson, aide to Gov. of LA, to other aides (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:56 p.m.). 17 John Barnshaw, Continuing Signifi cance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural
Hazards Center), Nov. 2005 at 2. 18 Wash. Post Kaiser Family Foundation, and Harvard University, Survey of Hurricane Katrina evacuees (2005). 19 Christine MacDonald, Months After Katrina, a Local Storm Surge on Race and Class, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 6, 2005 at 4. 20 Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, New Orleans after the Storm: Lessons Learned from the Past, a Plan for the Future, (Oct. 2005)
at 6. 21 John Barnshaw, Continuing Signifi cance of Race and Class among Houston Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER (Natural
Hazards Center), Nov. 2005 at 3. 22 Alison Stateman, Time for a Change? What Hurricane Katrina Revealed About Race and Class in America, PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGIST, Oct. 1,
2005 at 8 (hereinafter Strategist Article). 23 Strategist Article.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 27
28 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina is
like nothing I have witnessed before. It is catastrophic. Words cannot
convey the physical destruction and personal suffering in that part of
the nation.” Dr. Max Mayfi eld
Director, National Hurricane Center
Select Committee hearing, September 22, 2005
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 29
BACKGROUND
National framework for emergency management
General role of FEMA, creation of DHS, and FEMA’s absorption into the department
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was
established in 1979 in an effort to consolidate many of the
federal policies related to the management of emergencies,
including preparedness, mitigation, disaster response, and recovery.1 Prior to FEMA’s creation, through a mix of legislation and executive decisions, responsibility for federal
emergency assistance as well as the types of assistance and
eligibility underwent numerous changes. For example,
administrative responsibility for assistance was shifted
among a variety of federal departments, agencies, and
the White House. In addition, the kinds of assistance the
federal government provided and the types of organizations
eligible were increased a number of times by, for example,
adding provisions for disaster relief to small businesses and
agricultural producers. By the late 1970s, these authorities
and administrative changes had “developed into a complex
mix of federal emergency management missions” with
which state, local, and federal offi cials were dissatisfi ed,
characterizing the situation as an ineffi cient maze of federal
policies and responsible administrative entities.2
In 1978, following the incident at Three Mile Island,
President Carter proposed reorganizing many of the
emergency operational and coordination functions
that had become dispersed throughout the federal
government. In a reorganization plan submitted to
Congress, the President proposed creating FEMA to
administer many of the federal policies related to
disasters, doing so based on a number of key principles:3
■ Federal authorities to anticipate, prepare for, and
respond to major civil emergencies should be
supervised by one offi cial responsible to the President
and given attention by other federal offi cials at the
highest levels;
■ An effective civil defense system requires the most
effi cient use of all available resources (later embodied
in the “all hazards” approach, through which civil
defense capabilities would be available for any disaster,
regardless of cause);
■ Whenever possible, emergency responsibilities should
be extensions of the regular missions of federal, state,
and local agencies (later embodied in federal response
plans through which FEMA coordinates and plans the
assistance other federal agencies provide rather than
providing the assistance directly);
■ Federal intervention should be minimized by
emphasizing hazard mitigation and state and local
preparedness; and,
This report is a story about federal, state, and local emergency response plans, and how they were or were not
implemented before and after Katrina. Where there were problems, we asked why. Where even fl awless execution led to
unacceptable results, we returned to questioning the underlying plans.
What this Select Committee has done is not rocket science. We’ve gathered facts and established timelines based on
some fairly rudimentary but important questions posed to the right people in both the public and private sectors. What
did you need and what did you get? Where were you in the days and hours right before, during, and after the storm? Who
were you talking to? What were you doing? Does that match what you were supposed to be doing? Why or why not?
In other words, the Select Committee has matched what was supposed to happen under federal, state, and local plans
against what actually happened. Our fi ndings emerged from this process of matching. In this lengthy Background chapter,
we beg your indulgence. We know that most readers do not care about acronyms or organizational charts, about
authorities and capabilities or the concepts of “push” versus “pull.” We know you simply want to know who was supposed
to do what, when, and whether the job got done. And if it didn’t get done, you want to know how we are going to make
sure it does the next time.
We provide this background on the framework for emergency management to set the stage for the story we will tell.
To understand the failure of initiative, we need to fi rst explain the tools that were available to so many.
30 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
■ Federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely
linked with emergency preparedness and response
functions.
The President’s reorganization plan took effect in
April 1979 through two executive orders which created
FEMA and assigned the various responsibilities previously
dispersed throughout a number of other agencies.4 These
included, among others, the coordination of civil defense,
civil emergency planning, and federal disaster relief;
federal disaster preparedness; federal
fl ood insurance authorities; dam
safety; natural and nuclear disaster
warning systems; and, coordination
of preparedness and planning to
reduce the consequences of major
terrorist incidents.5 To meet these
responsibilities, FEMA focused on
(1) enhancing the capability of state
and local governments to respond
to disasters; (2) coordinating with
other federal agencies that provide
resources to respond to disasters;
(3) giving federal assistance directly to citizens recovering
from disasters; (4) granting fi nancial assistance to state
and local governments; and, (5) providing leadership
for hazard mitigation through grants, fl ood plain
management, and other activities.6
FEMA’s transfer to the Department of Homeland Security and role in disaster response
In 2002, Congress created the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and placed FEMA within the new
department. Specifi cally, the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (HSA) established in DHS the Emergency
Preparedness and Response (EPR) Directorate, placing
FEMA (except for its terrorism preparedness functions)
into EPR along with a number of additional entities and
functions.7 For example, EPR also assumed responsibility
for the Department of Health and Human Services’ Offi ce
of Emergency Preparedness, which manages the National
Disaster Medical System, a network of federal, state, local,
private sector, and civilian volunteer medical and support
personnel who augment local medical providers during
disasters.8 In addition to these functional responsibilities,
the HSA assigned to EPR responsibility for:9
■ promoting the effectiveness of emergency responders;
■ supporting the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT)
through standards, training exercises, and funding;
■ managing, overseeing, and coordinating federal
response resources;
■ aiding disaster recovery;
■ creating an intergovernmental national incident
management system;
■ consolidating existing federal response plans into one
plan;
■ ensuring emergency responders have interoperative
communications technology;
■ developing a coordinated strategy for public health-
related activities; and
■ using private sector resources.
Federal vs. state and local roles
Pull vs. push system
The federal government responds to most natural disasters
when the affected state(s) requests help because the
disaster is of such severity and magnitude that an effective
response is beyond the capabilities of the state and local
governments.10 This system in use for most disasters
— providing federal assistance in response to requests of
the states (or local governments via the states) — is often
referred to as a “pull” system in that it relies on states to
know what they need and to be able to request it from the
federal government.11
In practice, states may make these requests before
disasters strike because of the near certainty that federal
assistance will be necessary after such an event (e.g., with
hurricanes) or, afterwards, once they have conducted
preliminary damage assessments and determined that
their response capabilities are overwhelmed. In either
case, the resources the federal government provides in
any disaster response are intended to supplement state
Providing federal assistance in response to requests of the states (or local governments via the states) is often referred to as a “pull” system.
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 31
and local government resources devoted to the ongoing
disaster relief and recovery effort.12
In certain instances, however, the federal response
may also be considered a “push” system, in which federal
assistance is provided and/or moved into the affected area
prior to a disaster or without waiting for specifi c requests
from the state or local governments.13 As discussed below,
DHS’s National Response Plan includes a component
— the Catastrophic Incident Annex — that outlines the
kinds of events that can cause damage so massive that fi rst
responders, local governments, and state governments
are unable to request — or “pull” — federal assistance
in the immediate aftermath of the incident, creating a
situation in which “pushing” the federal resources might
be necessary.
EMAC system to supplement state and local capabilities
Prior, or in addition, to seeking assistance from the
federal governments, states are set up to help each other
when disasters or emergencies overwhelm their capacity.
States do so through participation in the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), an interstate
mutual aid agreement among member states to provide
assistance after disasters overwhelm the affected state’s
capacity. Congress approved the creation of EMAC in
1996, building on the earlier efforts of the Southern
Regional Emergency Compact that Florida and 16 other
states created in 1993 after experiencing dissatisfaction
with the state and federal response to Hurricane Andrew
in 1992.14 EMAC provides the legal structure for states to
request assistance from one another as well as a menu of
resources, such as temporary shelters and cargo aircraft,
which may be available from other member states.
Importantly, this assistance can, and often does, come
from participating states’ National Guards.15 The National
Emergency Management Association, the professional
association of state emergency managers, administers the
compact.16
Federal authorities and capabilities
When an incident overwhelms, or is likely to overwhelm,
state and local resources, the Stafford Act authorizes the
President, in response to a request from the governor of
the affected state, to issue two types of declarations—
emergency or major disaster.
Emergency declaration
The Stafford Act defi nes an emergency as “any occasion or
instance for which, in the determination of the President,
federal assistance is needed to supplement state and
local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect
property and public health and safety, or to lessen or
avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
States.”17 An emergency declaration is more limited in
scope than a major disaster declaration; generally, federal
assistance and funding for emergencies are provided to
meet a specifi c need or to help prevent a major disaster
from occurring.18 Emergency assistance under such
a declaration may include: grants to state and local
governments for debris removal; direct assistance (grants)
to individuals and households for temporary housing
and other needs; and, assistance to states in distributing
medicine and food.19
Major disaster declaration
A major disaster can result from a hurricane, earthquake,
fl ood, tornado or other incident that clearly overwhelms
the ability of state or local governments to respond on their
own. A presidential declaration of a major disaster usually
occurs after local and state governments have responded
with their own resources (such as the National Guard),
conducted damage assessments to determine losses and
recovery needs, and determined that the disaster is of such
severity and magnitude that an effective response is beyond
In certain instances, the federal response may be considered a “push” system, in which federal assistance is provided into the affected area prior to a disaster or without waiting for specifi c requests from the state or local governments.
32 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
the capabilities of the state and local governments.20 Such
a declaration sets into motion federal assistance to and
support of state and local response efforts as well as long-
term federal recovery programs.21
Principles of the National Response Plan and the National Incident Management System
Broadly speaking, the overall structure for the federal
response to most disasters consists of the National
Response Plan and National Incident Management System.
The President issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive (HSPD)-5 in February 2003, directing DHS
to develop a new plan for responding to emergencies
(regardless of cause). Specifi cally, HSPD-5 required DHS
to establish a single, comprehensive approach to the
management of emergency events, whether the result
of terrorist attacks or large-scale natural or accidental
disasters.22 According to DHS, the intent of this plan is
to align federal coordination structures, capabilities, and
resources into a unifi ed, all-discipline, and all-hazards
approach to domestic incident management.23
To implement HSPD-5, DHS developed the National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National
Response Plan (NRP). In short, the NRP defi nes what
needs to be done in a large-scale emergency event and the
NIMS defi nes how to manage it:
■ The NRP describes the structure and mechanisms
for coordinating federal support during emergencies
(or exercising direct federal authority).24 It uses the
framework of the NIMS to integrate federal government
domestic prevention, protection, response, and
recovery plans into a single operational plan for all
hazards and all emergency response disciplines. The
NRP describes operational procedures for federal
support to state, local, and tribal emergency managers
and defi nes situations in which federal authorities are
to provide support and when federal authorities are
to assume control. The NRP organizes capabilities,
staffi ng, and equipment resources in terms of functions
that are most likely to be needed during emergencies,
such as communications or urban search and rescue,
and spells out common processes and administrative
requirements for executing the plan. DHS issued the
NRP in December 2004 and used it for the fi rst time in
the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.
■ NIMS consists of six major components of a systems
approach to domestic incident management: command
and management, preparedness, resource management,
communications and information management,
supporting technologies, and ongoing management
and maintenance. According to DHS, NIMS “aligns
the patchwork of federal special-purpose incident
management and emergency response plans into an
effective and effi cient structure.”25 To do so, it defi nes
the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local
fi rst responders during emergencies and establishes
a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and
organizational processes to enable effective, effi cient,
and collaborative emergency event management at
all levels. The concepts, principles, and processes
underlying the NIMS are intended to improve the
ability of different jurisdictions and fi rst-responder
disciplines to work together in various areas, such as
command and communications.26 NIMS, according to
DHS, is based on an “appropriate balance of fl exibility
and standardization.” It allows government and private
entities to use an adjustable national framework to
work together managing domestic incidents, no matter
their cause, size, location, or complexity and, while
doing so, provides a set of standardized organizational
structures to improve interoperability among
jurisdictions.27 Beginning in federal fi scal year 2005,
state and local governments were required to adopt
NIMS in order to receive federal (DHS) preparedness
grants or contracts.28
The NRP consists of 5 components: 29
1. The base plan describes the overall structure and
processes of a national approach to domestic incident
management that integrates the efforts and resources
of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and non-
governmental organizations. It includes planning
assumptions (e.g., state and local capabilities may be
overwhelmed), roles and responsibilities, a concept
of operations, incident management actions, and
instructions for maintaining and periodically updating
the plan.
2. Appendices provide relevant, detailed supporting
information, such as statutory authorities and a
compendium of national interagency plans.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 33
3. Support Annexes provide guidance and describe the
functional processes and administrative requirements
for meeting various plan objectives, such as logistics
management and coordination with the private sector
(including representatives of critical infrastructure
resources).
4. Emergency Support Annexes spell out in detail the
missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities
of federal agencies for coordinating resource and
programmatic support to state, local, and tribal
governments as well as other federal agencies. Each
Emergency Support Function (ESF) has a coordinator
with ongoing responsibilities throughout the incident
as well as one or more primary agencies responsible for
accomplishing the ESF mission. Most ESFs also have
support agencies responsible for assisting the primary
agency or agencies.
5. Incident Annexes address contingency or hazard
situations requiring specialized application of the
NRP for seven different types of incidents: biological;
catastrophic; cyber; food and agriculture; nuclear/
radiological; oil and hazardous materials; and,
terrorism.
Emergency Support Functions
The ESFs are the primary vehicle through which DHS
directly responds to disasters and coordinates the direct
responses of other federal agencies as well as groups like
the American Red Cross (Red Cross).30 For each of the 15
ESFs, DHS identifi es a primary federal agency (or, in one
case, a lead organization, the Red Cross. For most ESFs,
DHS also identifi es one or more support agencies. Primary
agencies’ responsibilities include orchestrating federal
support for their ESF, managing mission assignments and
coordinating with state agencies, and executing contracts
and procuring goods and services as needed. Support
agencies’ responsibilities include conducting operations
at the request of DHS or the ESF primary agency, assisting
with situation (or damage) assessments, and participating
in training or other exercises having to do with their
prevention, response, and recovery activities.31
The 15 ESFs, their overall purpose, primary and
support agencies are as follows:
F E
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34 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Emergency Support Function Purpose Primary Agency Support Agencies
1—transportation32 To support DHS, other federal agencies, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Forest Service); state, and local responders requiring Transportation DOD; U.S. Army Corps of transportation. Engineers; DHS; Interior
2—communications33 To ensure the provision of federal DHS/Information Analysis Agriculture (Forest Service); communications support to federal, state, and Infrastructure Interior; FEMA local, private sector response efforts Protection/National during an Incident of National Communications System Signifi cance; supplement the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-wartime Emergencies (NTSP).
3—public works and engineering34 To coordinate and organize the DOD/U.S. Army Corps of USDA; HHS; Interior; capabilities and resources of the federal Engineers (during response); EPA; American Red Cross government to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, FEMA (during recovery) engineering expertise, construction management, and other support relative to the condition of (or damage to) public works infrastructure and facilities.
4—fi refi ghting35 To detect and suppress fi res resulting Department of Agriculture/ Commerce; DOD; from an Incident of National Signifi cance Forest Service U.S. Army Corps of by providing personnel, equipment, and Engineers; DHS supplies in support of state, local, and tribal agencies involved in fi refi ghting operations.
5—emergency management36 To support the overall activities of the FEMA None federal government for domestic incident management by providing the core management and administrative support functions in support of the NRCC, RRCC, and JFO37 operations; ESF 5 is the “support ESF for all federal departments and agencies…from prevention to response and recovery.”
6—mass care, housing, and To support the state, regional, local and FEMA Agriculture (Food and human services38 tribal government and non-governmental American Red Cross Nutrition Service; Forest efforts to address the nonmedical mass Service); U.S. Army Corps of care, housing, and human services needs Engineers; DHS/National of individuals affected by Incidents of Disaster Medical System; National Signifi cance. Mass care includes Interior organizing feeding operations and coordinating bulk distribution of emergency relief items; housing involves providing short- and long-term assistance with housing needs; and, human services includes counseling and identifying support for special needs populations.
7—resource support39 To assist DHS and supporting federal, GSA DHS state, and local agencies prior to, during, and after incidents of national signifi cance with emergency relief supplies, facility space, offi ce equipment, offi ce supplies, telecommunications and others services.
8—public health and medical services40 To provide coordinated federal assistance HHS DOD; U.S. Army Corps to supplement state and local resources of Engineers; DHS; DOT; in response to public health and medical American Red Cross care needs for incidents of national signifi cance. Federal support can consist of assessment of public health needs, public health surveillance, medical care personnel, and medical equipment and supplies.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 35
9—urban search and rescue41 To rapidly deploy the National Urban FEMA Agriculture (Forest Service); Search and Rescue (US&R) response DOD; U.S. Army Corps of system to provide specialized life-saving Engineers; DHS/ assistance to state and local authorities U.S. Coast Guard; DHS/ during an incident of national signifi cance. Border and Transportation US&R activities include locating and Security Directorate; DOT; extracting victims and providing onsite U.S. AID medical assistance.
10—oil and hazardous materials To provide a coordinated response to EPA Commerce/NOAA response42 actual or potential oil and hazardous DHS/U.S. Coast Guard43 materials discharges or releases during incidents of national signifi cance. ESF 10 operates by placing the mechanisms of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) within the broader NRP coordination structure. The NCP describes the National Response System—an organized network of agencies, programs, and resources with authorities and responsibilities in oil and hazardous materials response.
11—agriculture and natural To support state, local tribal and other Department of Agriculture DOD; American Red Cross resources44 federal agencies’ efforts to (1) address the provision of nutrition assistance, Department of the Interior including determining needs, obtaining (NCH properties) appropriate food supplies, and arranging for delivery of the supplies; (2) control and eradication of disease outbreaks and plant infestations; (3) assurance of food safety and security; and (4) protection of natural and cultural resources and historic (NCH) properties.
12—energy45 To restore damaged energy systems and Department of Energy Agriculture/Rural Utilities components during a potential or actual Service; Commerce/NOAA; Incident of National Signifi cance; collect, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; evaluate, and share information on energy DHS; Interior; Department of system damage and estimations on the Labor; Department of State; impact of energy system outages within EPA; Nuclear Regulatory affected areas. Commission; Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)
13—public safety and security46 To provide via federal to federal support DHS Agriculture (Forest Service); or federal support to state and local DHS/Border and authorities a mechanism for coordinating Department of Justice Transportation Security and providing non-investigative/ Directorate; DHS/Customs non-criminal law enforcement, public and Border Protection; DHS/ safety, and security capabilities and Immigration and Customs resources. Enforcement; Interior
14—long-term community recovery To provide a framework for federal Agriculture Commerce; U.S. Army Corps and mitigation47 support to enable community recovery Commerce of Engineers; Department of from the long-term consequences of DHS/FEMA Energy; HHS; DHS; Interior; an Incident of National Signifi cance. HUD Department of Labor; DOT; Treasury EPA; TVA; American Red Cross SBA
15—external affairs48 To provide accurate, coordinated, and FEMA Commerce/NOAA; timely information to affected audiences, Department of Justice; including governments, media, the private Corporation for National and sector, and the local populace. Community Service
Emergency Support Function Purpose Primary Agency Support Agencies
36 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Catastrophic disasters and incidents of National Signifi cance (INS)
Recognizing that certain disasters are so different in terms of
size, scope, and damage that they require a response above
and beyond the normal procedures for “emergencies” and
“major disasters,” DHS defi nes and has distinct plans for the
federal response to “catastrophic” disasters.49 Specifi cally,
DHS defi nes a catastrophic event as:
Any natural or manmade incident, including
terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass
casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting
the population, infrastructure, environment,
economy, national morale, and/or government
functions. A catastrophic event could result in
sustained national impacts over a prolonged period
of time; almost immediately exceeds resources
normally available to state, local, tribal and
private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and
signifi cantly interrupts governmental operations and
emergency services to such an extent that national
security could be threatened.50
Using this defi nition, DHS makes a number of
assumptions about the scenarios that will unfold before,
during, and after a catastrophic disaster and attempts to
structure the federal response to address those assumptions
(and their ramifi cations). DHS assumes:51
■ A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of
casualties and/or displaced persons;
■ The incident may cause signifi cant disruption of the
area’s critical infrastructure, including transportation,
telecommunications, and public health and medical
systems;
■ Response activities may have to begin without the
benefi t of a detailed or complete situation and needs
assessment because a detailed, credible operating
picture may not be possible for 24 to 48 hours or
longer after the incident;
■ The federal government may have to mobilize and
deploy assets before local and state governments
request them via normal protocols because timely
federal support may be necessary to save lives, prevent
suffering, and mitigate severe damage; and,
■ Large numbers of people may be left temporarily or
permanently homeless and require temporary or
longer-term interim housing.
Consequently, in anticipation of or soon after a
catastrophic incident, DHS is expected to rapidly — and
proactively — provide critical resources to assist and
augment the ongoing state and local responses. To do
so, when the Secretary of DHS declares a disaster to be
“catastrophic,” the department also implements the
Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response
Plan.52 DHS characterizes this annex as establishing the
context and overarching strategy for implementing and
coordinating an accelerated, proactive national response
to certain catastrophic disasters. When this annex is
implemented, all federal agencies and others with
responsibilities under the Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs) of the National Response Plan are supposed to
immediately begin operations. Specifi cally, DHS expects
the federal government and others will need to provide
expedited help in one or more of the following areas:53
■ Mass care (shelter, food, emergency fi rst aid, etc.),
housing, and human services;
■ Urban search and rescue, such as locating, extricating,
and providing onsite medical treatment;
■ Decontamination in incidents involving weapons of
mass destruction;
■ Public health and medical support;
■ Medical equipment and supplies;
■ Casualty and fatality management and transportation
for deceased, injured, or exposed victims; and,
■ Public information when state and local public
communications channels are overwhelmed.
When the Secretary of DHS declares a disaster to be “catastrophic,” the Department implements the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 37
Because of fundamental and time-critical differences
in catastrophic disasters, FEMA has established protocols
to pre-identify and rapidly deploy essential resources.
Among other things, FEMA assumes the demands of
responding to a catastrophic disaster may mean it
has to expedite or even temporarily suspend normal
operating procedures for state and local governments
to request assistance, doing so proactively rather than
in response to things like specifi c requests based on
detailed damage assessments.54 For catastrophic incidents,
DHS is supposed to activate and deploy DHS-managed
teams, equipment caches, and other resources in order
to accelerate the timely provision of critically skilled
resources and capabilities.55 These can include medical
and search and rescue teams, transportable shelters, and
preventive and therapeutic pharmaceutical caches that
may be necessary to save lives and contain damage.
Incidents of National Signifi cance
DHS defi nes incidents of national signifi cance (INS) as
“those high-impact events that require a coordinated and
effective response by an appropriate combination of federal,
state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental
entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide
the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation
activities.” All catastrophic incidents are also “incidents of
national signifi cance.”56 DHS bases this defi nition of an INS
on criteria drawn from HSPD-5:57
■ A federal department or agency acting under its own
authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary
of Homeland Security;
■ The resources of state and local authorities are
overwhelmed and federal assistance has been requested
by the appropriate state and local authorities in response
to major disaster declarations under the Stafford Act or
catastrophic incidents (as defi ned by DHS, above);
■ More than one federal department or agency has
become substantially involved in responding to an
incident, for example, in response to credible threats or
warnings of imminent terrorist attacks; and,
■ The President directs the Secretary of Homeland
Security to assume responsibility for managing a
domestic incident.
Managing the federal response to emergencies and disasters and implementing the National Response Plan
To respond to a disaster or a potential situation that is
likely to require a federal response, DHS (on its own
or acting via FEMA) uses existing homeland security
monitoring operations; creates or activates operational
components to manage the federal response; and,
designates one or more offi cials to coordinate. The
operational components DHS uses or which can be
activated (or take on situation-specifi c duties) include
the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC),
the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG),
a National or Regional Coordination Center (NRCC or
RRCC), Emergency Response Teams (an Advance Element,
ERT-A; and a National team, ERT-N), and, the Joint
Field Offi ce (JFO), which can have one or two high-level
offi cials directing and coordinating the federal response.
Homeland Security Operations Center
The Homeland Security Operations Center, which
represents over 35 agencies, including state and local law
enforcement as well as federal intelligence agencies, is
always in operation. It provides situational awareness,
and monitors conditions in the United States, and, in
conjunction with the DHS Offi ce of Information Analysis,
issues advisories and bulletins concerning specifi c threats
to the nation.58 The HSOC continually monitors potential
major disasters and emergencies and, when such an
event occurs (or is likely) provides primary situational
awareness to the Secretary and the White House.
Depending on the nature of the incident and the response
it demands, the HSOC may activate the Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG).59
Interagency Incident Management Group
DHS is supposed to convene the IIMG when it declares
a situation to be an Incident of National Signifi cance.
In addition, DHS should convene the IIMG when
it determines there is a need to do so in response to
incidents such as major disasters, a heightened threat
situation, or, high-profi le, large-scale events that present
All catastrophic incidents are “incidents of national signifi cance.”
38 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
high-risk targets, such as National Special Security
Events (NSSEs).60 The IIMG is comprised of senior
representatives from other DHS agencies, other federal
departments and agencies, and non-governmental
organizations, such as the American Red Cross, as
needed. When activated, the IIMG (1) maintains
strategic situational awareness of threat assessments and
ongoing incident-related operations and activities; (2)
provides decision-making support for incident-related
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts;
(3) synthesizes key intelligence, frames issues, and makes
recommendations with respect to policy, operational
courses of action, and resource allocation; (4) anticipates
evolving federal resource and operational requirements;
and, (5) maintains ongoing coordination with the
Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the Joint Field Offi ce
(JFO) Coordination Group.61
Regional Response Coordination Center, National Response Coordination Center
For most major disasters, incidents, or emergencies, DHS
(via FEMA) establishes a Regional Response Coordination
Center (RRCC) using staff from regional offi ces. The
RRCC coordinates the initial regional and fi eld activities,
such as deployment of advance teams of FEMA and other
agencies’ staff, and implements local federal program
support until a multi-agency coordination center can be
established. Depending on the scope and impact of the
event, DHS (via FEMA) may also establish a National
Response Coordination Center (NRCC) comprised of ESF
representatives and FEMA support staff to carry out initial
activation and mission assignment operations from FEMA
headquarters. The NRCC supports the operations of the
RRCC.62
Emergency Response Team-Advance Element, National Emergency Response Team
FEMA’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) is the
principal interagency group that staffs the multi-agency
coordination center where federal, state, and local offi cials
coordinate and direct response and recovery operations.63
Each FEMA region maintains an ERT ready to deploy
in response to threats or incidents. Before a disaster or
incident (when there is warning) or soon thereafter,
the RRCC typically deploys an Emergency Response
Team-Advance Element (ERT-A) to the affected area(s).
The ERT-A conducts preliminary damage and needs
assessments and begins coordinating with the state as
well as any federal resources that may be part of the initial
deployment. For large-scale, high-impact events
or when FEMA otherwise determines it is needed, FEMA
also deploys a National Emergency Response Team
(ERT-N), which is a national-level fi eld response team.
FEMA currently has 2 ERT-Ns.
Joint Field Offi ce
The Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) is a multiagency coordination
center that FEMA establishes locally to serve as the central
point for coordinating and directing the efforts of the
federal, state, and local offi cials involved in the response
effort.64 Often, FEMA establishes the JFO at the state’s
emergency operations center or other locations from
which the affected state is directing response efforts. For a
Stafford Act emergency or major disaster declaration, the
President must designate a Federal Coordinating Offi cer
(FCO) to direct all federal assistance in the disaster area.65
The Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) is a multiagency coordination center that FEMA establishes locally to serve as the central point for coordinating and directing the efforts of the federal, state, and local offi cials involved in the response effort.
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 39
During an incident of national signifi cance, which
may or may not involve a Stafford Act declaration,66 the
Secretary of DHS may designate a Principal Federal Offi cial
(PFO) to act as the secretary’s representative in overseeing
and executing incident management responsibilities.
The FCO is responsible for managing and coordinating
federal assistance in response to declared disasters and
emergencies. The FCO has the authority under the
Stafford Act to request and direct federal agencies to use
their authorities and resources to support or conduct
response and recovery operations. The FCO provides
overall coordination for the federal components of the
JFO and works in partnership and support of the state
offi cials to determine and meet state and local needs for
assistance.67
The PFO is the primary point of contact and source
of situational awareness for the Secretary of DHS for
incidents of national signifi cance. The PFO is expected
to facilitate federal support to the unifi ed command
structure that is set up in conjunction with state and
local offi cials. Also, PFOs coordinate the overall federal
incident management and assistance activities throughout
all of the phases of emergency management—prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery. In carrying out this
coordination role, the PFO does not have direct authority
over the FCO or other federal and state offi cials.68
The Role of DOD, the National Guard, and the U.S. Coast Guard
The Department of Defense (DOD) makes a distinction
between “homeland security” and “homeland defense”
in defi ning mission responsibilities. Whereas homeland
security refers to a concerted national effort to secure the
homeland from threats and violence, including terrorism,
homeland defense refers to military protection of United
States territory, domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and aggression. In
the context of homeland security, DOD operates only in
support of a civilian-led federal agency, referred to as Civil
Support (CS). In the area of homeland defense (HD),
however, DOD is the lead agency. The Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASDHD) is charged
with leading the Department’s activities in homeland
defense, and serves as DOD’s interagency liaison.69
Under the National Response Plan (NRP)70 and the
recently released DOD Joint Doctrine on Homeland
Security71 Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)
is normally provided only when local, state and other
federal resources are overwhelmed and the Lead Federal
Agency (LFA) responding to an incident or natural disaster
requests assistance. This is a fundamental principle of
DOD’s approach to civil support: “[I]t is generally a
resource of last resort.”72
An exception is in cases of immediate response authority,
a scenario entailing imminently serious conditions
resulting from any civil emergency or attack requiring
immediate action, where local military commanders may
take such actions as necessary to save lives, prevent human
suffering, and mitigate great property damage.73
The federal military role described in the NRP and the
MSCA is apart from National Guard resources available
to governors of affected states. Governors may utilize
their own National Guard units, as well as other National
Guard units made available by state EMAC compacts. In
most circumstances, National Guard troops fall under the
command of the Governor and the state Adjutant General,
and they follow state emergency procedures.
When in state active duty status, the National Guard
remains under the command of the governor, not DOD.
The National Guard can also be “federalized” by the
President to be placed under the command of DOD.
As discussed below, a governor may also seek “Title 32
status” for the National Guard, which leaves the governor
and the state Adjutant General in command, but provides
federal funding and benefi ts.74
Natural disasters and man-made disasters
In the event of a natural disaster or emergency the NRP
stipulates that DOD may be asked to provide assistance
to DHS and FEMA in an attempt to save lives, protect
Military Support to Civil Authorities
Natural Disasters Special Events Manmade Disaster
Severe Weather Olympics CBRNE-CM
Firefi ghting Summits Terroist Incident
Earthquakes World Fair Oil Spill
CBRNE-CM chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives-consequence management
JOINT PUBLICATIONS 3-26 HOMELAND SECURITY
40 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
property, and lessen the threat of catastrophe in the
United States. When disasters occur and a military
response is anticipated, DHS/FEMA will request a Defense
Coordinating Offi cer (DCO) to serve as the single DOD
point of contact within the disaster area. The DCO will
be the operational contact to the designated combatant
commander and designated Joint Task Force (JTF)
commander.75
In situations when a disaster is anticipated and DOD
wants to be forward leaning, Northern Command has
designated a DCO prior to a DHS/FEMA request. This
is done informally and is intended to allow the DCO
to integrate into the state emergency operations center
(EOC) as early as possible to begin assessing the needs
of the affected area. This has been done in the absence
of a Presidential directive and before state authorities
have made specifi c requests for DOD support via FEMA.
Additionally, the doctrine of immediate response is a
DOD directive which allows deployment of some DOD
resources prior to receiving formal requests from the lead
federal agency.76
Northern Command
Within the DOD Joint Staff, civil support responsibilities
reside with the Joint Director of Military Support.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is the DOD
coordinating command for domestic terrorist and
natural disaster incidents. Northern Command carries
out civil support missions with forces assigned as
required from all the armed services, typically through
the creation of a joint task force.77 NORTHCOM has a
permanently assigned Joint Interagency Coordination
Group, comprised of liaison offi cers from other DOD
components and other federal agencies, including the
Department of Homeland Security.
As discussed above, unless there is specifi c direction
from the President, requests for military assistance must
originate from a lead federal agency. Typically, this falls
to FEMA in natural disasters. Requests are submitted to
the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), where they
are evaluated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense (ASDHD) according to the following
criteria: legality, readiness, lethality, risk, cost, and
appropriateness.78
Once the requests are approved by OSD, they are
forwarded to the Joint Director of Military Support within
the Joint Staff, who in turn provides the appropriate
orders to Northern Command. A Defense Coordinating
Offi cer is designated and deployed to the area of incident.
When the size of the response is of a greater scale, a
joint task force will be created, with the DCO normally
serving as task force commander. The DCO then serves as
the single point of contact for DOD resources, but does
not have operational control of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers or National Guard personnel operating in state
active duty or Title 32 status.79
The process for requesting DOD active duty forces
has several layers of review. Requests for DOD assistance
are to be generated at the state level. These go from the
state to FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer, who in turn
requests assistance from the DCO. The DCO passes these
requests on to the joint task force, which routes it through
NORTHCOM to the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense
Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate of Military
Support.80
At each stage, the requirement is validated to ensure
that the request can be met and that it is legal to provide
the requested assests. Once vetted, the request is tasked to
the services and coordinated with Joint Forces Command
and forces or resources are then allocated to the joint
task force, which in turn gets the support down to the
user level by way of the DCO. This process is in place
not only to satisfy DOD internal requirements, but to
ensure maximum coordination with both FEMA and state
governments.
National Guard Bureau
The National Guard is the nation’s fi rst military responder
to events within the United States. Governors historically
rely on the Guard to assist civilian authorities during
times of natural or manmade disasters. In particular,
the National Guard is a major asset in responding to
any catastrophic incident within the United States.
The National Guard is a reserve component of the
Departments of the Army and the Air Force, at times,
called in to support federal operations. The National
Guard is also a force for each state, deploying for state
duty status under the control of the governor. Only the
National Guard has the unique dual mission of providing
forces at both the state and federal levels and is the only
service that abides by two oaths-of-offi ce, one to the
governor and one to the President of the United States.81
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 41
The governor has command and control of the
National Guard, either in state active duty or Title 32
status, unless units are federalized.82 If federalized under
Title 10, the Guard falls under the command and control
of the President. While on state active duty status, the
Guard’s mission is to serve its state or territory during
times of crisis, disaster, civil disturbance or other threats
to life and property as directed by the governor. They are
funded by state dollars and are entitled to state benefi ts
and compensation. Under Title 32 status, the National
Guard is trained and resourced to support federal war-
fi ghting operations, yet remains under control of the
governor, while supported by federal funds with Secretary
of Defense approval.83
During Hurricane Katrina, the governors of Alabama,
Mississippi, and Louisiana requested that all National
Guard forces deployed to their states operate under
Title 32 status. This request was granted retroactively to
August 29 by the Secretary of Defense. Under Title 32, the
governors were in command of all National Guard assets
and actions during Hurricane Katrina.84
The National Guard may also be called up by a
governor at his or her own initiative, paid by the state,
to respond to a state emergency or protect state facilities.
Many states do not have the fi scal resources to use the
National Guard extensively in this manner.
The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is the home of
the leadership of the National Guard, headed by a Chief,
who is supported by the Director of Army National Guard
and the Director of the Air National Guard.85 These
positions, fi lled by military Guard personnel, are Title 10
positions. The current chief of the National Guard Bureau
is Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, and although he is
the senior Guard offi cer, he does not command National
Guard forces. Lieutenant General Daniel James, III is the
Director of the Air National Guard and Lieutenant General
Clyde A. Vaughn is Director of the Army National Guard.
Under the National Response Plan, the role of
the National Guard Bureau is not defi ned. However,
in roughly 50 percent of the states and territories,
the Adjutant General also serves as the state’s senior
emergency management offi cial, responsible for
coordinating and integrating all response agencies.86 The
National Guard Bureau and the National Guard of the
individual states and territories work on a daily basis
with local, state, and federal civilian agencies in various
communities in all of the states and territories.
United States Coast Guard
The Coast Guard is a
military, multi-mission,
maritime service within
the Department of
Homeland Security and
one of the nation’s fi ve
armed services. Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter
Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has provided maritime
safety and security capabilities, and is renowned worldwide
for it search and rescue (SAR) capabilities, whether near the
shore or hundreds of miles at sea. Title 14 of the United
States Code requires the Coast Guard to develop, establish,
maintain and operate rescue facilities for the promotion of
safety on, under and over the high seas and waters subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Additionally, with the passage of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) in 2002, the Coast
Guard was given added responsibilities for the enforcement
of port safety, security, and marine environmental
regulations including the protection and security of vessels,
harbors, and waterfront facilities, deepwater ports and
waterways safety.87
The Coast Guard has a longstanding history in the
Gulf of Mexico region. The current Eighth Coast Guard
District, headquartered in New Orleans, covers all or part
of 26 states throughout the Gulf coast and heartland of
America. It stretches from the Appalachian Mountains and
Chattahoochee River in the east to the Rocky Mountains
in the west, and from the U.S.-Mexico border and the Gulf
of Mexico to the Canadian border in North Dakota, which
F E
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42 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
includes 15,490 miles of coastline and 10,300 miles of
inland navigable waterways.88
Within the Coast Guard’s District boundaries, the
operational Coast Guard is organized into Sectors which
oversee response, prevention, and logistics units, and
coordinate Coast Guard operations within the Sector’s
geographic boundaries. The areas most affected by
Hurricane Katrina are those that fall within the boundaries
of Sector New Orleans and Sector Mobile, Alabama.
Private authorities and capabilities — role of the American Red Cross
The American Red Cross (Red Cross) is the only
nongovernmental organization with lead agency
responsibilities under the NRP. The Red Cross is an
independent, non-governmental organization (NGO)89
that operates as a nonprofi t, tax-exempt, charitable
institution pursuant to a charter granted by the United
States Congress.90 It has the legal status of a “federal
instrumentality” due to its charter requirements to carry
out responsibilities delegated by the federal government.
Among those responsibilities are:
to perform all duties incumbent upon a national
society in accordance with the spirit and
conditions of the Geneva Conventions to which
the United States is a signatory, to provide family
communications and other forms of assistance to
members of the U.S. military, and to maintain a
system of domestic and international disaster relief,
including mandated responsibilities under the
Federal Response Plan coordinated by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).91
The Red Cross is not a federal agency, nor does it
receive federal funding on a regular basis to carry out
its services and programs.92 It receives fi nancial support
from voluntary public contributions and from cost-
recovery charges for some services.93 Its stated mission is
to “provide relief to victims of disasters and help people
prevent, prepare for, and respond to emergencies.”94
To meet its mandated responsibilities under the NRP,
the Red Cross functions as an ESF primary organization
in coordinating the use of mass care resources in a
presidentially declared disaster or emergency.95 As the
lead agency for ESF #6, dealing with Mass Care, Housing
and Human Services, the Red Cross assumes the role
of providing food, shelter, emergency fi rst aid, disaster
welfare information and bulk distribution of emergency
relief items.96 ESF #6 includes three primary functions:
Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services:97
■ Mass Care involves the coordination of nonmedical
care services to include sheltering of victims, organizing
feeding operations, providing emergency fi rst aid at
designated sites, collecting and providing information
on victims to family members, and coordinating bulk
distribution of emergency relief items.
■ Housing involves the provision of assistance for short-
and long-term housing needs of victims.
■ Human Services include providing victim-related
recovery efforts such as counseling, identifying support
for persons with special needs, expediting processing
of new Federal benefi ts claims, assisting in collecting
crime victim compensation for acts of terrorism, and
expediting mail services in affected areas.
Function 1: Mass Care
■ The NRP describes the Mass Care function as comprised
of six elements: coordination, shelter, feeding,
emergency fi rst aid, Disaster Welfare Information
(“DWI”), and bulk distribution.98
■ The coordination element relates to assisting victims
obtain various forms of available federal assistance, as
well as gathering information about shelters and food
kitchens for victims.
■ The shelter element includes the use of pre-identifi ed
shelters, creating temporary facilities capable of
housing victims, and coordination of obtaining shelters
outside of the immediate incident area.
■ The feeding element includes a variety of food
distribution sites, from mobile food carts, to kitchens,
to bulk distribution of food.
■ The emergency fi rst-aid element consists of assisting
victims with the most basic fi rst-aid needs, as well as,
coordinating the referral of victims to local hospitals,
if needed, and other appropriate medical treatment
options.
■ The Disaster Welfare Information (“DWI”) element
provides for family connectedness services. It aims
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 43
to re-connect families displaced or separated by the
incident, as well as assist victims of the incident to
connect with family or friends located outside the area
of the incident.
■ The bulk distribution element provides emergency relief
items, principally ice, water and food, at specifi c sites
to meet the urgent needs of victims within the affected
area.
Function 2: Housing
The housing function addresses both the short and long-
term housing needs of victims affected by an incident.99
It is effectuated through programs designed to meet the
individualized needs of victims and includes a variety
of options, including provision of temporary housing,
rental assistance, or fi nancial assistance for the repair or
replacement of original residences.
Function 3: Human Services
The human services function implements programs and
services to assist victims restore their livelihoods.100 It
acts as a broad-based, multipurpose effort to support
divergent needs such as re-routing of mail, assistance with
processing federal benefi ts-related paperwork, assuring
the provision of necessary mental health services, and
providing other important, sometimes victim-specifi c
services. The wide range of services may include support
for victims with disabilities and victims who do not speak
English.
With its shelters, feeding kitchens, and blood
distribution capabilities, the Red Cross has long played
an important role in assisting those affected by natural
disasters — especially hurricanes. Due to the frequency
of hurricanes in the United States, the Red Cross has
developed an expertise in deploying its resources
and operational capabilities to help those affected by
hurricanes. In its 23-page Tropical Storm and Hurricane
Action Plan, (“Hurricane Plan”) the Red Cross outlines
its systematic approach to preparing for and responding
to tropical storms and hurricanes.101 “The objective of
this plan is to enable the Red Cross to be ready to deliver
immediate services and assistance needed by those
threatened and affected by such storms at an appropriate
scope and scale,” the report says.102
Additionally, as the NRP-model to disaster planning
takes shape, the Red Cross’ preparation regime is being
bolstered with a Standard Operating Procedure Document
for ESF #6.103 Although not formally adopted and still in
the draft stage, the document identifi es the procedures,
protocols, information fl ows and organizational
relationships for the activation, implementation and
operation of the Red Cross’ responsibilities under ESF #6.
There is also an interim Shelter Operations Management
Tool Kit, which provides Red Cross chapters and shelter
managers with resources to plan, open, operate, and close
shelters.104
Adhering to the concept of all disasters being local,
the Red Cross relies on its fi eld chapters to act as fi rst
responders in opening shelters and providing for the
feeding of those in need.105 The fi rst 48 hours of a disaster
are usually handled by the local Red Cross chapters,
and thereafter by national-level support, as both the
federal government (FEMA), and the Red Cross National
Headquarters, begin to reach the affected area.106 The
national Red Cross is structured to provide relief (mostly
shelter and feeding) from days two through 30 of a
disaster.107 The local chapter ultimately is supported by its
service area, of which there are eight in the United States,
followed by support from the National Headquarters in
Washington, D.C.108
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For disasters such as hurricanes, the Red Cross’ actions
prior to landfall typically begin with activating the
chapter response plans in all of the areas threatened by
the storm.109 Simultaneously, the jurisdictional service
areas move into the Service Area Major Disaster Response
Structure (“Disaster Response Structure”). At this time
the service areas establish their contacts with the affected
state’s emergency operations center (“EOC”). This often
involves positioning a Red Cross offi cial at the state EOC.
The service area then begins deploying resources to the
threatened areas as called for under the chapters’ planning
requirements. Also, at this pre-landfall time, a disaster
relief operations headquarters is established.110
During the pre-landfall stage, the local chapter is to
focus on several key activities: sheltering, feeding, public
information, fundraising and maintaining contact with
government offi cials, specifi cally emergency management
offi cials.111 While the chapter response operation is
arming itself with the necessary resources, the service
areas shift into their Disaster Response Structure. The
service area personnel are responsible for implementing
the necessary facility arrangements so that storm victims
can be sheltered and fed. The service area also deploys
additional personnel to the chapter regions. Once the
Disaster Response Structure is opened, the national
headquarters shifts its Disaster Operations Center into
hurricane response mode.112 At this point, personnel
from Headquarters’ Preparedness and Response division
are able to monitor developments and deploy additional
resources as necessary.
Following landfall of a hurricane, the affected
chapters continue their focus on the key activities of
sheltering, feeding, disaster assessment, providing public
information and liaising with government offi cials.113
After the shelters and feeding kitchens are opened, the
chapters expand their role to include bulk distribution
of supplies. Supplies include toiletries packages, clothing
and blankets, and as the storm passes, clean-up supply
packs, including mops, rakes, trash bags, and cleaning
supplies to assist storm victims clean their residences and
neighborhoods.114
As the impact of the disaster becomes better
understood, a Disaster Relief Operation Headquarters is
established in the region. The operations headquarters is
activated, meaning operational oversight and direction
of Red Cross relief activities is transferred to the on-site
headquarters.115 As the disaster headquarters staffs up, the
service area’s role decreases.
Outside of the affected region, other service areas
and the national headquarters remain poised to assist
as necessary. The main opportunities for other service
areas involve shifting resources, such as cots, blankets,
and other warehoused supplies, to the affected region.
Personnel at national headquarters monitor events in the
fi eld and leverage relationships with national agreements
with suppliers, partner groups and agencies.116
Service area major Disaster Response Structure
Upon the approach of a threatening hurricane, “the
service area reconfi gures its structure, priorities and actions
to provide support, guidance and resource assistance
to its threatened chapters.”117 The Disaster Response
Structure, led by a response manager, is comprised of four
departments or cells. These are the planning cell, forward
headquarters cell, information and resource management
cell, and the service area response operations.118
Planning cell
The planning cell is focused on ensuring adequate services
and logistics support. “The planning cell develops an
anticipated service delivery plan and deploys the forward
headquarters cell, which enables the relief operation to
begin service delivery immediately after the storm makes
landfall.”119 The planning cell is tasked with determining
the necessary scope of Red Cross service delivery, an
estimated budget and the estimated length of time needed
to serve the affected area.120 The planning cell is the heart
of decision making as it relates to what people need,
where they need it, and, based on a damage assessment,
how long will services be necessary.
Response manager
The response manager oversees the disaster response.
The manager’s responsibilities include ensuring adequate
levels of staffi ng throughout the response organization,
conducting staff meetings with the Disaster Response
team, leading conference calls with the affected
chapters, ensuring that adequate reports are compiled
for coordination with state and federal emergency
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 45
management offi cials, and assuring the suffi cient
movement of assets, both human and material, to the
affected region.121
Forward headquarters cell
The forward headquarters cell is “the deployed unit of the
planning cell.”122 Its most important task is to establish
a relief operation headquarters and to receive Red Cross
personnel, both paid Red Cross employees and volunteers,
and material resources.123 Essentially this group serves as
the advance team prior to the opening of a headquarters
operation near the affected area.
Information and resource management cell
The information and resource management cell is a
tactical team that concentrates on gathering information
and supporting the local chapters in the evacuation
of people.124 While the Red Cross does not physically
transport evacuees, it is often the recipient of a large
percentage of evacuees, as shelters are established. This
group establishes reporting requirements, coordinates
data gathering (such as shelter tallies), monitors the
inbound fl ow of resources to shelters, helps acquire
vehicles, and handles all issues related to the immediate
deployment of resources, including maintaining computer
systems, managing supply warehouses, and ensuring all
invoices are properly processed.125
Service area response operations
The day-to-day paid operations staff of the service area
coordinate fundraising and communications and provide
the institutional knowledge of the affected area.126
Armed with the right data, and knowledge of the area,
the information and resources management cell can help
provide essential services to those in need.127
State, local, and private authorities and capabilities
Typical local and state emergency management responsibilities
Whether the response is coming from local or state
offi cials—or both—most emergency management
agencies and government plans assume it may take 24
to 72 hours to get assistance to individuals, particularly
those who remain in affected areas. Consequently,
successful emergency management can, in part, depend
on individuals’ willingness to evacuate to places where
more immediate assistance may be available (when time
and circumstances permit) and/or their preparedness
to survive independently for the 24 to 72 hours that
responders expect it will take to fi rst deliver assistance.
Nonetheless, as discussed elsewhere in this report,
primary responsibility for the fi rst response to any
potential or imminent incident or disaster begins —
and often stays — at the local and state levels. In most
situations, emergency management in the U.S. envisions
a process of escalation up from the local level as incidents
grow or as it becomes known that an incident has
overwhelmed local and state capabilities.128
Local emergency management
First responders — local fi re, police, and emergency
medical personnel who respond to all manner of
incidents such as earthquakes, storms, and fl oods —
have the lead responsibility for carrying out emergency
management efforts. Their role is to prevent, protect
against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from
emergencies, including natural disasters. Typically, fi rst
responders are trained and equipped to arrive fi rst at
the scene of an incident and take action immediately,
including entering the scene, setting up a command
center, evacuating those at the scene, tending to the
injured, redirecting traffi c, and removing debris.129
In most situations, emergency management in the U.S. envisions a process of escalation up from the local level as incidents grow or as it becomes known that an incident has overwhelmed local and state capabilities.
46 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Local governments — cities, towns, counties or parishes
— and the offi cials who lead them are responsible for
developing the emergency operations and response
plans by which their communities respond to disasters
and other emergencies, including terrorist attacks. Local
emergency management directors are also generally
responsible for providing training to prepare for disaster
response and they seek assistance from their state
emergency management agencies when the situation
exceeds or exhausts local capabilities.130 In many states,
they may also negotiate and enter into mutual aid
agreements with other jurisdictions to share resources
when, for example, nearby jurisdictions are unaffected by
the emergency and are able to provide some assistance.131
Particularly relevant to the preparation for Hurricane
Katrina, local offi cials have signifi cant responsibilities for
either setting evacuation laws and policies or working
with their state government to enforce state laws
pertaining to evacuations.132 According to the National
Response Plan, depending on the terms of the state or
local laws, local offi cials have “extraordinary powers” to,
among other things, order evacuations. In addition, local
offi cials may suspend local laws and order curfews.133
State emergency management
As the state’s chief executive, the governor is responsible
for the public safety and welfare of the state’s citizens
and generally has wide-ranging emergency management
responsibilities, including requesting federal assistance
when it becomes clear the state’s capabilities will be
insuffi cient or have been exhausted. Governors are
responsible for coordinating state resources to address the
full range of actions necessary to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to incidents such as natural disasters.
Upon their declaration of an emergency or disaster,
governors typically assume a variety of emergency powers,
including authority to control access to an affected area
and provide temporary shelter. Also, in most cases, states
generally authorize their governors to order and enforce
the evacuation of residents in disaster and emergency
situations. The federal government generally defers to the
states to enact laws dealing with evacuation, with local
offi cials—as mentioned earlier—typically responsible for
working with state offi cials to enforce those laws.134
Governors also serve as the commanders-in-chief of their
state military forces,135 specifi cally, the National Guard
when in state active duty or Title 32 status.136 In state active
duty — to which governors can call the Guard in response
to disasters and other emergencies — National Guard
personnel operate under the control of the governor, are
paid according to state law, and can perform typical disaster
relief tasks, such as search and rescue, debris removal,
and law enforcement. Most governors have the authority
to implement mutual aid agreements with other states
to share resources with one another during disasters or
emergencies when, for example, others (particularly nearby
states) are unaffected by the emergency and able to provide
assistance.137 Most states request and provide this assistance
through the EMAC.
State emergency management agencies —reporting to
their respective governors — have primary responsibility for
their states’ disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities. These agencies typically coordinate with
other state agencies as well as local emergency response
departments to plan for and respond to potential or
imminent disasters or emergencies. Among other things,
state emergency management agencies are responsible for
developing state emergency response plans, administering
federal grant funding, and, coordinating with local and
federal agencies to provide training and other emergency
response-related activities.138 Some states, such as Louisiana
and Mississippi, spell out specifi c tasks or preparatory steps
emergency management agencies must take to meet their
responsibilities.
For example, Louisiana requires that its Offi ce of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
determine requirements for food, clothing, and other
necessities and procure and pre-position these supplies
in the event of an emergency.139 Similarly, Mississippi
requires its emergency management agency to determine
needs for equipment and supplies and plan and procure
those items as well.140
Governors are responsible for coordinating state resources to address the full range of actions necessary to prevent, prepare for, and respond to incidents such as natural disasters.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 47
Specifi c state and local emergency management and homeland security laws and roles and responsibilities—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the city of New Orleans
Alabama
Governing statutes
Two Alabama statutes address how the state prepares for
and responds to emergencies and disasters: the Alabama
Emergency Management Act of 1955 (EMA) and the
Alabama Homeland Security Act of 2003 (HSA). The EMA
authorizes the state to prepare for and manage disasters
and emergencies. It also authorizes the state to make
grants to local governments to assist their emergency
management activities and improve preparedness. The
HSA established a state Department of Homeland Security
(and other entities) to coordinate and undertake state
homeland security preparedness, planning, and response
activities.141
Roles and responsibilities
State documents detail the specifi c options and steps
available to the chief executive, including an analysis of
gubernatorial prerogatives, including:142
First and foremost, the
governor must understand
and accept the fact that
he/she is the primary person
responsible for response and
crisis management within
his/her state. All citizens
look to their governor
as the person ultimately
responsible. That is not to
take away from the local responsibility of mayors,
city councils, and county commissions, but, in truth
and fact, “the buck stops at the governor.” Secondly,
although the governor must be the leader of his/her
state, the governor must also be prepared to delegate.
This statement may seem rather simplistic since every
governor in the United States is confronted with so
many governmental and administrative decisions,
on a daily basis, that they obviously need to be
able to delegate. On the other hand, in the case of
an emergency catastrophe situation, the number
of issues that arise are exponentially greater than
ordinary day-to-day issues of government, they are
unusual, sometimes technical in nature, they require
instantaneous decisions, as opposed to general
governmental issues which commonly allow for
consideration and even collaboration among advisors
and affected entities. In these regards, in order to
delegate, it is extremely important that the governor
has surrounded himself/herself with an outstanding
group of cabinet offi cials who are not only qualifi ed
but who are both qualifi ed and capable of responding
in emergency situations. This is most particularly true
of the adjutant general of the state’s National Guard,
the director of the state’s Department of Homeland
Security, and the offi ce of the director of the state’s
offi ce of Emergency Management. Obviously each of
these positions is a key appointment for every governor,
but when confronted with a catastrophic emergency,
the importance of the quality and qualifi cations
of the persons holding these positions becomes
extraordinarily important. Thirdly, an emergency
operations center and a communications system
which are capable of and designed to operate under
emergency conditions become a key element of the
governor’s ability to communicate, manage, and lead
through the crisis. Finally, there must be pre-planning
(“emergency operations plan”) that sets out clearly
policies, procedures, and responsibilities that will be
required to meet all known emergency catastrophe
situations. These must be coordinated with local
emergency management offi cials and local government
offi cials.143
Consistent with the National Response Plan and
the practices of other states, in Alabama responsibility
for emergency preparedness and response begins at
the local level and escalates as the emergency exceeds
the capabilities of each level of government. The
state’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) spells this
out, specifying that, “When a disaster is imminent
or has occurred, local governments have the primary
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48 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
responsibility and will respond to preserve life and
property. . . . When disaster conditions appear likely to
exceed the combined capabilities of a local jurisdiction
and mutual aid compact signatories, local governments
will request the support of the state.… If the capabilities
(fi nancial or operational) of state government are
exceeded, the governor can request federal disaster
emergency assistance.”144
Alabama’s statutes authorize and direct local
governments to establish emergency management
organizations (agencies), appoint directors for these
organizations, and confer police offi cer powers on
their offi cials. In addition, local directors of emergency
management may develop mutual aid agreements with
public or private agencies (such as nearby counties)
for emergency aid and assistance during disasters and
emergencies.145 These local directors and some of their
personnel must, if they choose to receive state funding,
meet state-set performance and competence standards for
their positions.146
Alabama’s statutes outline specifi c responsibilities of
the state’s Emergency Management Agency as well as its
Department of Homeland Security. The state EMA has
overall responsibility for preparing for and managing
disasters and emergencies. Its director is appointed by
the governor and also serves as an assistant director for
the state’s Department of Homeland Security.147 To meet
its obligations, the state EMA promulgates a statewide
Emergency Operations Plan with policy and guidance for
state and local disaster mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery operations.148 The plan also outlines state
and local government responsibilities in relation to federal
disaster assistance programs under the Stafford Act.149
Alabama’s Director of Homeland Security, also
appointed by the governor, heads the state’s Department
of Homeland Security and has overall responsibility for
the state’s homeland security preparedness and response
activities. Specifi c state Department of Homeland Security
responsibilities include: receiving and disseminating
federal intelligence; planning and executing simulations;
ensuring cooperation among public offi cials and the
private sector; coordinating receipt and distribution
of homeland security funding; and coordinating state
strategy and standards for homeland security efforts.150
Mississippi
Governing statutes
The Mississippi Emergency Management Law outlines the
specifi c responsibilities of key state entities and emergency
responders and provides for the coordination of emergency
preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation activities
among state agencies, local and federal governments, and
the private sector.151 The law establishes the Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA); confers
emergency powers on the governor, MEMA, municipal and
county governments; and, authorizes the establishment of
the Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan (MEOP).152
Roles and responsibilities
Consistent with the National Response Plan and the
practices of other states, in Mississippi responsibility
for emergency preparedness and response begins at the
local level and escalates as the emergency exceeds the
capabilities of each level of government. Among other
things, Mississippi’s governing statute spells out that
“state policy for responding to disasters is to support local
emergency response efforts,” but it also recognizes that
catastrophic disasters can overwhelm local resources and
that, as a result, the state “must be capable of providing
effective, coordinated, and timely support to communities
and the public.”153
The state’s statute authorizes (but does not direct)
counties and municipalities to create emergency
management organizations, which are in turn authorized
to do the various things necessary to handle emergency
management functions in a disaster.154 Local governments
are also authorized to enter into mutual aid agreements
within the state (for example, with nearby counties)
for emergency aid and assistance during disasters and
emergencies.155 If a disaster or emergency “exceeds the
capability of local resources and personnel, state resources
may be made available through coordination” with
MEMA. Local authorities are mandated to “recognize
the severity and magnitude” of the emergency by (1)
declaring a local emergency, (2) utilizing the localities
own resources and (3) designating one capable person to
make requests to MEMA for additional resources.156
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 49
The governor of Mississippi is
granted broad powers to deal with
a natural disaster and may assume
direct operational control over
all state emergency management
functions.157 For example,
the governor is authorized to
“determine needs for food,
clothing or other necessities in
the event of attack, natural, man-made or technological
disasters and to procure supplies, medicines, materials,
and equipment.” As commander-in-chief of the state
militia, the governor may order the Mississippi National
Guard into active state service.158
The MEMA director, appointed by the governor,
is responsible for, among other things: working with
the governor to prepare and implement an emergency
management plan that is coordinated with federal and
state plans to the fullest extent possible; adopting standards
and requirements for local emergency management plans;
determining needs for equipment and supplies; planning
for and procuring supplies, medicine and equipment; and,
assisting political subdivisions with the creation of urban
search and rescue teams. In addition, the MEMA director
is authorized to create mobile support units to reinforce
disaster organizations in stricken areas. MEMA’s director
also serves as a liaison to the emergency management
agencies of other states and the federal government.159
Louisiana
Governing statutes
The Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency
Assistance and Disaster Act outlines the specifi c
responsibilities of key state entities and emergency
responders and provides for the coordination of activities
among state agencies and local and federal governments.
The law establishes the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), confers
emergency powers on the governor and parish and
municipal governments, and requires the establishment of
the Louisiana Emergency Management Plan (EOP).160
Roles and responsibilities
In Louisiana, parish and municipal governments’
chief executives by law have overall responsibility for
the direction and control of emergency and disaster
operations and are assisted by a local homeland
security and emergency preparedness director.161
Their responsibilities include the development and
implementation of emergency management programs to
provide for rapid and effective action to “direct, mobilize,
staff, train and coordinate use of local resources.”162
Louisiana’s governor has overall responsibility for
emergency management in the state and is assisted in
these duties by the LOHSEP director in meeting dangers
to the state and people presented by
emergencies or disasters. The governor
is authorized, for example, to declare a
disaster or emergency if he or she fi nds
that one has occurred (or the threat is
imminent) and coordinate delivery of all
emergency services (public, volunteer,
and private) during a natural disaster.163
By making a disaster or emergency
declaration, the governor activates the
state’s emergency response and recovery program (which
is under the command of the LOHSEP director). This
authorizes the governor to, among other things: (1) utilize
all available resources of the state government and of each
political subdivision of the state as reasonably necessary
to cope with the disaster or emergency; (2) direct and
compel the evacuation of all or part of the population
from any stricken or threatened areas within the state if
deemed necessary for the preservation of life; and, (3)
prescribe routes, modes of transportation, and destination
in connection with evacuation.164
The LOHSEP, within the Military Department and
under the authority of the governor and the adjutant
general, is responsible for emergency preparedness
and homeland security in the state.165 The LOHSEP
prepares and maintains a homeland security and state
emergency operations plan (EOP), which establishes
the policies and structure for the state’s management of
emergencies and disasters. The EOP prescribes the phases
of emergencies and disasters—preparedness, response,
recovery and prevention (mitigation)—and outlines the
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roles and responsibilities of the state’s Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs), which mirror those in the National
Response Plan. The EOP is an all-hazards plan, assigning
responsibilities for actions the state will take to provide
for the safety and welfare of its citizens against the threat
of natural and man-made emergencies and disasters. The
EOP is designed to coordinate closely with the federal
National Response Plan as well as parish Emergency
Operations Plans.166
New Orleans
The City of New Orleans
Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan (“New Orleans
Plan”) is consistent with the
State of Louisiana Emergency
Management Plan. The plan
refl ects the principle that “City
government bears the initial
responsibility for disaster response
and relief.”167 It is therefore the Mayor of the City of
New Orleans who must initiate, execute, and direct the
operations during any emergency or disaster affecting the
City of New Orleans.168
According to the New Orleans Plan, “[i]f it becomes
clearly evident that local resources are inadequate to
fully manage the effects of an emergency or disaster, the
Mayor may request state and/or federal assistance through
[LOHSEP].169 The New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness (“NOOEP”) will coordinate with the
LOHSEP to assure the most effective management of such
assistance.”170
The plan also says, “The authority to order the
evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching
hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana
statute.”171 But this power “is also delegated to each
political subdivision of the State by Executive Order.”172
“This authority empowers the chief elected offi cial of
New Orleans, the Mayor of New Orleans, to order the
evacuation of the parish residents threatened by an
approaching hurricane,”173 according to the plan.
For example, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin,
according to the plan, is responsible for giving the
order for a mandatory evacuation and supervising the
actual evacuation of the population. The city’s Offi ce of
Emergency Preparedness “must coordinate with the state
on elements of evacuation” and “assist in directing the
transportation of evacuees to staging areas.”174
The New Orleans Plan states, “The safe evacuation of
threatened populations . . . is one of the principle reasons
for developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan.”175 The city’s evacuation plan states, “The city of
New Orleans will utilize all available resources to quickly
and safely evacuate threatened areas.”176
The plan also directs “[s]pecial arrangements will be
made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves
or who require specifi c life saving assistance. Additional
personnel will be recruited to assist in evacuation
procedures as needed.”177 The evacuation plan further
warns that “[i]f an evacuation order is issued without the
mechanisms needed to disseminate the information to
the affected persons, then we face the possibility of having
large numbers of people either stranded and left to the
mercy of the storm, or left in areas impacted by toxic
materials.” 178
Threats and vulnerabilities related to hurricanes
General threats — frequency of hurricanes and vulnerable coastal areas in the U.S.
Hurricanes threaten the United States, particularly the
coastal areas along the Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic
Ocean, virtually every year. While Florida is the state
most frequently hit, other states — particularly Texas,
Louisiana, and North Carolina — have frequently been
struck by hurricanes, according to the records of the
National Hurricane Center (NHC).179 The coastal areas of
these and other states are among the most vulnerable to
storm surge, which carries the greatest potential for loss of
life in a hurricane. Storm surge is the water that swirling
hurricane force winds push toward the shore as the storm
advances. Combined with normal tides, this can increase
the average water level by 15 feet or more.180
Flooding is also a serious threat to lives and property in
a hurricane. The NHC reports that, although storm surge
has the greatest potential to take lives, in the last 30 years,
more people have died from hurricane-induced inland
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fl ooding.181 Tornadoes can also add to the destructive
power of a hurricane. While not all hurricanes
produce them, according to the NHC, studies have
shown that more than half of the hurricanes that
reach landfall produce at least one tornado.
Specifi c vulnerabilities of New Orleans— inherent vulnerability to fl ooding
Metropolitan New Orleans is built on subsiding
swampland on the delta of the Mississippi River,
which makes the city inherently vulnerable to
fl ooding.182 The City of New Orleans is shaped like
a bowl, with an average elevation of 6 feet below sea
level.183 Some elevations are as high as 12 feet above
sea level, and some elevation are as low as 9 feet
below sea level.184 The Mississippi River, which fl ows
through the middle of New Orleans, is on average
14 feet above sea level, and Lake Pontchartrain, which
establishes the northern border of New Orleans, is on
average one foot above sea level.185
New Orleans and its surrounding areas have
experienced numerous fl oods from both the Mississippi
River and hurricanes.186 A major fl ood on the Mississippi
River completely inundated New Orleans in 1927, and
others following severe rainstorms damaged parts of
the city in 1979 and 1995.187 Several hurricanes have
hit New Orleans, including Hurricane Betsy in 1965,
Hurricane Camille in 1969, Hurricane Georges in
1998, and Hurricane Lilli in 2002.188 The greatest threat
from hurricanes is not wind, but storm-surge, which
accounts for most of the damage and deaths caused by
hurricanes.189
Levees designed, built to address vulnerabilities
After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, federal and state
governments proposed a number of fl ood control projects
to deal with the threat of hurricanes and the fl ooding
they might cause in New Orleans.190 These included
a series of control structures, concrete fl oodwalls, and
levees along Lake Pontchartrain and several other
waterways.191 One of the major projects is formally called
the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project.192 This project included levees along
the Lake Pontchartrain lakefront, the 17th Street Canal,
the London Avenue Canal, the Orleans Avenue Canal, the
Intercoastal waterway, the Industrial Canal, the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet, and others.193 Although the project was
federally authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local
effort with shared costs.194
52 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Exec. Order 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239, 3 C.F.R. at 412, (1979 Comp.). 2 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 33064, Organization and Mission of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate: Issues and
Options for the 109th Congress, App. B: Evolution of Federal Emergency Authorities (Sept. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Bea, Organizational Mission]. 3 See Id. at App. B; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/T-RCED-93-46, Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to
Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter GAO, Recent Disasters]. 4 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 31670, Transfer of FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security: Issues for Congressional Oversight,
App. A: Summary of FEMA Authorities (Dec. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Bea, Transfer of FEMA]. 5 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/RCED-93-186, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic Disasters
(July 23, 1993) [hereinafter Bea, Disaster Management]. 6 See Bea, Transfer of FEMA; GAO, Disaster Management. 7 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Title V, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 8 See Bea, Organization and Mission; Federal Emergency Mgmt. Agency [hereinafter FEMA], News Release, National Disaster Medical System (Apr.
21, 2004) available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=11927 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 9 See Bea, Transfer of FEMA. 10 See FEMA, A Guide to the Disaster Declaration Process (undated) available at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/rrr/dec_proc.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,
2006). 11 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with City of New Orleans offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005) [hereinafter Select Comm. New
Orleans Interviews]. 12 See Elizabeth B. Bazan, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 33090, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: Legal Requirements
for Federal and State Roles in Declarations of an Emergency or a Major Disaster (Sept. 16, 2005). 13 Select Comm. New Orleans Interviews. 14 Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RS 21227, The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview, 2 (Feb. 4, 2005). 15 See Id. at 1-5. 16 See Id. at 1-2.; http://www.emacweb.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 17 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [hereinafter Stafford Act] 42 U.S.C. § 5122(1) (2005). 18 See FEMA, The Disaster Process and Disaster Aid Programs, (Apr. 4, 2005) available at http://www.fema.gov/library/dproc.shtm (last visited Jan.
22, 2006) [hereinafter, FEMA, Disaster Process]. 19 Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 33053, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible Activities, and Funding,
3-4 (Sept. 27, 2005). 20 See FEMA, Disaster Process (FEMA allows that, when an obviously severe or catastrophic event occurs, Governors may request a major disaster
declaration prior to conducting a damage assessment). 21 See FEMA, Disaster Process (Specifi cally, FEMA provides three categories of disaster assistance: (1) individual assistance; (2) public assistance;
and (3) hazard mitigation assistance. Individual assistance is a combined FEMA-State program that provides money and services to people in the affected area whose property has been damaged or destroyed and whose losses are not covered by insurance. Individual assistance from FEMA can consist of funds to rent temporary housing, grants to repair damage that is not covered by insurance, and grants for “necessary and serious needs” such as medical or funeral expenses. Individual assistance can also include federally subsidized loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to repair or replace homes, personal property or businesses that sustained damages not covered by insurance); See FEMA, Disaster Process at 4 (Public assistance funds, through grants or SBA loans, the repair, restoration, reconstruction or replacement of public facilities or infrastructure damaged or destroyed by a disaster. Eligible recipients include state and local governments and certain private nonprofi t organizations, such as educational, medical, rehabilitation or permanent custodial care facilities. Recipients may use their public assistance funds for projects such as debris removal and repair of road systems, bridges, and/or water control facilities); See FEMA, Disaster Process at 4-5 (Hazard mitigation assistance supports measures to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects. For eligible projects, the federal government pays up to 75 percent of the costs with states providing a 25 percent match. Eligible mitigation measures under this program include buying or relocating property located in high hazard areas (such as fl ood plains); elevating fl ood-prone structures; and, seismic rehabilitation of existing structures).
22 See Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 280 (Feb. 28, 2003) (Known as Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5).
23 See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Dec. 2004) at i [hereinafter NRP]. 24 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO-05-652, Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All-Hazards Capabilities
Continue to Evolve, 11-12 (July 11, 2005) [hereinafter GAO: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance Capabilities]. 25 See NRP at 1. 26 See Id. at 11. 27 DHS, National Incident Management System, 2 (Mar. 1, 2004 ) available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf (last
visited Jan. 22, 2006). 28 Id. at ix, 1-4. 29 See NRP at xi-xiii. 30 Id. at 11. 31 See Id. at ESF-i-iv. 32 Id. at ESF#1-1-5. 33 Id. at ESF#2-1-12. 34 Id. at ESF#3-1-8. 35 Id. at ESF#4-1-5. 36 Id. at ESF#5-1-5. 37 National Response Coordination Center (NRCC); Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC); Joint Field Offi ce (JFO). 38 NRP at ESF#6-1-8.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 53
39 Id. at ESF#7-1-6. 40 Id. at ESF#8-1-13. 41 Id. at ESF#9-1-7. 42 Id. at ESF#10-1-13. 43 See Id. (Depending on whether an incident affects the inland or coastal zone, either EPA or DHS/USCG serves as the primary agency for ESF 10
actions. For incidents affecting both, EPA is the primary agency with DHS/USCG serving as the deputy). 44 Id. at ESF#11-1-12. 45 Id. at ESF#12-1-6. 46 Id. at ESF#13-1-9. 47 Id. at ESF#14-1-6. 48 Id. at ESF#15-1-5. 49 See GAO, Recent Disasters (The notion that FEMA distinguishes “catastrophic” disasters from other incidents and makes specifi c plans for a
different, proactive response to them builds on its experiences, problems, and lessons learned in past disasters, particularly Hurricane Andrew in south Florida in 1992. In that disaster, FEMA was too reactive—waiting for state and local governments to identify what they needed and then ask for it—when the hurricane had clearly overwhelmed the ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to adequately provide victims with essential services, such as food and water, within 12 to 24 hours. Summarizing its review of FEMA’s response to Hurricane Andrew, GAO described the [then] federal strategy for responding to such disasters as defi cient because it lacked provisions for the federal government to (1) immediately, comprehensively assess damages and the resulting needs of disaster victims and (2) provide food, shelter, and other essential services when victims’ needs outstripped what state, local and voluntary agencies could themselves provide).
50 Id. at 43. 51 NRP at CAT-3. 52 See Id. at CAT-1-3 (According to the catastrophic incident annex, DHS is developing a “more detailed and operationally specifi c NRP
Catastrophic Incident Supplement” (CIS) to this annex. The supplement will be designated “For Offi cial Use Only” and published independently of the NRP base plan and annexes. As of November 2005, DHS had not yet published the CIS); See Letter from Henry A. Waxman and Charlie Melancon, Members of Congress, to Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, Nov. 1, 2005 (on fi le with the Select Comm.) available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20051101103226-17173.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006).
53 See NRP at CAT-2-4. 54 See Id. at CAT-3-5. 55 See Id. at CAT-1. 56 Id. at CAT-1. 57 Id. at 3-4. 58 See DHS, Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) (July 8, 2004) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=30
&content=3813 (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) [hereinafter HSOC Fact Sheet]. (Specifi cally, participants in the HSOC include the FBI, U.S. Coast Guard, Postal Inspection Service, CIA, U.S. Secret Service, DC Metropolitan Police Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Protective Service, New York Police Department, National Security Agency, Customs and Border Protection (DHS), Los Angeles Police Department, Immigration Customs Enforcement (DHS), U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Drug Enforcement Agency, U.S. Department of Interior (U.S. Park Police), U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, National Capitol Region, Transportation Security Administration, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, FEMA, National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration, Public Affairs (DHS), State and Local Coordination Offi ce, Science and Technology Directorate, Geo-spatial Mapping Offi ce, Information Analysis Offi ce, and the Infrastructure Protection Offi ce).
59 NRP at 24; HSOC Fact Sheet. 60 See NRP at 70 (A National Special Security Event (NSSE) is a designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious
signifi cance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity). 61 See Id. at 22-23; HSOC Fact Sheet. 62 NRP at 27-28, 91. 63 Id. at 27-28, 40; Interview by Select Comm. staff with Michael Lowder, Deputy Director, Response Division, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Jan. 5,
2006). 64 NRP at 28, 68. 65 Stafford Act at § 5143(a). 66 NRP at 4, 7. 67 Id. at 34. 68 Id. at 33-34. 69 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security [hereinafter Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security], (Aug. 2.
2005) at IV-4, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_26.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 70 NRP at 42. 71 Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-1. 72 Steven Bowman et al., Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 33095, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response at 2 (Sep. 19, 2005). [Hereinafter
Katrina: DOD Response]. 73 Department of Defense, Directive 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (Jan. 15, 1993). 74 32 U.S.C. § 901 (2005). 75 Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at vii, IV-10-IV-15; NRP at 37. 76 Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4. 77 Civil support for incidents in Hawaii and the Pacifi c territories is provided by U.S. Pacifi c Command. 78 Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-12; Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4.
54 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
79 Bowman, Katrina: DOD Response at 3, 4. 80 Joint Chiefs, Homeland Security at IV-10-12. 81 Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Types of Duty, 1 (undated) (on fi le with the Select Comm., No. MMTF 00415-05). 82 Id. 83 Id. 84 Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 2, 2005) (on fi le with the Select Comm.); Letter
from Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 4, 2005) (on fi le with the Select Comm.); Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of Louisiana, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 5, 2005) (on fi le with the Select Comm.); Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense to Secretary of the Army and Acting Secretary of the Air Force (Sept. 7, 2005) (authorizing Title 32 status for Katrina Disaaster Relief activities, on fi le with the Select Comm.).
85 Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Headquarters, Army Regulation 130-5 AFMD 10, Organization and Functions of the National Guard Bureau (Dec. 30, 2001).
86 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing] 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum).
87 Chris Doane & Joe DiRenzo III, Protecting Our Ports: A Coast Guard Operational Commander’s Perspective of the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 in 2004 U.S. COAST GUARD: THE SHIELD OF FREEDOM, 124 (2004).
88 District Eight, U.S. Coast Guard, District Eight Facts, available at http://www.uscg.mil/d8/d8facts.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 89 See Debra Spar and James Dail, Essays: The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations: Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting
for Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 Chi. J. Int’l L. 171, 180 note 1 (“Strictly defi ned, NGO stands for “non-governmental organization” and would thus include any group that does not fall under the purview of the government. Taken to the extreme, this would include private companies, religious congregations, and trade unions. For the most part, however, the term NGO is used to refer to organizations that (1) are tax exempt, (2) have a decisionmaking body separate from the government, (3) consist, at least in part, of volunteers and donations, (4) have a charter or mandate within a specifi c development arena, and (5) consist of a formal organization (in other words, are registered as organizations.”).
90 36 U.S.C. § 300101 (2005). 91 American Red Cross Museum, History: The Federal Charter of the American Red Cross, available at http://www.redcross.org/museum/history/
charter.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2006). 92 Id. 93 Id. 94 American Red Cross, 2004 Corporate Annual Report, Introduction, 4, available at http://www.redcross.org/pubs/#report (last visited Jan. 23,
2006). 95 NRP at 3. 96 Id. at 12, ESF #6-5. 97 Id. at ESF #6-5. 98 Id. at 2 99 Id. at ESF #6-3. 100 Id. 101 American Red Cross, Tropical Storm and Hurricane Action Plan, 1 (undated) [hereinafter American Red Cross, Storm Action Plan]. 102 Id. 103 American Red Cross, American Red Cross Responsibilities Under the Federal Response Plan (Aug. 2001) (Internal Red Cross planning document on
fi le with the Select Comm.). 104 American Red Cross, Interim Shelter Operations Management Toolkit, iii (Sept. 2005) (It is not clear to what extent this document was utilized in
the Red Cross’s response to Hurricane Katrina). 105 American Red Cross Storm Action Plan at 2 (“The chapters serving the affected area provide the initial incident response in their respective
communities, report their activities and assessments and are augmented by human and material resources and guidance, in a coordinated manner, from the service area or national headquarters.”).
106 Interview by Select Comm. staff with Joseph C. Becker, Sr. Vice Pres., Preparedness and Response, American Red Cross in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Oct. 14, 2000 Red Cross Interview].
107 Id. 108 American Red Cross, Storm Action Plan at 20 (chart entitled, “Hurricane Response Plan Routine Business Model Structure”). 109 Id. at 3. 110 Id. at 3 111 Id. at 4. 112 Id. at 5. 113 Id. 114 Oct. 14, 2000 Red Cross Interview. 115 American Red Cross Storm Action Plan at 3. 116 Id. at 7. 117 Id. at 9. 118 Id. at 9-18. 119 Id. 120 Id. at 9. 121 Id. at 9. 122 Id. at 12.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 55
123 Id. 124 Id. 125 Id. at 15. 126 Id. at 16. 127 Id. 128 See NRP at 6 (incidents typically managed at the lowest possible level), 8 (roles of local chief executive offi cer and governor), 15 (concept
of operations); FEMA supra note 10; DHS supra note 27 at (“most incidents are managed locally”); Bazan supra note 12 (summary—federal resources supplement state and local).
129 See GAO: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance Capabilities at 7-8. 130 Keith Bea, et al., Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 32287, Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities in the States, District of
Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, 6 (Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Bea, Statutory Authorities]. 131 See Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation, available at http://www.emacweb.org/?150 (last visited Jan.
23, 2006) (for a list of states that have intrastate mutual assistance compacts). 132 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RS 22235, Disaster Evacuation and Displacement Policy: Issues for Congress, 1-2 (Sept. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy]. 133 NRP at 8. 134 See Bea, Disaster Evacuation Policy 132 at 1-2. 135 See Bea, Statutory Authorities at 4. 136 See Bowman Katrina: DOD Response at 7-8. 137 See Bea, Statutory Authorities at 10. 138 Id. at 5-6. 139 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 32678, Louisiana Emergency Management and Homeland Security Authorities Summarized (Sept. 2,
2005) [hereinafter Bea, Louisiana Authorities]. 140 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RL 32316, Mississippi Emergency Management and Homeland Security Authorities Summarized (Sept. 2,
2005) [hereinafter Bea, Mississippi Authorities]. 141 See Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., Order No. RD 21777, Alabama Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities Summarized,
1-5 (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Bea, Alabama Authorities] (a third statute, the Emergency Interim Succession Act, applies when continuity of government operations come into question and provides for the succession of powers for legislators and offi cers of political subdivisions).
142 State Chief Executives Emergency Response: Hurricanes & Other Disaster Emergencies: State Of Alabama Experience (on fi le with the Select Comm., Nos. 000659AL-000666AL).
143 Id. 144 Preparedness Division Technological Hazards Branch, State of Alabama, State of Alabama Emergency Operations Plan [hereinafter AL Emergency
Operations Plan] 4-5 (Oct. 1, 2000). 145 Id. at 2-3. 146 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in AL (Oct. 11-12, 2005). 147 See Bea, Alabama Authorities at 2. 148 See AL Emergency Operations Plan. 149 Id. at 1. 150 See Bea, Alabama Authorities at 2. 151 Miss. Code Ann. §§ 33-15-11 to 33-15-53 (2004). 152 Id. 153 Id. at § 33-15-2. 154 See Bea, Mississippi Authorities at 2. 155 Id. at 5. 156 The Disaster Improvement Grant Program Plans Sec., Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Miss. Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II Miss.
Comprehensive Emergency Mgmt. Plan, p. Basic-2 (May 14, 199) (change log updated through Feb. 2003). 157 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11 (2004). 158 See Bea, Mississippi Authorities at 1; Bea, Alabama Authorities at 4. 159 See Bea, Mississippi Authorities at 2-3; Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-7 (2004). 160 See Bea, Louisiana Authorities at 1-3. 161 Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, State of Louisiana, Emergency Operations Plan, 7 (April 2005) [hereinafter LA
Emergency Operations Plan]. 162 Id. at 7. 163 Id. at 9. 164 Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 724 D (2003). 165 Id. at §§ 724-725. 166 LA Emergency Operations Plan at 1. 167 Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, (2004) at 7 [hereinafter N.O. Emergency
Management Plan]. 168 Id. at 4. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171 Id. at 51. 172 Id. 173 Id.
56 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
174 Id. at 54. 175 Id. at 48. 176 Id. at 50. 177 Id. 178 N.O. Emergency Management Plan at 45. 179 See Eric S. Blake, et al., Tropical Prediction Center, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4, The Deadliest
Costliest, and Most Intense U.S. Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts Aug. 2005) available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/paststate.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
180 See National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness: Storm Surge, available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/storm_surge.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
181 See National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness: Inland Flooding, available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/inland_fl ood. shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
182 Anu Mittal, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO-05-1050T, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, 2 (Sept. 28, 2005); R.B. Seed, et al., U. of Calif. At Berkely and Am. Soc’y of Civil Engineers, Rept. No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee System in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, 1-4 (Nov. 2, 2005) (support for subsidence); IEM, Inc., IEM/TEC04-070 r5, Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan, 5 (Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter IEM, Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Plan] (support for “bowl” topography “Hurricane Pam”).
183 IEM, Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Plan at 5; Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s In Charge of the New Orleans Levees? Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs [Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing], 109th Cong. (Dec. 15, 2005) (written statement of Max. L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District) at 1.
184 New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Un-Watering Plan Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, Louisiana, 1 (Aug. 18, 2000) (While we use the term “sea level,” the technical measurement used by the Corps is National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) which was developed by observing the mean sea level height at various locations around North America).
185 New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NGVD Datum Plane (Apr. 15, 2005) available at http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/ response/NGVD.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2006).
186 Mittal, Testimony at 2. 187 See FEMA, Disasters: Louisiana Severe Storm, Flooding Declared May 10, 1995, available at http://www.fema.gov/news/event.fema?id=2250
(last visited Jan. 25, 2006). 188 Mittal, Testimony at 2. 189 Richard D. Knabb, et al., National Hurricane Center, Dep’t of Commerce, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina 23-20 August 2005, 11, (Dec.
20, 2005); Mittal, Testimony at 2. 190 Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing (written statement of Max. L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District at 2); R.B. Seed, et al. at 1-3. 191 Mittal, Testimony at 2. 192 Flood Control Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 103, 1077 (1965) (The Flood Control Act of 1965 authorized this project). 193 Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing (written statement of Col. Richard P. Wagenaar) at 1-2; Mittal, Testimony 182 at 3; The Industrial Canal is also
known as the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. 194 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Pezza, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (Dec. 9, 2005); Mittal, Testimony at 3.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 57
58 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“Preparing for an event like Hurricane Katrina or
any natural disaster, we should never feel like we are
completely prepared. We can always do better.”
Robert R. Latham, Jr.
Executive Director,
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
Select Committee hearing, December 7, 2005
G E
T T
Y I M
A G
E S
/M A
R IA
N N
E T
O D
D
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 59
PRE-LANDFALL PREPARATION AND KATRINA’S IMPACT
As Hurricane Katrina entered the Gulf of Mexico, Gulf coast states and the federal government prepared for landfall in the region.
Pre-landfall preparation by FEMA
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
positioned an unprecedented number of resources in
affected areas prior to Katrina’s landfall. Indeed, FEMA’s
efforts far exceeded any previous operation in the agency’s
history. A staggering total of 11,322,000 liters of water,
18,960,000 pounds of ice, 5,997,312 meals ready to eat
(MREs), and 17 truckloads of tarps were staged at various
strategic locations in and near the Gulf region prior to
Katrina’s landfall.1 FEMA also pre-positioned 18 disaster
medical teams, medical supplies and equipment, and nine
urban search and rescue task forces (US&R) and incident
support teams.2 Rapid Needs Assessment Teams also were
deployed to Louisiana on the Saturday before landfall.3
In Louisiana alone, on August 28, a total of 36 trucks of
water (18,000 liters per truck) and 15 trucks of MREs
(21,888 per truck) were pre-staged at Camp Beauregard.4
FEMA’s Hurricane Liaison Team, which consists of
FEMA, the National Weather Service, and state and local
emergency management offi cials and is tasked with
coordinating closely with FEMA Headquarters staff by
phone and video conferencing systems, was activated and
deployed to the National Hurricane Center on August 24
in anticipation of Hurricane Katrina’s making landfall.5
FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support detachments
were pre-positioned in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama
to provide emergency satellite communications capability.6
According to former FEMA Director Michael Brown,
prior to landfall, FEMA reached out to other agencies for
assistance, such as the Department of Defense (DOD) for
potential movement of strategic airlift support.7
By 10 a.m. on Monday, August 29, the morning Katrina
made landfall, 31 teams from the National Disaster
Medical System (NDMS) had been deployed to staging
areas in Anniston, Alabama; Memphis, Tennessee;
Houston, Dallas; and New Orleans, including 23 Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams.8 The teams, trained to handle
trauma, pediatrics, surgery, and mental health problems,
brought truckloads of medical equipment and supplies
with them. By September 1, 72 hours after landfall, FEMA
had deployed more than 57 NDMS teams and 28 US&R
teams with nearly 1,800 personnel to save lives and render
medical assistance. FEMA had also supplied generators
and thousands of cots and blankets.9
Pre-landfall preparation in Mississippi
Preparations for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi
involved an array of actions, including county and
state preparedness and disaster response training in
the months leading up to the storm; the establishment
of local, state, and federal command structures by way
of emergency proclamations; activation of emergency
operations centers (EOCs); evacuations, many of them
mandatory, of the areas and types of homes most in
danger from a hurricane; and, the opening of emergency
shelters to which those evacuating could fl ee. Preparation
by the military in Mississippi largely took place through
activation of the state’s National Guard and some initial
requests for Emergency Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC) assistance with security, engineering support, and
helicopters.
Following a request from Governor Haley Barbour, on
Sunday, August 28, President Bush issued an emergency
declaration for Mississippi.10 Following a further request
from Barbour, on Monday, August 29, President Bush
declared a major disaster in Mississippi.11
Disaster preparedness training — Mississippi
For several years, Mississippi’s Emergency Management
Agency (MEMA) has been using federal emergency
preparedness grant funds to improve its counties’ abilities
to prepare for and respond to disasters. In 2000, 43 of
Mississippi’s 82 counties had active county emergency
management programs; MEMA used DHS emergency
60 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
management performance grant funds, including a $1.3
million allocation in fi scal year 2005, to increase this to 79
active county programs in 2005.12 In addition, the MEMA
reported that, as of early 2005, over 1,200 fi rst responders
had received training in the National Incident Management
System (NIMS).13
During the summer of 2005, the director of MEMA,
Robert Latham, his key staff, and most of Mississippi’s
county emergency management directors underwent
training in NIMS and the NIMS Incident Command
System (ICS).14 At approximately the same time, the
FEMA offi cials who would later lead the federal response
in Mississippi (Bill Carwile and Robert Fenton) also
participated in extensive ICS training. Fenton was
described by Carwile as having been involved for a long
time in developing training for subjects such as the
ICS and as an expert in how to adapt it for large scale
operations, such as the response to Katrina. Carwile
and Latham said they believe their training in the
ICS and the ability it gave them to quickly establish a
unifi ed command were positive elements of the state’s
preparation for and response to Katrina.
Establishment of command structures in Mississippi
Mississippi issued its fi rst Hurricane Katrina situation
report on August 23 and, through Thursday, August
25, continued monitoring the storm.15 According to
this situation report, during these three days, MEMA
conducted executive planning sessions to develop an EOC
activation timeline as well as plans for protective actions
and a proactive response.16 It also established contact with
a FEMA logistics cell and began encouraging the public to
prepare for the storm.
On Friday, August 26, Mississippi activated its National
Guard, and MEMA activated its EOC on Saturday, August
27.17 At that time, it also deployed County Liaisons to six
counties (Jackson, Harrison, Hancock, Pearl River, Stone,
and George) and activated its State Emergency Response
Team (SERT) for deployment to Camp Shelby the next
day, August 28. The SERT established forward operations
at Camp Shelby at 3 p.m. on August 28. According to
the MEMA Director’s brief, as of about 7 p.m. on August
28, 18 counties and 11 cities and towns had issued local
emergency proclamations; by early morning of August 29,
this had increased to 41 counties and 61 cities and towns.18
FEMA’s liaison arrived at the state’s EOC on Saturday,
August 27. FEMA’s Emergency Response Team-A (ERT-A)
arrived the same day, August 27, when the state activated
its EOC.19 On August 28, MEMA reported that FEMA was
deploying resources to a Regional Mobilization Center in
Selma, Alabama, and that FEMA’s ERT-A would be able to
supply large quantities of water and ice to the hardest hit
areas.20
Evacuations in Mississippi
Although the governor could order mandatory
evacuations, longstanding practice in Mississippi rests
that authority with local governments.21 However, the
state is generally included in any discussions about
evacuation orders because, once a city or county chooses
to make such an order, state responsibilities for managing
traffi c (including contra fl ow) and opening shelters can
come into play.22 In preparing for Hurricane Katrina, the
state worked through the MEMA liaisons it dispatched
to the counties along or near the Gulf coast as well as
a representative it had stationed in Louisiana’s EOC
(because of contra fl ow agreements between Mississippi
and Louisiana that provide for evacuations out of
southeast Louisiana through Mississippi).
AP PHOTO/ROGELIO SOLIS
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 61
Emergency shelters—Mississippi
On August 27, MEMA urged Mississippi’s coastal counties
not to open local shelters in order to encourage people to
evacuate north.23 MEMA described coastal county shelters
as an option of “last resort.” On Sunday, August 28,
MEMA reported that Red Cross shelters were open and on
standby in the coastal counties.
Mississippi began opening shelters as early as August
28. MEMA reported 51 shelters open with 475 persons
registered at that time and 36 additional shelters available
on standby as needed.24 In addition, MEMA indicated
the Jackson Coliseum had been open as a shelter (and
individuals were authorized to bring pets) and three
special needs shelters had been established.25 According
to the Director’s brief, also on August 28, MEMA reported
the Red Cross had begun opening shelters that morning,
bringing the total available shelters to 68 prior to the
opening of the Jackson Coliseum.26
By August 29, just prior to landfall, MEMA reported
57 shelters were open with 7,610 persons registered in
them. An additional 31 shelters were available on standby
to open based on need.27 The Jackson Coliseum opened
as expected the day before and by early morning August
29 was reported by MEMA to be at capacity. Similarly, all
Red Cross central Mississippi shelters were reported to be
full as of 4:30 a.m. on August 29.28 Two additional special
needs shelters opened, bringing their total to fi ve.29
Military preparation in Mississippi
Military preparation in Mississippi began as early as
August 26 when, as noted earlier, the Governor activated
the state’s National Guard.30 Mississippi’s National Guard
has over 12,000 troops, with Army and Air National
Guard components, both under the direction of the
Adjutant General (TAG), Major General Harold A. Cross.31
Throughout the preparation and response to Katrina,
Mississippi’s Guard reported to and received taskings (or
mission assignments) from MEMA.32 The Mississippi
National Guard has an Operations Plan, (OPLAN MSSTAD)
on top of MEMA’s Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan, that was used during Hurricane Katrina.33 Refi ned and
updated in an order issued to Mississippi Guard on June 1,
2005, this operations plan was validated during Hurricane
Dennis, July 7 to 10, 2005.34
On August 27, Mississippi’s Guard accelerated its
preparations by alerting state emergency personnel to
assemble for hurricane operations on the Mississippi
Gulf coast under Joint Task Force Magnolia.35 In doing
so, Mississippi’s National Guard assembled and pre-
positioned at all three coastal county EOCs its special
“hurricane strike” squads; each squad consisted of 10
military police (MPs), 15 engineers and fi ve trucks.36 In
addition, the Guard placed on alert the following units
from throughout the state:
223rd EN BN – Camp McCain, MS (Grenada, MS)
890th EN BN – Home Station Armories (located in the
coastal region)
112th MP BN – Camp Shelby, MS (Hattiesburg, MS)
367th MAINT. CO – Home Station (Philadelphia, MS)
1687th TRANS CO – Home Station (Southaven, MS)
1387th QM WATER - Home Station (Leland, MS)
210th FINANCE – Home Station (Jackson, MS)
172nd AW – Home Station (Jackson, MS)
186th ARW – Home Station (Meridian, MS)37
Cross noted that these assets “were suffi cient for a
Category II storm, but as Katrina approached the Gulf
coast on August 28, it became apparent that additional
forces from outside the state would be required.”38
As a result, that afternoon, he initiated requests for
assistance via the EMAC. The fi rst such request, relayed
to the on-site National Guard Bureau Liaison Offi cers
(LNO) was for an additional MP Battalion, two more
Engineering Battalions, and 3 CH-37 helicopters.39 That
same day, August 28, the National Guard Bureau Joint
Operations Center in Washington, D.C., sent LNOs to
Mississippi, with the fi rst going to Mississippi’s Joint Force
Headquarters, followed by offi cers sent to the three coastal
county EOCs and to MEMA’s Operations Cell to facilitate
out of state National Guard assets.40
In addition, Cross established at Gulfport a Forward
Operations Center that eventually combined state
and federal (including active duty) logistics support
personnel.41 In response to questions regarding the Guard’s
preparations, including the EMAC assistance it received,
Cross said, “This greatly assisted in the command and
control and situational awareness of all operations. As
forces fl owed into the state, more liaison teams were
established in each county EOC that had Guard operations
62 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
in that county. This was a very effi cient system since the
National Guard headquarters was linked directly with each
county for coordination of relief efforts.”42
The Guard’s preparation in Mississippi was not,
unfortunately, without incident. Prior to the storm’s
landfall, Sgt. Joshua Russell, Detachment 1, Company A,
89th Engineers, was killed when attempting to rescue an
elderly couple in Harrison County.43
Pre-landfall preparation in Alabama
Final preparation for Katrina in Alabama began in
earnest four days prior to landfall when it became
evident the path of the storm pointed towards the Gulf
coast. Three days prior to landfall, the Governor’s staff
participated in frequent videoconference calls with
personnel from FEMA, the National Hurricane Center,
including its director Max Mayfi eld, senior staff at the
White House, and senior staff from the Governors’ offi ces
from Louisiana and Mississippi.44 The Governor’s staff
indicated they were satisfi ed with the federal support
they received and that Max Mayfi eld’s briefi ngs were
particularly valuable.45
In Alabama’s southernmost counties, Baldwin and
Mobile, preparations began fi ve days before the storm,
when they started regular consultations with the National
Hurricane Center, the State of Alabama Emergency
Management Agency, and the National Weather Service in
Mobile to discuss the storm’s likely path and strength.46
Information was then disseminated to all local offi cials
and fi rst responders and staff prepared to activate the
EOCs.47
On August 28, 2005, Governor Riley wrote to
President Bush, asking that he “declare an emergency
disaster declaration for the State of Alabama as a result
of Hurricane Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005 and
continuing.”48 That same day President Bush “declared an
emergency . . . for the State of Alabama.”49
The next day, Monday, August 29, Riley wrote to
President Bush again, this time asking him to “declare
an expedited major disaster . . . as a result of Hurricane
Katrina beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing.”50
That same day, President Bush issued a major disaster
declaration for Alabama.”51
Establishment of command structures in Alabama
On Friday, August 26, Riley declared a state of emergency
to handle what was then thought would be a surge of
evacuees from the Florida panhandle. The state went into
what they call Level II response and expected to receive 10
to 15 percent of Florida’s evacuees.52 A Level II response
activates the Alabama EOC on a 24-hour basis, and all
relevant agencies are activated and necessary personnel are
assigned to staff the EOC.
One day later, on Saturday, August 27, a Level I response
was activated.53 The EOC was operating in full force, with
desks staffed for each ESF. A FEMA Emergency Response
Team - Advance (ERT-A) was on site late in the day. An
ERT-A team is a small FEMA contingent with capabilities
for planning, operations, communications, and logistics. A
total of fi ve to eight people from the Atlanta-based FEMA
region IV were on site at the EOC. The Alabama Emergency
Management Agency (AEMA) expressed some frustration
with FEMA’s late arrival. AEMA offi cials believed that
had FEMA been on site sooner with a larger contingent,
Alabama may have been able to acquire needed resources
and commodities more quickly.
President Bush spoke to Riley on Saturday, August
27, two days prior to landfall, to ensure the Governor
had everything he needed. The Governor’s staff indicated
they felt they were better prepared for Katrina than they
were for Hurricanes Dennis and Ivan.54 In addition to
implementing many of the lessons learned from previous
hurricanes, the Governor’s staff believes one key element
of the state’s response to Katrina was the state’s proactive
communications strategy.
On Friday, August 26, as the storm gathered in the
Gulf, the Governor personally visited all of the counties
in the Gulf, holding numerous press conferences to urge
local residents to evacuate pursuant to the mandatory
evacuation orders.55 In Alabama, the failure to obey a
mandatory evacuation order is a misdemeanor enforced
by county or municipal police.56
The Alabama EOC is divided into fi ve clusters of desks,
and each desk is equipped with computers, telephony and
other management tools.57 The fi ve clusters are:
■ emergency services (ESF #s 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 13)
■ human services (ESF #s 6, 8, 11)
■ infrastructure and support (ESF #s 10, 12)
■ operations support (ESF #s 14, 15) and
■ information and planning (ESF #s 5, 7).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 63
There is a station for each ESF
function and stations for all of
the involved agencies, federal and
state, including FEMA, EMAC,
Army Corps of Engineers, National
Guard, Alabama State Police,
among others.58
One of the tools Alabama uses
to respond to local disaster needs
is the EM-2000 incident log, a
Lotus Notes-based system which
captures, in log book fashion,
emergency events and requests
from each of the 67 counties.59
Each activity or request logged into
the system gets assigned to one of
the desks in the EOC for attention.
If a report comes in regarding individuals who are trapped
and in need of rescue, the event will be assigned to the
personnel in the emergency services cluster. Multi-ESF
teams involving state police (ESF #13), transportation
(ESF #1), and urban search and rescue (ESF #9) huddle to
coordinate the optimal response. Events can be reported
and tracked by ESF, by status, by county, and by a number
of other custom data elements. Documents related to
information requests, as opposed to action requests, are
later scanned and attached. The EM-2000 data fi les appear
to serve as the central universe of actions and documents
related to the state’s response to the storm.
Applying the lessons learned from Hurricane Ivan,
the state upgraded the tracking system used to determine
hospital bed vacancies, giving state offi cials real-time
visibility of surge capacity and making it possible to better
direct those with special medical needs to appropriate
sites.60 The state health offi ce also has the capability to
conduct daily conference calls with county health staff
to assess status and needs. Health offi cials staff their own
emergency operations center, linked by computer and
phone to the main state EOC in Clanton.
Evacuations in Alabama
Even before any evacuations began, AEMA and state
transportation offi cials participated in the FEMA regional
Evacuation Liaison Team conference calls, during which
emergency managers from Florida, Louisiana, and
Mississippi shared information on the status of evacuation
routes, road closures, traffi c volumes, hotel availability,
and other interstate implications of signifi cant population
migrations in the region.61
On the morning of August 29, Shelby County, Alabama,
posted a message on the statewide EM2000 system saying
the “Shelby County Humane Society will house animals
during the emergency. Can house small animals as well as
farm animals for a short duration.”62 More than 50 pets
were evacuated from Mississippi and brought to Maxwell
Air Force Base, where they were taken in by families on the
base until the pet owners could be located.63
Pre-landfall preparation in Louisiana
On Saturday, August 27, Louisiana Governor Blanco
wrote to President Bush, requesting that he “declare an
emergency for the State of Louisiana due to Hurricane
Katrina for the time period beginning August 26, 2005,
and continuing.”64 Later that same day, President Bush
declared an emergency for the state of Louisiana.65
William Lokey was named Federal Coordinating Offi cer.66
On Sunday, August 28, in recognition of the potential
catastrophic impact of Hurricane Katrina, Blanco asked
President Bush, prior to landfall, to “declare an expedited
major disaster for the State of Louisiana as Hurricane
Katrina, a Category V Hurricane approaches our coast . . .
beginning on August 28, 2005 and continuing.”67 The
next day, President Bush declared a major disaster for
Louisiana.68
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64 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Establishment of command and safeguarding of assets
The State of Louisiana took a number of steps to prepare
for the arrival of Hurricane Katrina, including getting the
EOC up and running with its full staff complement by
the afternoon of Friday, August 26.69 The EOC conducted
communications checks with all the state agencies and
parishes on Thursday, August 25 – four days before
landfall.70
The state EOC then began holding regular conference
calls with all state agencies, key parishes, federal agencies,
other states, and the Red Cross to coordinate pre-landfall
activities among all the different authorities.71 These calls
began at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, August 26, with fi ve calls on
Saturday, four calls on Sunday, and a fi nal call Monday
morning as the storm hit but before communications
went out. In addition, several state agencies moved key
assets northward, stockpiled critical supplies, positioned
teams to do post-landfall damage assessments, or
otherwise prepared for the hurricane.72 The Louisiana
Department of Fish and Wildlife coordinated with the
Louisiana National Guard in advance to get boats placed
on trailers and pre-positioned at Jackson Barracks in
New Orleans in anticipation of fl ooding and the need for
waterborne search and rescue.73
There were also preparations at the parish level. As
noted, the parishes participated in conference calls
with the state. Plaquemines Parish, one of the southern
parishes most exposed to the storm, parked vehicles
on high ground, gathered administrative records and
moved them north, transferred prisoners to upstate
facilities, and set up an emergency command post in a
local high school.74 Jefferson Parish, part of metropolitan
New Orleans, also took a number of preparatory steps.
According to Emergency Management Director Walter
Maestri, they implemented their “Doomsday Plan”
to hunker down in their EOC with a skeleton crew
to minimize the number of people exposed to the
hurricane’s damage.
The Louisiana National Guard (LANG) and other state
agencies went on alert and began staging personnel and
equipment.75 By Saturday, August 28, the day prior to
landfall, the LANG had pre-positioned 9,792 MREs and
13,440 liters of water at the Superdome, the “shelter of
last resort.” The state also had positioned teams north, out
of harm’s way, prior to landfall, and the fi rst requests for
EMAC teams were issued as well.
On Saturday, August 28, the New Orleans Regional
Transit Authority (RTA) fueled up its fl eet based at its
Eastern New Orleans facility and moved buses not
providing service to higher ground on a wharf near
downtown New Orleans.76 Buses that were providing
regular service were also eventually moved to the wharf
as well.
Evacuations in Louisiana
The state was actively involved in executing the Southeast
Louisiana evacuation plan, with the Department of
Transportation and Development and the Louisiana
State Police working to manage traffi c and implement
“contrafl ow” — making all highway lanes outbound
to maximize traffi c fl ow and minimize traffi c jams.77
The Governor was personally involved in monitoring
contrafl ow, which ran from Saturday at about 4:00 p.m. to
Sunday at about 6:00 p.m.78
State offi cials coordinated the contrafl ow with
the states of Mississippi and Texas, since Louisiana
interstates fed into these states.79 In a conference call
at 6:30 a.m. Saturday morning, it was recommended
that the evacuation plan for southeast Louisiana be
implemented.80 The state began staging assets necessary
to execute an evacuation, including alerting and activating
National Guard troops, pre-deploying traffi c cones
and barriers to key locations, and coordinating plans
among all of the parishes.81 Some parishes had already
begun evacuation proceedings. By 6:00 p.m. on Sunday,
August 28, traffi c was light, so contrafl ow was halted,
but residents could still evacuate on the outbound
lanes once the highways were returned to their normal
confi guration.82
Up to 1.2 million Louisiana residents followed the
evacuation orders and evacuated themselves in their
private vehicles.83 However, it later became apparent that
thousands of residents, particularly in New Orleans, did
not evacuate or seek shelter, but remained in their homes.
The parishes began declaring evacuations on Saturday,
August 27 at 9:00 a.m. These declarations had been
coordinated among the state and parishes in advance as
part of Louisiana’s emergency evacuation plan, which calls
for the most southern parishes to evacuate fi rst so that, as
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 65
they drive north, they do not encounter traffi c bottlenecks
in New Orleans or Baton Rouge.84 While some parishes
(e.g., Plaquemines and St. Charles) began the process with
“mandatory” evacuation orders, most parishes began with
“recommended” evacuation orders and upgraded these
to “mandatory” orders later on Saturday or Sunday.85
Some of the parishes farther north (e.g., St. Tammany,
Tangipahoa) declared mandatory evacuation orders only
for residents living in low lying areas or manufactured
homes.86
Some parishes also asked nongovernmental
organizations to help evacuate those residents that did not
have their own vehicles. Both New Orleans and Jefferson
Parish have a program called “Brother’s Keeper” run by the
parishes in conjunction with local churches and the Red
Cross. According to Maestri, the parish had a phone bank
in the EOC manned by volunteers that help take the calls
and match up riders with drivers once the evacuation was
announced.87 By Sunday evening, most of the parishes
reported empty streets and had declared dusk-to-dawn
curfews.88
Emergency shelters in Louisiana
Louisiana also set up shelters as part of its evacuation
plan. A “Sheltering Task Force” led by the Department
of Social Services and the Department of Health and
Hospitals, coordinated its activities with the state EOC
and parishes through the aforementioned conference
calls.89 Specifi c shelters were designated along the main
evacuation routes, including both general population
shelters and special needs shelters.90 These efforts were
coordinated with both Mississippi and Texas, which set up
shelters once Louisiana shelters began to fi ll.91
Several parishes also established “shelters of last
resort” for residents that could not evacuate or had
delayed leaving. Parish offi cials Ebbert and Maestri told
Select Committee staff they purposefully designate these
shelters at the last minute so people will not use them
as an excuse to avoid evacuation.92 New Orleans, which
had already designated the Superdome as a shelter for
the special needs population, also designated that facility
as a “shelter of last resort” on Sunday, August 28.93 The
Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned 9,792 MREs
and 13,440 liters of water at the Superdome.94 Also in
New Orleans, the RTA began running special service from
12 sites across the city to take riders to the Superdome.95
The RTA also ran at least 10 paratransit vehicles to the
Superdome and then on to the Baton Rouge area for
“special needs” citizens; each of these vehicles made
at least two trips.96 All service ceased at approximately
7:00 p.m. Sunday night, approximately 11 hours before
Katrina was due to make landfall and as conditions
worsened.97 Jefferson Parish also designated four facilities
as “shelters of last resort.”98 According to Maestri, unlike
the Superdome, these locations in Jefferson Parish did not
have any prepositioned medical personnel or supplies but
they did have pre-positioned food and water.
Pre-landfall preparations by DOD, the National Guard, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Coast Guard
DOD In preparation for the last part of the 2005 hurricane
season, the Secretary of Defense approved a standing
order on August 19 that allowed the commander, U.S.
Northern Command, to use military installations and
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deploy Defense Coordinating Offi cers (DCO) as needed
to coordinate directly in support of FEMA in affected
states. As the force provider to Northern Command, the
U.S. Joint Forces Command issued general instructions on
August 20 on how it would task units in support of any
Northern Command requests to support FEMA.99
On August 23, Northern Command began tracking
the tropical depression that became Hurricane Katrina.
On August 24, the Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), Northern Command, and the National Guard
Bureau participated in a teleconference with FEMA on
what would be needed to respond to Katrina. Joint Forces
Command issued a warning order to military services
to be ready to support requests for assistance. Northern
Command issued a similar warning order on August 25,
the day Katrina struck Florida as a category 1 storm.100
On August 26, Northern Command issued an execute
order, setting initial DOD relief actions into motion. The
initial response was focused on Florida, but DCOs were
also activated for Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi.101
On August 27, Northern Command received its fi rst
mission assignment from FEMA, to provide Barksdale
Air Force Base in Louisiana as a federal operational
staging area. The same day, the Corps of Engineers
positioned teams and supplies in Alabama, Louisiana,
and Mississippi. In New Orleans, the commander of the
Corps’ New Orleans District evacuated most of his staff
to alternate locations to be ready to respond when the
storm passed. Other active military units ordered similar
evacuations of personnel and equipment. In addition,
the Louisiana National Guard aviation offi cer requested
helicopter support from the National Guard Bureau, and
support was coordinated through the EMAC.102
On August 28, DCOs were deployed to Mississippi and
Louisiana. Northern Command took several additional
steps to organize military assets that might be needed,
including deployment of Joint Task Force-Forward
(eventually Joint Task Force-Katrina) to Camp Shelby,
Mississippi and a general alert to DOD assets potentially
needed, particularly aviation assets.103
On the day Katrina made landfall, August 29, the
Deputy Secretary of Defense led an 8:30 a.m. meeting
to get damage assessment for DOD facilities and review
resources that might be required from DOD to support
hurricane relief. The Secretary of Defense was briefed on
DOD’s readiness and Northern Command issued several
more alerts in anticipation of requests for assistance.104
National Guard At the beginning of each hurricane season, National
Guard Bureau (NGB) personnel participate in an
interagency conference to assess potential response
shortfalls and identify potential solutions that could
be resolved through EMAC requests.105 NGB planners
conducted this EMAC conference in the spring of 2005
with participants from Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, New York, and South Carolina. The
Joint Staff J3 Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS)
also participated. The participants in these conferences
believe that EMAC is capable of providing most military
capabilities needed by states for hurricane disaster relief
operations.
The role of the NGB grew in preparation for Guard
response to Hurricane Katrina. On August 24, it issued
an executive order calling on its Joint Staff to provide
proactive planning and staffi ng support to states
potentially affected by then-tropical storm Katrina. NGB
Liaison Teams (LNOs) were sent to Alabama, Mississippi,
and Louisiana.106 On Wednesday, August 24, the fi rst
teleconference between NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff,
Guard Headquarters, and FEMA was held to discuss DOD
support to federal authorities.
The Joint Operations Center at the NGB geared up as
the operations center for Katrina response.107 The heads
of the Army and Air National Guard also use this center
for coordination of effort. During Hurricane Katrina
preparation and response, the Joint Operations Center
provided daily intelligence updates, logs of current
operations, daily teleconferences, and coordination
with states on logistical assistance; maintained
communications with states and other agencies; and,
coordinated Guard aviation assets.
On August 25, the NGB began hosting daily
teleconferences with the operations offi cers of the Gulf
states’ Adjutant Generals. The Adjutant Generals reported
their preparations to respond, and were asked if they
needed out of state assistance.108 Some of them had
already contacted or were contacted by other nearby states
to arrange for assistance via the EMAC in the form of
personnel and equipment that might be needed.109
On Sunday, August 28, reports into NGB by state
Adjutant Generals indicated that 4,444 Army National
Guard and 932 Air National Guard in Florida, Alabama,
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 67
Mississippi, and Louisiana were ready to respond. Both
General Bennett C. Landreneau of Louisiana and Cross
of Mississippi requested additional aircraft from EMAC
via NGB.110 Consequently, these requests were considered
state-to-state requests for assistance, not federal requests
involving FEMA or OSD, even though NGB facilitated the
assistance. On Monday, August 29, NGB noted that 65
Army National Guard aircraft were in position in Florida,
Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
Louisiana National Guard The Louisiana National Guard is an integral part of
managing emergencies in the state. The Adjutant General,
Landreneau, wears two hats, as he is head of both the
National Guard and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP).111 The
National Guard plays a signifi cant role in emergency
command and control because of the dual role of the
Adjutant General. Also, many of the personnel who staff
the state’s EOC are guardsmen.
On Friday, August 26, Blanco authorized the
mobilization of 2,000 Louisiana guardsmen.112 The
next day, Landrenau called an additional 2,000 to
active duty.113 By the end of the day on Saturday, 3,085
Louisiana National Guard troops had been fully activated.
Coordination also began with other states for additional
aviation assets for search and rescue and EMAC support, if
needed.
The Louisiana National Guard participated in
a number of preparation missions, including law
enforcement, traffi c control, shelter support and security,
and securing operations at the Superdome.114 Many
guardsmen were also embedded with state and parish
offi cials and later used their radios to help these offi cials
reestablish some minimal level of communications.115
Before Katrina hit, guardsmen provided support for
general purpose shelters and special needs shelters by
providing medical personnel.116
Alabama National Guard The Alabama National Guard has 13,200 troops, with
Army and Air National Guard components falling under
its Adjutant General, Major General Mark Bowen.117 The
Adjutant General is also a member of the Governor’s
Cabinet, but is not dual-hatted as the emergency
response coordinator. Although he participates in the
state’s EOC, Bowen’s chain of command is a direct line
to the governor. The Alabama Guard has developed
and is organized around mission-oriented joint force
packages, (i.e., hurricanes, snow and ice storms). Task
forces typically include security forces, engineers, medical,
communications, special operations forces, logistics and a
command and control cell. Alabama also has a voluntary
state militia that is administered by the National Guard.
They are used to augment the Guard force and have
approximately 2,000 to 3,000 members.
During the Alabama National Guard’s
preparation phase, which began six days
before Katrina hit, Guard assets monitored
the storm track and began discussions with
the NGB.118 By August 26, Riley ordered
3,000 Alabama National Guard soldiers and
airmen to state active duty and requested
Secretary of Defense approval of 180 days
of military duty.119 Approval was granted by
DOD on September 7 and was retroactive to
August 29.120
Two days before the storm, a National
Guard liaison offi cer was dispatched to the
state EOC in Clanton.121 On August 28, two
National Guard Task Forces were formed,
gathered pre-positioned supplies (food,
water, ice, gas) from Maxwell Air Force
Base, and equipment, including generators,
Before Katrina hit, Louisiana National Guard soldiers screen residents entering the Superdome.
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fuel trucks, and aviation assets.122 Guard assets also
began deployment to assist Mobile and Baldwin County
Emergency Management activities.123
Mississippi National Guard The Mississippi National Guard has 12,041 troops, with
Army and Air National Guard components falling under
Adjutant Major General Harold A. Cross.124 The Adjutant
General reports directly to the Governor, but is not
dual-hatted as the state emergency management offi cer.
Mississippi’s emergency response is handled by the state’s
emergency management agency, MEMA.
On August 28, 2005, the Mississippi National
Guard alerted state emergency personnel to assemble
for hurricane operations on the Mississippi Gulf coast
under Joint Task Force Magnolia.125 National Guard
special “hurricane strike” squads were pre-positioned
at all three coastal county EOCs. Recommended but
voluntary evacuation of civilians brought bumper-to-
bumper traffi c along Highway 49 northbound, from
the beach in Gulfport to Jackson. By Sunday evening,
numerous mandatory evacuation orders were in effect,
and Mississippi National Guard Soldiers took shelter at
Camp Shelby, 62 miles north of the predicted landfall
area. These Guard personnel moved south after the storm
had passed to begin assisting with response and recovery
efforts.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers The Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), another active
duty military unit, provided substantial resources to
prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Under the
National Response Plan, the USACE, as the lead federal
agency for public works and engineering (ESF #3), provides
relief and response support to FEMA.126 To meet these
responsibilities, USACE has pre-awarded competitively
bid contracts for all of these functions to allow quick
deployment of resources prior to and immediately after an
event.127 These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s
Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI), which has been in
place for about six years.
USACE took a number of preparatory steps in
anticipation of the hurricane season in general and for
Hurricane Katrina specifi cally.128 Over the summer, the
USACE New Orleans District participated in an annual
hurricane preparedness exercise conducted by the regional
headquarters. In July 2005 the district sponsored a
hurricane preparedness conference for federal, state, and
local emergency managers.
In addition, USACE had equipment and supplies,
including those needed to repair levees, pre-positioned
in various locations along the Gulf of Mexico.129 When
Katrina approached, the New Orleans District monitored
the situation and evacuated most staff, establishing a
temporary district headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi.
The district commander and eight staff remained in New
Orleans, retreating to a bunker designed to withstand
a category 5 hurricane. Their objective was to monitor
the levee system, stay in contact with local offi cials, and
provide post-storm assessments to the USACE chain of
command.
U.S. Coast Guard Well before arriving in the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane
Katrina was closely watched by Coast Guard offi cials as the
storm approached and eventually passed through southern
Florida. By Thursday, August 25, the Seventh Coast Guard
District, based in Miami, had prepared for Katrina’s arrival
by partially evacuating Coast Guard boats, aircraft, and
personnel, and closely monitoring Katrina’s progress across
the Florida peninsula.130 As Katrina cleared the Seventh
District, the Eighth District was busy executing hurricane
plans in anticipation of Katrina’s arrival.131
On August 27, the Eighth Coast Guard District’s Incident
Management Team (IMT), based in New Orleans, relocated
to St. Louis in accordance with Coast Guard hurricane
plans.132 The Eighth District set heightened readiness for all
units, ordered the evacuations of personnel and dependents
from units along the Gulf coast in the anticipated impact
zone, and closed the entrance to the lower Mississippi river
to all commercial maritime traffi c.
On August 28, the Coast Guard activated personnel to
support air and swift boat operations under ESF-1, and
positioned liaison offi cers at FEMA regions IV and VI, and
to state EOCs in Florida, Louisiana and Mississippi.133
The Coast Guard’s computer hub in New Orleans
dropped off-line, resulting in no computer or internet
connectivity to all coastal ports within the Eighth District.
Coast Guard units resorted to using phone and fax
machines to communicate.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 69
The Eighth District Commander requested additional
Coast Guard air assets and personnel to support rescue
and recovery operations.134 Coast Guard aircraft and
crews from Louisiana, Alabama, Florida, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas were
pre-staged to provide rapid support.135 Eighth District
Commander Rear Admiral Robert Duncan contacted
Blanco to discuss damage assessments and response
efforts.136
Sector New Orleans operations and critical
communications personnel evacuated to Alexandria,
Louisiana. Non-essential Coast Guard personnel and
dependents in the New Orleans area evacuated to the
Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi.137 Coast Guard
helicopters originally located in New Orleans relocated to
Houston and Lake Charles, Louisiana to avoid Katrina’s
path, and prepared to begin rescue operations. All Coast
Guard cutters and small boats relocated to safe locations,
or traveled out to sea to avoid the storm.
In Mississippi, a Coast Guard Incident Management
Team was established in Meridian.138 Duncan contacted
Barbour to discuss damage assessments and response
efforts. Non-essential personnel and dependents from
the Gulfport and Lockport areas relocated to Naval
Air Station Meridian.139 In Alabama, helicopters from
Aviation Training Center Mobile deployed to Shreveport
and Jacksonville for storm avoidance, and prepared
to respond. Also, a Transportable Multi-mission
Communications Center was pre-staged at Sector Mobile
to provide temporary communication support. Non-
essential Coast Guard personnel and dependents relocated
to Maxwell Air Force Base.140
On August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the
Sector New Orleans Incident Management Team was
established in Alexandria, LA.141 Outside of the forecasted
area of impact, Coast Guard Disaster Assistance Teams
from Ohio, Kentucky, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Miami
were pre-positioned to the region to respond as soon as
conditions permitted.
During normal conditions, there are 15 helicopters
assigned within the Eighth Coast Guard District, along
with four fi xed-wing aircraft and 16 cutters. Within 12
hours of Hurricane Katrina making landfall, the Coast
Guard assigned 29 helicopters, eight fi xed-wing aircraft,
and 24 cutters to the area to support rescue operations.142
Pre-landfall preparations by the American Red Cross
The Red Cross’ Gulf coast-area preparation was far along
two days before Katrina made landfall in the Gulf coast.
As of 2:00 p.m. on August 27, Carol Hall of the Red
Cross reported to the White House and the Department
of Homeland Security, among other governmental
organizations that it “has every resource at its disposal
on alert/moving in anticipation of this event to include
personnel, equipment, and materials.”143 According to
Hall, key aspects of this preparation included:
■ Chapters across the region opened shelters in support
of evacuations in all states.
■ 275,000 HeaterMeals were staged in Baton Rouge, LA.
■ 225,000 HeaterMeals were staged in Montgomery, AL.
■ 15 sites were identifi ed to bring in big kitchens with the
support of Southern Baptists to provide 300,000-meals-
per-day feeding capability.
■ All 14 Disaster Field Supply Center warehouses loaded
supplies, including 50,000 cots, 100,000 blankets,
comfort and clean-up kits.
■ All vehicles in the Red Cross fl eet across the country
were placed on alert for possible deployment and were
dispatched to staging areas.
■ All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles
(ECRVs) deployed to staging areas.
■ Red Cross staff deployed to NRCC, Region VI RRCC,
Region IV RRCC, ERT-As and other ESF #6 posts.
Red Cross volunteers unload supplies in preparation for Katrina.
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By August 28, the Red Cross started to understand the
magnitude of Katrina. One of its Disaster Operations
Reports remarked, if Katrina makes landfall at its current
pressure, “it will be the most intense storm to hit the US
mainland.”144 On the same day it was reported, “For the
fi rst time ever, an ESF6 coordination center will be set up
tomorrow at American Red Cross national headquarters
to coordinate the deliver [sic] mass care services with
our governmental and non-governmental organization
partners.”145
As Katrina made landfall on August 29, the Red Cross
was fully staffi ng all of the relevant state and federal
EOCs, including Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi,
Georgia, South Carolina, Tennessee, FEMA Regions IV
and VI’s RRCC, FEMA’s NRCC, as well as ERT-A teams
in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.146 Sites
for 25 kitchens to feed as many as 500,000 people were
identifi ed and pre-staged.147
Trajectory and impact of Hurricane Katrina
Finding: The accuracy and timeliness of National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center forecasts prevented further loss of life
Timeline of Hurricane Katrina and NWS Warnings to Federal, State and Local Offi cials
At 5:00 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) (4:00 Central
Daylight Time (CDT), the National Weather Service (NWS)
reported that Katrina’s projected path had shifted 150 miles
to the west (toward Mississippi) and projected that Katrina
would make landfall as a category 4 storm.148 By 10:00 p.m.
CDT that same night, the NWS projected that landfall was
most likely at Buras, Louisiana, 65 miles south-southeast
of New Orleans.149 NWS proved extremely accurate; the
fi nal landfall location was only 20 miles off from Friday’s
forecast.150 Since meteorological conditions that affect the
track and intensity of the storm were relatively stable, NWS
was especially certain of the accuracy of its prediction, even
56 hours from landfall.
At 10:00 a.m. CDT, on Saturday, August 27, the
National Hurricane Center (NHC) issued a hurricane
watch for southeast Louisiana, including New Orleans,
which was extended to Mississippi and Alabama later
that afternoon.151 Later that evening, between 7:30 and
8:00 p.m. CDT, 35 hours before landfall, Max Mayfi eld,
the director of the NHC called state offi cials in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama to inform them of the
storm’s intensity and its potential to be devastating and
catastrophic.152 At Governor Blanco’s urging, Mayfi eld
also called Ray Nagin.153
Despite media reports indicating Mayfi eld encouraged
Nagin to immediately order a mandatory evacuation,
Mayfi eld “just told [offi cials] the nature of the storm [and
that he] probably said to the Mayor that he was going
to have some very diffi cult decisions ahead of him.”154
Similarly, Mayfi eld said that the “purpose of [his] calls
there to the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi was
really just to make absolutely sure that they understood
how serious the situation was . . . .”155
In public advisories issued at 10:00 p.m. CDT Saturday,
32 hours before prior to landfall, NHC warned of storm
surge forecasts.156 At 7:00 a.m. on Sunday, August 28,
NWS advisories characterized Katrina as a “potentially
catastrophic” storm.157 Additionally, at 4:00 p.m. CDT on
Sunday, the storm surge was predicted to be 18 to 22 feet,
and locally as high as 28 feet with “large and battering”
waves on top of the surge, meaning “some levees in the
greater New Orleans area could be overtopped.”158
Although it was reported that Mayfi eld cautioned the
levees would be breached, no such warning was issued.
“What I indicated in my briefi ngs to emergency managers
and to the media was the possibility that some levees
in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped,
depending on the details of Katrina’s track and intensity,”
Mayfi eld said.159
Also on Sunday, August 28, the NWS offi ce in Slidell,
Louisiana, which is responsible for the New Orleans
area, issued warnings saying, “most of the area will be
uninhabitable for weeks…perhaps longer” and predicting
“human suffering incredible by modern standards.”160
Ultimately, NWS and NHC proved remarkably accurate in
capturing Katrina’s eventual wrath and destruction.
It is important to note, the hurricane risk to New
Orleans and the surrounding areas was well-recognized and
predicted by forecasters long before Hurricane Katrina. “The
33 years that I’ve been at the Hurricane Center we have
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 71
always been saying
— the directors before
me and I have always
said — that the greatest
potential for the
nightmare scenarios,
in the Gulf of Mexico
anyway, is that New
Orleans and southeast
Louisiana area,”
Mayfi eld said.161
The NWS and NHC
are not without critics
though. AccuWeather
Inc., a private weather service company, has said the public
should have received earlier warnings that Gulf coast
residents, and New Orleans residents in particular, were
directly in Katrina’s path.162 AccuWeather issued a forecast
predicting the target of Katrina’s landfall nearly 12 hours
before the NHC issued its fi rst warning, and argued the
extra time could have aided evacuation of the region.163
Responding to this criticism, Mayfi eld said premature
evacuation can lead too large of an area to evacuate,
causing unnecessary traffi c and congestion on the
roads.164 As Mayfi eld testifi ed, “the mission here of
the National Hurricane Center and then the National
Weather Service, is to provide the best forecast that we
possibly can, and then the emergency managers at the
local and state levels will use that, then they will call for
evacuations.”165
Ultimately, as Mayfi eld tried to convey, NHC and NWS
can only forecast, issue warnings, and provide timely
information to the state and local decision-makers who
determine who and when to evacuate. The timeliness and
accuracy of the forecasts saved lives. No government can
blame inadequate response or lack of advanced warning.
Katrina makes landfall
Hurricane Katrina made landfall at Buras, Louisiana on
the southeast corner of Louisiana, at 6:10 a.m. CDT, on
Monday, August 29.166 Katrina had maximum sustained
winds of 121 mph and was unusually large, measuring
approximately 400 miles across. Its eye was at least 30 miles
wide. Though it had weakened from a category 5 to a strong
category 3 storm by landfall, the damage and loss of life
from the storm was staggering, with effects extending from
Louisiana through Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and the
Florida panhandle.167 The three states most directly affected
— Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana — each suffered
signifi cant damage, with NHC noting that many of the
most severely affected areas along the Gulf coast could take
years to completely rebuild.168
Alabama — impact of Hurricane Katrina
Though Alabama was not where Hurricane Katrina made
landfall, damages there were substantial. According to the
NHC, “despite being more distant from the eye of Katrina,
the storm surge over Dauphin Island, Alabama destroyed
or damaged dozens of beachfront homes and cut a new
canal through the island’s western end.”169 Two deaths
were reported during Hurricane Katrina in Alabama.
However, these deaths were the result of an auto accident
and unrelated to the Hurricane.170
Katrina caused signifi cant damage along its coast
with a wave surge of 13.5 feet, exceeding the 100-year
fl ood level of 12 feet.171 Bayou La Batre and (as noted
above) Dauphin Island received the brunt of the storm
in Alabama, losing 800 and 200 homes, respectively.172
The storm caused wind damage as far north as Tuscaloosa
County. Mobile Bay spilled into downtown and fl ooded
large sections of the city, destroying hundreds of homes.
The sheer power of the storm dislodged a nearby oil
drilling platform, which became caught under the U.S.
Highway 98 bridge.173
As of early January 2006, federal assistance to Alabama
had exceeded $500 million.174 Specifi cally, FEMA reported
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that, to date, it had provided $117 million in assistance
to individuals and families (for housing and rental
assistance) and $348 million for public assistance, crisis
counseling, disaster unemployment assistance, and various
mission assignments to other federal agencies during
the disaster response. The public assistance funds were
provided for, among other things, infrastructure costs,
debris removal, and road and bridge repair. The costs for
mission assignments to other federal agencies included
the use of military aircraft for rapid needs assessments,
shipments of ice (280 truckloads), water (186 truckloads),
MREs (103 truckloads), generators (11 truckloads), cots
(27 truckloads), and blankets (32 truckloads). The Small
Business Administration (SBA) has approved over $68
million in loans to homeowners, renters, and businesses.
Mississippi — impact of Hurricane Katrina
In reporting casualty and damage statistics for Hurricane
Katrina, NHC noted that “the storm surge of Katrina
struck the Mississippi coastline with such ferocity that
entire coastal communities were obliterated, some left
with little more than the foundations upon which homes,
businesses, government facilities, and other historical
buildings once stood.”175 According to the NHC, the
Hancock County EOC recorded a storm surge of as high
as 27 feet; this surge likely penetrated at least six miles
inland in many portions of the Mississippi coast and up
to 12 miles inland along bays and rivers.176 Even in areas
that may have been spared the destruction of the storm
surge, hurricane force winds wreaked havoc—according
to Pearl River County EMA Director Bobby Strahan, for
example, his EOC (one county inland) twice registered
wind speeds of 135 miles per hour.177
All told, at least 231 Mississippians died during
Hurricane Katrina.178 In the three coastal counties alone,
66,000 may have been displaced from their homes due to
fl ooding and/or structural damage to their homes.179 At
peak levels on August 31, Mississippi’s power companies
reported 958,000 customers were without power and that
over 19,000 households were still powerless as of the end
of September.180
Damages to Mississippi’s economy were also
substantial—the state’s agricultural, forestry, gaming,
maritime, and poultry industries all suffered extensive
damages.181 For example, the state reported that its two
biggest crops—poultry and forestry—were very hard
hit, with at least two years’ worth of timber destroyed
(worth $1.3 billion) and the value of the poultry industry
dropping by six percent due to hurricane damage
(including the estimated loss of 8 million birds and
damage to 2,400 of the state’s 9,000 poultry houses, 300
of which were totally devastated).182 The state’s dairy
industry suffered losses estimated to exceed $6 million,
and 20 percent of the expected rice and corn harvests may
have been lost.183
The costs and volume of response and clean-up activity
in Mississippi refl ect the enormous damage Katrina left
behind. For example, a month and a half after landfall,
the state reported the total cost of assistance it received via
EMAC was over $327 million ($176 million in civilian
costs and $151 million in National Guard expenses).184
According to the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA, which administers the EMAC185),
commonly requested resources included fi refi ghters, search
and rescue personnel, HAZMAT personnel, emergency
medical technicians, state police, sheriffs, fi sh and wildlife
personnel, corrections personnel, livestock inspectors,
bridge inspectors, airport maintenance personnel,
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ambulances, medical doctors, registered nurses and
National Guard Troops.186 In total, at least 33 states aided
the law enforcement response effort in Mississippi through
the EMAC.187
Federal costs in Mississippi have also been
substantial.188 FEMA reports that, as of January 4, 2006
it had disbursed in Mississippi just over $1 billion in
assistance via its Individuals and Households Program
and obligated to the state and local governments $666
million in public assistance to repair things like roads and
bridges. SBA, FEMA reports, has approved home, business,
and economic injury loans totaling over $529 million.
USACE has installed nearly 50,000 temporary roofs
through its Operation Blue Roof program (making that
effort 99 percent complete) and, in addition to the efforts
of local governments and contractors, removed more than
23 million cubic yards of debris. While just over 30,000
FEMA travel trailers and mobile homes are now occupied
in Mississippi, four shelters housing 759 people remained
open at year’s end.
Louisiana — impact of Hurricane Katrina
On August 28, at 10 a.m. CDT, the NWS fi eld offi ce in
New Orleans issued a bulletin predicting catastrophic
damage to New Orleans, including partial destruction
of half of the well-constructed houses in the city, severe
damage to most industrial buildings rendering them
inoperable, the creation of a huge debris fi eld of trees,
telephone poles, cars, and collapsed buildings, and a lack
of clean water.189 As previously noted, NWS predicted
the impact on Louisiana would be a human suffering
incredible by modern standards.” Unfortunately, much of
what the NWS predicted came to pass.
With intense gale-force winds and massive storm surge,
the effect of Hurricane Katrina on Southeast Louisiana
was indeed catastrophic. After 11:00 a.m. CDT on August
29, several sections of the levee-system in New Orleans
breached, and 80 percent of the city was under water at
peak fl ooding, which in some places was 20 feet deep. The
extensive fl ooding left many residents stranded long after
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Hurricane Katrina had
passed, unable to leave
their homes. Stranded
survivors dotted the
tops of houses citywide.
Flooding in the 9th
Ward sent residents onto
rooftops seeking aid.
Many others were trapped
inside attics, unable
to escape. Some chopped their way to their roofs with
hatchets and sledge hammers, which residents had been
urged to keep in their attics in case of such events. Clean
water was unavailable and power outages were expected to
last for weeks.
Katrina took approximately 1,100 lives in Louisiana,
most due to the widespread storm surge-induced fl ooding
and its aftermath in the New Orleans area.190 Fatalities
included some of those widely seen on the media — bodies
at refugee centers, such as an old woman in a wheelchair
who had been covered with a cloth, and a man dead on
the interstate. In addition to fl ooding, contaminated water
also caused deaths—on September 6, E. coli was detected in
the water supply and, according to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), fi ve people died from
bacterial infections caused by the toxic waters.191
The economic and environmental ramifi cations of
Katrina have been widespread and could in some respects
be long-lasting due to effects on large population and
tourism centers,
the oil and gas
industry, and
transportation.
The hurricane
severely damaged
or destroyed
workplaces in
New Orleans
and other heavily
populated areas of
the northern Gulf
coast, resulting in
thousands of lost
jobs and millions
of dollars in lost
tax revenues
for the affected
communities.192
All told, 41 of
Louisiana’s 64 parishes suffered serious damage.193
Thousands of homes and businesses throughout entire
neighborhoods in the New Orleans metropolitan area
were destroyed by the fl ood. Strong winds also caused
damage in the New Orleans area, including downtown,
where windows in some high rise buildings were blown
out and the roof of the Louisiana Superdome partially
peeled away.
As of mid-January, 2006, the federal costs FEMA
reported for Louisiana were enormous. Specifi cally,
FEMA said it had provided $4 billion directly to Katrina
victims for fi nancial and housing assistance through its
Individuals and Housing Program, an amount it projected
will eventually grow to a total of $7.7 billion (including
costs from Hurricane Rita in late September 2005).194
FEMA had paid out an additional $3.1 billion in housing
assistance to victims of Katrina and Rita and projected it
will pay $17 billion in claims under the National Flood
Insurance Program to policyholders in Louisiana.
Likewise, loan activity in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita has been substantial. FEMA has approved
$539 million in Community Disaster Loans in Louisiana
for essential public services in hard-hit communities,
including a $120 million loan to the city of New
Orleans, and SBA has approved $1.3 billion in loans to
homeowners and renters and $252 million in disaster
assistance loans to businesses.195 ■
NWS predicted Karina could “make human suffering incredible by modern standards.”
AP PHOTO/CHRISTOPHER MORRIS/VII
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1 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Commodity status by site as of Aug. 28, 2005, (10:00 a.m.). 2 Press Conference with Offi cials from the Department of Homeland Security, Justice Department, Defense Department, the National Guard
Bureau, U.S. Coast Guard and FEMA, CNN, et al, Sept. 1, 2005 [hereinafter DHS Press Conference], available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/ display?theme=43&content=4779&print=true (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
3 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, in Washington, DC (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Lokey Interview].
4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Commodity status by site as of Aug. 28, 2005 (10:00 a.m.). 5 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 54-55
(statement of Michael Brown) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 6 Id. at 63-64 (statement of Michael Brown). 7 Id. at 34 (statement of Michael Brown). 8 Press Release, FEMA, Assistance Continues To Areas Impacted By Hurricane Katrina (Press Release No. HQ-05-175) (Aug. 29, 2005), available
at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease_print.fema?id=18471 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 9 Press Release, Dept. Homeland Security, United States Government Response to the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4777&print=true (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 10 Letter from Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 27, 2005); Mississippi, Emergency
and Related Determinations (FEMA-3213-EM), 70 Fed. Reg. 53,229 (Aug. 28, 2005). 11 Letter from Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 28, 2005); Mississippi, Major
Disaster and Related Determinations (FEMA-1604-DR), 70 Fed. Reg. 72,549 (Aug. 28, 2005, as amended Dec. 20, 2005). 12 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Status of Emergency Management Capability (Feb. 01, 2005). 13 See, DHS, National Incident Management System, 2 (Mar. 1, 2004) at ix, 1-4, 7, available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-
web.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) [hereinafter NIMS]. NIMS was developed by the Department of Homeland Security to implement HSPD-5, which directed DHS to develop a new national plan for managing emergencies. NIMS defi nes the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local fi rst responders during emergencies and establishes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, effi cient, and collaborative emergency event management at all levels. The concepts, principles, and processes underlying the NIMS are intended to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and fi rst-responder disciplines to work together in various areas, such as command and communications. DHS describes the NIMS ICS as the “standardized incident organizational structure for the management of all [domestic] incidents.” The ICS provides a common organizational structure for the immediate response to emergencies and involves the coordination of personnel and equipment on-site at an incident.
14 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 3 (written statement of William L. Carwile) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; see also, Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 39-40 (statement of William L. Carwile); see also, Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 33-34 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.).
15 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 5 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 16 See generally, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Preparedness and Response Timeline—Hurricane Katrina [hereinafter MS Timeline]. 17 MS Timeline at 1-2. 18 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Director’s Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA -0010688) (Aug. 28, 2005) at 3. 19 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of William L. Carwile). 20 Id. at 6 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 21 Id. at 64-65 (statement of Haley Barbour). 22 Id. at 2 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 23 MEMA Timeline at 2. 24 Id. at 3. 25 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Director’s Brief as of 0430 hours, Aug. 29, 2005 (MEMA -0010696) (Aug. 29, 2005) at 1. 26 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Director’s Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA -0010688) (Aug. 28, 2005) at 3. 27 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Director’s Brief as of 0430 hours, Aug. 29, 2005 (MEMA -0010696) (Aug. 29, 2005) at 1. 28 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Director’s Brief as of 0502 hours, Aug. 29, 2005 (MEMA -0010700) (Aug. 29, 2005) at 2. 29 Id. at 2. 30 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 22-23 (statement of Harold A. Cross), [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; see also, E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 27, 2005; 3:50 p.m.).
31 Interview by Select Comm. with Major General Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General (TAG), in Jackson, MS (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Cross Interview].
32 E-mail correspondence from Colonel Penn, Defense Co-ordination Offi ce for Mississippi, to Lt. General Russel Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 30, 2005; 7:47 a.m.); see also Mississippi National Guard Joint Force Headquarters, Operation Secure Magnolia, Hurricane Katrina Aug. 26-Present; see also, E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); see generally, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Situation Report #24 (Sept. 1, 2005; 00:35 a.m.).
33 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Major General Harold A. Cross). 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id.
76 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
38 Id. 39 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Major General Harold A. Cross); see also, E-mail
correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); see also, E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré; see also, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 4:42 a.m.).
40 E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré , Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Lt. Col. Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré; see also, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 4:42 a.m.).
41 E-mail correspondence from Lt. Col. Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:26 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from LTC Rodney Neudecker, Mississippi Sr. Army Advisor Guard, to Lt. General Russel L. Honoré; see also, Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina (Aug. 28, 2005; 4:42 a.m.).
42 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Major General Harold A. Cross). 43 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 26 (statement of Major General Harold A. Cross). 44 See generally, Daily Video Teleconferences amongst offi cials dated Aug. 25 – Sept. 4, 2005 [hereinafter “Daily VTC”]. State and local offi cials
from each of the impacted areas met daily with offi cials from, among other agencies, FEMA, and the National Hurricane Center. 45 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Toby Roth, Chief of Staff to Governor Barbour, and Dave Stewart, Policy Advisor to Governor Barbour, in
Montgomery, AL (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Roth / Stewart Interview]. 46 FEMA, Chronology and Time Line, (DHS-FEMA-070-0001256). 47 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 86 (statement Leigh
Ann Ryals) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; see also, Nov. 9, 2005 Hearing at 93 (statement Walter Dickerson). 48 Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 28, 2005). 49 Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States to Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama (Aug. 29, 2005). 50 Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 28, 2005). 51 See, Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States to Bob Riley, Governor of Alabama (Aug. 29, 2005); see, Alabama; Major
Disaster and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,540-71,541 (Aug. 29, 2005, as amended Nov. 29, 2005). 52 Level I being the highest (a declared disaster) and Level IV being the lowest (daily operating level). The AL EOP is in the process of being
revised. The State of Alabama, with a view to being NRP and NIMS compliant, has reversed its ordering of the activation levels, i.e., Level I is now Level IV. See, E-mail correspondence from Bill Filter, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Operations Department, to Select Comm. Staff (Nov. 8, 2005).
53 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Charles Williams, Division Chief of Preparedness and Tim Payne, Branch Chief Emergency Management Program Coordinate, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Williams / Payne Interview].
54 Williams / Payne Interview; see also, Roth / Stewart Interview. 55 Roth / Stewart Interview. 56 See, ALA. CODE §§ 31-9-6 (4); 31-9-8 (4); 31-9-14 and 31-9-15 (2005). 57 William / Payne Interview. 58 Id. 59 EM2000 messages from Aug. 23 through Sept. 15 were provided to the Select Comm. See generally, EM/2000 Tracker System Message Database
(Aug. 23 – Sept. 15, 2005). 60 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Donald E. Williamson, MD, Alabama State Health Director, in Montgomery, AL (Oct. 12, 2005)
[hereinafter Williamson Interview]. 61 Meeting Summaries, FEMA Regional Emergency Liaison Team Conference Calls (Aug. 28, 2005 – Sept. 02, 2005). 62 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, EM/2000 Tracker System Message 05-1839, (Aug. 29, 2005) (Doc. No. 002771AL). The AEMA
Situation Report (SitRep) #8 also contained the following: “The Department has a list of 15 facilities across the state that will house animals evacuated because of the hurricane. The list, along with contact information and type of animal is posted on the Department website as well as on the EM2000. Some of these facilities will house small animals such as dogs and cats; however, most only house horses. The total number of animals that can be accommodated is over 2,000. Late this morning it was reported that just under 100 horses were being sheltered.” Alabama Emergency Management Agency / Emergency Operation Center, Situation Report #8 (Doc. No. 000235AL) (Sept. 1, 2005).
63 Alabama Emergency Management Agency / Emergency Operation Center, Situation Report #12 (Doc. No. 000312AL) (Sept. 5, 2005). 64 Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 27, 2005). 65 Louisiana: Emergency and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (Aug. 27, 2005, as amended Sept. 7, 2005). 66 Louisiana: Emergency and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 53,238 (Aug. 27, 2005, as amended Sept. 7, 2005). 67 Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, to George W. Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 28, 2005). 68 Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations, 70 Fed. Reg. 72,458 (Aug. 29, 2005, as amended Dec. 5, 2005). 69 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LTC William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Doran Interview]; see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim Ballou, Operations Division, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Ballou Interview].
70 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex McDonald, Information Technology and Communications Director, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter McDonald Interview].
71 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug 26-28, 2005). 72 See Ballou Interview; see also, Doran Interview. 73 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Joseph B. Veillon, Louisiana National Guard Commander for Task Force Minnow, in New
Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Veillon Interview]. 74 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Maestri Interview].
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 77
75 Superdome Personnel, MREs, and Water from 28 Aug. – 3 Sept., Table: provided by staff from LA Governor Blanco’s offi ce (Dec. 2005). 76 Hearing on Rebuilding Highway and Transit Infrastructure on the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina: State and Local Offi cials Before the House
Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines, 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 1 (statement by William J. DeVille) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 T&I Hearing].
77 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-28, 2005). 78 Id. 79 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-29, 2005). 80 Id. 81 Id. 82 Id. 83 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Kopplin
Interview]. 84 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-28, 2005). 85 Id. 86 Id. 87 Maestri Interview. 88 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-29, 2005). 89 Id. 90 Id. 91 Id. 92 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9,
2005) [hereinafter Ebbert Interview]; see also, Maestri Interview. 93 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-29, 2005). 94 Table: Superdome Personnel, MREs, and Water from 28 Aug. – 3 Sept., provided by staff from Louisiana Governor Blanco’s offi ce (Dec. 2005). 95 Oct. 27, 2005 T&I Hearing (statement of William DeVille). 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Maestri Interview. 99 E-mail correspondence from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Department of Defense, et al (Aug. 19, 2005). This subject of this e-mail was a
“Severe Weather Execute Order (EXORD) for DOD Support to Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).” 100 Department of Defense OASD HD, Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline (Aug. – Sept. 2005) (Nov. 2, 2005) at 2 [hereinafter DOD
Timeline]; see also, Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement by Timothy J. Keating). 101 DOD Timeline at 2. 102 Id. at 2-3. 103 DOD Timeline at 3; see Col. Kranepuhl – Chief Operations, US Army, 1A Commander’s Hurricane Assessment (Aug. 29, 2005), First US Army
(Doc No. MMTF 00346-05) (Aug. 29, 2005); see also, Col. Kranepuhl – Chief Operations, US Army, 1A Commander’s Hurricane Assessment (Aug. 30, 2005), First US Army (Doc No. MMTF 00349-05) (Aug. 30, 2005).
104 DOD Timeline at 4. 105 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of LTG H Steven Blum). 106 United States National Guard, Hurricane Katrina: National Guard After Action Review (Dec. 21, 2005) at 1. 107 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard, in Arlington, VA, (Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Blum
Interview]; see also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LT General Daniel James, III, Director of Air National Guard, in Arlington, VA, (Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter James Interview; see also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LT General Clyde A. Vaughn, Director of Army National Guard, in Arlington, VA, (Oct. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Vaughn Interview].
108 United States National Guard, Hurricane Katrina: National Guard After Action Review (Dec. 21, 2005) at 1; see also, Blum Interview; see also, James Interview; see also, Vaughn Interview.
109 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of General Landreneau; see also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Major General Cross, State Adjutant General of MS, in Jackson, MS (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Cross Interview].
110 United States National Guard, Hurricane Katrina: National Guard After Action Review (Dec. 21, 2005) at 10. 111 See, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Field Offi cer, FEMA [hereinafter Wells Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005); see
also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Stephen Dabadie, Chief of Staff to LA Adjutant General Landrenau, LA National Guard, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Dabadie Interview].
112 Louisiana Nat’l Guard, Overview of Signifi cant Events Hurricane Katrina at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter LANG Overview]. 113 Id. at 5. 114 See, Dabadie Interview; see also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gordon Nelson, LA Dep’t of Transportation and Development, in Baton
Rouge, LA, Nov. 4, 2005 [hereinafter Nelson Interview]. 115 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Plaquemines Parish Sherriff, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 7, 2005). 116 Nelson Interview. 117 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Mark Bowen, Adjutant General, AL National Guard, in Montgomery, AL, Oct. 12, 2005 [hereinafter
Bowen Interview]. 118 Alabama National Guard, AL National Guard Katrina Response Notebook, 4-1. 119 Bowen Interview. 120 Id. 121 Alabama National Guard, AL National Guard Katrina Response Notebook, 4-1. 122 Bowen Interview.
78 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
123 Id. 124 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of General Harold A. Cross). 125 Id. 126 Briefi ng to Select Comm. Staff with US Army Corps of Engineers, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 28, 2005) at 7 [hereinafter ACE Briefi ng]; see also,
Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of Federal Agency Contracting in Disaster Preparedness Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) at 1-2 (written statement of Col. Norbert Doyle) [hereinafter Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
127 Briefi ng to Select Comm. to Invest. the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Staff with US Army Corps of Engineers, in Washington, DC (Oct. 28, 2005) at 7 [hereinafter ACE Briefi ng]; see also, Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of Federal Agency Contracting in Disaster Preparedness Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) at 1-2 (written statement of Colonel Norbert Doyle) [hereinafter Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
128 Hurricane Katrina: Who’s In Charge of the New Orleans Levees? Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Dec. 15, 2005) at 4 (statement of USACE/Col Wagenaar) [hereinafter Dec. 15, 2005 Senate Hearing].
129 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 4 (statement of USACE/Col Wagenaar). 130 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 270024Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000006) (Aug. 26, 2005; 8:24
p.m. EDT). Note: the Atlantic Area is the Portsmouth, Virginia Command. Note: this report was created at 0024 Zulu Time. Zulu Time is the same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During the summer months, the time in Portsmouth is GMT-4 hours.
131 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 270024Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000006) (Aug. 26, 2005; 8:24 p.m. EDT).
132 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 271638Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000003) (Aug. 27, 11:38 a.m. CDT). Note: District Eight is the New Orleans, Louisiana Command, which was relocated to St. Louis, Missouri during Hurricane Katrina. Note: This report was created at 1638 Zulu Time. Zulu Time is the same as Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). During the summer months, the time in St. Louis is GMT -5 hours.
133 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 11:13 p.m. CDT).
134 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 29, 2005; 12:13 a.m. EDT).
135 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:13 p.m. EDT).
136 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 290413Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004044) (Aug. 28, 2005; 11:13 p.m. EDT).
137 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
138 See generally, Hurricane Katrina: Always Ready: The Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of Rear Admiral Robert Duncan) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005 Senate Hearing].
139 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard Atlantic Area situation report, 290900Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004053) (Aug. 29, 2005; 05:00 a.m. EDT).
140 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 281534Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0002-0000008) (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:34 a.m. CDT).
141 United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard District Eight situation report, 291541Z (Doc. No. DHS-USCG-0001-0004058) (Aug. 29, 2005; 10:41 a.m. CDT).
142 Briefi ng to Select Comm. Staff with Coast Guard regarding Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 27, 2005).
143 E-mail correspondence from Carol Hall, American Red Cross, to Kirstjen M. Nielsen, et al, (Doc. No. WHK-16197) (Aug. 28, 2005; 2:48 p.m.). 144 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #7, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 5:00 p.m. at 2. 145 Id. at 3. 146 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #9, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 3:00 p.m. at 3. 147 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report #9, Aug. 28, 2005; update as of 3:00 p.m. at 2. 148 National Hurricane Center, Nat’l Weather Serv., Hurricane Katrina Discussion No. 14, (Aug. 26, 2005) (5:00 p.m. EDT). 149 National Hurricane Center, Nat’l Weather Serv., Hurricane Katrina Probabilities No. 15, (Aug. 26, 2005) (11:00 p.m. EDT). 150 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina and When Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2005),
[Hereinafter Sept. 22, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing] (statement of Max Mayfi eld). 151 Id. at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfi eld). 152 Id. at 5 (statement of Max Mayfi eld). 153`Id. at 51-52 (statement of Max Mayfi eld). 154 Id. at 52 (statement of Max Mayfi eld) 155 Id. at 51 (statement of Max Mayfi eld). 156 Id. at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfi eld). 157 Id. at 59-60 (statement of Max Mayfi eld) 158 Id. at 3 (written statement of Max Mayfi eld). 159 Id. 160 Public Advisory, National Weather Center (New Orleans, LA), Urgent Weather Message: Devastating damage expected (Aug. 28, 2005;
10:11 a.m. CDT). 161 John Pain, Federal Forecasters Got Hurricane Right, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 16, 2005. 162 Id. 163 Id.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 79
164 Id. 165 Sept. 22, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 47 (statement of Max Mayfi eld). 166 Id. at 12 (written statement of Max Mayfi eld) (reporting that Katrina made landfall as a Category 4 storm with 140 mph winds. The NHC’s
fi nal report on Katrina, released Dec. 20, revised this information. Regardless, “it was the costliest and one of the fi ve deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the United States,” the NHC report said); Richard D. Knabb, et al, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 Aug. 2005 at 1 (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter NHC Katrina Report].
167 NHC Katrina Report at 3, 7-9. 168 Id. at 11. 169 Id. 170 EM 2000 Message no. 05-1878, (Bates no. AL002716); Nov. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 30 (statement of Governor Bob Riley). 171 Garry Mitchell, Katrina’s painful blow to coast Alabama’s top story in 2005, ASSOC. PRESS, Dec. 24, 2005. 172 Id. 173 Alabama Emergency Management Agency / Emergency Operation Center, Situation Report #5 (Doc. No. 000205AL) (Aug. 30, 2005); see also,
Kathleen Koch, Katrina Drenches Mobile, CNN, Aug. 30, 2005. 174 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Katrina Disaster Aid to Alabama Surpasses $516 Million, (FEMA Release No. 1605-162) (Jan. 17, 2006)
available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=22538 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 175 NHC Katrina Report at 11. 176 Id. at 3, 7-9. Wind speed estimates calculated using KTS to mph converter at http://www.disastercenter.com/convert.htm. 177 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Director, River County EMA, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Strahan
Interview]. 178 Interview with Robert Latham, Director, MS Emergency Management Agency, in Washington, D.C. (Jan, 2006) [hereinafter Latham Interview]. 179 Virginia W. Mason, Congressional Research Service, (CRS Publication RL33141) Hurricane Katrina Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted
Areas, (Nov. 4, 2005) at 2. 180 See, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Situation Report #22 (Aug. 31, 2005; see, 12:00 p.m.); FEMA-MEMA, Joint Field
Offi ce Situation Report SITREP 30 / FEMA-1604-DR-MS (Sept. 25, 2005 07:00 a.m. – Sept., 26, 2005 06:59 a.m. 181 NHC Katrina Report at 11. 182 See Press Release, State’s agriculture exceeds $6 billion, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at
http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/051215all.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press Release, Timber industry salvages profi ts, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/ 051215forest.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press release, Katrina leaves damaged crops, fuel frustrations, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/cropreport/crop05/050902.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press release. Katrina drops poultry’s estimated farm value, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/051215poultry.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
183 See Press Release, State’s agriculture exceeds $6 billion, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/051215all.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press Release, Timber industry salvages profi ts, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/ 051215forest.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press release, Katrina leaves damaged crops, fuel frustrations, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/cropreport/crop05/050902.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006); see also, Press release. Katrina drops poultry’s estimated farm value, MS State Univ., Offi ce of Agricultural Communications, Dec 15. 2005, available at http://msucares.com/news/print/agnews/an05/051215poultry.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
184 Mississippi EMAC, Cost Tracker as of Oct. 10, 2005 (Oct. 11, 2005). 185 See, Keith Bea, The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview (Jan. 5, 2006) (CRS Publication RS21227) at 1-2. 186 See, Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), EMAC Request, MS: Katrina (unaudited draft), Nov. 3, 2005 [hereinafter EMAC
Requests]. 187 See, EMAC Requests. 188 See Federal Emergency Management Agency, Weekly Katrina Response Update for Mississippi, Jan. 6, 2006, (FEMA Release No. 1604-202)
(Jan. 17, 2006), available at http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=22242 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 189 Public Advisory, National Weather Center (New Orleans, LA), Urgent Weather Message: Devastating damage expected (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:11
a.m. CDT). 190 NHC Katrina Report at 10-11. 191 Fox News, Five Deaths Linked to Polluted Flood Water, Sept. 7, 2005, available at http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,168630,00.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2006). 192 See, Hearing After the Hurricanes: Impact on the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, Before House Budget Comm. 109th Cong. (Oct. 6, 2005) (statement
by Douglas Holtz-Eakin). 193 Dec. 14, 2005 Select. Comm. Hearing at 44 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 194 See FEMA, By the Numbers: Recovery update in Louisiana, (FEMA Release No. 1603-294) (Jan. 17, 2006) available at http://www.fema.gov/
news/newsrelease.fema?id=22551 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 195 See FEMA, By the Numbers: Recovery update in Louisiana, (FEMA Release No. 1603-294) (Jan. 17, 2006) available at http://www.fema.gov/
news/newsrelease.fema?id=22551 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
80 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“[Hurricane Exercise] Pam was so very prescient. And yet Katrina highlighted many,
many weaknesses that either were not anticipated by Pam, or were lessons learned but
not heeded.
“That’s probably the most painful thing about Katrina, and the tragic loss of life: the
foreseeability of it all.” Chairman Tom Davis
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
G E
T T
Y I M
A G
E S
/C H
R IS
G R
A Y
T H
E N
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 81
The Hurricane Pam exercise refl ected recognition by all levels of government of the dangers of a catastrophic hurricane striking New Orleans
HURRICANE PAM
One of the key planning and preparedness steps many
of the local, state, and federal offi cials involved in the
response to Katrina in Louisiana took part in was the July
2004 exercise commonly known as “Hurricane Pam.”
FEMA funded and participated in this disaster simulation
exercise in which a fi ctional, strong category three — with
qualities of a category four — hurricane named Pam hit
the New Orleans area. Emergency offi cials from 50 parish,
state, federal, and volunteer organizations faced this
scenario during the fi ve-day exercise held at the Louisiana
State Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge.1
The purpose of the exercise was to help offi cials
develop joint response plans for a catastrophic hurricane
in Louisiana. While many found the Pam exercise to
be useful in executing a better response to Katrina, the
exercise also highlighted lessons learned that were not
implemented and did not anticipate certain weaknesses
that Katrina exposed.
The Hurricane Pam scenario focused on 13 parishes
in southeast Louisiana — Ascension, Assumption,
Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard,
St. Charles, St. James, St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa,
and Terrebonne. Representatives from outside the primary
parishes, including offi cials from Mississippi’s Emergency
Management Agency (EMA), participated because hurricane
evacuation and sheltering involve communities throughout
Louisiana and into Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas.2
The Hurricane Pam exercise scenario was prescient. The
virtual storm brought sustained winds of 120 mph, up
to 20 inches of rain in parts of Southeast Louisiana, and
storm surges that topped the levees and fl ooded the New
Orleans area. The exercise assumed that:3
■ 300,000 people would not evacuate in advance;
■ 500,000 to 600,000 buildings would be destroyed;
■ Phone and sewer services would be knocked out and
chemical plants would be fl ooded;
■ 97 percent of all communications would be down;
■ About 175,000 people would be injured, 200,000
would become sick, and more than 60,000 would be
killed;
■ About 1,000 shelters would be needed for evacuees;
■ Boats and helicopters would be needed for thousands
of rescues because many residents would be stranded
by fl oodwaters;
■ A catastrophic fl ood would leave swaths of southeast
Louisiana uninhabitable for more than a year.
The Pam simulation was designed and run by a private
contractor, Baton Rouge-based Innovative Emergency
Management Inc. (IEM). FEMA issued the Request for
Proposal in 2004 asking for speedy execution of the
catastrophic planning project. IEM was awarded the
contract for more than a half million dollars in May
2004 and was told by FEMA it had 53 days to mount
the exercise. As it can take up to eight months to write
an emergency plan, 6 to 12 months to train on the plan,
and about one year to issue the report, Pam was clearly
a different type of plan in scope, execution, and timing.
According to IEM President Madhu Beriwal, Hurricane
Pam was a “planning exercise” designed to develop
usable information in a much shorter timeframe.4 FEMA
and Louisiana offi cials accelerated the planning process
because of the overwhelming consensus that a category
fi ve hurricane hitting New Orleans was one of the most
likely and devastating disaster scenarios our nation faced,
Beriwal explained.
This effort was part of FEMA’s larger initiative for
conducting catastrophic disaster planning, in which it
chose 25 disaster scenarios based on priority of risk. A
hurricane hitting New Orleans was picked as the fi rst
scenario to be studied. According to Beriwal, “We were still
fairly early in the process” of developing a formal response
plan for New Orleans when Katrina made landfall.5
In July of 2004, IEM held its fi rst workshop. The initial
eight day workshop had over 300 participants from
federal, regional, and local agencies. The fi rst three days
were dedicated to establishing the specifi cs of the disaster
82 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
scenario and pre-landfall planning, the remaining fi ve
days to post-landfall logistics.
Offi cials were presented with a hurricane scenario
designed by Louisiana State University (LSU) researchers.
Ivor Van Heerden, an LSU professor who used computer
modeling to help create a realistic hurricane, said, “It
was a slow moving category three storm, something
that could quite easily happen, and designed so that it
totally fl ooded the city, so that the participants could
try to understand the full impacts of a fl ooded New
Orleans.”6 Indeed, experts involved in the Hurricane Pam
exercise were struck by the similarity of the simulation
to the actual destructive conditions wrought by Katrina.
According to Beriwal, Pam’s slow-moving category
three “made it virtually equal in force and devastation
to Katrina’s category four based on its surge and wind
capacity.”7 And, of course, Katrina itself was later
recategorized as a strong category 3.8
During the Pam simulation, participants broke into
groups and devised responses as the disaster scenario
unfolded. The workshop focused on issues ranging from
search and rescue and temporary sheltering to unwatering,
debris removal, and medical care. Not all issues, however,
were covered in the workshop. Beriwal said while issues
related to security and communications were on the
agenda, the development of a plan to coordinate the
displacement of school children took precedence.9 Beriwal
also said the issue of pre-landfall evacuation was not
addressed, although Exercise Pam did make the basic
presumption that the state and locals were responsible for
pre-landfall evacuations. Apparently FEMA directed IEM
to emphasize post-landfall and recovery issues in the Pam
exercise as pre-landfall evacuation had always been a focal
point in prior emergency disaster planning sessions.10
The Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan
was the product of these series of workshops. The Plan
was “designed to be the fi rst step toward producing a
comprehensive hurricane response plan, jointly approved
and implemented by federal, state, and city offi cials.”11 By
January 2005, IEM sent a draft planning document to the
state and localities based on the planning derived from
the July workshop. The delivery of the draft was expedited
to give the Southeast Louisiana emergency management
planners time to prepare for the 2005 hurricane season.
Indeed, IEM scurried to make the plan available at this
early date so offi cials could use it and translate it into
individual detailed operational plans.12 Beriwal noted
the plan was not meant to provide operational detail
but rather was designed to provide general guidance,
a sort of “to do list” for state and localities.13 Beriwal
further characterized the exercise as a “work in progress.”
She described IEM’s role as “facilitator and assessors of
consequences.”14
The plan itself outlines 15 subjects that emergency
managers should address during and after a catastrophic
storm hitting New Orleans. The report is detailed in
certain respects. It includes diagrams for makeshift
loading docks to distribute water, ice, and food to storm
victims — color-coded to show where pallets, traffi c
cones, and trash bins would be placed. Yet in other places
the report is less specifi c; it does not identify, for example,
what hospitals or airports would be used.
Numerous action plans ranging from debris removal,
to sheltering, to search and rescue were developed. For
example, state transportation offi cials took the lessons
learned from the Pam exercise and previous hurricanes
and revised the state’s contrafl ow plan.15 The revisions
included making adjustments to traffi c lights, cessation
of construction, and greater coordination with the private
sector. State offi cials reported that Hurricane Pam greatly
improved the state’s contrafl ow evacuation plan.16 In
fact, federal, state, and local offi cials across the board
agreed the contra fl ow plan was a success story of Katrina’s
emergency response. Over 1.2 million were evacuated in
the 48 hours prior to landfall.17
As part of the Pam exercise, planners also identifi ed
lead and support agencies for search and rescue and
established a command structure that would include
four areas with up to 800 searchers. For example, “[t]he
search and rescue group developed a transportation
plan for getting stranded residents out of harm’s way.”18
“The medical care group reviewed and enhanced existing
plans.”19 “The medical action plan included patient
movement details and identifi ed probable locations, such
as state university campuses, where individuals would
receive care and then be transported to hospitals, special
needs shelters or regular shelters as necessary.”20
Workshops subsequent to the initial fi ve-day Hurricane
Pam exercise were held in November 2004 and August
2005. A second Hurricane Pam Exercise was planned for
the summer of 2005, but did not take place, apparently
due to lack of funding.21 Agencies had anticipated
expanding on aspects of response and recovery that were
not explored in the 2004 exercise.22
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 83
Finding: Implementation of lessons learned from Hurricane Pam was incomplete
While state and local offi cials turned some lessons from
the Hurricane Pam exercise into improvements of their
emergency plans, other important changes were not
made. State health offi cials said the exercise had helped
them better prepare for evacuation of hospital patients
and special needs people.23 Since Pam was a catastrophic
hurricane with fl ooding of New Orleans, it required
them to consider the issue of evacuating New Orleans
hospitals and the Superdome’s special needs shelter.24
Subsequent to the exercise, medical offi cials held planning
sessions focused on post-landfall care and evacuation.
The contingency plan for the medical component was
almost complete when Katrina made landfall.25 Offi cials
said although the plan was not yet fi nalized, it proved
invaluable to the response effort.26
Further, in the aftermath of Katrina, varying opinions
have surfaced as to the roles and responsibilities
established during the Hurricane Pam exercise. Some state
and parish offi cials said they saw Pam as a “contract” of
what the various parties were going to do, and the federal
government did not do the things it had committed
to doing.27 According to Dr. Walter Maestri, the
Jefferson Parish Director of Emergency Management, he
understood that FEMA may not provide help until 48-72
hours later—but then he expected help.28 That is, once the
state cleared the roads, he anticipated that FEMA trucks
would arrive with large quantities of water, food, and ice.
Although these were the parish’s planning assumptions,
he said FEMA did not get substantial relief to the parish
until 11 days after landfall.29 Dr. Maestri also said the
Hurricane Pam documentation makes it clear what FEMA
was supposed to do, but FEMA did not do those things.30
Beriwal said, however, the plan derived from the Pam
exercise was intended as a “bridging document” designed
to serve as a guide and roadmap to be used by emergency
operational offi cials at the state and local level. In other
words, it was up to state and local offi cials to take the
Plan and turn it into more detailed individual operational
plans.31
Yet, according to Scott Wells, Deputy Federal
Coordinating Offi cer from FEMA, there were several
Hurricane Pam Exercise “to do” items state or local
governments did not complete.32 For example, the state
was supposed to develop more detailed concepts and
plans in several areas: (1) search and rescue, (2) rapid
assessment teams, (3) medical evacuation, (4) sheltering
and temporary housing, (5) commodity distribution,
and (6) debris removal.33 The state’s previous Louisiana
Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
Deputy Director had laid these six areas out as priorities
for the state to work on.34 In Wells’s view, the only one
of these where the state made some progress was medical
evacuation.35
Wells also said, however, that the need to shelter
special needs people in the Superdome showed the state
and city had not taken steps (which they had agreed to do
after the Pam Exercise) to coordinate the movement and
sheltering of these people further north, away from the
Gulf.36 As a result of the exercise and subsequent planning
workshops, the state was supposed to develop “hasty
plans” to address all these areas.37 He said although he
had tried to get state offi cials to focus on these hasty plans
just before landfall, they would not do so.38 According
to Wells, the state had also agreed to learn and exercise
a unifi ed command through the incident command
system.39 Wells said the state did not do so, which led to
major command and control problems during Katrina.40
Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina highlighted many weaknesses that
either were not anticipated by the Pam exercise or perhaps
were lessons learned but simply not implemented.
For example, Hurricane Pam has been criticized for its
emphasis on managing the aftermath of the catastrophe
and not creating initiatives that would diminish the
magnitude of the catastrophe. Indeed, much of the
recrimination over the Hurricane Katrina response came
because government authorities apparently failed to have
a plan in place to assist in evacuating individuals without
transportation. Nor did they appear to have an adequate
sheltering plan in place. With Hurricane Pam’s striking
resemblance to Katrina in force and devastation, many
have been left wondering at the failure to anticipate, and
plan for, these essentials. Is a plan that leaves 300,000 in a
fl ooded city and results in 60,000 deaths acceptable? ■
84 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Press Release, Fed. Emer. Mgmt. Agency (FEMA), Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes (July 23, 2004) available at http://www.fema.gov/news/ newsrelease.fema?id=13051 (last visited Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter July 23, 2004 FEMA Press Release].
2 Id. 3 Ron Fournier and Ted Bridis, Katrina What Planners Feared; Hurricane Simulation Predicted 61,290 Dead, AP, Sept. 10, 2005 [hereinafter Sept. 10,
2005 Fournier Article]; David R. Baker, Hard Times in Big Easy Efforts Intensify to Evaluate Living, Recover Dead, SF CHRONICLE, Sept. 9, 2005. 4 Interview by Select Comm. staff with Madhu Beriwal, IEM, Inc., in Wash., DC (Jan. 6, 2006) [hereinafter Beriwal Interview]. 5 John McQuaid, ‘Hurricane Pam’ Exercise Offered glimpse of Katrina Misery, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 9, 2005. 6 Id. 7 Beriwal Interview. 8 Associated Press, Hurricane Katrina Was Weaker Than First Thought At Landfall, USA TODAY, Dec. 20, 2005 available at http://www.usatoday.
com/weather/hurricane/2005-12-20-katrina-strength_x.htm. 9 Beriwal Interview. 10 Id. 11 Sept. 10, 2005 Fournier Article. 12 Beriwal Interview. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Interview by Select Comm. staff with Gordon Nelson, LA Dep’t of Trans., in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005). 16 Id. 17 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 77
(statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA). 18 July 23, 2004 FEMA Press Release. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Beriwal Interview. 22 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, State Coordinating Offi cer, LA. Offi ce of Homeland Sec. and Emerg. Preparedness, in Baton
Rouge, LA (Nov 7, 2005). 23 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jimmy Guidry, Med. Dir., LA Dept. Health and Hospitals, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005). 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Maestri, Dir. of Emer. Mgmt., Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005). 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Beriwal Interview. 32 Interview with Select Comm. Staff, Scott Wells, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005). 33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 85
86 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“What happened to us this year, however, can only be
described as a catastrophe of Biblical proportions. We in
Louisiana know hurricanes and hurricanes know us. We
would not be here today if the levees had not failed.”
Kathleen Babineaux Blanco
Governor, State of Louisiana
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
A P
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 87
LEVEES
Summary
The levees protecting New Orleans were not built to
survive the most severe hurricanes. It was a well-known
and repeatedly documented fact that a severe hurricane
could lead to overtopping or breaching of the levees and
fl ooding of the metropolitan area. In fact, for years the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has had a written
plan for unwatering (i.e., draining) New Orleans in such
a contingency. This well-known threat was the motivation
for FEMA to sponsor the “Hurricane Pam” exercise. The
potential for Katrina to be “the Big One” and breach the
levees was also the key reason for the National Weather
Service, Governor of Louisiana, and Mayor of New
Orleans to issue such dire warnings.
Once construction of the levees was completed by
USACE, the responsibilities for operating and maintaining
the levees were split among many local organizations,
which is the standard cooperation agreement for carrying
out fl ood control projects nationwide. The costs of
constructing these projects are shared, with operation
and maintenance being a 100 percent local responsibility.
These include levee boards in each parish, as well
as separate water and sewer boards. The number of
organizations involved, and disagreements among them,
makes accountability diffuse and creates potential gaps
and weaknesses in parts of the fl ood protection system.
In one case, improvements to levee strength which may
have mitigated or prevented some of the critical breaches
that fl ooded downtown New Orleans were rejected by
the competing local organizations. There also appear to
have been lapses in both maintenance and inspections of
selected levees, including those that breached. Also, prior
to Hurricane Katrina, residents along those same levees
reported they were leaking, another potential lapse in
maintenance.
Despite the well-known importance of the levees,
and the consequences of failure, the local levee boards
responsible for maintaining and operating the levees
did not have any warning system in place. While
federal regulations require that they monitor levees
during periods of potential fl ooding, the requirement is
impractical to implement during a hurricane. In addition
to no warning system, the loss of communications and
situational awareness, and only sporadic reports of
fl ooding from a variety of sources, made it diffi cult to
confi rm that there were breaches in the levees and then
to assess the damage. These factors, as well as physical
diffi culties of getting to the breach sites, combined to
delay repair of the levee breaches.
The ultimate causes of the levee breaches, and
subsequent fl ooding of New Orleans, are yet to be
determined. At least four forensic investigations are under
way to examine scientifi c evidence and determine the
reasons for levee breaches. These include investigations by
USACE’s Engineer Research and Development Center, the
National Science Foundation (NSF), the American Society
of Civil Engineers (ASCE), and Louisiana State University
(LSU). Possible causes include (1) the design was not
appropriate for the purpose, (2) the storm exceeded levee
design standards, (3) the levees were not actually built
to the original design standards, (4) the levees were not
properly maintained, or (5) a combination of these and
other factors.
Finding: Levees protecting New Orleans were not built for the most severe hurricanes
New Orleans is protected from fl ooding by a system of levees
As noted in the BACKGROUND
chapter, hurricanes threaten the
Gulf coast every year, and New
Orleans is particularly vulnerable
because of its location and
topography.1 The majority of the
metropolitan area is below sea
level. Over the years, the city has
continued to sink, due to drainage,
subsidence, and compaction of the
soils.2 As an example of previous
damage, Hurricane Betsy brought
extensive destruction to New
Orleans when it made landfall in Louisiana in September,
1965.3 Unfortunately, many of the descriptions and
N W
S
88 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
photos from Hurricane Betsy sound and look familiar
to our nation as it considers the damage from Hurricane
Katrina, forty years later. According to USACE’s after
action report on Hurricane Betsy…
■ She left in her wake a path of devastation unparalleled
by any other storm in the recorded history of
Louisiana.4
■ Betsy inundated over 5,000 square miles in Louisiana,
including highly populated urban areas in Orleans and
St. Bernard Parishes.5
■ Extensive fl ooding was caused by overtopping and
breaching of existing protection levees in Orleans,
Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes.6
■ As Betsy’s winds and tidal surge rolled inland, entire
buildings were swept away from their foundations and
fl oated as far as 10 miles away.7
■ Betsy left 81 dead, over 17,600 injured, and caused the
evacuation of 250,000 to storm shelters.8
■ Betsy left thousands homeless in south Louisiana.
Returning refugees often found only a pile of debris
where their homes had stood just days before.9
■ Betsy left numerous towns in south Louisiana with no
means of communication.10
After Hurricane Betsy in 1965, federal and state
governments proposed a number of fl ood control projects
to deal with the threat of hurricanes and the fl ooding they
T IM
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 89
might cause in New Orleans.11 These included a
series of control structures, concrete fl oodwalls,
and levees along Lake Pontchartrain and several
other waterways.12 One of the major projects
is formally called the Lake Pontchartrain and
Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project.13
This project included levees along the Lake
Pontchartrain lakefront, the 17th Street Canal,
the London Avenue Canal, the Orleans Avenue
Canal, the Intercoastal waterway, the Industrial
Canal,14 the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, and
other areas.15 Although the project was federally
authorized, it was a joint federal, state, and local
effort with shared costs.16
Levees were designed for a “standard” hur- ricane, not the most severe hurricanes
The levees protecting New Orleans were not
designed to withstand the most severe hurricanes.
According to USACE’s plans for unwatering New
Orleans, “the hurricane protection system is not
designed for the largest storms and as a result,
the metropolitan area is vulnerable to fl ooding from
hurricane storm surges.”17 USACE originally designed
the levees around New Orleans to protect against a
hurricane intensity that might occur once every 200-300
years.18 This protection level was used by USACE, in
consultation with the U.S. Weather Bureau,19 to develop
specifi c criteria for a “standard project hurricane.”20 The
“standard project hurricane” is a statistical compilation of
many combined hurricane parameters or characteristics
intended to simulate a natural hurricane occurrence in
southeast Louisiana. The standard project hurricane was
used not only for the Lake Pontchartrain project, but also
nationwide for all hurricane protection projects where the
loss of human life is possible.21 According to USACE, the
“standard project hurricane” was used to design the New
Orleans levees and is roughly equivalent to a fast moving,
or “moderate,” category 3 hurricane.22 However, there is
no direct comparison of the “standard project hurricane”
to a specifi c category on the Saffi r-Simpson Hurricane
Scale—which did not exist when the levees were
designed.23 As shown in the table below, the “standard
project hurricane” is equivalent to a hurricane with
category 2 winds, category 3 storm surge, and category 4
barometric pressure.24
In addition, there is no “standard” hurricane — the
actual forces that levees need to withstand are a function
of several factors. According to the preliminary NSF study,
“the actual wind, wave and storm surge loadings imposed
at any location within the overall fl ood protection system
are a function of location relative to the storm, wind speed
and direction, orientation of levees, local bodies of water,
channel confi gurations, offshore contours, vegetative cover,
etc. They also vary over time, as the storm moves through
the region.”26 Similarly, USACE documents indicate that
“[o]vertopping will depend upon the intensity of the storm,
the track that the center or “eye” of the storm follows and
the speed at which it travels along the track.”27
Although the Lake Pontchartrain project is named a
hurricane “protection” project, a number of factors other
than saving lives and property are included in the design
of such projects. For example, in addition to protecting
urban and community lives and health, the design of
such projects must include environmental and economic
effects, and ensure that benefi ts of the completed project
outweigh its cost of construction.28 In discussing the
design of the Lake Pontchartrain project in a 1978
hearing, USACE District Commander for New Orleans,
Table 1: Comparison of “Standard Project Hurricane” with Saffi r Simpson Scale
“Standard Saffi r-Simpson Saffi r-Simpson Saffi r-Simpson project category 2 category 3 category 4 hurricane” hurricane hurricane hurricane
Central pressure (1) 27.6 Hg 28.50-28.91 Hg 27.91-28.47 Hg 27.17-27.88 Hg
Wind speed (2) 100 mph 96-110 mph 111-130 mph 131-155 mph
Radius of maximum winds (3) 30 miles N/A N/A N/A
Average forward speed (3) 6 knots N/A N/A N/A
Storm surge 11.2-13 feet (4) 6-8 feet 9-12 feet 13-18 feet
GAO ANALYSIS OF USACE AND NOAA DATA.25
Table Notes: The shaded areas indicate those parameters with the closest match between the standard project hurricane and the Saffi r-Simpson Scale.
(1) Central pressure is measured in inches of mercury (Hg) or millibars.
(2) Wind speed for the standard project hurricane was measured as the maximum 5-minute average wind speed. The Saffi r-Simpson Scale uses the maximum 1-minute average wind speed, a lower threshold.
(3) USACE estimated the radius of maximum winds and the average forward speed for a standard project hurricane, and the Saffi r-Simpson Scale does not take either of these parameters into account.
(4) The standard project hurricane calculated maximum surge heights for different geographic areas within the Lake Pontchartrain area. The maximum surge height for the South Shore of Lake Pontchartrain—where the 17th Street, London Avenue, and Industrial Canals are located—was estimated at 11.2 feet.
90 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Colonel Early Rush, stated “Even though economists may,
and in this case did, favor protection to a lower scale to
produce a higher ratio of benefi ts to projected costs, the
threat of loss of human life mandated using the standard
project hurricane.”29
Potential for Katrina to breach levees was well-known, leading to urgent warnings
Even with its hurricane protection system, it was common
knowledge that New Orleans was susceptible to hurricane-
caused fl ooding.30 The risks of a major hurricane and
fl ooding in New Orleans had been covered in the general
media — by Scientifi c American (October 2001) and
National Geographic (October 2004) — as well as in
emergency management literature.31 A recent article in the
Natural Hazards Observer stated:
When Hurricane Katrina came ashore on August
29, she ended decades of anticipation. There were
few hazards in the United States more studied
by scientists and engineers and there was ample
warning that a strong storm could cause the City of
New Orleans to fl ood.32
Emergency planners in the local area were particularly
knowledgeable about this potentiality. A November 2004
article in Natural Hazards Observer — written by Shirley
Laska, of the Center for Hazards Assessment, Response
and Technology, at the University of New Orleans — laid
out the hypothetical case that Hurricane Ivan had hit New
Orleans. The article cites a fi ctional situation that is now
all too real to the nation.33
New Orleans was spared, this time, but had it not
been, Hurricane Ivan would have… caused the
levees between the lake and the city to overtop
and fi ll the city “bowl” with water from lake levee
to river levee, in some places as deep as 20 feet…
Recent evacuation surveys show that two thirds of
non-evacuees with the means to evacuate chose
not to leave because they felt safe in their homes.
Other non-evacuees with means relied on cultural
traditions of not leaving or were discouraged by
negative experiences with past evacuations. Should
this disaster become a reality, it would undoubtedly
be one of the greatest disasters, if not the greatest,
to hit the United States, with estimated costs
exceeding 100 billion dollars. Survivors would have
to endure conditions never before experienced in
a North American disaster. Hurricane Ivan had the
potential to make the unthinkable a reality. Next
time New Orleans may not be so fortunate.34
Because of the well-known potential for fl ooding,
USACE has had a plan for several years for draining New
Orleans — Unwatering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area,
New Orleans, Louisiana, dated August 18, 2000. This plan
provides details on the hurricane protection system and
describes methods to get the water out after catastrophic
fl ooding from a hurricane. The premise of the plan is
that a category 4 or 5 hurricane may produce storm surge
water levels of suffi cient height to overtop the existing
protection system.35 The plan lays out a series of scenarios
that could occur, and suggests appropriate emergency
responses to unwater the area.36 For example, in one
case…
There is catastrophic fl ooding due to complete
overtopping of the levees and fl oodwalls and
inundation of the protected area. There will be
extensive and severe erosion of levees and perhaps
complete breaches. Due to the high water levels, all
of the pumping stations will probably be fl ooded
with major damages . . . . The levee districts and
drainage departments may be dysfunctional to
some degree.37
In more recent years, well before Hurricane Katrina,
questions were raised about the ability of the Lake
Pontchartrain project to withstand more powerful
hurricanes than the “standard project hurricane,” such
as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. USACE had discussed
undertaking a study of modifi cations needed to increase
the strength of the existing levees, but no formal study was
undertaken.38
As discussed earlier in the HURRICANE PAM chapter,
FEMA sponsored the “Hurricane Pam” exercise to look at
the response to and recovery from a catastrophic hurricane
hitting New Orleans and fl ooding the city. In that scenario,
“It was a slow moving Category three storm, something
that could quite easily happen, and [the exercise scenario
was] designed so that it totally fl ooded the city, so that the
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 91
participants could try to understand the full impacts of a
fl ooded New Orleans” according to Ivor Van Heerden, the
LSU professor who used computer modeling to help create
a realistic hurricane for the exercise.39 Again, the key reason
for that exercise was the well-known potential for levee
failure and catastrophic fl ooding in the metropolitan area.
As Katrina turned and began its track toward New
Orleans, the potential for the levees overtopping or
breaching and fl ooding New Orleans resulted in a number
of dire warnings from federal, state, and local offi cials. As
also discussed in the EVACUATION chapter, the National
Weather Service issued a warning on Sunday, August 28,
stating that Katrina was “a most powerful hurricane with
unprecedented strength,” that “devastating damage” was
expected, that “most of the area will be uninhabitable
for weeks,” and that there will be “human suffering
incredible by modern standards.”40 Governor Blanco
also made dire predictions, stating in several interviews
on Saturday and Sunday that fl ooding in New Orleans
was a major concern. On Saturday at approximately 8:00
p.m., she appeared on CNN and said that in New Orleans
“[t]he storm surge could bring in 15 to 20 feet of water.
[People in the city of New Orleans] will not survive that
if indeed that happens.”41 Similarly, in a news conference
on Sunday morning, Mayor Nagin said, “The storm surge
most likely will topple our levee system.”42
Finding: Responsibilities for levee operations and maintenance were diffuse
USACE oversees design and construction then turns levees over to local sponsors
Several organizations are responsible for building,
operating, and maintaining the levees surrounding
metropolitan New Orleans. USACE generally contracts
to design and build the levees.43 After construction,
USACE turns the levees over to a local sponsor.44 USACE
regulations state that once a local sponsor has accepted
a project, USACE may no longer expend federal funds
on construction or improvements. This prohibition does
not include repair after a fl ood. Federally authorized
fl ood control projects, such as the Lake Pontchartrain
project, are eligible for 100 percent federal rehabilitation
if damaged by a fl ood.45 The Mississippi River levees are
the exception to the arrangement just described. USACE
operates and maintains these levees. These levees generally
withstood Hurricane Katrina, except for a breach south of
New Orleans in Plaquemines Parish—the parish that took
the full force of Hurricane Katrina at landfall.46
The local sponsor has a number of responsibilities. In
accepting responsibilities for operations, maintenance,
repair, and rehabilitation, the local sponsor signs a
contract (called a Cooperation Agreement) agreeing to
meet specifi c standards of performance.47 This agreement
makes the local sponsor responsible for liability for
that levee.48 For most of the levees surrounding New
Orleans, the Louisiana Department of Transportation
and Development was the state entity that originally
sponsored the construction. After construction, the state
turned over control to local sponsors.49 These local
sponsors accepted completed units of the project from
1977 to 1987, depending on when the specifi c units
were completed.50 The local sponsors are responsible for
operation, maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation of the
levees when the construction of the project, or a project
unit, is complete.51
Local sponsors do not have control over all factors that could affect their parts of the levee system
The local sponsors include a variety of separate local
organizations. For example, different parts of the
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane
Protection Project, were turned over to four different
local sponsors — to include the Orleans, East Jefferson,
Lake Borgne, and Pontchartrain levee districts.52 In
addition, there are separate water and sewer districts that
are responsible for maintaining pumping stations.53 The
USACE unwatering plan notes these arrangements by
stating that, among other factors, “the political boundaries
with internal local levees have resulted in this series of
loops or bowls of low lying ground encircled by levees
and fl oodwalls. Each of these areas is served by its own
drainage collection and pumping stations.”54
The different local organizations involved had the
effect of diffusing responsibility and creating potential
weaknesses. For example, levee breaches and distress were
repeatedly noted at transition sections, where different
organizations were responsible for different pieces and
92 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
thus two different levee or wall systems joined together.
According to USACE, “[a]t sections where infrastructure
elements were designed and maintained by multiple
authorities, and their multiple protection elements came
together, the weakest (or lowest) segment or element
controlled the overall performance.”55 Similarly, a scientist
working on the NFS study, Raymond Seed, stated there
needs to be better coordination of these transition sites.56
Peter Nicholson, head of an ASCE team investigating the
levees, said in response to a question of whether transition
sections mattered:
Well, certainly we fi nd that each individual
organization will do as they see fi t, and when the
two sections of the fl ood control system operated
or owned, designed, maintained by each of those
different organizations come together, they may
be in two different manners. They may have
two different heights. They may be two different
materials.57
The different organizations also have different agendas,
and sometimes these can thwart efforts to improve
the safety of the overall system. Seed also provided an
example where USACE had suggested improvements
to the strength of the system that were rejected by the
competing organizations. According to Seed:
No one is in charge. You have got multiple
agencies, multiple organizations, some of whom
aren’t on speaking terms with each other, sharing
responsibilities for public safety. The Corps of
Engineers had asked to put fl ood gates into
the three canals, which nominally might have
mitigated and prevented the three main breaches
that did so much destruction downtown. But
they weren’t able to do that because, unique to
New Orleans, the Reclamation Districts who are
responsible for maintaining the levees are separate
from the Water and Sewage District, which does the
pumping. Ordinarily, the Reclamation District does
the dewatering pumping, which is separate from
the water system. These guys don’t get along.58
While required inspections of levees were done, some defi ciencies in maintenance were not fully addressed
Both USACE and the local sponsors have ongoing
responsibility to inspect the levees. Annual inspections are
done both independently by USACE and jointly with the
local sponsor.59 In addition, federal regulations require
local sponsors to ensure that fl ood control structures
are operating as intended and to continuously patrol
the structure to ensure no conditions exist that might
endanger it.60
Records refl ect that both USACE and the local sponsors
kept up with their responsibilities to inspect the levees.
According to USACE, in June 2005, it conducted an
inspection of the levee system jointly with the state and
local sponsors.61 In addition, GAO reviewed USACE’s
inspection reports from 2001 to 2004 for all completed
project units of the Lake Pontchartrain project. These
reports indicated the levees were inspected each year and
had received “acceptable” ratings.62
However, both the NSF-funded investigators and
USACE offi cials cited instances where brush and even trees
were growing along the 17th Street and London Avenue
canals levees, which is not allowed under the established
standards for levee protection.63 Thus, although the
records refl ect that inspections were conducted and the
levees received acceptable ratings, the records appear to
be incomplete or inaccurate. In other words, they failed to
refl ect the tree growth, and of course, neither USACE nor
the local sponsor had taken corrective actions to remove
the trees.
In addition, there was apparently seepage from one
canal before Hurricane Katrina, indicating problems had
developed in the levee after construction. Specifi cally,
residents of New Orleans who live along the 17th Street
Canal said water was leaking from the canal and seeping
into their yards months before Hurricane Katrina caused
the levee system to collapse. The leaks, they said, occurred
within several hundred feet of the levee that later failed.64
National Public Radio, which reported the story, said:
State and federal investigators say that a leak may
have been an early warning sign that the soil
beneath the levee was unstable and help explain
why it collapsed. They also say if authorities
had investigated and found that a leak was
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 93
undermining the levee, they could have shored it
up and prevented the catastrophic breach.65
National Public Radio also reported that work orders
confi rm that the Sewerage and Water Board had visited
the location of the seepage a number of times. However,
both USACE and the Orleans Levee District, with shared
responsibilities for inspecting the levees, reported that
they had not received any reports of seepage at the site.66
Finding: The lack of a warning system for breaches and other factors delayed repairs to levees
Actual levee breaches caused catastrophic fl ooding in New Orleans
Katrina made landfall as an
“extraordinarily powerful”
hurricane.67 Katrina was expected
to be a category 4 or 5 storm,
although a recent updated
analysis from the National
Weather Service concluded it
made landfall at the upper end
of a category 3 hurricane (with
estimated maximum sustained
winds of 110 knots) near Buras,
Louisiana.68 While Katrina had
weakened from its peak intensity
of category 5, it remained a very
large hurricane — the extent of
tropical-force and hurricane-force
winds were as large as predicted
when Katrina was at maximum
intensity.69 Due to Katrina’s large
size, it is possible that sustained
winds of category 4 strength
briefl y affected the extreme
southeastern tip of Louisiana.70
However, the sustained winds over
all of metropolitan New Orleans
and Lake Pontchartrain likely
remained weaker than category 3
strength.71
The storm surge, not the winds, is the most destructive
part of a hurricane,72 and Katrina produced a massive
storm surge. A precise measurement of Katrina’s storm
surge in the New Orleans area is diffi cult to measure, in
part because of the widespread failures of tide gauges.
However, various efforts are under way to make a
defi nitive determination, particularly near the levees.73
While the surge varied by location, some preliminary
estimates are that the storm surge off Lake Borgne, which
abuts New Orleans, was approximately 18-25 feet.74
One of the highest credible reports of storm surge
came from the Hancock County, Mississippi, emergency
operations center, where the storm surge was 27 feet.75
One reason for the large size of the storm surge was that
Katrina, although making landfall as a strong category 3,
had already generated large northward propagating swells
when it was a category 4 and 5 hurricane during the 24
T IM
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94 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
hours before landfall.76 One of the instrument buoys
located south of Dauphin Island, Alabama, measured
a wave height of 55 feet — which matches the largest
signifi cant wave height ever measured by such a buoy.77
Because the eye of Katrina passed just slightly to the east
of New Orleans, the hurricane threw unusually severe wind
loads and storm surges on the fl ood protection systems.78
The surge overtopped large sections of the levees during
the morning of August 29 east of New Orleans, in Orleans
and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the
Intercoastal waterway and into the Industrial Canal. The
water rise in Lake Pontchartrain strained the fl oodwalls
along the canals adjacent to its southern shore, including
the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal.79
Breaches along all of these canals led to fl ooding of 80
percent of New Orleans to depths up to 20 feet.80 The
fl ooding of central New Orleans led to the most widespread
and costly damage of the hurricane. It also led to the
diffi culties encountered by emergency responders that are
documented elsewhere in this report.
The lack of warning systems and degraded communications prevented situational awareness of the breaches in the levees, and delayed repairs
Despite the well-known importance of the levees, and the
consequences of failure, the local levee boards responsible
for maintaining and operating the levees do not have any
warning system in place.81 Federal regulations require
local sponsors to ensure that fl ood control structures are
operating as intended and to continuously patrol the
structure during fl ood periods to ensure that no conditions
exist that might endanger it.82 However, it would be
impractical to monitor the levees during a hurricane.
The Executive Director of the Orleans Levee District, Max
Hearn, stated:
As the hurricane approached, and as water levels
began to rise, District employees monitored the
water levels and patrolled the fl ood control system.
As weather conditions deteriorated and became
unsafe, the District’s employees were pulled into
sheltered areas to ride out the storm.83
Again, with the large number of local organizations
involved, it was not always clear who would be
responsible for monitoring the levees and sounding the
alarm if there was a breach. According to one scientist,
“If the lines of responsibility and who is in charge aren’t
clear, it is very hard to decide who needs to be issuing
warnings and public notices….”84
Given that Hurricane Katrina led to the loss of power
and severely degraded communications, as discussed
in the COMMUNICATIONS and COMMAND AND
CONTROL chapters, it is not clear that any warning
system would have survived or have been effective. In the
absence of communications that would have provided
situational awareness, there were many rumors of fl ooding
and its causes that had to be confi rmed before assessment
teams and repair teams could be dispatched. There were
many sources of these reports of fl ooding.
■ Monday August 29, at 6:00 a.m., fl oodwaters began
fl owing into Jackson Barracks, according to Louisiana
National Guard offi cers. Jackson Barracks is near
the Orleans Parish – St. Bernard Parish line, and the
fl oodwaters were determined later to be from the
Industrial Canal breach. By late Monday morning, the
fl oodwaters were 8-10 feet deep at Jackson Barracks,
requiring the Louisiana National Guard to abandon
their operations center and re-establish it at the
Superdome.85
■ Monday, August 29, at 7:30 a.m., the state Emergency
Operations center (EOC) received reports of fl ooding
in the last conference call before communications
were lost. Jefferson Parish relayed unconfi rmed reports
of signifi cant fl ooding in the east bank. New Orleans
reported extensive fl ooding in the east and on the lake
front. St. Bernard Parish reported “overtopping” of the
Industrial Canal and 3 feet of water in Arabi. When
the State Coordinating Offi cer (SCO) Jeff Smith asked
if those fl ooding rumors were confi rmed, the parish
deputy sheriff said they were confi rmed and noted
that his building was surrounded by white caps. Smith
also stated he was aware of 3-4 feet of fl oodwaters at
Jackson Barracks.86
■ Monday, August 29, morning (exact time unknown),
USACE district commander fi rst heard sporadic reports
about levee overtopping and breaches.87 The sources
of these early reports included local radio stations
and a USACE employee reporting overtopping at the
Industrial Canal.88 Later that day, the USACE district
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 95
commander issued a situation report, noting fl ooding
with 4-5 feet of water in Kenner (Jefferson Parish);
fl ooding with 10 feet of water in Arabi (St. Bernard
Parish); and water coming into Lakeview (New
Orleans) from the 17th Street Canal. The report also
said that there was a one-block section of the Industrial
Canal that had breached.89
■ Monday, very late evening (exact time unknown), off
duty police offi cers began calling their police stations
from their residences to report fl ooding near the 17th
Street and London Avenue Canals, according to the
New Orleans Police Department. Deputy Chief Lonnie
Swain said that these reports were the department’s fi rst
knowledge that fl ooding was moving into central New
Orleans — they had been aware of fl ooding in East
New Orleans (from Lake Pontchartrain) and the Lower
Ninth Ward (from the Industrial Canal).90
Beyond these reports known to the National Guard, the
EOC, and the New Orleans Police Department, USACE
was trying to determine the detailed status of the levee
system. However, the USACE district commander in New
Orleans also suffered from a lack of communications
capabilities.91 As noted earlier, there is no early warning
system for levee breaches in New Orleans.92 On Monday
at about 3:00 p.m., the commander and a team ventured
out to conduct early assessments of the situation. They
were unable to conduct a thorough review because of the
high winds, debris, and fl ooding. Although they had to
return to the bunker, it was clear to them at that point that
New Orleans had suffered catastrophic fl ooding and they
began to review plans for unwatering New Orleans.93
On Tuesday, August 30, at about 9:00 a.m., the USACE
district commander was able to get a helicopter and see
the extent of the fl ooding from the air.94 The USACE
district offi ce began to develop more detailed plans for
repairing the levees after the airborne reconnaissance on
August 30.95 USACE has authority to provide a variety
of emergency response actions when levees fail or are
damaged.96 Any repairs to federally constructed levees are
funded 100 percent by the federal government.97
There were also physical barriers that made assessments
and repair diffi cult. Specifi cally, emergency repair
operations to close some of the breaches were seriously
hampered by lack of access roads. USACE regulations
generally require access roads on top of levees to allow
for inspections,
maintenance, and
fl ood-fi ghting
operations, and
most USACE levees
built in the United
States meet this
requirement.98
However, in New
Orleans, exceptions
were made to these
regulations because
of its highly urban
nature. Access roads
were foregone when
it was decided to use
I-walls in the levee
crowns to minimize
right-of-ways into
surrounding neighborhoods.99 When Hurricane Katrina
led to the breaches in the levees, the lack of access roads
atop the levees resulted in very signifi cant increases in
time and cost to repair the damaged areas.
Poor communications, diffi culties in doing assessments,
and physical barriers all served to delay efforts to repair the
levees. Levee repairs did not begin until Wednesday, when
USACE began marshalling resources — such as contractors,
materials, and equipment — at the 17th Street Canal
site.100 The Louisiana National Guard was also involved
in these early efforts to conduct emergency repairs of the
17th Street Canal. That afternoon, USACE began dropping
3,000 pound sandbags into the breach.101 The next day
contractors started delivering sand, gravel, and rock to
the breach site on a newly-built access road. At both the
17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal, Army
Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters dropped 7,000 pound
sandbags—an average of 600 per day—into the breaches.
One breach took over 2,000 sandbags before engineers
could see the bags under the water surface. According to
one witness before the Select Committee, the need for sand
was so great that USACE broke into a local business and
“took” $580,000 worth of sand.102 One week later, the 17th
Street Canal breach was closed.103
Once the levee repairs were underway, USACE turned
its attention to unwatering New Orleans and other
fl ooded areas.104 Since at least 2000, USACE has had
F E
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a detailed plan for unwatering greater New Orleans in
the event of fl ooding. These unwatering plans were also
discussed in the “Hurricane Pam”exercise (discussed
previously).105 The exercise assumed the levees did not
breach, however there was fl ooding due to overtopping
which inundated New Orleans with at least 10 feet of
water. The purpose of the USACE unwatering mission was
to remove water from fl ooded areas (New Orleans), seal
off canals from Lake Pontchartrain, repair breaches, create
a series of deliberate breaches in the levee system (to help
drain them), and pump out fi nal excess with existing and
temporary pumps.106
Through an emergency contracting process, USACE
contacted four companies to complete the unwatering
activities and, according to USACE, only one company—
Shaw Environmental of Baton Rouge—could respond in
a timely manner.107 Projections made prior to Hurricane
Katrina that it would take nine weeks to unwater New
Orleans proved unfounded.108 On October 11 (43 days
after Katrina landfall) USACE reported that all fl oodwaters
had been removed from the city of New Orleans.109
Finding: Ultimate cause of levee failures is under investigation, results to be determined
Several investigations are under way to assess causes of levee failure
There are at least four ongoing “forensic” investigations
to determine the cause of the levee breaches around
New Orleans. These are being done by USACE’s Engineer
Research and Development Center; the Center for the
Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, LSU;
the National Science Foundation, and ASCE. Each of
these investigations has somewhat similar charters and
overlapping membership.110
■ Interagency Performance Evacuation Task Force (IPET).
The USACE Chief Engineer appointed the IPET, headed
by the Engineer Research and Development Center, to
examine and analyze data in a variety of areas (e.g.,
Geodetic Reference Datum, Storm and Surge Wave
Modeling, Hydrodynamic Forces). At the request of
the Secretary of Defense, the results will be analyzed
independently by ASCE and the National Research
Council.111
■ Louisiana State University (LSU). The Hurricane Center
was appointed by the State of Louisiana to lead the
state’s forensic investigation of the Hurricane Katrina
levee failures. The investigation team includes engineers
and coastal scientists conducting analysis of the storm
surge levels, levee construction, and levee failures.112
■ National Science Foundation (NSF). NSF assembled
a Levee Investigation Team consisting of leading
national and international experts in major disasters.113
Participating teams of scientists are from the University
of California, Berkeley; the Geo-Institute of ASCE; the
Coasts, Oceans, Ports and Rivers Institute of ASCE; and
the Hurricane Research Center of LSU.114
■ American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE). ASCE
assembled an independent team of experts, consisting
of professional engineers with a wide range of
geotechnical engineering expertise in the study, safety,
and inspection of dams and levees. The purpose of
the team is to collect data and make observations to
determine why certain sections of the levee system
failed and others did not.115
Preliminary results suggest some levees did not withstand forces they were designed to withstand
Some of the investigators testifi ed or released reports on
their preliminary fi ndings. For example, at a November
2, 2005, Senate Hearing, witnesses included Paul Mlakar,
of IPET; Ivor Van Heerden, of LSU; Raymond Seed of
the University of California, Berkeley, representing the
NSF; and Peter Nicholson of the University of Hawaii,
representing the ASCE.116 These witnesses (except
Mlakar) testifi ed on the preliminary fi ndings from their
investigations. In addition, the NSF and ASCE investigators
released a joint interim report, with initial fi ndings, at that
hearing.117 A month after the Senate Hearing, IPET released
an interim report with a summary of its fi eld observations,
which generally concurred with the NSF/ASCE interim
report.118 In evaluating the causes of levee and fl oodwall
failure, these preliminary reports indicated the impact of
the hurricane, and thus the potential causes of the breaches,
varied by location.119
According to preliminary information from NSF, ASCE,
and LSU, most of the levees and fl oodwall breaches on
the east side of New Orleans were caused by overtopping,
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 97
as the storm surge rose over the tops of the levees and/or
their fl oodwalls and produced erosion that subsequently
led to breaches.120 A variety of factors led to overtopping
of the Industrial Canal and the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet (MR-GO). An LSU Scientist, Hassan Madhriqui,
said that MR-GO worked as a funnel which increased
the height of the storm surge and “caused fl oodwaters to
stack up several feet higher than elsewhere in the metro
area and sharply increased the surge’s speed as it rushed
through the MR-GO and into the Industrial Canal.”121 The
overtopping eroded the backside of the canals, scoured
out the foundations, and led to their collapse and thus
major fl ooding of adjacent neighborhoods. According to
Seed, “A majority of them [levee breaches] were the result
of overtopping, and that simply means that the hurricane
was bigger than the levees were built to take….”122
In contrast, there was little or no overtopping along
most of the levees in the vicinity of Lake Pontchartrain.
The only breach along Lake Pontchartrain was in New
Orleans East, which was probably due to overtopping. But
in the drainage canals that feed into Lake Pontchartrain
— the 17th Street and London Avenue Canal — there was
no overtopping, and the failures were likely caused by
weaknesses in the foundation soil underlying the levees,
the weakness in the soils used to construct the earthen
levee embankments themselves, or weaknesses caused
by vegetation growing along the levees. These were the
most costly breaches, leading to widespread fl ooding of
central New Orleans — to include the downtown area
and several large residential neighborhoods.123 According
to Van Heerden of LSU, “the surge in Lake Pontchartrain
wasn’t that of a category 3 storm, and nor did it exceed
the design criteria of the standard project hurricane.”124
Nicholson of ASCE concurred with this assessment,
adding, “If the levees [on Lake Pontchartrain] had done
what they were designed to do, a lot of the fl ooding of
New Orleans would not have occurred, and a lot of the
suffering that occurred as a result of the fl ooding would
not have occurred.”125
However, these fi ndings are preliminary.126 Most of
the investigations will not issue their fi nal reports until
the spring or summer of 2006. For example, the USACE
IPET report is scheduled to be completed in June 2006.127
Possible causes of the levee breaches include a design not
appropriate for the actual application (indicating a shared
defi ciency), storm conditions simply too overwhelming
for the designed levees to withstand (indicating an act of
nature); levee walls not secured deeply enough into the soil
or otherwise improperly constructed (indicating a USACE
defi ciency); improper maintenance of the levees (indicating
a local defi ciency); or a combination of factors.
Conclusion
Hundreds of miles
of levees were
constructed to defend
metropolitan New
Orleans against storm
events. These levees
were not designed to
protect New Orleans
from a category 4 or
5 monster hurricane,
and all the key players
knew this. The original
specifi cations of the
levees offered protection that was limited to withstanding
the forces of a moderate hurricane. Once constructed,
the levees were turned over to local control, leaving the
USACE to make detailed plans to drain New Orleans
should it be fl ooded.
The local sponsors — a patchwork quilt of levee and
water and sewer boards —were responsible only for their
own piece of levee. It seems no federal, state, or local entity
watched over the integrity of the whole system, which
might have mitigated to some degree the effects of the
hurricane. When Hurricane Katrina came, some of the
levees breached — as many had predicted they would —
and most of New Orleans fl ooded to create untold misery.
The forces that destroyed the levees also destroyed
the ability to quickly assess damage and make repairs.
The reasons for the levee failures appear to be some
combination of nature’s wrath (the storm was just too
large) and man’s folly (an assumption that the design,
construction, and maintenance of the levees would
be fl awless). While there was no failure to predict the
inevitability and consequences of a monster hurricane
— Katrina in this case — there was a failure of initiative to
get beyond design and organizational compromises to
improve the level of protection afforded. ■
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1 See Eric S. Blake, et al., Tropical Prediction Center, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS TPC-4, The Deadliest Costliest, and Most Intense U.S. Tropical Cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (and Other Frequently Requested Hurricane Facts, (Aug. 2005) available at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/paststate.shtml (last visited Jan. 24, 2006); Anu Mittal, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO-05-1050T, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Army Corps of Engineers: Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project [hereinafter GAO Hurricane Protection Project] at 2 (Sept. 28, 2005); R.B. Seed, et al., U. of Calif. at Berkely and Am. Soc’y of Civil Engineers, Rept. No. UCB/CITRIS – 05/01, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee System in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 [hereinafter Report on Levee Performance] at 1-4 (Nov. 2, 2005) (support for subsidence); IEM, Inc., IEM/TEC04-070 r5, Southeast LA Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan [SE LA Functional Hurricane Plan] at 5 (Jan. 5, 2005).
2 U.S Army Engineer District, New Orleans, Un-watering Plan Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, LA [hereinafter Un-Watering Plan] at 1 (Aug. 18, 2000).
3 New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hurricane Betsy, September 8-11, 1965: After Action Report, 1-5 (July 1966) (Included as App. E in Un-Watering Plan).
4 Id. at 2. 5 Id. at 4. 6 Id. at 32. 7 Id. at 24. 8 Id. at 5. 9 Id. at 29. 10 Id. at 26. 11 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s In Charge of the New Orleans Levees? Before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs [hereinafter Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees], 109th Cong. (Dec. 15, 2005) at 2 (written statement of Max. L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District); Report on Levee Performance at 1-3.
12 GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 2. 13 Flood Control Act of 1965. Pub. L. No. 89-298, § 204, 79 Stat. 103, 1077 (1965) (The Flood Control Act of 1965 authorized this project). 14 The Industrial Canal is also known as the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. 15 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 1-2 (written statement of Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, Commander and District Engineer, New
Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers); GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 3. 16 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Pezza [hereinafter Pezza Interview], U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Dec. 9, 2005); GAO Hurricane
Protection Project at 3. 17 Un-Watering Plan at 1. 18 GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 4; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Release No. PA-05-08, News Release: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hurricane
Relief Support and Levee Repair, (Sept. 3, 2005) (hurricane protection projects were designed to withstand forces of a hurricane that has a 0.5 percent chance of occurrence in any given year).
19 The U.S. Weather Service is now the National Weather Service. 20 GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 4-5. 21 Hearing on Hurricane Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Before the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation Subcommittee
on Water Resources [hereinafter 1978 Hearing on Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain], 95th Congress, 45 at 16, (Jan. 5, 1978) ( statement of Col. Early Rush, District Engineer, US Army Engineer District, New Orleans) (When USACE designs fl ood protection projects, it models forces that were expected from the most severe combination of meteorological conditions reasonably characteristic of the region approaching from different paths. This is one of the reasons why, there is a great deal of variability among the heights of the different parts of the fl ood protection system).
22 USACE News Release: Levee Repair; GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 1, 4; Anu K. Mittal, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Offi ce, Pub. No. GAO-06- 322T, Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: Hurricane Protection: Statutory and Regulatory Framework for Levee Maintenance and Emergency Response for the Lake Pontchartrain Project [hereinafter GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework] at 2 (Dec. 15, 2005); Un-Watering Plan at 3.
23 GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 4-5. 24 Id. 25 Id. at 5. 26 Report on Levee Performance at 1-3, 1-4. 27 Un-Watering Plan at 6. 28 U.S. Water Resources Council, Economic and Environmental Principals for Water and Related Land Resourcess Implementation Studies at iv, vi, 12
(Mar. 10, 1983) (These guidelines apply to USACE, among other agencies, and require calculations of impact on (a) national economic development, (b) environmental quality, (c) regional economic impact, and (d) other social effects. The last category includes “urban and community impacts: life, health, safety” and others).
29 1978 Hearing on Protection Plan for Lake Pontchartrain at 16 (statement of Col. Early Rush). 30 See Eric Lipton, White House Was Told Hurricane Posed Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006 at A6. 31 William L. Waugh, Jr., The Disaster That Was Katrina, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER, Vol. XXX No. 2, Nov. 2005 at 7-8. 32 Id. 33 Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER, Vol. XXIX No. 2, Nov. 2004 at 5-6. 34 Id. 35 Un-Watering Plan at 1. 36 Id. at 7. 37 Id. 38 GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 8.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 99
39 Bob Marshall, Hurricane Pam Exercise Offered Glimpse of Katrina Misery, TIMES PICAYUNE (New Orleans) Sept. 9, 2005. 40 National Weather Service, New Orleans, LA, Urgent - Weather Message, ...Devastating Damage Expected..., 10:11 a.m. CDT (Aug. 28, 2005). 41 Interview of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, CNN Saturday Night, (Aug. 28, 2005) (8:00 p.m. ET). 42 Press Conference by C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, and Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, MSNBC, et al, Aug. 28, 2005. 43 Pezza Interview; Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 2 (written statement of Director Hearn); Report on Levee Performance at 6-1; GAO
Hurricane Protection Project at 3. 44 Pezza Interview; Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 2 (written statement of Director Hearn); Report on Levee Performance at 6-1; GAO
Hurricane Protection Project at 3. 45 33 U.S.C. §701t (2005) (They are eligible as long as they are active in USACE’s Rehabilitation Inspection Program. To be eligible, they have to
pass annual inspections by USACE, which was the case for the Lake Pontchartrain project). 46 Pezza Interview. 47 Pezza Interview; Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 3 (written statement of Director Hearn); GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory
Framework at 6. 48 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail? Before U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs [hereinafter
Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail], 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) (statement of Raymond B. Seed, Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkley).
49 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar at 2); GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 6. 50 Pezza Interview; GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 8. 51 Pezza Interview; GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 9. 52 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar at 2); GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 6. 53 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 54 Un-Watering Plan at 4. 55 Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Interim Report to Task Force Gaurdian, Summary of Field Observations Relevant to Flood Protection in
New Orleans [hereinafter Interim Report on Flood Protection in New Orleans], LA at 7 (Dec. 5, 2005). 56 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 57 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Peter Nicholson, Associate Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of
Hawaii). 58 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 59 Pezza Interview; Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 3 (written statement of Director Hearn). 60 Pezza Interview; GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 9. 61 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 2 (written statement of Col. Wagenaar). 62 GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 10. 63 Pezza Interview; Report on Levee Performance at 2-2. 64 Frank Langfi tt, Residents Say Levee Leaked Months Before Katrina National Public Radio, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, MORNING EDITION (Nov.
22, 2005) available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5022074 (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 Richard D. Knabb, et al., National Hurricane Center, Dep’t of Commerce, Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005
[hereinafter NHC: Hurricane Katrina] at 1, (Dec. 20, 2005). 68 Id. at 1. 69 Id. 70 Id. at 7. 71 Id. at 8. 72 Id. at 11; GAO Hurricane Protection Project at 2. 73 NHC: Hurricane Katrina at 8. 74 Report on Levee Performance at 1-4. 75 NHC: Hurricane Katrina at 8. 76 Id. at 9. 77 Id. 78 Report on Levee Performance at 1-2; NHC: Hurricane Katrina at 9 (Additional support that the surge severely strained the levee system). 79 NHC: Hurricane Katrina at 9. 80 Id. 81 Pezza Interview. 82 GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 9. 83 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 4 (written statement of Director Hearn). 84 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 85 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Joseph B. Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General for Air, LA Air Nat’l Guard in Baton Rouge, LA
(Nov. 3, 2005). 86 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-29, 2005). 87 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 4 (written statement of Col. Wagenaar). 88 Id. at 5. 89 Richard P. Wagenaar, Col., New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Situation report: Event Hurricane Katrina, (Aug. 29, 2005). 90 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Police Superintendent, New Orleans Police Dep’t, in New Orleans, LA, (Nov. 9,
2005). 91 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar).
100 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
92 Pezza Interview. 93 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar). 94 Id. at 5. 95 Id. at 6. 96 Flood Control Act of 1941 § 5, 33 U.S.C. § 701n (2005) (Authorizes USACE to conduct emergency operations and rehabilitation activities
when levees fail or are damaged and allows USACE to provide emergency operations to include technical assistance and direct assistance— providing sandbags and pumps, emergency contracting, and levee reinforcement. USACE administrative policies, guidance, and operating procedures for natural disaster preparedness, response, and recovery activities are set out in 33 C.F.R. Part 203 (2005).); see Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees at 3 (written statement of Col. Wagenaar); also GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 14-15.
97 GAO Hurricane Protection: Statutory Framework at 10. 98 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Manual No. 1110-2-1913, Engineering and Design: Design and Construction of Levees 8-9 (Apr. 30, 2000). 99 See Interim Report on Flood Protection in New Orleans at 12-13. 100 Lieutenant Colonel Pease, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, US Army Corps of Engineers Support to Hurricane Katrina Response, (Aug. 31, 2005). 101 Id. 102 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm Before Select Comm., 109th Cong., (Dec. 6, 2005) (statement of Harry Alford,
President, National Black Chamber of Commerce). 103 Senate Hearing: Who’s in Charge of Levees (written statement of Col. Wagenaar). 104 Id. 105 See Un-Watering Plan; SE LA Functional Hurricane Plan at 6-7. 106 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USACE/ESF#3: Hurricane Season 2005 at 23 (Oct. 28, 2005) (on fi le with the Select Comm.). 107 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government’s Use of Contractors to Prepare and Respond Before the Select Comm., 109th Cong., (Nov. 2,
2005) (written statement of Norbert Doyle, Col., Principal Assistant Responsible For Contracting (Acting), U.S. Army Corps Of Engineers). 108 Shirley Laska, What if Hurricane Ivan Had Not Missed New Orleans?, NATURAL HAZARDS OBSERVER, Vol. XXIX No. 2, Nov. 2004 at 6. 109 NHC: Hurricane Katrina at 9; see SE LA Functional Hurricane Plan at 6. 110 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman). 111 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar, Ph.D., P.E., Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army Research and
Development Center). 112 Louisiana State U. Hurricane Center, Newsbriefs, http://hurricane.lsu.edu/newsbriefs.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 113 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Peter Nicholson). 114 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 115 Report on Levee Performance at 1-1. 116 See Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail. 117 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Sen. Collins). 118 See Interim Report on Flood Protection in New Orleans. 119 Report on Levee Performance at v; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar). 120 Report on Levee Performance at iv; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden, Ph.D., Deputy Director, LA State U.
Hurricane Center). 121 Report on Levee Performance at 1-5; Matthew Brown, Katrina may mean MR-GO has to go, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 24, 2005 at 1;
Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden). 122 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of R.B. Seed). 123 Report on Levee Performance at 1-5; Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (written statement of Paul F. Mlakar) and (statement of Ivor L. van
Heerden). 124 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Ivor L. van Heerden). 125 Senate Hearing: Why Did Levees Fail (statement of Peter Nicholson). 126 Report on Levee Performance at cover, v. 127 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Release No. PA-05-18, News Release: Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force – Testing Report on Sheet Pile
Foundation Lengths in New Orleans Levees, (Dec. 9, 2005).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 101
“At the local level, I think the biggest failure was leadership didn’t take into account the fact
that poor residents had no way of evacuating. I also think Governor Blanco should have
called for a mandatory evacuation sooner and that Mayor Nagin should have coordinated
better with Amtrak.” Terrol Williams
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 2005
“We estimate that over 1 million people, or approximately 90 percent of the affected
parishes’ populations, evacuate[d] in about a 40-hour period. I don’t know of any other
evacuation that has occurred with that many people under these circumstances with that
high of percentage of people being evacuated in that short of a time period.”
Colonel (Ret.) Jeff Smith
Deputy Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness
Select Committee Hearing, December 14, 2005
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EVACUATION
Failure of complete evacuations led to preventable deaths, great suffering, and further delays in relief
Summary
Evacuation is a critical part of emergency preparation
for a hurricane. Such preparation includes both
detailed evacuation planning and implementation of
the evacuation plan in potentially affected areas once
a hurricane is projected to make landfall. The states of
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, and many of their
localities (e.g., New Orleans) have hurricane evacuation
plans and years of experience implementing them.
In Alabama and Mississippi, the state or localities
declared mandatory evacuations as Hurricane Katrina
approached, and implementation of their evacuation
plans went relatively well. In Louisiana, the state and
local implementation of evacuation plans for the general
population also went well, resulting in one of the largest
emergency evacuations in history.
Two of Louisiana’s most populous localities, New
Orleans and Jefferson Parish, declared mandatory
evacuations late or not at all. While the defi nition of
“mandatory” evacuation and the associated obligations
and liabilities that local governments assume are still
being debated, early designation of the evacuation of New
Orleans as mandatory could have increased the number of
people that left, resulting in a more complete evacuation,
saving lives, and reducing suffering. New Orleans city
offi cials, who were responsible for executing an evacuation
plan and who had the authority to commandeer resources
to assist in the evacuation, failed to evacuate or assist in the
evacuation of more than 70,000 individuals who did not
leave either before the announcement of the mandatory
evacuation or before the storm hit. Those who did not
evacuate included many who did not have their own means
of transportation. Despite the declaration of a mandatory
evacuation on Sunday before landfall, New Orleans
offi cials still did not completely evacuate the population.
Instead, they opened the Superdome as a “shelter of last
resort” for these individuals.
Problems sheltering this population, beyond
emergency planners’ general preference for evacuation,
were exacerbated by inadequate preparations for a large
population at the Superdome. For those with medical
or special needs, New Orleans and other institutions
also failed to evacuate them, but instead sheltered them
— a decision that also had negative consequences and is
discussed in detail in the MEDICAL CARE chapter. Those
individuals in all states who
had the means to evacuate, but
did not do so, must also share
the blame for the incomplete
evacuation and the diffi culties
that followed.
The failure of a more
complete evacuation led to
catastrophic circumstances
when Katrina made landfall,
particularly in New Orleans
where the force of the hurricane
breached the levee system in
multiple locations throughout
the metropolitan area. As the
resulting fl oodwaters spread
through low lying urban areas,
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104 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
thousands of people
who were trapped in
their homes climbed
to their roofs or
fl ed into fl ooded
streets. Fortunately,
thousands of these
people were saved by
a massive and heroic
search and rescue
effort. But many were
not as fortunate, and
hundreds of people
died in their homes or other locations, presumably from
drowning. Those who were in the Superdome, or those
that found shelter and high ground at other locations,
suffered horrible conditions. The fl oodwaters, which
had been anticipated and even predicted from a large
hurricane such as Katrina, furthered the misery and
delayed the immediate relief of the remaining population.
The incomplete evacuation and fl oodwaters also
required a post hurricane evacuation, for which federal,
state, and city offi cials had not prepared. Because of a
lack of preparations, planning had to be accomplished
in emergency circumstances, where communications and
situational awareness were in short supply. Requirements
for buses kept growing as a lack of willing drivers and
diversions of buses continued to delay the evacuation
of the Superdome and other locations. Finally, the
combination of more buses and supplemental airlifts
resulted in a complete evacuation of New Orleans.
Finding: Evacuations of general populations went relatively well in all three states
Evacuation is a critical part of emergency preparation for a hurricane
Because of the destructive forces of hurricanes, evacuation
planning is very important. Preparation for an approaching
hurricane includes both detailed evacuation planning and
implementation of that plan in potentially affected areas
once a hurricane is projected to make landfall. Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) offi cials told
Select Committee staff that emergency planners prefer
evacuation to sheltering people within affected areas
because the sheltered population is subject to the most
intense dangers of the storm and because it may be a slow
and diffi cult operation to get relief personnel and supplies
back into hurricane ravaged areas.
The state of Louisiana has an evacuation plan, which
was revised following Hurricane Ivan in 2004. The
evacuation for that storm had caused massive traffi c
jams leading out of New Orleans. Those traffi c jams were
the result of the
southernmost
parishes trying to
evacuate at the same
time as Orleans and
Jefferson Parishes,
the two most
populous parishes.
The new plan
called for a staged
evacuation with
the southernmost
parishes evacuating
fi rst, followed by
Lower Orleans
and Jefferson
Parishes, and then
Upper Orleans and Jefferson Parishes, facilitated by the
implementation of contrafl ow (one-way outbound traffi c)
on the highways leading out of New Orleans.1
In addition to the Louisiana state plan, local
governments have emergency evacuation plans. The City of
New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
(“New Orleans Plan”) provides: “The authority to order
the evacuation of residents threatened by an approaching
hurricane is conferred to the Governor by Louisiana
statute.”2 But this power “is also delegated to each political
subdivision of the State by Executive Order.”3
The New Orleans Plan further explains: “This authority
empowers the chief elected offi cial of New Orleans, the
Mayor of New Orleans, to order the evacuation of the
parish residents threatened by an approaching hurricane.”4
Under this authority, the Mayor of New Orleans is
responsible for giving the order for a mandatory evacuation
and supervising the actual evacuation of his population.
The Mayor’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness must
“[c]oordinate with the State . . . on elements of evacuation”
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 105
and “[a]ssist in directing the transportation of evacuees to
staging areas.”5
The importance of evacuations is expressed in the
New Orleans Plan: “The safe evacuation of threatened
populations . . . is one of the principle reasons for
developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan.”6 In furtherance of that goal, “[t]he city of New
Orleans will utilize all available resources to quickly and
safely evacuate threatened areas.”7
Mississippi also has a state evacuation plan, one that
takes account of local plans because of the key role that
counties play in declaring evacuations. According to the
testimony of the Director of the Mississippi Emergency
Management Agency (MEMA), Robert Latham, the
authority to make decisions about mandatory evacuations
in Mississippi rests with local governments.8 However,
the state is generally included in any discussions about
evacuation orders because, once a city or county chooses
to make such an order, state responsibilities for managing
traffi c (including contrafl ow) and opening shelters can
come into play.9 In preparing for Hurricane Katrina,
the Mississippi offi cials worked through the MEMA
liaisons it dispatched to the counties along or near the
Gulf Coast as well as a representative it had stationed
in Louisiana’s emergency operations center (because of
contrafl ow agreements between Mississippi and Louisiana
that provide for evacuations out of southeast Louisiana
through Mississippi).10
Alabama also has an evacuation plan and recently
revised it. Lessons learned during Alabama’s response
to Hurricanes Ivan and Dennis helped refi ne the state’s
actions as Katrina neared. Having been criticized for
triggering evacuations that turned out to be unnecessary,
Alabama offi cials practiced to reduce the time required to
reverse traffi c fl ows on the major routes and encouraged
county and local offi cials to defi ne smaller evacuation
zones within their jurisdictions to better target evacuation
actions. According to Governor Riley:
On Katrina there was an evacuation plan that was a
little more moderate than I had hoped for, and we
convinced everyone in the room to expand it. The
time before, as I said earlier, we got some criticism
because we may have expanded it too much. We have
gone back and built a zone type process. But we take
all of the local team, because you have to have local
buy-in because it won’t work if you don’t.11
Alabama state and county offi cials testifi ed that one
of their diffi culties in planning evacuations is that Army
Corps of Engineers data used as the basis for evacuation
plans and models is outdated. According to Alabama
Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) Director Bruce
Baughman:
The two coastal counties have had studies done by
the [Army] Corps of Engineers. Those studies were
about fi ve years old. In the case of Mobile County,
the data did not include the windfi elds. So it doesn’t
give you complete information when you are trying
to make decisions on clearance times …. [I]t is
based upon dated information. Baldwin County has
grown by leaps and bounds so that you have got a
higher population. And not only that, before Labor
Day, you have got probably 100,000 people … as far
as outside individuals that are tourists down in that
area, and that is not computed into your clearance
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times. What we have done is we have taken the data
that is available that is between 22 and 24 hour
clearance times for those two counties, and generally
we allow 26 to 28 hour clearance times. But that is a
best guess. What we need to do is based upon some
real time data, so other studies need to be done in
that particular area. That used to be funded out of
the Hurricane Preparedness Program, and those
studies are lagging way behind.12
Mississippi declared mandatory evacuations which generally went well
Mississippi evacuations were generally mandatory and
went relatively well. Five Mississippi counties — Hancock,
Jackson, Harrison, Stone, and Pearl River — issued
mandatory evacuation orders on or before August 28
for specifi c areas or zones of their counties and/or those
living in mobile homes.13 For example, Harrison County
fi rst issued a mandatory evacuation order for its zones A
and B, which include all of its Gulf-front and low-lying
areas, at 10 a.m. on August 28; it strongly advised, but did
not mandate, that residents in its highest elevations (zone
C) evacuate the county.14 According to Governor Haley
Barbour, he has the authority to usurp county offi cials’
decisions — that is, order a mandatory evacuation if they
have not — but he chose not to do so because county
offi cials are closer to the situation than he is.15
During the evacuation, Mississippi Department of
Transportation personnel collected and reported traffi c
fl ow information along evacuation routes, including
areas where contrafl ow was in place for those evacuating
Louisiana. At 7 p.m. on August 28, traffi c counts
were “consistently high” and the contrafl ow areas
showed a continuous increase in traffi c.16 According
to traffi c counts, by 11 p.m. that evening, traffi c along
the evacuation/contrafl ow routes had decreased
substantially.17
Rep. Gene Taylor asserted, however, that evacuation
planning ought to include providing people with gasoline,
especially at the end of the month:
The other thing that I fi nd interesting is that in all
these scenarios that I’m sure you’ve thought out,
did FEMA bother to realize that it is the 28th of
the month, a lot of people live on fi xed income,
be it a Social Security check or a retirement check,
they’ve already made their necessary purchase for the
month. What they couldn’t envision is having to fi ll
up their gas tank one more time, at almost 3 bucks
a gallon just to get the heck out of there. What I
think no one is really focused on is a heck of a lot of
people who stayed behind were people with limited
means.18
Former Undersecretary Brown strongly opposed the
suggestion that FEMA should have supplied gasoline:
Congressman, FEMA is not there to supply
gasoline, transportation; it is not the role of the
federal government to supply fi ve gallons of gas for
every individual to put in a car to go somewhere.
I personally believe that is a horrible path to go
down. And while my heart goes out to people
on fi xed incomes, it is primarily a Sate and local
responsibility.19
Whether providing gasoline should be a federal or
state and local responsibility, there may very well have
been victims of Hurricane Katrina who did not evacuate
because at the end of the month they had run out of
money for gasoline and found no other way to get
gasoline or evacute. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 107
Alabama mandatory evacuations also went relatively well
Alabama began implementing the evacuation early, and
its evacuation also went well. Even before any Alabama
evacuations began, AEMA and state transportation
offi cials participated in the FEMA regional Evacuation
Liaison Team conference calls during which emergency
managers from Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi
shared information on the status of evacuation routes,
road closures, traffi c volumes, hotel availability, and
other interstate implications of signifi cant population
migrations in the region.20
As it became clear Katrina would have a signifi cant
impact on the Alabama coast, Baldwin County emergency
management offi cials called for a voluntary evacuation
of all coastal, fl ood-prone, and low lying areas at 5 p.m.
on Saturday, August 27.21 State emergency management
offi cials asked the Governor to declare a mandatory
evacuation for threatened areas of Baldwin and Mobile
Counties on Sunday, August 28.22 According to the
announcement released by the Governor’s offi ce, “In
Baldwin County, the order calls for the evacuation of
those on Plash Island, the Fort Morgan peninsula, and
all areas south of Fort Morgan Road for Gulf Shores.
The order also calls for the evacuation of those living in
Perdido Key and south of Perdido Beach Boulevard. Those
in all low lying and fl ood-prone areas south of I-10 in
Baldwin County and those living along the Mobile Bay
Area and other water inlets also fall under the evacuation
order.”23 Governor Riley testifi ed:
. . . [W]e made it voluntary 36 hours out, and then
shortly thereafter we made it mandatory. As it comes
closer, as the cone begins to funnel in and we have
a higher likelihood that it is going to happen, we
make it mandatory. We ask people to leave. We do
everything we can to encourage them to leave. But,
again, the limiting factor is the amount of time. The
difference between trying to evacuate our beaches
before Labor Day and after Labor Day is like daylight
and dark, because we have so many more vacationers
there. And then when you layer on top of that the
number of people that will be coming out of the
Florida panhandle that will come through Alabama,
if we don’t start it three days early, you just physically
do not have the capacity to take care of it.24
Alabama did not implement reverse lane strategies
(i.e., contrafl ow) in response to Hurricane Katrina, as road
closures were limited and traffi c volume never warranted
it. The state reported 118,900 applications for evacuation
assistance by Alabama residents, of which 23,853 were by
out of state residents.25
Louisiana evacuation of general population was very successful
The Louisiana evacuation for the general population,
including contrafl ow, worked very well. Governor Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco and other state offi cials labeled the
implementation of this evacuation as “masterful” and
as one of the most successful emergency evacuations in
history.26 Based on National Weather Service reports of
Katrina’s “dramatic shift” toward Louisiana on Friday, the
state had less time than planned to prepare for contrafl ow
and had to implement it in a compressed timeframe.27
Nevertheless, the contrafl ow planning and
implementation went smoothly. The state effectively used
conference calls to coordinate among the parishes. Some
parishes declared some level of evacuation for the entire
parish as early as Saturday morning, August 27, at 9:00
a.m. These were generally the lower parishes (LaFourche,
Plaquemines, St. Bernard, and St. Charles), which was
consistent with the Louisiana state plan for getting these
populations to evacuate ahead of the metropolitan New
Orleans population.
The parishes generally started with the declaration
of a “recommended” evacuation and changed these to
a “mandatory” evacuation as Katrina got closer. The
state also coordinated closely with Mississippi and Texas
on traffi c and/or sheltering issues. For example, Friday
afternoon Blanco called Barbour to coordinate that
portion of the contrafl ow plan that involved highways
leading out of Louisiana into Mississippi, and Governor
Barbour agreed to the contrafl ow plan.28
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Finding: Despite adequate warning 56 hours before landfall, Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin delayed ordering a mandatory evacuation in New Orleans until 19 hours before landfall
Terms for voluntary and mandatory evacuations lack clear defi nitions
A wide variety of terms were used to describe the levels
of evacuation orders, indicating a lack of clarity and a
potential point of confusion for the resident population.
For example, the different parishes used a wide variety of
terms to describe the level of evacuation imposed before
declaring a mandatory evacuation. These terms included
a “precautionary” evacuation, a “voluntary” evacuation,
a “recommended” evacuation, a “highly recommended”
evacuation, and a “highly suggested” evacuation.29 It
appeared many of these offi cials were bending over
backward to avoid using the term mandatory.
Throughout our discussions in all three states, Select
Committee staff were unable to fi nd a clear and consistent
defi nition of mandatory evacuation. However, there was a
consensus among almost all offi cials in all three states that
even under a mandatory evacuation, authorities would not
forcibly remove someone from their home. For example,
in the case of Louisiana, both Blanco and LOHSEP Deputy
Director Colonel Jeff Smith emphatically rejected the idea
that people could be forcibly removed from their homes
even under a mandatory evacuation order. Blanco said,
“Well, in the United States of America you don’t force
people [out of their homes], you urge them.”30 Smith said:
“It is America. You can’t force people on to buses; you can’t
go into their houses at gunpoint and leave [sic].”31
Under Alabama state law, a mandatory evacuation
declaration by the Governor is required before counties can
take certain actions to ensure maximum compliance with
local orders by those at risk.32 But, regarding the practical
meaning and effect of “mandatory” versus “voluntary”
evacuations, Riley said:
We probably need to come up with a better
defi nition of what mandatory is. We call it a
mandatory evacuation because everyone else calls it
a mandatory evacuation. But do we arrest anyone?
No. Do we send people door to door? Absolutely.
We have a phone system, that they can explain to
you in just a moment, where we have an automated
system that calls every resident, asks them to
leave, advises them with a phone message of how
important it is. We keep doing it until we get in
touch with everyone. Do you ever get to the point
that everyone is going to leave? I don’t think so.33
Nevertheless, it is clear to the Select Committee
that declaring a mandatory evacuation delivers a more
powerful statement to the public than declaring a
voluntary or similarly worded evacuation. A mandatory
evacuation implies that individuals do not have a choice,
that the government will not be able to protect them and
provide relief if they remain, and it generally conveys a
higher level of urgency.
Federal, state, and local offi cials recognized the potential for catastrophe and fl ooding and communicated that potential among themselves and to the public
Regardless of the various terms used for evacuations, federal
offi cials fully informed Blanco and New Orleans Mayor C.
Ray Nagin about the threat to New Orleans. On the evening
of August 27, National Hurricane Center Director Max
Mayfi eld called Blanco and later spoke to Nagin about the
power of Hurricane Katrina.34 Also on Sunday, President
Bush called Blanco to express his concern for the people
of New Orleans and the dangers they faced and urged a
mandatory evacuation.35 On Sunday, the Slidell Offi ce of
the National Weather Service, issued a very strongly worded
warning at approximately 10:00 a.m.:
Devastating damage expected . . . Hurricane Katrina
. . . a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented
strength . . . rivaling the intensity of Hurricane
Camille of 1969… Most of the area will be
uninhabitable for weeks . . . perhaps longer. At least
half of well constructed homes will have roof and
wall failure. All gabled roofs will fail . . . leaving
those homes severely damaged or destroyed… Water
shortages will make human suffering incredible by
modern standards.36
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 109
State and local offi cials also urged the public to evacuate
by foretelling the potentially catastrophic consequences.
For example, beginning on Saturday, August 27, Blanco
publicly urged citizens to evacuate the city, expressing her
concern for the strength of the levees against at least a
Category 4 storm.37 In several interviews on Saturday and
Sunday, Blanco stated that fl ooding in New Orleans was a
major concern. On Saturday at approximately 8:00 p.m.,
she appeared on CNN and said that in New Orleans “[t]he
storm surge could bring in 15 to 20 feet of water. [People in
the city of New Orleans] will not survive that if indeed that
happens.”38 In the Sunday morning papers, it was reported
that she had said the water levels could reach as high as
20 feet.39 In a television interview on Sunday, Blanco was
asked if the 15 foot levees could survive the storm, and she
replied: “I don’t think anything can tolerate a storm surge
of 15-20 feet.”40
In a Fox News interview on Sunday, Nagin was very
specifi c about the threat. He said whether the levees would
hold was the “big question.”41 He said he hoped people
who stayed in the French Quarter would go up to their
homes’ second or third story and bring something to chop
through their roofs.42 He expressed his worry that “[the
levees] have never truly been tested the way they’re getting
ready to be tested. If there’s a breach and if they start to fail,
it probably will create somewhat of a domino effect which
would pour even more water into the city.”43
Blanco’s staff also called ministers on Saturday to
urge them to tell their congregations to get out.44 And
apparently, the Mayor and his staff did similar things.45
But these steps were clearly insuffi cient.
The declarations of a “mandatory” evacuation were delayed or never made in metropolitan New Orleans
Neither Blanco nor Nagin, however, ordered a mandatory
evacuation until Sunday morning. According to the
Saturday newspapers, Nagin said “he will make a decision
about evacuations and other emergency procedures
[Saturday] about noon.”46 At a news conference on
Saturday, Nagin announced: “Ladies and Gentlemen,
this is not a test. This is the real deal.”47 But as late as
Saturday afternoon, according to news reports, Nagin was
consulting city lawyers about legal liability to the city’s
businesses for lost revenue from evacuating customers.48
In addition, despite express authority to commandeer
resources and enforce or facilitate the evacuation of
the City of New Orleans and despite recognition of
the probability that Hurricane Katrina would cause
breaches of the levees and fl ooding of the city, Blanco and
Nagin did not exercise those authorities by declaring a
mandatory evacuation and enforcing it or using state and
city resources to facilitate the evacuation of those who
could not or would not, absent extraordinary measures
and assistance, evacuate. This extraordinary storm required
extraordinary measures, which the Governor and Mayor
did not take.
Finally, on Sunday morning at around 11:00 a.m.
central time — 19 hours before projected landfall, Nagin
announced the issuance of a mandatory evacuation
order.49 According to the New Orleans Plan, that gave
the Mayor the authority to “direct and compel, by any
necessary and reasonable force, the evacuation of all or
part of the population from any stricken or threatened
area within the City if he deems this action necessary
for the preservation of life, or for disaster mitigation,
response, or recovery.”50 As previously noted, the New
Orleans Plan also recognizes that “[t]he safe evacuation
of threatened populations when endangered by a major
catastrophic event is one of the principle reasons for
developing a Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan” and that “[s]pecial arrangements will be made to
evacuate persons unable to transport themselves or who
require special life saving assistance.”51
In a joint news conference on Sunday morning, Blanco
and Nagin continued to express their concerns and
explain the reason for the Mayor’s issuing a mandatory
evacuation order. Their comments raise the question as to
why, given the severity of the predicted catastrophe, the
mandatory evacuation was not ordered sooner.
Mayor Nagin: Ladies and gentlemen, I wish I had
better news for you. But we are facing a storm that most of us have feared. I do not want to create panic. But I do want the citizens to understand that
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this is very serious, and it’s of the highest nature. And
that’s why we are taking this unprecedented move.
The storm is now a Cat 5, a Category 5, as I appreciate it, with sustained winds of 150 miles an hour, with wind gusts of 190 miles per hour.
The storm surge most likely will topple our levee system. So we are preparing to deal with that also. So that’s why we’re ordering a mandatory
evacuation . . . .
. . . .
This is a once in probably a lifetime event. The
city of New Orleans has never seen a hurricane of
this strength to hit it almost directly, which is what
they’re projecting right now.52
During the press conference Blanco stated:
I want to reiterate what the mayor has said. This is
a very dangerous time. Just before we walked into this room, President Bush called and told me to share with all of you that he is very concerned about the citizens. He is concerned about the impact that this hurricane would have on our people. And he asked me to please ensure that there would be a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.
The leaders at the highest ranks of our nation have
recognized the destructive forces and the possible
awesome danger that we are in. And I just want to say, we need to get as many people out as possible. The shelters will end up probably without electricity or with minimum electricity
from generators in the end. There may be intense fl ooding that will be not in our control, which would be ultimately the most dangerous situation that many of our people could face.
Waters could be as high as 15 to 20 feet. That is
what the Miami National Weather Service, the
National Hurricane Center, has shared with us. That
would probably be ultimately the worst situation.
We’re hoping that it does not happen that way.
We need to pray, of course, very strongly, that the
hurricane force would diminish. But just remember,
even if it diminishes to 1, there were six people lost
in Florida when it was a Category 1 hurricane. So
there’s still imminent danger. There seems to be no
real relief in sight, and it has been startling to see
how accurate the path was predicted, and how it is
following the predicted path.
So we have no reason to believe right now that it
will alter its path.
Hopefully, you know, it could move just a little
bit in one direction or another and not keep New
Orleans in its sights. But we don’t know that that
would happen. That would be — we would be
blessed if that happened.53
Jefferson Parish — the other major component
of metropolitan New Orleans — never did declare a
mandatory evacuation, except for the lower parts of the
parish on the Gulf Coast. In a conference call among
parish offi cials, Jefferson Parish President Aaron Broussard
said he did not have the “resources to enforce” a
mandatory evacuation.54 Resource or enforcement issues,
however, were not raised by any of the other parishes that
declared mandatory evacuations. In addition, no one
requested that the state or federal government provide
resources to supplement those of the parish to implement
a more complete evacuation.
STATE OF LOUISIANA
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 111
Finding: The failure to order timely mandatory evacuations, Mayor Nagin’s decision to shelter but not evacuate the remaining population, and decisions of individuals led to incomplete evacuation
Earlier mandatory evacuation could have helped get more people out
While the Mayor and the Governor recognized the dangers
and expressed them to the public, they did not implement
evacuation procedures for all of the citizens of New
Orleans that refl ected the seriousness of the threat. The
results demonstrate the fl aw of the evacuation — tens of
thousands of citizens did not get out of harm’s way.
Specifi cally, the failure to order a mandatory
evacuation until Sunday, the decision to enforce that
order by “asking” people who had not evacuated to go
to checkpoints for bus service, and then using that bus
service to take people only as far as the Superdome did
not refl ect the publicly stated recognition that Hurricane
Katrina would “most likely topple [the] levee system”
and result in “intense fl ooding” and “waters as high
as 15 or 20 feet,” rendering large portions of the city
uninhabitable.55 As a result, more than 70,000 people
remained in the City to be rescued after the storm.56
While Blanco, Nagin, and Broussard, and leaders from
other parishes carefully managed the phased contrafl ow
evacuation, that only facilitated the evacuation of those
who had the means to evacuate the city. Nagin testifi ed
that, on Saturday, August 27, he “called for a strong
voluntary evacuation, urging all citizens that were able to
evacuate the city.”57 Although Nagin was rightly proud
of the achievement of the contrafl ow evacuation of the
region, he also conceded that “it probably wasn’t as good
as we — all of our citizens needed.”58
Some citizens of New Orleans believed that a
mandatory evacuation should have been called earlier and
that the government needed to assist people to evacuate.
New Orleans citizen and evacuee Doreen Keeler testifi ed,
“If a mandatory evacuation [order] would have been
called sooner, it would have been easier to move seniors
out of the area and many lives would have been saved.”59
She further testifi ed that “[g]oing to [senior citizens] with,
yo, this is a mandatory evacuation, you do not have a
choice, you have to leave, I feel would defi nitely help me
to get my senior citizens out without waiting as long as I
did in order to leave. And I think that if by some miracle
there was any type of evacuation plan available, it could
have been put into play earlier if a mandatory evacuation
had been called.”60
New Orleans citizen and community leader Dyan
French asked: “Why would you get in the public media
and ask a city, where 80 percent of its citizens ride public
transit, to evacuate? What [were] they supposed to do?
Fly?”61 New Orleans citizen and evacuee Terrol Williams
observed, “I think, unfortunately, a lot of the destruction
that we saw, that persons were unable to safely evacuate,
was because they were basically poor,”62 which was
echoed by Doreen Keeler: “They suffered through it
because they had no way of getting out.”63
New Orleans citizen and evacuee Leah Hodges
complained that “[t]he stray animals from the animal
shelter, most of whom would have been euthanized, were
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evacuated 2 days before the storm, and the people were
left to die. Buses that could have gotten our people, who
otherwise could not get out, were left to fl ood, and people
were left to die.”64 And Barbara Arnwine, Executive
Director for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights,
testifi ed: “We know that people were not able to evacuate
because some people just didn’t own cars.”65
In contrast to New Orleans, offi cials in adjoining
Plaquemines Parish cited their early declaration of a
mandatory evacuation as the key to achieving a high
evacuation rate. Plaquemines Parish President Benny
Rousselle (according to Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff
Hingle) declared a mandatory evacuation on television
at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 27.66 Sheriff’s deputies
started working the intersections to turn off traffi c lights
and expedite outbound traffi c.67 On Sunday, August 28,
Placquemines Parish Sheriff’s deputies went door-to-door
to warn people to evacuate and to identify those who
needed help doing so.68 Hingle said these efforts resulted
in Plaquemines Parish having an evacuation rate of 97 to
98 percent, which helped account for the small number of
fatalities there — only three.69
The shelter of last resort for those who could not or would not evacuate was inadequate
A critical part of evacuation planning is accounting for
those who cannot evacuate on their own, including those
without access to private transportation. State and local
emergency operations plans task transportation agencies
with primary responsibility to assemble buses and other
resources to operate this response function. For example,
Alabama’s Mobile County EOP states: “The principle
mode of transportation during an emergency situation
will be private vehicles. There will be citizens in Mobile
County that do not have private vehicles nor are able
to obtain transportation. These people will be looking
to the City and County government to provide this
emergency transportation. The Mobile County Emergency
Management Agency has been given the responsibility of
managing and coordinating this task.”70 An annex to the
Baldwin and Mobile County plans is more explicit:
Evacuation preparedness plans consider all
persons who do not have access to a private
vehicle and therefore would have to rely on public
transportation for evacuation. Local governments
attempt to arrange for adequate resources to
meet the demand for public transportation.
Planning for adequate special needs emergency
transportation for residents in private homes
is usually the responsibility of local emergency
management offi cials, while transportation for
those in health-related facilities is the responsibility
of the individual facilities. Although detailed
information concerning residents of private homes
may be diffi cult to obtain, each local government
is developing procedures for maintaining an up-
to-date roster of persons likely to need special
assistance. Non-ambulatory patients will require
transportation that can easily accommodate
wheelchairs, stretchers, and, possibly, life-sustaining
equipment. Lack of resources for these needs could
result in critical evacuation delays and increased
hazards for the evacuees. The Special Needs
population for each county changes from year to
year and requires public cooperation and assistance
to maintain an up-to-date listing.71
AP PHOTO/DAVID J. PHILLIP
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 113
Similarly, the New Orleans Plan specifi cally addresses
the issue of those without access to transportation. The
plan states that “[s]pecial arrangements will be made
to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves….
Additional personnel will be recruited to assist in
evacuation procedures as needed.”72 The New Orleans
Plan further warns that “[i]f an evacuation order is
issued without the mechanisms needed to disseminate
the information to the affected persons, then we face
the possibility of having large numbers of people either
stranded and left to the mercy of the storm, or left in areas
impacted by toxic materials.”73
Specifi cally, the New Orleans Plan provides that
“[t]ransportation will be provided to those persons
requiring public transportation from the area,” placing
the Regional Transit Authority as the lead agency for
transportation, supported by multiple federal, state, and
local agencies, including the Orleans Parish School Board,
New Orleans Equipment Maintenance Division, Louisiana
Department of Transportation, Louisiana National Guard,
Port of New Orleans, U.S. Coast Guard, New Orleans
Public Belt Railroad, and Amtrak.74 The tasks allotted to
the RTA include: “plac[ing] special vehicles on alert to
be utilized if needed[,] [p]osition[ing] supervisors and
dispatch[ing] evacuation buses [and i]f warranted by
scope of evacuation, implement[ing] additional service.”75
The New Orleans Plan expressly acknowledges that
“[a]pproximately 100,000 Citizens of New Orleans do not
have means of personal transportation.”76 Following the
mandatory evacuation order, city offi cials sent the police
and fi re department through the city “asking” people to
go to checkpoints where buses circulating through the
city would pick them up — but only to take them to the
Superdome which had been opened as a refuge of last
resort that day.77
Despite the New Orleans Plan’s acknowledgement
that there are people who cannot evacuate by themselves,
the city did not make arrangements for their evacuation.
Instead, city offi cials decided to shelter them in New
Orleans. As stated previously, emergency planners prefer
evacuation to sheltering, because the sheltered population
is subject to the most intense dangers of the storm.
Evacuation is also favored because it may be slow and
diffi cult to get relief personnel and supplies back into
hurricane ravaged areas.
In addition, New Orleans preparations for sheltering
these individuals were woefully inadequate. On Sunday
morning, New Orleans offi cials, instead of working to
move individuals out of New Orleans and out of harm’s
way, were drafting a plan to seize private facilities to
create additional “refuges of last resort.”78 Ultimately, city
offi cials designated only the Superdome as such a refuge.
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the
Superdome proved to be inadequate for the crowds that
had to take refuge there. Only at the last minute did the
City ask for food and water and medical personnel for
the Superdome. As discussed in the MEDICAL CARE
chapter, some of the federal medical assistance teams were
called in so late they did not make it to the Superdome
before landfall. On Sunday morning, the New Orleans
Director of Homeland Security, Terry Ebbert, predicted
“nightmare” conditions in the Superdome.79
Individuals share the blame for incomplete evacuation
The role of the individual was also an important factor
in metropolitan New Orleans’ incomplete evacuation. In
Louisiana, state and parish offi cials said that it is generally
the individual’s responsibility to evacuate or identify
themselves as having special needs if they need help. State
and parish offi cials noted varying degrees of cooperation
with evacuations among the individuals in the general
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population. They said many residents evacuate early on
their own, even before an evacuation is declared. These
individuals watch the weather reports when a hurricane is
in the Gulf and make their own informed choices.
Offi cials know from
experience, however, that
some percentage (from
10-25 percent) will not
evacuate. The Governor and
other state offi cials said some residents play “hurricane
roulette.”80 That is, against the advice of the authorities,
they stay and take the risk that the hurricane will hit
somewhere else or that they will be lucky and relatively
unaffected.
Select Committee staff heard similar comments
in Mississippi. Testimony from county emergency
management offi cials as well as Mississippi’s governor
indicated that “hurricane fatigue” as well as the expense
of repeatedly evacuating when storms threaten may have
caused some to not heed the mandatory evacuation
orders. For example, Barbour testifi ed that various areas
in the state had undergone mandatory evacuations for
Hurricane Ivan in 2004 and Hurricane Dennis earlier in
2005, but in both instances the storms ultimately made
landfall farther east, sparing Mississippi.81
Both state and parish offi cials in Louisiana said the
older population, some of whom might be classifi ed as
special needs, make up a substantial portion of those
playing “hurricane roulette.” They said there are a few
reasons for this. First, many of the older residents had
experience “sitting out” earlier hurricanes such as Betsy
(1965) or Camille (1969) and reasoned they could “sit
out” Katrina. Second, some of them were just “set in their
ways” and would not listen to others’ advice, even that of
their own adult children, to evacuate. In addition, Katrina
was originally headed for the Florida Panhandle, and its
turn to the west caught many residents by surprise. Finally,
it was the end of the month, when people did not have
money for gas to evacuate.82
Regardless of their reasons for not evacuating, those
that had the means to evacuate and did not do so must
share some of the blame. Many of these people paid for
their poor choices with their lives — as rising fl oodwaters
drown them in their homes. Others who stayed, but could
have left, suffered the less severe consequences of walking
through fl oodwaters to crowded shelters or other high
ground. These individuals suffered in horrible conditions
— some with shelter and food and water and some
without any of these — while they awaited evacuation,
which they could have done for themselves earlier.
Finding: The incomplete pre- landfall evacuation led to deaths, thousands of dangerous rescues, and horrible conditions for those who remained
Failure of complete evacuation resulted in hundreds of deaths and severe suffering for thousands
Contrary to Blanco’s claim that “[t]he word ‘mandatory’
doesn’t mean any more than us getting up, saying, get
out[,]”83 the delay in calling a mandatory evacuation
and not enforcing or facilitating that evacuation had
real consequences for the city and for the protection of
Some residents play “hurricane roulette.”
“Hurricane Fatigue” — May have caused some people to not heed the mandatory evacuation orders.
AP PHOTO/PAUL SANCYA
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 115
ordinary people. As noted above, many residents believed
that an earlier declaration of a mandatory evacuation
would have helped get more people out. The President of
the Louisiana Nursing Home Association also told Select
Committee staff that at least one nursing home had been
unable to evacuate its patients prelandfall because it could
not fi nd bus drivers by the time the mandatory evacuation
order was issued.84
While these warnings were suffi cient to motivate more
than a million citizens to evacuate using the state’s revised,
well-planned and executed, phased contrafl ow evacuation
plan, more than 70,000 people did not evacuate.85 Those
who did not evacuate were exposed fi rst to the dangers of
drowning in the fl ood waters after the breach of the levees
and then to deprivation of food, water, and shelter as they
awaited rescue from other locations.
The anticipated fl ooding of New Orleans, unfortunately,
occurred in an environment where a population of
more than 70,000 had not evacuated, with thousands
of these people remaining in their homes. Hundreds of
these people died as fl oodwaters enveloped low lying
neighborhoods in waters above the roof lines.86 In tours
of the affected areas, Select Committee staff noted the
debris lines from the fl oodwaters were halfway up the
roof of many single-story houses in St. Bernard Parish.
The parish Director of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness Larry Ingargiola told Select Committee
staff that during the storm, he had answered emergency
cell phone calls from desperate people trapped in their
attics, who had no way to escape the rising fl oodwaters.87
As stated before, many of these deaths were the result of
hurricane roulette — individuals making decisions not
to evacuate, or, for the poor population and those who
procrastinated, not to seek shelter in the Superdome or
other refuges of last resort in other parishes. As discussed in
the MEDICAL CARE chapter,, there were also many deaths
among those in medical and nursing home facilities.
An analysis of these deaths indicates that the fl ooding
had a broad impact across all neighborhoods in New
Orleans and the immediate surrounding parishes. The
Knight Ridder news organization, using preliminary data
from the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals,
reviewed the location, ethnicity, sex and age of the victims.
The results of their analysis were published in the Baton
Rouge Advocate newspaper on December 30, 2005.88
According to the analysis, “[t]he bodies of at least 588
people were recovered in neighborhoods that engineers
say would have remained largely dry land had the [levees]
not given way. . . .”89 However, according to Orleans
Parish coroner Dr. Frank Minyard, “[t]he cause of death
for many will never be known because their bodies were
too badly decomposed by the time they were recovered.”90
Dr. Minyard, however, did estimate that 20 percent of
Katrina’s New Orleans victims drowned,91 and scores of
others died of other causes awaiting rescue, trapped by
fl oodwaters. Similarly, St. Bernard Parish Coroner, Dr.
Bryan Bertucci, is cited as saying that most of the parish’s
123 victims drowned in their homes.92
The analysis found that the victims of Hurricane
Katrina were roughly proportionate to the pre-landfall
population (based on census data) in terms
of ethnicity, sex, and wealth. In terms of
ethnicity, the dead in New Orleans were 62
percent black, compared to 66 percent for
the total parish population.93 The dead in
St. Bernard Parish were 92 percent white,
compared to 88 percent of the total parish
population.94 The percentage of the dead
by sex was approximately the same as the
overall population.95 In terms of wealth,
the analysis found that the percentage of
dead bodies found in poorer New Orleans
and St. Bernard Parish neighborhoods—as
measured by poverty rates and median
household incomes—was roughly
equivalent to their percentage in the overall
population.96 AP PHOTO/DAVE MARTIN
116 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The fi nding about wealthier residents comports
with statements by Louisiana First Assistant Attorney
General Nicholas Gachassin, Jr. who said that many New
Orleans area residents with the wealth and the means
to evacuate and who decided not to do so paid for that
decision with their lives.97 Gachassin said that there were
approximately 250,000 vehicles left in New Orleans,
which he said demonstrated that there were many people
with the means to leave the city who chose not to do
so.98 Similarly, the Advocate article stated that “at many
of the addresses where the dead were found, their cars
remained in their driveways, fl ood-ruined symbols of fatal
miscalculation.”99
Failure of complete evacuations required heroic search and rescue efforts
The fortunate ones — among those who had stayed in
their homes — were those that were able to climb to
their roofs or fl ee into fl ooded streets. Many of these
individuals had to use tools or other objects to chop
through their roofs to escape the rising fl oodwaters.
Thousands of these people were saved by a massive and
heroic search and rescue effort. The U.S. Coast Guard
alone reported that it rescued more than 33,000.100 The
Louisiana National Guard reported initial rescues of
more than 25,000.101 These people were pulled out of
the fl oodwaters into boats or plucked from roofs into
helicopters operated by a wide array of government
agencies, non-governmental organizations, and citizen
volunteers. State rescuers included personnel from the
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, local police, and
the National Guard.102 Federal rescue personnel included
the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, and several
law enforcement agencies. All 28 of FEMA’s Urban Search
and Rescue teams (who come from a variety of states and
local governments across the nation) were also involved
in the rescues. The chapters on THE MILITARY and
LAW ENFORCEMENT have more details on the search
and rescue efforts by the military and law enforcement,
respectively.
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The massive search and rescue effort, while necessary
under the circumstances, distracted emergency managers
and diverted key assets from other critical missions.
According to National Guard offi cials involved in search
and rescue, the entire focus of Monday and Tuesday was
on saving lives; that was the Governor’s top priority.103
While the Select Committee does not question Blanco’s
urgency and priority on saving lives after the fl ooding
took place, the same urgency and priority on a more
complete evacuation of New Orleans before the fl ooding
would have saved lives. If there had been a more complete
evacuation, the number of fl ood victims requiring
search and rescue would have been greatly reduced. This
would have allowed federal, state, and local emergency
response offi cials to focus earlier on re-establishing
communications and situational awareness, and moving
commodities into hard hit parishes beyond New Orleans.
Many of the helicopters used for search and rescue could
have been utilized for these tasks.
Those in shelters or on high ground suffered through horrible conditions
Those who escaped to shelters or high ground suffered
horrible conditions at a number of locations including the
Superdome, the Convention Center, and the Cloverleaf,
where they arrived through a number of different means.
Some had walked or driven before landfall, some had
walked after the fl oodwaters reached their homes, and
some had been dropped off by search and rescue boats or
helicopters. Each of the locations had their own miserable
conditions.
New Orleans opened the Superdome as a “refuge of
last resort.”104 As such, it was set up to allow people to
survive a storm passing over; it was not intended to house,
feed, and water thousands of people for several days.
A cadre of more than 200 New Orleans Police and the
Louisiana National Guard searched all people entering the
Superdome for weapons and contraband.105 In addition,
FEMA and the National Guard had prepositioned food
and water in the Superdome, and some additional food
and water was trucked in at the last minute.106 Some of
the people arriving had listened to the Mayor’s suggestion
and had brought a three day supply of food and water,
sleeping bags, and clothes. Those who came to the
Superdome after the fl ooding brought nothing but the
clothes on their backs.
The conditions in the Superdome soon deteriorated.
The initial calm situation Sunday night changed early
Monday morning when the dome’s roof opened up and
the building lost power. While the Superdome was still
structurally sound, the hole in the roof scared people; it
made noise and water started coming in.107 The National
Guard had to suddenly move thousands of people from
the fi eld up into the seating sections.108 Later, after the
fl ooding, the power went out across the city.
Without power, the only lighting in the Superdome was
emergency lighting that ran off the emergency generator.
This was not the same as full lighting, and with no power,
the air conditioning was also not working. Related to
the power outage, the water system went out, causing
the toilets to back up, creating an awful stench that grew
progressively worse as the days wore on.
Many people could not stand the heat and smell
and gathered outside on the surrounding walkway area,
which thus became very crowded. Although the situation
was bad and deteriorating, there was never a shortage of
food and water; they were distributed twice a day at fi rst
and continuously later.109 In general, people were hot, it
smelled, and they were anxious to leave. This deteriorating
situation led to the increasing urgency among offi cials and
the population to evacuate the Superdome.110
Conditions were also unbearable in the Convention
Center. The Select Committee was unable to determine
exactly when the Convention Center became a shelter
and when offi cials became aware of the deteriorating
AP PHOTO/RON HAVIV/VII
118 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
conditions there. None of the offi cials who spoke with the
Select Committee staff were willing to take responsibility
for the operation of the Convention Center as a “shelter,”
and none claimed that they knew about the situation
until Wednesday morning or afternoon, August 31.
While these offi cials stated that the Convention Center
was never designated as a shelter like the Superdome,
Mayor Nagin’s testimony suggested that the city had
sanctioned that location. In his prepared statement, the
mayor stated that “[t]he swelling crowd at the Superdome
and the number of people needing shelter required us to
open the Convention Center as another refuge.”111 Brown
was widely criticized for saying on Thursday night that
he only found out that afternoon about the people at the
Convention Center.112 Late that same night, however, the
city of New Orleans fi nally requested that the National
Guard secure and evacuate the Convention Center in
conjunction with the New Orleans Police Department the
next day.113
People initially went to the Convention Center after the
breaches of the levees late Monday night or early Tuesday
morning. As the fl oodwaters rose, people left their homes
and headed for higher ground. The Convention Center is
near the Mississippi River levee, one of the higher elevations
in New Orleans. The National Guard estimated that there
were 19,000 people there.114 Conditions in the Convention
Center were notably worse than the Superdome in several
ways. Like the Superdome, the Convention Center had
no electrical power, no lighting, no air conditioning, and
no functioning toilets. But unlike the Superdome, the
Convention Center had no authorities or security on hand,
no weapon screening, no food and no water.115
Other high ground spots became spontaneous gathering
points with miserable conditions. Many people went to
these locations on their own, because their houses were
fl ooded and they were looking for dry land. In addition,
many people were dropped off at these sites by rescuers.
Because of initial emphasis on saving lives, people were
just dumped off there by helicopters or boats without any
initial concerns for providing them with food or water.
Unlike the Superdome or the Convention Center, there
was no shelter from the sweltering sun. Specifi c locations
AP PHOTO/DAVID J. PHILLIP
AP PHOTO/ERIC GAY
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 119
where evacuees found themselves included the Cloverleaf
(where two highways met), the Industrial Canal levees,
the Mississippi River levees, and Broad Street levees. These
locations had generally not been manned with security
personnel such as police, nor had there been any plans to
supply them with food, water, or medical treatment.
The “Cloverleaf” on the interstate was one of the worst
locations. The site was being used for medical triage
and evacuation, so there was initially some food and
water there, at least for the medical patients. However,
additional people arrived on their own or by the
helicopters or boats that rescued them from the water. The
supply of food and water was not suffi cient for the crowd,
which eventually grew to 6,000-7,000 people.116
Flooding further hampered relief efforts for those not initially evacuating
Efforts to provide relief to those stranded at the
Superdome, Convention Center, the Cloverleaf, and
other positions of high ground were stymied by the
fl oodwaters. Simple tasks, such as trucking food and
water to these locations, were complicated by fl ooded
highways that necessitated the use of high clearance
vehicles or long detours. Some of these sites were very
diffi cult to supply or evacuate later because they were
“islands” completely surrounded by water. As mentioned
in the COMMUNICATIONS and the COMMAND AND
CONTROL chapters, the lack of communications,
situational awareness, command and control, and
effective logistics systems further hampered efforts to
identify many of these locations and coordinate relief.
The fl oodwaters also complicated efforts to conduct a post
landfall evacuation, as discussed in the next section.
Finding: Federal, state, and local offi cials’ failure to anticipate the post-landfall conditions delayed post-landfall evacuation and support
Federal, state, and local offi cials had not prepared for post landfall evacuation despite predictions of extensive fl ooding
While these victims endured horrendous conditions,
hundreds of city buses and school buses that could have
been used for evacuation sat useless, fl ooded or without
drivers. Nagin testifi ed that the school buses belong to
the New Orleans school district and, to his credit, he is
now considering a cooperative agreement with the school
district to move the school buses out of the area for the
next storm.117 Nagin also testifi ed that the RTA buses were
“always staged, or have been staged, in an area that has
been high and dry throughout every storm that has ever hit
the City of New Orleans; and we expected the same for this
event. Unfortunately, those buses fl ooded also because 80
percent of the city went under water.”118 He testifi ed that he
had had trouble getting drivers even for the 20 buses that
had taken residents to the Superdome prelandfall “because
most [drivers] had evacuated” and that the National Guard
was not available to drive buses.119
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120 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
By the time Hurricane Katrina made landfall at 6:10
a.m. central time on Monday, August 29, approximately
10-12,000 people were sheltered in the Superdome.120 The
massive fl ooding led to urgent search and rescue operations
throughout the city and in other parishes as well. Those
search and rescue operations moved tens of thousands
of people off of their roofs and out of the fl ood waters to
shelter or high ground. As the fl ood waters rose, people
also self-evacuated from the city to the Superdome, the
Convention Center, and other high ground around the city.
As previously noted, the Governor and the Mayor were
well aware of the probability of levee breaches and fl ooding
in New Orleans following a Category 4 or 5 hurricane.
Federal offi cials were also aware of that probability.
When Brown was asked by Select Committee Member
Congressman Hal Rogers: “Was it known by you and others
that the fl ood wall around New Orleans was only rated to
take a category 3 hurricane,”121 he replied, “Yes. That was
a fact that came out in [the Hurricane Pam Exercise] that
the levees may or may not hold, that the storm surge may
or may not top them, they could top — the storm surge
could top the levees without breaking and they could top
and also break the levees. So we knew both of those were
potential.”122 As Vice Mayor of Newport News, Virginia,
and city planner Charles Allen testifi ed before the Select
Committee: “[I]t is clear from information in the news
that the U.S. Government, in the form of the U.S. Weather
Service [sic], the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
and the U.S. Corps of Engineers [sic] understood the
magnitude of this storm.”123
Planning for the post landfall evacuation had to be done in emergency environment
Despite the advance knowledge of extensive fl ooding,
the fi rst task order for buses by the federal government to
evacuate New Orleans post landfall was not issued until
1:30 a.m. on Wednesday, August 31.124 Although Blanco
claims that Brown told her that he had 500 buses standing
by and that she was concerned when those buses did not
materialize sooner,125 the Select Committee found no
other evidence that any such buses were, in fact, “standing
by” or that Brown had made such a statement to Blanco.
Developing a plan to evacuate the Superdome and
other locations after the fl ooding was a complicated
endeavor. That planning included determining the
number of buses needed, accessible routes to the
Superdome and other locations, security needs, and
the ultimate destination of those evacuated. This
planning occurred in a highly degraded environment
that included limited communications that prevented
a full understanding of the scope of the needs and
even the visibility of deployed resources. Repeatedly,
during the daily video teleconferences, state and federal
offi cials expressed their frustrations with the level of
communications.126
In assessing the needs for the Superdome alone,
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Spot
Report Number 30, prepared at 2:00 a.m. on Wednesday,
August 31, (even after the federal task order for buses)
refl ects that (1) there are 12-15,000 people at the
Superdome, (2) the water is not rising as rapidly as
previously feared, (3) the loss of electricity does not
appear imminent, (3) the intention was to begin
evacuations that day and continue them over the next few
days, (4) alternate shelters have not been identifi ed, and
(5) two days of food and water is on hand.127 According
to that document, neither the means of egress to the
buses for the Superdome population nor the alternative
location to which they would be evacuated had been
determined.128 Options for egress from the Superdome
included walking once the State Police can verify a
route, constructing temporary bridging, “construct[ing]
a sandbag dyke to allow for walk[ing] out,” “us[ing]
DOD landing craft to shuttle . . . to buses,” and using
helicopters for short fl ights to buses.129 Alternative shelters
included “stadiums in the State college system but other
options are possible.”130 As we now know, many of the
buses took people to the Astrodome in Houston. But as of
Wednesday morning, FEMA offi cials were still concerned
that Blanco had not spoken to Texas Governor Rick Perry
to confi rm that part of the plan.131
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The planning process for the post-landfall evacuation
did not really begin until Tuesday, August 30. Blanco
testifi ed that she did not realize the full consequences of
the levee breaches until Tuesday morning, when she was
able to travel to New Orleans and see the effects of the
fl ooding for those sheltered in the Superdome.132 At the
noon video teleconference, Smith asks only that
[Y]ou realize what’s going on and the sense of
urgency here needs to be ratcheted up. Everybody
is being fully cooperative, but in the deployment
of some of these Federal assets, especially
transportation for the evacuation effort that we’re
trying to coordinate, we don’t need anything to
slow that down. The push of the resources and so
forth to date has not been an issue, but we don’t
need to let it become an issues [sic] because we’re
going to literally have tens of thousands of people
that we’ve got to push these supplies too [sic].133
Later that day and into the evening, FEMA offi cial Phil
Parr and others sheltered in the Superdome, apparently
unaware of the evacuation planning at the EOC, began
their own planning to evacuate the Superdome as they
observed the rising waters around the building and
realized that people would not be able to walk out of the
dome and return home.134 According to Parr, the team
inside the Superdome devised a plan involving the use of
helicopters to airlift people away from the Superdome.
They concluded that they needed at least nine helicopters,
of which the Louisiana National Guard had three.135
They communicated this plan to the FEMA Regional
Response Center (FEMA RRC) in Denton, Texas and got
initial approval for it, with the RRC searching for the assets
to implement it.136 They believed their plan would have
been able to move virtually all of the evacuees from the
Superdome at that time in about 30 hours.137 The next day,
Parr learned that Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina
Lt. General Russel L. Honoré had stopped that plan as he
came to Louisiana to lead Joint Task Force Katrina.138
At the same time, there remained some doubt about the
consequences of the levee breaches. General Don Riley of
the Army Corps of Engineers reported at the noon video
teleconference on Tuesday, August 30, that “[t]he lake
[Pontchartrain] level may recede quickly enough before
we can get anything in there [to fi ll the breach] and then
we can turn that pump station on with the city and turn
that water around and pump it back into the lake.139
FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) Bill Lokey
discussed at the same video teleconference that they were
“developing the distribution plan [for commodities] that
we can get them out to the communities as the water does
recede in some areas . . . .”140 The FEMA Acting Director for
Response during Hurricane Katrina, Ed Buikema, also said
that on Tuesday and Wednesday, August 30 and 31, there
was still some hope that the breaches in the levees could be
repaired quickly.141
By the Wednesday, noon video teleconference, the
numbers at the Superdome had swollen to approximately
23,000.142 Reggie Johnson from the U.S. Department of
Transportation reported that there were 455 buses under
contract and “it looks like we’ve got about 200 that are
currently in place, with the remainder that should be
coming in on a staggered basis.”143 The next day, Johnson
reported:
120 buses . . . departed for [the] Houston
Astrodome last night. And there are 300 buses in the
New Orleans area. You may not see those because
actually they’re staging at what’s called the Poker
Palace Texaco refueling site, and that’s in a place in
Louisiana, and I understand that they are
drawing down from that site. They’re bringing in
about 40 buses at a time. There are 155 buses that
were requested, and they are en route and should
arrive at the truck stop by midnight tonight. We have
not received any other requests . . . .144
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Blanco also attempted to deploy state resources. She
issued an executive order on August 31 to commandeer
school buses to assist in the evacuation.145 While these
buses could handle short trips (such as to the airport or
other local shelters), they were not appropriate for long
trips, such as the trip to Houston.
Lack of willing drivers and diversions of buses further delayed Superdome evacuation
But even as the buses were arriving there were further
delays. There was evidence that drivers refused to
drive into New Orleans because of perceived security
problems.146 Although the state had found 100 school
buses, the drivers, according to Smith, “are little old ladies,
and I don’t blame them, they don’t want to go and drive
in and do evacuations.”147 He added that 100 military
police had just arrived at Belle Chasse Naval Air Station
right across from the Superdome and that two Chinooks
with National Guard MPs were arriving.148
In addition, there were concerns that drivers had
to meet the requirements for limiting hours of service
between rests. In that same video teleconference, Smith
reported that the Governor would waive the commercial
drivers license requirements.149 DOT’s Johnson advised
that he would “coordinate with the bus companies to
ensure that we can start doubling up on the drivers.”150
Smith responded to this report by advising that they were
about to run out of buses and that he had just made a
new request for 500 buses.151
Finally, the buses for the Superdome did not always get
to the Superdome. Parr said that the Governor diverted
some buses from the Superdome to other locations like
the Cloverleaf and other high ground where, unlike
the Superdome, there was no food, water, or shelter.152
Buikema agreed that buses that were intended for the
Superdome actually picked people up off the highway and
fi lled up before getting to the Superdome.153
Strangely, the video teleconference transcripts never
refer to evacuating the Convention Center. At one point,
Smith seems to recognize that the evacuation problem is
broader than the Superdome, when he says on September
1, “I would ask you to quit referring to evacuation from
the Superdome, but maybe an evacuation from the greater
New Orleans area from the Superdome.”154
The insatiable demand for more buses was a constant source of frustration
On September 2, Smith expressed substantial frustration
with the number of available buses: “I’ve got 2500 people
on Algiers Point right now, which is not right in the
downtown area, that we could be sending missions to and
getting off. Those people have been on levees for a day
and a half. Get us the transportation assets with drivers,
and we’ll start making that happen quicker and more
effectively, and I told you all that yesterday.155 But by
September 2, DOT’s Johnson reported that of apparently
1,100 buses in the system, “800 of those buses . . . are
actually operating throughout.”156 Despite having 1,100
buses operating, DOT recognized at that time that it
“appears that what we’re going to have to do is increase
the amount of buses from the 1,100 to an additional
5-600 buses for their operation.”157 But DOT had no
“visibility of how many buses [were] right now within the
state of Louisiana and getting close to staging areas.”158
Louisiana National Guard General Graham, who was
coordinating the bus evacuation for the state reported that
there were 40 commercial buses “on the ground.”159
Despite the large number of buses deployed, there
were still not enough. Some delays were inherent in the
system. DOT’s Johnson related that buses were delayed at
“chokepoints” at their destinations where it takes three to
four hours to unload at times.160 And Graham reported
that buses would be held up to allow drivers to rest:
“Many bus drivers have driven a long way and must rest
prior to driving.”161 These factors alone could not have
accounted for the shortage. More likely, the degraded
environment prevented Smith and other federal offi cials
from realizing the full scope of the need for evacuation by
bus that even 1,100 buses could not satisfy.
Although the state had found 100 school buses, the drivers, according to Smith, “are little old ladies, and I don’t blame them, they don’t want to go and drive in and do evacuations.”
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 123
Airlift operations supplemented evacuations by the buses
The effort to evacuate New Orleans was greatly facilitated
by the establishment of an air evacuation component
at the New Orleans International Airport. This activity
required signifi cant coordination regarding obtaining
aircraft and crews, passenger screening, security (crowd
control), air traffi c control, passenger boarding,
availability of passengers for departure, and itinerary
management. According to Air Transport Association
(ATA) offi cials, late Thursday, September 1, Deputy
Secretary Michael Jackson called the ATA President Jim
May and said they had 25,000 people who needed to
be evacuated.162 That night, airplanes from Washington,
D.C. were in transit to New Orleans.163 Friday morning,
planes started arriving with Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) offi cials, fl ight crews, volunteers,
and supplies. Planes were loaded around the clock from
that weekend through most of the following week. A total
of 13,000 evacuees were moved using 129 airplanes.164
Despite their overall success, airlift operations needed
to feed into an overall management system. There
were times when the military and the private carriers
were duplicating efforts. Moreover, the coordination
of all the parts was complex. For example, there were
no pre-existing contracts in place for air support.165
Landstar asked carriers like Delta, Jet Blue, Spirit, and
approximately a dozen commercial airlines for help.166
These airlines provided planes (“hot spares” or back-up
planes) fl ight crews, and additional staff, asking at most
for jet fuel reimbursement. In the future airlines may be
interested in entering into a Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)
program (a contractual program where civil airlines
augment military operations during a crisis in exchange
for Defense Department business).
Conclusion
None of this had to
happen. The potential
effects of a Category
4 or 5 storm were
predictable and were
in fact predicted.
Declarations of
mandatory evacuations
— declarations that
could have resulted in a more complete evacuation — were
delayed or not done at all. New Orleans’ decision to shelter
instead of evacuate the population, as well as individuals’
reluctance to leave, further resulted in an incomplete
evacuation. The thousands of people left in New Orleans
suffered death or had to be rescued to await an evacuation
that should have already occurred before landfall.
Regarding
the post landfall
evacuation,
neither the New
Orleans Plan
nor the state’s
Emergency
Plan expressly
provided for the
protection of vital transportation assets to evacuate the
City after fl ooding. State and local offi cials also failed to
prepare for such an eventuality, regardless of the plans.
Nor did the expert federal agency anticipate the needs
of the state and city to bring to bear immediate relief. As
DHS Secretary Chertoff observed, planning was not what
it should be at DHS.167 Despite years of recognition of
the threat that was to materialize in Hurricane Katrina,
no one — not the federal government, not the state
government, and not the local government — seems to
have planned for an evacuation of the city from fl ooding
through breached levees. Having failed to anticipate these
needs, poor communications that hampered situational
awareness, hours of service limits, security needs, and
logistical problems further delayed the deployment of
buses to evacuate the city. ■
F E
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F E
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S TA
T E
O F
L O
U IS
IA N
A
124 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 State of LA and U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide [hereinafter LA Evacuation Flyer]; see also, State of LA, Emergency Operations Plan, (Apr. 2005) [hereinafter LA State Plan]; Supplement 1A: Emergency Operations Plan: Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan (Rev. Jan. 2000) [hereinafter LA State Evacuation Plan].
2 City of New Orleans, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, (2004) at 51 [hereinafter New Orleans Plan]. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 54. 6 Id. at 48. 7 Id. at 50. 8 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 63-64 (statements
by Haley Barbour, Governor of MS, and Robert R. Latham, Jr., Exec. Dir., MS EMA) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 9 Id. 10 Id. at 34 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr., Exec. Dir., MS EMA). 11 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 46 (statement of Bob
Riley, Governor of AL) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 12 Id. at 122-123 (statement of Bruce Baughman, Dir., AEMA). 13 Director’s Brief, Director of MS Emergency Management Agency, Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA -0010688) (Aug. 28, 2005) at 3. 14 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of Brent Warr); see also id. at 157 (statement of Benjamin J. Spraggins, Dir., Harrison
County EMA). 15 Id. at 64, 74 (statement of Haley Barbour). 16 Director’s Brief, Director of Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Brief as of 1900 hours, Aug. 28, 2005 (MEMA -0010688) (Aug. 28,
2005) at 3. 17 See generally, Director’s Brief, Director of Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, Brief as of 0430 hours, Aug. 29, 2005 (MEMA -0010696)
(Aug. 29, 2005). 18 September 27 hearing at 68-9. 19 Id. at 70. 20 Meeting Summaries, FEMA Regional Emergency Liaison Team Conference Calls (Aug. 28, 2005 – Sept. 02, 2005). 21 Baldwin County, AL, Hurricane Katrina Time Line of Events (Doc. No. 002553AL). The notation on the Time Line reads “volunteer
evacuation” which Select Comm. Staff interpreted as a “voluntary evacuation.” 22 Memo to Files, Alabama Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1675, (Aug. 28, 2005). Two days before the
request for a mandatory evacuation in Alabama, AEMA offi cials had already requested transportation assistance for purposes of coordinating evacuation traffi c fl ow out of Florida. Memo to Files, Alabama Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1611, (created Aug. 26, 2005; completed Aug. 28, 2005).
23 Press Release, Offi ce of Gov. of AL, Governor Riley Orders Evacuation for Parts of Mobile and Baldwin Counties (Doc. No. 002580AL); Press Release, Offi ce of Gov. of AL, Governor Riley Orders Evacuation for Parts of Mobile and Baldwin Counties (Aug. 28, 2005), available at http:// www.governorpress.alabama.gov/pr/pr-2005-08-28-02-katrina_evac_order.asp (last visited Jan 21, 2006).
24 Nov. 9, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 28 (statement of Bob Riley). 25 Memo to Files, Evacuee Population Presently in AL by County as of 9/28/05, AL Emergency Management Agency (Oct. 10, 2005) (Doc. No.
002576AL). 26 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm.,109th Cong. (2005) at 67 (statement
of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco) (Blanco: “I am very happy to talk about our evacuation process, because it is the one thing that we did masterfully.”) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; id. at 94 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA) (Chairman Davis: “This was the most successful evacuation you ever had, right?” Blanco: “Absolutely without a doubt.”).
27 Id. at 68-69 (statement of Jeff Smith, State Coordinating Offi cer and Deputy Dir., LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness).
28 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 61 (statement of Haley Barbour). 29 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-28, 2005). 30 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 138 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 31 Id. at 88 (statement of Jeff Smith). However, despite this insistence that forcing people out of their homes prelandfall was not an option,
it was apparently still a very live option post landfall and may have been carried out, even if not ordered. See E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 4, 2005) (10:33 a.m.) (“Appears state is reluctant to execute a true mandatory evacuation – i.e., forced if necessary. Therefore, State is pushing for shelters (includes all life support) in [New Orleans] to house citizens that will not leave voluntarily.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (9:13 a.m.) (“Governor Blanco has decided not to force any evacuations in New Orleans. Resident are still encouraged to evacuate. Buses were sent through NO on previously in deifi ed evac routes today and no additional residents would board buses for voluntary evacuation. It appears that the evacuation phase of operations is winding down, or may be completed. Since FEMA did not anticipate reversal of decision for mandatory evacuation, crisis-action planning is now underway to provide this support.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (10:04 a.m.) (“Evacuations are slowing to a trickle.”); see E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, Military Assistant to then FEMA Director Michael Brown, to Michael Brown, et al. (Sept. 6, 2005) (11:17 a.m.) (“Decision by Governor Blanco to not force any evacuations in New Orleans remains in place. Mayor of New Orleans is not forcing evacuations in NO and is not prohibiting residents from returning. Residents are still strongly encouraged to evacuate. . . . [S]ince NO is not being fully evacuated, requirements exist to provide all commodities to the remaining population.”). See also Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from inside the Storm Before Select
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 125
Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 18 (statement of Terrol Williams) (“I was [in my mother’s home] for about a week until September 8th or so, at which point a rescue crew comprised of State and local police as well as armed military offi cers forced me to evacuate. They arrived in a truck and two tanks and confi scated my weapons. I didn’t resist them, and the offi cers weren’t rough with me . . . . The rescue team took me to the Convention Center . . . . and from there I was immediately taken by helicopter to the airport. The next morning I was put on a Delta 757 airplane. . . . Passengers weren’t told where they were going until after the plane had taken off.”) [hereinafter Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
32 See ALA. CODE §§ 31-9-6 (4); 31-9-8 (4); 31-9-14 and 31-9-15 (2005). 33 Id. at 22 (statement of Bob Riley). 34 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 65 (statement of Hal Rogers) (“Saturday evening at 7:30, Max Mayfi eld, the head of the National
Hurricane Warning Center, personally, for the second time in his 36-year career, personally, called the mayor [of New Orleans] and the [Louisiana] Governor, all the Governors, by phone to reiterate the severity of this upcoming storm. 8 p.m., Mayfi eld telephones Mayor Nagin.”); see also id. at 72 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco) (“On Saturday morning, indeed, Max Mayfi eld didn’t call until – in fact he didn’t call until Saturday night.”).
35 Press Conference by C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, and Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of LA, MSNBC, et al. Aug. 28, 2005 (Blanco: “Just before we walked into this room, President Bush called . . . and asked me to please ensure that there would be a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.”) [hereinafter Nagin-Blanco Press Conference].
36 Public Advisory, National Weather Center (New Orleans, LA), Urgent Weather Message: Devastating damage expected (Aug. 28, 2005; 10:11 a.m. CDT).
37 Interview of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, CNN Saturday Night, (Aug. 28, 2005) (8:00 p.m. ET) (Blanco: “We are very concerned about the people in the City of New Orleans and some of the people in the region as well, who have not actually gotten the message. They went to bed last night thinking the hurricane was going to Florida. And some have just gotten busy in their day and not gotten – you know, had any media contact, and don’t even know this is happening. So, we’re hoping that by tonight, that they’re watching you and getting the message that it’s a real threat. It’s very serious. We want them to get out of town.”).
38 Id. 39 Gordon Russell, Ground Zero, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans), Aug. 29, 2005 at 1. 40 Interview of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, ABC News Good Morning America, (Aug. 28, 2005). 41 Interview of C. Ray Nagin, At Large with Geraldo Rivera, Fox News Channel, (Aug. 28, 2005) (10:00 p.m. ET). 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 74 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 45 Id. 46 Mark Schleifstein, Katrina Puts End to Lull, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans) Aug. 27, 2005 at 1. 47 Bruce Nolan, Katrina Takes Aim, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans) Aug. 28, 2005 at 1. 48 Id. 49 Nagin-Blanco Press Conference. 50 New Orleans Plan at 12. 51 Id. at 48, 50. 52 Nagin-Blanco Press Conference (emphasis supplied). 53 Id. (emphasis supplied). 54 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 28, 2005) (12:00 p.m.)
(statement of Aaron Broussard). 55 Nagin-Blanco Press Conference. 56 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Jeff Smith). This fi gure was arrived at based upon the reported number of individuals
evacuated by offi cials from New Orleans. 57 Id. at 162 (statement of C. Ray Nagin). 58 Id. 59 Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 23 (statement of Doreen Keeler). 60 Id. 90 (statement of Doreen Keeler). 61 Id. at 49-50 (statement of Dyan French). 62 Id. at 61 (statement of Terrol Williams). 63 Id. (statement of Doreen Keeler). 64 Id. at 64 (statement of Leah Hodges). 65 Id. at 137-138 (statement of Barbara Arnwine). 66 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Sherriff Hingle, Plaquemines Parish Sherriff, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 7, 2005). 67 Id. 68 Id. 69 Id. 70 Mobile County, AL, Comprehensive Emergency Operations Plan, Mobile County Emergency Mgmt. Agency (July 1, 2004) at ESF1-11. 71 Baldwin County, Emergency Operations Plan, Annex O: “Alabama Hurricane Evacuation Study, Technical Data Report for Mobile and Baldwin
Counties” (May 2001). 72 New Orleans Plan at 50. 73 Id. at 45. 74 Id. at 50, 24. 75 Id. at 54. 76 Id. at 55.
126 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
77 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 172 (statement of Terry Ebbert, Dir. of Homeland Security, City of New Orleans). 78 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-28, 2005). 79 Id. (statement of Terry Ebbert). 80 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 73 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 81 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 62 (statement of Haley Barbour). 82 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 67-69
(statements of Michael Brown and Gene Taylor) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 83 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 74 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 84 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Joseph Donchesse (Pres., LA Nursing Home Assoc.) in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005). 85 See generally Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Jeff Smith). 86 John Simerman, Breaches took toll: N.O. ruin greatly increased, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge) Dec. 31, 2005 at 1A, 8A [hereinafter Breaches Article]. 87 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Larry Ingargiola, St. Bernard Parish Director of Homeland Security and Emergency Prepaedness, in St.
Bernard Parish, LA (Nov. 3, 2005). 88 Breaches Article, 1A; see also, Knight Ridder Tribune News, Most Katrina Victims Older; many white, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge) Dec. 30, 2005 at
9A [hereinafter Analysis Article]. 89 Breaches Article at 1A. 90 Breaches Article at 8A. 91 Id. 92 Id. 93 Analysis Article at 9A. 94 Id. 95 Id. 96 Id. (“The comparison showed that 42 percent of the bodies found in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes were recovered in neighborhoods with
poverty rates higher than 30 percent. That’s only slightly higher than the 39 percent of residents who lived in such neighborhoods, according to the census data. Similarly, 31 percent of the bodies turned up in areas with poverty rates below 15 percent, where 30 percent of the population lived. The median household income in neighborhoods where Katrina victims were recovered was about $27,000 a year, just under the $29,000 median for the overall area. One-fourth of Katrina deaths fell in census tracts with median incomes above $35,300. One-fourth of the area’s pre-storm population lived in tracts with median incomes above $37,000.”).
97 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Nicholas Gachassin, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, LA Department of Justice, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005).
98 Id. 99 Analysis Article at A3. 100 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) at 2 (written statement of R. Dennis Sirois), [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; see also id. at 37 (statement of R. Dennis Siros).
101 LA Nat. Guard, Overview of Signifi cant Events Hurricane Katrina at 23-24 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter LANG Overview]. 102 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Jeff Smith). 103 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Brod Veillon, LA National Guard Commander for Task Force Minnow, in New Orleans, LA
(Nov. 3, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Colonel Barry Keeling, LA National Guard Commander of Task Force Eagle, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005).
104 Nagin-Blanco Press Conference (Nagin: “At noon today, the Superdome will then be opened up as a refuge of last resort, where we will start to take citizens that cannot evacuate.”).
105 LANG Overview at 6. 106 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jacques Thibodeaux (LtC, LA Nat’l Guard) in New Orleans (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Thibodeaux
Interview]; see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Mark Mouton (Col, LA Nat’l Guard) in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Mouton Interview]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells (Field Offi cer, FEMA) in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Wells Interview]; see also E-mail correspondence from David Passey (Dep’t Homeland Security) to Cindy Taylor (Dep’t Homeland Security), et al. (Aug. 28, 2005) (Doc. No. DHS 007265) (“Seven trucks (5 water and 2 MREs) are less than 2 hours away from the Superdome.”).
107 Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview. 108 Id. 109 Id. 110 Id. 111 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of C. Ray Nagin). 112 See FEMA Chief Mike Brown (NPR: All Things Considered broadcast, Sept. 5, 2005) (playing audio clip from CNN interview by Paula Zahn,
CNN anchor, and Michael Brown, FEMA Director: “Mr. MICHAEL BROWN (FEMA Director): We just learned about that today. And so I have directed that we have all available resources to get to that Convention Center to make certain that they have the food and water. And I’ll tell you...
Ms. PAULA ZAHN (CNN): But, sir, you’re not telling me that you just...
Mr. BROWN: ...also—and I will tell you...
Ms. ZAHN: ...learned that the folks at the Convention Center didn’t have food and water until today are you?
Mr. BROWN: Paula, the federal government did not even know about the Convention Center people until today [Thursday, Sept. 2,
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 127
2005].”); see NBC Today Show (NBC television broadcast Sept. 10, 2005) (New Orleans co-host, Lester Holt: “That’s right Campbell. If you’ll recall, Michael Brown, the head of FEMA, acknowledged it was about 24 hours after those fi rst TV reports of people holed up here [the New Orleans Convention Center] without food, in need of water, that he found out about it. That opened him up to a lot of criticism.”); see, Editorial Opinion, Bush: First the Head of FEMA; Would you trust your safety to Michael Brown?, DAILY NEWS (Phila.), Sept. 7, 2005, at 17 (“Here was a clueless bureaucrat [Mr. Brown] who didn’t seem to believe the horror stories coming out of the New Orleans convention center.”); see, Leadership: Some tragedy avoidable, CHARLESTON GAZ. (W. Va.), Sept. 3, 2005, at 4A (“FEMA Director Michael Brown admitted that he did not know until Thursday that thousands of people had been stranded at the New Orleans Convention Center for days without water of foods, as well as in the Superdome. How could he not know? Anyone listening to local radio knew.”).
113 LA Nat. Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events Hurricane Katrina at 7 (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter LANG Timeline]. 114 Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview; LANG Overview at 23-24. 115 Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview. 116 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gordon Mitchell (LA State Police) in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005). 117 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 200, 202 (statement of C. Ray Nagin). It is important to remember, however, that the school district is
already a support agency for transportation under the New Orleans Plan. 118 Id. at 201 (statement of C. Ray Nagin). There was evidence that a portion of the RTA bus fl eet was saved by being moved to the wharf by the
Mississippi River. Email from Leo Bosner to Linda Mammett-Morgan, et. al., transmitting Final Version DHS 0230 Situation Report input for Sept. 2, 2005, Doc. No. DHS-FEMA-0051-03122-03151 at 03128 (Sept. 02, 2005). According to RTA General Manager William DeVille, 197 of the RTA’s 372 buses were destroyed. Hearing on Rebuilding Highway and Transit Infrastructure on the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Katrina: State and Local Offi cials Before House Subcomm. on Highways, Transit and Pipelines of the Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of William J. DeVille). Whether the buses were available or not, no drivers were apparently available.
119 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 201 (statement of C. Ray Nagin). 120 Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview. 121 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 57 (statement of Rep. Hal Rogers). 122 Id. at 58 (statement of Michael Brown). 123 Dec. 6, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 107 (statement of Charles Allen). 124 E-mail correspondence from Tony Robinson, Response and Recover Division Director, FEMA, to Jeff Smith, Col. Dep. Dir. LA Off. of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, (Sept. 15, 2005). 125 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 131 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco). 126 See generally Daily Video Teleconferences amongst offi cials dated Aug. 25 – Sept. 4, 2005 [hereinafter “Daily VTC”]. State and local offi cials
from each of the impacted areas met daily with offi cials from, among other agencies, FEMA, and the National Hurricane Center. 127 Memorandum of Spot Report regarding FEMA Co-ordination Calls, Doc. No. DHS-FEMA-00510001220–21 (Aug. 31, 2005). 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Id. 131 E-mail correspondence from Gary Jones, FEMA, to Edward Buikema, FEMA Acting Director for Response during Hurricane Katrina, (Aug. 31,
2005) (“Jack Colley just advised me that Gov Perry has not received a call from Gov Blanco regarding this plan [to move LA evacuees to the Houston Astro Dome]. Jack said he heard that she was going to make the call early this morning, again this has not happened.”).
132 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 155-156 (statement of Kathleen Babineaux Blanco) (Chairman Davis: “One last question, when did you realize that the tens of thousands of people in the Superdome would have to be evacuated out of New Orleans . . . .?” Blanco: “I recognized it on Tuesday [Aug. 30], when I was able to do – well, I knew about it before, but I had, you know, with my own eyes, made an evaluation.”).
133 Daily VTC (Aug. 30, 2005) at 10. 134 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coord Offi cer, FEMA in Washington, DC (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter “Parr
Interview”]; see generally Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (statement of Phil Parr). 135 Parr Interview. 136 Id. 137 Id. 138 Id. 139 Daily VTC (Aug. 30, 2005) at 11-12. 140 Id. at 14 (emphasis supplied). 141 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Edward Buikema, FEMA acting Director for Response during Hurricane Katrina, in Washington, DC (Jan.
6, 2006) [hereinafter “Buikema Interview”]. 142 Daily VTC (Aug. 31, 2005) at 3. 143 Id. at 26. 144 Daily VTC (Sept. 1. 2005) at 9. 145 Executive Order, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Emergency Evacuation by Buses, Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-31 (Aug. 31,
2005). 146 E-mail correspondence from Miles Bruder, LA State Offi cial, to “All Gov. Staff” regarding co-ordination of bus service (Aug. 31, 2005). 147 Daily VTC (Sept. 1, 2005) at 8. 148 Id. 149 Id.; Executive Order, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Emergency Evacuation by Buses, Exec. Order No. KBB 2005-25 (Sept. 2,
2005). Note, this differs from the Executive Order issued on Aug. 31, 2005, in that it waves the commercial drivers license requirement for bus drivers.
150 VTC (Sept. 1, 2005) at 9. 151 Id. at 11.
128 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
152 Parr Interview. 153 Buikema Interview. 154 VTC (Sept. 1, 2005) at 14. 155 See generally, Id. Daily VTC (Sept. 2, 2005). 156 Id. at 4-5. 157 Id. at 5. 158 Id. at 5-6. 159 Id. at 3. 160 Id. at 5. 161 Id. at 3. 162 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim McVaney, Director of Government Relations for Air Transport Association, in Washington, DC (Oct.
24, 2005). 163 Id. 164 Id. 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) at 48 (statement
of Michael Chertoff); see also H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-297, at 127 (1997) (appropriating $500,000 for a “comprehensive analysis and plan of all evacuation alternatives for the New Orleans metropolitan area”); see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-379, at 151 (1999) (directing FEMA to develop an evacuation plan for the New Orl eans area). Whatever plans resulted from these federal directives, they were clearly inadequate.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 129
130 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“The one-two combination of a catastrophic hurricane and massive fl ood overwhelmed
the normal disaster relief system. Some things worked well. But there were shortcomings
that we must urgently address.
“This tragedy has emphasized how critical it is that we ensure our planning and response
capabilities perform with seamless integrity and effi ciency in any type of disaster situation
– even one of cataclysmic nature.” Michael Chertoff
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Select Committee Hearing, October 19, 2005
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NATIONAL FRAMEWORK
Critical elements of the national response plan were executed late, ineffectively, or not at all
Summary
Similar to the troubled national responses to Hurricanes
Hugo and Andrew in 1989 and 1992 respectively, the
federal government failed to recognize the magnitude
of the situation presented by Hurricane Katrina prior to
landfall, adequately project future needs, fully engage the
President, and respond in a proactive and timely manner.
While the Federal Emergency Management System had
evolved since Andrew to include a developed protocol
for responding proactively to catastrophic disasters,
important aspects of the National Response Plan were
poorly executed, which contributed to the inadequate
federal response to Hurricane Katrina.
With the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the development of the National
Response Plan (NRP), an additional layer of management
and response authority was placed between the President
and FEMA, and additional response coordinating
structures were established.1 The Secretary of Homeland
Security became the President’s principal disaster advisor
responsible for enabling the President to effectively utilize
his authority under the Stafford Act to direct all federal
agencies, particularly the Department of Defense (DOD),
to respond in a coordinated and expeditious fashion. As
part of these changes, critical response decision points were
assigned to the Secretary of Homeland Security.2 Secretary
Chertoff executed these responsibilities late, ineffectively, or
not at all. These secretarial authorities include:
■ The designation of an incident of national signifi cance
(INS);
■ The authority to convene the Interagency Incident
Management Group (IIMG);
■ The designation of the principal federal offi cial (PFO);
and
■ The invocation of the national response plan’s
catastrophic incident annex (NRP-CIA).
There was plenty of advance warning by the National
Weather Service, and the consequences of a category 4
hurricane striking New Orleans were well-documented.
Fifty-six hours prior to landfall, Hurricane Katrina
presented an extremely high probability threat that
75 percent of New Orleans would be fl ooded, tens
of thousands of residents may be killed, hundreds
of thousands trapped in fl ood waters up to 20 feet,
hundreds of thousands of homes and other structures
destroyed, a million people evacuated from their homes,
and the greater New Orleans area would be rendered
uninhabitable for several months or years.3 An August
28 report by the department’s National Infrastructure
Simulation and Analysis Center concluded: “Any storm
rated Category 4 or greater . . . will likely lead to severe
fl ooding and/or levee breaching, leaving the New Orleans
metro area submerged for weeks or months.”4
Under these conditions it seems reasonable to expect
the criteria for designating an INS would have been
met, the appointment of a PFO would be necessary to
coordinate an unprecedented federal response, the IIMG
would be convened to provide strategic guidance and
recommendations to the Secretary and the President,
and the NRP-CIA would be invoked to shift the
federal response posture from a reactive to proactive
mode in order to save lives and accelerate assistance
to overwhelmed state and local systems. According
to a recent letter submitted by DHS (see Appendix
7) in response to the preliminary observations of the
Comptroller General (see Appendix 6), DHS viewed the
NRP-CIA as applicable only to no-notice or short-notice
events. And the Select Committee acknowledges that
the State of Louisiana expressed its satisfaction with the
supplies and that former FEMA Director Michael Brown
directed that commodities be “jammed up” the supply
chain.
While the NRP-CIA may be particularly applicable
to a no-notice event, the Annex itself refl ects only that a
catastophic incident may occur with little or no warning.
132 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
And the pre-positioning of supplies to the satisfaction of
state and local authorities, while an appropriate measure
for a disaster without catastophic consequences, was
clearly not suffi cient for the catastrophic consquences of
Hurricane Katrina.
Instead, absent a catastrophic disaster designation from
Chertoff, federal response offi cials in the fi eld eventually
made the diffi cult decisions to bypass established
procedures and provide assistance without waiting
for appropriate requests from the states or for clear
direction from Washington. These decisions to switch
from a “pull” to a “push” system were made individually,
over several days, and in an uncoordinated fashion as
circumstances required. The federal government stumbled
into a proactive response during the fi rst several days
after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, as opposed to the
Secretary making a clear and decisive choice to respond
proactively at the beginning of the disaster. The White
House Homeland Security Council (HSC), situated at
the apex of the policy coordination framework for DHS
issues, itself failed to proactively de-confl ict varying
damage assessments. One example included an eyewitness
account of a levee breach supplied by a FEMA offi cial
at 7:00 p.m. on August 29. The White House did not
consider this assessment confi rmed for 11 more hours,
when, after 6:00 a.m. the next morning, it received a
Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) Situation
Report confi rming the breach.
The catastrophic nature of Katrina confi rmed once
again that the standard “reactive” nature of federal
assistance, while appropriate for most disasters, does
not work during disasters of this scale. When local and
state governments are functionally overwhelmed or
incapacitated, the federal government must be prepared
to respond proactively. It will need to anticipate state
and local requirements, move commodities and assets
into the area on its own initiative, and shore up or even
help reconstitute critical state and local emergency
management and response structures.
The need for assistance is extreme during the initial
period of a catastrophic hurricane, yet the ability of state
and local responders to meet that need is limited. That
is why it is so important for the federal government,
particularly DOD resources, to respond proactively and
fi ll that gap as quickly as possible. Because it takes several
days to mobilize federal resources, critical decisions must
be made as early as possible so that massive assistance can
surge into the area during the fi rst two days, not several
days or weeks later. The CIA-NRP was drafted to meet this
specifi c and well known requirement, yet Chertoff never
invoked it for Katrina.
In contrast, the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC), a critical part of the national
emergency management framework, successfully provided
unprecedented levels of response and recovery personnel
and assets to the Gulf coast in record time following
Hurricane Katrina. EMAC is designed by statute to be
adaptable and scaleable to meet the changing needs of
each event. EMAC was widely praised for its quick and
effective process for putting vital resources into every
aspect of the response.
Finding: It does not appear the President received adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional
Although the Select Committee’s access to White House
documents, communications, and staff was not as
comprehensive as we had hoped, the information we did
receive suggests the President could have received better
disaster advice and counsel.
The Stafford Act places the federal government’s
disaster response authorities with the President. Similar
to military matters, the President is the commander in
chief of federal disaster response. Yet, unlike the military,
which provides the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as the President’s primary professional military advisor,
the President does not have regular access to a senior
disaster professional to advise him during disasters or on
disaster response issues. The President lacks this resource
even though catastrophic disasters may strike with little
or no warning and require early Presidential involvement
to reduce the loss of life, human suffering, and extensive
property damage.5
Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary
of Homeland Security reports to the President and is
the department’s top disaster offi cial; yet emergency
management is just one of the Secretary’s many
responsibilities.6 According to Chertoff’s testimony before
the Select Committee, he is not a hurricane expert, nor
does he have much experience with disasters.7
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 133
However, according to White House and FEMA
documents, it appears the White House took several steps
to improve the fl ow of information and strategic advice
into the President. For example, HSC staff solicited regular
situation reports from almost every federal agency for the
White House situation room. The HSC commenced 24-
hour operations the morning Katrina hit New Orleans.8
In addition, White House offi cials attempted to pressure
the HSOC to convene the IIMG on the Saturday before
Katrina made landfall.9
The IIMG consists of high level offi cials from all the
major federal agencies, and it is intended to assess the
magnitude of crisis situations, project future requirements
for federal assistance, develop plans for meeting those
requirements, recommend to the Secretary and the
President appropriate courses of action, and provide
strategic advice.10 The Secretary did not convene the IIMG
until three days later, roughly 36 hours after landfall.11
Within the emergency management community, there
are a handful of potential catastrophes that keep disaster
professionals awake at night. Perhaps the most troubling
of these has been a category 3 or larger storm striking New
Orleans because of its high likelihood of occurrence, the
extreme vulnerability of the city to long term fl ooding,
and the diffi culty of evacuating a large urban population
over limited evacuation routes. As a result, this scenario
has been studied, planned, and exercised perhaps more
than any other potential catastrophic disaster in the
country. A senior disaster professional would be well
aware of the consequences of such a storm, recognize the
challenges of responding to such a disaster, and appreciate
the need for timely and proactive federal assistance.
Comments such as those the President made about
not expecting the levees to breach do not appear to
be consistent with the advice and counsel one would
expect to have been provided by a senior disaster
professional. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to expect
delays in recognizing the need for and then requesting
DOD mission assignments may have been avoided if
the President had been advised of the need for early
presidential involvement.
Finding: Given the well-known consequences of a major hurricane hitting New Orleans, the Secretary should have designated an incident of national signifi cance no later than Saturday, two days prior to landfall, when the National Weather Service predicted New Orleans would be struck by a Category 4 or 5 hurricane and President Bush declared a Federal Emergency
The consequences of a major hurricane, defi ned as a
category 4 or greater storm, striking New Orleans were
well-known within Louisiana, the emergency management
community, and DHS.12 FEMA offi cials selected New
Orleans as the fi rst project for its catastrophic disaster
preparedness program precisely because of its high
probability of occurrence and horrifi c consequences.13 The
New Orleans levee system was designed to withstand, in
Comments such as those the President made about not expecting the levees to breach do not appear to be consistent with the advice and counsel one would expect to have been provided by a senior disaster professional.
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The “single biggest failure” of the federal response was that it failed to recognize the likely consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the fl ooded city. If it had, then federal assistance would have arrived several days earlier.
essence, a category 3 storm. Anything larger would exceed
the levees’ design capacity and likely cause catastrophic
fl ooding of the city. FEMA’s Hurricane Pam exercise
predicted the storm would inundate 75 percent of the city
up to 20 feet and cause 60,000 deaths.14
Two days before landfall the National Weather Service
predicted Katrina would strike New Orleans as a category 4
or 5 hurricane. The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi
declared state emergencies and the President issued an
emergency declaration for Louisiana. At this point in time,
it was extremely likely FEMA’s worst case hurricane scenario
was about to unfold. Chertoff should have declared an INS
in recognition of the severity of the situation and to allow
for the immediate convening of the IIMG, designation of
the PFO, and invocation of the NRP-CIA.
Finding: The Secretary should have convened the IIMG on Saturday, two days prior to landfall, or earlier to analyze Katrina’s potential consequences and anticipate what the federal response would need to accomplish
The purpose of the IIMG is to anticipate evolving
requirements and provide strategic recommendations
or courses of action for the Secretary and President
to consider as part of a national response to a major
incident. The IIMG replaces the Catastrophic Disaster
Response Group from the old Federal Response Plan and
was created to fi ll an important operational planning
gap. During a major incident, the NRP expects the
response organization to be focused on the current and
subsequent 24-hour operational period and unable to
assess the overall disaster situation, project future needs,
and develop effective plans to protect life and property.
The NRP utilizes the IIMG, a group of experienced high
level professionals with agency decision making authority,
to look at the big picture, anticipate what will be needed
several days in advance, and develop plans to fulfi ll those
requirements. Those plans can then be provided to the
operational commanders and implemented in a timely
manner.15
The authority to convene the IIMG is the Secretary’s,16
yet Chertoff did not execute that authority early enough
for the IIMG to perform this function during the critical
pre-landfall period and initial days of the disaster.
According to an e-mail between top FEMA offi cials on
Sunday, the day before landfall, White House offi cials
were pressuring the head of the HSOC, Matthew
Broderick, to convene the IIMG.17 Because the Secretary
did not activate the IIMG until roughly 36 hours after
landfall, despite the White House pressure, we will
never know what the IIMG would have done, given the
hurricane forecast and well-known consequences of a
category 4 storm, in anticipation that the New Orleans
levees would likely breach and force the rescue and
evacuation of tens of thousands of victims from the
fl ooded city.
If Chertoff had convened the IIMG, then perhaps
on the Saturday or Sunday before landfall, when FEMA
offi cials were deploying emergency response teams
and moving tons of commodities into the surrounding
region, the IIMG would have begun to accelerate DOD’s
involvement, develop plans to evacuate the Superdome,
and pre-stage buses and boats outside the region for
immediate deployment after the storm passed. Instead,
the FEMA operational teams did not begin planning these
critical actions until three days later, Tuesday evening, and
the buses and boats did not arrive in large quantities until
Thursday.18
According to Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director
for Emergency Preparedness with the Louisiana Offi ce
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 135
(LOHSEP), the “single biggest failure” of the federal
response was that it failed to recognize the likely
consequences of the approaching storm and mobilize
federal assets for a post-storm evacuation of the fl ooded
city. If it had, then federal assistance would have arrived
several days earlier.19
By not convening the IIMG prior to landfall, the
Secretary robbed himself and the President of the
opportunity to receive professional advice and strategic
options for proactively addressing the unfolding
catastrophic disaster. The threat stream presented by
Katrina was clear days before landfall, the potential
consequences were well-known, and important tools for
dealing with the situation were available yet not utilized.
Finding: The Secretary should have designated the Principal Federal Offi cial on Saturday, two days prior to landfall, from the roster of PFOs who had successfully completed the required PFO training, unlike FEMA Director Michael Brown. Considerable confusion was caused by the Secretary’s PFO decisions
According to the NRP, “the PFO is personally designated
by the Secretary of Homeland Security to facilitate federal
support to the established Incident Command System
(ICS) Unifi ed Command structure and to coordinate
overall federal incident management.”20 During large
multi-state disasters such as Katrina, the PFO’s role becomes
particularly important for providing a coordinated federal
response, as the FCOs appointed by the President for each
state only control operations within their respective states.
The Secretary should have begun this coordination earlier
and appointed a PFO on Saturday.
The Secretary’s eventual designation of Brown as PFO
on Tuesday evening was highly unusual and elicited a
concerned and confused reaction from Brown.21 In order
to prepare PFO-designates to fulfi ll the responsibilities
and functions of the PFO, the department conducts
a formal training program, and maintains a roster of
individuals approved and qualifi ed to serve as a PFO. The
NRP requires that “[u]nless extenuating circumstances
dictate otherwise, all PFO-designates should satisfactorily
complete this training program prior to performing PFO-
related responsibilities.”22
According to DHS offi cials, Brown had not taken
the required PFO training program and was not on
the approved PFO roster.23 Coast Guard Admiral Thad
Allen had successfully completed the training program,
as had all of the other individuals designated by the
Secretary to serve as PFO for past INS designations and
National Special Security Events.24 It is unclear why
Chertoff deviated from the requirements of the NRP and
designated an untrained individual to serve as PFO for
such a catastrophic disaster.
There was confusion over the role and authority of the PFO
The Secretary was confused about the role and authority
of the PFO. According to Chertoff’s testimony, he
designated Brown PFO because Brown was his “battlefi eld
commander.”25 Yet, the NRP specifi cally states, “The PFO
does not direct or replace the incident command structure
established at the incident, nor does the PFO have
directive authority over the SFLEO [Senior Federal Law
Enforcement Offi cer], FCO [Federal Coordinating Offi cer],
or other federal and state offi cials.”26 Furthermore, the
Stafford Act places all emergency response authorities with
Brown had not taken the required PFO training program and was not on the approved PFO roster.
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the President and requires that the President designate
a FCO for each disaster or emergency declaration.27 As a
result, the legal authority to “command the battlefi eld,”
as the Secretary put it, resides with the FCO, not the PFO.
The apparent confusion over the authority and role
of the PFO does not seem to have been recognized
until almost two weeks after Chertoff selected Allen
to replace Brown as PFO. It was at that time that the
unprecedented decision was made to appoint Allen the
FCO for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in addition
to PFO. This step was necessary because DHS eventually
recognized Allen, as the PFO only, did not have the legal
authority to commit the expenditure of federal funds or
direct federal agencies under delegated authority from
the President.28 As described above, only the FCO has
that authority. This confused and unprecedented series
of actions by the department prompted the resignation
and departure of Bill Carwile, one of FEMA’s most well
respected FCOs, who was serving as FCO in Mississippi.29
Finding: A proactive federal response, or push system, is not a new concept, but it is rarely utilized
What is a push system?
In response to most disasters, the federal government
provides assistance in response to state requests. This
reactive approach is often referred to as a “pull” system in
that it relies on states knowing what they need and being
able to request it from the federal government.30 States
may make these requests either before disasters strike
because of the near certainty that federal assistance will
be necessary after such an event, e.g., with hurricanes, or
afterwards, once they have conducted preliminary damage
assessments and determined their response capabilities
are overwhelmed.
Unlike the bulk of the disasters requiring FEMA’s
response, catastrophic disasters require the federal
response to be more proactive. This proactive response is
referred to as a “push” system, in which federal assistance
is provided and moved into the affected area prior to a
disaster or without waiting for specifi c requests from the
state or local governments.31
Implementing a push system—a proactive federal
response—does not require federalization of the disaster
or the usurping of state authority. Although a push system
is a proactive response by the federal government, it still
requires notifi cation and full coordination with the state.
The coordination process, however, should not delay or
impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of these
critical federal resources.32
A proactive response, or push system, is nothing new.
In 1992, the nation’s management of catastrophic disasters
was intensely criticized after Hurricane Andrew leveled
much of South Florida and Hurricane Iniki destroyed
much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai.33 In particular, a
1993 GAO report points to the slow delivery of services
vital to disaster victims as a major fl aw in the response
to Hurricane Andrew in South Florida.34 The report then
contrasts this with the more effective response to Hurricane
Iniki in Hawaii, where FEMA implemented a push system
and sent supplies to the island of Kauai before local
offi cials requested them.35 This occurred despite being
implemented in an ad hoc manner—rather than as part
of an orderly, planned response to catastrophic disasters.36
Furthermore, the long-standing authority for a proactive
federal response resides in the Stafford Act. The current
plan for how to utilize that authority is the NRP-CIA.
The pre-positioning of assets and commodities is a distinct action from the push or pull of those assets
The federal government will often pre-position life-saving
and life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies prior
to landfall of a hurricane as close to a potential disaster
site as possible. This pre-positioning of supplies can
substantially shorten response time and delivery of initial
critical disaster supplies to the fi eld.
Although part of a proactive response, this pre-
positioning of disaster supplies and assets is not in
and of itself a push of commodities. Once assets are
pre-positioned to go into the fi eld, they still need to be
mobilized and deployed into the fi eld either proactively
by pushing the commodities to the state or reactively by
waiting for a request from the state.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 137
Operational procedures for a push are not well exercised, practiced, or utilized
The majority of declared disasters are not catastrophic.
Because of this, the pull system is most commonly used
during disasters and training exercises and, therefore, is
more familiar to disaster response personnel. In fact, the
NRP-CIA has never been appropriately exercised.37 As a
result, federal personnel have little experience or comfort
with instituting a proactive response.
Additionally, if the Homeland Security Secretary does
not invoke the NRP-CIA, federal personnel have no
clear instruction to switch from a reactive approach to a
proactive approach. Without this clear direction, federal
personnel can be uncomfortable pushing resources
into the state because of the inherent risks, such as
complicating the disaster response by diverting needed
resources from other areas or wasting millions of dollars
in a duplication of effort.
Finding: The Secretary should have invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) to direct the federal response posture to fully switch from a reactive to proactive mode of operations
Perhaps the single most important question the Select
Committee has struggled to answer is why the federal
response did not adequately anticipate the consequences
of Katrina striking New Orleans and, prior to landfall,
begin to develop plans and move boats and buses into the
area to rescue and evacuate tens of thousand of victims
from a fl ooded city. At least part of the answer lies in the
Secretary’s failure to invoke the NRP-CIA, to clearly and
forcefully instruct everyone involved with the federal
response to be proactive, anticipate future requirements,
develop plans to fulfi ll them, and execute those plans
without waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed
state and local response offi cials.
The NRP-CIA was specifi cally written for a disaster such
as Katrina. According to the NRP:38
■ A catastrophic incident results in large numbers of
casualties and displaced persons.
■ The incident may cause signifi cant disruption to the
area’s critical infrastructure.
■ A credible operating picture may not be achievable for
24 to 48 hours or longer. As a result, response activities
must begin without the benefi t of a complete needs
assessment.
■ Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to
save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe
damage. This may require mobilizing and deploying
assets before they are requested via normal NRP
protocols.
■ Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed may
occur.
■ Large numbers of people may be left homeless and may
require prolonged temporary housing.
It is clear the consequences of Hurricane Katrina
exceeded all of these criteria and required a proactive
response. According to the NRP, “Upon recognition that
a catastrophic incident condition (e.g. involving mass
casualties and/or mass evacuation) exists, the Secretary of
DHS immediately designates the event an INS and begins,
potentially in advance of a formal Presidential disaster
declaration, implementation of the NRP-CIA.”39 On
Monday evening, when DHS received reports the levees
had breached in multiple locations, it should have been
clear to the department the nation’s worst case hurricane
scenario had occurred and a proactive federal response
was required.40 Chertoff never invoked the NRP-CIA.
Smith, LOHSEP Deputy Director for Emergency
Preparedness, believed, “the biggest single failure of
the federal response was the Department of Homeland
Security’s failure to recognize that Katrina was a
catastrophic event and implement the catastrophic
incident annex to the National Response Plan…Had
DHS recognized Katrina for the event that it was, a
truly catastrophic event, had DHS implemented the
catastrophic incident annex to the NRP, Louisiana should
have had a signifi cant number of federal troops and
federal assets, days prior to their actual arrival. . . . Instead
federal troops did not arrive in number until Saturday,
after the evacuations of the Superdome, Convention
Center and cloverleaf were complete.”41
138 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Finding: Absent the Secretary’s invocation of the NRP-CIA, the federal response evolved into a push system over several days
Even though Chertoff never invoked the catastrophic
annex, federal offi cials in the fi eld began, in an ad hoc
fashion, to switch from a pull response to a push system
because of the operational demands of the situation. The
switch was uncoordinated but widespread by the end of
the fi rst week. This has occurred in previous disasters. As
previously mentioned, the response to Hurricane Iniki
in Hawaii implemented an ad hoc push system as FEMA
sent supplies to the island of Kauai before local offi cials
requested them.42 Similarly, the response to Katrina
evolved into an ad hoc push system, even though the
NRP-CIA was not invoked.
The following Mississippi and Louisiana examples
illustrate the switch to a push response and several other
important principles of effective emergency management.
First, they demonstrate the importance of having qualifi ed
and experienced professionals in charge of operations.
Second, these offi cials need to have the authority to
commit resources as they see fi t without waiting to seek
approval from above. And, third, federal offi cials need
to have good working relationships with their state
counterparts. In the fi rst example, Carwile had been the
FCO in Florida during the 2004 hurricane season and
developed a close relationship with the Florida Director
of Emergency Management Craig Fugate. It is clear from
e-mails and numerous staff interviews that Carwile did
not hesitate to authorize and Fugate provided any and all
assistance to Mississippi without formal requests from
Mississippi authorities.43
On August 30, FEMA worked with Florida offi cials
to push response assets into Mississippi. In an e-mail to
Brown and Carwile, Fugate informed them Florida was
pushing search and rescue teams into Mississippi. He
noted the EMAC paperwork was not keeping up with
the need, so they were working off of verbal requests.
Specifi cally, he wrote, “To both of you, you need it, you
got it from [F]lorida. [T]he paper work (sic) can follow.”44
On Thursday, September 1, Carwile and Fugate
continued to push resources into Mississippi without clear
mission requests:
[5:42 a.m. e-mail from Fugate to Carwile]
I’m out of water and ice from my stocks. I’ve
directed Mike DeLorenzo [with the Florida
Division of Emergency Management] to start
purchasing and shipping product into the coastal
Mississippi Counties. Not sure I have an EMAC
mission, but our folks on the ground have
concerns if they run out.
Not sure how much and when, but will try to
keep you updated on progress. If this works, will
continue until told to stop.
So far we have only been shipping water and ice.
No food or baby products.
Craig
——————————————
Craig Fugate, Director
Florida Division of Emergency Management
[10:26 a.m. reply from Carwile to Fugate]
Craig:
You are doing the right thing. Thanks. Know
Robert [Robert Latham, Director of the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency]
would concur. Will police up paperwork later
– you have my guarantee.
Food is also critical. Need MRE [meals ready to
eat] and/or heater meals if you have any. Water,
ice, food in eastern counties should be your
priority. Recommend Allen coordinate with
MGen Cross (TAG, MS) for integration into their
distribution system.
Also, know FL is providing law enforcement.
Need all you can send. Public safety major
concern (looting, etc.). Have used Dixie Co. body
bags (250) got more?
Thanks, old friend, Bill
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 139
In Louisiana, FEMA response personnel tried on a
number of occasions to push commodities and assets into
the fi eld. In cases where it was clear there was a need for
life-saving and life-sustaining commodities but no clear
state distribution system set up, FEMA acted proactively to
provide assistance. For example, Louisiana FCO Bill Lokey
noted there were situations where stranded individuals
were not in immediate danger, but needed food and
water. When FEMA gained access to several helicopters,
FEMA began ferrying food and water to people stranded
on high ground even though there was no formal request
by the state to perform this function. In addition, FEMA
contracted with over 100 ambulances to transport hospital
evacuees. This mission was not requested by the state,
but FEMA responded proactively because the situation
demanded immediate action.45
Although there are numerous examples of a push
system being implemented at times, there were also a
number of times when state or local offi cials expressed
frustration that requests for assistance were not processed
because they did not follow the formal request process.
For example, according to Louisiana and FEMA offi cials,
state and local offi cials verbally requested specifi c assets
or commodities during conference calls that were never
fulfi lled.46 In these cases no immediate action was taken
because FEMA offi cials assumed the state would follow
up the verbal requests with offi cial written requests. If the
catastrophic annex had been invoked, then perhaps FEMA
would have expected requests outside the normal process
and acted on them.
Finding: The Homeland Security Operations Center failed to provide valuable situational information to the White House and key operational offi cials during the disaster
During Hurricane Katrina, the roles and responsibilities
of the HSOC were unclear. One of the primary roles
performed by the HSOC is to maintain an accurate
picture of events as an incident unfolds by gathering and
integrating information from multiple sources, including
the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the
Coast Guard, and other DHS elements.47 Specifi cally, the
NRP has designated the HSOC as the national-level hub
for information sharing management during domestic
incidents. The HSOC provides primary situational
awareness to the Secretary, the IIMG, and the White House.
Perhaps the single most important piece of
information during Katrina was confi rmation of the levee
breaches in New Orleans. Beyond the importance of the
information itself, the implications of the information
determined whether or not Katrina would be just another
bad storm in New Orleans or the nation’s worst-case
hurricane disaster. Because DHS failed to anticipate the
likely consequences of the storm and procure the buses,
boats, and aircraft that were ultimately necessary to
evacuate the fl ooded city prior to Katrina’s landfall, the
next critical decision point of the federal response became
On Monday evening the HSOC failed to conclude levees breached in New Orleans despite a FEMA eyewitness report and the presence of numerous Coast Guard air assets over New Orleans, which had the ability to communicate to most anywhere in the country. FEM
A
140 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
confi rmation of the levee breaches. If the levees breached
and fl ooded a large portion of the city, then the fl ooded
city would have to be completely evacuated.48 Any delay
in confi rming the breaches would result in a delay in the
post-landfall evacuation of the city.
On Monday evening the HSOC failed to conclude
that levees had breached in New Orleans despite a FEMA
eyewitness report and the presence of numerous Coast
Guard air assets over New Orleans, which had the ability
to communicate to almost anywhere in the country.
According to the commander of the Coast Guard’s Air
Station New Orleans, Captain Bruce Jones, there were
nine Coast Guard helicopters, including the helicopter he
piloted, operating over New Orleans by Monday evening,
and Rear Admiral Duncan was fl own over the city in a
Coast Guard Falcon aircraft to assess the situation.49
In addition, a Coast Guard C-130 from Clearwater,
Florida arrived over the city Monday evening after it heard
the radio chatter from the rescue helicopter operations
and diverted from its mission to reconnoiter the status
of off shore oil rigs. The C-130 was able to communicate
with all of the helicopters, and it could patch some
communications through to the Coast Guard’s division
eight headquarters temporarily established in St. Louis.
The division headquarters could then patch those
communications through to a landline and reach almost
any destination from there. The one important exception
was calling into Baton Rouge, which was not possible.50
According to Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA External
Affairs offi cial, and the Coast Guard, he was fl own over
New Orleans early Monday evening for the specifi c
purpose of providing situational awareness to Brown and
DHS headquarters.51 Captain Frank M. Paskewich said
his unit took Bahamonde up in the helicopter because
they were under the impression he had a direct line of
communication into the White House. They thought
Bahamonde could get the information regarding the
status of the levees and fl ooding in the city to Washington
faster than they could through the Coast Guard chain of
command.52 Bahamonde’s observations were received in
the HSOC a few hours after his over fl ight and became a
Monday 10:30 p.m. HSOC spot report that was sent to the
White House situation room shortly after midnight.53 This
spot report can be found in Appendix 2. However, it is not clear if the other Coast Guard observations, including
Duncan’s reconnaissance fl ight, reached the HSOC on
Monday evening or at all.
Because the HSOC failed to confi rm the levee breaches
on Monday, the fi rst federal decision to procure buses was
made by Deputy FCO Phil Parr, who was at the Superdome,
on Tuesday when he saw the water reaching the Superdome
and realized it would become an island and have to be
evacuated. At that point he began to develop an evacuation
plan and requested hundreds of buses.54
The HSOC’s role is not only to provide situational
awareness and policy advice to top offi cials within DHS,
but also to provide situational information and address
lower level coordination issues. Yet, interviews suggest
that while information was fl owing upwards to the HSOC
and onto the Secretary, it was less clear what valuable
information was fl owing down to key offi cials on the
ground during the disaster. Edward Buikema, FEMA’s
former Acting Director of Response, and Mike Lowder,
Deputy Director of Response, both stated that while
situational reports were continually fl owing up the ladder
from FEMA headquarters to the HSOC, no information
was fl owing back down from the HSOC to the NRCC.55
Finding: The White House failed to de-confl ict varying damage assessments and discounted information that ultimately proved accurate
In response to document requests to White House
Chief of Staff Andrew Card56 and the Offi ce of the
Vice President,57 the Select Committee received and
reviewed 22,830 pages of Katrina-related documents.58
Of this production, 16,482 pages were from staff of
F E
M A
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 141
the President’s Homeland Security Council Prevention,
Preparedness and Response (PPR) directorate, headed
by Kirstjen Nielsen. The remaining 6,348 pages were
produced by the Offi ce of the Vice President.
Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff received a
continuous paper fl ow in the hours and days before
Katrina made landfall and after. Of the 16,482 pages
produced, almost all of the documents are repeated
numerous times. The most commonly found documents
include:
HSOC Situation Reports
HSOC Spot Reports
Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness
Situation Reports
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
Situation Reports
Alabama Emergency Management Agency Situation
Reports
E-mails from DHS Watch Offi cer to White House
HSC Staff
FEMA executive briefi ng slides
FEMA Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT) Advisories
FEMA National Situation Reports
FEMA Regional Situation Reports
DOE Energy Reports from Offi ce of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability
DOT Situation Reports
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) Status
Reports
Talking Points from both DHS and the White House
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) Reports
Coast Guard briefi ng materials
National Guard briefi ng materials
Pipeline Situation Reports
FAA Emergency Operations Division Reports
HHS Operations Center Situation Reports
HUD briefi ng materials
White House Press Offi ce materials, and
Red Cross Disaster Operations Summary Reports
The HSC was situated at the apex of the policy
coordination framework for responding to Hurricane
Katrina.59 A HSC chart has Chertoff, and the IIMG
through the Secretary, seemingly reporting into the HSC.
As the coordinator of policy, it would seem to follow that
HSC was directly involved in the Katrina response:
Not really, according to Deputy Homeland Security
Advisor Ken Rapuano, who twice briefed Select
Committee members and staff. “We don’t do operations
at the White House,” Rapuano said on January 27. “We’re
a transit site for information. DHS is the operating agency
for response, and we were working closely with them . .
. . At the time we believed we were fully supporting the
[federal, state, and local response] requirements. Now we
know differently.”60
As discussed previously in the Investigation Overview
chapter, the Select Committee grew frustrated by the
White House’s slow response to requests for information
and documents. On the one hand, it is true the Rapuano
briefi ngs the Select Committee ultimately received in
lieu of more complete document production offered a
wide array of acknowledged failures and lessons learned.
On the other, the White House’s decision to withhold
documents and communications raising concerns about
executive priviledge, leaves the Select Committee no
choice but to fi nd, based on the information we have
received, that a failure of initiative plagued the White
House as well.
Failure to resolve confl icts in information and the “fog of war,” not a lack of information, caused confusion
The White House did not suffer from a lack of
information. At 1:47 a.m. on August 29, before Katrina
made landfall, DHS forwarded an infrastructure advisory
to the White House Situation Room and HSC staff
indicating the risks associated with a potential levee
White House Homeland Security Council/Hurricane Task Force
Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff
Principal Federal Official (PFO) Michael D. Brown
Interagency Incident
Management Group (IIMG)
FEMA FCO Louisiana JFO
Bill Lokey
FEMA FCO Mississippi JFO
Bill Carwille
FEMA FCO Alabama JFO Ron Sherman
FEMA FCO Florida JFO
Justin Demello
Hurricane Katrina Policy Coordination Framework for Response
WHITE HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL
142 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
breach.61 The report advised a severe storm surge would
likely lead to severe fl ooding, leaving New Orleans under
water for weeks or months.62 The report further estimated
an economic impact of $7 to $10 billion.63 Detailed
diagrams of the New Orleans levee system arrived at the
White House at 12:14 p.m. on Sunday, August 28.64
After Katrina made landfall and the levees failed,
the White House continued to receive a substantial
information fl ow. At 2:20 p.m. on August 29, a HSOC
report stated some Louisiana parishes had eight to 10 feet
of water and an unspecifi ed number of Louisiana and
Mississippi residents were stranded in fl ooded areas.65 In
a 6:00 p.m. HSOC report, the White House was advised
extensive fl ooding in New Orleans could take months to
reverse through the dewatering process.66 At 12:02 a.m. on
August 30, the White House received the Bahamonde spot
report in which it was reported he observed a quarter-
mile breach in the levee near the 17th Street Canal.
Bahamonde also reported free-fl owing water emptying
into the city, Orleans Parish “under water,” homes
completely underwater, hundreds of people on roofs and
balconies, and bodies fl oating in the fl ood waters.67
While Bahamonde’s report was detailed in a 10:30
p.m. HSOC spot report, that report was not e-mailed to or
received by the White House Situation Room until shortly
after midnight on August 30.68 Even then, according
to Rapuano, White House offi cials did not believe they
had confi rmation of any levee breaches, since an earlier
Army Corps of Engineers’ report had not confi rmed them
and because “this was just Marty’s observation, and it’s
diffi cult to distinguish between a [levee] overtopping and
a breach.”69
Bahamonde has testifi ed, however, that he was certain
the levee was breached.
At approximately 11 a.m. [Monday, August
29], the worst possible news came into the EOC.
I stood there and listened to the fi rst report of the
levee break at the 17th Street Canal. I do not know
who made the report but they were very specifi c
about the location of the break and the size. And
then they added it was “very bad.” I continued to
provide regular updates to FEMA Headquarters
throughout the day as the situation unfolded.
At approximately 5 p.m., I rushed over to the
Superdome because I had been notifi ed that a
Coast Guard helicopter was able to take me for a
short fl yover so that I could assess the situation
in the city and plan for Under Secretary Brown’s
visit the next day. My initial fl yover lasted about 10
minutes and even in that short time I was able to
see that approximately 80 percent of the city was
under water, and I confi rmed the 17th Street Canal
levee break. I was struck by how accurate the 11
a.m. call was about the levee.70
After his helicopter over fl ight at about 7:00 p.m.,
Bahamonde said he called Brown and explained what he
saw.71 “I picked up the phone and I called Under Secretary
Brown directly and I began a 10-, 15-minute conversation
that explained everything that I have already explained in
my statement.”72 Brown listened to Bahamonde’s report
and did not ask any questions.73 “All he said was, ‘Thank
you. I am now going to call the White House.’”74
White House offi cials did not consider the breaches
confi rmed until roughly 6:30 a.m. the next morning,
upon receipt of an updated situation report from DHS,
Rapuano said.75 “Confi rmation of a full breach would not
have changed anything we would have done,” Rapuano
said. “We weren’t going to repair the levees overnight,
and search and rescue was already operating in full gear,
regardless.”76
But confi rmation of the breach of the levees could
have had practical implications for White House
involvement in the response. Flooding from breaches and
fl ooding from overtopping have different consequences.
Overtopping fl ooding will stop as the waters recede;
fl ooding through a breach will continue, as it did, through
the breach until the water in the city is at the same level
as the water in the lake. The latter fl ooding could drive
more of the population that stayed behind from their
homes, necessitating greater needs for evacuating that
Determining the status of the levees could have spurred earlier evacuation for that population, which might have been facilitated by White House involvement.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 143
population. When President Bush was concerned that
Governor Blanco had not ordered the evacuation of New
Orleans, he called her on Sunday morning to urge such an
evacuation.77 Similarly White House involvement could
have spurred earlier evacuation post-landfall for those
trapped by the fl oods from the breached levees.
Further, White House offi cials clearly were able to
identify and locate resources for the relief effort when
they had suffi cient information to know what was
needed. Maggie Grant, Special Assistant to the President
for Intergovernmental Affairs, played a key role in
coordinating shelter for 15,000 in Arkansas with Arkansas
Governor Mike Huckabee and in coordinating shelter for
thousands of others in Georgia and Alabama.78
Regardless of what the White House did or did not,
or could or could not, do with the information at its
disposal, it appears clear offi cials charged with reviewing
that information failed to de-confl ict it. Among the
primary tasks of the HSOC and HSC is to shuttle and
synthesize information. Yet both appeared to discount
information that ultimately proved accurate, and failed
to provide decision-makers, up to and including the
President, with timely information.
Brown testifi ed that he spoke with White House offi cials
as many as “thirty times.”79 He said he had no trouble
getting through to senior decision makers: “I had no
problem picking up the phone and getting hold of Chertoff
or Andy Card or Joe Hagin, or the President; I don’t have
those problems.” Brown told The New York Times he advised
both Chertoff and a White House offi cial, either Chief of
Staff Andrew Card or Card’s deputy, Joe Hagin, on Monday
evening, August 29, “I am having a horrible time. I can’t get
a unifi ed command established.”80 On Tuesday, August 30,
he said he called to ask the White House to “take over” the
Katrina response.81 In his testimony, Brown said that this
was offered to Blanco.
One of the things that I was trying to do was to
assist the Governor in any way that I could in
the decision-making process, in trying to help
her manage what was going on. And one of my
suggestions was that, you know, that we could
federalize this disaster and take over the National
Guard and run the operation through that National
Guard. And I — I do not know whether she
considered it or not, but I know that she came back
to me and rejected that.82
Neither Rapuano nor anyone else at the White House
would confi rm these accounts. Rapuano would only say
he “was not aware that Brown called the White House
asking us to take over.”83
Rapuano acknowledged at both briefi ngs that “the fog of
war” affected both the quality and quantity of information
that reached the White House.84 The Select Committee also
believes, in the absence of any information to the contrary
from the White House, that the President’s Homeland
Security team did not effectively substantiate, analyze, and
act on the information at its disposal.
Listed in Appendix 3 are examples of documents that fl owed to the White House over the days right before and
after Katrina made landfall, August 27 through September
3. The items logged do not refl ect the entire information
fl ow to the White House, or all documents provided to the
Select Committee. Rather, they are meant to illustrate the
type and range of information known to the White House
suggesting Katrina and the subsequent fl ooding was not
a standard emergency event. Yet the enormity of Katrina
seemed not to have been fully understood by the White
House until at least Tuesday, August 30.
Finding: Federal agencies, including DHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and responsibilities under the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS)
It has become clear the response to Katrina was not unifi ed
and coordination among local, state, and federal authorities
failed in several areas. The NRP and NIMS serve as a pre-
established unifi ed command structure for response to
such a catastrophic incident. In order to seamlessly execute
the NRP, each agency needs to develop effective operating
procedures essential to satisfying that agency’s roles and
responsibilities under the NRP and NIMS.
Rapuano acknowledged at both briefi ngs that “the fog of war” affected both the quality and quantity of information that reached the White House.
144 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Some agencies had well developed standard operating
procedures while others had none at all. The U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers and the Department of Transportation
had previously developed signifi cant operating procedures
that covered agency responsibilities under the NRP.85
Both agencies had used these operating procedures during
training exercises to ensure an understanding of operating
procedures prior to real time application.86 These agencies
executed their responsibilities under the NRP fairly well.
Other agencies lack suffi cient operating procedures for
their responsibilities under the NRP. Many, when asked
for operating procedures, referred to related sections of
the NRP. Since the NRP is not an operational plan, this
led to problems with execution of Emergency Support
Function (ESF) responsibilities.87
While DOD, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), and the Coast Guard performed
admirably in many respects, there were problems
adequately coordinating their activities with other federal,
state, and local agencies through the NRP structure.
For example, DOD by-passed the NRP mandated
unifi ed command, taking requests from the states directly,
absent the necessary input and coordination by FEMA.
This was apparent in the evacuation of the Superdome.
Parr completed a plan to evacuate the Superdome
Wednesday morning with the support of the Louisiana
National Guard. Shortly before implementation of the
plan, Parr was informed of the decision by General
Honoré of Northern Command to proceed with a
different evacuation plan. Unknown to Parr, Blanco had
requested DOD’s involvement in the evacuation the day
before. The Governor’s request was made outside the
unifi ed command and without the knowledge of FEMA
offi cials, resulting in a duplication of efforts and a delay
in the evacuation. Additionally, Parr stated that the actual
evacuation under Honoré’s plan resulted in an additional
24 hour delay to evacuees.88
In another case, HHS activated the National Disaster
Medical System without prior notice or consultation with
Alabama, thereby removing 200 beds from the inventory
the state believed on hand, and to which state offi cials
were still directing patients. Likewise, Coast Guard search
and rescue operations were bringing survivors from
Mississippi unannounced to already full hospitals until
Alabama sent its own personnel forward to help triage
cases and coordinate the direction of Coast Guard fl ights.
This resulted in confusion over available hospital beds for
victims through the Gulf coast and delay in the medical
response.89
Additional failures to adhere to the NRP were apparent
in the lack of communication between the NRCC and the
HSOC, which disrupted the overall information fl ow and
situational awareness.
Finding: Once activated, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) enabled an unprecedented level of mutual aid assistance to reach the disaster area in a timely and effective manner
EMAC provided invaluable interstate mutual aid in
support of Hurricane Katrina by deploying more
than 67,891 personnel (19,481 civilians and 48,477
National Guard) to Louisiana and Mississippi.90 EMAC
facilitated mutual assistance from 48 states, the District of
Columbia, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
In support of Hurricane Katrina, more than 2,188
resource requests (missions) were fi lled.91 Record numbers
of National Guard troops, local responders, and health/
medical personnel were deployed through the compact.
EMAC also works in cooperation with the federal
government by co-locating personnel, when requested,
in the NRCC or Regional Response Coordination Center
A P
P H
O T
O /E
R IC
G A
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 145
(RRCC) in order to share information on EMAC activities
in the affected states, monitor the availability of needed
resources being offered by assisting states, and facilitate
overall emergency response and recovery activities.
Through state statute, EMAC addresses the legal issues
of liability, workers compensation, reimbursement, and
professional licensure—prior to a disaster or emergency
when resource needs and timing are critical.92 State and
territory members must pre-designate personnel with
the authority to request and commit resources. Standard
operating procedures exist for compact members and
training and exercise of state personnel is required. While
formalized protocols are in place, EMAC is designed to
be adaptable and scaleable to meet the changing needs of
each event.
Following each large scale activation of the compact, a
review and evaluation of the response is conducted and
standard operating procedures revised and updated to
refl ect lessons learned and best practices. For example,
lessons learned from the 2004 Florida hurricanes led to
an overhaul of some operational procedures related to
mobilization and deployment of resources, an enhanced
automation system to provide more accurate data and
electronic tracking of resources, and a new standardized
EMAC training curriculum and updated operations
manual.93 These enhancements were either in progress or
completed prior to Hurricane Katrina.
In Mississippi, EMAC assistance was considered a
success. The assistance in Mississippi included help from
other states’ security agencies (such as their state police) as
well as various states’ National Guards (troops and hard
assets).94 (See the MILITARY chapter for more detail.)
Louisiana state offi cials also viewed EMAC assistance
as very successful. One state offi cial said there were almost
900 EMAC agreements for assistance. Although the EMAC
response from surrounding states varied, state offi cials
applauded EMAC for successfully getting law enforcement
manpower assistance. According to state police offi cers
Ralph Mitchell and Joseph Booth, Arkansas, Tennessee,
New Jersey, and California all sent law enforcement
offi cers through EMAC.95
FEMA offi cials also noted the general success of
EMAC. Because of the magnitude of the disaster, however,
Louisiana was unable to handle all of the EMAC requests,
requiring FEMA to become more involved in the process
than normal. In particular, FCO Scott Wells noted some
state offers of assistance through FEMA were rejected
by Louisiana. He said these offers were rejected by SCO
Smith because of concerns about the costs to the state.96
Finding: Earlier presidential involvement might have resulted in a more effective response
Similar to other large scale disasters, the catastrophic
nature of Katrina required early presidential involvement
to direct federal agencies in a massive coordinated
response. In practice, it takes presidential action to
quickly deploy the logistical capability of the military to
meet the tremendous food, shelter, and medical needs of
large affected populations. According to the Government
Accountability Offi ce’s (GAO) review of hurricanes Hugo
(1989, SC and NC), Andrew (1992, FL and LA), and Iniki
(1992, HI):
Often, when a catastrophic disaster leaves a gap
between what volunteers can provide and the needs
of disaster victims, DOD is the only organization
capable of providing, transporting, and distributing
suffi cient quantities of the items needed to fi ll that
gap. . . . While we clearly see a major role for DOD
in providing mass care, we do not advocate turning
over the entire disaster response, relief, and recovery
operations to the military.97
Not only did senior DHS offi cials fail to acknowledge the scale of the impending disaster, they were ill prepared due to their lack of experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by the NRP.
146 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Instead, the GAO recommended increased presidential
involvement in the disaster and an improved process
for FEMA to request DOD assistance as the solution for
enabling DOD to provide relief during the critical fi rst
few days of a catastrophic disaster.98 The Stafford Act
authorizes the President, not the director of FEMA or the
Homeland Security Secretary, to direct federal agencies
to save lives and protect property and support state and
local response efforts.99 While the Stafford Act requires the
President to delegate the coordination of response efforts
to a federal coordinating offi cer (FCO), the law does
not give the FCO command authority over other federal
agencies. As a result, the FCO is not in a position to direct
the operations of large departments such as DOD. Only
the President appears able to promptly engage active duty
military forces and achieve a unity of effort among all the
federal agencies responding to a catastrophic disaster.
During Hurricane Katrina this problem was apparent in
FEMA’s and DHS’ inability to promptly task major mission
assignments to DOD. For example, FEMA did not approach
DOD about taking over the logistics mission until
Thursday, September 1, according to staff interviews with
senior FEMA offi cials.100 In response, Colonel Chavez with
the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense Paul McHale
instructed FEMA that the request had to go to Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.101 Although details and
planning still needed to take place, the Secretary of Defense
supported approval of the request on Friday, and Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Pete Verga approved
execution orders on Saturday, September 3.102 Out of this
request, according to McHale, DOD found additional
mission assignments that it could undertake and proposed
them to FEMA. Seven other mission assignments were
negotiated and approved over the next few days with senior
DHS offi cials, including Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson
and the Director of Operations Coordination Brigadier
General Matthew Broderick (USMC-Ret).103 But by the time
all of these missions were assigned, it was one week since
Katrina had made landfall.104
Conclusion
Hurricane Katrina exposed numerous defi ciencies
in the existing national framework for emergency
management, including specifi c mistakes that delayed an
appropriate federal response. Confusion accompanied
the implementation of the NRP, resulting in key elements
of the plan executed late, ineffectively, or not at all. Not
only did senior DHS offi cials fail to acknowledge the scale
of the impending disaster, they were ill prepared due to
their lack of experience and knowledge of the required
roles and responsibilities prescribed by the NRP. The
Secretary of DHS failed to declare an INS, convene the
IIMG, and properly designate the PFO in a timely manner.
The White House failed to de-confl ict varying damage
assessments and discounted FEMA-supplied eyewitness
information that ultimately proved accurate. Furthermore,
the government was limited to a reactive response due
to failure to activate the NRP-CIA. Despite failures of
the system, portions of the national framework were
successful, including EMAC, which proved invaluable in
providing necessary levels of mutual aid assistance. ■
Similar to other large scale disasters, the catastrophic nature of Katrina required early presidential involvement to direct federal agencies in a massive coordinated response.
Although the Select Committee’s access to White House documents, communications, and staff was not as comprehensive as we had hoped, the information we did receive suggests the President could have received better disaster advice and counsel.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 147
1 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, Title V, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) [hereinafter Homeland Security Act]. 2 Dep’t of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, (Dec. 2004) [hereinafter NRP]. 3 State of Louisiana, Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Planning Project, (Sept. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Southeast LA Planning Project]. 4 E-mail correspondence from Stephen York, Department of Homeland Security, to Andrew Akers, Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC), Senior Watch Offi cer, et al. (Aug. 28, 2005) (11:59 a.m.) [hereinafter Aug. 28, 2005 York E-mail]; http://www.cnn.com/2006/ POLITICS/01/24/katrina.levees.ap/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
5 1993 GAO Report. 6 Homeland Security Act. 7 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) (written
statement of Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security) [hereinafter Oct. 19, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 8 See E-mail correspondence from Kirstjen Nielson, White House Homeland Security Council, to Tom Ryder, Department of Energy (Aug. 29,
2005) (10:58 a.m.). 9 E-mail correspondence from Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, to Patrick Rhode, FEMA, et al. (Aug. 28, 2005) (7:48 p.m.)
[hereinafter Aug. 28, 2005 Lowder E-mail]. 10 NRP at 22. 11 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by the White House in Washington, DC (Dec. 13, 2005). 12 Aug. 28, 2005 York E-mail; E-mail correspondence from Andrew Akers, DHS, to Paul Perkins, HSOC, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (1:47 p.m.)
[hereinafter Aug. 29, 2005 Akers E-mail]. 13 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Madhu Beriwal, Pres., Innovative Emergency Management in Washington, DC (Jan. 6, 2005). 14 Southeast LA Planning Project. 15 NRP at 22-23. 16 Id. at 22. 17 Aug. 28, 2005 Lowder E-mail. 18 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs,109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 70-73 (testimony of Philip Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA Joint Field Offi ce, Austin, TX) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing].
19 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of LA Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 18 (statement of Colonel Jeff Smith) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
20 NRP at 33. 21 See E-mail correspondence from Ken Hill, Executive Secretary, DHS to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS, et al., (Aug. 30, 2005) (8:22
p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Michael Brown, Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to Sharon Worthy, Special Assistant, DHS (Aug. 30, 2005) (11:00 p.m.).
22 NRP at 34. 23 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview. 24 Id. 25 Oct. 19, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing, (written statement of Michael Chertoff). 26 NRP at 33. 27 Stafford Act, §§ 5143, 5170(a)-(b), 5192. 28 NRP at 33-34. 29 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview. 30 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with New Orleans offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 31 Id. 32 NRP at 342. 33 1993 GAO Report at 3. 34 Id. 35 Id. at 7. 36 May 25, 1993 Senate Armed Forces Comm. Hearing (Statement of J. Dexter Peach). 37 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, Federal Contracting Offi cer for LA, FEMA , in Washington, DC ( Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter
Jan. 23, 2006 Lokey Interview]. 38 NRP at Catastrophic Incident Annex. 39 Id. at CAT-4. 40 DHS HSOC Spot Report of Marty Bahamonte, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, FEMA (Aug. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Aug. 29, 2005
HSOC Spot Report]; Interview by Select Comm. with Bruce Jones, Captain, Coast Guard New Orleans Air Commander in Washington, DC (Jan. 10, 2006).
41 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 18 (testimony of Colonel Jeff Smith). 42 1993 GAO Report at 7. 43 E-mail correspondence from William Carwile, DHS, to Craig Fugate, Director, Florida Division of Emergency Management (Aug. 30, 2005). 44 Id. 45 Jan. 23, 2006 Lokey Interview. 46 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 47 NRP. 48 Southeast LA Planning Project. 49 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by U.S. Coast Guard in Washington, DC (Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 10, 2006 Coast Guard Briefi ng].
148 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
50 Id. 51 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: a Flooded City, a Chaotic Response Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Oct. 20, 2005) at 9-13 (testimony of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, FEMA) [hereinafter Oct. 20, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing]; Jan. 10, 2006 Coast Guard Briefi ng.
52 Jan. 10, 2006 Coast Guard Briefi ng. 53 E-mail correspondence from Michael Inzer, HSOC, to Bethany Nichols, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (12:02 p.m.) [hereinafter Aug. 30, 2005 Inzer
E-mail]; Aug. 29, 2005 HSOC Spot Report. 54 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005); Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing
at 70-73 (testimony of Philip Parr). 55 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview. 56 Letters from Select Comm. to Andrew H. Card, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, Sept. 30, Oct. 13, and Dec. 1, 2005. 57 Letters from Select Comm. to I. Lewis Libby, Jr., then Chief of Staff to the Vice President, Oct. 13, 2005, and to David S. Addington, Counsel to
the Vice President, Oct. 4 and Dec. 7, 2005. 58 The Executive Offi ce of the President produced 16,482 pages of documents and the Offi ce of the Vice President produced 6,348 pages of
documents. 59 Hurricane Katrina – Policy Coordination Framework for Response, Offi ce of the Vice President document supplied to the Select Comm. 60 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by the White House in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 26, 2006 White House Briefi ng]. 61 Aug. 28, 2005 York E-mail. 62 Aug. 29, 2005 Akers E-mail; DHS National Infrastructure Simulation & Analysis Center, Fast Analysis Report (Update to Refl ect Category 5 Status)
to DHS IP on Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast (Aug. 28, 2005). 63 Id. at 1. 64 E-mail correspondence from Stephen York, DHS, to Andrew Akers, HSOC SWO, et al. (Aug. 28, 2005) (12:14 p.m.); Homeland Security
Operations Center, Diagrams of New Orleans Levee Systems and Scenarios. 65 E-mail correspondence from Insung Lee, HSOC, to Frank DiFalco, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (2:20 p.m.). HSOC report received at the White House
Aug. 29, 2005 at 2:20 p.m. 66 E-mail correspondence from Tom Holz, to Bethany Nichols, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (6:13 p.m.); HSOC, Hurricane Katrina SITREP #7. HSOC
report received at the White House, Aug. 29, 2005 at 6:13 p.m. 67 Aug. 30, 2005 Inzer E-mail; Aug. 29, 2005 HSOC Spot Report. 68 Id. 69 Jan. 27, 2006 White House Briefi ng. 70 Oct. 20, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing (testimony of Marty Bahamonte, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region One, FEMA). 71 Id. at 27. 72 Id. 73 Id at 28. 74 Id. 75 Jan. 27, 2006 White House Briefi ng. 76 Id. 77 Id. 78 Daily Video Teleconference amongst offi cials dated Sept. 2, 2005 [hereinafter Sept. 2, 2005 Daily Video Teleconference]. 79 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 213
(testimony of Michael Brown, then Director of FEMA) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 80 David D. Kirkpatrick and Scott Shane, “Ex-FEMA Chief Tells of Frustration and Chaos,” The New York Times, Sept. 15, 2005, A1. 81 Id. 82 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 104. 83 Sept. 2, 2005 Daily Video Teleconference. 84 Jan. 26, 2006 White House Briefi ng. 85 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, ESF #3 Field Guide (June 2001). 86 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by Department of Transportation in Washington, DC on Oct. 31, 2005; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Washington, DC on Oct. 28, 2005. 87 NRP at 5. 88 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 70-72 (testimony of Philip Parr). 89 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Alabama Offi cials in Clanton and Montgomery, AL on October 11-12, 2005. 90 Beverly Bell, NEMA, “EMAC Strides in 2005 Set a Precedent for Future,” (Jan. 30, 2006) http;//www.mema.org/newsletterwork/temamain.
html. 91 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Louisiana Offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 92 See Emacweb.org. 93 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Louisiana Offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 94 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec.7, 2005) at 2 (statement
of Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Mississippi). 95 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA Offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 96 Id. 97 Hearing on Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy Before the Subcomm. On Nuclear
Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence of the Senate Comm. on Armed Forces, 103rd Cong. (May 25, 1993) at 11-12 (statement of J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller General) [hereinafter May 25, 1993 Senate Armed Forces Comm. Hearing].
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 149
98 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., Pub. No. GAO/RCED-93-186, Disaster Management: Improving the Nation’s Response to Catastrophic Disasters, 2 (July 1993) [hereinafter 1993 GAO Report].
99 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170(a)-(b), 5192 (2005) [hereinafter Stafford Act]. 100 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Edward Buikema, former Acting Director of Response, FEMA [hereinafter Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema
Interview], in Washington, DC (Jan. 6, 2006). 101 E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, to Thomas Kuster, CIV, OSD-Policy (Sept. 2,
2005) (9:38 a.m.). 102 DOD and FEMA, MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina, on fi le with the Select Comm., No. MMTF 00028-05. 103 Correspondence from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, to Chairman Davis (Jan. 25, 2006). 104 Jan. 6, 2006 Buikema Interview.
150 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“FEMA pushed forward with everything it had in order to
help the states respond after landfall …Every single team,
every single program of FEMA, was pushed to its limit to
respond to Hurricane Katrina.”
Michael D. Brown
Former FEMA Director, Select Committee Hearing,
September 27, 2005
F E
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FEMA PREPAREDNESS
DHS and the states were not prepared for this catastrophic event
Summary
It is clear the federal government in general and the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in particular
were not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects
of Hurricane Katrina. There is also evidence, however,
that in some respects, FEMA’s response was greater than
it has ever been, suggesting the truly catastrophic nature
of Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed a federal response
capability that under less catastrophic circumstances
would have succeeded.
Nevertheless, DHS’ actual and perceived weaknesses
in response to Katrina revived discussion of the value
of incorporation of FEMA into DHS. Many experts and
Members of Congress debated the policy and operational
ramifi cations of bringing FEMA into DHS during
consideration of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA).
The HSA transferred FEMA functions, personnel,
resources, and authorities to the DHS Emergency
Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate. The
emergency management community has complained
since 2003 that FEMA was being systematically
dismantled, stripped of authority and resources, and
suffering from low morale, in part because of the
Department’s focus on terrorism. Others have said that
FEMA’s placement in DHS enabled the Secretary of
Homeland Security to augment FEMA’s resources
with other DHS personnel and assets, all within an
integrated command structure.
The cycle of emergency management begins with
preparedness and mitigation, fl ows into response,
and ends with recovery. The four cornerstones
to comprehensive emergency management
— preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation
— are interdependent and all vital to successful
emergency management.
Preparedness encompasses those pre-disaster
activities that develop and maintain an ability to
respond rapidly and effectively to emergencies
and disasters. All levels of government need to be
prepared to respond to disasters. International Association
of Emergency Managers President Dewayne West
described preparedness as “what emergency managers
do every day in order to be able to respond.”1 Emergency
management offi cials at different levels of the government
expressed concerns that distancing preparedness efforts
from response, recovery, and mitigation operations could
result in an ineffective and uncoordinated response.2
Following Hurricane Katrina, emergency management
professionals in the Gulf coast region have questioned
whether DHS and state preparedness for catastrophic
events has declined over the past years due to
organizational changes within DHS and a shift in
programmatic priorities. In particular, the decline in
preparedness has been seen as a result of the separation
of the preparedness function from FEMA, the drain of
long-term professional staff along with their institutional
knowledge and expertise, and the diminished readiness of
FEMA’s national emergency response teams.
In the Gulf coast region, emergency managers expressed
the view that FEMA’s disaster response capabilities
had declined since its inclusion in DHS, in part due to
subsequent organizational changes within DHS and FEMA.
The emergency management community has suggested
that FEMA’s readiness for a large disaster has declined
despite extensive preparedness initiatives within the federal
government, pointing to the separation of preparedness
functions from response, recovery, and mitigation.
F E
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152 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Additionally, the tremendous damage and scale of
Hurricane Katrina placed extraordinary demands on the
federal response system and exceeded the capabilities and
readiness of DHS and FEMA in a number of important
areas, particularly in the area of staffi ng. The response to
Hurricane Katrina required large numbers of qualifi ed
personnel at a time when FEMA’s professional ranks had
declined. FEMA response offi cials in both Mississippi
and Louisiana testifi ed that the department’s inability
to fi eld suffi cient numbers of qualifi ed personnel had a
major impact on federal response operations. In addition,
FEMA had lost, since 2002, a number of its top disaster
specialists, senior leaders, and experienced personnel,
described as “FEMA brain drain.” Many emergency
management professionals had predicted this ‘drain’
would have a negative impact on the federal government’s
ability to manage disasters of all types.
In addition, emergency management professionals
said the degraded readiness of FEMA’s national emergency
response teams reduced the effectiveness of the federal
response to Hurricane Katrina. The diminished readiness of
the national emergency response teams has been attributed
to a lack of funding for training exercises and equipment.
Emergency management professionals note the need for
trained people, who have experience working together with
their federal colleagues and state counterparts prior to a
disaster, as a part of national emergency response teams.
Emergency responders should not meet each other for the
fi rst time right before or after a major catastrophe. A decline
in the readiness of these teams along with appropriate
staffi ng added to an ineffective response.
Finding: While a majority of state and local preparedness grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this does not preclude a dual use application
The “all hazard” versus “just terrorism” debate plays out in
the interpretation of permissible uses for homeland security
grant funding and efforts to make equipment purchases
and exercise scenarios fi t terrorism-related criteria while
still being of some general use in day-to-day emergency
response. For example, funding to exercise response
capabilities for WMD-related scenarios might be used to
test evacuation planning and other “all hazard” response
functions, with the WMD element little more than pretext.
This concern is evident at the local level. Alabama
conducts or participates in approximately 50 training
exercises each year ranging from “table top,” classroom-
like discussions to full scale exercises involving all
members of the emergency management community,
including federal, state, and local offi cials. According to
Alabama offi cials, federal DHS funding restrictions dictate
that almost all of these exercises involve a terrorism-based
threat or scenario, despite the fact that all emergencies
largely involve the same set of procedures — evacuations,
loss of power, communications diffi culties, need
for shelter, food, and water, and inter-governmental
coordination.3
State offi cials also
voiced a concern
that in the post-9/11
environment undue
emphasis is placed
on terrorism-based
hazards.4 Alabama’s
hazard risk profi le
includes terrorism,
but state emergency
management offi cials
believe natural
disasters pose a much
more likely, perhaps
inevitable, risk.5 Although lately, hurricanes have hit
the state with some regularity, Alabama is susceptible
to a wide variety of other natural disasters, including
earthquakes, tornadoes, fl oods, and droughts. With
nuclear facilities located within the state, Alabama
Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) offi cials are also
on alert for nuclear-related emergencies. Special plans
and precautions have also been funded to prepare for
risks posed by an Army chemical weapons storage and
incineration facility.6
According to Colonel Terry Ebbert, the Director of
Homeland Security & Public Safety for the City of New
Orleans, DHS’ all hazards focus is unsubstantiated.
[T]he Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness restricted
any use of grant funding for preparing,
equipping, training, and exercising to enhance
the preparedness of fi rst responders operating in
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 153
a potential WMD environment. Most allowable
expenditures under the UASI program remain
closely linked to the WMD threat to the exclusion
of many other forms of enhanced readiness.7
When Ebbert submitted a request to purchase a
number of inexpensive, fl at-bottomed, aluminum boats
to equip his fi re and police departments, with the intent
of having them available to rescue people trapped by
fl ooding, the request was denied. Ebbert concluded that
the rules on what is permitted and reimbursable are
unaltered while the newly stated focus on an “all hazards”
approach to preparedness remains “elusive.”8 Ebbert
recommended that “existing limitations imposed on the
availability of Federal preparedness funding should be
broadened.”9
DHS offi cials are particularly sensitive to the charge
that the agency has stopped state and local governments
from purchasing equipment not exclusively suited to
terrorism preparedness. Former Offi ce of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP) Director Suzanne Mencer stressed
the dual use capability of many grants: “The grants don’t
prohibit a city from buying equipment for use in a natural
disaster if it can also be used in a terrorist attack.”10
Mencer said some locals see the WMD wording and think
it prohibits items, such as radios, that could also be used
in a natural disaster: “They can still meet their needs in
almost all instances if they look at the broader picture and
not [just] the wording in the grant.”11 When asked about
state and local complaints in Alabama and elsewhere,
former director of ODP’s Preparedness Programs Division,
Tim Beres, noted that in fi scal 2004, grants paid for
more than $1 billion worth of dual-use equipment,
including $925 million for interoperable communications
equipment and $140 million in chemical protection
suits.12
DHS continues to develop and refi ne its guidelines
to states and localities, in accordance with Presidential
Directives, which require grants to be used in support of
catastrophic events regardless of their cause.13 Although
a July 2005 Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO)
report found many state preparedness offi cials and local
fi rst responders believed DHS planners focused excessively
on anti-terrorism criteria in their grant, training, and
exercise programs, the auditors concluded that 30 of
the 36 essential capabilities fi rst responders need to
fulfi ll the critical tasks generated by the department’s
15 catastrophic emergency planning scenarios would
apply to both terrorist and non-terrorist incidents.14 The
GAO auditors concluded that DHS planning supported
an all hazards approach.15 Indeed, according to GAO
auditors, in response to state and local complaints that
DHS required too much emphasis on terrorism-related
activities, DHS increasingly promoted fl exibility to allow
greater dual usage within the grant program requirements
for fi scal year 2005.
DHS’ growing dual use fl exibility is refl ected in its most
recent grant guidelines. Specifi cally, the FY2006 guidance
points out the numerous dual-use target capabilities
(identifi ed in the National Preparedness Goal) to be
attained through DHS grant funding.16 The guidance
further states:
[f]unding remains primarily focused on enhancing
capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond
to, or recover from CBRNE [Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Conventional Explosives],
agriculture, and cyber terrorism incidents. However,
in light of several major new national planning
priorities, which address such issues as pandemic
infl uenza and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
the allowable scope of SHSP [State Homeland
Security Program] activities include catastrophic
events, provided that these activities also build
capabilities that relate to terrorism.17
Finding: Despite extensive preparedness initiatives, DHS was not prepared to respond to the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina
As a result of various changes within DHS and FEMA, the
emergency management community suggested FEMA’s
preparedness and readiness for a large disaster would
decline despite extensive preparedness initiatives within
the federal government. For example, during an April
2005 House Subcommittee hearing on DHS preparedness
efforts, Dave Liebersbach, then President of the National
Emergency Management Association (NEMA), expressed
154 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
his fear that DHS’ de-emphasis of hazards other than
terrorism would result in FEMA’s inability to respond to a
major disaster:18
My concern is we are not going to be able to
maintain [capabilities]. I honestly believe . . .
that if the hurricane scenario of September 2004
that occurred in the Southeastern U.S., [happens]
fi ve years from now, we will fail the way we are
going, because the success of that response, of
that hurricane season, was based on the programs
that had come before . . . . As we are moving
forward, that legacy is going to drop if we don’t pay
attention to dealing with that.19
Similar issues were raised during the establishment of
the department by various fi rst responder professional
associations and think tanks, Members of Congress from
both political parties, the Government Accountability
Offi ce, and the Congressional Research Service.20
One of the
primary reasons for
creating FEMA in
1979 was to closely
link preparedness,
response, and mitigation
within one organization.21 During consideration of the
Homeland Security Act in 2002, the President proposed
that all terrorism preparedness functions be consolidated
into FEMA’s Offi ce of National Preparedness and be
managed within the Emergency Preparedness and
Response Directorate (EP&R) of the proposed department.
The intention was to provide a one-stop shop for state
and local governments and achieve a unifi ed approach
to disaster response. Instead Congress opted to split
preparedness functions between the Offi ce of Domestic
Preparedness (ODP), which was to be transferred
to DHS from the Justice Department, and EP&R (or
FEMA).22 The goal was to place terrorism preparedness
in an organization, ODP, with a strong law enforcement
background and relationship with that community.
In late 2003, the debate over the need for a one-stop
shop for fi rst responder grants and to unite preparedness
with the other functions of comprehensive emergency
management continued. When DHS Secretary Tom Ridge
proposed to transfer most state and local grant programs
to ODP, the emergency management community again
cautioned the capabilities of state and local governments
and FEMA to respond to all disasters would suffer.23
Ridge and his aides “believed FEMA should be a response
and recovery agency, not a preparedness agency. In an
age of terrorism, they argued, preparedness needed a law
enforcement component, to prevent and protect as well as
get ready to respond.”24
The proposal prompted then FEMA Director
Michael Brown to urge Ridge not to further distance
preparedness from response as it “can result in an
ineffective and uncoordinated response . . . [would]
shatter agency morale and would completely disconnect
the Department’s response functions from the responders
and governments they are supposed to support.”25 Brown
was overruled and the programs were transferred to ODP,
which was then incorporated into the newly created
Offi ce of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (SLGCP).
The controversy over how to manage disaster
preparedness increased with incoming Secretary Michael
Chertoff’s Second Stage Review. Chertoff argued the
federal government’s preparedness efforts needed to
be enhanced, particularly for catastrophic disasters,
and that could be best achieved by consolidating
the department’s preparedness functions into a new
Preparedness Directorate. In a letter opposing the move,
NEMA criticized the department’s “total lack of focus on
natural-hazards preparedness” and argued that separating
preparedness from response and recovery would
break emergency management’s cycle of continuous
improvement and result in disjointed and ineffective
response operations.26
While Brown agreed with the need to increase
catastrophic planning (FEMA had originally proposed
the catastrophic preparedness program that funded the
Hurricane Pam process), he strongly disagreed with
Chertoff’s recommended solution of removing FEMA’s
remaining preparedness functions and transferring them
to ODP, which would then be elevated to a Preparedness
Directorate. Instead, Brown drafted a 13-page memo to
Chertoff urging the consolidation of all preparedness
functions into the Emergency Preparedness & Response
Directorate, as originally proposed by President Bush, in
order to “ensure that capabilities and procedures trained
will be identical to the capabilities and procedures
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actually applied during a real event.”27 As Brown
described it, “These recent organizational changes [the
transfer of several FEMA preparedness programs to
ODP in Secretary Tom Ridge’s reorganization plan of
September 2003] have divided what was intended to be
one, all-hazards preparedness mission into two artifi cially
separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural
disasters.”28
Some experts do, however, endorse the consolidation
of preparedness efforts. Last December, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and the Heritage
Foundation released a joint study called “DHS 2.0,” in
which the authors suggested adding a new undersecretary
for preparedness with direct access to the secretary.29 Such
a move, they said, would speed preparedness decisions
past layers of bureaucracy. And in a September 1, 2005
Washington Post article, at the height of the Katrina
response effort, Paul C. Light, an authority on government
operations at New York University, also endorsed
Chertoff’s proposed reforms.30
In a December 7, 2005 report entitled “The Truth
About FEMA: Analysis and Proposals,” Heritage
Foundation homeland security expert James Carafano
and the Hudson Institute’s Richard Weitz argued that
Chertoff’s proposed reorganization would address many
of the shortfalls created by placing FEMA within DHS.31 At
the same time, they said it would preserve the advantages
of having most major federal disaster-related preparedness
and response activities, for both man-made and natural
disasters, concentrated in one department.32 The authors
pointed out that in the event of large-scale disasters, FEMA
could be reinforced by other assets from within DHS.”33
In testimony before the Select Committee, Chertoff
explained his rationale for integrating the Department’s
existing preparedness efforts in to a single directorate for
Preparedness:
Preparedness is not just about response and
recovery — rather, it must draw on the full
spectrum — from prevention through protection to
response. Our preparedness directorate will rely on
the expertise of FEMA, but it will also integrate the
experience of the Coast Guard, our Infrastructure
Protection division, our intelligence units, and our
other operational assets . . . FEMA will become a
direct report to the Secretary, allowing it to focus
on response and recovery while partnering with
the new preparedness directorate to increase our
overall capabilities . . . FEMA must also continue
to function as an all-hazards agency, leveraging
entities within the preparedness directorate,
including Infrastructure Protection, the Offi ce
of Domestic Preparedness, and State and Local
Government Coordination.34
Although many in the emergency management
community opposed Chertoff’s preparedness
consolidation, many fi rst responder groups support
it. For example, in a press release issued immediately
following the release of Chertoff’s Second Stage Review,
the International Association of Fire Chiefs applauded
the proposal, particularly the creation of a Preparedness
Directorate.35
Finding: DHS and FEMA lacked adequate trained and experienced staff for the Katrina response
Brown’s memorandum also identifi ed budget cuts
and organizational changes he believed were harming
FEMA’s ability to perform its statutory responsibility of
leading the federal government’s response to all disasters,
including terrorist attacks. For example, Brown claimed
“These recent organizational changes have divided what was intended to be one,
all-hazards preparedness mission into two artifi cially separate preparedness categories of terrorism and natural disasters.”
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FEMA’s operational budget baseline (for non-Stafford Act
disaster funding) had been permanently reduced by 14.8
percent since joining DHS in 2003. In addition to the
permanent baseline reduction, he claimed FEMA lost $80
million and $90 million in fi scal years 2003 and 2004
respectively from its operating budget.36 Brown argued
these budget reductions were preventing FEMA offi cials
from maintaining adequate levels of trained and ready
staff.
Brown also said FEMA no longer managed numerous
functions that were essential to meeting its statutory
responsibilities, and therefore did not have the tools to
successfully accomplish its mission. For example, the
National Response Plan is a fundamental element of
coordinating the federal government’s response to disasters.
Given FEMA’s response mission, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 specifi cally assigned FEMA responsibility for
“consolidating existing Federal Government emergency
response plans into a single, coordinated national response
plan.”37 However, instead of assigning this function to the
organization responsible for executing the plan during a
disaster (i.e. FEMA), the department initially assigned it
to the Transportation Security Administration, which then
relied on an outside contractor.
When some in the fi rst responder community reacted
negatively to the contractor’s draft plan, the department
transferred the NRP’s development to another area of the
department, the Integration Staff within the Secretary’s
offi ce. The resulting plan made a number of departures
from the existing Federal Response Plan, including the
introduction of the Incident of National Signifi cance
(INS), the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), the Interagency
Incident Management Group (IIMG), the Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC), and the Catastrophic
Incident Annex (NRP-CIA).38 The emergency management
community expressed concerns about each of these newly
created structures, which ultimately proved problematic or
experienced diffi culties achieving their intended purposes
during the response to Hurricane Katrina.
Brown also identifi ed what he believed were the most
important goals for achieving FEMA’s mission of leading
the federal government’s response to disasters. Several
of the issues he identifi ed for improvement proved to
be critical problem areas in the Katrina response. The
requirements he identifi ed in March 2005 included the
following:39
1. Improve logistics capability and asset visibility.
2. Implement a comprehensive and integrated multi-year
catastrophic planning strategy.40
3. Establish a National Incident Management System
Integration Center to improve command and control
capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels.
4. Recruit, train, credential, deploy and retain a disaster
workforce with the appropriate skill mix and
management structure to support the operational
requirements of all disaster related functions.
5. Ensure appropriate numbers, skills, and grades of
employees to support current and long-term mission
needs.
Senior DHS and Offi ce of Management and Budget
offi cials vigorously dispute the claim that FEMA’s budget
has been cut at all. They argue that any transfers from
the FEMA budget refl ect the transfer of functions carried
out by DHS for FEMA, start up costs of the Department,
and the use of unobligated funds. According to Andrew
Maner, Chief Financial Offi cer for DHS, the core of the
budget adjustments cannot be classifi ed as permanent
reductions to FEMA’s base budget, as Brown claims.41 For
example, Maner said the transfer of $30.6 million was a
transfer of unobligated balances from the 2002 Olympic
Games to help fund the start-up of the new Department.
The transfer of such unobligated balances was authorized
by Congress in H.J. Res. 124, which became law on
November 23, 2002 (P.L. 107-294), to pay for “the
salaries and expenses associated with the initiation of
the Department.”42 Also, Maner noted the $28 million
transfer to ODP refl ects efforts to complete the transfer
of funds accompanying former FEMA functions that have
been assumed by other DHS entities.43
Regardless of the impact, if any, of these budget
adjustments on FEMA capabilities, the tremendous
damage and scale of Hurricane Katrina placed
extraordinary demands on the federal response system
and exceeded the capabilities and readiness of DHS
and FEMA in a number of important areas, including
staffi ng. Hurricane Katrina consisted of three separate
major disaster declarations, three separate statewide
fi eld operations, two directly-affected FEMA regional
operations, and the full activation of national level
resources such as the National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC), the HSOC, and the IIMG. In addition,
most FEMA regional offi ces were actively supporting
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 157
Katrina operations or assisting their regions receive Gulf
Coast evacuees. These operations required large numbers
of qualifi ed personnel from what had become a relatively
small agency of approximately 2,500 positions.
FEMA response offi cials in both Mississippi and
Louisiana testifi ed that the department’s inability to fi eld
suffi cient numbers of qualifi ed personnel had a major
impact on federal response operations.44 The Federal
Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in Mississippi, Bill Carwile,
described how managing the personnel shortfall was
perhaps his most diffi cult challenge. While he was able
to deploy division supervisors to the coastal counties, he
needed similar qualifi ed employees for the devastated
cities of Gulfport, Biloxi, and Pascagoula. Ultimately,
FEMA offi cials turned to federal agencies like the U.S.
Forest Service and city fi refi ghters from across the country
to staff FEMA positions in the state.
Despite those measures, Carwile stated, “We never had
suffi cient personnel to meet requirements.”45 According
to Scott Wells, Deputy FCO for Louisiana, a 90-person
FEMA regional offi ce “is woefully inadequate” to perform
its two primary disaster functions, operating a regional
response coordination center and deploying people to
staff emergency response teams in the fi eld.46 “You cannot
do both. Pick one,” he said.47 Wells added, “We had
enough staff for our advance team to do maybe half of
what we needed to do for a day shift….We did not have
the people. We did not have the expertise. We did not have
the operational training folks that we needed to do our
mission.”48
In addition to having an inadequate number of
qualifi ed personnel, FEMA had lost a number of its top
disaster specialists, senior leaders, and most experienced
personnel. Both critics and supporters of FEMA’s merger
with DHS have acknowledged “FEMA brain drain”
in recent years and its negative impact on the federal
government’s ability to manage disasters of all types.49
Since 2003, for example, the three directors of FEMA’s
preparedness, response, and recovery divisions had left the
agency, and departures and retirements thinned FEMA’s
ranks of experienced professionals. At the time Hurricane
Katrina struck, FEMA had about 500 vacancies and eight
out of its ten regional directors were working in an acting
capacity.50
At least two factors account for FEMA’s loss of seasoned
veterans. First, like other government agencies, many of
FEMA’s long-term professionals are reaching retirement
age.51 And second, job satisfaction was second to last in
2005, according to the Partnership for Public Service,
a nonprofi t group that promotes careers in federal
government.52 Regardless of the reasons for the exodus,
Brown and senior DHS offi cials were unable to maintain
their ranks of disaster professionals, through employee
retention, development, or recruitment, and this failure
hindered the response to Hurricane Katrina.53
The disastrous effect of this manpower shortage was
compounded in Hurricane Katrina by the diffi culty of
getting federal workers where they needed to be because
of security concerns. In Louisiana, media reports and
rumors of violence and general lawlessness delayed the
deployment and placement of federal response workers.
The Governor’s Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin said there
were approximately 1,000 FEMA employees deployed and
on their way to New Orleans Wednesday, August 31, 2005,
many of whom turned back due to security concerns.54
Ultimately, FEMA offi cials turned to federal agencies like the U.S. Forest Service and city fi refi ghters from across the country to staff FEMA positions in the state.
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Finding: The readiness of FEMA’s National Emergency response teams was inadequate and reduced the effectiveness of the federal response
One of the most critical links in the federal response
system is the team of FEMA personnel that deploys to a
disaster site to establish a unifi ed command with state
offi cials and directs federal operations. These national
emergency response teams are the conduits through which
federal disaster assistance is requested by and delivered
to a state. They are intended to be on call and deploy at a
moment’s notice, since many disasters provide no advance
warning. In prior years, according to Carwile, “We were
then able to build a team to about 125 individuals, hand
picked, from around the country, and we were able to
routinely exercise that team because we had the funding
in place to do so on the plan, against several scenarios.”55
The team had a robust operational plan, was sent to the
Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, and received dedicated
satellite communications equipment. It appeared to
be a well-equipped, well-trained team at a high state of
readiness.56
Carwile testifi ed that by 2004, the readiness of FEMA’s
emergency response teams had plummeted dramatically.57
Funding for the teams dried up after 2002. They lost their
dedicated communications equipment. Teams were split
up into ever smaller units. Team training and exercises
ceased.
In a June 30, 2004 memorandum, FEMA’s top disaster
response operators, the cadre of Federal Coordinating
Offi cers, warned then FEMA Director Brown that the
national emergency response teams were unprepared
because no funding was available for training exercises
or equipment.58 In a few short years, FEMA’s emergency
response teams had been reduced to names on a roster.
It appears no actions were taken to address the problems
identifi ed in the memorandum.
Asked whether or not implementing the
recommendations would have made a difference in
Katrina, Carwile responded, “I felt very fortunate because
many of my colleagues with me in Mississippi had been
with me on a national team in years past. It was kind of
coincidental . . . but I can’t help but believe that trained
and ready teams, people who have worked together,
would not have made some difference in a positive
way.”59 Wells described the situation in Louisiana in
this way: “We need to really train together as a team.
We need to work as a team. What you have with this
National Response Plan in the fi eld is we have no unity of
command.”60
The requirement for trained people, who have
experience working together with their federal colleagues
and their state counterparts, is a constant theme of federal,
state, and local emergency professionals. Numerous
offi cials and operators, from state and FEMA directors to
local emergency managers told the same story: if members
of the state and federal emergency response teams are
meeting one another for the fi rst time at the operations
center, then you should not expect a well-coordinated
response.61
Conclusion
For years emergency management professionals have
been warning that FEMA’s preparedness has eroded. Many
believe this erosion is a result of the separation of the
preparedness function from FEMA, the drain of long-term
professional staff along with their institutional knowledge
and expertise, and the inadequate readiness of FEMA’s
national emergency response teams. The combination
of these staffi ng, training, and organizational structures
made FEMA’s inadequate performance in the face of a
disaster the size of Katrina all but inevitable. ■
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 159
1 International Ass’n of Emergency Managers, Press Release: IAEM Announces Recommendations for Improved Emergency Response, (Oct. 25, 2005) (on fi le with Select Comm.).
2 Hearing on The National Preparedness System: What are we preparing for? Before the House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency Management, 109th Cong. (Apr. 14, 2005) at 61-62 (statement of Dave Liebersbach, Pres., Nat’l Emergency Mgmt. Assoc.) [hereinafter Apr. 14 Preparing Hearing]; Memorandum from Michael Brown, Dir., FEMA to Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dept. of Homeland Sec. (March 2005) [hereinafter March 2005 Brown Memo]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Ed Buikema, Dir., Response Div., FEMA, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 2006).
3 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) at 75 (statement of Bruce Baughman, Dir., Ala. State Emergency Mgmt. Agency) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005, Select Comm. Hearing].
4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with senior AL emergency management offi cials, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005). 5 Id. 6 Nov. 9, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 75 (statement of Bruce Baughman, Dir., Ala. State Emergency Mgmt. Agency). 7 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 174
(written statement of Col. (Ret.) Terry Ebbert, Dir., Homeland Sec. for New Orleans) [hereinafter statement of Terry Ebbert] [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
8 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 174 (statement of Terry Ebbert). 9 Id. at 174-75 (statement of Terry Ebbert). 10 Shane Harris, Federal Emphasis on Terrorist Threat Frustrates Local Disaster Response Offi cials, NAT’L JOURNAL, Oct. 20, 2005 at 4 available at
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/102005nj1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Directive on Management of Domestic Incidents, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 280 (Feb. 28, 2003) (Known as Homeland Security
Presidential Directive/HSPD-5); Directive on Management of National Preparedness, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1822 (Dec. 17, 2003) (Known as Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8).
14 Government Accountability Offi ce [hereinafter GAO], Pub. No. GAO-05-652, Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve (July 2005) 26-30.
15 Id. at 39-41. 16 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., FY 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit, (Dec. 2005). Those capabilities
include planning, community preparedness and participation, communications, critical infrastructure protection, on-site incident management, citizen protection: evacuation and in-place protection, emergency operations center management, critical resource logistics and distribution, urban search and rescue, volunteer management, emergency public information and warning, responder safety and health, triage and pre-hospital treatment, public safety and security response, medical surge; medical supplies management and distribution, environmental health, mass prophylaxis, mass care, fi refi ghting operations and support, hazardous material response, structural damage assessment and mitigation, economic and community recovery, restoration of lifelines. Id.
17 Id. 18 Apr. 14 Preparing Hearing at 90 (statement of Dave Liebersbach, Pres., Nat’l Emergency Mgmt. Ass’n). 19 Id. 20 GAO, GAO-03-119, High-Risk Series: An Update (Jan. 2003); Congressional Research Service [hereinafter CRS], Rep. No. 31670, Transfer of FEMA
to the Department of Homeland Security: Issues for Congressional Oversight [hereinafter CRS Rep. No. 31670] at 5 (Dec. 17, 2002). 21 Exec. Order No. 12127, 3 C.F.R. 1979 (1979); Exec. Order No 12,148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (1979). 22 CRS Rep. No. 31670 at 5 (2002). 23 March 2005 Brown Memo; Letter from Michael Brown, Dir., FEMA to Tom Ridge, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 15, 2003); National
Emergency Mgmt Ass’n, Priority Congressional Issues: 2004 Mid Year Conference, (Feb. 10-13, 2004). 24 Spencer S. Hsu and Julie Tate, Brown’s Turf Wars Sapped FEMA’s Strength, WASH. POST., Dec. 22, 2005. 25 Letter from Michael Brown, Dir., FEMA to Tom Ridge, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 15, 2003). 26 Letter from David Liebersbach, Pres., Nat’l Emergency Mgmt. Ass’n to Honorable Don Young and Honorable James Oberstar (July 27, 2005). 27 March 2005 Brown Memo. 28 March 2005 Brown Memo. 29 James J. Carafano and David Heyman, THE HERITAGE FOUND, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Dec. 13, 2004 at 14. 30 Paul C. Light, Katrina’s Lesson in Readiness, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005 at A29. 31 James Carafano, Ph.D., and Richard Weitz, Ph.D., THE HERITAGE FOUND, The Truth About FEMA: Analysis and Proposals, Dec. 7, 2005. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Department of Homeland Security Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 19, 2005) at 4-5 (written
statement of Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.). 35 Press Release, Int’l Assoc. of Fire Chiefs, Secretary Chertoff Announces Reorganization, Plans for DHS (Aug. 1, 2005) (on fi le with Select Comm.). 36 March 2005 Brown Memo. 37 Homeland Sec. Act of 2002, Pub. L. No 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 38 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Nat’l Response Plan (Dec. 2004). 39 March 2005 Brown Memo. 40 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff with Madhu Beriwal, Pres., Innovative Emergency Mgmt., in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 2006) (discussing how
funding for FEMA staff to participate in subsequent Hurricane Pam implementation workshops had been cut). 41 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff with Andrew Maner, Chief Fin. Offi cer, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 18, 2006) [hereinafter
Briefi ng with Andrew Maner].
160 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
42 Briefi ng with Andrew Maner; FEMA, Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005 (Jan. 18, 2006) (on fi le with Select Comm.). 43 According to OMB data, a total of 448 employees (full-time equivalents, or FTEs) were transferred from FEMA to various DHS offi ces in 2003:
• 42 FTEs were transferred from FEMA’s salaries and expenses budget account to DHS’s Departmental Operations account; • 206 FTEs were transferred from FEMA’s Working Capital Fund to DHS’s Working Capital Fund; and • 200 FTEs were transferred from FEMA’s Offi ce of Inspector General to DHS’s Offi ce of Inspector General. (GAO, GAO-04-329R, Transfer of
Budgetary Resources to the Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (DHS) at 22 (Apr. 30, 2004) (on fi le with Select. Comm)). And since the establishment of the Department, the following programs have been transferred from FEMA to other Departmental entities
(OMB, Funding Chart (Oct. 4, 2005) (on fi le with Select Comm.): • Emergency Management Performance Grants • National Strategic Stockpile • Citizen Corps • Other grants for emergency management • Inspector General • FIRE Act Grants • First Responder Grants • Metropolitan Medical Response System grants
Moreover, according to information provided to the Select Comm. by DHS, the funding transfers that Brown referenced in his testimony Before the Select Comm. break down as follows (Briefi ng with Andrew Maner; FEMA, Reductions to FEMA Base, FY 2003-2005 (Jan. 18, 2006) (on fi le with Select Comm.)):
FY 2003 – • Unobligated balances from FY 2002 – $30.6 million (Id.) (DHS start-up costs) • FY 2003 appropriations – $12 million (DHS start-up costs) (Of the $12 million in FY 2003 appropriations, $10 million had been allocated
for Salaries and Expenses for preparedness functions and $2 million had been allocated for the programs of another management account – Emergency Management Planning and Assistance.)
• Transfer of Offi ce for National Preparedness functions to Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness/Bureau of Transportation Security - $10.6 million • Transfer to the Transportation Security Administration to fund a shortfall from the Liberty Shield Supplemental – $5.5 million • Transfer to the DHS Offi ce of Inspector General for audits and investigations of the Disaster Relief Fund – $21.4 million FY 2004 – • FEMA share of DHS e-government initiatives (mostly to maintain DisasterHelp.gov website) – $2.6 million • FEMA share of other DHS central services – $2.8 million • Transfer to Inspector General for audits and investigations of the Disaster Relief Fund – $22 million • National preparedness functions transferred to ODP – $28 million • General reduction to base funding for Departmental management – $34 million FY 2005 – • Reduction for management cost savings realized from effi ciencies attributable to the creation of DHS – $11.7 million • $18,501 million for Working Capital Fund
44 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina Response and Initial Recovery Operations: Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 7 (written statement of William Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, State of Miss.) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]; Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operational Professionals Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 57-58 (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy, FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, State of LA) [hereinafter Perspectives of FEMA Hearing].
45 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 7 (written statement of William Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, State of Miss.). 46 Perspectives of FEMA Hearing at 57 (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy, FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, State of LA) [hereinafter statement of
Scott Wells]. 47 Id. 48 Id. at 57-58. 49 Spencer Hsu, Leaders Lacking Disaster Experience, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2005 at A1. 50 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with William Lokey, FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 26, 2006); FEMA Regions I, II, III,
IV, V, VI, VIII, and IX with Acting Directors; See, e.g., Region VIII Acting Director, available at http://www.fema.gov/about/bios/maurstad.shtm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
51 Justin Rood, FEMA’s Decline: An Agency’s Slow Slide From Grace, GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE (Oct.1, 2005). 52 www.ourpublicservice.org/usr_doc/2003-rankings.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 53 Id. 54 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff, Offi ce of the Governor of LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 6, 2005). 55 Perspectives of FEMA Hearing at 60 (statement of William Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, State of Miss.) [hereinafter
statement of William Carwile]. 56 Id. at 60. 57 Id. at 65-68. 58 Id. at 59 (statement of Senator Joseph Lieberman). 59 Id.. at 67 (statement of William Carwile). 60 Id. at 58 (statement of Scott Wells). 61 See id. at 67 (statement of William Carwile).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 161
162 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina disabled many of the communications systems
that state and local authorities and fi rst responders rely upon to communicate with each
other and with FEMA. This was not an issue of interoperability, but of basic operability,
resulting from wind, fl ooding, loss of power, and other damage to infrastructure.”
Michael Chertoff
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Select Committee Hearing, October 19, 2005
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COMMUNICATIONS
Massive communications damage and a failure to adequately plan for alternatives impaired response efforts, command and control, and situational awareness
Summary
Massive inoperability—failed, destroyed, or
incompatible communications systems—was the
biggest communications problem in the response to
Katrina. It was predicted and planned for by some, while
others experienced problems with their operations or
were caught relatively unprepared. The loss of power
and the failure of multiple levels of government to
take the initiative to adequately prepare for its effect
on communications hindered the response effort by
compromising situational awareness and command
and control operations, particularly in New Orleans and
along the Mississippi Gulf coast. The Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) could have pre-positioned
mobile communications in New Orleans but did not
because it believed that it should fi rst be asked to do so by
local authorities. In turn, poor situational awareness, and
its resulting effect on command and control, contributed
to the negative effects of inaccurate or unsubstantiated
media reports because public offi cials lacked the facts to
address what the media reported. To deal with the loss of
power, some state and local governments had redundant
communications and other means to communicate, such
as satellite phones, which were invaluable. But they also
experienced certain problems due to technical diffi culties,
high winds, and exceptionally high demand that at times
overtaxed their capacity.
Where communications were operable or soon
were restored, long debated and unresolved issues
with interoperability among federal, state, and local
communications systems complicated the efforts of fi rst
responders and government offi cials to work together in
managing the response to Katrina. In recent years, local
and state governments in each of the affected states have
received several million dollars in federal funding to
address communication interoperability issues. Despite
claims of an “austere fi scal environment,”1 at each level
of government, internal debate, parochial interests,
and a general lack of prioritization and coordination
between affected jurisdictions regarding the formation
and implementation of interoperable communications
policies and plans severely hindered the rescue, response,
and recovery efforts at all levels of government.
Finding: Massive inoperability had the biggest effect on communications, limiting command and control, situational awareness, and federal, state, and local offi cials’ ability to address unsubstantiated and inaccurate media reports
Massive inoperability was the biggest communications
problem in the response to Katrina. By all accounts,
destruction to regional communications companies’
facilities and the power systems on which they depend
was extraordinary. For example:
■ More than three million customer telephone lines
were knocked down in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama.2 As of September 28, 2005, over 260,000
customer lines remained out of service, including
238,000 in Louisiana and 22,000 in Mississippi.
A downed communications tower, Plaquemines Parish, LA.
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■ The entire communications infrastructure on the
Mississippi Gulf coast was destroyed.
■ Signifi cant damage was infl icted both on the wire line
switching centers that route calls and on the lines used
to connect buildings and customers to the network.
■ Thirty-eight 911 call centers went down. Thirty days after
landfall, two call centers in Louisiana remained out of
service.
■ Two telephone company switches in New Orleans
responsible for routing 911 calls for the surrounding
parishes were knocked out by fl ooding, resulting in one
of the most signifi cant losses of capacity in and around
New Orleans.
■ Local wireless networks also sustained considerable
damage, with up to 2,000 cell sites out of service.3
A month after landfall, approximately 820 cell sites
remained out of service, the majority within New
Orleans and other areas of Louisiana.4
■ Over 20 million telephone calls did not go through the
day after the hurricane.
■ 37 of 41 broadcast radio stations in New Orleans and
surrounding areas were knocked off the air (2 AM and
2 FM stations continued to broadcast).
After surviving Hurricane Katrina’s initial blow, the
radio communications system for the New Orleans police
and fi re departments dissolved as its radio towers lost
their backup power generators in the ensuing fl ood.5
The New Orleans Police Department’s communications
system failed and was inoperative for three days following
the hurricane. At one point, hundreds of New Orleans
fi rst responders were trying to communicate on only
two radio channels on a backup system, forcing them
to wait for an opening in the communications traffi c
to transmit or receive critical information. The New
Orleans Police Department headquarters, and six of the
eight police districts’ buildings were out of commission
due to fl ooding, limiting (or precluding) their ability to
establish command and control by performing basic law
enforcement functions because their communications
were destroyed.
The Louisiana State Police reported the devastation
caused by the storm “severely hampered the ability of
emergency responders operating on the state system to
communicate with other emergency services personnel.”
The State Police currently operate a statewide analog
wireless communications system originally installed for
voice communications and last upgraded in 1996. It is used
by about 70 agencies with a total of over 10,000 subscribers.
Its infrastructure consists of 46 tower sites and 28 dispatch
consoles. In a report issued December 7, 2005, the State
Police reported, in addition to the effect it had on the state’s
system, storm damage to communications systems the local
governments maintained was “severe and debilitating,”
further restricting communications between emergency
responders. The equipment at its 46 towers depends on
electricity and, when that was lost, keeping them running
was nearly impossible once it became necessary to refuel
the generators operating them because debris and fl ood
waters hampered their refueling efforts.6
Mississippi experienced problems similar to the other
affected Gulf states. Most of its state and fi rst responder
communications capabilities were inoperable during
and in the immediate aftermath of the storm, forcing
the various responders to rely on satellite phones and
radios (which experienced their own problems due to
wind damage and interference). According to Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) Director Robert
Latham, the entire communications infrastructure of the
state’s Gulf coast was destroyed by Hurricane Katrina,
systems elsewhere across the state were inoperable,
and those systems that were working were overloaded,
resulting in delays processing local governments’ requests
for assistance. As a result, often the only communications
capability present in Mississippi — for both MEMA as
well as the affected counties — was through satellite
phones and radios, which operate by connecting to
satellites rather than routing calls through land-line or
cellular towers.7 FEMA, for its part, deployed a Mobile
Six of the eight police districts’ buildings were out of commission due to fl ooding, limiting (or precluding) their ability to establish command and control by performing basic law enforcement functions because their communications were destroyed.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 165
Emergency Response Support detachment (MERS)8 to the
state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson,
Mississippi, to provide satellite communications systems
for its operations in the Gulf coast counties. However,
despite the presence of MERS and hand-held satellite
phones in all of the affected counties’ EOCs, the Federal
Coordinating Offi cer for Mississippi, Bill Carwile, testifi ed
that communications capabilities were far short of what
was needed to be effective.9
The majority of site problems were due to lack of
power. Some sites had T-1 (high speed data) telephone
land-line problems, but the design of the system generally
allows access to more than one site in the area, so the
radio/telephone calls were routed from the secondary
tower site. This created some delays in accessing the
system, but was not a critical factor. Cellular telephone
service was generally available throughout Alabama’s
affected areas, but several tower sites were overloaded or
not fully operational after Katrina made landfall. This was
not a major problem because the Alabama Emergency
Management Agency (AEMA) does not consider cellular
telephone service a primary source of communications
during emergency response. Instead, AEMA has a cache
of pre-programmed Southern LINC radios that are
activated during disasters, programmed with specifi c
groups for users (such as Mutual Aid, Logistics, Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), Staging, etc.)
and have telephone capability. There were approximately
115 LINC portable units activated and delivered for use in
the fi eld for this disaster.
The importance of power, fuel, and communications to disaster response and situational awareness
The near total failure of regional communications
degraded situational awareness and exacerbated problems
with agency coordination, command and control,
logistics, and search and rescue operations. Reliable
communications are critical to the preparation for and
response to a catastrophic event because of the effect
they have on establishing command and control and
maintaining situational awareness.10 Without functioning
communications systems, fi rst responders and government
offi cials cannot establish meaningful command and
control, nor can they develop the situational awareness
necessary to know how and where to direct their response
and recovery efforts. Similarly, without the ability to call
for help, citizens cannot seek emergency assistance, alert
responders or others to their whereabouts and needs, or
receive updates or instructions from offi cials.
Katrina interoperability problems were masked to
some degree by the larger and more serious breakdown
of operability resulting from the destruction of facilities
or power outages. Restoring phone service requires more
than waiting for the fl ood waters to recede and restoring
power. While many cables may be salvageable, the
electronics that pass the signals across those lines will
need to be replaced. As noted by Jim Gerace of Verizon
Wireless: “It’s essentially analogous to putting a PC in
your bathtub. It’s not going to work once it dries.”11
In Louisiana, the winds and fl ooding degraded the
quality of available communications, reducing most
communications to the limited number of available
satellite phones. Additionally, the communications
infrastructure that remained intact was soon overwhelmed
by the heavy communications traffi c during the
response.12 FEMA offi cials reported “there were no status
reports coming into the EOC Monday.”13 Deputy Federal
Coordinating Offi cer Scott Wells stated that if the Coast
Guard was doing fl yovers of New Orleans, those reports
did not get to the EOC on Monday.14 Additionally,
failed communications affected responders’ ability to
share information up and down the chain of command.
According to Louisiana offi cials, “Two or three days
after the storm, state police were running into division
commanders in the New Orleans Police Department who
reported that they had not talked to anyone above their
rank since the storm.”15
The Alabama communications infrastructure
fared better than in Mississippi and Louisiana. The
AEMA has various communications capabilities, with
redundant backups, to ensure it maintains a high level
of connectivity throughout the state. The EOC had
equipment and trained personnel to communicate
over all types of communications networks, including
satellite, 800 MHz digital phone service, amateur radio,
and others. AEMA staff viewed communications systems
and capabilities during Katrina as strengths, although the
goal of true interoperability within and among county
emergency response and law enforcement agencies
remains elusive to this day.16 The state has little ability to
mandate what types of communications technology each
166 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
county procures. AEMA makes recommendations, but
with so many different counties all with communications
equipment in various stages of their life cycle, the EOC
must be able to process all types of communications.
The AEMA integrates these systems with various bridging
technologies. Several attempts have been made in the
past to build a state-wide/state-owned system, but lack
of funding has prevented construction of this system.
Nevertheless, state and county emergency management
offi cials concluded their communications capacity
functioned reasonably well during their response to
Hurricane Katrina.17
Power is the most dominant factor for any
telecommunications system18 and hurricanes virtually
always knock out the power, even if only for a short
period of time. Very often these power outages can last
for several days or more following powerful storms. For
Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) was aware the power outages caused by the storm
could go on for weeks after the storm, possibly longer. On
August 28, the DHS National Infrastructure Simulation
and Analysis Center issued and provided to the White
House (among others) a “Fast Analysis Report” predicting
the storm’s likely impact on the Gulf coast area based
on conditions as of August 27 when Katrina was still a
Category 5 storm. In the report, DHS made a number of
predictions about the storm’s impact on power supplies,
including:
■ Electric power loss is likely to affect over 2.6 million
customers;
■ Restoring power could take more than 2 weeks for most
of the affected areas excluding New Orleans and the coastal areas and may be hampered by fl ooding or other obstacles;
■ The New Orleans region could have power outages
lasting 16 weeks if excessive fl ooding occurs, disabling
existing pumping stations up to 10 weeks and entailing
power repairs that may take up to 6 weeks
to complete.19
As predicted, the affected states all suffered
severe damage to their power and communications
infrastructures. During Hurricane Katrina, the City of New
Orleans lost two primary tower sites and had to evacuate
the police and fi re communications centers because of
fl ooding. Associated with the loss of the communications
centers was the loss of all 911 capabilities and the federally
funded New Orleans Maritime Interoperable Committee’s
(NOMIC) interoperable bridging capability. Colonel Terry
Ebbert, the Homeland Security Director for New Orleans,
testifi ed “Over 2,000 police, fi re, and Emergency Medical
Services (EMS) personnel were forced to communicate
in a single channel mode, between radios, utilizing only
three mutual aid frequencies.”20
The government’s ability to communicate depends
upon the viability of the commercial network’s
infrastructure. Ninety percent of communications assets
are privately owned and operated.21 Verizon Wireless
serves the Gulf coast with two major switching stations in
Baton Rouge and Covington, Louisiana. These serve as the
links between cell phone antennae scattered throughout
the region and the rest of the global network. While the
stations themselves remained operational during and
after landfall, the Covington facility lost connectivity
with the cell towers due to two breaks in the connecting
fi ber-optic ring run by BellSouth.22 Normally, a fi ber-optic
link provides redundancy: if one link is cut, information
can still travel along the other route. Katrina, however,
knocked out both sources because of physical damage
to the fi ber-optic cable. In one case, the fi ber-optic cable
that transported calls and internet traffi c to and from
New Orleans and ran along the Lake Pontchartrain
Causeway was severed. Additionally, at least 20 cell
towers went down due to either power loss or fl ooding.
Verizon Wireless installed backup generators at many of
the towers, but not at all, reportedly, due to local zoning
restrictions.23 Refueling remote generators also proved
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diffi cult if not impossible. Verizon Wireless reported a
number of its generators were stolen, one of Nextel’s fuel
trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its fuel taken for other
purposes while en route to refuel cell tower generators,
and the Mississippi State Police redirected a fuel truck
carrying fuel designated for a cell tower generator to fuel
generators at Gulfport Memorial Hospital.24
Other power and telecommunications companies
reported similar problems due to exhausted fuel supplies,
disruption of natural gas supply lines, or refueling
diffi culties due to fl ooding or security concerns. BellSouth
reported that on September 1, 112 of its central offi ces
were running on emergency generators, an additional
17 were completely down, and an additional 32 had no
connectivity to the backbone network.25 These central
offi ces served as 911 tandems, and when they went down,
they created outages of 911 service in as many as 13
Louisiana parishes.26 In Gulfport, Mississippi, company
offi cers at Alabama Power and Southern Nuclear’s Watson
Electric Generating Plant watched as a 30-foot storm surge
rose 20 feet within the plant and fl ooded the 50-kilowatt
backup generator that normally would have started
when the power failed. The nerve center for the region’s
power company had no backup power to supply to the
community.27
The loss of power — a common and altogether
expected result of a hurricane — need not mean
an affected area has no communications capability
until the utility companies are able to restore normal
electricity service. A well-planned and robust emergency
communications system should be sustainable at
reasonable levels of operation even after electrical power
is lost.28 Resources to sustain operations include backup
generators and fuel, redundant systems, self-healing
networks, access to multiple technologies, common
radio frequencies for wireless communications, suffi cient
spectrum bandwidth to support communications needs,
and the proper equipment and infrastructure to make
it all work.29 Regular land-line telephone connections
can function after local power is lost if central switches
maintain power and lines are not damaged; telephone
switches can usually operate until their backup generators
run out of fuel or are knocked out by fl ooding. Similarly,
cell towers carrying commercial phone service and public
safety radio communications can continue to function
with back-up power, usually batteries.
Destruction to communications capability hindered command and control and severely limited situational awareness
“It sounds like it can happen again. How many local governments have a communications plan when everything fails?”
REPRESENTATIVE TAMMY BALDWIN (D-WI), query during hearing, U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2005
In myriad ways, the vast destruction to the communications
infrastructures, particularly
those in Mississippi and
Louisiana, negatively
affected fi rst responders
and local and state
governments’ attempts
to establish command
and control. It also
limited — and sometimes
precluded — them from
achieving and maintaining
situational awareness. In
New Orleans and along
the Gulf coast, the National Guard and fi rst responders
were forced to rely on paper relays or face-to-face
communications to convey critical information between
emergency operation centers and the fi eld.30 This drastically
slowed the pace at which those in the EOCs became
aware of situations throughout their respective areas of
With communications knocked out, police relied on two-way radios.
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168 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
responsibility. It delayed the delivery of direct assistance
where it was most needed, and it hindered the ability to
forward requests to state or federal agencies that might
have been able to help. In the Louisiana state EOC, the
communications problems were so severe that state offi cers
could not reliably communicate with local offi cials, others
in the state government, or federal offi cials, exacerbating
the already severe problems with situational awareness.
On Tuesday, August 30, FEMA Deputy Federal
Coordinating Offi cer Phillip E. Parr traveled by helicopter
to the New Orleans Superdome.31 His mission there was
threefold: (1) form a unifi ed command with the state as
represented by the Louisiana National Guard, and the City
of New Orleans; (2) maintain visibility of commodities
ordered; and (3) build out a base from which FEMA teams
could be formed to locate and assist in the hardest hit
parishes. But according to Parr his ability to accomplish
those goals were hindered by the lack of appropriate
communications as mentioned in his statement: “To
accomplish these goals we were to meet a Mobile
Emergency Operations and Communications Vehicle
and use that as a base of operations and communication.
Due to extensive fl ooding in the city our communications
vehicle was unable to enter the Dome and this severely
hampered our operations.”32
First responders’ ability throughout the Gulf coast to
communicate across a broad range (or distance) and gain
control of an incident was compromised when power was
lost and many had only their mobile (cellular) phones
available. Because these phones run on batteries, they lose
power the longer fi rst responders have to use them in lieu
of other means and, as a result, have shorter and shorter
ranges over which they can operate as their batteries run
down.
In Mississippi, Major General Harold A. Cross, the
state’s Adjutant General, told Select Committee staff the
National Guard forward operating units on the coast
were unable to establish and maintain meaningful
communications with MEMA or Governor Barbour for
the fi rst 48 hours following landfall.33 As a result, their
initial activities were based on executing pre-landfall
assignments and reacting to events on the ground as they
found them. They acted with initiative. Exacerbating the
situation, and unknown to Cross, the company providing
the satellite service to his phones (Mobile Venture
Satellites) had not informed the Guard it had changed the
contact numbers on two of the Guard’s satellite phones.
As a result, no one attempting to reach these phones
— one with the Guard’s Director of Military Assistance,
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Smithson (the offi cer responsible
for coordination of the Guard’s materials and assets
during the response and recovery effort), and another
at the Stennis Space Center commodities distribution
center — could get through. The Guard did not learn of
the change until two days into the response when the
state National Guard’s Assistant Adjutant General, Gen.
Playnt, fi nally spoke with Smithson to ask why he was
not answering his satellite phone. Smithson contacted the
satellite phone company, and was only then informed of
the number change.34 Because of this failure to notify the
Guard of two number changes, those who needed to reach
two of the most important people or places involved in
the response did not have the correct numbers to do so.
This contributed to the problems and delays experienced
during commodity coordination and distribution efforts
experienced in Mississippi.35 These types of problems are
further discussed in the COMMAND AND CONTROL
chapter.
FEMA pre-positioned communications assets, but not in New Orleans, where the need became exceptionally critical
FEMA partially anticipated the communications
infrastructure, particularly the parts dependent on
electric power, would be needed in the Gulf coast and
pre-positioned with each of the three states’ EOCs a
MERS detachment.36 MERS detachments are designed to
provide rapid multi-media communications, information
processing, logistics, and operational support to federal,
F E
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state, and local agencies during catastrophic emergencies
and disasters. They do so, in part, by providing mobile
telecommunications, operational support, life support,
and power generation for on-site disaster management;
this includes satellite, telephone, and video hook-ups.37
Former FEMA Director Michael Brown testifi ed, in
hindsight, FEMA should have pre-positioned a MERS
detachment in New Orleans. Brown stated:
In terms of communications, one of the things
that I didn’t mention in the litany of things that we
prepositioned is something called our MERS unit,
our Mobile Emergency Response System [sic]. Those
are vehicles that are command and control units
that have satellite hook-ups, telephone hook-ups,
video hook-ups; enable us to do communications.
I prepositioned those in all three states so that we
would have communications wherever we needed it.
I eventually sent one of those command units — in
fact, it’s one of the largest ones we have, called Red
October — I eventually sent one of those into New
Orleans for Mayor Nagin to use.
In retrospect, I wish I’d done that four days
earlier. Had I done it four days earlier, though,
guess what? It probably wouldn’t have gotten there.
So I’m now second-guessing myself, and perhaps I
should have prepositioned it there before Katrina
made landfall. But again, that’s not the role of the
federal government; that’s Mike Brown Monday
morning quarterbacking, having seen everything
that took place and trying to fi gure out, okay, now
seeing everything that did not work in Louisiana,
if I had known that beforehand, what could I have
done?38
As a result, one of the federal assets that might have
allowed FEMA and the local and state governments to
work around the damage to the communications systems
and sooner gain situational awareness about conditions in
New Orleans was not present. Arguably, this instance of a
failure of initiative — leaving a MERS detachment outside
of the city — exacerbated the degree to which the massive
damage to the local communications infrastructure
delayed the ability of FEMA to learn of or confi rm events
on the ground in New Orleans and act accordingly.
“Communications and coordination was lacking, preplanning was lacking. We were not prepared for this.”
WILLIAM M. LOKEY, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana, testimony before U.S. Senate, Jan. 30, 2006
Poor situational awareness and its resulting effect on
command and control contributed to the negative effects
of inaccurate media reports because public offi cials lacked
access to the facts to address media reports. Throughout
the early days of the response, media reports from New
Orleans featured rampant looting, gunfi re, crime, and
lawlessness, including murders and alleged sexual assaults
at the Superdome and Convention Center. Few of these
reports were substantiated, and those that were—such
as the gunfi re—were later understood to be actually
coming from individuals trapped and trying to attract the
attention of rescuers in helicopters.
Offi cials on the ground in New Orleans interviewed
by Select Committee staff stated the media greatly
exaggerated reports of crime and lawlessness and that
the reports from the Convention Center and Superdome
were generally unsubstantiated. Of the six deaths in the
Superdome, none were crime-related (fi ve were due to
medical reasons and one was a suicide).39 In some cases,
the media’s coverage of its own performance - well after
the fact - showed many of these reports from the early
days after Katrina were false. In December, ReasonOnline
reported that:
On September 1, 72 hours after Hurricane
Katrina ripped through New Orleans, the
Associated Press news wire fl ashed a nightmare
of a story: “Katrina Evacuation Halted Amid
Gunfi re…Shots Are Fired at Military Helicopter.”
The article fl ew across the globe via at least
150 news outlets, from India to Turkey to
Spain. Within 24 hours commentators on every
major American television news network had
helped turn the helicopter sniper image into
the disaster’s enduring symbol of dysfunctional
urbanites too depraved to be saved.
Like many early horror stories about ultra-
violent New Orleans natives, whether in their
home city or in far-fl ung temporary shelters, the
A.P. article turned out to be false. Evacuation
from the city of New Orleans was never “halted,”
170 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
according to offi cials from the Coast Guard,
FEMA, and the Louisiana National Guard. The
only helicopter airlifts stopped were those by
a single private company, Acadian Ambulance,
from a single location: the Superdome. And
Acadian offi cials, who had one of the only
functional communications systems in all of
New Orleans during those fi rst days, were taking
every opportunity to lobby for a massive military
response.
More important, there has been no offi cial
confi rmation that a single military helicopter over
New Orleans—let alone a National Guard Chinook
in the pre-dawn hours of September 1—was fi red
upon.
The Air Force, to which the Air National Guard
reports, also has no record of helicopter sniping.
“We investigated one incident and it turned out
to have been shooting on the ground, not at the
helicopter,” Air Force Maj. Mike Young told The
New York Times on September 29.
Aside from the local National Guard, the other
government agency with scores of helicopters over
New Orleans was the U.S. Coast Guard, which
rescued more than 33,000 people. “Coast Guard
helicopters,” says spokeswoman Jolie Shiffl et,
“were not fi red on during Hurricane Katrina rescue
operations.”
[But] the basic premise of the article that
introduced the New Orleans helicopter sniper to a
global audience was dead wrong, just like so many
other widely disseminated Katrina nightmares.
No 7-year-old rape victim with a slit throat was
ever found, even though the atrocity was reported
in scores of newspapers. The Convention Center
freezer was not stacked with 30 or 40 dead bodies,
nor was the Superdome a live-in morgue.40
“[The] National Guard have landed in the city of New Orleans. These troops are fresh back from Iraq, well trained, experienced, battle-tested and under my orders to restore order in the streets. They have M-16s and they are locked and loaded. These troops know how to shoot and kill and they are more than willing to do so if necessary and I expect they will.”
GOVERNOR KATHLEEN B. BLANCO
According to offi cials on the ground in New Orleans
interviewed by Select Committee staff, and subsequent
media reports, erroneous or exaggerated reporting of
conditions in New Orleans created anxiety and fear among
those sheltering at the Superdome and Convention Center,
delayed some critical elements of the response effort, and
discouraged some residents in dry neighborhoods from
evacuating the city. Media reports described how BellSouth
evacuated its personnel from their Emergency Operations
Center near the Superdome under armed escort due to
security concerns. Reportedly, company offi cials worried
about the center being targeted by unruly individuals.
Gary Ludgood, vice president for integrated network
planning and implementation for BellSouth, stated,
“[W]e chose to evacuate
our employees before
anything happened.”41
Offi cials interviewed by
Select Committee staff
said some of the media
reporting made the
crowds in the Superdome
anxious and scared away
truck drivers carrying
critical commodities;
these same offi cials indicated some residents of the city
in areas not fl ooded were reluctant to evacuate because of
these reports, choosing instead to stay behind to protect
their belongings. ReasonOnline reported on the effect of
radio broadcasts containing erroneous reports:42
The information vacuum in the Superdome was
especially dangerous. Cell phones didn’t work,
the arena’s public address system wouldn’t run
on generator power, and the law enforcement on
hand was reduced to talking to the 20,000 evacuees
using bullhorns and a lot of legwork. “A lot of
them had AM radios, and they would listen to news
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Media reporting made the crowds in the Superdome anxious and scared away truck drivers carrying critical commodities.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 171
reports that talked about the dead bodies at the
Superdome, and the murders in the bathrooms of
the Superdome, and the babies being raped at the
Superdome,” Bush [Maj. Ed Bush, public affairs
offi cer for the Louisiana Air National Guard] says,
“and it would create terrible panic. I would have to
try and convince them that no, it wasn’t happening.”
The reports of rampant lawlessness, especially the
persistent urban legend of shooting at helicopters,
defi nitely delayed some emergency and law
enforcement responses. Reports abounded, from
places like Andover, Massachusetts, of localities
refusing to send their fi refi ghters because of “people
shooting at helicopters.” The National Guard refused
to approach the Convention Center until September
2, 100 hours after the hurricane, because “we
waited until we had enough force in place to do an
overwhelming force,” Lieutenant General H Steven
Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, told
reporters on September 3.
“One of my good friends, Col. Jacques
Thibodeaux, led that security effort,” [Maj.] Bush
says. “They said, ‘Jacques, you gotta get down here
and sweep this thing.’ He said he was braced for
anything. And he encountered nothing—other than
a whole lot of people clapping and cheering and so
glad that they were here.”
“I certainly saw fi ghts, but I saw worse fi ghts at a Cubs game. The people never turned into these animals. They are been cheated out of being thought of as these tough people who looked out for each other. We had more babies born [in the Superdome] than we had deaths.”
MAJOR ED BUSH, LA National Guard
Mississippi government offi cials echoed these concerns:
“Even drivers coming in to Mississippi were dissuaded by
the media reports in New Orleans. A lot of them ended
up demanding military escorts. They’d call and say ‘we’ve
been hijacked or we ran out of gas on Highway 49 or
59. When help arrived they’d admit that wasn’t the case,
that they just wanted an escort. Obviously this situation
impeded ‘just in time’ logistics,’”43 Ebbert said.
“We were going to protect the lives of our residents. It’s impossible to know what happened unless you were here. At the time, you don’t know what to believe, but you don’t want to be in a place to fi nd out if what you heard is true.”
RONNIE HARRIS, Mayor, Gretna, LA
Without suffi cient working communications capability
to get better situational awareness, the local, state, and
federal offi cials directing the response in New Orleans had
too little factual information to address — and, if need
be, rebut — what the media were reporting. This allowed
terrible situations — the evacuees’ fear and anxiety in the
Superdome and Convention Center — to continue longer
than they should have and, as noted, delayed response
efforts by, for example, causing the National Guard to wait
to assemble enough force to deal with security problems
at the Convention Center that turned out to be overstated.
For further discussions of exaggerated media reports, see
the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter.
Finding: Some local and state responders prepared for communications losses but still experienced problems, while others were caught unprepared
Though the loss of power and damages to the Gulf coast
area’s communications infrastructure were massive, some
of the local and state responders had taken the steps
necessary to ensure that they had some communications
capability in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina. The AEMA had various communications
capabilities, all with redundant backups, to ensure that
it maintained a high level of connectivity throughout the
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172 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
state. AEMA offi cials considered their communications
redundancy to be one area that worked well in their
response to Katrina.44 Southern LINC, the company
whose network Alabama uses as its primary radio system,
had a representative on site at the state EOC during this
period that provided outage updates (as noted earlier,
the AEMA has a cache of pre-programmed LINC radios
that it activates during disasters and which also provide
telephone capability).
In Mississippi, Gulf coast county governments had
taken steps (including using DHS preparedness grant
funds) to ensure some communications capability
would likely survive a disaster. For example, despite the
catastrophic damage suffered by the Gulf coast, Harrison
County’s Enhanced Digital Access Communication
Systems (EDACS)45 remained operational at nearly 100
percent capacity during and after Katrina’s landfall. One
interoperability success story from Mississippi was that
although the Harrison County EDACS was not capable
of linking to FEMA or to the MEMA EOC in Jackson,
Mississippi, it was capable of linking with similar systems
utilized by the Florida State Police and the Florida Fish &
Wildlife Agency who arrived in Mississippi shortly after
Katrina’s landfall. These Florida state agencies were able
to quickly reprogram their EDACS radios to communicate
over the county’s network. Within two weeks of landfall,
the Harrison County EDACS system was able to expand
to allow fi rst responder communications within the
adjoining Jackson and Hancock counties.46
MEMA Director Latham testifi ed that Mississippi
had satellite radios permanently mounted in the three
coastal counties (Harrison, Hancock, and Jackson)
and that 30 other counties also had these radios.47 All
MEMA personnel had access to a mobile satellite radio
for communications throughout the state. This proved
fortunate because often the only communications
capability in Mississippi after the storm—for both
MEMA and the affected counties—was through satellite
phones and radios, which operate by connecting to
satellites rather than routing calls through land-based
lines or cellular towers.48 The Harrison County EOC was
only able to use its cellular communications system for
approximately 12 hours until the battery on the cell tower
died. They were unable to use the satellite system at the
Harrison County EOC because it was damaged during the
storm. Additionally, and currently, MEMA has a mobile
operations unit, which it can deploy to disaster areas
and allows communication across all bands.49 Despite
problems the satellite systems experienced (discussed
below), Latham noted they did allow the state to learn
vital information it needed about conditions in the
counties and their assistance needs.50
Unlike the three coastal counties, Pearl River County
fared better at maintaining communications capability
during and after the storm. Pearl River County had two
satellite phones in its emergency operations center.
According to its Emergency Management Director, Bobby
Strahan, these worked throughout the response but
did prove problematic early on because it took a long
time for any calls to go through.51 In addition, Strahan
reported the county has four high band repeater systems
strategically placed throughout the county which allow all
of its fi rst responders (including police, fi re, and EMS) as
well as its schools to communicate. All of these systems’
locations had generator backup systems which functioned
properly during Katrina. In addition, Pearl River County
was able to sustain communications within the county
and, to a limited extent, with portions of adjacent
Hancock County because it had used DHS grant funds
to buy a mobile communications center (trailer) that
allowed it to communicate with agencies throughout the
county as well as with MEMA’s mobile operations unit.52
Others were caught relatively unprepared to deal with
the communications problems that resulted from the
hurricane’s damage or found their existing capabilities
were insuffi cient. In Louisiana, most of the parishes
did not have satellite phones (as their counterparts in
Mississippi did) because they chose to discontinue the
service after the state stopped paying the monthly fees for
the phones. In 1999, the state began using federal funding
to provide each parish emergency management offi ce with
a satellite telephone and paid the $65.00 monthly fee, but
In Louisiana, most of the parishes did not have satellite phones because they chose to discontinue the service after the state stopped paying the monthly fees for the phones.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 173
it discontinued doing so for the parishes in August 2004.
As a result, all but three parishes—Orleans, Plaquemines,
and Jefferson—discontinued their satellite phone
service.53 Larry Ingargiola, Director, Offi ce of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management, St. Bernard
Parish, told Select Committee staff the parish returned
the satellite phones when the state stopped paying the
monthly service fee. After Katrina hit, the state sent the
phones back to St. Bernard because there was no other
means of communication available to the parish.54
The failure of 911 call centers in New Orleans also
illustrates how others were unprepared to deal with
communications problems. Identifying where calls to a
911 call center will be routed if it is rendered inoperable
is a basic preparation for Public Safety Answering
Points (PSAPs) such as 911 call centers.55 Although
the technology to switch calls to 911 to an alternative
location exists,56 many 911 call centers in Louisiana did
not have protocols in place to identify where their calls
should go and had not arranged for any rerouting. As a
result, numerous calls to 911 in the immediate aftermath
— especially as the fl oodwaters in New Orleans were
rising — simply dropped.57
In Mississippi, MEMA Director Latham testifi ed the state
found it did not have enough satellite radios when only
its satellite systems were operable.58 As a result, during its
response to Katrina, MEMA purchased additional portable
satellite phones for its State Emergency Response Team (in
the future, Mississippi indicated these additional phones
can be issued to local authorities as a redundant system in
disasters).59 Some Mississippi responders also found their
satellite communications capabilities were not suffi ciently
capable of withstanding high winds. Specifi cally, though
they generally remained operable and the state relied on
them during its response to Katrina, Mississippi’s satellite
communications capabilities suffered because the hurricane
force winds—at times sustained over 130 miles per hour—
shifted the antennas in each of the coastal counties, causing
satellite communications there to fail because the antennas
were no longer properly targeted. As a result, for several
days, these counties lost their ability to communicate with
the state EOC in Jackson or FEMA about their needs for
assistance or the status of any commodities requests they
had made before the storm.60 Because of the lessons it
learned from the damage to its satellite systems in Katrina,
Mississippi is investigating for future use in its counties’
EOCs the omni-directional antennas it has in place on all
of its state EMA and Department of Wildlife, Fisheries, and
Parks vehicles. According to Latham, these antennas would
not be affected by strong winds and would allow constant
communications.61
Responders in Louisiana similarly experienced certain
problems that can plague satellite-based communications.
Specifi cally, satellite phones are technically capable of
transmitting calls virtually anywhere on earth, but they
may have trouble doing so when the user is inside a
building or when the weather is cloudy. According to
the Louisiana State Police report, “heavy cloud coverage
and system inundation” limited the effectiveness of
the portable satellite phones delivered to several troop
headquarters in the affected areas.62 Even when weather
conditions permit smooth transmissions of signals for
satellite communications, this is meaningless if the caller
does not know how to use the satellite phone, or the
phone does not work at all. As Mayor Nagin noted during
Congressional testimony, “I have a huge box of satellite
phones that did not work.”63
For the systems that were functioning after the storm
as well as those that were eventually restored, problems
with interoperability further exacerbated rescue efforts.
As Colonel Ebbert testifi ed, “[T]here was no voice radio
contact with surrounding parishes or state and federal
agencies. Lives were put at risk and it created a direct
operational impact on their ability to maintain control
of the rapidly deteriorating situation within the city, carry
out rescue efforts and control the evacuation of those
people who had failed to heed the call for evacuation.”64
Despite hundreds of millions in federal funding for technology and communications, the absence of true communication interoperability within and between affected jurisdictions severely hindered rescue and response efforts at all levels of government
Many in the industry, media, and government have long
focused on the problem of “interoperability.” FEMA
offi cials claimed they did not know for days about the
thousands of people at the New Orleans Convention
Center, fi rst responders in helicopters could not talk
to crews patrolling in boats, and National Guard
Commanders in Louisiana and Mississippi had to use
runners to relay orders.
174 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“We’ve got runners running from commander to commander. In other words, we’re going to the sound of gunfi re, as we used to say in the Revolutionary War.”
MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD A. CROSS, Adjutant General, Mississippi National Guard
Interoperability for public safety communication is
defi ned as the ability to share information via voice,
data, on-demand, in real-time, when needed and as
authorized. The public safety community expects this level
of interoperability will be available using equipment from
multiple manufacturers,
be transparent to the
user, require little or
no special knowledge
of the system, and
not be dependent on
common frequency
assignments.65 A
Conference of Mayors
2004 survey of 192
cities showed 44 percent
reported an accident
within the preceding
year in which the
lack of interoperable
communications made
response diffi cult;
49 percent of cities
are not interoperable with state police; 60 percent are
not interoperable with their state emergency operation
centers; and 83 percent are not interoperable with the
federal law enforcement agencies.66
Communications — particularly wireless
communications — enable all other functions in any
disaster relief operation along with the sensors to inform
offi cials and fi rst responders what is happening and share
the information and the ability to command and control
those functions and information. These are all mission-
critical functions. Hurricane Katrina was no exception.
Without effective communications, every operation
will suffer debilitating ineffi ciencies, some leading to
ineffectiveness.67 Too many public safety personnel
cannot communicate by radio because their equipment is
still incompatible or the frequencies they’re assigned are
different. They operate on 10 different frequency bands
and run communication systems that are often proprietary
and too often 30 or more years old. Over 90 percent
of the nation’s public safety wireless infrastructure is
fi nanced, owned, operated, and maintained by the more
than 60,000 individual local jurisdictions, police, fi re and
emergency medical services that serve the public.68
Louisiana government offi cials have long been
cognizant of the interoperability problem among the
state and parish fi rst responders.69 Despite longstanding
and sizable federal interoperability grants to multiple
Louisiana jurisdictions, coordinated planning had barely
progressed when Katrina hit.70 Although some New
Orleans and Louisiana state offi cials attribute the lack of
true interoperability for fi rst responders in the region to
fi nancial limitations,71 this explanation fl ies in the face of
the massive amounts of federal grants to Louisiana.72 State
and local governments were responsible for designing
and coordinating their efforts, and they failed to make
meaningful progress despite knowledge of the problem
for years and the expenditure of millions in federal funds.
Since 2001, the federal government has given $8.6
billion to states for equipment, fi rst responder training,
and disaster exercises. In 2005, DHS gave the states
$2.1 billion, of which $925 million was allocated for
communications upgrades.73 In Louisiana alone, since
fi scal year 1999, the federal government allocated over
$135 million for preparedness, of which more than $108
million was awarded to local governments, and nearly $27
million to the state. Of these funds, nearly $107 million
was dedicated to equipment purchases and the remaining
$28 million was allocated for planning, training, exercises
and administrative costs. Since 1999, approximately $16
million has been spent on interoperability.74 In addition
to these funds, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana are
also the recipients of federal grants for law enforcement
agencies via the Justice Department’s Community
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Offi ce.75
■ Alabama received $24,770,274 from FY2003 to FY2005
under the COPS Interoperability Communications, Law
Enforcement Technology, Universal Hiring Program
(UHP), COPS in Schools (CIS), and Homeland Security
Overtime (HSOP) grant programs;
■ Louisiana received $23,495,114 from FY2003 to FY2005
under the COPS Interoperability Communications,
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 175
Law Enforcement Technology, UHP, CIS, Regional
Community Policing Institute (RCPI) and Homeland
Security Overtime (HSOP) grant programs; and,
■ Mississippi received $7,003,688 from FY2003 to
FY2005 under the COPS Law Enforcement Technology,
UHP, CIS, and HSOP grant programs.76
More specifi cally, the COPS Interoperable
Communications Grant Program provides funding
to local communities to help them develop effective
interoperable communications systems for public safety
and emergency service providers. The grant program
funds projects that explore the use of equipment and
technology to increase interoperability and data sharing
amongst law enforcement, fi re departments, and
emergency medical services. From 2003-2005, the COPS
program awarded over $242 million to 63 agencies across
the nation to address the need to ensure interoperable
communications. In 2003, for example, the City of
New Orleans received a COPS grant for interoperable
communications technology in the amount of $5,510,412;
in 2004, the City of Shreveport and the Birmingham,
Alabama Police Department received COPS grants for
interoperable communications technology in the amounts
of $2,998,901 and $5,625,000, respectively; and in 2005,
the City of Baton Rouge Police Department and the Police
Department in Mobile, Alabama received COPS grants for
interoperable communications technology in the amounts
of $5,999,184, and $3,000,000, respectively.77
The $5,510,412 COPS interoperability grant awarded to
the City of New Orleans in September 2003 initially was
approved for one project. A year and a half later, however,
the city requested approval to modify its original plan,
and in May 2005, the COPS program offi ce approved a
new plan to build upon the Jefferson Parish 800 MHz
radio system, and link four parishes (Orleans, Jefferson,
St. Bernard and Plaquemines) together. As of September
2005, the City had spent only $275,428 of the $5,510,412
originally awarded in 2003.78
“Technology is at the center of this, but most of the components required to achieve interoperability in the near-term already exist. However, it requires agreements, planning, and governance arrangements across jurisdictions.”
DAVID BOYD, Deputy Director, Offi ce Systems Engineering & Development, DHS Testimony before U.S. Senate Sept. 29, 2005
Despite these awards (and other federal grants
described in detail in Appendix 4 of this report), offi cials
in Louisiana claim “austere fi nancial circumstances”
prevented the completion of the interoperability
modifi cations of its communications system. New
Orleans designed and purchased its M/A-Com 800 MHz
radio communications system in 1992. The Louisiana
State Police updated a different Motorola 800 MHz
radio communications system in 1996, and while the
two systems are capable of communicating, this requires
special integration modifi cations to each system, and
only is attempted, typically, for large events such as
the 2002 Super Bowl held in New Orleans.79 Under
normal circumstances, the City’s system is linked to
the state’s system via a traditional T1 landline. As Greg
Meffert, the New Orleans Chief Information Offi cer told
Select Committee staff, the two systems’ interoperable
capabilities are based on faulty assumptions. If the
T1 lines are damaged, this destroys the connection
between the systems.80 This is exactly what happened
during Katrina. The city’s system went down after the
system’s generators were fl ooded or damaged by fl ying
debris. As noted by Ebbert in his testimony before the
Select Committee, “there was no voice radio contact
with surrounding parishes or state and federal agencies.
Lives were put at risk and it created a direct operational
impact on their ability to maintain control of the rapidly
deteriorating situation within the city, carry out rescue
efforts and control the evacuation of those people who
had failed to heed the call for evacuation.”81
There was no voice radio contact with surrounding parishes or state and federal agencies. Lives were put at risk. Col. Terry Ebbert, New Orleans Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety
176 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Finding: The National Communications System met many of the challenges posed by Hurricane Katrina, enabling critical communication during the response, but gaps in the system did result in delayed response and inadequate delivery of relief supplies
The federal government’s use of the National
Communications System (NCS) prior to, during, and
after Katrina’s landfall to coordinate assets and personnel
proved effective, but like the efforts of the Gulf states, it
too was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the damage
left in Katrina’s wake.
Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy
established the National Communications System by a
Presidential Memorandum on August 21, 1963.82 On
April 3, 1984, President Ronald Reagan signed Executive
Order 12472, which broadened the NCS’ national security
and emergency preparedness capabilities and superseded
President Kennedy’s original 1963 memorandum.
The NCS expanded from its original six members to
an interagency group of 23 federal departments and
agencies, and began coordinating and planning NS/
EP telecommunications for the federal government
under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency,
attack, recovery, and reconstruction. As mandated by
the Executive Order, the NCS also includes an industry
component called the National Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC), a joint industry-government
body within the NCS. The operational mission of the
NCC is coordination of restoring and reinstituting
national security and emergency preparedness
communications in an emergency situation. During
Hurricane Katrina, the NCC operated a 24-hour watch
center and conducted daily analysis and situational
monitoring of ongoing events, and coordination of
government and industry response capabilities.83
In addition to the Executive Order, the NCS has a
specifi c communications role in the National Response
Plan (NRP). Specifi cally, the NCS is the lead agency
responsible for the communications component of
Emergency Support Function 2 (ESF 2), which “ensures
the provision of Federal communications to Federal,
State, local, tribal and private-sector response efforts
during an Incident of National Signifi cance.” In support
of ESF 2, the NCC is tasked to function as a central
point of coordination and information sharing among
communications infrastructure operators.
To facilitate coordination of industry and government
operations during an emergency, the NCS maintains
and operates several priority service programs, which
help ensure critical calls are completed in the event
of congestion damage to the national commercial
communications infrastructure. They include the
Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS), which provides authorized users a higher rate of
call completion during periods of outages or congestion
resulting from disasters. During and after
Hurricane Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000 new
GETS access code numbers to fi rst responders
and emergency recovery offi cials in the affected
states. Between August 28 and September 9,
the GETS system was utilized to make over
35,000 calls.84 The NCS also operates a wireless
counterpart to GETS, the Wireless Priority
Service (WPS) program. It provides priority
treatment for calls made during periods of
wireless network congestion by emergency
response personnel with national security
and emergency preparedness responsibilities.
During Katrina, the NCS enabled and
distributed over 4,000 WPS cellular phones.85 In Gulfport, MS., video conferencing was used to coordinate disaster aid.
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 177
The NCS operates the Telecommunications Service
Priority (TSP) program, which establishes a regulatory,
administrative and operational framework for restoring
and provisioning priority communications services.
Through this program, service vendors are authorized
to give priority to restoration and provision of service to
those with TSP assignments. Following Hurricane Katrina,
the NCS completed more than 1,500 TSP assignments
helping to restore emergency response capabilities in the
Gulf states.86
The NCS also maintains the Shared Resources High
Frequency Radio Program (SHARES), which provides a
single, interagency, voluntary message handling system
using over 250 High Frequency (HF) radio frequencies
when other communications are unavailable. A network
of government, military, and Military Affi liate Radio
Service (MARS) radio stations (an organized network
of Amateur Radio stations affi liated with the different
branches of the armed services to provide volunteer
communications), and more than 90 federal, state, and
private industry organizations participate in the SHARES
program. Within days following Katrina’s landfall, the
NCS coordinated participation by 431 SHARES stations
across the nation and assisted fi rst responders conducting
search and rescue missions by relaying information
to appropriate government agencies; relayed logistical
and operational information between FEMA’s EOCs
in Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana; relayed health
and welfare messages between volunteer agencies in
Georgia and the national headquarters of the American
Red Cross in Washington, DC; established radio contact
with deployed U.S. Navy ships detailed to New Orleans;
and provided frequency coordination between federal
agencies, Louisiana and Mississippi’s EOCs, and the Civil
Air Patrol.87
Additionally, the NCS coordinated the frequencies
used by the nearly 1,000 Amateur Radio Emergency
Services (ARES) volunteers across the nation who served
in the Katrina stricken area providing communications
for government agencies, the Red Cross and the Salvation
Army. Emergency communications were conducted not
only by voice, but also by high-speed data transmissions
using state-of-the art digital communications software
known as WinLink. In Mississippi, FEMA dispatched
Amateur Radio operators to hospitals, evacuation centers,
and county EOCs to send emergency messaging 24 hours
per day. According to Bay St. Louis Mayor Edward A.
“Eddie” Favre, amateur radio operators were especially
helpful in maintaining situational awareness and
relaying Red Cross messages to and from the Hancock
County EOC.88 At airports in Texas and Louisiana,
radio amateurs tracked evacuees and notifi ed families
of their whereabouts. The Red Cross deployed amateur
radio volunteers at its 250 shelter and feeding stations,
principally in Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida.89
The Salvation Army operates its own Amateur Radio
communications system using Amateur radio volunteers,
known as SATERN. During the Hurricane Katrina response
and recovery effort, SATERN joined forces with the
SHARES program and received over 48,000 requests for
emergency communications assistance utilizing federal
frequencies made available via the SHARES program.90
Following landfall, the NCS activated the SHARES
network on August 29, and worked with The U.S.
Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to identify and
deploy communications assets, and by September
2, all NCS ESF 2 systems were in place to receive
communications requests from the affected region.
The NCS dispatched satellite communications vans to
various locations, including New Orleans City Hall, the
Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge, the
New Orleans Airport, and the Louisiana National Guard
in Jefferson Parish; dispatched AT&T and MCI cellular
communication vans to the state EOCs in Mississippi and
Louisiana; and identifi ed and delivered satellite handsets
to fi rst responders in all three affected states. Additionally,
the NCS designed and installed a new E-911 system in
Plaquemines Parish, and provided an interim digital Land
Mobile Radio system to the eight parishes surrounding
New Orleans.91
Like all levels of government, the NCS was not able to
address all aspects of the damage to the communications
FEMA dispatched Amateur Radio operators to hospitals, evacuation centers, and county Emergency Operations Centers to send emergency messaging 24 hours per day.
178 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
infrastructure of the Gulf states. Although the NCS
performed several important functions prior to and
during the response efforts, the “historical magnitude of
Hurricane Katrina stressed the processes and procedures
of the NCS and required ESF 2 to perform functions . . .
which it [had] never done before.”92
Conclusion
The extent of destruction and damage to the
communications infrastructure and services caused
by Katrina exceeded that of any other natural disaster
experienced by the Gulf coast states. Simply put, Katrina’s
devastation overwhelmed government resources at all
levels. The loss of power and the failure of various levels
of government to adequately prepare for the ensuing and
inevitable loss of communications hindered the response
effort by compromising situational awareness and
command and control operations.
Despite the devastation left by Katrina, this needn’t
have been the case. Catastrophic disasters may have
some unpredictable consequences, but losing power
and the dependent communications systems after a
hurricane should not be one of them. The parish offi cials
in Louisiana who declined to spend $65 per month for
satellite phones showed a failure of initiative when they
gave up those assets. Why such a “penny wise-pound
foolish” decision was allowed to stand defi es explanation.
The same satellite phones that were given up by some
of the parishes eventually were returned to them after
Katrina’s landfall because they had no other means of
communicating with those bringing help to people in
need. Similarly, those in the 911 call centers who could
not reroute calls for help showed a failure of initiative by
not taking the steps necessary to ensure calls to them were
not in vain, simply because predictable things — power
losses and fl ooding — happened after a hurricane.
Issues with interoperability have existed for years.
Government offi cials and emergency service agencies are
well aware of the need to establish and maintain robust
emergency communications systems. Modern day National
Guard units should not have to rely upon runners to relay
messages. Governors should be able to communicate
with their generals. Police commanders should be able
to communicate with their offi cers in the street. Despite
knowledge of interoperability problems and the seriousness
of the consequences of failure to address them, and because
of often parochial desires for duplicative, expensive, and
diverse stand alone communications systems, offi cials
responsible for providing for public safety spent millions
on other priorities.
Disasters start and end at the local level. If fi rst
responders want interoperability with their counterparts
in the future, their leaders need to communicate.
Federal authorities need to establish standards. State
and local offi cials need to take the initiative to make
responsible use of federal, state and local funding to
develop communications systems that can grow with their
communities. These offi cials need to fulfi ll the public trust
given to them. They need to lead. ■
Catastrophic disasters may have some unpredictable consequences, but losing power and the dependent communications systems after a hurricane should not be one of them.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 179
1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 3 (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert, USMC (ret), Director of Homeland Security & Public Safety, City of New Orleans) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Hearing on Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events Before the Comm. on Homeland Security Subcomm. on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Cong. (Oct. 26, 2005) at 1 (written statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Deputy Manager, National Communications System, DHS) [hereinafter Oct. 26, 2005 Comm. on Homeland Security Hearing].
3 Id. at 6. 4 Hearing on Public Safety Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons Before the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet, 109th Cong. (Sept. 29, 2005) at 3 (written statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission) [hereinafter Sept. 29, 2005 Energy & Commerce Comm. Hearing].
5 Matthew Fordahl, Communication Breakdown: From 9/11 to Katrina, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 13, 2005. 6 LA State Police, Louisiana Totally Interoperable Environment at 2-3 (Dec. 7, 2005). 7 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 3-4
(statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr., Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
8 See http://www.fema.gov/rrr/mers01.shtm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 9 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 7 (statement of William L. Carwile, III, former Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Hurricane Katrina Response
and Initial Recovery Operations: Mississippi). 10 Command and control are two key aspects of emergency management involving unity of command and effort among local, state, and federal
authorities as well as an accepted chain of command. (See DHS National Response Plan, (Dec. 2004) at 1 [hereinafter NRP].) Situational awareness simply refers to the extent to which the various responders—local, state, or federal offi cials, for example—have accurate, reasonably reliable information about conditions in the affected area and can use that information to guide their response efforts.
11 Stephen Lawson, Cell carriers tackle Katrina damage, IDG NEWS, (San Fran.), Sept. 1, 2005. 12 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA, Louisiana state and local offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 13 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA offi cials, New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9-10, 2005). 14 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, FEMA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005). 15 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gordon Mitchell and Ralph “Joey” Booth, Louisiana State Police in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005). 16 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Jerry McRay, Branch Chief, Information Technology Systems, Alabama Emergency Management Agency
EOC offi cials in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005). 17 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with Alabama Emergency management Agency EOC offi cials in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005). 18 Hearing on Communications in a Disaster Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2005) (statement
of Hossein Eslambolchi, President, AT&T Global Networking Technology Services and AT&T Labs) [hereinafter Sept. 22, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing].
19 DHS National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Fast Analysis Report (Update to Refl ect Category 5 Status) to DHS IP on Hurricane Katrina, Gulf coast at 1-2 (Aug. 28, 2005) (emphasis supplied).
20 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert). 21 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina Before the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. (Sept. 7, 2005) (statement of Kenneth P. Moran, Acting
Director, Offi ce of Homeland Security Enforcement Bureau, Federal Communications Commission). 22 Joab Jackson, Telecom infrastructure was no match for Katrina, WASH. TECH., Nov. 7, 2005 [hereinafter Telecom Infrastructure Article]. 23 Id. 24 Interview (telephone) by Select Comm. Staff with Anthony Melone, Vice President of Network Operations Support, Verizon Wireless (Jan. 27,
2006); See also, E-mail correspondence from Hans Leutenegger to Anthony Melone and Select Comm. Staff (Jan. 30, 2006) (9:45 a.m.). 25 BellSouth Press Release (Sept. 2, 2005). Prior to Katrina, BellSouth Corporation served 1.9 million lines in Louisiana. Approximately 1.03
million lines (54.2%) were initially affected. In Mississippi, approximately 438,000 (39.8%) were affected, and in Alabama 93,000 (5.5%) of the state’s 1.7 million lines were effected. By Sept. 2, approximately 144,000 remained out of services in New Orleans due to long term displacement. BellSouth News Release, Sept. 2, 2005.
26 Hearing on Communications Interoperability Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (Sept. 29, 2005) at 5-6 (written statement of Chief Willis Carter, First Vice President of the Assoc. of Public Safety Communications Offi cials-Int’ and Chief of Communications, Shreveport Fire Department, Shreveport, LA) [hereinafter Sept. 29, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing].
27 Julia Harwell Segars, Katrina’s Wrath, OPTIMIZE, Oct. 2005. 28 Congressional Research Service Report RL32594, Public Safety Communications Policy, by Linda K. Moore (Updated Jan. 5, 2006). 29 Id. 30 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Major General Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi National Guard in Jackson, MS (Oct. 13,
2005). 31 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 3 (statement of Phillip E. Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA Joint Field Offi ce, Austin, TX) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Comm. Hearing].
32 Id. 33 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant Gen., Mississippi National Guard at Jackson, MS (Oct. 13, 2005). 34 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Mississippi National Guard, in Gulfport, MS (Jan. 19, 2006). 35 Id. 36 See http://www.fema.gov/rrr/mers01.shtm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 37 Id.
180 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
38 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 32-33 (statement of Michael D. Brown, former Dir., FEMA) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
39 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Colonel Mark Mouton and Lieutenant General Jacques Thibideaux, Louisiana National Guard, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005).
40 Matt Welch, They Shoot Helicopters, Don’t They? How journalists spread rumors during Katrina, REASON ONLINE, Dec. 2005, available at http:// www.reason.com/0512/co.mw.they.shtml, (last visited Jan. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Media Rumors Article].
41 Telecom Infrastructure Article. 42 Media Rumors Article. 43 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Members and Staff by Mayor Favre, Bay St. Louis, MS, in Hancock County, MS (Jan. 20, 2006). 44 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Dir., State of Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11,
2005). 45 This simulcast trunked radio system consisting of three 20 channel sites and two 10 channel sites was installed in 2003 to serve law
enforcement, fi re, emergency medical, emergency management, and public utility services in Harrison County, which includes the cities Gulfport and Biloxi, MS.
46 E-mail correspondence from Benjamin J. Spraggins, Dir., Harrison County Emergency Management Agency, to Select Comm. Staff (Feb. 1, 2006) (2:53 p.m.).
47 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 56 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 48 Id. at 3-4. 49 Id. at 7 (statement of Bobby Strahan, MCEM, Director, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency). 50 Id. at 97 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 51 Interview (telephone) by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, MCEM, Director, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency (Nov.
29, 2005). 52 Id.; Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2, 7-8 (statement of Bobby Strahan). 53 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Matt Farlow, Information Technology Divisions Chief, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (Nov. 4, 2005). 54 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by Larry Ingargiola, Director, Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, St. Bernard Parish, in
St. Bernard Parish, LA (Nov. 3, 2005). 55 Sept. 22, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing (written statement of Kevin J. Martin). 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 35 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.). 59 Id. 60 Id. at 1 (written statement of Benjamin J. Spraggins; Id. at 4 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr). 61 Id. at 4 (written statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr). 62 LA State Police Report, Louisiana Totally Interoperable Environment at 3 (Dec. 7, 2005). 63 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Hurricane Katrina Evacuations Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. (Feb. 1,
2006) (testimony of C. Ray Nagin, Mayor of New Orleans, LA). 64 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert). 65 Sept. 29, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing at 1 (written statement of Dereck Orr, Program Manager of Public Safety Communications,
Nat’l Institute of Standards and Technology). 66 Sept. 22, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing at 5 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). 67 Oct. 26, 2005 Comm. on Homeland Security Hearing (written testimony of Dr. Linton Wells II, Acting Ass’t Sec’y of Defense, Networks and
Information Integration, and DOD Chief Information Offi cer). 68 Sept. 29, 2005 Senate Commerce Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of David Boyd, Deputy Director, Offi ce Systems Engineering &
Development, DHS). 69 Correspondence from Colonel Henry L. Whitehorn, Superintendent, LA State Police, to Select Comm. (Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Col.
Whitehorn correspondence]. 70 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert). 71 Louisiana State offi cials claim for “Louisiana to achieve true interoperability, the initial acquisition cost infrastructure and equipment is
$552,680, 423” thus rendering “the achievement of true interoperability at the state level virtually impossible.” See also Col. Whitehorn correspondence.
72 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3-4 (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert); Col. Whitehorn correspondence. 73 Matthew Fordahl, U.S. Lacks Unifi ed Emergency Radio System, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 13, 2005 [hereinafter Radio System Article]. 74 Col. Whitehorn correspondence. 75 The COPS Offi ce was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322). The mission of the
COPS Offi ce is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS Offi ce awards grants to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and train law enforcement offi cers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fi ghting technologies, and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies.
76 Congressional Research Service Memo, FEMA Hazard Mitigation, COPS and ODP Grants Awarded in Alabama, Louisiana and Mississippi in Fiscal Years 2003-2005 (Dec. 21, 2005).
77 Id. 78 Interview (telephone) by Select Comm. Staff with Gilbert Moore, COPS Program External Affairs Offi ce (Sept. 27, 2005). 79 Radio System Article. 80 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gregg Meffert, Chief Information Offi cer, City of New Orleans, in Wash., DC (Oct. 18, 2005).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 181
81 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of Col. Terry Ebbert). 82 The NCS began in 1962 after the Cuban missile crisis when communications problems among the United States, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and foreign heads of state threatened to complicate the crisis further. After the crisis, President John F. Kennedy ordered an investigation of national security communications, and the National Security Council (NSC) formed an interdepartmental committee to examine the communications networks and institute changes. This interdepartmental committee recommended the formation of a single unifi ed communications system to serve the President, Department of Defense, diplomatic and intelligence activities, and civilian leaders in order to provide better communications support to critical government functions during emergencies. The NCS mandate included linking, improving, and extending the communications facilities and components of various federal agencies, focusing on interconnectivity and survivability. See NCS website: http://www.ncs.gov/faq.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
83 Oct. 26, 2005 Homeland Security Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash). 84 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Peter M. Fonash, in Wash., DC (Jan. 27, 2006). 85 Oct. 26, 2005 Homeland Security Comm. Hearing at 3 (written statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash). 86 Id. 87 Id. at 4. 88 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by Edward A. Favre, Mayor, Bay St. Louis, MS, in Bay St. Louis, MS (Oct. 13, 2005). 89 Hearing on Back to the Drawing Board: A First Look at Lessons Learned from Katrina Before the Government Reform Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 15,
2005), at 257-58 (written statement of Jim Haynie, President, National Association for Amateur Radio). 90 Sept. 29, 2005 Energy & Commerce Comm. Hearing (written statement of Harold Kramer, Chief Operating Offi cer, American Radio Relay
League). 91 Oct. 26, 2005 Comm. on Homeland Security Hearing at 9 (written statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash). 92 Id. at 7.
182 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“Natural disasters will always be chaotic situations. But with proper planning
and preparation, it is possible to respond quickly to restore order and begin
recovery efforts.” Bob Riley
Governor, State of Alabama
Select Committee hearing, November 9, 2005
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COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and Control was impaired at all levels, delaying relief
Summary
Command and control are key aspects of emergency
management, and the federal government has taken
several steps, most notably developing an Incident
Command System (ICS), to promote unity of command
among local, state, and federal authorities. However,
during and immediately after Hurricane Katrina made
landfall, there were lapses in command and control
within each level of government, and between the three
levels of government.
Local governments’ command and control was often
paralyzed by the complete destruction of their entire
emergency management infrastructure. While state
command and control facilities (such as the Emergency
Operations Centers (EOCs)) were generally intact after
the storm, the magnitude of the storm and a variety of
operational factors impaired their unity of command. The
federal government also struggled to maintain unity of
command across different agencies and within individual
agencies. These problems exacerbated the challenges
of coordinating across all levels of government and
prevented overall unity of command.
One of the factors that impaired command and
control was the lack of communications and situational
awareness. While the reasons for these defi ciencies
were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS
chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command
and control mechanisms. Local governments in
many locations in Louisiana and Mississippi lost all
communications capabilities for some period. This
prevented them from communicating their situation and
needs to the state level.
The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own
communications problems. State offi cials in the EOC
could not reliably communicate with local offi cials, other
state offi cials, or federal offi cials. Similarly, the federal
government lost some communications, and initial
efforts to bring in supplemental capabilities to improve
command and control were unsuccessful. Other key
factors that impaired command and control can be traced
to a lack of suffi cient qualifi ed personnel, inadequate
training, and limited funding.
The lack of effective command and control, and its
impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts.
Delays and otherwise poor assistance efforts caused by a
lack of command and control are documented in this and
other chapters. They include:
■ delayed and
duplicative
efforts to plan
for and carry
out post landfall
evacuations at the
Superdome;
■ uncoordinated
search and rescue
efforts that resulted
in residents being
left for days without food and water;
■ separate military commands for the National Guard
and Department of Defense (DOD) active duty troops;
■ confusion over deliveries of commodities because
some offi cials diverted trucks and supplies without
coordination with others;
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■ lack of clarity as to who was assisting hospitals to
evacuate; and
■ the collapse of the New Orleans Police Department and
its ability to maintain law and order.
Finding: Command and Control was impaired at all levels of government
Command and control are key aspects of emergency management
Command and control are key aspects of emergency
management, and the federal government has taken
several steps to promote unity of command among
local, state, and federal authorities. For example, the
National Incident Management System (NIMS) was
developed in 2004 to enable all responders, regardless
of jurisdictions or discipline, to effectively and
effi ciently work together. The NIMS “provides a
nationwide template enabling federal, state, local,
and tribal governments and private-sector and
nongovernmental organizations to work together
effectively and effi ciently to prevent, prepare for,
respond to, and recover from domestic incidents
regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”1
In addition, NIMS incorporated the ICS, which
has been in existence since the early 1970s. ICS
is the standardizing scalable concept designed to
provide for an integrated and organized structure
while eliminating jurisdictional boundaries.2
The National Response Plan (NRP) calls for the
implementation of NIMS and the ICS upon
activation of the NRP to ensure maximum
fl exibility of operation during the situation at
hand.3
Optimal levels of coordination occur when there is
unity of command, unity of effort, and an accepted chain
of command. Unity of effort encompasses the concept
that all parties to a mission should be focused upon the
same agreed-to objectives and should work together to
achieve them. Unity of command is the concept that an
individual has only one superior to whom he or she is
directly responsible, creating a clear line of supervision
and command and control.
Chain of command furthers the concept of unity of
command, creating a line of authority from the lowest
ranking individual to those in command, establishing a
highly effective and effi cient system. It requires that orders
are given only to those directly below an individual in
the chain of command and orders are received from only
those directly superior in the chain of command. Those at
the appropriate level in the chain of command can then,
as authorized, coordinate their activities with peers in
their partner organizations.
Many local governments lost command centers or otherwise could not establish unity of command
Achieving unity of command — with local, state, and
federal authorities all acting together seamlessly to
plan and conduct emergency operations — is often a
challenge during a major disaster. It was particularly
so when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Local
governments’ command and control was often paralyzed
by the complete destruction of their entire emergency
management infrastructure.
In Alabama, local counties had the least problems
with command and control. Because Katrina turned to
the west and hit Mississippi and Louisiana the hardest,
Alabama counties were able to maintain their emergency
management infrastructure. Both Baldwin and Mobile
counties still had operating EOCs and generally were able
to stay in contact with the state EOC.4
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In Mississippi,
there was a
massive storm
surge that
destroyed
government
facilities, making
it very diffi cult for the local communities to establish
command and control. According to FEMA’s Federal
Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) for Mississippi, Bill Carwile,
much of the emergency management and public safety
infrastructure was destroyed in the coastal counties.5
Mayor of Waveland Tommy Longo said the city staged
at various points around the city some of the resources
it expected to need to respond to the storm’s damage,
and it also staged some of these resources about 10 miles
north of the city as a backup in the event of a catastrophic
event.6 Despite the city’s preparations, the hurricane
destroyed these resources. The storm decimated all of
Waveland’s public buildings, severely limiting its ability to
provide command and control and to mount a response
to the storm.7
Similarly, Hancock County lost its EOC—the location
from which it expected to provide command and control
for the county’s response to the storm—because of severe
fl ooding early on in the hurricane.8 Pearl River County
also lost its EOC in the early hours of the storm due to
wind and water damage that knocked out its emergency
backup generator and caused other damage, making the
center inoperable.9
In Louisiana, there was a similar level of destruction
to the basic emergency management infrastructure at
the parish level. Many of the parish EOCs and public
safety facilities were wiped out or fl ooded.10 While
Jefferson Parish was hard hit, it was in better shape to
respond because it had protected its EOC. Jefferson Parish
Emergency Manager Dr. Walter Maestri explained the
EOC was in a hardened facility — an old incinerator with
cement walls — with the command center, living quarters,
and emergency generator all on upper fl oors.11 While the
EOC suffered immediate problems with communications
being down, and it eventually had a shortage of fuel for its
generator, it was able to keep operating at some level.12
Lack of command and control was particularly a
problem in New Orleans. The authorities in the city
lost their command and control facilities after the levee
breaches and subsequent fl ooding. The city abandoned
its EOC when City Hall was fl ooded and the emergency
generator was fl ooded, cutting out power.13 As discussed
in more detail in the LAW ENFORCEMENT chapter, the
New Orleans Police Department headquarters and district
stations were fl ooded, crippling command and control
for that department.14 Similarly, the Louisiana National
Guard, with headquarters at Jackson Barracks in New
Orleans, lost its command and control due to fl ooding
and had to abandon its operations center and re-establish
it in an elevated parking structure at the Superdome.15
According to Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief
of the National Guard Bureau, “…Jackson Barracks
fl ooded at the most inopportune time, and he [Major
General Landreneau—the Louisiana Adjutant General]
had to relocate in the middle of trying to gain situational
awareness and coordinate the response.”16 Thus, in New
Orleans, for at least some period of time, emergency
managers, the police, and the military lost command
and control over their own personnel and lost unity of
command with the other local, state, and federal agencies
that needed to be involved in the relief efforts.
Even where there was still some infrastructure in
place and communications were less of a problem, local
command and control suffered from lack of clarity. The
most notable example of this was at the Superdome in
New Orleans. Although there were both National Guard
and New Orleans Police Department offi cials on site to
physically establish a unifi ed command and personally
talk to each other face to face, there was no consensus
on who was in charge. Louisiana National Guard offi cers
who ran security operations at the Superdome, Colonel
Mark Mouton and LtC. Jacques Thibodeaux said the New
Orleans Police Department had the lead for command
and control.17 They stated that the National Guard was
there in support of the police.18
These statements directly confl ict with New Orleans
Police Department comments that the National Guard
had the lead for command and control at the Superdome.
Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain, the senior New Orleans Police
Department offi cer at the Superdome, said the National
Guard always had the lead for command and control at
the Superdome and the police were there in support of the
military.19 In support of this position, New Orleans offi cials
said the Superdome was a state facility, so a state agency
(the National Guard) would naturally be in charge.20
One FEMA offi cial, Deputy FCO Scott Wells, also said
there was no clear unity of command at the Superdome.
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He said he arrived there on Wednesday, August 31, and
when he tried to contact the leadership at the location to
coordinate FEMA activities, he found “nobody in charge,
and no unifi ed command.”21 For example, he said there
was no organization or structure to collect requests,
prioritize them, and pass them on to the next appropriate
echelon. He described the conditions as “chaotic” and said
there appeared to be no one planning the next steps.22
The Cloverleaf was another location in New Orleans
where the command and control structure was unclear.
Louisiana State Police offi cials Ralph Mitchell and Joseph
Booth stated that one government agency (they did not
know which one) set up a medical triage and treatment
center at the Cloverleaf on Wednesday, August 31.23
Crowds grew there as people came to the dry land on their
own accord or were dropped off by the helicopters or
boats that rescued them from the water.
On Thursday, September 1, medical patients were
evacuated, but the rest of the crowd grew to about 6,000-
7,000 people. By Thursday afternoon and evening, the
crowd started getting restless. At one time, there were 60
state police offi cers there, in addition to National Guard
troops. The two offi cials — who had been on site — said
they did not know who was in charge of command and
control or which agency had set up the medical triage
center there in the fi rst place.24 Later on Thursday night
and Friday morning, some relief came from FEMA and
the National Guard, and the Cloverleaf was completely
cleared by Saturday, September 3.25
The Convention Center, discussed in more detail
in the EVACUATION chapter, suffered from no offi cial
presence at all. There was not even an attempt to establish
command and control there until the rescue mission
arrived on Friday, September 2 (four days after landfall).26
While there may have been some type of command
structures set up at both the Superdome and the
Cloverleaf, they do not appear to have been effective.
The fact that the senior offi cials who were stationed at or
visiting these locations disagreed on who was in charge,
could not fi nd out who was in charge, or did not know
who was in charge, shows there was a signifi cant lapse in
command and control and demonstrates there was little
unity of command at these locations in New Orleans.
State government unity of command was impaired by the magnitude of Katrina and other operational factors
While state command and control facilities (such as their
EOCs) were generally intact after landfall, the magnitude
of the storm and a variety of operational factors impaired
their unity of command.
Again, Alabama encountered the fewest command
and control problems because it was least affected by
Katrina. According to Alabama Emergency Management
Agency (EMA) Director Bruce Baughman, the state EOC
was up and running, with effective command and control
throughout the hurricane and its aftermath. Unlike
Louisiana (discussed below) where the parishes and
EOC lost use of their emergency management software,
Alabama used its software effectively. The software, known
as “EM 2000,” was used by county EOCs to send requests
for assistance and by the state EOC to task appropriate
state or federal agencies and to track the status.27 Select
Committee staff were able to review the EM 2000
database and confi rm the system was effectively used to
track and close out many of the local requests.
Many examples demonstrate the effectiveness of
Alabama’s EOC and the EM 2000 system. On August 29
at 9:30 p.m. the Mobile Police Department requested
vehicles for search and rescue operations. This task was
marked complete in the EM 2000 database in a little over
one hour at 10:41 p.m.28 Earlier on August 29, Baughman
ordered 40 truck loads of ice and 40 truck loads of water
from Lipsey Water. This task was marked complete by 2:00
p.m. the next day.29 At 6:41 p.m. on August 29, Baldwin
County EMA requested, through EM 2000, fi ve generators
for use at water wells. This task was marked complete at
9:16 am the next morning.30
When some FEMA requests were made, however, they
were not immediately addressed. On August 29, Mobile AP P
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County EMA Director Walter Dickerson requested two
FEMA operations personnel and two FEMA logistics
personnel to augment his staff. This need was not
addressed until September 21.31 Similarly, on August 30,
when Monroe County requested shelter supplies from
FEMA, it had to wait for six days for the task to be closed.
150 cots were needed in addition to a self-contained
shower and bath trailer.32
The Select Committee encountered severe
disagreements about whether the State of Louisiana
maintained effective unity of command. Some FEMA
offi cials were very critical of Louisiana’s command and
control. Michael Brown, Director of FEMA during Katrina,
called the state of Louisiana “dysfunctional” and said it
did not have unity of command.33 Brown cited this as one
of the main reasons for delays in relief efforts in Louisiana
and New Orleans.34
In addition, Wells said there was no unity of command
in the EOC. Wells was particularly critical of the state
for not practicing unity of command with the federal
government’s planning and coordination efforts.35 Wells
said state offi cials were “preoccupied with the evacuation”
and would not participate in critical pre-landfall “hasty”
planning in other areas such as (1) search and rescue,
(2) rapid assessment teams, (3) medical evacuation,
(4) sheltering and temporary housing, (5) commodity
distribution, and (6) debris removal.36
According to Wells, these “hasty plans” would have
helped guide the course of activities for the fi rst couple
of days after landfall, when situational
awareness was weak and before more
deliberate planning could take place.37
FEMA went ahead and developed the hasty
plans, but without the benefi t of state
EOC personnel participating. He said such
state personnel should have participated
because they had expertise in state and local
conditions and capabilities.38
The only exception to this was the
commodity distribution hasty plan. Wells
said that was the only plan the state worked
with FEMA to develop before landfall.39 As
another example, Wells cited the incident
(covered in more detail in the MILITARY chapter)
where the Louisiana Adjutant General requested DOD
active duty forces directly without going through or
even notifying FEMA.40 Instead of practicing unity of
command, Wells said the state bypassed FEMA for federal
assistance, then later complained FEMA did not know
what was going on, and that FEMA could not coordinate
the federal effort.41
Other FEMA offi cials were not as harsh in their
criticisms of Louisiana. Bill Lokey, the FEMA FCO in
the state EOC, said there was at least a minimum level
of command and control and unity of command, to
the extent the various parties were working together to
set common priorities for common objectives.42 Lokey
attributed any lack of unity of command and control to
a variety of operational factors (detailed below) and the
catastrophic nature of the event.43
Similarly, another FEMA offi cial who was in the
EOC and in New Orleans, Deputy FCO Phil Parr, said
some level of chaos occurs in any disaster, so it was not
particularly unusual that the EOC seemed chaotic under
the circumstances.44 As discussed in the next section, Lokey
and Parr both stated that not only was the state government
overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, but the
federal government was overwhelmed as well.45
Louisiana state offi cials, including State Coordinating
Offi cer (SCO) Jeff Smith, countered FEMA criticisms by
saying the EOC was fully functional.46 Smith said it was
always clear who was in charge at the EOC: the SCO.
Michael Brown, Director of FEMA during Katrina, called the state of Louisiana “dysfunctional” and said it did not have unity of command.
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He also maintained the EOC and the state did maintain
unity of command.47 In response to then-FEMA Director
Brown’s comment that he arrived at the EOC and could
not fi gure out who was in charge, Smith said that such
comments were “just plain bull.”48 Smith stated — and
Lokey concurred — that the SCO and FCO worked closely
together throughout the crisis.49 Smith also provided the
Select Committee with a photo taken during the crisis
of Lokey and Smith together in the EOC.50 According to
Smith, “if FEMA Director Michael Brown had wanted to
fi nd out who was in charge of the EOC, all he had to do
was fi nd his FEMA FCO, because I was standing right next
to him.”51
The Select Committee attempted to make an
independent determination of the effectiveness of
command and control in the EOC by listening to
conference calls between the EOC and parishes.52 Based
on a review of pre-landfall conference calls, the EOC
appeared to be organized and unifi ed to the limited
extent this could be determined through these calls.53 For
example, the SCO was clearly in charge of coordinating
state and parish activities and managing all discussions
and decisions in an orderly and logical fashion.54
Participation in the calls was very broad, to include
multiple state agencies, more than a dozen key parishes,
federal agencies, other states, and the American Red Cross.
In addition, every organization got its opportunity to talk,
and there was time for each organization to ask questions.
It appeared pre-landfall decisions and issues were fully
vetted among the participants. However, these conference
calls do not cover the period just after landfall — the
most critical and challenging time for establishing and
maintaining command and control.55
Despite the disagreements over the degree of effective
command and control in the state EOC, federal and state
offi cials both cited several operational factors that made
unity of command diffi cult to maintain. Among the most
signifi cant factors were a lack of communications and
situational awareness and a lack of suffi cient qualifi ed
personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding.
These are described later in this chapter as separate
fi ndings. The other operational factors impairing
command and control in the state EOC, described by
a number of federal and state offi cials, included the
following:
■ Katrina’s late turn toward Louisiana: State offi cials indicated that Katrina had taken a “dramatic shift”
toward Louisiana on Friday (August 26). They said they
were not fully aware of the situation until Saturday and
were therefore not as prepared as they otherwise would
have been.56
■ Overwhelming number of requests: The size of Katrina and the destruction she wrought was
immense, including the fl ooding of New Orleans and
subsequent problems with security and the post-
landfall evacuation. All of these circumstances led to an
overwhelming number of requests for assistance.57
■ Overcrowding in the EOC: The EOC building and main room were very crowded by the large contingent
of state and federal offi cials. 58 The EOC main room
has a capacity of about 50 people, but there were about
200 people. The EOC building as a whole was also
overcrowded with about 750-1,000 people in it. There
were only 12 Emergency Support Function (ESF) rooms
for 15 ESFs. State offi cials cited the size of the current
Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) (in an old department store
with thousands of staff) as an indication of the amount
of physical space and number of people needed to run
an operation the size of Katrina.59
■ EOC Information Technology was overloaded: The Information Technology system was overloaded by the
number of additional computers logged in and the
volume of information processed. This was slowing
down and destabilizing the system, and offi cials had to
add two servers in the middle of the response.60
■ Deviation from normal procedures: Due to the overwhelming number of requests and degraded
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communications, offi cials had to deviate from normal
procedures for requesting assistance.61 The federal
government contributed to this problem by also
deviating from normal procedures. Specifi cally, other
federal agencies tasked FEMA directly rather than
putting requests to the parishes in the fi rst place so they
could go through the normal process (e.g., from the
parish to the state and then to FEMA to be mission-
assigned to other federal agencies.)62
■ Freelancing by other federal, state, and local agencies: State offi cials said, and a FEMA offi cial confi rmed, that federal agencies were “freelancing,”
or just showing up without coordinating with the
appropriate authorities at FEMA or the state. They
would bypass the command structure and just appear
in the EOC.63 In addition, several freelancers showed
up from other state and local agencies, again, without
coordinating with the appropriate authorities. They too
would just appear in the EOC not knowing what to do.64
■ Visits by politicians and celebrities: Several elected offi cials from the state and national levels showed up in
the EOC. While they just wanted to see what was going
on and were trying to help, their presence distracted
the EOC personnel.65 There were similar visits by
celebrities such as Oprah Winfrey and Sean Penn.66
Most visits by elected offi cials and celebrities had large
media crews covering them, further distracting the EOC
personnel from their more urgent tasks.67
State offi cials who directed operations in the EOC
— Col. William Doran and Mr. Jim Ballou — noted that
with all of these operational factors, it would be easy for
an outsider to conclude the EOC was a chaotic place.68
In response to criticism from FEMA’s Michael Brown,
these two state offi cials (as well as the SCO Smith) said
some level of confusion was to be expected in the EOC
under the circumstances. They said FEMA should have
been more sympathetic and provided more assistance
when it was clear Louisiana was overwhelmed by the size
of Katrina’s devastation.69
Federal government also lacked unity of command across and within agencies
Like the states, the federal government also struggled
to maintain unity of command across and within
agencies. According to Louisiana SCO Smith, the federal
government did not follow its own plan, the NRP, which
calls for a unifi ed command. In his prepared statement
before the Select Committee, Smith stated “[a]nyone who
was there, anyone who chose to look, would realize that
there were literally three separate Federal commands.”70
Smith’s statement goes on to describe these three separate
command structures:
■ FCO and Joint Field Offi ce (JFO): This was the unifi ed
joint command with the FCO (Lokey) and SCO
(Smith) located initially at the state EOC, then moved
to the Joint Field Offi ce (in the old department store)
once that was established.71 The FCO, by doctrine, is
the individual that is supposed to be in charge of all
federal response operations, and only the FCO has the
authority to obligate federal funds.72
■ Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO): Smith said that “[t]he
Primary [sic] Federal Offi cer (PFO) by doctrine is not
supposed to be an operational person directly involved
in response activities . . . . The PFO in Katrina went
operational and began directing and guiding response
operations and to a large degree left out the Federal
Coordinating Offi cer (FCO).”73 This was inconsistent
with the NRP: “The PFO cell was operating on its
own, communicating directly with the Governor,
communicating directly with the Mayor of New
Orleans and a myriad of other local elected offi cials,”
Smith said.74
■ Joint Task Force Katrina: This command was intended
to serve DOD active duty forces. According to Smith,
“[w]henever the task force commander of Hurricane
Katrina, General Honoré, came onto the scene, he
was also operating independently with little regard
whatsoever for the Joint Field Offi ce, which should
have been the only unifi ed command.”75
The Select Committee found ample evidence
supporting the view that the federal government did not
have a unifi ed command. For example, FEMA offi cials
Lokey and Wells supported Smith’s position, saying the
PFO was not supposed to have an operational role and
FEMA should have been more sympathetic and provided more assistance when it was clear Louisiana was overwhelmed by the size of Katrina’s devastation.
190 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
was not supposed to bypass the FCO.76 They stated the
initial PFO, Michael Brown, followed protocol. However,
the second PFO, Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen,
immediately began directing operations and established
a separate command in New Orleans, set apart from the
SCO and FCO in the Joint Field Offi ce. Both FEMA offi cials
said Allen’s direction of operations as a PFO exceeded his
authorities as enumerated in the Stafford Act.77
Eventually Allen was appointed FCO in addition to
PFO.78 As Smith noted, “DHS in essence acknowledges
that there was a problem …when DHS appointed the
PFO as the FCO as well. DHS discovered the PFO did not
have the authority to obligate money. Only the FCO has
authority to obligate money.”79 This issue also arose in
an April 2005 national level exercise sponsored by DHS
called TOPOFF 3, where there was confusion over the
different roles and responsibilities performed by the PFO
and FCO.80 The PFO issue is also discussed in detail in the
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter.
FEMA offi cials also acknowledged that DOD frequently
acted on its own, outside the established unifi ed
command. Lokey said Honoré was directing activities
from his JTF Katrina command ship (the USS Iwo Jima,
docked pier-side in Orleans) without coordinating with
the FCO at the state EOC and later the Joint Field Offi ce.81
He said Honoré, like the PFO was coordinating directly
with local parishes and was accepting taskings from
them, which violated established federal protocols.82
Requests for assistance are supposed to go from the
local level, to the state SCO, then to the FEMA FCO,
and if appropriate, then to the Defense Coordinating
Offi cer for DOD support.83 Some may forgive Honoré
for bypassing this process because it was broken and
therefore unworkable after Katrina (as we discuss in the
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK chapter). In fact, Lokey praised
Honoré for “doing what had to be done to get things
moving.”84 However, one of the results of Honoré’s modus
operandi of acting independently was further impairing
FEMA’s ability to maintain unity of command across the
federal government. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul
McHale testifi ed that “[m]ilitary command and control
was workable, but not unifi ed.”85 Additional diffi culties
between FEMA and DOD are discussed in the MILITARY
chapter.
In addition to the problems with establishing and
maintaining a unifi ed command with DOD, FEMA
struggled to establish a unifi ed command with other
organizations within DHS. According to Wells, the
Coast Guard did not fuse their command in the search
and rescue operation with the state and FEMA. Wells
stated that for “the U.S. Coast Guard, who had junior
offi cer representation but no authority to direct search
and rescue air operations, all operations were directed
by senior Coast Guard offi cers from another location.
These offi cers refused to meet and conduct joint search
and rescue operations with FEMA and state agencies.”86
Captain Bruce Jones, the Coast Guard offi cer in charge
of air operations, commented that airborne search and
rescue was suffi ciently coordinated between the Louisiana
National Guard’s Task Force Eagle at the Superdome and
the Coast Guard’s air operations center at Belle Chasse
Naval Air Station and that having two incident commands
was an effective way to divide the work load.87 Regardless
of the positive outcome of saving lives, there was not unity
of command across the function of search and rescue.
In addition to its problems coordinating with other
federal agencies, FEMA had problems coordinating its
own activities. Because most communications systems
were impaired, Lokey could not talk directly with his
advance team leader in New Orleans, Parr.88 Thus, they
were unable to coordinate their activities. As another
example, Lokey and his staff in the EOC did not know
another FEMA offi cial, Marty Bahamonde, was in New
Orleans during and immediately after landfall until
they were informed by FEMA headquarters on late
Monday, August 29. Before that time, they did not even
know Bahamonde was there or what his function was.89
More generally, Lokey said the federal government and
particularly FEMA, were overwhelmed.90 Overwhelmed
organizations cannot achieve unity of command.
Louisiana EOC
conference calls
provide additional
evidence there was a
lack of coordination
within FEMA.91
Once emergency communications were restored and
the Louisiana EOC restarted its conference calls with the
Lokey said the federal government and particularly FEMA, were over- whelmed. Overwhelmed organizations cannot achieve unity of command.
S TA
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L O
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A
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 191
parishes on September 9, it was clear FEMA activities were
not well-coordinated. The September 9 call recorded a
discussion in which Smith stated FEMA’s “right hand is not
always knowing what the left hand is doing.”92
Parish offi cials agreed with this assessment and
provided several examples. They noted the local FEMA
representatives (situated in the parish EOCs) were working
hard to resolve their problems, but that “other FEMA
people just keep showing up.”93 The call indicates some
FEMA offi cials were making commitments to various local
elected offi cials, without coordinating with the FEMA FCO,
the state EOC, or the parish EOC. One parish offi cial said
this situation was “creating downright chaos.”94
Temporary housing was cited as a particular area where
FEMA coordination was unacceptable to the state and
parishes. According to Smith, a FEMA regional housing
team was not coordinating with the JFO. Smith said he
“blew his top” that morning because these FEMA regional
offi cials were bypassing the state and parish EOC process
in planning for temporary housing. FEMA needs to have
appropriate state and parish representatives involved in
any FEMA discussions of temporary housing, he said.
Smith told the parishes the FEMA FCO needs to “ride
herd” on the FEMA regional housing group so they follow
established procedures.95
Finding: Lack of communications and situational awareness paralyzed command and control
Localities, without communications, could not participate in unifi ed command
One of the key factors that impaired command and
control was the lack of communications and situational
awareness. While the reasons for these defi ciencies
were detailed previously (see the COMMUNICATIONS
chapter), their impact was to paralyze normal command
and control mechanisms. Many local governments in
Mississippi and Louisiana lost all communications
capabilities for some period. This prevented them from
communicating their situation to the state level.
Alabama, as noted before in this chapter and the
COMMUNICATIONS CHAPTER, experienced relatively
few communications problems. Federal and state
offi cials alike concluded their communications capacity
functioned well during their response to Katrina.96 The
Alabama EMA has various communications redundancy
programs to ensure that it maintains a high level of
connectedness throughout the state. The EOC has
equipment and trained personnel to communicate over
all types of communications networks, including satellite,
800 MHz digital phone service, amateur radio, and others.
Communications systems and capabilities are viewed
by AEMA staff as a strength, and during Katrina, this
redundancy proved effective. That said, the goal of true
interoperability within and among county emergency
response and law enforcement agencies remains elusive
since each county has its own authority and timetable to
procure communications technology.97
In Mississippi, most land-based communications
systems, including cellular phones, were inoperable.
According to Mississippi’s EMA Director, Robert Latham,
voice and data systems statewide were also inoperable.98
As a result, often the only communications capability
present in Mississippi — for both the state EMA as well as
the affected counties — was through satellite phones and F
E M
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F P
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T O
192 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
radios, which operate by connecting to satellites rather
than routing calls through land-based lines or cellular
towers. Despite FEMA efforts to bring in additional
communications capabilities to the affected counties’
EOCs, Carwile reported that communications capabilities
were far short of what was needed to be effective.99
To illustrate the problem in Louisiana, the EOC uses
conference calls as a way to provide command and
control and ensure unity of effort among the state and
effected parishes. However, after the conference call during
landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the parishes
lost their communications capabilities and were unable
to convene another conference call until 11 days later, on
Friday, September 9.100 Even then, the participants in the
conference call noted that it was still hard to make regular
phone calls.101
State of Louisiana offi cials lost local input to unifi ed command, and were unreachable for coordinating activities
The state EOC in Louisiana experienced its own
communications problems, with offi cials in the EOC
unable to communicate reliably with local offi cials, other
state offi cials, or federal offi cials.102 In one conference call,
Smith noted that part of the problem was the state EOC
had not been wired for the volume of communications
required for a major catastrophe.103 Many e-mails noted
the diffi culty of communicating with the state EOC. As
one example, a U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
e-mail that laid out the procedures for requesting DOD
assistance through the Defense Coordinating Offi cer in
the EOC also emphasized the EOC telephone appeared to
be continuously busy.104
Federal government also lost communications and failed in initial efforts to improve command and control
Similarly, the federal government lost some
communications, and initial efforts to bring in
supplemental capabilities to improve command and
control were unsuccessful. For example, FEMA has a
mobile command and control suite, named Red October,
which is housed in an oversized tractor trailer.105 Lokey
and his staff said during Hurricane Katrina, Red October
was pre-deployed to Shreveport, in northern Louisiana,
to keep it out of harm’s way but also to allow rapid
movement into Baton Rouge or New Orleans after the
hurricane passed.106 Red October, once deployed and
opened up, had a command and control suite with about
30 work stations and robust communications.
As the situation unfolded in New Orleans, and the
fl ooding destroyed much of the command and control
capability of the city, FEMA offi cials decided to move Red
October to New Orleans to provide on-site command
and control to its advance team and to help connect
with New Orleans and National Guard authorities at
the Superdome.107 However, while some tractor trailers
were able to get into the fl ooded city, Red October was
unable to do so because of its oversized dimensions.
Other FEMA communications vehicles, such as the Mobile
Emergency Response Support detachments, noted in the
COMMUNICATIONS chapter, were not capable of driving
through the fl oodwaters without damaging their sensitive
electronic equipment. Therefore, FEMA was unable to use
these to restore command and control with its forward
team in New Orleans, led by Parr.108
Finding: A lack of personnel, training, and funding also weakened command and control
A lack of suffi cient personnel hindered command and control
The lack of trained, professional personnel at both the
state and federal level greatly hindered the response.
According to FEMA, the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) had an
inadequate staff, both in numbers and training. “There
were too few professional staff” provided by the state,
according to Wells.109 The FCO Operations Chief, Tony
Robinson, agreed, saying the EOC had only 40 full-
time trained staff, leaving only 20 staff to operate in 12
hour shifts.110 Twenty people were far too few to run the
EOC during a large disaster and the state should have
developed a surge capacity, Robinson said.111
Wells said LOHSEP’s supplemental staff were
inadequately trained, and LOHSEP relied too heavily on
the Louisiana National Guard troops to work the EOC.112
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 193
He characterized the guardsmen as well meaning but not
trained to be professional emergency managers.113 Wells
cited this as one of reasons the state EOC personnel did
not understand the unifi ed command under the ICS.114
Robinson also said the ability to effectively operate
decreased as the state’s cadre of professional emergency
managers was augmented by these inexperienced
guardsmen.115 FEMA was also signifi cantly short on
available trained staff to send into the fi eld.116 Finally,
Wells stated that “[w]e did not have the people. We did
not have the expertise. We did not have the operational
training folks that we needed to do our mission.”117
A lack of training also hindered command and control
In Louisiana the lack of adequately trained personnel was
also a major impediment to utilizing ICS and achieving
effective command and control over state and federal
resources. Wells said the state personnel lacked overall
discipline, lacked clear control lines of authority, lacked
a clearly understood command structure, and lacked
consistency in operational procedures.118 “If people don’t
understand ICS, we can’t do ICS. And if we can’t do ICS,
we cannot manage disasters,” he stated in testimony
before the Senate.119
Valuable time and resources were expended to provide
on-the-job training in ICS to state personnel assigned
to the emergency operations center in Baton Rouge.120
Wells noted that state offi cials hired a consultant to teach
their EOC staff about ICS after landfall.121 Specifi cally,
the state hired former FEMA Director James Lee Witt
as a consultant, and one of Witt’s staff (a former FCO)
was training the state staff in the EOC on Tuesday and
Wednesday, August 30 and 31.122 Wells said it was
ridiculous to try to teach unifi ed command after the
hurricane had hit when everyone in the EOC should have
already known it by then; at that point, it was too late,
and the training created additional confusion in the EOC,
Wells said.123
In Mississippi, ICS issues were less of a problem.
According to Carwile, “[t]here had been training previous
to Hurricane Katrina by the Mississippi Emergency
Management Agency on down to the county emergency
managers. So, it worked well.”124
Inadequate funding cited as reason for inadequate personnel and training
As addressed more fully in the FEMA PREPAREDNESS
chapter, the lack of adequate staff and insuffi cient
training are directly attributable to limited funding for
FEMA operations. For example, the funding for training
exercises is, and has been defi cient. This is evident in the
lack of coordination of FEMA staff. According to Carwile,
training funding for national emergency response teams
dried up in 2003.125 Teams sent to the Gulf coast never
had an opportunity to train together beforehand. Prior
to activation, the teams were nothing more than names
on rosters. This contributed greatly to the ineffi cient and
timely delays in the initial federal response. Senator Joe
Lieberman described the training and funding issues as
“a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren’t
giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this.”126
Finding: Ineffective command and control delayed many relief efforts
The lack of effective command and control, and its
impact on unity of command, degraded the relief efforts.
Moreover, the problems experienced individually by the
local, state, and federal governments exacerbated the
challenges of coordinating across all levels of government
and prevented overall unity of command.
The evacuation of the Superdome provided one of
the clearest examples of how ineffective command and
control and the lack of unity of command hindered
urgently needed relief. It was planned multiple times by
different parties. On the day after Katrina’s landfall, Parr
worked with the Louisiana National Guard to devise a
Senator Joe Lieberman described the training and funding issues as “a FEMA disaster waiting to happen because we weren’t giving [FEMA] the resources to get ready for this.”
194 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
evacuation of the Superdome population 24 hours later
than would have occurred under the joint National Guard
/ FEMA plan put together at the Superdome.130
Other delays and poor assistance efforts caused by
a lack of command and control, mainly in Louisiana,
include:
■ Search and Rescue. Search and Rescue efforts were
uncoordinated. During the critical fi rst days after
Katrina and the fl ooding, there was no unity of
command between the various local, state, and federal
agencies participating in search and rescue efforts.
While heroic efforts by these agencies immediately
saved lives, there was little coordination of where the
victims should be or actually were taken. This resulted
in victims being left in shelters or out in the open on
high ground for days without food and water. For more
details, see the EVACUATION chapter.
plan for evacuating the Superdome through the use of
Chinook and Blackhawk helicopters.127 After working
through most the night, the plan was ready for execution
Wednesday morning. Parr and the Louisiana National
Guard offi cer working with him estimated it would take
30 hours to completely evacuate the Superdome. However,
earlier that day Blanco had instructed Landreneau of
the Guard to contact Honoré of Northern Command
to arrange for active duty military support of response
operations in Louisiana.128
This request was made outside the unifi ed command
and without the knowledge of FEMA and Parr. During the
early morning hours of Wednesday, Landreneau instructed
Louisiana National Guard offi cials at the Superdome to
cease planning for the evacuation as Honoré would be
“taking charge” of the evacuation project, thus bypassing
the unifi ed command and requirements that state requests
to federal agencies go through FEMA to further coordinate
and limit duplication.129 Parr said this resulted in the
F E
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■ Military Support. Much of the military support was also
uncoordinated. The Louisiana National Guard and
DOD active duty forces, under Joint Task Force Katrina,
were under separate commands. Federal attempts to
bring them under the same command were rejected by
the Governor. This resulted in delays in the arrival of
DOD active duty troops—troops that provided a robust
reservoir of manpower and a wide array of capabilities.
For more details, see the MILITARY chapter.
■ Medical Evacuations. There was confusion over which
agencies or personnel were supposed to assist with
hospital evacuations. Hospitals reported that Army
and FEMA offi cials came and surveyed the situation
and never returned despite saying that they would.
This resulted in delays in evacuating patients, with
sometimes fatal consequences. For more details, see the
MEDICAL CARE chapter.
■ Lawlessness in New Orleans. The New Orleans Police
Department, in addition to losing hundreds of its
personnel who did not report to duty, lost command
and control over those that still reported to work. This
resulted in delays in determining where problems were,
dispatching offi cers to those locations, and otherwise
planning and prioritizing operations to restore law and
order. For more details, see the LAW ENFORCEMENT
chapter.
Conclusion
In responding to Hurricane Katrina, elements of federal,
state, and local governments lacked command, lacked
control, and certainly lacked unity. Some of the reasons
for this can be traced back to the magnitude of the storm,
which destroyed the communications systems that are
so vital to effective command and control. In addition,
the magnitude of the storm created so much damage
across such a wide area that it overwhelmed agencies and
individuals who were struggling to mount an organized
response.
But some of the lapses in command and control can
be traced back to agencies and individuals demonstrating
a failure of initiative to better protect their command and
control facilities, better clarify command and control
relationships on location, and better follow established
protocols for ensuring unity of command. This problem
of not following protocols is summed up well in a recent
DHS-IG report on an exercise involving federal, state,
and local governments: all levels of government have “a
fundamental lack of understanding for the principals and
protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”131
Finally, to some degree, lapses in command and
control can be traced to a lack of suffi cient qualifi ed
personnel, inadequate training, and limited funding.
In total, these factors paralyzed command and control,
leading to an agonizingly disjointed and slow response to
the disaster. ■
“All levels of government have “a fundamental lack of understanding for the principals and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”
196 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, (Dec. 2004) at 1 [hereinafter NRP]. 2 Id. at 66. 3 Id. at 1. 4 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Leigh Anne Ryals, Emergency Manager, Baldwin County [hereinafter Ryals Interview], in Washington,
DC, via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005); see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Walter Dickerson, Emergency Manager, Mobile County [hereinafter Dickerson Interview], in Washington, D.C., via telephone from AL (Oct. 25, 2005).
5 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 5 (written statement of William L. Carwile) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
6 Id. at 125-127 (statement of Steve Longo). 7 Id. 8 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Hootie Adams, Director, Emergency Management for Hancock County, MS, in Hancock County, MS
(Oct. 14, 2005). 9 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Director, Pearl River County Emergency Management Agency, in Washington, D.C., via
telephone from MS (Nov. 29, 2005). 10 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness [hereinafter
Smith Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005). 11 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005). 12 Id. 13 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex Macdonald, Information and Technology and Communications Director, Department of Public
Safety and Corrections [hereinafter Macdonald Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans [hereinafter Ebbert Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005).
14 Macdonald Interview; see also Ebbert Interview. 15 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jacques Thibodeaux, LtC, LA Nat’l Guard [hereinafter Thibodeaux Interview], in New Orleans, LA
(Nov. 3, 2005); see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Mark Mouton, Col, LA Nat’l Guard [hereinafter Mouton Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005).
16 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 194 (statement of H Steven Blum) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
17 See Thibodeaux Interview; Mouton Interview. 18 Id. 19 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Chief New Orleans Police Department [hereinafter Swain Interview], in New
Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005). 20 Ebbert Interview. 21 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Cordinating Offi cer, FEMA [hereinafter Wells Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA
(Nov. 9, 2005). 22 Id. 23 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Ralph Mitchell, LA State Police [hereinafter Nov. 4, 2005 Mitchell Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4,
2005); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Joseph Booth, LA State Police [hereinafter Booth Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).
24 Mitchell Interview; see also Booth Interview. 25 Id. 26 See Thibodeaux Interview; Swain Interview. 27 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Baughman Interview],
in Clancy, AL (Oct. 11, 2005); see also, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, General Counsel for AL Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter Tranter Interview], Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005).
28 AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1992, (Aug. 29, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002567). 29 AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1969, (Aug. 30, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002600). 30 AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1948, (Aug. 30, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002625). 31 AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-1974, (Sept. 21, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002593). 32 AL Emergency Management Agency EM/2000 Tracker System message 05-2096, (Sept. 5, 2005) (Doc. No. AL 002444). 33 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 32, 157
(statement of Michael Brown) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 34 Id. 35 Wells Interview. 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Id. 39 Id. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer [hereinafter Lokey Interview], in Washington, DC (Dec. 2,
2005); see also Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005), at 229-230 (statement of Bill Lokey) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 197
43 Lokey Interview; see also Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 229-230 (statement of Bill Lokey). 44 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA [hereinafter Parr Interview], in Washington, DC (Dec. 6,
2005). 45 Lokey Interview; see also Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 196 (statement of Phil Parr). 46 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LTC William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (LOHSEP) [hereinafter Doran Interview]; see Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim Ballou, Operations Division, LA Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) [hereinafter Ballou Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Smith Interview.
47 Smith Interview. 48 Id. 49 Smith Interview; see also Lokey Interview. 50 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing, Appendix: Photo Presentation Slide 26 (written statement of Jeff Smith). 51 Smith Interview. 52 See generally Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005). 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. 56 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview. 57 Id. see also Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview. 58 Id. 59 Id. 60 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview. 61 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview. 62 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview. 63 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview. 64 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview. 65 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview. 66 Nicole Bode, Sean Penn Gets into Rescue Act, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.) (Sept. 8, 2005) at 6; Ryan Parry, 150 Hurricane Brits Missing, MIRROR
(London) (Sept. 5, 2005) at 1, 4 (“Last night [Sept. 04] TV’s Oprah Winfrey arrived in New Orleans with 33 supply trucks.”). 67 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Parr Interview. 68 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Lokey Interview; Parr Interview; Smith Interview. 69 See Doran Interview; Ballou Interview; see also Smith Interview. 70 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 16 (written statement of Jeff Smith). 71 Id. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 Id. 76 Lokey Interview; see also Wells Interview. 77 Id. 78 Smith Interview. 79 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 16 (written statement of Jeff Smith). 80 Offi ce of Inspector General, Dep’t of Homeland Security, A Review of the Top Offi cials 3 Exercise (Rpt. No. OIG-06-07) at 1, 12 (Nov. 2005)
[hereinafter DHS IG Report]. 81 Lokey Interview; Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense: Legislative Affairs, DOD Support for Hurricane Katrina Relief: Executive Summary
Mon., Sept. 12, 2005 as of 0700 (Sept. 12, 2005). 82 Lokey Interview. 83 Id. 84 Id. 85 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 134 (statement of Paul McHale). 86 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operational Professionals Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 45 (statement of Scott Wells) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing]. 87 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Jones, Captain, Coast Guard, in Washington, D.C. via telephone from New Orleans, LA (Jan. 10,
2006). 88 Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview. 89 Id. 90 Lokey Interview. 91 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005). 92 Id. 93 Id. 94 Id. It was not possible to determine exactly which parish offi cial made this statement. 95 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005). 96 See generally Ryals Interview; see also Dickerson Interview; Baughman Interview; Tranter Interview. 97 Baughman Interview; see also Tranter Interview. 98 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 34 (statement of Robert R. Latham, Jr.).
198 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
99 Id. at 7 (written statement of William L. Carwile). 100 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26 – Sept. 9, 2005). 101 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005). 102 Macdonald Interview. 103 See Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Sept. 9, 2005). 104 E-mail correspondence from Clair Blong (DHS/FEMA NORAD USNORTCOM IC) to FEMA-NRCC and FEMA-HSOC Staff (Sept. 01, 2005 7:51
p.m.), citing e-mail correspondence from Nanette Nadeau (DAF NORAD USNORTHCOM), to Clair Blong, Sept. 01, 2005 (Doc No. DHS- FEMA-0028-0000685).
105 Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview. 106 Id. 107 Id. It is not clear which FEMA offi cial ultimately approved this decision. 108 Lokey Interview; see also Parr Interview. 109 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 5 (written statement of William L. Carwile). 110 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tony Robinson, FEMA JFO Operation [hereinafter Robinson Interview], in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10,
2005). 111 Robinson Interview. 112 Wells Interview. 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Robinson Interview. 116 Wells Interview. 117 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 58 (statement of Scott Wells). 118 Wells Interview. 119 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 46 (statement of Scott Wells). 120 Wells Interview. 121 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 46 (statement of Scott Wells). 122 Wells Interview. 123 Id. 124 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 48 (statement of William L. Carwile). 125 Id. 126 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 61 (statement of Senator Joseph Lieberman). 127 Parr Interview. 128 Id. 129 Id. 130 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing at 70-72 (statement of Phil Parr). 131 DHS IG Report at 1, 12.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 199
200 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“In the early hours of Hurricane Katrina, and without regard to
their own safety, and in many cases, knowing their own homes
were probably destroyed, these great citizens of Louisiana began
to go out, by helicopter and boat, to begin the massive search and
rescue operations.
“Pulling residents from rooftops, out of attics, and directly from
the water, the men and women of the Louisiana National Guard
were there, saving thousands of lives …”
Major General Bennett C. Landreneau
The Adjutant General, State of Louisiana
Select Committee hearing, October 27, 2005
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The military played an invaluable role, but coordination was lacking
Summary
The active and reserve components of the United States
armed forces have a long and proud history of providing
essential aid to the civilian populace of this country in the
aftermath of natural disasters. There are several reasons
the nation continues to rely on the military to perform
this role. One is that the military is able to provide
essential, life saving services more quickly and more
comprehensively than any other entity when local and
state response capabilities are overwhelmed, including
the ability to provide helicopter and boat rescue, shelter,
food, water, and medical support. Importantly, much of
this capability is vested with the National Guard, and is
thus an asset under the control of the governor of each
respective state or territory and the District of Columbia.
As robust as the military capability is, there are
limitations, many of which are highlighted in the specifi c
fi ndings below. The most important limit to the military’s
ability to manage domestic disaster response is the nation’s
traditional reliance on local control to handle incident
response. The federal government, with the Department
of Defense (DOD) serving as part of the federal response
team, takes its directions from state and local leaders. Since
that is our nation’s tradition, DOD does not plan to be the
lead agency in any disaster situation and expects to assist
as local authorities request and direct. Furthermore, DOD
lacks the detailed knowledge of local conditions essential to
effective relief operations.
Even so, the element of the U.S. military with the
longest tradition of service — the militia, now called the
National Guard — is a particularly valuable asset to each
state, territory, and the District of Columbia. Units can be
called to active duty by the order of the governor and serve
as the state’s chief executive directs. Thus, the National
Guard is responsive and will possess knowledge of local
conditions. In contrast, the processes by which active
military forces are brought to a region are lengthy and
burdensome. When they arrive, these forces will not have
detailed local knowledge and will be prohibited by law
THE MILITARY
from performing law
enforcement functions.
In addition, there will
be two distinct military
chains of command
— one for federal
troops and one for
National Guard troops
under state command.
This dual chain of
command structure,
lengthy federal troop
activation system,
and, in the case of
Katrina, devastated
local authorities,
contributed to a poorly coordinated federal response to
Katrina. It would not be possible to anticipate all problems
and prevent all the diffi culties that ensued from a storm
of this magnitude, but better planning, more robust
exercises, and better engagement between active forces
and the National Guard both before and during disaster
response would have helped prevent human suffering.
Two new organizations created after September 11, 2001,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD’s
Northern Command, are integral parts of this process, and
the growing pains were evident to the Select Committee.
Northern Command is charged with managing the federal
military response to disasters and DHS is in charge of the
overall federal effort. Northern Command has taken strides,
but needs better integration with FEMA and with the
National Guard effort at disasters and emergencies. Clearly,
more needs to be done.
Even though there were problems, the military played
an invaluable role in helping the citizens of Louisiana,
Alabama, and Mississippi respond to the devastation of
Katrina and saved countless lives. Indeed, as Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale
testifi ed:
“The Department of Defense’s response to the
catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina was the
largest military deployment within the United States
since the Civil War.”1
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There is no doubt DOD
resources improved the
national response to Katrina.
Although trained and
equipped for war fi ghting,
there is enough commonality
of expertise and equipment
that made for a signifi cant
military contribution to
the majority of Emergency
Support Functions (ESFs) of
the National Response Plan.
DOD is the only federal
department with supporting
responsibilities in each of the fi fteen ESFs.2
The Hurricane Katrina response also reinforced the
National Response Plan’s designation of the National
Guard as the military’s fi rst responders to a domestic crisis.
“In contrast to Hurricane Andrew (1992) in which
National Guard forces constituted 24% of the military
response, National Guard forces represented more than
70% of the military force for Hurricane Katrina.”3
Number of National Guard and active Duty Personnel in Joint Operational Area of Hurricane Katrina
Date National Guard Active Duty
August 26 2,505 n/a
August 27 2,633 n/a
August 28 4,091 n/a
August 29 7,522 n/a
August 30 8, 573 1,000
August 31 11,003 2,000
September 1 13,113 3,000
September 2 16,928 4,011
September 3 22,624 4,631
September 4 30,188 10,952
September 5 32,760 15,204
September 6 42,990 17,417
September 7 45,420 18,342
September 8 48,560 19,749
September 9 50,116 21,408
September 10 50,116 21,168
September 11 48,045 22,028
September 12 48,280 22,670
September 13 45,791 22,232
September 14 45,063 18,690
SOURCE: NORTHERN COMMAND TIMELINE
Despite the immediacy of required action, confusion
created by multi-intergovernmental agency activities
and dual military responses, the men and women of the
armed services came when they were called. And whether
on the ground, in the air, or on the water, they worked
extremely hard to save and offer aid to the victims of
Hurricane Katrina.
There are a number of specifi c areas where better
coordination mechanisms could have greatly improved
the execution of military support during Hurricane
Katrina. The protocols associated with sharing essential
information, the coordinated movement of personnel and
equipment, and prior joint planning and training are vital
to an effective and comprehensive response.
Finding: The National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex as written would have delayed the active duty military response, even if it had been implemented
The National Response Plan (NRP) creates confusion
about federal active duty military involvement due to
unresolved tension between the possible need for active
duty military assistance when state and local offi cials
are overwhelmed, and the presumption that a governor
will use his or her understanding of the situation on the
ground to decide whether and when to ask for active duty
military support.
A foundational assumption of the NRP’s Catastrophic
Incident Annex (CIA) is that local and surrounding
jurisdictions’ response capabilities may be insuffi cient as
they could be quickly overwhelmed by an event. Despite
this guiding assumption, NRP-CIA policy assumes that
state/local incident command authorities will be able to
integrate federal resources into the response effort. The
NRP-CIA fails to refl ect whether in a catastrophic incident,
DHS should rely upon the same principle — the presence
of local and state fi rst responders for the fi rst 48-72 hours
of an emergency — as the non-catastrophic incident
portion of the NRP. This failure would have delayed the
federal military response and prevented full integration of
the National Guard and active duty missions, even if the
NRC - CIA had been involved.
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Whether there exists an effective local and state
response for the fi rst 48-72 hours of a disaster is a critical
element in determining the need for and extent of military
involvement. Some point out that in cases of a major
catastrophe, the President through the Stafford Act can
designate and deploy federal resources without following
NRP procedures. This view does not address if the NRP
procedures in place in the event of a major catastrophe
— whether or not the President chooses to federalize the
response — are sound.
Recognizing that federal resources might be required
to augment overwhelmed state and local response
efforts, the NRP-CIA establishes protocols to pre-
identify and rapidly deploy essential resources that are
urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents.
Under the NRP-CIA, normal procedures for a number
of the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) may be
expedited or streamlined to address urgent requirements.
These include: medical teams, urban search and rescue
teams, transportable shelter, medical and equipment
caches, and communications gear. Standard procedures
regarding requests for assistance may be, under extreme
circumstances, temporarily suspended.
One of the planning assumptions of the NRP-CIA is
that a detailed and credible common operating picture
may not be achievable for 24 to 48 hours after the
incident. As a result, the NRP-CIA calls for response
activities to begin without the benefi t of a complete
situation and critical needs assessment. Moreover, under
this Annex, notifi cation and full coordination with states
should not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and
deployment of critical federal resources.
Finding: DOD/DHS coordination was not effective during Hurricane Katrina
The Department of Homeland Security and the
Department of Defense share responsibility for ensuring
the security and safety of America. Since the establishment
of DHS after 9/11, both departments have sought to
defi ne their roles and responsibilities.
McHale testifi ed at a recent congressional hearing that
he was the Defense Department’s principal liaison with
DHS.4 A memorandum of understanding between DHS
and DOD assigns 64 DOD personnel to DHS to fi ll critical
specialties, principally in the areas of communications
and intelligence. There is also a Homeland Defense
Coordination Offi ce at DHS headquarters, as well as
around-the-clock DOD presence in the DHS Homeland
Security Operations Center.
Despite these efforts to integrate operations, gaps
remained in DOD/DHS coordination. During a BRAC
Commission hearing conducted August 11, 2005, a
commissioner asked Peter F. Verga, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), of the
existence of any document issued by DHS that would help
DOD determine the requirements for military assistance
to civilian authorities. Verga replied: “To my knowledge,
no such document exists.”5
On August 30, an e-mail generated in the Offi ce
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicated concern
about the fl ow of information between DOD and FEMA
and a lack of understanding of what was an offi cial
request for assistance and what was not.6 Another e-
mail from DHS to DOD on this day indicated Secretary
Chertoff was requesting updated information on the
levees in New Orleans, shelter information, and search
Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, during the immediate week after landfall, refl ect a lack of information sharing, near panic, and problems with process.
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and rescue missions DOD was performing. The OSD
response expressed wonder at why DHS was asking for
this information, as FEMA had not yet even generated
requests for these missions for DOD.7 Communications
between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA,
during the immediate week after landfall, refl ect a lack
of information sharing, near panic, and problems with
process.8 As time went on, and FEMA and DOD worked
out Requests for Assistance (RFAs), and communications
and information sharing did improve.9
These problems are indicative of a dispute between
DOD and DHS that still lingers. DOD maintains it
honored all FEMA requests for assistance in the relief
effort, refusing no missions.10 FEMA offi cials insist
that notwithstanding the offi cial paper trail, DOD
effectively refused some missions in the informal
coordination process that preceded an offi cial FEMA
request.11 Therefore, when DOD thought a mission was
inappropriate, FEMA simply did not request the assistance
from DOD.
The reliance of FEMA on DOD during the Hurricane
Katrina response, although not anticipated in scope,
became at its most basic, a takeover of FEMA’s
responsibilities as the logistics manager for the federal
response. According to Secretary McHale:
During Katrina, the federal military remained
under FEMA’s control. It meant that the Defense
Department, which had the resources to appraise
the situation and prioritize its missions more
quickly than could FEMA, actually drafted its own
requests for assistance and sent them to FEMA,
which copied them and sent them back to the
Department of Defense for action.12
Finding: DOD, FEMA and the state of Louisiana had diffculty coordinating with each other, which slowed the response
The process for requesting DOD active duty forces has
several layers of review and is understandably not well
understood or familiar to state offi cials who rarely
would need to request DOD support. Even though state
offi cials do not routinely work with DOD, requests for
DOD assistance are generated at the state level. These go
from the state to FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer
(FCO), who in turn requests assistance from the Defense
Coordinating Offi cer (DCO). The DCO passes these
requests on to the joint task force, which routes them
through Northern Command to the Offi ce of the Secretary
of Defense Executive Secretariat, to the Joint Directorate
of Military Support on the Joint Staff. At each stage, the
request is validated to ensure it can be met and that it is
legal to provide the assistance. Once vetted, the request is
tasked to the services and coordinated with Joint Forces
Command, and forces or resources are then allocated to the
joint task force, which in turn gets the support down to the
user level by way of the DCO. This process is in place not
only to satisfy DOD internal requirements, but to ensure
maximum coordination with both FEMA and the state.
DOD’s process for receiving, approving, and executing
missions was called bureaucratic by Louisiana offi cials.13
Despite the multiple layers of paperwork requirements
described above, the Select Committee could not
defi nitively determine the origin of the request for DOD
to provide active duty forces. Louisiana offi cials said their
Adjutant General made the request directly of General
Russel L. Honoré — without coordinating the request
through FEMA — the established process to request
all federal assistance.14 This request outside of normal
channels may refl ect frustration with the bureaucratic
process.
Current FEMA FCO Scott Wells told Select Committee
staff this direct state request to DOD was indicative of
Louisiana not having a unifi ed command during Katrina
and created coordination problems during the response
and recovery efforts.15 Without a unifi ed command,
the system for requests for assistance was diffi cult. This
diffi culty was compounded by the scarcity of telephone
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communication capability remaining in Louisiana,
resulting in a communications chokepoint at the EOC in
Baton Rouge where the telephone was continuously busy.
Prior to the arrival of Honoré, senior FEMA
offi cials were unable to get visibility on their requests.
For example, former Undersecretary for Emergency
Preparedness and Response and FEMA Director, Michael
Brown, testifi ed that he did not know what happened to
some of his requests for assistance.16
While DOD offi cials testifi ed in October that DOD
was “leaning forward” and taking quick action prior to
Katrina’s landfall, FEMA offi cials said the DOD process
appeared cumbersome.17 Louisiana Governor Blanco’s
Chief of Staff Andy Kopplin said DOD was, in his
opinion, slow and overly bureaucratic.18 It appears that
although DOD may have been doing the best it could
with the system it had, Hurricane Katrina was of such
magnitude that more rapid response was necessary.
Although acknowledging that General Honoré operated
outside normal FEMA-led channels, FEMA FCO William
Lokey praised him for getting things done that Louisiana
and FEMA could not.19
Finding: National Guard and DOD response operations were comprehensive, but perceived as slow
National Guard response
“I am particularly proud of the timeliness and
magnitude of the National Guard’s efforts in
advance of Hurricane Katrina and our response in
its immediate aftermath. National Guard forces
were in the water and on the streets of New Orleans
rescuing people within four hours of Katrina’s
passing. More than 9,700 National Guard Soldiers
and Airmen were in New Orleans by the thirtieth of
August. The National Guard deployed over 30,000
additional troops within 96 hours of the passing of
the storm.”20 Lieutenant General H Steven Blum,
Chief, National Guard Bureau
When reports on the catastrophic damage in
Louisiana and Mississippi began to fl ow in, the National
Guard Bureau did not hesitate to act. The NGB took
responsibility for coordinating the fl ow of Guard
resources and personnel from all 50 states to speed up
the process and increase effi cient use of resources as
requirements from coastal states grew beyond their ability
to coordinate individual state-to-state compacts.21 The
NGB Joint Operations Center (NGBJOC) worked closely
with the Army National Guard Crisis Response Cell and
the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team to source and
move these forces into the Gulf Coast.
Initially, this operated via a “push” methodology
with supporting states pushing available forces based on
requirements identifi ed by the Adjutants General in the
supported states.22 As situational awareness improved,
this gradually transitioned to a “pull” process whereby
supported states submitted requests for forces through the
NGBJOC to be sourced by the supporting states.
NGB operated its Joint Operations Center around the
clock to coordinate all National Guard actions associated
with information sharing between Offi ce of the Secretary
of Defense, the Army and the Air Force, Northern
Command, state emergency operations centers, and
other DOD liaison offi cers. This coordination supported
National Guard response activities in the affected states.23
One of the challenges of Katrina for the Department
of Defense was the lack of protocols set by Northern
Command for information fl ow between the separate
DOD entities.24
On Tuesday, August 30, state Adjutants General
reported the following troop deployments to the NGB:
5,149 to Louisiana, 2,826 to Mississippi, 1,066 to
Alabama, and 753 to Florida for a total of 9,794.25 At
this time, Louisiana and Mississippi were supplemented
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by Guardsmen from nine other states. In position and
responding were 64 Army National Guard aircraft, that
reported 186 search and rescue missions performed, 1,017
patients moved, 1,910 evacuees, 91 cargo movements, and
29 food and water movements.
On August 31, at 7:21 a.m., Lieutenant General Blum
and Army National Guard Director Lieutenant General
Clyde A. Vaughn placed a phone call to Louisiana State
Adjutant General Landreneau.26 The following is a record
of their conversation:
General Blum: Benny, how are things going? General Landreneau: Sir, we’ve had a diffi cult night.
General Blum: What do you need? General Landreneau: We need 5K soldiers to help out. The armory is fl ooded. My command
and control is at the Superdome. We have a lot of
undesirables here trying to cause trouble.
General Vaughn: Hey Benny, can we drive to the Superdome?
General Landreneau: No sir, we are cut off by the rising water, along with the armory.
General Vaughn: Where do you want us to send the incoming soldiers?
General Landreneau: Sir, send them to the intersection of Interstate 310 and State 10.
General Blum: Benny, when’s the last time you got any sleep?
General Landreneau: Well sir, I think two days ago. General Blum: Listen, you need to get some rest, you sound exhausted.
General Landreneau: I’ll try Sir, but every time I lay down someone gets me up for a little emergency.
General Blum: Try and get some rest, this is an ongoing effort and we need your energy.
General Vaughn: Benny, we’re going to push help so be ready.27
On Wednesday, August 31, Blum set up a
teleconference with all state Adjutants General at noon
to coordinate “full capabilities of National Guard to be
deployed as rapidly as possible to save life and limb.”28
Every state Adjutant General reported their Guard forces
deploying or available for deployment.29
On Thursday, September 1 at 11:30 a.m., Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld and Blum met with President Bush to
discuss the National Guard response.30 At this briefi ng, the
President agreed with Rumsfeld that the National Guard
was responding effectively to the disaster and chose not to
federalize Guard troops.31 At 1:15 p.m., Blum was asked
to be part of a DHS press conference with Chertoff and
McHale, to discuss federal assistance to the Gulf. At 5:30
p.m., after coordinating with McHale and Rumsfeld, Blum
departed for Belle Chasse, Louisiana, and immediately
met with Louisiana State Adjutant General Landreneau
at the Superdome. Later that evening, Blum met with
Governor Kathleen Blanco to discuss troop and resource
requirements in Louisiana.32
Also during this time, federal offi cials considered ways
to structure a unifi ed command. According to Deputy
Homeland Security Advisor Ken Rapuano, federal offi cials
discussed with Blanco federalizing the National Guard.33
President Bush ultimately offered Blanco a “Memorandum
of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent and
Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF Katrina,” making
Honoré, as commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, a
member of the Louisiana National Guard.34 An excerpt
from a DOD letter drafted for Governor Blanco to President
Bush explained how the command would have been
structured under the proposal:
In order to enhance Federal and State efforts, and if
you grant permission, I would like to appoint the
Regular Army offi cer commanding the Federal Joint
Task Force Katrina to be an offi cer in the Louisiana
National Guard. I would assign him to command
the National Guard forces under my command.35
Thus, President Bush’s proposal would not have put
National Guard troops under federal control. Rather,
the proposal would have put Honoré under Blanco’s
command in the chain-of-command over National Guard
troops in Louisiana. In this proposal, Honoré would
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have served in two capacities — fi rst, as the commander
of federal troops ultimately answering to the President,
and second, as the commander of the Louisiana National
Guard, answering to Blanco. This proposal was intended
to establish a single command for all military operations
in Louisiana.
Blanco wrote to President Bush on September 3,
declining this proposal. The Governor only agreed to the
importance of creating a single military commander for
federal forces that “could enhance the contribution of over
25 National Guard states currently being commanded
by the Louisiana State Adjutant General.”36 As a result,
federal troops remained under one command — Honoré
and Northern Command, while the National Guard
remained under the separate command of Landreneau
and the Governor.
Administrative matters proved to be a challenge as well
for National Guard troops deploying under Emergency
Management Assistant Compacts (EMAC) with various
states. Since these forces were activated in state-to-state
agreements they were on state active duty and subject
to the rules and entitlements authorized by their
respective home states. This plethora of statuses made
administration problematic for the National Guard, and
led to a request that these forces be activated under Title
32 of the U.S. Code. This federal status permits uniform
administration while allowing continued command and
control by the Governor.37 Numerous state Adjutants
General suggested the National Guard Bureau request that
guard troops be activated under Title 32.38 In response,
the National Guard Bureau strongly advocated for the use
of Title 32:
not only because it allowed Governors to retain
control, but because it was the right thing to do for
the soldiers and airmen. Each state has a different
way of handling pay and benefi ts under State Active
Duty. We had soldiers and airmen operating under
54 different payroll systems and receiving different
benefi ts such as medical care and disability
coverage. Our forces needed the protection
provided by DOD entitlements.39
Between September 2 and September 5, the governors
of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana sent letters to the
Secretary of Defense asking for all National Guard assets
to be put under Title 32.40 Blum then discussed putting
the Guard on Title 32 status with McHale and together,
they submitted a formal Title 32 request to Rumsfeld.41
On September 7, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
England approved Title 32 status retroactive to August
29.42
On September 8, the NGB noted 50 States, two
territories, and the District of Columbia had contributed
forces in support of operations in Louisiana and
Mississippi. National Guard forces reached peak
deployment numbers for Katrina relief with over 50,000
personnel mobilized on this day.43
Army National Guard
“Four hours after landfall, Army National Guard
helicopters are performing rescue missions, with 65
helicopters positioned in Florida, Texas, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama.” Northcom Timeline:
Hurricane Katrina 1/3/0644
The Army National
Guard contributed heavily
to the Katrina response,
including the primary
priority of search and rescue,
evacuation, and commodity
distribution. Distribution
of water, ice, and food from
military stockpiles in the
days immediately following
landfall was done at both
designated and undesignated
distribution sites. The
Army Guard also provided much needed military
transportation, helped clear debris from roads and
residences, and provided assistance to law enforcement.45
Unlike their active duty counterparts, the National
Guard is not restricted from performing law enforcement
duties under federal law, and thus rendered considerable
assistance to civilian law enforcement efforts.46 According
to the daily log of Mississippi National Guard activities
prepared for the Select Committee, the majority of the
mission requests were for security, a mission that would
only increase in the weeks following landfall.47
The following chart contains the number of Army
National Guard present in the Gulf States.
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Date Number of Army Guard Personnel
In Katrina Joint Operational Area
August 26 922
August 27 1,701
August 28 4,444
August 29 6,908
August 30 9,668
August 31 10,428
September 1 14,284
September 2 18,678
September 3 24,548
September 4 29,588
September 5 33,608
September 6 38,093
September 7 39,736
September 8 40,667
September 9 42,164
September 10 42,257
September 11 42,264
September 12 41,530
September 13 40,928
September 14 41,119
September 15 38,831
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS TIMELINE, 12/21/05
Air National Guard
August 30: “The Air National Guard launches its
fi rst Air National Guard JTF-Katrina mission. A
C-17 crew assigned to the 172nd Fighter Wing,
Mississippi ANG fl ew its fi rst sortie in support
of Hurricane recovery. The mission lasted for 3
days. They airlifted 85 civilians from Gulfport.”
Northcom Katrina Timeline 12/22/05
The Director of the
Air National Guard
Lieutenant General
Daniel James III, told
the Select Committee
the efforts of the
Air National Guard
during Hurricane
Katrina represented
“the largest military airlift operation supporting disaster
relief in the United States.”48
But the Air National Guard brought more than
evacuation, rescue, and airlift capabilities to the response.
The Air National Guard also has an emergency medical
capability. ANG medics treated over 13,000 patients by
September 19.49 Expeditionary Medical Support (EMEDS)
units provided medical personnel and equipment to
support up to 10 major trauma surgeries without re-
supply.50 The Air National Guard also has a large civil
engineering capability in its Rapid Engineer Deployable
Operational Repair Squadron Engineer (RED HORSE)
Squadrons.
Date Number of Air Guard Personnel
In Katrina Joint Operational Area
(includes Air Guard in transit from outside wings transporting personnel, supplies and equipment)
August 26 8
August 27 932
August 28 932
August 29 933
August 30 956
August 31 960
September 1 972
September 2 2,464
September 3 3,998
September 4 4,596
September 5 6,613
September 6 5,770
September 7 5,952
September 8 5,735
September 9 4,347
September 10 4,581
September 11 4,125
September 12 4,109
September 13 4,112
September 14 3,477
September 15 3,512
NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU AFTER ACTION REVIEW OBSERVATIONS TIMELINE, 12/21/05
Some of the highlights of ANG activity in the fi rst few
days following landfall include:
August 29 Aero-medical Evacuation Squadron
positioned to respond in Mississippi
50 ANG medical personnel at Naval Air
Station New Orleans
August 30 The ANG launches its fi rst Air National
Guard JTF Katrina mission. A C-17 crew
assigned to the 172nd FW, Mississippi ANG
fl ew its fi rst sortie in support of Hurricane
recovery. The mission lasted for three days.
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They airlifted 85 civilians from Gulfport.
All ANG Airlift and Tanker units put on
alert and places all air crew on Title 32
status
Texas ANG starts reconnaissance, activates
search and rescue personnel and security
forces to Louisiana
ANG establishes Tanker Airlift Control
Center
August 31 ANG sources a NORTHCOM request for
ANG Combat Weather Team to
New Orleans
ANG reports 700 ANG Civil Engineer and
350 Red Horse personnel available
Tennessee and Oklahoma ANG help
evacuate 143 patients from the New
Orleans Veterans Hospital
The 259th ATCS Louisiana Air National
Guard deploys their MSN-7 Mobile Control
Tower to the Superdome51
September 1 First Air Force, composed of ANG wings
across the country, is tasked to lead for
planning, orchestrating and overseeing
all Air Force support to Joint Task Force
Katrina.52 Gulfport, Mississippi is
designated the main operating base
for sustained ANG Hurricane relief efforts,
including evacuation.
ANG Expeditionary Medical Support
(EMEDS) units, civil engineering units
arrive in Mississippi and New Orleans
On this day ANG Para-rescuemen are
credited with 48 air saves and 250 boat
saves in New Orleans. ANG Combat
Controllers provide air movement for 750
helicopter sorties where 3,000 people are
evacuated. From September 1 through
9, ANG from Alaska and Oregon pushed
through 3,169 military and civilian
helicopter sorties at multiple landing zones
in New Orleans. ANG aircraft and crew
would fl y 2,542 sorties, airlifting 21,874
people and 11,110 pounds of cargo in
support of hurricane relief.53
September 2 149th Air National Guard Surgical Team
established fi eld hospital in parking lot
adjacent to New Orleans Convention
Center.54
The National Guards of other states also played
key roles in the Hurricane Katrina response. Through
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMAC),
Louisiana and Mississippi were able to request and
receive assistance from scores of states from across the
country. While the EMAC process is a direct state-to-state
relationship, both FEMA and the National Guard Bureau
participated in negotiations to facilitate the identifi cation
and procurement of specifi c types of assistance from other
states. There was a consensus among federal, state, and
local offi cials that EMAC worked well. These troops served
in Title 32 status, and were therefore commanded by the
respective Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi and
paid with federal funds.
Louisiana
The Louisiana National Guard conducted roving patrols,
manned checkpoints, and supported the New Orleans
Police Department in the parishes. The Army National
Guard also secured key infrastructure sites, including
levees,55 and provided support for general purpose shelters
and special needs
shelters with medical
personnel. One of
the Guard’s largest
missions was to
provide security
and other support
at the Superdome.
Approximately 250
Guardsmen were
at the Superdome,
searching entrants for weapons, providing them with food,
water, and medical attention, and attempting to maintain
law and order.
After Katrina hit, the National Guard was deeply
involved in search and rescue operations to save people
after the levees breached and many areas fl ooded.56 Their
role included both helicopter and boat sorties to rescue
people from roofs and fl oodwaters and take them to
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high ground. They were also part of the more deliberate
post-fl ood activities to go house to house and search for
survivors and victims.
The National Guard also had a law enforcement mission
beyond the shelters (e.g., the Superdome) to help restore
law and order through street patrols and other activities in
support of the overtaxed New Orleans Police Department.57
One of the National Guard’s law enforcement missions was
to secure the Convention Center and generally maintain
order there as occupants were evacuated. They provided
food, water, and medical treatment, and searched evacuees
as they boarded buses. Because the National Guard
was never federalized, they could fully participate in all
law enforcement
missions.
Finally, the
National Guard
played a key role
in logistics and
transportation,
using their high-
clearance vehicles
and helicopters to
ferry personnel and
supplies into and out of fl ooded areas.58 For example,
they transported and distributed food into the Superdome
and supported the evacuation of its occupants.
The Louisiana National Guard received much
assistance from many states across the country through
EMAC.59 Examples of the specifi c deployments included
2,426 infantry from Pennsylvania, 1,016 military police
from Puerto Rico, 580 security troops from Michigan,
500 support troops from Arkansas, 535 security troops
from Massachusetts, 350 security forces from Tennessee,
315 transportation and logistics troops from Alabama,
310 maintenance troops from Illinois, 250 air traffi c
controllers from Texas, and 221 truckers from South
Carolina. In total, Louisiana made 451 EMAC requests,
and 29,502 National Guard troops responded from other
states to undertake these missions.
Alabama
The Alabama National Guard headquarters began
monitoring Hurricane Katrina on August 23 and actively
engaged in discussions with the National Guard Bureau
on August 25. When Katrina became a Category 3
hurricane on August 27, the Alabama Guard increased
staff at the state emergency operations center. EOCs
along the Alabama Coast for the 20th Special Forces
Group, 711th Signal Battalion, and 16th Theater Support
Command were opened and manned. When FEMA
designated Maxwell Air Force Base as a federal staging
area for supplies, the Alabama National Guard sent
troops there to help prepare for distribution.60 Governor
Riley declared a state of emergency on August 28, which
formally activated the state National Guard.61
On August 29, the Alabama Emergency Management
Agency (AEMA) received requests for commodities from
Mobile, Baldwin, Butler, and Washington counties,
and the Alabama Guard took control of all recovery
and relief operations in coastal Alabama to include
county distribution points. When AEMA requested
special boat teams for search and rescue, and security,
the Alabama National Guard responded. The Guard
also performed damage assessment tasks. The Alabama
National Guard had developed mission specifi c force
packages for emergencies like hurricanes, snow and ice
storms, and chemical and biological attacks. These force
packages include security forces, engineers, medical,
communications and logistical equipment, and trained
personnel.62
The Alabama National Guard deployed approximately
750 soldiers and airmen within Alabama, but also
provided 2,000 soldiers to locations in Mississippi and
Louisiana in response to immediate EMAC requests for
support on August 29 and 30.63
Mississippi
On August 29, in the rear area operations center in
Jackson, it was recorded that the Mississippi National
Guard had activated 2,736 Army National Guard
soldiers, and 1,003 Air National Guard members to
provide security, search and rescue, and debris removal
operations.64
In his testimony before the Select Committee,
Mississippi Adjutant General, Harold A. Cross, made the
following observations:
During and immediately after landfall,
National Guard search and rescue operations
began on the Gulf Coast. My personnel night
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ground reconnaissance on the 29th and aerial
reconnaissance early the next morning clearly
revealed a disaster of unprecedented proportion all
along the Gulf Coast of Mississippi and signifi cant
damage as far as one hundred and fi fty miles
inland. After reporting this initial surveillance to
Governor Barbour, I immediately directed my rear
operations center to activate all remaining available
Mississippi National Guardsmen and to execute the
movement of pre-planned assistance from other
states. In addition, I requested assistance through
the National Guard Bureau from other states, up
to division sized strength. Accordingly, the 4,533
Mississippi National Guard soldiers and airmen
were ultimately augmented by 11,839 National
Guard personnel from 36 states under EMAC
agreements.65
The Mississippi National Guard personnel on
standby at Camp Shelby moved forward after the storm
had passed to a scene of unbelievable destruction.
Hurricane Katrina was by all accounts the worst storm
in nearly a century, but Cross was prepared.66 As soon
as the storm abated somewhat, Mississippi National
Guard personnel deployed from Camp Shelby into the
devastated Mississippi coast to provide security, search
and rescue and debris removal operations.67 Even so,
Cross recognized his own resources would be insuffi cient
to assist along the whole coast of the state and he needed
help from the National Guard of other states. In that
regard, General Cross said:
EMAC agreements negotiated with 40
states creating a division-sized force
within 96 hours eliminated need for
Title 10 forces. The fi rst out of state
National Guard units to arrive in
Mississippi were units from Alabama.
483 soldiers arrived on 30 August with
an additional 359 soldiers arriving
on 31 August. This Alabama National
Guard Force consisted of combat
engineers, military police, security
forces, and communications assets.
Their quick response was due to the
fact that the Alabama National Guard
was already postured to respond
to Katrina in the event it impacted
Alabama. The personal relationship
between the adjutants general of the two states
allowed for the rapid response of forces.68
MISSISSIPPI NATIONAL GUARD
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212 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The initial requests for assistance from Cross were
through personal relationships with other State Adjutant
Generals.69 General Blum, held a video teleconference
on August 31 to solicit assistance from each of the 54
states and territories for both Louisiana and Mississippi.
States responded rapidly to the urgent need and decided
to worry about the authorizing paperwork later. In most
cases, EMAC documentation followed after individual
states provided the assets requested by Louisiana or
Mississippi.70 As noted earlier, all National Guard troops
were retroactively placed in Title 32 status on September 7
by Deputy Secretary of Defense England.71
Out of state National Guard support in Mississippi through EMAC process
State National Guard Assistance
Alabama 1,500 Security Forces, 7 Tactical planners and engineers, 2- CH47s with crew for S and R, 2-UH60s with crew for S and R, 300 Sleeping Bags and 80 cots, Engineering Brigade, MP Battalion, 1,450 personnel for TF, 37 personnel from Air Refueling Wing, CBCS Communications support, Ministry Team, Ground Safety Manager, EMEDS personnel
Arizona Family Assistance Personnel, Medical support
Arkansas 100 soldiers, MP Company, 25 Heavy Trucks with 75 soldiers
California Fire Team, Aircraft Maintenance personnel, medical support personnel
Colorado MP Company, 50 Signal company personnel
Delaware MP Security Company, 100 personnel to assist command and control, EMEDS personnel
Florida 4-UH60s, rescue teams, infantry battalion, 50 ambulances with crew, 15 cooks, OH-58 with crew, logistics aides, safety personnel, aircraft maintainers
Georgia 2- UH1s, 2 CH47s with crew, 1,500 Task Force personnel, Fire Vehicle, Cable/Copper Repair personnel
Idaho Refuelers
Illinois Security Forces, EMEDS personnel, public health personnel
Indiana 2,300 soldiers, 40 tankers
Iowa Medical Support Battalion
Kansas Air Refueling personnel, Emergency Medical teams, Guard Fire Fighters, Ministry Team, Internist, 25 EMEDs personnel and supplies
Kentucky 50 Heavy trucks with 150 soldiers, 24 person refueling team, food service personnel, Medical Preventative Medicine personnel, communications and LNO personnel
Kentucky Water Purifi cation Equipment with Operators, Ministry Team, medical personnel
Maine Preventative Medicine Team, Cable repair personnel, Security personnel
Maryland MP Security Company, 104 Personnel for S and R and ice and water distribution
Massachusetts Medical Offi cers
Michigan MP Security Company, construction engineers, EMEDS personnel
Minnesota Ministry Teams, Mental Stress Team, medical support
Missouri 2-C130 Aircraft with Crew, medical personnel
Montana Public Affairs Team
Nebraska Security Forces, Priest, Ground Safety Manager, ARW personnel
New Hampshire EMEDS personnel, bioenvironmental personnel
New Jersey Medical Support Personnel, bioenvironmental personnel
New York 8 UH6s, 2 CH7, 6 UH1 and 130 personnel, Rabbi, EMEDS personnel
North Dakota Water Purifi cation Equipment with Operators, 72 personnel from fi ghter wing
Ohio 119 soldiers for debris removal, etc., 1,300 Task Force soldiers, aviation assets, generators, 3 OH-58 with crew, aircraft maintenance personnel, food service personnel, EIS Management Team, tactical support personnel, EMEDS personnel, Air wing personnel
Oklahoma 25 personnel/Air Mobility, Fire Vehicle, Medical Support personnel
Oregon Chief of Safety, Medics, EMEDS personnel
Pennsylvania SatCom with personnel, AVC ATS Company, Food Services, Medical Support Personnel, EMEDS personnel
Puerto Rico Air wing personnel
Rhode Island Units to load and unload aircraft
South Carolina Bioenvironmental Engineer
Tennessee ATS Co. with Tower, TTCS, 3 MP Security Companies, fi xed wing support teams, engineering battalion, logistics control cell, Mobile Emergency Operations Center, EIS Teams, 26 personnel from air refueling wing, aviation assets, Forklift loader, Fire Vehicle, EIS Management Team, EIS Repair Team, 26 Security personnel
Utah Ministry Teams
Vermont Bioenvironmental personnel
Virginia 447 Light Infantry for security and recovery, EMEDs personnel
West Virginia Airlift Wing support
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 213
Wisconsin EMEDs personnel
Wyoming Medical Support, Bioenvironmental Engineer
MISSISSIPPI EMAC COST TRACKER DATED OCTOBER 10, 2005
Cross also coordinated closely with all other state
entities involved, including the Mississippi Department
of Public Safety, in order to maintain a coordinated
law enforcement effort. Cross noted that coordination
between Guard engineering companies with various
utility companies to clear roads and restore electricity and
phone services was instrumental in getting power restored
to the majority of coastal counties well in advance of
projections.72
The National
Guard provided
immediate and
continued support
to the people of
Mississippi during
Hurricane Katrina.73
National Guard
accomplishments
included: 3,900
miles of roads
cleared of fallen
trees and debris; 1.2
million meals ready
to eat (MRE) and 1 million gallons of water delivered
via air (over 2,000 missions); 39 million pounds of ice,
56.4 million gallons of water, and 2.7 million MREs
distributed to central distribution points in 37 counties;
200 presence patrols and more than 600 search and rescue
missions conducted; law enforcement assistance provided,
resulting in 72 arrests; aircraft logged over 1,995 hours
and delivered 2.57 million pounds of cargo. Emergency
medical assistance from the Air National Guard assisted
hundreds of Mississippi citizens.
Department of Defense response
The day after Katrina made landfall, England led an
early roundtable session to get damage assessments for
DOD facilities and review resources that may be required
of DOD to support hurricane relief.74 The Secretary of
Defense was briefed on DOD’s response and Northern
Command issued several more alerts in anticipation of
requests for assistance.
While Honoré arrived on Wednesday, August 31, as
the commander of the newly established Joint Task Force
Katrina to supervise federal military operations, the
fi rst active duty Navy and Air Force personnel arrived in
Louisiana late Thursday, September 1, and active duty
Army personnel started to arrive early Friday, September
2.75 These active duty personnel helped the Louisiana
National Guard and the New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD) control the crowds during the evacuation of the
Superdome, maintain law and order in the streets, and
eventually conduct secondary searches, going door to
door looking for survivors or bodies and assisting those
who had not yet
escaped.
The support
provided by DOD
was invaluable,
according to a wide
variety of offi cials.76
DOD active duty
forces were involved
in search and
rescue, but generally
after the initial rescues from roofs by helicopters and
boats. They were involved in the more deliberate search
activities where mixed teams, to include National Guard,
law enforcement, Coast Guard, and DOD worked together
going house to house and searching for hold-outs and
dead bodies.77
DOD also took over FEMA’s logistics distribution
functions. According to FEMA Acting Director for
Response during Hurricane Katrina, Edward G. Buikema,
FEMA initially approached DOD about this mission on
Thursday, September 1.78 On that date, Colonel Richard
Chavez informed FEMA Acting Director of Operations Ken
Burris the request “would require a Secretary DHS [sic]
to Secretary DoD call to initiate and signifi cant General
Counsel input.”79 The formal Mission Assignment was
prepared the next day at 6:15 p.m.80 and by 7:41 p.m.,
McHale informed DHS Deputy Secretary Michael P.
Jackson that “SecDef agreed to support your RFA for broad
logistics support” and that DOD was “working on the
specifi c language — and a planning staff to implement
it.”81 Execution of the mission apparently began the next
day, September 3, according to written orders signed by
Principal Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense Pete Verga.82
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In the same e-mail to Jackson, McHale also said,
“We may actually be able to do more than you have
requested.”83 This apparently led to further meetings
and, according to McHale, an additional seven approved
mission assignments on Monday, September 5.84
Although Buikema and his FEMA colleague Deputy
Director of Response Michael Lowder expressed their
view that DOD acted slowly on the logistics request,85
the record refl ects a prompt decision, followed by fi nal
resolution of details involving a billion dollar mission
assignment. FEMA offi cials’ perception of a slow response
from DOD refl ected that they were (1) unaware of the
planning already under way (as refl ected in McHale’s e-
mail) before fi nal details were resolved and (2) possibly
an unrealistic expectation that acceptance of such a
massive mission would result in immediate action. This
was not, however, just a single airlift of needed supplies
— it was “planning and execution for the procurement,
transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, fuel
and medical supplies in support of the Katrina disaster in
Louisiana and Mississippi.”86
This is not to say that all went smoothly with
DOD support. For example, DOD apparently refused
to allow the shipment of MREs on FEMA-provided
transportation.87 The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
apparently claimed DLA could only ship MREs on “DOD
approved carriers” and DLA “would arrange transportation
within the next 24-48 hours.” The September 4 e-mail
lamenting this problem ended: “SEND MRE’S NOW.”
Finding: The Coast Guard’s response saved many lives, but coordination with other responders could improve
On August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the U.S.
Coast Guard Sector New Orleans Incident Management
Team was stood up in Alexandria, Louisiana.88 Outside
of the forecasted area of impact, Coast Guard Disaster
Assistance Teams from Ohio, Kentucky, St. Louis,
Pittsburgh, and Miami were pre-positioned to the region
to respond as soon as conditions permitted.
During normal conditions, there are 15 helicopters
assigned within the Eighth Coast Guard District, along
with four fi xed-wing aircraft and 16 cutters.89 Within
hours of Hurricane Katrina’s passing, the Coast Guard
surged 31 cutters, 76 aircraft, 131 small boats, and over
4,000 personnel into the affected areas.
The fi rst Coast Guard rescue occurred within a few
hours after the storm made landfall.90 An HH-65 helicopter
working out of the Coast Guard’s Air Station New Orleans
located at Naval Air Station Bell Chasse rescued two adults
and one infant, operating in 60-knot winds.
On August 30, all pre-positioned Coast Guard aircraft
began conducting search and rescue missions, damage
over-fl ight assessments, and logistical support, and the
medium endurance cutter DECISIVE arrived offshore to
conduct damage assessment of oil platforms.91
To maximize the number of missions that could be
fl own, all of the helicopters refueled at Air Station New
Orleans, which was also in charge of Coast Guard air asset
coordination.92 When crew changes were to occur, the
Mobile-based aircraft would return to Mobile. Tasking
orders, such as directing a helicopter to pick up a particular
group of people, were provided when the aircraft was located
at a base, as well as any time communications were possible.
Nevertheless, specifi c tasking orders were not necessary in
the initial days after the storm because of the large volume
of survivors throughout the region. Helicopters were able to
rescue people without needing instructions.
Search and Rescue Communications
Communications were limited in many respects. Vital
communications infrastructure was destroyed by the
storm, and it was not possible for the Aviation Training
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Center or Air Station
New Orleans to
communicate directly
with the operations
centers in the rescue
area, nor could the
Emergency Operation
Center (EOC) in
Baton Rouge be
contacted.93 When
aircraft left their
base in Mobile,
communication
was limited to
aircraft-to-aircraft
transmissions; pilots were unable to speak with the
Aviation Training Center.94 When aircraft fl ew over
New Orleans, communication was possible with Task
Force Eagle (the National Guard command center for
air operations at the Superdome) and occasionally with
Air Station New Orleans.95 Air Station New Orleans lost
all power and telephone lines were inoperable.96 When
power was restored, however, it was intermittent at times
and continued to limit communications.97 By 5:00 p.m.
on the fi rst day of rescue operations, communication
became more diffi cult because of the large volume of
radio traffi c in the area.98 Boats were able to communicate
via limited range low-level radios, but these did not afford
continuous coverage for airborne assets.99 On Monday
August 29, a Coast Guard C-130 arrived to provide
communications assistance; it could occasionally patch air
communication to land lines (if operational) in St. Louis,
Missouri and Alexandria, Louisiana (where Sector New
Orleans had set up operations).100
For the fi rst three days, no air traffi c control was
available, and pilots relied solely on internal pilot-
to-pilot communications and standardization of
training to maintain order in the airspace.101 The Coast
Guard practice of standardization allowed for easy
communication between pilots who had never fl own
together before, and this proved to be critical to the
success of search and rescue missions in the fi rst days
without air traffi c control. A U.S. Customs and Border
Protection P-3 aircraft arrived four days after landfall to
provide air traffi c control and ground communication.
On the day of the storm, helicopter crews monitored
weather reports to determine locations in the region
where the weather would permit them to begin rescue
fl ight operations.102 Subsequently, crews proceeded to
areas located at the edge of the storm.103 The fi rst rescue
occurred in 60-knot winds in Port Sulphur, Louisiana
at approximately 3:00 p.m.104 One helicopter fl ew to
Air Station New Orleans to drop off three personnel
to clear the fi eld of debris, activate the generators, and
permit operations to resume at that location, while
others conducted rescues in Grand Isle, Louisiana and
St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana.105 At approximately 5:00
p.m., Coast Guard helicopters from Mobile and Houston
began rescuing people in New Orleans.106 At that time,
the Coast Guard only rescued people from immediate
danger and brought them to higher ground because of the
tens of thousands of people in immediate danger and the
limited fuel capacity of each helicopter.107 In the case of
people with medical conditions which required treatment,
helicopters transported them to the Louis Armstrong New
Orleans International Airport (New Orleans Airport).108
Central drop-off locations were not set up until the
next day, when large areas that were dry and close to
operations were able to be identifi ed.109
Conduct of Coast Guard search and rescue operations
Upon the completion of each mission and arrival on the
ground at either the Mobile or New Orleans Air Stations,
pilots briefed the Operations Commander on their missions,
including the number of people rescued.110 Given the time
constraints of performing rescues, the Coast Guard did not
record the names of those rescued, nor the locations where
they were deposited.111 While the immediate life saving
measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable,
the failure to systemically communicate the location of the
rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued
persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and
shelter for extended periods. There was no way to confi rm
whether survivors would remain in these locations, and
specifi c information concerning a number of those rescued
was communicated to other entities (EOCs and other Coast
Guard stations) whenever communications were possible.112
Within 24 hours of the storm, surface operations
(boats) were conducted out of Zephyr Field (a local
professional baseball stadium). According to the Coast
Guard, a unifi ed command for surface operations was
established at Zephyr Field with the Coast Guard, FEMA,
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and the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.113
A Coast Guard offi cer dispatched vessels. Crews returned
to the site for food and rest.
On the second day of operations, August 30, drop off
locations were chosen by helicopter pilots and established
at the Superdome, Lakefront Airport, the “Cloverleaf” (an
area along I-10), the University of New Orleans, Zephyr
Field, and New Orleans Airport.114 This information was
communicated to the FEMA representative at Zephyr
Field, who coordinated resources to assist survivors at
each location. Notwithstanding this effort to coordinate,
the hand-off was not effective, leaving many “rescued”
persons without sustenance or shelter for extended
periods. In addition, as larger numbers of survivors were
placed at each location, requests were made for larger
Department of Defense and National Guard helicopters,
including MH-53s (from the USS Bataan) and CH-47s to
shuttle them from dry land islands to locations accessible
by bus for further evacuation; the helicopters began
arriving on the same date.
On August 31, a Coast Guard liaison offi cer arrived at
Task Force Eagle (the National Guard command center for
air operations) at the Superdome.115 The National Guard
also received rescue requests at this site, and tasking orders
would be passed to Coast Guard helicopters that arrived at
that location.
The fi rst heavy lift aircraft to arrive at the New Orleans
Airport was a Coast Guard C-130.116 It brought water and
food to the area on approximately August 31, which was
subsequently forwarded to Zephyr Field, the Superdome,
and Air Station New Orleans to be distributed by
helicopters on their return fl ights to fl ooded areas. The
Coast Guard initiated this effort because it recognized that
victims placed on higher ground “islands” had not yet
been completely evacuated and required water and food,
as temperatures during the day were nearing one hundred
degrees. Once again, the effort was laudable but fell short
of the need, as some evacuees remained in distress.
On the afternoon of September 1, additional
communications were re-established when Coast Guard
Cutter SPENCER arrived on-scene in New Orleans.117
SPENCER took tactical control of Coast Guard surface
forces in New Orleans and, on September 2 established a
Vessel Traffi c System (VTS) to control marine vessel traffi c
in the area. The SPENCER’s communications capabilities
include satellite, medium frequency, high frequency,
and very high frequency voice and data communications
(surface – to - surface communications, and surface - to
- air voice and data links).
On September 2 and 3, Joint Field Operations (JFOs)
were established.118 In Louisiana, however, there were
Coast Guard and urban search and rescue personnel at
While the immediate life saving measures taken by the Coast Guard crews were laudable, the failure to systemically communicate the location of the rescued citizens to local authorities resulted in some rescued persons being effectively stranded, lacking food, water, and shelter for extended periods.
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the state EOC in Baton Rouge before the formalized JFO
was established. A cadre of Coast Guard personnel from
Port Arthur, and others, who had been evacuated from
New Orleans, was already in the EOC handling search and
rescue coordination.
By September 20, the Coast Guard had organized and
coordinated the rescue or evacuation of 33,544 people.119
At the height of Katrina operations, over 33 percent
of Coast Guard aircraft were deployed to the affected
region.120 Despite coordination diffi culties, the Coast
Guard’s efforts were heroic and saved countless lives.
Finding: The Army Corps of Engineers provided critical resources to Katrina victims, but pre-landfall contracts were not adequate
The Army Corps of Engineers (“USACE” or “Corps”),
another active duty military unit, provided critical
resources to respond to Hurricane Katrina. The Corps
provided relief and response support to FEMA in
accordance with the National Response Plan as the
lead federal agency for public works and engineering
(Emergency Support Function #3). Some of the Corps’
specifi c missions related to Hurricane Katrina included
providing water and ice to regional warehouses, providing
emergency power, providing emergency roof repair, and
removing debris.
During Katrina and the aftermath, USACE provided
112 million liters of water, 232 million pounds of ice,
installation of about 900 large generators, repairs to
170,000 roofs, and removal of a million cubic yards
of debris.121 USACE had pre-awarded competitively
bid contracts for all of these functions to allow quick
deployment of resources prior to and immediately after an
event.122 These pre-awarded contracts are part of USACE’s
Advanced Contracting Initiative (ACI) which has been in
place for six years.
Due to the magnitude of the destruction, USACE
pre-awarded contracts for roofi ng repair and debris
removal were not adequate, and additional contracts were
advertised and awarded using shortened but competitive
procedures.123 In addition, FEMA tasked USACE to
provide structural safety evaluations of low-rise and non-
public buildings in New Orleans and other locations.
To date, USACE has completed assessments of 47,800
of an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 units.124 Given the
large number of uninhabitable or unusable buildings,
FEMA has recently tasked USACE with demolition of
buildings.125 To date, USACE is still developing estimates
and conducting planning for the demolition mission.
Finding: The Department of Defense has not yet incorporated or implemented lessons learned from joint exercises in military assistance to civil authorities that would have allowed for a more effective response to Katrina
The Department of Defense participates in several
command and control exercises involving responses
to domestic emergencies, ranging from the combatant
command level to the national level.126 In the past these
have included Northern Command exercises UNIFIED
DEFENSE (2003,2004), ARDENT SENTRY (2005),
DETERMINED PROMISE (2003, 2004), VIGILANT
SHIELD (2005), DILIGENT ENDEAVOR (2003),
DILIGENT WARRIOR (2004), NORTHERN EDGE (2003),
SCARLET SHIELD (2004), DARK PORTAL (2004) and
TOPOFF (2003, 2005). Many of these exercise scenarios
were designed to overwhelm local and state assets to
evoke a response under the National Response Plan,
including the employment of DOD assets.
Hurricane Katrina was a test of the recently established
(post - 9/11) United States Northern Command, and its
ability to oversee and coordinate the largest use of active
duty and Guard military in a domestic action in recent
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history. Although Northern Command has conducted
numerous exercises with the National Guard in state and
local exercises, the lessons learned during these events were
not consistently applied to the military response to Katrina.
NORAD/NORTHCOM ARDENT SENTRY 05 was a
combined exercise with TOPOFF 3, conducted April 4-9,
2005.127 The overall goal of this exercise was to conduct a
joint service and interagency exercise that would provide
realistic training opportunities for all agencies in incident
management. Canadian forces also participated as part
of the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD). Another objective was to plan, deploy, and
employ DOD forces in support of civilian authorities’
operations in accordance with the National Response Plan
and DOD policy. The lessons learned during this exercise
offered a preview of problems that would surface again
during the Katrina response. Some of Northern Command’s
recommendations for improvement were as follows:
Conduct strategic effects-based planning between
DOD and DHS for each Incident Annex in the
National Response Plan.
Investigate requirement for integrated “National
Strategic Communications Plan” in coordination
with interagency partners.
Develop national capability to electronically
produce, staff, validate, approve and track mission
accomplishment of mission assignments.
Determine requirements for a “National Common
Operating Picture” in coordination with DHS,
Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies.128
TOPOFF 2 also contained fi ndings that, if corrected,
would have enhanced the federal response to Katrina.129
From uncertainty between federal and state roles
to the lack of robust and effi cient local emergency
communications and the need to improve data collection
from military agencies, TOPOFF 2 fi ndings were telling
predictors of some of the challenges the military faced.
Northern Command predicted in its ARDENT SENTRY/
TOPOFF 3 Master Executive Summary, that “this exercise
success is due in part to scenario constraints that could
provide a false sense of security and lack of incentive
to initiate or aggressively participate in the integrated
regionally-based planning that is so essential.”130 Just over
four months later, Katrina struck.
After Katrina, DOD offi cials refl ected on the
value of prior exercises. McHale commented that
government training exercises “have not been suffi ciently
challenging.”131 Other Pentagon offi cials noted that in
many cases, top offi cials, from Cabinet-level secretaries
and generals to governors and mayors, do not participate
and these simulations do not last long enough.132 The
Government Accountability Offi ce, in a November 29
briefi ng also noted key players are not always involved
in drills, the lessons from previous training and exercises
are not retained, and the training and exercises are more
targeted at terrorist events than natural disasters.133
The lack of implementation of lessons learned and
the training necessary to learn them resulted in less than
optimal response by all military components. Oxford
Analytica took the following view:
After Katrina made landfall, the NORTHCOM-led
military support mission suffered many of the
same planning failures, unclear lines of authority,
communication breakdowns, and shortages of
critical resources that were experienced by the
civilian agencies, such as the Department of
Homeland Security.134
Finding: The lack of integration of National Guard and active duty forces hampered the military response
“Title 10 versus 32 versus 14…again.”135
Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull, NORTHCOM
“Advance planning between active-duty personnel
and the Guard is vital – in contrast to the
cooperation that . . . unfolded during Katrina ‘on
the fl y’ – albeit by ‘superb leaders’.”136 Washington
Post, October 13, 2005, quoting Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale
In a speech on October 21, McHale indicated planning
by the National Guard was not well integrated with the
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 219
overall military, and the Joint Staff did not
have a grasp of the National Guard’s plans.137
Interestingly, a September 14 e-mail originating
in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) offi ces
commended the Bureau’s efforts to provide
operational information to JCS.138 McHale
stated that National Guard plans were not well
integrated with overall DOD plans. The Joint
Staff acknowledged that the NGB was providing
timely and accurate reports, but Northern
Command was apparently more focused on active
operations and therefore did not have a well informed
view of the signifi cant National Guard effort in the region.
The Joint Staff e-mail went on to say that Northern
Command’s briefi ngs are too active duty focused and lack
unity of effort.139 In the same speech, McHale said DOD
did not understand how to integrate with the plans of the
National Guard.140 The reverse was also true, despite past
lessons learned.
In the TOPOFF 3 exercise in April 2005, it was clear the
National Guard and the National Guard Bureau would be
part of a large scale emergency response. The New Jersey
National Guard noted that “although TOPOFF 3 began as
an exercise with minimal National Guard involvement, it
quickly evolved into one that heavily relied upon Guard
participation, and identifi ed a need early on for assistance
from the National Guard Bureau.”141
At the time of Katrina landfall, however, the National
Guard did not have adequate knowledge of DOD
planning guidance developed at Northern Command,
including concept of operations plans and functional
plans for military support to civilian authorities.142
The National Guard After Action Report on TOPOFF 3
found that numerous members of the Guard operational
leadership did not have adequate knowledge of these
plans.143
At an after action meeting of state Adjutants General,
the Adjutants General agreed coordination between
active duty and National Guard in the response operation
needed to be improved. According to the meeting report,
“There was a lack of coordination of Joint Task Force
Katrina operation with the National Guard Headquarters
in the supported states.”144
The National Guard Bureau also reported lines of
command, control, and communications lacked clear
defi nition and coordination between federal military
forces and National Guard forces operating under state
control, resulting in duplicate efforts. For example,
elements of the 82nd Airborne Division moved into a
sector already being patrolled by the National Guard.145
The meeting report also stated:
Federal troops often arrived prior to being
requested and without good prior coordination.
This resulted in confusion and often placed
a strain on an already overburdened disaster
response system. A specifi c case in point was the
Marine Corps amphibious units which landed
in Mississippi without transportation, requiring
National Guard transportation assets to move
them to New Orleans increasing the burden on an
already stretched support system.146
The National Guard 38th Infantry Division, composed
of smaller Guard units from many states, reported they
never formally coordinated with Northern Command.147
Members of the 82nd Airborne Division, the fi rst active
duty personnel to arrival in New Orleans on September
3, had a similar experience. In a September 9 e-mail, a
soldier in the 82nd indicated coordination of evacuation
efforts in New Orleans was very poor.148
We’re conducting boat patrols using Coast Guard
boats but coordination is very diffi cult . . . . National
Guard seems to move in and out of sectors doing
what they want then just leaving without telling
anyone . . . . And this is in 4 days of operations.149
Despite the lack of integration in Washington, D.C.
and in Louisiana, active and reserve forces worked
well together in Mississippi. Notably, the Governor of
Mississippi did not request active duty military assistance,
relying instead on Mississippi and other National Guard
personnel provided through EMAC.
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However, in the DOD effort to lean forward, Honoré
contacted Cross immediately to offer any help needed,
and remained in contact with him daily in person or on
the phone.150 On September 3, Northern Command and
JTF Katrina received confi rmation from the Secretary of
Defense that JTF Katrina was to assume responsibility
for logistical operations in Mississippi and Louisiana in
response to FEMA’s request.151 All DOD operations in the
state of Mississippi were conducted with Cross’ consent.152
One of the most important roles played by DOD in
Mississippi was the delivery of military stocks of food and
water that started to arrive in Gulfport on September 1. In
his testimony before the Committee, Cross noted:
By the end of the second day after landfall, my
intelligence reports indicated that the previously
assumed fl ow of food and water was severely
restricted. Many pre-planned distribution points
were inaccessible and
many hundreds of
people were stranded by
fl ood waters, blocked
roadways or lack of fuel
for transportation. These
desperate civilians were
primarily observed by
aerial reconnaissance
in Hancock County.
Upon realization that
food and water was not
going to arrive by normal
means in time, I offered
an immediate airlift of
food and water utilizing our helicopters and our
rations and immediately requested through US
NORTHCOM an emergency airlift of military
stocks of MRE’s. Within a day, massive amounts
of MRE’s began arriving at Gulfport just in time to
be disseminated to prevent starvation. Almost 1.7
million MRE’s were fl own in to my position thanks
to the quick reaction of Lieutenant General Joe Inge
of Northern Command.153
Air Force personnel and aircraft from the 920th
Rescue Wing and 347th Rescue Wing, as well as Special
Operations Command aircraft arrived at the Jackson Air
National Guard Base the day after landfall, and along with
National Guard, performed search and rescue mission in
the fi rst days.154
The USS Bataan, the USS Truman, the USS Whidbey
Island, and other vessels supported Navy and Marine
Corps operations in Mississippi, delivering personnel,
equipment, and commodities.155 The USS Bataan had six
helicopters, one land craft, extensive logistics supplies,
and trauma medical capabilities that were used for
search and rescue in both Mississippi and Louisiana.156
According to a September 1 e-mail from Colonel Damon
Penn, Mississippi’s Defense Coordinator, a total of 19
active duty and National Guard teams were conducting
search and rescue missions on the Mississippi coast.157
The Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport
was severely damaged during Katrina, and although most
of the 800 “Seabees” were evacuated before the hurricane
struck, remaining personnel and other Seabees deployed
by the Navy helped with Hurricane Katrina recovery
operations.158 Gulfport-based Seabees, who linked up
with the National Guard at their Joint Operations Center
in Gulfport, coordinated with the National Guard to clear
roads and assisted in removing debris.159 The Seabees also
set up logistics centers to distribute food and water and
provide emergency medical services.160 Two active-duty
Seabee battalions from Port Hueneme, California, their
subordinate detachments from both coasts, and Reserve
Seabee volunteers joined those already in Gulfport,
Mississippi, forming a total Seabee force of about 3,000
sailors by September 9.161 The Seabees were also joined by
100 Mexican Marines and 215 Canadian Navy personnel
who helped them work on FEMA temporary housing
sites, nursing home repair, and repairs to public buildings,
schools and construction sites.162
On September
5, 1,000 Marines
from the I Marine
Expeditionary
Force (MEF),
Camp Pendleton,
California, arrived
at Biloxi, and
1,000 Marines
from the II MEF Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, arrived at
Stennis Space Center.163 These Marine units, commanded
by Marine Corps Reserve Major General Douglas V.
Odell, Jr., assisted in the transportation of large amounts
of commodities, as well as providing personnel and
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equipment to assist in recovery operations in Hancock
County as directed by Cross.164 “Without concern for
service lines and or ‘Title of Authority,’ [Major General]
Odell accepted the mission and executed all requirements,
until directed by his higher headquarters to move to New
Orleans,” Cross said.165
On September 8, the USNS Comfort arrived in
Pascagoula to offer medical assistance and facilities.166
Four days later, the Northern Command suggested to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Comfort be withdrawn
because there was “very limited usage;” estimated at
“fewer than a dozen patients.”167
According to Cross’ response to questions by the Select
Committee, the Mississippi National Guard maintained
a very good relationship with DOD forces. “Active
duty units that responded always took a subordinate,
support role and these units coordinated directly with
the Mississippi National Guard Forward Operations
Center.”168
In Louisiana, airborne search and rescue was another
area where National Guard and DOD integration was
lacking. As noted in the National Guard Bureau’s After
Action Report, National Guard and DOD active duty (as
well as other) helicopters were conducting rescue missions
over New Orleans with no preplanning for command and
control. The different helicopters had different radios and
used different frequencies, creating a dangerous situation
for mid-air collisions in an area with little or no air traffi c
control.169 Beyond the safety issue, National Guard and
DOD active duty assets operated under their own tasking
orders, which sometimes led to duplication.170 Search and
rescue coordination problems are discussed in more detail
later in this chapter.
Another Louisiana example illustrating integration
problems is the area of communication. The 35th Infantry
Division, a National Guard unit, arrived at Belle Chasse
Naval Air Station on September 6, and the 82nd Airborne
Division, a DOD active duty unit, was to provide them
with some communications support. Specifi cally, the
35th Infantry Division had forwarded its frequency
and network requirements and the 82nd Airborne
Division was to provide frequency management support
– providing specifi c frequencies to use. However, after the
arrival of the 35th, there was still confusion over what
frequencies to use because many systems were already
using the assigned frequency. The 35th Infantry Division
did not have the proper equipment to de-confl ict the
frequency use, and could not obtain it until September
12, almost a week later.171 For more information on
communication diffi culties during Hurricane Katrina, see
chapter on COMMUNICATIONS.
Finding: Northern Command does not have adequate insight into state response capabilities or adequate interface with governors, which contributed to a lack of mutual understanding and trust during the Katrina response
“There must be a strong agreement between
state and federal leadership as to the operational
objectives. State concerns about maintaining
sovereignty must be respected.”172 General H
Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau
“Admiral Keating, who heads US NORTHCOM, a
newly created military body overseeing homeland
defense, has told lawmakers that active-duty forces
should be given complete authority for responding
to catastrophic disasters. . . . The head of the
Washington State National Guard, General Timothy
Lowenberg, suggested in emails to colleagues
that Admiral Keating’s suggestion amounted to a
“policy of domestic regime change.”173 Wall Street
Journal, December 8, 2005
On Friday, September 1, the President offered to place
Honoré under the joint command of Northern Command
and Governor Blanco. Under this proposal, Honoré
would have commanded both active duty U.S. military
forces and the Louisiana National Guard, subject to the
command of the Governor with respect to the Guard and
Northern Command with respect to the federal active
duty troops. Governor Blanco declined this offer, leaving
Honoré and Northern Command in charge of the federal
active troops and Landrenau and Blanco in charge of the
Louisiana National Guard.
The Governors of the Gulf states chose not to
relinquish command of the National Guard units in their
respective states. While better coordination of the military
222 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
effort may have resulted if one commander were in charge
of all aspects of military support, the Governor had
confi dence in Landreneau and saw no need for an added
layer of command.
The Department of Defense was eager to assist the Gulf
states. The establishment of JTF Katrina to coordinate the
military response and the command’s desire to help made
state sovereignty an issue during the Katrina response.174
Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi declined active duty
military assistance, but active duty units pre-positioning
at active duty bases in Mississippi operated smoothly with
the Mississippi National Guard. Therefore, the issue of
federalism played out in Louisiana. Resolving this issue
may have slowed the active duty military response and
contributed to tension in the state-federal relationship. In
the end, there was a dual military response to Hurricane
Katrina in Louisiana. Honoré commanded the active
duty military response, and Landreneau commanded the
Louisiana National Guard response.
The failure of DOD, governors, and other state offi cials
to actively participate in joint planning for emergencies,
both natural and man-made, that occurred within
Northern Command’s area of responsibility contributed
to the tension. There were too few “civilian authorities” in
DOD’s military assistance to civilian authority planning.
As Northern Command lamented it did not have
adequate insight into the states, the Gulf governors also
lacked insight into the operations of Northern Command.
In Northern Command’s Master Exercise Summary
Report on ARDENT SENTRY/TOPOFF 3, concern
was expressed that Northern Command “does not
have adequate insight into state response capabilities
(responders, medical systems, National Guard, etc.) and
other federal capabilities (contracts, FEMA, DHHS, etc). .
. . This lack of understanding could contribute to off-
target planning for potential active duty DoD roles and
missions.” 175
DOD understands the different capabilities of
Transportation Command, Forces Command, 1st Army,
5th Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Navy and
role and capabilities of Joint Forces Command, Northern
Command and Joint Task Force Katrina, but the Governor
of Louisiana did not. In a September 19 interview
with Gannett News Service, Blanco commented on the
diffi culties of communicating her request for troops. She
said others asked, “Did you ask for this; did you ask for
that[?] It got to be a very diffi cult little game,” she said.176
One cause of this misunderstanding is that DOD and
DHS have not adequately defi ned what is required for
military assistance to civilian authorities during large
disasters. According to McHale, “It has never been the
plan, nor has the Department of Defense been trained,
resourced and equipped to provide a fi rst responder
capability.”177
According to a September 2003 report to Congress on
DOD’s role in supporting homeland security missions:
[The] Chairman [of the] Joint Chiefs of Staff,
maintains visibility of National Guard assets performing homeland security missions. . . .
Moreover, NORTHCOM and PACOM must have
insight into state-controlled National Guard operations to facilitate coordination between
Title 10 and Title 32 or State Active Duty military
operations, which might be occurring in the same
area, at the same time, towards a common goal.
[emphasis added]178
Honoré was not familiar with emergency operational
procedures and personnel within the Katrina states.
According to Blum, granting him a state commission
without the knowledge and understanding of the state’s
operational environment would not necessarily have
added anything to the response.179 The Gulf coast
governors, with their close relationships to state Adjutants
General and common experiences with past emergencies,
shared that view.180
Admiral Keating, the Commander of Northern
Command has acknowledged that there are advantages
to having a National Guard offi cer in command of
homeland response:
The advantages of using a N[ational] G[uard]
offi cer during a disaster are: (1) the overwhelming
majority of forces that respond to disasters are/will
DOD and DHS have not adequately defi ned what is required for military assistance to civilian authorities during large disasters.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 223
be National Guard who will usually be on the scene
in a state active duty status before DOD is requested
to respond; (2) the NG is familiar with the local
area and the local culture; (3) the NG usually has
close ties with fi rst responders such as local and
state law enforcement, fi re departments, etc.; and
(4) the local community knows and relies upon the
NG because they are part of the community. . . . NG
personnel are more likely to have more experience
working with local responders than the active
component. A disadvantage of using a NG offi cer is:
NG commanders might not be familiar with federal
capabilities brought to the table, especially those
from Navy and Marines.181
Some of the Adjutants General from the Gulf states and
around the country believe the much needed integration,
trust, and increased understanding by state offi cials of
what constitutes joint military assistance would improve
if Northern Command were a National Guard Command,
led by an experienced National Guard offi cer.182
Northern Command’s mission is to “deter, prevent,
and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United
States.”183 It also has a mission to “provide defense
support of civil authorities.”184 During a national
emergency within the United States, NORTHCOM
requires policies and procedures for interaction with
state offi cials. The absence of these policies hampered the
Katrina response.
The Select Committee does not believe there is a simple
answer to improving state and federal integration. Local
control and state sovereignty are important principles
rooted in the nation’s birth that cannot be discarded
merely to achieve more effi cient joint military operations
on American soil.
Finding: Even DOD lacked situational awareness of post-landfall conditions, which contributed to a slower response
The Department of Defense has signifi cant assets for the
collection of intelligence, as well as communications and
satellite equipment needed in all military operations. These
assets are at the very heart of conducting comprehensive
and directed military operations around the world, and
were not optimally used during the Katrina response. For
example, the Select Committee found little evidence that
DOD satellite imagery was used to great advantage to target
relief to the hardest hit areas, nor was information resulting
from DOD aerial damage assessment fl ights properly
disseminated. Lack of a unifi ed data collection system
among DOD military and civilian personnel also forced the
Department to rely on other sources.
Department of Defense documents indicated
an unusual reliance on news reports to obtain
information on what was happening on the ground in
the days immediately following landfall. It appeared
the Department also relied on the press for initial
damage assessment in New Orleans. Reliance on often
unsubstantiated press stories appeared to make DOD
reactive instead of a leading participant in the response.
DOD e-mail and JTF Katrina Commander’s
Assessments cited press as the source of the information
on looting, the situation at the Superdome, other shelters,
and the New Orleans Hyatt.185 E-mail from private
sources to Honoré and McHale about people needing to
be rescued at Xavier University and the Salvation Army
Building in New Orleans were acted on. In the Xavier case,
Honoré dispatched a reconnaissance team based on this
Department of Defense documents indicated an unusual reliance on news reports to obtain information on what was happening on the ground in the days immediately following landfall.
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information.186 An e-mail dated August 30 from a colonel
from the National Guard Bureau noted that Northern
Command, First Army, and Fifth Army commanders
could not make contact with the Louisiana State Adjutant
General.187
Keating stated that the biggest challenge for Northern
Command was “gaining and maintaining situational
awareness as to the catastrophic disaster.”188 This also
came as no surprise to McHale, who commented that
“early situational awareness was poor, a problem that
should have been corrected following identical damage
assessment challenges during Hurricane Andrew.”189
Finding: DOD lacked an information sharing protocol that would have enhanced joint situational awareness and communications between all military components
According to a National Guard assessment, JTF Katrina
“had limited visibility on in-transit forces” being
deployed. There was no system in place to track all
active duty or Guard “forces and material from ports of
embarkation” through distribution.190 For example, an
August 29 e-mail generated in the Offi ce of the Secretary
of Defense indicated concern over a Navy ship that
announced its deployment without legal authority or
Secretary of Defense approval.191
Information fl owing up from the National Guard
state headquarters or the National Guard Bureau also did
not always make its way to the JTF Katrina commander.
An August 31 e-mail confi rmed that 1st Army and 5th
Army headquarters could not communicate directly
with the Louisiana Defense Coordinating Offi cer, which
prevented the JTF Katrina commander from knowing
what Guard assets were streaming into New Orleans at the
time. On September 1, a general offi cer at NORTHCOM
complained he had not been getting e-mail from the
DCOs for two days.192
The Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Homeland Defense also had problems keeping track of
what DOD capabilities were being utilized and what tasks
had been performed for the Homeland Defense Secretary.
In a September 4 e-mail, some questions posed were:
How many MREs have been made available by DoD? . .
What is the # of hospital beds on USN ships?. . .
What is the status of aerial surveillance capability? . . .
What is [the] status of the New Orleans Police
Department?
How linked up is the Guard with NOPD?193
There was also a request: “Need a daily DoD roll-up
matrix: What we’re doing, Who’s doing it, [and w]hat’s the
progress?194
During the TOPOFF 3 and ARDENT SENTRY 05
exercises, NORTHCOM learned that
. . . the ground rules for the channel of
communications between USNORTHCOM,
NGB J[oint] O[perations] C[enter] and State
National Guard JOCs is largely undefi ned. There
is not an agreement that delineates reporting
responsibilities for force readiness and disaster
response planning. Needed is a framework and an
agreed on channel of communications to ensure
the fl ow of information between USNORTHCOM,
NGB and State National Guard JOCs is timely and
complete.195
Yet, during Katrina, the National Guard Bureau learned
NORTHCOM did not standardize reporting guidelines.196
E-mails, logs, and daily briefi ngs indicated a great fl ow
of information between DOD component headquarters
and the National Guard Bureau. There also appeared to
be numerous mechanisms to assist in integrating federal
and state operations. These included the establishment
of a National Guard desk at the National Military
Command Center, Guard representation in the Northern
Command Joint Operations Center, web portals, daily
conference calls, and e-mail situation updates to key
leaders.197 However the Select Committee could fi nd no
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reporting requirements for sharing important information
between DOD entities. Blum, however, noted that “these
efforts, while effective, cannot be expected to overcome
the inability of forces on the ground to effectively share
information.”198
Finding: Joint Task Force Katrina command staff lacked joint training, which contributed to the lack of coordination between active duty components
Hurricane Katrina required the Army, Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps to work together in an emergency mission
in the continental United States. Although skilled and
trained in war-fi ghting missions abroad, conducting joint
missions in this country, quickly, and under tremendous
public pressure, posed integration challenges. One of the
fi ndings in an after action report from the Department
of the Navy stated: “Service cultural issues seemed to
dominate in a negative fashion.”199
The core element of the JTF is formed by the
1st Army Staff. There is a perception that JTF is
in essence, an Army T[ask] F[orce], with joint
augmentation and that this disposition colors their
decision making processes and view of the conduct
of operations. . . . In a crisis, organizations play to
their strengths and [tend] to disregard unfamiliar
capabilities or concepts.200
Retired Coast Guard Vice Admiral Jim Hull was asked
by Northern Command to assess the command’s Katrina
response. Hull’s observations were critical of JTF Katrina,
noting that the capabilities of 1st Army headquarters,
which formed the nucleus of JTF Katrina, “was not
organized or resourced to operate as a Joint Task Force.”201
Specifi c challenges ranged from inexperienced personnel
to lack of communications and equipment. “The JTF is
an ad-hoc organization doing the best it can without
the resources necessary to make it an optimal enabler,”
he said. Hull noted that as Honoré made command
decisions away from his headquarters, his staff was not
always informed. “We track General Honoré’s location by
watching CNN,” JTF Katrina staff said.
The Department of the Navy Emergency Preparedness
Liaison Offi cer Program in a September 12 After Action
Report listed key problems within JTF Katrina:
Joint Doctrine was largely ignored. In the melee
of the fi rst few days where lives literally hung in
the balance, perhaps this was a necessary course of
action. However, as the Active Duty Force began
to develop, the JTF Katrina headquarters never
transitioned from the very tactical mindset of life
saving to the operational mindset of sustaining
and enabling a Joint Force. Since the Forward
Command Element (General Honoré) was unable
to communicate, they became embroiled and
distracted with the tactical and were unable to focus
on even the most basic of operational issues….
Other units who were responding from outside
the area to integrate with what was called a “Joint”
task force expected certain doctrinal norms which
materialized very slowly or not at all.202
The report also remarked that since the JTF did not
establish a commander for all land components, 1st
Army, 5th Army, and the Marine Corps were unclear on
JTF Katrina expectations, causing confusion and lack of
coordination between land forces in New Orleans.203 The
effects of the diffi culties with creating and sustaining a
truly joint effort were visible on the ground in Louisiana,
especially during later evacuation efforts, and the
patrolling of New Orleans parishes.
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Finding: Joint task force Katrina, the National Guard, Louisiana, and Mississippi lacked needed communications equipment and the interoperability required for seamless on the ground coordination
Reliable communications were the exception in
the aftermath of Katrina. Even Honoré experienced
communications problems. Honoré moved into Camp
Shelby before he had the communications equipment
necessary to support JTF Katrina.204 Honoré’s staff was
frustrated at the lack of communications equipment.
According to a Navy after action report, “At this stage it is
believed that when the commander leaves Camp Shelby
in the morning and returns in the evening, the staff’s only
access to communicate with him is through a borrowed
Nextel cell phone and his Blackberry.205 The Navy
reported the USS IWO JIMA did have task force-capable
communications equipment during the fi rst ten days of
the storm that would have been of great help to General
Honoré.206
Blum also noted that “one critical area where we lack
integration is in interoperable communications. National
Guard units do not have the equipment necessary to
effectively share information with Title 10 forces. This
caused signifi cant challenges on the ground that then
bubbled up the chains.”207
At the time of Katrina, Northern Command had yet to
establish standardized communications architecture or
to identify the system and information requirements to
be used during homeland response operations.208 Oxford
Analytica reported:
Since September 11, emergency response planners
have recognized that during a major disaster, local
communications systems would be disrupted or
disabled, and communication between federal,
state, and local offi cials is a particularly weak
link in coordinating emergency response. Katrina
showed that little has been accomplished to fi x this
disconnect. Within the military, the National Guard
was hindered by a shortage of communications
equipment. These shortcomings suggest that the
Pentagon does not assign homeland defense a
suffi ciently high priority.209
The loss of communications infrastructure in
Mississippi and Louisiana due to hurricane forces caused
a great deal of confusion for days following landfall.
Communication outages that occurred in state emergency
offi ces also caused problems in situational awareness. The
state Adjutant General of Mississippi on the Gulf coast
could not reach the Mississippi Emergency Management
Agency in Jackson until two days after landfall.210 When
cell phones and towers were destroyed or lost power,
states were not equipped with backup communications
capabilities even with Guard forces. According to Cross:
One of the biggest lessons learned was the need to
adequate, redundant communications systems with
an emphasis on satellite backhaul capability in the
event of cellular and landline failure. Obviously,
this type of equipment requires resourcing. The
Mississippi National Guard received $29,100
for fi scal year 2005 for Military Support to Civil
Authorities. $8,000 of this amount was applied to
pay the satellite phone service bill for the seven
satellite phones currently on hand. In order for
the Mississippi National Guard to be prepared to
respond to catastrophic events, it must be funded
accordingly.211
The Louisiana National Guard also experienced
problems with lost or weak communications
infrastructure.212 Immediately after Hurricane Katrina
passed, the Industrial Canal levee broke, fl ooding the
National Guard headquarters at Jackson Barracks. The
Guard had to abandon its headquarters operations center
and establish a new one, including new communications
connections, at the Superdome. Re-establishing these
communications was greatly facilitated by the arrival of the
state’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support
Team (CST) and its emergency communications suite.
However, the National Guard in Louisiana was also
plagued by problems with the state’s 800 MegaHertz
public safety radio system, which it shares with the state’s
law enforcement and other public safety agencies. State
offi cials said this system was about 11 years old and
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 227
limited to 48 channels.213 They said it was not designed
to handle thousands of calls, so the volume of calls after
Hurricane Katrina overloaded the system. In addition,
one of the state’s three 800 MegaHerz relay towers, the
Buras tower in Plaquemines Parish, was toppled by the
hurricane, which further degraded the capacity of the
system.214 Louisiana National Guard offi cials cited the
weaknesses in this system as one of the reasons they had
problems communicating with the state’s Emergency
Operations Center in Baton Rouge.215
The National Guard Bureau confi rmed that its liaison
teams should also be deployed with signifi cant mobile
communications.216 The Louisiana NGB Liaison Offi cer
was equipped with a satellite phone, which was critical
during the fi rst days of response.217
Finding: EMAC processing, pre-arranged state compacts, and Guard equipment packages need improvement
Although there was a consensus among federal, state,
and local offi cials that Emergency Mutual Assistant
Compacts worked very well, the current EMAC approval
process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited
to a large scale emergency. While initial Adjutant General
to Adjutant General coordination allowed for rapid
deployment of National Guard forces during Katrina, the
sheer size of the emergency pointed out weaknesses in the
current system.
As key communications infrastructure was taken out,
the ability to negotiate state-to-state compacts became
diffi cult, if not impossible. In the hours immediately
following landfall, when it was needed most, offers of
assistance from states all over the country were delayed in
the EMAC process, as other states’ invaluable assets were
not immediately visible to the states affected.
The National Guard Bureau stepped in to help the
Gulf state Adjutants General prior to landfall, and
increased its management of requests for National Guard
forces throughout the response, but some states still
used the standard EMAC process through the National
Coordinating Committee (NCC). As both the National
Guard Bureau and the NCC tried to anticipate requests,
this dual track approach for requesting troops caused
confusion and duplicated efforts. Better coordination
between the NGB and the NCC was needed.218
In addition, not all National Guard personnel are
trained in the EMAC process. Louisiana National Guard
offi cers seemed to lack the knowledge and experience
necessary to manage the tremendous surge of requests for
assistance, as well as fi eld offers from other states under
EMAC. This inexperience was one of the reasons the
National Guard Bureau played an unusually large role in
the EMAC process.219
More familiarity with the EMAC procedures and assets
by Northern Command and other federal forces would
also have enhanced joint response efforts and given them
a better appreciation of National Guard capabilities.220
Finding: Equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls affected the National Guard response
Needed equipment and manpower
The Army National Guard relied heavily on its aviation
units and found that helicopter hoist-equipped aircraft
resulted in immediate and successful search and rescue
operations. Current Army doctrine, however, does not
provide suffi cient numbers of hoist-equipped aircraft to its
Guard counterpart, nor stage them regionally to support
responses to events of signifi cant size.221 For example,
the Mississippi National Guard needed more airlift and
helicopters immediately. Cross suggested pre-arranged
state compacts for hurricane assets, especially search and
rescue aviation assets, would make these assets more
readily available and not run the risk they could not be
obtained through EMAC requests.222
The current EMAC approval process is cumbersome, and therefore not fast or suited to a large scale emergency.
228 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The Air National Guard also relied heavily on its airlift
capabilities during Hurricane Katrina. The Air National
Guard fl ew 351 missions with C-130s between August
30 and September 6.223 Air National Guard personnel
reported that:
The C-130 is the ANG work horse, moving
equipment for the National Guard such as CST’s,
EMEDS, and civil engineering equipment into areas
with moderate to heavy infrastructure damage…the
Guard can’t have enough of them for responding
to major homeland emergencies…they are
essential.224
New aircraft like the C-17 are better suited to carry
over-size equipment such as the Rapid Engineer
Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer
(RED HORSE) Squadrons, but the limited number
of C-17s in inventory require its use to take care
of war fi ghting requirements overseas. This 404-
person mobile construction squadron does it all:
rapid damage assessment, repair, contingency
heavy construction operations such as roads and
ramps.225 Red Horse Squadrons were invaluable
during Katrina.226
At the time of Katrina’s landfall, Northern Command
had not yet articulated specifi c requirements or capabilities
that National Guard forces need during major homeland
disasters.227 Without established formal requirements, the
equipment deemed necessary for the National Guard to
assist civilian authorities in Katrina had not been purchased
by the Department of the Army and the Department of the
Air Force. The military departments only establish units and
procure equipment for which formal mission requirements
have been validated, like Title 10 warfi ghting missions
abroad. Northern Command has yet to determine — with
or without input from DHS — which specifi c military
assets should be dedicated to provide military assistance to
civilian authorities, in part because DHS has not articulated
the requirement to DOD in any formal manner.228
Therefore, at the present time, DOD does not require the
purchase of equipment specifi cally for homeland defense
or military assistance to civilian authorities for the National
Guard.
Attempts to rent needed equipment were complicated
by the great demand for heavy machinery created by the
storm. Cross noted that contractors responding to other
federal, state, and local requests for assistance leased the
same type of equipment sought by the National Guard,
leaving little
available for
National Guard
use.229
In a National
Guard After
Action Review
dated September
2005, it was
strongly recommended that the Department of Defense
“identify the Continental United States mission as a valid
requirement and equip it as a valid tasking.”230
“I was there. I saw what needed to be done. They
were the fastest, best capable, most appropriate force
to get there in the time allowed. And that’s what it’s
all about.” General Blum231
Hurricane Katrina required signifi cant National Guard
manpower, and quickly. With the current level of 457,000
personnel in the National Guard, the Katrina response
demonstrated the Guard response was not hindered
by the deployment of Guard troops to support the War
on Terrorism. According to Blum, although National
Guard from the affected states were deployed overseas,
Guardsmen from surrounding, and then other states
quickly supplemented the effort.232 At landfall, over 40
percent of the Mississippi Guard, some 4,200 troops, were
deployed overseas. Fortunately, critical engineering units
and military police units were home.233 In Louisiana,
Blanco asked for the immediate return of Louisiana
National Guard troops from Iraq, but the National Guard
Bureau was satisfi ed it could provide suffi cient troops
from other states to meet the needs of Louisiana more
quickly than trying to extract Louisiana troops from
combat operations in Iraq.234 The Joint Staff and Center
for Army Lessons Learned were very impressed at the
ability of the Guard to mobilize and move a Corps worth
of personnel and equipment in four days.235
Nonetheless, organizational challenges surfaced in this
rapid deployment. The National Guard forces fl owing
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 229
into the staging areas at Alexandria, Louisiana, and to the
Naval Air Station New Orleans at Belle Chasse arrived
so quickly that the number of Guardsmen assigned
to process and task these units was too small.236 The
capabilities of each unit were not readily known by the
logistics personnel tasking offi cers, causing further delays.
A lack of well defi ned personnel and equipment
packages by the Department of Defense to support
civilian authorities in large disasters degraded instant
tasking of units deployed to Louisiana.237 General DOD
development of regional strike forces composed of various
National Guard units would have done a great deal to
mitigate the effects of a large natural disaster or other
catastrophic event: “Hurricane equipment packages for the
Guard should be developed by the Department of Defense
to help them provide more adequate assistance to civilian
authorities in the future, Cross said.”238
Current law hindered some congressionally mandated National Guard Civil Support Teams’ response
Congress established WMD Civil Support Teams (CSTs)
to deploy rapidly to assist local incident commanders in
determining the nature and extent of an attack or incident;
provide expert technical advice on WMD response
operations; and help identify and support the arrival of
follow-on state and federal military response assets.239 The
fi rst 10 teams were funded as part of the National Defense
Appropriations Act for FY 1999. Each team consists of 22
highly skilled, full-time National Guard members who
are federally resourced, trained, and exercised in chemical,
biological, and nuclear specialties, and skilled in
reconnaissance, medical support, logistics, administration,
communications, air liaison, and security.240
In these capacities, especially the use of their
communications vehicles, the National Guard CSTs
proved invaluable to the Katrina response. On September
2, a JTF Katrina offi cial relayed a report from the National
Guard Bureau that CSTs from Connecticut, North
Carolina, Nebraska, Utah, Arkansas, West Virginia,
Indiana, Kansas, Alabama, and the District of Columbia
were on route to the Gulf Coast.241
During Katrina, there was confusion regarding the legal
aspects of CST deployment, as some states interpreted
the law to mean they were only authorized to be used
for WMD incidents, and only in their states.242 This
interpretation delayed deployment of these vehicles
to Mississippi. Lieutenant Colonel Smithson of the
Mississippi National Guard said, “CSTs saved the day, I
just wish they were here sooner.”243 Clarifying that they
are available for use beyond WMD events would have
greatly enhanced states abilities to react quickly to the
Katrina disaster. 244
Guard personnel categories caused confusion
Multiple types of duty status of National Guard
personnel presented some legal challenges in the proper
employment of forces.245 State military lawyers interpreted
laws, regulations, and policies pertaining to the various
statuses and units of assignment very differently, which
caused unnecessary delays. Delays in the Title 32 approval
process, previously identifi ed, added to the diffi culty. The
National Guard Bureau May 23, 2005 after action report
on TOPOFF 3 found:
As highlighted in Operation Winter Freeze, [the
Democratic National Convention, the Republican
National Convention] and [the] G-8 summit,
and further during Ardent Sentry 05 events, the
T[itle] 10/ T[itle] 32 approval process must be
standardized. Current process is lengthy, largely
undefi ned, and requires excessive time periods for
approval.246
E-mails from various state Adjutants General began
to arrive at the National Guard Bureau immediately after
landfall inquiring about changing all Guard response
to Title 32.247 The National Guard Bureau agreed with
these suggestions and began to actively discuss this status
change with the Department of Defense.248 On September
2, 4 and 5 respectively, Governor Riley of Alabama,
Governor Barbour of Mississippi, and Governor Blanco
of Louisiana wrote to the Secretary of Defense to formally
ask that all National Guard personnel responding in their
states be put on Title 32, Chapter 9, a new operational
section of Title 32 that allows for the National Guard to
perform homeland missions under governor control.249
The Select Committee believes the Guard response in
Katrina would have been more effective had the decision
to place National Guard troops in Title 32 status been
made earlier by the governors, the National Guard Bureau,
and the Secretary of Defense.
230 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Lack of unifi ed DOD support for enhanced Guard resources under Title 32
A September 10 NGB e-mail to Blum indicated frustration
at the lack of understanding by the Army and Air Force
and some DOD offi ces of Title 32 and the resources that
were to fl ow to the National Guard of states participating
in the Katrina response.250 Currently, there are no
clear directives for the use of Title 32 National Guard
homeland missions, so the confusion was not unexpected.
The e-mail indicates, however, that some offi cials in
DOD did not totally embrace the use of Title 32 during
the Katrina response. The e-mail stated specifi cally that
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, Craig Duehring, expressed that Title 32
would only apply to the three affected states; that Service
Secretaries must get approval from the Deputy Secretary
of Personnel and Readiness before issuing any orders; and
that the Offi ce of Reserve Affairs will “run this” and have a
matrix of needed information that will be required before
any consideration is given to funding of Guard activities.
Even though the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved
use of Title 32 on September 7, uncertainty within the
Pentagon on Title 32 parameters, required the National
Guard Bureau to ensure Title 32 status for those states
who had rushed in to help.251
Lack of training for Military Assistance to Law Enforcement (MSCLEA)
Before the storm, the Louisiana National Guard opened
the Superdome for evacuees with a minimal number of
staff, many of whom were not military police or formally
trained for crowd control operations. On Monday night,
August 29, when an increased number of Louisiana
National Guard arrived at the Superdome, they found
many Guard personnel working at checkpoints alone,
with no hand held radios, and unarmed. Though the
crowd was generally peaceful, even when the plumbing
failed, these soldiers were in a volatile situation they
were not trained to handle.252 An Army National Guard
after action report dated December 21 found these Guard
personnel were not properly trained to respond to areas
where there are a large number of civilians, resulting in
risk to their safety and the safety of others.253 McHale
indicated the Pentagon is interested in enhanced training
for National Guard in this homeland role. “I think we will
be looking at formalizing the training, equipment and
deployment capability associated with National Guard
military police units,” McHale said.254
Finding: Search and rescue operations were a temendous success, but coordination and integration between the military services, the National Guard, the Coast Guard, and other local, state, and federal rescue organizations was lacking
“During the fi rst four days, no single organization
or agency was in charge of providing a coordinated
effort for rescue operations.”255 Admiral Timothy
Keating, Commander, NORTHERN COMMAND
Urban search and
rescue operations
are multi-agency
in nature and no
standardized federal
system currently
exists to effectively
integrate operations.
The lack of a coordination mechanism and standardized
processes led to duplication of effort in some locations
The Select Committee believes the Guard response in Katrina would have been more effective had the decision to place National Guard troops in Title 32 status been made earlier by the governors, the National Guard Bureau, and the Secretary of Defense.
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and a lack of response in others. Each military entity
relied on its own airspace coordinators during the fi rst
critical days, which also contributed to a lack of awareness
of who was doing what.
In New Orleans, the Louisiana National Guard and the
U.S. Coast Guard maintained separate tactical operations
centers for airborne search and rescue missions. The
National Guard had its tactical operations center with
Task Force Eagle at the Superdome, and the Coast Guard
had its tactical operations center at Belle Chasse Naval Air
Station. The two entities divided up areas and ran separate
operations.
Because of the urgent emphasis on getting victims
to high ground, the drop-off points were not well
coordinated. While some were dropped off at the
Superdome (which provided shelter, food, and water),
others were dropped off at the Convention Center (which
provided only shelter), and others were dropped off on
freeway overpasses or levees (with nothing at all). The
philosophy at that point was to save fi rst, then worry later
about providing other relief.256 This situation resulted
in people being saved from the fl oodwaters, but then
suffering — some for days — in sweltering conditions
with or without food and water. ■
232 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) (written statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense at 4) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
2 Id. at 8. 3 Id. at 6. 4 Joint Hearing on Role of the Military and National Guard in Disaster Responses Before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities and the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) at 7 (written statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense) [hereinafter Nov. 9, 2005 Joint Armed Services and Homeland Hearing].
5 Hearing Before Base Realignment and Closure Commission (Aug. 11, 2005) at 34 (statements of Harold Gehman, 2005 BRAC Commissioner, and Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense) [hereinafter Aug. 11, 2005 BRAC Commission Hearing].
6 E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support to Anthony Capra, Offi ce of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, et al., (Aug. 30, 2005) (12:18 p.m.).
7 E-mail correspondence from InSung Oaks Lee, Senior Watch Offi cer, Department of Homeland Security [hereinafter DHS] to Homeland Security Operations Center [hereinafter HSOC] Federal Emergency Management Agency [hereinafter FEMA] mailing list, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (10:43 a.m.).
8 See generally E-mail correspondence from Anthony Capra, OASD Homeland Defense, Department of Defense [hereinafter DOD] Desk to Michael Ritchie, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Policy, (Aug. 29, 2005) (12:15 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Anthony Capra, OASD Homeland Defense Desk, DOD Desk to DOD HD Coordination Group, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (10:54 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, DOD to Anthony Capra, OASD Homeland Defense Desk, DOD Desk, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (12:18 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Anthony Capra, OASD Homeland Defense Desk, DOD Desk to Col. Richard Chavez, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, DOD (Aug. 30, 2005) (11:36 a.m.); see also E-mail correspondence between DOD HSOC and FEMA HSOC (Sept. 3-4, 2005).
9 See generally E-mail correspondence between policy staff of Offi ce of Secretary for Defense (Sept, 5, 2005). 10 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 10 (written statement of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense
Command [hereinafter NORAD] and U.S. Northern Command [hereinafter NORTHCOM]). 11 See Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. at 34-35, 162 (Sept. 27,
2005) (statement of Michael Brown, Former Director, FEMA) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 12 Mark Sappenfi eld, Battle Brews Over a Bigger Military Role, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 13, 2005 at 3. 13 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andrew Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Gov. Kathleen Blanco, State of LA [hereinafter Kopplin Interview] in
Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005); Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, LA State Coordinating Offi cer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005).
14 Kopplin Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Col. Stephen Dabadie, Chief of Staff to Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, The Adjutant General, State of LA [hereinafter Dabadie Interview] in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005).
15 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA, in Baton Rouge, LA [hereinafter Wells Interview] (Nov. 9, 2005).
16 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 34-35, 84, 109, 112, 113, 126, 161 (statement of Michael Brown, Former Director, FEMA). 17 See Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 127 (statement of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM and statement of
Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense); Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for LA, FEMA in Washington, DC [hereinafter Lokey Interview] (Dec. 2, 2005); Wells Interview.
18 Kopplin Interview. 19 Lokey Interview. 20 Nov. 9, 2005 Joint Armed Services and Homeland Hearing (written statement of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau
[hereinafter NGB] at 2-3). 21 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, NGB, Lt. Gen. Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard, and Lt.
Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, United States Army, Director, Army National Guard [hereinafter Blum, James, and Vaughn Interview] in Arlington, VA (Dec. 19, 2005).
22 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, NGB). 23 See NGB, Hurricane Katrina, National Guard After Action Review Observations, National Guard Timeline at 17 [hereinafter National Guard Timeline
as of Dec. 21, 2005] (Dec. 21, 2005). 24 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Brig. Gen. Pete Aylward, NGB, Liaison Offi cer assigned to Lt. Gen. Russell Honoré, First US Army,
Commanding General, in Arlington, VA (Jan. 5, 2006); Memorandum from Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretaries of Defense, Commander, United States Northern Command, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, and General Counsel, DOD (Sept. 9, 2005).
25 See National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 13. 26 Director of Army National Guard, DARNG Katrina [hereinafter Dec. 19, 2005 Army National Guard Binder] (Dec. 19, 2005). 27 Id. 28 See Dec. 19, 2005 Army National Guard Binder; National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 14; E-mail correspondence from Lt. Gen. H
Steven Blum, Chief, NGB to National Guard Adjutants General, et al. (Aug. 31, 2005) (10:01 a.m.).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 233
29 Blum, James, Vaughn Interview; E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Francis Vavala, The Adjutant General, State of Delaware, to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB, (Aug. 31, 2005) (11:45 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, Army National Guard (Sept. 1, 2005) (10:43 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Douglas Burnett, The Adjutant General, State of Florida, to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB, (Sept. 4, 2005) (7:21 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Lt. Col. Chuck Larcom, Senior Army Advisor, Rhode Island, to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General (Sept. 1, 2005) (11:19 a.m.); E-mail correspondence from Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB to National Guard Adjutants General, et al. (Aug. 31, 2005) (10:01 a.m.). E-mail correspondence from NGB Chief to all Adjutant Generals regarding deployment coordination for Hurricane Katrina Relief (Aug. 31, 2005).
30 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 17. 31 See Blum, James, Vaughn Interview; National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005; Nicole Gaouette, et al., Government’s Response Plan Proves to
be a Disaster, STAMFORD ADVOCATE, Sept. 15, 2005 at A1. 32 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 17. 33 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2005). 34 E-mail correspondence from Jon Sims, DOD Offi ce of General Counsel to Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary for Defense for Homeland Defense
(attached Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, Consent, and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF Katrina) (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:45 p.m.).
35 Draft Letter from Governor Kathleen Blanco, State of LA, to President George W. Bush (Sept. 3, 2005). 36 Letter from Governor Kathleen Blanco, State of LA, to President George W. Bush (Sept. 3, 2005). 37 Letter from Governor Bob Riley, State of Alabama, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 2, 2005 Letter
from Gov. Riley to Sec. Rumsfeld]; Letter from Governor Haley Barbour, State of MS to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 4, 2005 Letter from Gov. Barbour to Sec. Rumsfeld]; Letter from Governor Kathleen Blanco, State of LA, to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense (Sept. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 5, 2005 Letter from Gov. Blanco to Sec. Rumsfeld].
38 E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Gus Hargett, The Adjutant General, State of Tennessee (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:07 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. David Poythress, The Adjutant General, State of Georgia (Sept. 2, 2005) (4:35 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Mason Whitney, The Adjutant General, State of Colorado (Sept. 2, 2005) (17:28 p.m.).
39 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, NGB). 40 Sept. 2, 2005 Letter from Gov. Riley to Sec. Rumsfeld; Sept. 4, 2005 Letter from Gov. Barbour to Sec. Rumsfeld; Sept. 5, 2005 Letter from Gov.
Blanco to Sec. Rumsfeld. 41 Dec. 19, 2005 Blum, James, Vaughn Interview; National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 24. 42 Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Francis Harvey, Secretary of the Army, and Acting Secretary of the Air
Force (Sept. 7, 2005). 43 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 29. 44 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM). 45 See NGB, Chief’s Battle Update Brief Covers 04 1400 September 2005, (Sept. 4, 2005); NGB, Chiefs Battle Update Brief Covers 01 September 2005,
(Sept. 1, 2005). 46 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB); Steve Bowman,
Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, CRS Report for Congress, RL33095 at 10 (Sept. 19, 2005). 47 See Mississippi National Guard, Hurricane Katrina August 2005-November 2005 [hereinafter “Mississippi National Guard Daily Logs”]. 48 Blum, James, and Vaughn Interview. 49 Air National Guard, NGAUS ANG Breakout, Lt. Gen. Daniel James, III, Director, Air National Guard [hereinafter Sept. 19, 2005 NGAUS ANG
Breakout] (Sept. 19, 2005). 50 U.S. Air Force, Expeditionary Medical Support, Offi ce of the Air Force Surgeon General, Air Force Medical Evaluation Support Activity at 5. 51 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005 at 14-15. 52 E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Scott Mayes, 1st Air Force, Command and Control, to Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (2:40 p.m.). 53 National Guard Timeline as of Dec. 21, 2005; Army National Guard Aviation, Hurricane Katrina – Aviation Support (Aug. 29, 2005) (attached
to E-mail correspondence from Maj. Karl Konzelman, NGB to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General, et al. (Aug. 30, 2005) (10:32 a.m.)); Sept. 19, 2005 NGAUS ANG Breakout.
54 E-mail correspondence from Fletcher Thornton, Joint Operations Center, HQ, First U.S. Army (Sept. 2, 2005). 55 See NGB, Chief’s Battle Update Brief, Covers 04 1400 September 2005; Louisiana National Guard, Overview, Hurricane Recovery, Focus of Effort. 56 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Col. Barry Keeling, Commander of Task Force Eagle, LA National Guard, [hereinafter Keeling Interview]
in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005); Interview by Select Comm. Staff with General Brod Veillon, Commander of Task Force Minnow, LA National Guard, [hereinafter Veillon Interview] in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005).
57 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lt. Col. Jacques Thibodeaux, LA National Guard [hereinafter Thibodeaux Interview], in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005); Dabadie Interview.
58 Id. 59 Email correspondence from Angela Copple, EMAC Coordinator, National Emergency Management Association regarding numbers of
personnel assisting by State (Nov. 3, 2005) (2:49 p.m.). 60 Alabama National Guard, Hurricane Katrina Binder at Tab 1, p. 3-4, and Tab 4. 61 Governor Bob Riley, State of AL, Press Release: Governor Riley Declares State of Emergency Due to Approaching Hurricane, Requests Federal
Assistance, Aug. 28, 2005. 62 Alabama National Guard, Hurricane Katrina Binder at Tab 1 at p. 6, and Tab 4. 63 Id. at Tab 4. 64 Briefi ng Memorandum prepared for Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of MS Before Select Comm., 109th Cong.
(Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing Briefi ng Memorandum]. 65 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 3-4 (written submission of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
234 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
66 See Id. 67 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing Briefi ng Memorandum. 68 Mississippi Nat. Guard Joint Force Headquarters, Joint Task Force Magnolia, Operation Secure Magnolia, Hurricane Katrina August 26-Present
[hereinafter Operation Secure Magnolia Presentation]; Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
69 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
70 Dec. 19, 2005 Army National Guard Binder. 71 Memorandum from Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretary of Defense
(Comptroller), Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, General Counsel, DOD, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Chief, NGB (Sept. 7, 2005).
72 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
73 Operation Secure Magnolia Presentation. 74 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM). 75 Id. 76 Dabadie Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Sheriff, Plaquemines Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005); Interview
by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Homeland Security Director of New Orleans, in New Orleans, LA [hereinafter Ebbert Interview] (Nov. 9, 2005); Lokey Interview.
77 Thibodeaux Interview; Ebbert Interview. 78 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Ed Buikema, Response and Recovery Directorate, FEMA, [hereinafter Buikema Interview] in Washington,
DC (Jan. 6, 2006). 79 E-mail correspondence from Col. Richard Chavez, USAF, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, to Thomas Kuster, Offi ce of the Secretary of
Defense, Policy, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005) (9:38 a.m.). 80 Letter from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to the Honorable Tom Davis, Chairman, Select Comm. (Jan.
25, 2006). 81 E-mail correspondence from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS
(Sept. 2, 2005) (7:41 p.m.). 82 DOD, MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina, signed by Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense (Sept. 3, 2005). 83 E-mail correspondence from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS
(Sept. 2, 2005) (7:41 p.m.). 84 Letter from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to the Honorable Tom Davis, Chairman, Select Comm. (Jan.
25, 2006). 85 Buikema Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Michael Lowder, Director of Response Division, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Jan. 5,
2006). 86 DOD, MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina, signed by Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Homeland Defense (Sept. 3, 2005); See also E-mail correspondence from Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense to Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, DHS (Sept. 2, 2005) (7:41 p.m.).
87 E-mail correspondence from Richard Harrington to Linda Sabatini, et al. (Sept. 4, 2005) (3:32 p.m.). 88 E-mail correspondence from Coast Guard Headquarters regarding District Eight situation Report (Sept. 7, 2005) (9:44 p.m.). 89 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Oct. 27, 2005). 90 Id. 91 E-mail correspondence from Coast Guard Headquarters regarding District Eight situation Report (Sept. 7, 2005) (9:44 p.m.). 92 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Captain Jones, Coast Guard [hereinafter Jan. 10,
2006 Jones Briefi ng] (Jan. 10, 2006). 93 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 21, 2005). 94 Id. 95 Jan. 10, 2006 Jones Briefi ng. 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 29, 2005). 100 Jan. 10, 2006 Jones Briefi ng. 101 Id. 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Oct. 27, 2005). 105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 21, 2005). 108 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 29, 2005). 109 Jan. 10, 2006 Jones Briefi ng.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 235
110 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 21, 2005). 111 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Nov. 29, 2005). 112 Id. 113 Jan. 10, 2006 Jones Briefi ng. 114 Id. 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Jan. 3, 2006). 118 Id. 119 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Response and Recovery Operations and Authorities with Coast Guard Offi cials (Oct. 27, 2005). 120 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 4 (written statement of Rear Adm. Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast
Guard). 121 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on 2005 Hurricane Season with Bill Irwin, U.S. Army Corp. of Engineers (Dec. 9, 2005). 122 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Federal Government’s Use of Contractors to Prepare and Respond Before Select Comm. [hereinafter Nov. 2,
2005 Hearing on Contractors], 109th Cong. (Nov. 2, 2005) at 1 (written statement of Col. Norbert Doyle, Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (Acting), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
123 Id. 124 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, USACE/ESF#3: Hurricane Season 2005, 23 (Oct. 28, 2005) (on fi le with the Select Comm.). 125 Nov. 2, 2005 Hearing on Contractors (written statement of Col. Norbert Doyle). 126 Nov. 9, 2005 Joint Armed Services and Homeland Hearing at 7 (written statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense). 127 NORAD-NORTHCOM, Master Exercise Summary Report ARDENT SENTRY 2005 at 1, 2, 5, 7 [hereinafter July 29, 2005 Master Exercise Summary
Report] (July 29, 2005). 128 Id. at 1-2. 129 DHS, TOPOFF Exercise Series: TOPOFF 2 After Action Summary Report (Dec. 19, 2003). 130 July 29, 2005 Master Exercise Summary Report at 10-11. 131 Tom Bowman, Reviews Fault U.S. Disaster Response Plans; Relief Plans Lack Needed Detail, Military Offi cials Say, THE BALTIMORE SUN,
(Washington, DC), Oct. 24, 2005 at 4A. 132 Id. 133 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff on Hurricane Katrina: Themes from Initial Field Work in Four States by Government Accountability Offi ce in
Washington, DC (Nov. 29, 2005). 134 United States: Pentagon Expands Homeland Security Role, OXFORD ANALYTICA, (Oct. 12, 2005); available at http://www.oxan.com. 135 NORTHCOM, VADM Hull’s In-Brief at 12. 136 Ann Scott Tyson, Pentagon Plans to Beef Up Domestic Rapid-Response Forces, WASHINGTON POST, (Washington, DC), Oct. 13, 2005 at 4. 137 Pam Zubeck, NorthCom Offi cial Lists Katrina Lessons, COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE, (College Park, MD) Oct. 22, 2005 at A6 [hereinafter
Oct. 22, 2005 NorthCom Article]. 138 E-mail correspondence from Brig. Gen Terry Scherling, USAF, Deputy Director for Anti-Terrorism and Homeland Defense to Lt. Gen. Steven
Blum, Chief, NGB, et al. (Sept. 14, 2005) (4:12 p.m.). 139 Id. 140 See Oct. 22, 2005 NorthCom Article. 141 Memorandum from Maj. Robert K. Bryan, New Jersey Army National Guard to Joint Force Headquarter, New Jersey National Guard (Apr. 25,
2005). 142 Oct. 22, 2005 NorthCom Article; Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 143 See NGB, National Guard Bureau Contribution to NORTHCOM Ardent Sentry 05 Executive Summary at 9 (May 23, 2005); see also Oct. 22, 2005
NorthCom Article. 144 NGB, National Guard After Action Review, Hurricane Response, September 2005 at 203 [hereinafter Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review] (Dec.
21, 2005). 145 Id. 146 Id. at 191-192. 147 Id. at 244. 148 E-mail correspondence from Andrew Poppas to Lt. Col. Manley Alford, Hurricane Katrina, Crisis Action Team (Sept. 8, 2005) (2:51 p.m.). 149 Id. 150 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of
MS). 151 E-mail correspondence from Brig. Gen. Michael Ferriter to Lt. Gen. Robert Wagner et al. (Sept. 3, 2005) (2:08 p.m.). 152 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of
MS). 153 Id. at 4-5. 154 NORTHCOM, News Release: U.S. Northern Command Support to Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief, (Peterson AFB, Colorado) Aug. 31, 2005. 155 See generally E-mail correspondence from Col. Damon Penn, Defense Coordinating Offi cer to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army,
Commanding General, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (7:43 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Adm. Michael Mullen to Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM, et al. (Sept. 12, 2005) (4:14 p.m.); DOD, Offi ce of Public Affairs, DoD Update: Sept 5, 2005-Katrina- OASD (HD) executive summary (Sept. 5, 2005).
236 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
156 See JTF-Katrina, JTF-Katrina Commander’s Assessment, (Sept. 5, 2005); DOD, Offi ce of Public Affairs, DoD Update: Aug. 31, 2005-Hurricane Katrina (Aug. 31, 2005); DoD Support to Katrina to Hurricane KATRINA, OASD (HD) Executive Summary (Dec. 16, 2005); E-mail correspondence from Cdr. J.N. Massello, USN, Crew Chief, D Crew, USNORTHCOM Operations Center regarding USNORTHCOM Operations (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:59 a.m.).
157 See E-mail correspondence from Col. Damon Penn, Defense Coordinating Offi cer to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General, et al. (Sept. 1, 2005) (2:14 p.m.).
158 OPNAV Battle Watch, Katrina Damage Installations, (Aug. 31, 2005). 159 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of
MS). 160 See OPNAV Battle Watch, Katrina Damage Installations, (Aug. 31, 2005); Navy Offi ce of Information, Navy Seabee Katrina Relief Effort Fact Sheet,
NAVY NEWSSTAND, Sept. 19, 2005. 161 OPNAV Battle Watch, Katrina Damage Installations, (Aug. 31, 2005); Daryl Smith, 1st Naval Construction Division Public Affairs, Seabee
Hurricane Recovery Force to Reach 3,000, NAVY NEWSSTAND, Sept. 2, 2005. 162 OPNAV Battle Watch, Katrina Damage Installations, (Aug. 31, 2005); Navy Offi ce of Information, Navy Seabee Katrina Relief Effort Fact Sheet,
NAVY NEWSSTAND, Sept. 19, 2005. 163 DOD, Offi ce of Public Affairs, DoD Update: Sept 5, 2005-Katrina-OASD (HD) executive summary (Sept. 5, 2005). 164 See JTF-Katrina, JTF-Katrina Commander’s Assessment, (Sept. 5, 2005); Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the
record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of Mississippi); E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Director Operations, J3 NORTHCOM to Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-NORTHCOM, et al. (Sept. 3, 2005) (11:15 p.m.).
165 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
166 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD- NORTHCOM).
167 E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Director Operations, J3 NORTHCOM to Lt. Gen. James Conway, Joint Chiefs of Staff, J3, et al. (Sept. 11, 2005) (5:20 p.m.).
168 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS).
169 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 90. 170 Id. at 151. 171 Id. at 104-105. 172 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 173 Robert Block and Amy Schatz, Local and Federal Authorities Battle to Control Disaster Relief, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Marco Island, FL) at 1, Dec.
8, 2005. 174 See Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State
of MS); Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (written statement of Governor Bob Riley, State of Alabama); Robert Block and Amy Schatz, Local and Federal Authorities Battle to Control Disaster Relief, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Marco Island, FL) at 1, Dec. 8, 2005.
175 July 29, 2005 Master Exercise Summary Report at 27. 176 John Hill, Blanco: National Guard ‘saved the day,’ GANNETT NEWS SERVICE (Baton Rouge, LA), Sept. 19, 2005. 177 Caitlin Harrington, Pentagon Rethinking Role of Military in Disaster Response, CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, Sept. 20, 2005. 178 DOD, Report to Congress on The Role of the Department of Defense in Supporting Homeland Security at 15 (Sept. 2003). 179 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 180 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of
MS); Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written statement of Maj. Gen. C. Mark Bowen, The Adjutant General, State of Alabama). 181 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM). 182 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutants General, State of MS (Jan. 6, 2006); interview by Select Comm.
Staff with State Adjutants General at Air Nat’l Guard Senior Leadership Conference, Dec. 13-14, 2005. 183 NORTHCOM, Who We Are – Mission, available at http://www.northcom.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission. 184 Id. 185 E-mail correspondence from Anthony Capra to POL DoD HD Coordination Group (Aug. 29, 2005) (1:55 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from
Phil Dalton, Battle Captain, HQ First Army, to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (2:29 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Phil Dalton, Battle Captain, HQ First Army, to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General, et al. (Aug. 29, 2005) (2:36 p.m.); JTF Katrina Commanders Assessments (Daily) (Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 2005).
186 E-mail from Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General to Col. James Hickey, Chief of Staff, First US Army (Sept. 1, 2005) (1:55 p.m.).
187 E-mail correspondence from Col. William Harrison, FORSCOM G3 AVN, to Col. Paul Kelly, NGB (Aug. 30, 2005) (10:35 p.m.). 188 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM). 189 Mark Mazzetti, Military Sees Limits to Role in U.S. Disasters, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Washington), Oct. 13, 2005 at A11. 190 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 168. 191 E-mail correspondence from Michael Ritchie, Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Policy to Anthony Capra, OASD Homeland Defense, DOD
Desk (Aug. 29, 2005) (1:14 p.m.). 192 E-mail correspondence from Col. William Harrison, FORSCOM G3 AVN, to Col. Paul Kelly, NGB (Aug. 30, 2005) (10:35 p.m.); E-mail
correspondence from Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Director Operations, J3 NORTHCOM to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, First US Army, Commanding General, et al. (Sept. 1, 2005) (10:21 a.m.).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 237
193 E-mail correspondence from Col. Mark Scraba, Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, to Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, et al. (Sept. 4, 2005) (2:25 p.m.).
194 Id. 195 July 29, 2005 Master Exercise Summary Report. 196 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 147. 197 See DOD Offi cial E-mails: Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB at MMTF 00415-05; DOD Offi cial E-mails: Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense at MMTF 00418-05. 198 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 199 Department of the Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer Program at First Army Memorandum to Commander, First Army, After
Action Report and Lessons Learned at 14 (Sept. 12, 2005). 200 Id. at 11. 201 NORTHCOM, VADM Hull’s In-Brief at 12. 202 Department of the Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer Program at First Army Memorandum to Commander, First Army, After
Action Report and Lessons Learned at 7 (Sept. 12, 2005). 203 Id. 204 NORTHCOM, VADM Hull’s In-Brief at 12. 205 Department of the Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer Program at First Army Memorandum to Commander, First Army, After
Action Report and Lessons Learned at 9 (Sept. 12, 2005). 206 Id. at 14-15. 207 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 208 Id. 209 United States: Pentagon Expands Homeland Security Role, OXFORD ANALYTICA, (Oct. 12, 2005); available at http://www.oxan.com. 210 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS, in MS (Oct. 12, 2006). 211 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, State of Ms). 212 Veillon Interview; Dabadie Interview. 213 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Matt Farlow, Division Chief, Information Technology Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness, [hereinafter Farlow Interview] in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005); Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Rex McDonald, Information Technology and Communications Director, Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, [hereinafter McDonald Interview] in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005).
214 Farlow Interview; McDonald Interview. 215 Veillon Interview; Dabadie Interview. 216 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 71. 217 Id. at 166. 218 Id. at 146. 219 Id. at 5, 7, 70, 137, 177-178, 251, 260, 262. 220 Id. at 137. 221 Id. at 67. 222 Operation Secure Magnolia Presentation; Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold
A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS). 223 Air National Guard, ANG C-130 Support for Hurricane Relief Missions. 224 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by NGB Staff in Washington, DC (Jan. 11, 2006). 225 U.S. Air Force, Headquarters Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Offi ce of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: United States Air Force Red Horse
Squadrons; Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by NGB Staff in Washington, DC (Jan. 11, 2006). 226 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by NGB Staff in Washington, DC (Jan. 11, 2006). 227 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM); DOD, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Washington, DC (June 2005). 228 Aug. 11, 2005 BRAC Commission Hearing (statement of Peter Verga, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense). 229 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, State of MS). 230 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 215. 231 Eric Lipton, et al., Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid, NEW YORK TIMES (Washington), (Sept. 9, 2005). 232 Dec. 19, 2005 Blum, James, Vaughn Interview. 233 Operation Secure Magnolia Presentation. 234 Letter from Governor Kathleen Blanco, State of LA, to President George W. Bush (Sept. 2, 2005). 235 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum). 236 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 87-88. 237 Id. 238 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, The Adjutant General, State of MS (Jan. 6, 2006). 239 DOD, Offi ce of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, DOD Announces Plans for 17 New WMD Civil Support Teams (Jan. 13, 2000). 240 Id.; Gerry Gilmore, Guard-Staffed WMD Civil Support Teams Slated for Increase, AMERICAN FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE (Washington),
Jan. 20, 2004; Donna Miles, Guard Civil Support Teams Provide WMD Expertise to Communities, AIR FORCE NEWS (Camp Robinson, AR), (May 26, 2005).
241 E-mail correspondence from Ronald Jones, Chief, WMD Division to 1A JOC WMD, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005) (11:21 a.m.). 242 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 196. 243 Id. 244 Id.
238 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
245 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 64; E-mail correspondence from Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, Army National Guard to Brig. Gen. Frank Grass, Deputy Director, Army National Guard (Sept. 11, 2005) (6:35 a.m.).
246 NGB, National Guard Bureau Contribution to NORTHCOM Ardent Sentry 05 Executive Summary at 8 (May 23, 2005). 247 See E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Gus Hargett, The Adjutant General, State of Tennessee (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:07 p.m.); E-mail
correspondence from Maj. Gen. David Poythress, The Adjutant General, State of Georgia (Sept. 2, 2005) (4:35 p.m.); E-mail correspondence from Maj. Gen. Mason Whitney, The Adjutant General, State of Colorado (Sept. 2, 2005) (17:28 p.m.).
248 Dec. 19, 2005 Blum, James, Vaughn Interview. 249 Sept. 2, 2005 Letter from Gov. Riley to Sec. Rumsfeld; Sept. 4, 2005 Letter from Gov. Barbour to Sec. Rumsfeld; Sept. 5, 2005 Letter from Gov.
Blanco to Sec. Rumsfeld. 250 E-mail from Col. Kelly McKeague, NGB, to Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, NGB, et al. (Sept. 10, 2005) (8:03 a.m.). 251 Id.; E-mail correspondence from Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, Director, Army National Guard to Brig. Gen. Frank Grass, Deputy Director, Army
National Guard (Sept. 11, 2005) (6:35 a.m.). 252 Dec. 21, 2005 NGB After Action Review at 91. 253 See Id. 254 Caitlin Harrington, Pentagon Rethinking Role of Military in Disaster Response, CQ HOMELAND SECURITY, Sept. 20, 2005. 255 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing (written response to questions for the record of Adm. Timothy Keating, Commander, NORAD-
NORTHCOM). 256 Veillon Interview; Keeling Interview.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 239
240 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“The members of the public safety community aggressively moved into areas
immediately after the storm passed and saved many lives and brought order. This
was a very diffi cult mission as much of the public safety infrastructure, police
and sheriff’s stations, patrol cars, and communications had been destroyed in the
coastal communities.” William L. Carwile, III
Hurricane Katrina Federal Coordination Offi cer for Mississippi
Select Committee hearing, December 7, 2005
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LAW ENFORCEMENT
The collapse of law enforcement and the lack of effective public communications led to civil unrest and further delayed relief
Summary
A wide variety of conditions led to lawlessness and
violence in areas hit by Hurricane Katrina. Lack of food,
water, and electricity. Uncertainty about evacuations. Even
the loss of hope. Looting occurred in several locations.
In some cases, people looted stores for their survival and
to diminish suffering, taking items such as food, water,
clothing, fl ashlights, batteries, and camping supplies. At
least some police departments were involved in breaking
into stores and commandeering supplies needed for their
departments, as well as those needed for feeding people
in shelters before state or federal assistance arrived. One
New Orleans physician said police helped him break into
a pharmacy to get needed medications and supplies. In
other cases, people looted for purely criminal purposes,
apparently taking items for personal use or resale that
would not be needed or were useless without electricity
(e.g., televisions).
General unrest and lawlessness arose in crowded
areas where people were uncertain about their survival,
or rescue, or prospects for evacuation. In some areas,
the collapse or absence of law enforcement exacerbated
the level of lawlessness and violence. Several police
departments lost dispatch and communication
capabilities, police vehicles, administrative functions
such as booking, and jails to confi ne arrested suspects.
Tremendous additional burdens were imposed on the
police, like search and rescue operations, that took priority
over normal police functions. The extent of crime and
lawlessness is diffi cult to determine, partly because of the
loss of police record keeping during the disaster and partly
because of unsubstantiated reporting by the media.
The breakdown of law enforcement was particularly
notable in New
Orleans. Despite the
well-known threat
from fl ooding, the
New Orleans Police
Department had
not taken basic
steps to protect
its resources and
ensure continuity
of operations. For
example, communications nodes, evidence rooms, and
even emergency generators were housed in lower fl oors
susceptible to fl ooding. When the levees broke and the
fl oodwaters overtook police headquarters and district
offi ces, the department lost its command and control and
communications functions. Police vehicles believed to
be moved out of harm’s way were lost to the fl oodwaters.
Hundreds of New Orleans Police Department offi cers
went missing — some for legitimate reasons and some
not — at a time they were needed most. This left the city
unable to provide enough manpower and other resources
to maintain law and order at shelters and on the streets.
Looting broke out in the downtown section of the city,
particularly along Canal Street. There were also reports,
currently under investigation by the Louisiana Attorney
General, that New Orleans police offi cers were involved in
stealing vehicles from a car dealership. Even when police
were present to restore law and order, they did not have
the resources to arrest, book, and detain suspects. Other
parts of the city, according to witnesses, were relatively
calm despite the lack of law enforcement personnel.
Public communications is a key aspect of emergency
management, and this function has its own emergency
support function in the NRP. In Louisiana, and particularly AP P
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242 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
New Orleans, the federal, state, and local governments did
not appear to have a public communications strategy to
utilize the media. This problem was particularly severe in
the area of law enforcement and crime. While the media
played a positive role in many aspects — such as providing
situational awareness to government authorities — it
also played a negative role in the often unsubstantiated
reporting of crime and lawlessness, undermining the
accuracy and value of that awareness.
Media reports of
violence often gave
credence to rumors
that were either false
or highly exaggerated.
Public offi cials did
not have a strategy
to get ahead of the
“information curve”
to use the media to
the public’s advantage
and help quell rumors. In fact, Mayor Ray Nagin and the
Chief of Police repeated rumors of rampant criminality to
the national media, contributing to the exaggerated image
of utter lawlessness. Many of these reports, particularly
of unchecked violence in the Superdome, appear to have
been unsubstantiated. Nevertheless, the hyped media
coverage of violence and lawlessness, legitimized by New
Orleans authorities, served to delay relief efforts by scaring
away truck and bus drivers, increasing the anxiety of those
in shelters, and generally increasing the resources that
needed to be dedicated to security.
Law and order were eventually restored as local law
enforcement offi cers were removed from search and rescue,
reassigned to law enforcement missions, and supplemented
fi rst by state National Guard troops, then by other state
and local police through the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC) process. The National Guard
played a substantial role in providing security and restoring
law and order. The Louisiana National Guard was deployed
before landfall, and provided security at the Superdome
that helped maintain order there. Once looting broke out
in New Orleans, guardsmen also patrolled the streets to
restore law and order.
The Alabama National Guard was also deployed before
landfall, providing a security task force for Mobile and
Baldwin counties. National Guards from other states sent
units through the EMAC process to perform security or
law enforcement duties. For example, Arkansas provided
310 guardsmen from a military police company to provide
security in Mississippi.
While not immediately deployed, Department of
Defense (DOD) active duty forces also played a role in
restoring and maintaining law and order. For example,
the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne arrived in New Orleans on
September 3 (fi ve days after landfall) and, according to
the city’s Director of Homeland Security, had a “calming
effect” on the populace by their mere presence on the
street. Precautions were taken to prevent DOD active duty
forces from direct law enforcement missions, thereby
avoiding Posse Comitatus issues.
Civilian law enforcement agencies from other states
and localities also provided personnel through the
EMAC process to supplement beleaguered state and local
police. For example, South Carolina provided 118 law
enforcement personnel with equipment to Mississippi.
Federal law enforcement agencies also played a major
role in restoring law and order after Hurricane Katrina.
Specifi c agencies included the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the U.S. Marshal
Service (USMS), the U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, the U.S. Border Patrol, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Federal
Air Marshal Service (FAMS). The fi rst priority for most of
these agencies was implementing continuity of operations
plans — locating their people, securing their workplaces
and sensitive information, getting supplemental manpower
from other fi eld offi ces, and otherwise fully restoring their
mission capabilities. These federal agencies then turned to
assisting state and local law enforcement agencies.
These agencies brought a wide array of capabilities
and tactical teams to help restore and maintain law and
order. Most of the federal personnel were deputized as
state law enforcement offi cials, so they could fully partner
with local police by participating in patrols, investigating
crimes, and arresting suspects. The FBI deployed its
Critical Incident Response Group and ATF deployed one
of its Special Response Teams. ATF located and inspected
federal fi rearms and explosives licensees to determine if
their facilities were secure. USMS assisted with evacuating
prisoners from fl ooded jails into federal facilities. FAMS
provided security at the New Orleans Airport.
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Police Chief Eddie Compass
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Federal agencies also helped establish interagency and
intergovernmental mechanisms — such as common
credentialing and a Law Enforcement Coordination
Center — to coordinate the activities of the multitude of
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Finally,
these federal agencies provided equipment, supplies, and
other resources to local law enforcement agencies to help
them start rebuilding their capabilities.
Finding: A variety of conditions led to lawlessness and violence in hurricane stricken areas
Several conditions led to lawlessness and looting
A wide variety of conditions led to lawlessness and
violence in areas hit by Hurricane Katrina. Bobby
Strahan, Pearl River County Emergency Management
Agency Director, said the lack of critical commodities
for those residents who did not evacuate (or returned
quickly) and crowds seeking shelter at a limited number
of facilities with generators may have been behind
some of the post-landfall requests for security and law
enforcement assistance.1 According to Strahan, Pearl
River experienced some looting and other crimes in the
immediate aftermath of the storm. Once the county was
able to secure and distribute limited amounts of food, ice,
and water (what it could gather on its own plus assistance
from the state of Florida), these security problems largely
dissipated.
Similarly, those who did not evacuate (or returned
quickly) may have contributed to signifi cant security
challenges at some of Mississippi’s healthcare facilities
in the affected areas. According Dr. Brian Amy, the State
Health Offi cer of Mississippi, most of those facilities had
generators and a limited power supply.2 This caused them
to quickly attract the attention of displaced residents,
who were drawn to the lights and the possibility they
might seek shelter there, and created what Amy termed
an “overfl ow” situation resulting in security issues at the
facilities.3 In Louisiana, offi cials cited the lack of food,
water, electricity, and uncertainty about evacuations as
reasons for lawlessness and looting.4 Even Governor
Kathleen Blanco said she sympathized with people who
looted stores to survive.5
Looting occurred in several locations. Mississippi
experienced some looting, armed robbery, and crowd
control problems immediately after the storm.6
Security-related requests the state received from local
offi cials included: (1) nighttime military police (MP)
security at pharmacy and drug dispensing operations in
several coastal cities; (2) help with security issues at an
understaffed shelter that was about to receive evacuees
from New Orleans; (3) law enforcement personnel to deal
with reported theft and carjacking threats at a medical
center in Biloxi; and (4) additional National Guard
protection to deal with looters at the South Mississippi
Regional Center in Long Beach.7
In Louisiana, state police offi cials said looting was most
concentrated in the New Orleans area.8 However, major
looting was generally limited to the Canal Street area and
ended by Tuesday, August 30. According to these offi cials,
in some cases people looted stores for their survival,
taking items such as food, water, clothing, fl ashlights,
batteries, and camping supplies. In other cases, people
looted for criminal purposes, apparently taking items for
their personal
use or resale that
would not be
needed or were
useless without
electricity (e.g.,
televisions).
Once most
perpetrators
realized they
had no way to
transport their
loot and no
place to store
it, they often
abandoned it.
State police
offi cials said several blocks away from the looting area,
many large electronic items and appliances were found
abandoned in their original boxes.
At least some police departments were involved in
breaking into stores and taking supplies. Plaquemines
Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle said his offi cers broke into stores
and commandeered food, water, and medicine.9 Some
of these items were needed to sustain the sheriff’s offi ce
and other emergency personnel. Most of the items taken,
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however, were
food and medical
items for the
growing population
at the parish’s
designated shelter
of last resort. The
shelter had been
originally set up to
house the police,
other emergency workers, and those with special needs.
However, after landfall, the shelter became crowded with
additional evacuees or people rescued by boat. Eventually
the numbers increased to about 400, and since state and
federal relief was slow in arriving, the sheriff’s offi cers
commandeered needed items. The sheriff said he later
contacted the stores and asked for forgiveness, which was
granted under the circumstances.
In Alabama, there were almost no reports of
lawlessness, looting, or other crimes. Offi cials said this
was because Hurricane Katrina did not hit Alabama as
hard as it hit the other states.10 In addition, Alabama’s law
enforcement infrastructure was not as severely damaged
and remained functional in the immediate aftermath of
the hurricane.
General unrest and violence occurred in crowded areas
General unrest and lawlessness arose primarily in crowded
areas where people were uncertain about their survival,
or rescue, or prospects for evacuation. For example, local
offi cials in Mississippi asked the state to send National
Guard soldiers to provide security and crowd control
at a Red Cross shelter because of “chaotic conditions”
and the shelter director’s belief that help was needed to
prevent “potential behavioral problems.”11 Some of the
most notorious locations for unrest were in New Orleans,
at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and the
Cloverleaf, as discussed in the EVACUATION chapter. The
conditions at the Superdome, as described in a National
Guard report, illustrate the desperation felt by the crowd
inside:
The water pressure declined steadily over the fi rst
several days and failed to provide toilet function
on or about Wednesday the 31st of August.
Unfortunately, many of the toilets had overfl owed
by then and foot traffi c distributed fecal material
and urine throughout the facility…The warm
temperature, combined with the fl oodwaters on the
lower level, rotting food and other refuse, human
and animal (pets) waste material, and the aroma
of unwashed humans, produced an increasingly
noxious smell in the place.12
Louisiana National Guard personnel said a lack of
hope was also a factor in the Superdome with the crowd
becoming restless and, in isolated incidents, violent.13
These people had lost their homes and belongings, had to
suffer unbearable conditions, and were uncertain about
their future. Exacerbating the problem were continuing
delays in getting buses to evacuate the Superdome, as
discussed in the EVACUATION chapter. After people had
been told for several days they would be evacuated the
next day, the buses did not arrive in large numbers, and
people did not see any progress.
The collapse or absence of law enforcement exacerbated lawlessness
In some areas, the collapse or absence of law enforcement
exacerbated the level of lawlessness and violence.
For example, several police departments lost their
dispatch and communication functions, police vehicles,
administrative functions such as booking, and jails to
confi ne arrested suspects. Tremendous additional burdens
were imposed on the police — such as search and rescue
— that took priority over normal police missions.
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In Mississippi, massive damage to police and sheriff
cars and stations, emergency response vehicles, and
emergency operations centers made it very diffi cult to
maintain law and order. According to William Carwile, the
FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Mississippi, much
of this public safety infrastructure was destroyed in the
coastal counties.14 Mayor Thomas Longo of Waveland said
the city staged at various points around the area some of
the resources it expected to need to respond to the storm’s
damage, including dump trucks and front-end loaders.15
Waveland also staged some of these resources about
10 miles north of the city as a backup in the event of a
catastrophe. Nonetheless, despite those preparations, the
hurricane destroyed the resources Waveland had staged
north of the city as well as much of what remained in the
city itself. Waveland lost all of its police cars (in addition
to other emergency vehicles), and the storm destroyed all
of Waveland’s public buildings, severely limiting its ability
to mount a response to the storm.16
Also in Mississippi, Hancock County lost its emergency
operations center — the location from which it expected
to manage the county’s response to the storm — to severe
fl ooding soon after the hurricane hit.17 Pearl River County
lost its emergency operations center in the early hours of
the storm due to wind and water damage that knocked
out its emergency backup generator and caused other
damage, making the center inoperable.18 These losses
degraded the ability to maintain law and order.
In Louisiana, there were similar losses of law
enforcement infrastructure, in both rural and urban areas,
that weakened the law enforcement community’s ability
to function. The lack of preparation and almost total loss
of police capabilities in New Orleans are addressed in the
next fi nding.
Plaquemines Parish, in contrast to New Orleans,
appeared to take many precautions before Katrina made
landfall. According to Plaquemines Parish Sheriff Jiff
Hingle, all police vehicles were moved and parked on high
ground.19 Only one or two vehicles were slightly damaged
when fl ying debris cracked their windows. Before landfall,
the sheriff’s offi ce gathered all administrative records,
loaded them into U-Haul trailers, and moved them to safe
locations in the north. In addition, Plaquemines Parish
evacuated all its prisoners in advance to upstate facilities.
After landfall, the Plaquemines Parish sheriff’s offi ce was
immediately able to conduct search and rescue missions,
along with some embedded Louisiana National Guard
and Coast Guard personnel who had radios.20 The sheriff
reported no major law enforcement issues, in part because
his offi ce could function immediately after the storm.
The full extent of crime and lawlessness is diffi cult
to determine, partly because of the loss of police record
keeping during the disaster, and partly because of
unsubstantiated reporting by the media (discussed below).
Finding: The New Orleans Police Department was ill prepared for continuity of operations and lost almost all effectiveness
New Orleans Police Department had not prepared for fl ooding
The collapse of law enforcement was particularly notable in
New Orleans. Despite the well-known threat from fl ooding,
the New Orleans Police Department had not taken some
basic steps to protect its resources and ensure continuity of
operations. For example, communications nodes, evidence
rooms, and even emergency generators were housed in
lower fl oors that were susceptible to fl ooding.
In 2004, the police department reportedly produced
an “elaborate hurricane plan” which was issued to all
commanders.21 But, according to a reporter who was
present during Katrina and reviewed police operations, it
“stayed on their bookshelves,” and the department never
ran “exercises to familiarize offi cers with the plan.”22
Few offi cers the reporter spoke with even knew the plan
existed.23
FEMA-provided temporary buildings out of which Waveland’s city government, including its police department, is now operating.
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When the levees broke, the fl oodwaters overtook
police headquarters and district offi ces. As a result,
the department lost its command and control and
communications functions. The dispatch and 911 call
center ceased to function. Most police vehicles had not
been moved out of harm’s way and were lost to the
fl oodwaters. The fl ooding created impassable roads which
prevented the New Orleans Police Department from using
their few remaining vehicles in most parts of the city.
This left offi cers to patrol without any communications
or transportation. With no command and control
or guidance, there was no unifi ed command or clear
priorities within the department. One reporter who was
on the scene wrote that “As an institution… the New
Orleans Police Department disintegrated with the fi rst
drop of fl oodwater.”24
Missing police offi cers led to a law enforcement manpower shortage
Further, hundreds of New Orleans Police Department
offi cers went missing — some for understandable
reasons and some not — at a time they were needed
the most. This left the city unable to provide enough
manpower and other resources to maintain law and order
at shelters and on the streets.
All New Orleans Police Department offi cers are
required to reside within the city limits, so a majority of
the city’s offi cers were personally affected by Katrina.25
Whether it was damage to their homes or the health and
safety of family members, many New Orleans Police
Department offi cers, like members of the general public,
were trapped in their homes and needed to be rescued
during the critical days and hours after the levees failed
and the fl ood waters rose.
Dereliction of duty by New Orleans Police Offi cers
factored signifi cantly into the department’s inability to
marshal an effective response. Original reports indicated
that up to 320 offi cers (of its 1,750-offi cer force)
resigned, were terminated, or are under investigation for
abandoning their duties.26 However, on December 14,
Mayor Nagin testifi ed that as of that date, 133 offi cers
had been terminated or resigned after Hurricane Katrina,
and said many of the original reports did not account
for nearly 100 offi cers who were trapped or stranded on
rooftops and unable to report to duty for that reason.27
Regardless, the New Orleans Police force was severely
depleted.
As a result, many residents were unable to obtain
police assistance. Calls for help to the city’s 911 system
went unanswered.28
Some of the offi cers were also apparently involved in
criminal activities. Offi cials from the Louisiana Attorney
General’s offi ce said they are investigating thefts of luxury
vehicles from a car dealership allegedly perpetrated by
New Orleans Police Department offi cers.29 The dealership,
Sewell Cadillac Chevrolet, reported that several police
offi cers had absconded with several brand new Cadillac
Escalades.30
The Louisiana State Police provided relatively quick
assistance. Although the New Orleans Police Department
had lost its command and control capabilities, the
Louisiana State Police operated under its own broad law
enforcement statutory mandate. Thus, state police were able
to move into the affected area quickly. As the signifi cance
of Katrina became evident, state police ceased other law
enforcement activities to focus on New Orleans’ needs.
As an institution… the New Orleans Police Department disintegrated with the fi rst drop of fl oodwater.
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Police had limited resources to stop looting in downtown New Orleans
Given the situation, police had limited resources with
which to stop the looting.31 And even when police were
present to restore law and order, they did not have the
resources to arrest, book, and detain suspects. One major
problem was the loss of the booking and jail systems.
Booking and jailing are done not by the New Orleans
Police Department, but by the parish criminal sheriff.
Sheriffs in each parish are constitutional positions
independent from the parish president or mayor or police.
The sheriff’s booking offi ces and jails were fl ooded and
therefore useless. While criminals, such as looters, could
be apprehended by law enforcement offi cers, there was
nowhere to book them or jail them. Many people originally
apprehended for looting were just let go.
Finding: Lack of a government public communications strategy and media hype of violence exacerbated public concerns and further delayed relief
Governments appeared to lack any public communications strategy and media and public offi cials fed rumors
Public communications is a key aspect of emergency
management, and this function has its own emergency
support function in the NRP. In Louisiana, and particularly
New Orleans, the federal, state, and local governments did
not appear to have a public communications strategy to
deal with the media. This problem was particularly severe
in the area of law enforcement and crime.
The media played a positive role in Hurricane
Katrina in many aspects — such as providing situational
awareness to government authorities and the public. And
many media reports of violence were substantiated and
responsibly reported. For example, MSNBC provided live
coverage of looters, including police offi cers, ransacking a
local Wal-Mart in New Orleans.32
However, other media reports were based on rumors
that were either false or highly exaggerated, undermining
the value of the situational awareness being provided.
CNN reported repeatedly on September 1, for example,
that evacuations at the Superdome were suspended
because “someone fi red a shot at a helicopter.”33 State and
local offi cials later said much of the “rampant shooting”
reported was actually from trapped individuals who were
fi ring weapons into the air to attract rescuers.34
According to state offi cials, rumors and reports
of people shooting at helicopters were diffi cult to
substantiate at the time.35 But in the end, there were no
bullet holes found in any helicopters. Again, people fi ring
into the air may have been the origin of this rumor. Other
reports of people shooting at helicopters taking patients
to hospitals were never verifi ed, nor were stories of two
babies found with their throats slit in Convention Center
bathrooms or of the man who heard a rape victim scream,
ran outside for help, and was shot and killed by troops.36
State law enforcement offi cials expressed frustration
over media reports of crime.37 Many of these offi cials
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said the media greatly exaggerated reports of crime and
lawlessness. They said any reports from the Superdome
and Convention Center were generally diffi cult to
substantiate. Few crime victims ever came forward to
the police. Without an offi cial complaint, victim, or eye
witness, it was nearly impossible for the police to assess
the credibility of rumors or conduct an investigation. On
September 1, during a FEMA videoconference call, FEMA
Federal Coordinating Offi cer, William Lokey, stated that
“media reports and what we are getting from on-scene
were contradictory and we [did not] have a clear picture of
what exactly went on.”38
Managing the spread of false or highly exaggerated
rumors proved diffi cult – and consequential — for
offi cials on the ground. On September 1, Colonel Jeff
Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland
Security and Emergency Preparedness, told public offi cials
that “the rumor control on this thing is going to be key…
[s]ome of the things you hear, some of it has probably
partial basis in fact, but there’s a lot of exaggeration going
on there.”39 False media reports impeded the relief effort
and affected decisions on where to direct resources. When
asked whether exaggerated media reports impeded rescue
efforts, Colonel Terry J. Ebbert, Director of Homeland
Security, City of New Orleans, responded “absolutely.”40
Mayor Nagin testifi ed that “dealing with the realities of
all the multiplicity of challenges that we had, managing
rumors, was the thing that we spent way too much time
doing.”41
At the strategic level, public offi cials did not have a
strategy to get ahead of the “information curve” to use
the media to the public’s advantage and quell rumors. On
the contrary, Mayor Nagin and the New Orleans Chief of
Police repeated unsubstantiated rumors before the national
media, creating an exaggerated image of utter lawlessness.
■ New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin told Oprah Winfrey
that “hundreds of armed gang members” were raping
women and committing murder in the Superdome.
The occupants, he said, were “in an almost animalistic
state…in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching
dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping
people.”42 Many news outlets also covered Nagin’s
claim that the city’s death toll would top 10,000.43
■ Police Superintendent Eddie Compass went further,
and told Oprah, “We had little babies in there getting
raped.” Compass was also reported as saying offi cers
were shot at inside the convention center but couldn’t
return fi re “because of the families.” He said offi cers
caught 30 suspects by rushing at muzzle fl ashes.44
Many of these media reports, particularly of rampant
violence in the Superdome, appear to be completely
unsubstantiated. National Guard offi cials who were on
the scene believe these reports were highly exaggerated.45
Lieutenant General H Steven Blum, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, stated “the media is not supposed to be
inciting an insurrection. It is not supposed to be advertising
and hyping lawlessness.”46 National Guard offi cials said
there were numerous reports and rumors of rape or assault,
but guardsmen and police could not fi nd any witness,
victim, or anyone willing to report the crime fi rsthand.
Only two arrests were made by the police. Of the six
deaths in the Superdome, none were crime-related. Guard
offi cials said there were only 50 weapons found among
the 25,000 to 30,000 people searched as they entered the
Superdome. According to the Guard and police, the people
in the Superdome were very unhappy and anxious, but they
were never out of control. The exaggerated media reports
of violence (which some of the evacuees had picked up on
their transistor radios) served to further evacuees’ anxiety,
pushing some close to the boiling point.
Like the Superdome, there were media reports of
violence and lawlessness in the Convention Center. For
example, the Times-Picayune reported that Guard troops
found 30 to 40 decomposing bodies piled in a freezer
at the Convention Center.47 But again, these reports
were generally uncorroborated. There were only four
dead bodies recovered from the Convention Center.48
The National Guard offi cials that secured the site said
they encountered no lawlessness or any resistance when
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they moved in to clear out the Convention Center. As
an indication of the generally peaceful intentions of the
crowd, they reported there were only 13 weapons found
among the 19,000 people searched before they boarded
the buses.
NOPD Captain Jeff Winn said, however, he made
several approaches to the Convention Center during those
fi rst few days and saw muzzle fl ashes.49 He also suggested
crime went unreported because of the continuing danger
in the Convention Center, the lack of law enforcement
resources to investigate and detain suspects, and the
dispersal of witnesses when the evacuation of the facility
was complete.50 He also reported he saw a body with
puncture wounds.51
Exaggerated media reports of crime further delayed relief efforts
The hyped media coverage of violence and lawlessness,
legitimized by New Orleans authorities, served to delay
relief efforts by scaring away truck and bus drivers,
increasing the anxiety of those in shelters, and generally
increasing the resources needed for security. With regard
to the impact of the media reports on the hurricane
recovery, Lieutenant General Blum, Chief of the National
Guard Bureau, testifi ed:
They [the media reports] also prevented truck
drivers coming in with the most needed supplies,
water, food, ice, shelter, medicine. They were afraid
to come in. They had to be escorted in by National
Guard convoys, which took other manpower away
from the relief efforts to go help get the commercial
truckers that the civilian organizations had
contracted to come in and help the people. They
delayed the exact commodities from getting to the
people that they were complaining weren’t getting
the commodities.52
State offi cials reported the hysterical and uncontrolled
media images led to much confusion.53 As the broadcast
media reports became widely seen and heard, the
Superdome population became increasingly agitated.
Reports of truck drivers and FEMA employees turning
around due to security concerns did not help the situation.
First Assistant Attorney General Nicholas Gachassin said
those in lesser affected neighborhoods were afraid to
evacuate as looting fears prompted them to stay at their
residences.54 Similarly, the Governor’s Chief of Staff Andy
Kopplin reported that 1,000 FEMA employees set to arrive
in New Orleans on Wednesday, August 31, turned back
due to security concerns.55 In repeating unsubstantiated
rumors of mayhem, news reporters unwittingly helped slow
an already slow response and further wound an already
wounded population.
Finding: EMAC and military assistance were critical for restoring law and order
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the state to state assistance compact, facilitated the deployment of resources to the hardest hit regions
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)
is a mutual aid agreement and partnership between states
to provide resources to one another during times of
emergency.56 EMAC offers state to state assistance during
governor-declared states of emergency.57 Ratifi ed by
Congress in 1996, 49 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted legislation to become members of EMAC.58
EMAC is administered by the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA).59 NEMA provides the
day to day managerial support and technical infrastructure
for EMAC operations and training programs. EMAC works
as follows:60
1. Governor declares a state of emergency.
2. A representative from the state emergency
management agency notifi es the EMAC National
Coordinating Group.
3. Affected state requests an EMAC team to be
1,000 FEMA employees set to arrive in New Orleans on Wednesday, August 31, turned back due to security concerns.
250 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
deployed to its emergency operations center.
This EMAC team is called an “A-Team.”
4. A-Team arrives at state emergency operations
center and begins coordinating state-wide
EMAC resource requests. These resource requests
are broadcast to all members of the compact
soliciting assistance.
5. States willing to assist respond to the broadcast
and coordinate with the A-Team the specifi cs
of the transaction, including costs. The A-Team
helps the affected state choose from available
resources.
6. Formal requisitions are fi nalized specifying, as
precisely as possible, the resources that will be
made available and their costs.
7. Resources are sent to the affected states.
8. Responding state submits reimbursement
request.
9. Affected state reimburses responding state.
EMAC is executed by eight components:61
1. Requesting state – EMAC state, operating
under a governor declared emergency, requests
assistance.
2. Assisting state – EMAC state, responds to a
request for assistance.
3. Authorized representative – state offi cial
empowered to request assistance or commit
state resources in response to a request.
4. Designated Contact – EMAC subject matter
expert within each member state.
5. National Coordination Group (NCG) –
national EMAC group during non-emergencies.
The NCG stands ready to activate EMAC as
emergencies develop.
6. National Coordinating Team (NCT) – when the
Department of Homeland Security and FEMA
activate their National Response Coordination
Center (NRCC) to coordinate the federal
response and recovery operations during
emergencies, EMAC deploys a NCT to serve at
the NRCC in Washington, D.C. From the NRCC,
the NCT coordinates EMAC’s national response.
7. Regional Coordinating Team (RCT) – If FEMA
activates a Regional Response Coordination
Center (RRCC) a parallel EMAC RCT is
deployed. From the RRCC, the RCT coordinates
deployed EMAC components responding
throughout the affected region.
8. Other member states – during times of
emergencies EMAC members are charged with
monitoring the situation and to stand ready to
assist as appropriate.
In supporting the response to Hurricane Katrina,
a two-person EMAC A-Team was deployed to Baton
Rouge, Louisiana on Sunday, August 28.62 Jeff Smith was
identifi ed as the Louisiana state EMAC coordinator.63
In Mississippi, Bill Brown, Operations Branch Chief,
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, coordinated
EMAC.64 On August 29, the A-Team was increased to four
people, and shortly thereafter the team increased to eight
members in Louisiana and nine members in Mississippi.65
Through EMAC, a sizable contingent was deployed to
assist Louisiana and Mississippi in the aftermath of
Katrina.66
In Louisiana, 27,727 personnel were deployed through
EMAC by September 13, and during the same time
frame, in Mississippi, 18,247 people deployed.67 There
were 680 requests for assistance in Louisiana and 723
in Mississippi.68 The total estimated cost for Louisiana
is $201.8 million and for Mississippi, $314.1 million.69
EMAC’s total Katrina response involved processing 1,403
requests for assistance and 46,288 personnel deployments
for a total estimated cost of $515.9 million.70 The most
commonly requested resources included: fi refi ghters,
search and rescue personnel, HAZMAT personnel,
emergency medical technicians, state police, sheriffs, fi sh
and wildlife personnel, corrections personnel, livestock
inspectors, bridge inspectors, airport maintenance
personnel, ambulances, medical doctors, registered nurses,
and National Guard troops.71
EMAC offi cials have acknowledged a signifi cant
population of “self-deployed” personnel, a large majority
of which were local and state police offi cers who deployed
to the scene, in what is believed to be a spontaneous
response to media reports of lawlessness in southeastern
Louisiana.72 Due to the ad hoc nature of these “self-
deployed” offi cers, specifi c fi gures are not known. As
the ranks of EMAC deployed law enforcement offi cials
and offi cially deployed federal law enforcement offi cials
continued to grow in the region, the number of “self-
deployed” personnel is believed to have declined rapidly.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 251
Without an offi cial deployment, the “self-deployed”
personnel were acting without proper authority, without
liability protection, and without eligibility for expense
reimbursement.
National Guard played a key role in restoring and maintaining law and order
Law and order were eventually restored as local law
enforcement offi cers were supplemented, fi rst by state
military troops. The National Guard played a substantial
role in providing security and restoring law and order. The
Louisiana National Guard was deployed before landfall,
and provided security at the Superdome that helped
maintain order there. Once looting broke out in New
Orleans, they also patrolled the streets. The Mississippi
National Guard was vital to restoring order and providing
security in the aftermath
of the storm. According
to Carwile, for example,
a “massive National
Guard presence” helped
quell problems with
isolated looting in
the western affected
counties (Pearl River
and Hancock) within
2 days after the storm.73 The Alabama National Guard was
also deployed before landfall, providing a security task
force for Mobile and Baldwin Counties.
National Guards from other states also sent units
through the EMAC process to perform security or law
enforcement duties. In Mississippi, nearly 11,000 troops
from 19 other states’ National Guards joined more than
4,500 Mississippi National Guard troops in missions
related to law enforcement (as well as other missions)
by September 10, 12 days after landfall.74 For example,
Arkansas provided 310 guardsmen from a military police
company to provide security in Mississippi.75
Similarly, the Louisiana National Guard’s
security forces were supplemented by thousands of
guardsmen from other states. Through EMAC, Louisiana
was able to request and receive assistance from scores
of states from across the country. Examples of the larger
deployments included 2,426 infantry from Pennsylvania,
1,016 military police from Puerto Rico, 580 security
troops from Michigan, 500 support troops from Arkansas,
535 security troops from Massachusetts, and 350 security
troops from Tennessee.
Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale, in his
testimony before the Select Committee, provided details
on the extent of assistance provided by the National
Guard. He stated that “when violence erupted in New
Orleans, the National Guard Bureau coordinated the
deployment of 4,200 National Guard MPs, 1,400 each day
every day for 3 days in a row, a law enforcement presence
nearly three times of the size of the New Orleans Police
Department.”76
There was a general consensus among federal, state,
and local offi cials that EMAC worked very well for
National Guard troops. Regarding military alone, by
November 3, for Louisiana, there were a total of 451
EMAC requests and 29,502 Guardsmen who came from
other states. Many of these out-of-state Guardsmen
performed security and law enforcement functions and,
like the Louisiana National Guard, operated under the
Louisiana governor’s Title 32 authority.
DOD active duty forces played an important, but less active, role in maintaining law and order
While they were not immediately deployed, DOD active
duty forces also played a role in restoring and maintaining
law and order. For example, the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne
arrived in New Orleans on September 3 (fi ve days after
landfall) and, according to the city’s Director of Homeland
Security, had a “calming effect” by their mere presence on
the street. Precautions were taken to prevent DOD active
duty forces from direct law enforcement missions, thereby
avoiding Posse Comitatus issues. For more details on the
use of the military, see the MILITARY chapter.
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Law enforcement personnel from other states also played a key role in restoring and maintaining law and order.
Civilian law enforcement agencies from other states and
localities also provided personnel through the EMAC
process to supplement beleaguered state and local police.
In Mississippi, local, state, and FEMA offi cials noted that
assistance from Florida’s law enforcement and emergency
management agencies (as well as law enforcement from
other states), plus the delivery of commodities Florida
pre-positioned in the panhandle, were key to providing
security and restoring order in southern Mississippi after
landfall.77
Florida, in particular, was instrumental in the early
days and received high praise from Mississippi offi cials
for the manner in which that state’s teams provided
security, established an incident command structure in the
coastal counties, and conducted some of the fi rst search
and rescue missions the night after the storm.78 As noted
earlier, Florida helped alleviate some of Mississippi’s
security problems by sending into the state some of the
commodities it had pre-positioned in the panhandle
region in anticipation of the hurricane striking farther east
than it eventually did. Florida’s supplies of food, water,
and ice helped relieve the situation in Mississippi.79
While Florida and Alabama were among the fi rst states
to provide Mississippi with law enforcement assistance,
they were not alone. Mississippi received assistance from
Arkansas, South Carolina, and Georgia’s state police or
other state law enforcement agencies.80 For example,
South Carolina provided 118 law enforcement personnel
with equipment to Mississippi.81
Louisiana also benefi ted from a very large infl ux of
law enforcement personnel from other states. Like their
counterparts in Mississippi, local, state, and federal
offi cials involved in Louisiana’s response to Katrina said
EMAC was critical to restoring law and order.
The EMAC process was not always smooth. For
example, a sheriff from Michigan and a sheriff from
Alabama were at the Louisiana border but could not assist
because no EMAC request had been made.82 The Jefferson
Parish Sheriff had apparently not made a request through
the state EOC for the assistance — a requirement for
providing law enforcement assistance through EMAC.83
Also, as late as September 2, EMAC requests simply had
not been made. According to Josh Filler, the Director of
DHS’ Offi ce of State and Local Government Coordination,
on the September 2 video teleconference:
My offi ce has received numerous phone calls from
law enforcement organizations across the country
— major city police chiefs, national sheriffs
— who want to help, but we have encouraged
them not to self-deploy to New Orleans or to
Louisiana, but to work through the system, but they
are saying that their States are not receiving requests
for assistance.84
Finding: Federal law enforcement agencies were also critical to restoring law and order and coordinating activities
The fi rst priority for federal law enforcement agencies was to implement their continuity of operations plans and locate their affected personnel
Prior to August 30, federal law enforcement worked
to prepare their coastal offi ces for Katrina’s landfall.
Immediately after the hurricane, these law enforcement
agencies implemented their continuity of operations plans
and began the process of locating personnel living in the
affected areas.
On August 26, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
(FBI) Jackson Field Offi ce notifi ed its Resident Agencies
in Hattiesburg, Pascagoula, and Gulfport to implement
their hurricane plans.85 Hurricane shutters were installed,
vehicles were secured, computers were bagged, and safes
were locked. The traditional FBI operations of the Jackson
Field Offi ce were moved to its Oxford Resident Agency,
in northern Mississippi.86 FBI air assets and personnel
who remained on the coast were utilized to determine the
damage and security of the Mississippi offi ces.87
Within 12 hours after the hurricane subsided,
the Jackson Field Offi ce was in contact with all of its
personnel.88 The Jackson Field Offi ce established a
Command Post at Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi. On
August 29, the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of New
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 253
Orleans surveyed the damage to the New Orleans Field
Offi ce.89 Sixty percent of the top fl oor was uncovered. Due
to the sensitivity of documents housed in the Field Offi ce,
the SAC and the four agents remained at the building. The
SAC ordered the move of the New Orleans Division to the
Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge.90 All
FBI personnel living in Louisiana were accounted for by
September 4.91
On August 23, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF) began Hurricane Katrina
preparations.92 ATF headquarters coordinated with Field
Divisions in Houston, New Orleans (which includes
the state of Mississippi), Nashville (which includes the
state of Alabama), Tampa, and Miami.93 Headquarters
ordered the evacuation of ATF personnel in New Orleans
and Mississippi prior to the hurricane, and a list was
comprised of personnel who chose to stay on the coast.94
All ATF personnel leaving the affected area were instructed
to contact their supervisors after the storm. Due to the
damage to the ATF facilities, a continuity of operations site
was activated on August 30 in Mandeville, Louisiana.95
On the same day, ATF began contacting all ATF
personnel living in the affected area.96 The New Orleans
Division Offi ce was relocated to Shreveport, where it
resumed responsibility over Louisiana and Mississippi.97
The Biloxi Field Offi ce was relocated to a public safety
compound behind the Harrison County Sheriff’s
Department.98 The Mobile Field Offi ce was moved to
Brookley Air Force Base, an inactive base in the Mobile
area.99 ATF established a Critical Incident Management
Response Team in Baton Rouge to coordinate ATF
operations.100
On August 26, in anticipation of Katrina’s landfall,
the New Orleans Field Division Special Agent-in-Charge
ordered the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA)
Field Division closed and all DEA personnel were asked
to evacuate the area.101 The New Orleans Field Division
and the Gulfport Resident Offi ce were severely damaged
by the hurricane.102 DEA established teams responsible
for locating all Field Division personnel following
the storm.103 On August 31, command centers were
established at the Baton Rouge District Offi ce and in
Mobile. DEA headquarters chose the Offi ce of Aviation
in Addison, Texas to serve as a logistical command
center for the fi eld divisions throughout the country. On
September 1, the New Orleans Field Division established
an operations center at a high school in Mandeville,
Louisiana, to house fi rearms and sensitive items from the
New Orleans Field Offi ce.104
On August 29, the United States Marshals Service
(USMS) activated an Emergency Operations Center in
Washington, D.C. in preparation for Hurricane Katrina.105
USMS also placed four Operational Management
Teams (OMT) on standby. Following Katrina, the OMTs
began accounting for all USMS personnel in Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama.106 Operational Medical
Personnel were also deployed to the coast to assist USMS
personnel.107 OMT created a command post in Pineville,
Louisiana and Jackson, Mississippi. On August 30, USMS
deployed personnel and surveillance planes to survey the
hurricane damage to USMS facilities.
Prior to landfall, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) pre-deployed Federal Protective
Service (FPS) personnel located in Texas.108 FPS was able
to move into the affected area the day after the hurricane
to assist FEMA. ICE’s Gulfport offi ce sustained no major
damage and due to backup generators, was utilized as
a staging site and provided assistance to ICE employees
affected by the hurricane, as well as other state and local
law enforcement.109 From landfall until September 2,
ICE’s New Orleans fi eld offi ce worked to account for ICE
personnel assigned to the New Orleans, Lake Charles,
Lafayette, Baton Rouge, and Gulfport offi ces and obtain
needed supplies.
On August 26 and 27, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(CBP) ordered the ports of Mobile and New Orleans,
and the Hammond Louisiana Air and Marine Branch to
activate their hurricane preparedness plans.110 CBP moved
its air assets to Shreveport and Dallas. CBP’s Mission
Critical Team relocated from New Orleans to Shreveport
and on August 29 began to locate CBP personnel
living in the affected area.111 CBP created a Forward
Deployed Operations Command Center at the air hanger
in Hammond to coordinate all CBP missions.112
By September 4, all CBP employees were located.113
While the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) did not
need to implement a continuity of operations plan for
a specifi c offi ce, they are responsible for meeting their
nationwide primary mission, while coordinating in
preparation for severe weather and fl ight disruptions.114
In anticipation of these disruptions due to Katrina,
FAMS began monitoring the hurricane’s track the week of
August 21.115
254 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
From August 26 to August 29, Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) personnel from the Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness, in Washington, D.C. and BOP’s South
Central Regional Offi ce in Dallas monitored Hurricane
Katrina’s path.116 The Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness
is responsible for coordinating the evacuation and for
supporting corrections institutions in the areas affected
by the hurricane. On August 30, BOP opened a command
center to help the Louisiana Department of Public Safety
and Corrections with transporting inmates out of the New
Orleans area.117
While working to reconstitute themselves, federal law enforcement agencies supplemented state and local law enforcement with forces and supplies
While surveying offi ce damage and locating personnel,
federal law enforcement worked to assist state and local
law enforcement with additional forces and supplies.
While it is impossible to account for every federal law
enforcement agent or offi cer who responded to requests
for assistance by state and local law enforcement, or even
by hurricane victims, there were specifi c assets brought
to bear by federal law enforcement that should be
highlighted to illustrate the degree of coordination with
entities outside the federal government.
On August 30, FBI headquarter offi cials put their
Field Offi ces on alert that additional personnel were
needed in the affected area.118 Ten Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) agents from the Houston Division were
deployed to New Orleans to assist the New Orleans
Police Department (NOPD) SWAT.119 These agents
brought a boat that enabled them to transport personnel
and supplies. On September 1, the Critical Incident
Response Group deployed agents from the Dallas, Atlanta,
Baltimore, and Houston SWAT teams and Hostage Rescue
Teams (HRT) to continue to help NOPD control its
affected area.120 The Violent Gang Task Force from the
New Orleans Division worked out of the Gretna Police
Department.121 Over 30 more agents coordinated with
NOPD to back up NOPD SWAT, FBI SWAT, and HRT
Special Agents.122
The FBI Command Post at Keesler Air Force Base in
Biloxi, Mississippi communicated with the Mississippi
Bureau of Criminal Investigations, the Mississippi
Highway Patrol, the Homeland Security Director for
the State of Mississippi, and local police and sheriffs
to respond to requests for assistance.123 The FBI was
able to create a Virtual Command Center for the Law
Enforcement On-Line Internet site.124 All law enforcement
nationwide were able to log onto the website and receive
daily situation reports regarding FBI relief efforts.125
The fi rst group of ATF personnel detailed to the
affected area arrived on September 2.126 Thirty-four
members of Special Response Teams (SRT), tactical teams
specifi cally trained to handle high risk law enforcement
and civil unrest, from the Dallas and Detroit Field Offi ces
and seven SRT support staff were deployed to Algiers,
Louisiana.127 The SRT members were sent to New Orleans
to assist the NOPD, whose SWAT teams were down to 25
percent capacity.128 On September 6 and 7, 10 ATF agents
were deployed to Biloxi, and 30 ATF agents were deployed
to Gulfport.129 These agents performed investigative
roles, as well as assisting local police with fi rearms-related
calls.130
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From August 30 to September 12, 251 DEA Temporary
Duty agents reported from Miami, Atlanta, St. Louis,
Houston and Dallas to provide law enforcement
and search and rescue support in New Orleans.131
On September 4, DEA deployed personnel from the
Atlanta Field Division, as well as the Houston Mobile
Enforcement Team (MET), self-contained, specially
trained teams of eight to twelve agents that specialize
in law enforcement missions involving violence.132
These agents were then joined by the Charlotte MET on
September 5, and the Miami MET on September 7. The
METs helped state and local departments in conducting
routine law enforcement tasks, including patrols as well as
search and rescue missions.
On September 1, fi ve USMS Marshals from the Training
Academy in Glynco, Georgia were deployed to provide
security at the Biloxi Airport.133 USMS deployed an
additional four Marshals to the airport on September 3.
USMS supported NOPD by working with the 1st and 5th
districts in New Orleans and responded to backlogged 911
calls. In addition, USMS redirected NOPD National Crime
Information Center traffi c to the USMS Communications
Center. USMS deployed more personnel to Mississippi
on September 5 to help local police and sheriff
departments.134 They provided security for 11 search and
rescue teams, operated a missing persons task force and
a task force to locate sex offenders, and protected the
Mississippi gulf coast’s fuel depot in Collins.
On September 2, ICE began its support of local law
enforcement in New Orleans’ 4th District.135 The 4th
District was still populated at that time, as it had not
taken on water. The New Orleans Special Response Team
(SRT), ICE’s tactical team, was in the city on September 1.
SRT teams from Chicago and San Antonio, consisting of
12 to 18 members, arrived the afternoon and evening of
September 2. By midnight of September 2, there were over
100 ICE agents in New Orleans preparing to assist in the
response to the hurricane.
Throughout the week, ICE agents were tasked with
patrols and shifts with local law enforcement, worked to
curtail looting, assisted with evacuations, and followed
up on the approximately 6,000 911 calls made during and
after the hurricane.136 ICE’s Tampa Field Offi ce provided
three infl atable Zodiac boats that helped ICE personnel
assist with transportation for fi re departments and
medical personnel and respond to rescue calls. ICE agents
and logistical teams assisted the Mississippi Highway
Patrol, county sheriffs, and city police forces in Mississippi
with patrols, rescues, and searches.137
On the morning of August 30, the Border Patrol’s
Tactical Unit pre-deployment site survey team left for
the affected area.138 This deployment was pursuant to a
request for CBP to assist in evacuating the Superdome and
for riot control. However, the agents also worked other
law enforcement functions and relief operations, such as
distributing water, assisting with minor medical care, and
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helping evacuees onto buses and helicopters. CBP had 100
agents, along with CBP vehicles, emergency equipment,
and lifesaving supplies in Louisiana by September 1.139
On September 2, Border Patrol agents were sent to
provide security at the Louisiana State University Hospital,
which served as the regional triage center. Border Patrol
agents were also deployed to the New Orleans Airport to
assist with crowd control and security.
A day after Katrina made landfall, FAMS responded to
reports of deteriorating conditions at Louis Armstrong
New Orleans International Airport.140 The airport was
starting to receive evacuees and was therefore becoming
a shelter. As a response, FAMS sent personnel – drawing
from its Houston Field Offi ce – to the airport to assist
as necessary.141 Conditions at the airport continued to
deteriorate as thousands of displaced persons sought
refuge there.142 There was no food, water, restroom
facilities, or security. Consequently, when FAMS personnel
began to arrive, they needed to help restore order.143 On
September 1, FAMS began initial deployment, including
54 from the Houston Field Offi ce, arriving in-person by
car. Also by late evening, evacuation fl ights out of the
airport were fully operational. By September 2, FAMS
personnel at the airport expanded their mission to include
interim law enforcement activities as well as all necessary
activities to operate the airport.144
On September 3, the Secret Service was asked by
NOPD and the Louisiana State Police to take control
of the credentialing process for state and local law
enforcement in the New Orleans area.145 The need for
secure credentials for NOPD was a primary concern, as
many police offi cers had lost their offi cial identifi cation
badges during the hurricane.146
On September 5, the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections requested that BOP provide 1,000
beds and transportation for Louisiana state inmates.147
BOP, along with USMS transferred 964 inmates to
the United States Penitentiary Coleman-II, Florida.148
From August 30 to September 7, BOP transported
approximately 2,500 inmates or detainees in Louisiana
to facilities outside of New Orleans.149 In addition,
BOP provided clothing, food, and water from Texas
correctional institutions to the Louisiana State Police
headquarters in Baton Rouge.150
Obtaining peace offi cer status presented prob- lems for some federal law enforcement entities responding to the hurricane
The process for federal law enforcement being deputized
or sworn in as a peace offi cer under state law in Louisiana
and Mississippi proved cumbersome for some entities. The
general concern was that in the process of assisting state or
local law enforcement, or victims of the hurricane, federal
law enforcement offi cers might fi nd it necessary to make
arrests outside of their federal jurisdiction. Due to the lack
of an across-the-board policy on how to deal with federal
law enforcement during a state of emergency, some federal
law enforcement entities were required to seek advice from
their individual Offi ce of the General Counsel on how
to proceed. The process was more diffi cult in Louisiana,
where it became necessary to fl y in representatives from
the Louisiana Offi ce of the Attorney General to the affected
area to swear in the law enforcement offi cers or agents in
person. Still other federal law enforcement agents were
deputized by the Louisiana State Police.
Under Louisiana law, FBI agents have qualifi ed
immunity that protects them when responding to felonies
committed in their presence or when assisting state
offi cers.151 However, FBI agents did not specifi cally have
peace offi cer status when responding to Hurricane Katrina
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in Louisiana.152 Governor Blanco granted the Louisiana
Offi ce of Attorney General authority to deputize FBI agents,
and all FBI agents deployed to Louisiana were deputized by
a representative of the offi ce.
FBI agents deployed to Mississippi did not receive
peace offi cer status until September 9, when Governor
Barbour wrote a letter to all state and federal law
enforcement offi cers.153 The letter granted federal law
enforcement offi cers working in cooperation with local
law enforcement “the authority to bear arms, make arrests
and to make searches and seizures, in addition to any
other power, duty, right and privilege as afforded forces of
the State of Mississippi.”154
Prior to ATF agents being deployed to the affected area,
DOJ examined the capabilities of ATF agents in assisting
state and locals with law enforcement functions.155 ATF
agents are not afforded automatic peace offi cer status in
the states of Louisiana and Mississippi. As ATF agents
conducted their core statutorily required mission, DOJ
determined ATF agents did not need to receive peace
offi cer status.
Pursuant to federal statute, USMS “may exercise
the same powers which a sheriff of the State my
exercise . . . .”156 USMS received further state law
enforcement powers when the Director of USMS received
an order from U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales
requesting the Director to “take all necessary and
appropriate steps within available resources to provide
the assistance” to Mississippi.157
The Louisiana Attorney General’s Offi ce coordinated the
peace offi cer status for ICE agents deployed to Louisiana.158
ICE agents were required to fi ll out paperwork and were
sworn in by the Louisiana State Police every time a new
rotation of ICE agents arrived in Kenner, Louisiana. ICE
agents were sworn in as peace offi cers in Mississippi by the
Hancock Sheriff’s Department.
Border patrol agents were deputized by the state of
Louisiana with law enforcement status on September 2.159
Agents were not sworn in as peace offi cers in Mississippi.160
On September 3, CBP’s Offi ce of Chief Counsel determined
that CBP offi cers and Border Patrol agents could make
arrests for state crimes in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama,
Florida, and Texas, if the offi cer or agent was acting in his or
her offi cial capacity.161
On September 3, Louisiana began to deputize FAMS
personnel as Louisiana State Police Offi cers, giving them
full authority to enforce local and state laws.162
Emergency Support Function #13 (ESF-13) of the National Response Plan
DOJ, along with the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), is responsible for the Emergency Support Function
#13 (ESF-13) of the National Response Plan.163 ESF-13
covers Public Safety and Security and tasks DOJ and DHS
with integrating federal non-investigative/non-criminal
law enforcement public safety and security capabilities
and resources to “support the full range of incident
management activities with potential or actual Incidents
of National Signifi cance.” The Offi ce of the Deputy
Attorney General and the Offi ce of Legal Counsel assist in
coordinating DOJ’s ESF-13 responsibilities. The Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is responsible
for DOJ’s day-to-day actions with respect to ESF-13.
After the hurricane, ESF-13 requests were processed
through the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC)
in Baton Rouge, because the LECC had working knowledge
of the available regional resources.164 The LECC determined
whether the request could be met under ESF-13. The LECC
(1) confi rmed the requestor could not perform the mission,
(2) determined whether the request was valid for ESF-13,
(3) determined whether there were available federal law
enforcement resources; and (4) approved or declined the
request. The LECC then forwarded the approved request to
Washington, D.C. Each requested agency coordinated with
FEMA to establish funding.
Federal law enforcement coordination required communication between the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the governors of the affected states
The Attorney General of the United States may “appoint
offi cials . . . to detect and prosecute crimes against the
United States.”165 The Attorney General may also approve
the request of a state governor for federal law enforcement
assistance if the Attorney General concludes that such
“assistance is necessary to provide an adequate response
to a law enforcement emergency.”166
DOJ also has the authority under the Stafford Act to
provide for non-operational assistance. In the case of a
major disaster or an emergency, the President may direct the
Department to “utilize its authorities and resources granted
to it under Federal law (including personnel, equipment,
258 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical and advisory
services) in support of State and local efforts.”167
On Friday, September 2, Gonzales sent a memorandum
to the heads of DOJ’s law enforcement agencies, asking
each agency to continue coordinating with state and local
law enforcement.168 The Attorney General specifi cally
requested that: (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation
continue to deploy agents and tactical assets, (2) the Drug
Enforcement Administration prepare to deploy its Mobile
Enforcement Teams, (3) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives establish a Violent Crime Impact
Team in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and (4) the United States
Marshals Service conduct prisoner transport operations
and provide court security.
On September 3, Gonzales received a letter from
Mississippi Governor Barbour requesting the “deployment
of Deputy U.S. Marshals to the State of Mississippi in
support of law enforcement requirements created by the
effects of Hurricane Katrina.”169 The same day, Gonzales
responded in writing to Barbour that his request was
approved, and an order authorizing the Director of the
U.S. Marshals Service to “take all necessary and appropriate
steps within available resources to provide the assistance so
requested by [Governor Barbour]” was issued.170
The same day, Gonzales received a letter from Blanco
requesting the deployment of the USMS and/or other
Department of Justice personnel to the area affected by
Hurricane Katrina.171 On September 4, Gonzales responded
in writing to Blanco that her request was approved, and an
order authorizing the Deputy Attorney General to “take all
necessary and appropriate steps within available resources
to provide the assistance so requested by [Governor
Blanco]” was issued.172
On September 6, Gonzales and DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff received a letter from Blanco requesting “the
deployment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
offi cers, Customs and Border Protection personnel and/or
other Department of Homeland Security personnel . . .
in support of the law enforcement challenges created by
the effects of Hurricane Katrina.”173 Gonzales responded
in writing to Governor Blanco on September 7, saying
that after consulting with DHS, he approved Blanco’s
request and deployed the appropriate law enforcement
personnel.174 Chertoff also responded to Blanco on
September 7, stating that DHS law enforcement would
“continue to provide assistance” with state and local
authorities in Louisiana.175
The Law Enforcement Coordination Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana coordinated the efforts of all federal law enforcement in the greater New Orleans area and assisted the New Orleans Police Department in reorganization
During the fi rst week following the hurricane, local, state,
and federal law enforcement working in New Orleans
began daily 9:00 a.m. meetings at the Harrah’s Casino
in downtown New Orleans.176 These meetings enabled
the law enforcement entities to meet face to face and
coordinate critical missions. The New Orleans Police
Department (NOPD) District Captain for each city
district attended the meetings, along with the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosive (ATF), the
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI), and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).
Michael J. Vanacore, Director of International Affairs
ICE, and Michael Wolf, Special Agent-In-Charge for the
FBI’s Critical Incident Response Group, were detailed by
their respective agencies to Baton Rouge to coordinate the
federal law enforcement response to Hurricane Katrina in
Louisiana.177 The two men were designated as Co-Senior
During the fi rst week following the hurricane, local, state, and federal law enforcement working in New Orleans began daily 9:00 a.m. meetings at the Harrah’s Casino in downtown New Orleans.
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Federal Law Enforcement Offi cers (SFLEO) and stood up
the Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) at LSP
headquarters in Baton Rouge.178
Vanacore arrived at the Louisiana State Police (LSP)
headquarters in Baton Rouge on Sunday, September 4.179
At the time, Vanacore understood his role was to work
with the ICE New Orleans Agent-in-Charge, Michael Holt,
and report to ICE headquarters in Washington, D.C. on
ICE’s mission in the area affected by the hurricane. Late
that evening, Vanacore was informed of the decision to
designate him SFLEO. He was instructed he would share
SFLEO responsibilities with Wolf. Wolf arrived in Baton
Rouge on Monday, September 5. The same day, Vanacore
reviewed an unsigned letter designating him and Wolf as
SFLEO.
Vanacore and Wolf had their fi rst meeting late on
September 5.180 On September 6, it was clear to Vanacore
and Wolf they needed an operations center to coordinate
federal law enforcement efforts in New Orleans.181 The
center was then designated the LECC. The LECC did
not have command and control over the federal law
enforcement missions. Rather it served as the point of
contact for all federal law enforcement in the greater
New Orleans area. The missions of the LECC were to
coordinate efforts to reestablish the NOPD and efforts
of all law enforcement agencies’ deployed resources to
the New Orleans area. According to Vanacore, the main
mission of the LECC was to ensure offi cer safety.182
On September 6, offi cials from the LECC, including
Vanacore, met with the Mayor of New Orleans, the City
of New Orleans Homeland Security Director and counsel
for the Mayor.183 Offi cials also met with the NOPD
precinct captains.184 Vanacore reported the Mayor’s offi ce
and NOPD were “very helpful” and worked well with
the LECC.185 The LECC had little communication with
the Louisiana Governor’s Offi ce, but Vanacore and Wolf
both said interaction with the Governor’s offi ce was not
necessary to achieve LECC’s goals.186
Wolf brought additional FBI agents with him to Baton
Rouge, as well as a Blue Whale Command, the FBI’s
mobile command station, specially equipped with offi ce
and communication equipment.187 Vanacore stated the
mobile command center was invaluable to standing up
the LECC.188 By September 7, the LECC was gathering
and centralizing information, to ensure there were not
duplicate law enforcement missions.189
The LECC divided the federal law enforcement entities
by New Orleans police districts.190 Each federal law
enforcement agency was responsible for coordinating with
the precinct captain of the district.191
The LECC also began daily 8:00 a.m. meetings with
representatives from state and federal law enforcement.192
ICE, FBI, DEA, ATF, USMS, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, including the Border Patrol, the National
Guard, the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce from New Orleans and
Baton Rouge, the Offi ce of the Louisiana Attorney General,
LSP, NOPD, and the New Orleans Fire Department were
all represented at the meetings. The City of New Orleans
Homeland Security Director also attended the daily
meetings. In addition, the U.S. Secret Service, the Sheriff’s
Association, and the Federal Air Marshals participated
on a limited basis. CBP and FBI provided helicopters to
transport attendees to and from New Orleans and the
LECC for the meetings.193
The daily meetings commenced with Wolf reporting
the number of arrests and incidents from the prior day.194
There was then a roll call of all attendees to report their
force numbers. Vanacore summarized the daily events
on his blackberry and communicated to Jon Clark at ICE
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Wolf communicated
with FBI Headquarters.195
As the LECC worked from Baton Rouge, it became
apparent to Vanacore and Wolf that in order to achieve its
goals, the LECC needed to be located in New Orleans.196
On September 9, the LECC and NOPD moved into the
Royal Sonesta Hotel on Bourbon Street.197 The LECC and
NOPD each had a conference room and an additional
room was used to receive incoming 911 telephone calls.198
The LECC worked with NOPD to assist in “standing
up” the police department. There were eight NOPD district
offi ces in New Orleans.199 Four were rendered useless
due to insuffi cient power, and four were fl ooded. LECC
acquired air conditioning compressors and generators for
the district offi ces that needed power. Temporary offi ce
spaces were procured to replace the fl ooded offi ces. The
evidence and property rooms for the NOPD were under
water and contained mold. The LECC assisted NOPD with
procuring contractors to recover and process the evidence
and property, and clean NOPD headquarters.
As a result of stolen uniforms, destroyed homes,
and displaced New Orleans police offi cers, NOPD was
patrolling the city without proper uniforms.200 The LECC
was able to procure temporary battle dress uniforms off
260 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
the Federal Supply Schedule maintained by the General
Services Administrations (GSA) for acquisitions by federal
agencies. By using GSA for the uniforms, the NOPD did
not have to utilize its local procurement process, which
would have required three separate bids before purchasing
new uniforms.
In addition, the LECC located photographers to create
credentials for LECC and NOPD guards and offi cials at
the Royal Sonesta.201 LECC provided lights and generators
to assist 15 police checks points. Supplies were provided
for crime scene processing, including gloves and masks to
protect police from mold.
Both Vanacore and Wolf reported the LECC had a
positive working relationship with NOPD and that the
department was receptive to LECC’s assistance.202
Conclusion
First the levees were breached––and then law and order.
As Katrina left people scrambling for food, for water, for
supplies – for survival — lawlessness and violence, both
real and imagined, spread, creating yet another problem
for authorities who were burdened enough already.
How did this happen? For starters, the lack of basic
necessities for residents who did not evacuate, or went
back to their homes too quickly, contributed. As we saw in
Pearl River County, once there were suffi cient amounts of
food, ice, and water, order was restored. Another problem
was the uncertainty about evacuations. Confusion
reigned, especially in places like the Superdome and the
Convention Center, where conditions were terrible, nerves
frayed, people desperate.
Compounding these diffi culties was the collapse or
absence of law enforcement. The police, in some cases,
were unable to function or were diverting their attention
to search and rescue operations. The New Orleans Police
Department had known of the threat that could arise from
fl ooding, yet failed to properly protect its resources or
come close to continuity of operations. There was also a
dereliction of duty by some New Orleans offi cers when, of
course, their presence was needed most.
The federal, state, and local governments also lost
another battle, this one with the media. Rumors spread, as
fast as the fear. Some turned out to be true, but many did
not, resulting in exaggerated reports that scared away truck
and bus drivers who could have furnished people with
much-needed supplies. Authorities needed to be on top of
this situation, not a victim of it.
Fortunately, the National Guard in all three affected
states were able to help out overburdened local
authorities. About 20 other states added support, an
effort that prevented a dire situation from being much
worse. DOD active duty forces also came through, their
mere presence serving to reduce tensions. Federal law
enforcement agencies played an important role, as well,
with additional forces and supplies.
For an exhaustive account of all federal law
enforcement actions in response to Hurricane Katrina
from August 23 to September 12, 2005, please see
Appendix 5. ■
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1 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bobby Strahan, Dir. Pearl River County Emergency Mgmt. Agency, State of Miss., in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Bobby Strahan].
2 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 11 (statement of Dr. Brian Amy, State Health Offi cer, Miss. Dep’t of Health) [hereinafter Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
3 Id. 4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Maj. Ralph D. Mitchell, Jr., Region 1 Commander, La. State Police and LtC. Joseph Booth, Deputy
Superintendent, La. State Police, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Mitchell and Booth]. 5 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 103
(statement of Governor Kathleen Blanco, State of LA) [hereinafter Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 6 EM2000 Messages, Nos. MEMA-0011924, MEMA-0012244, MEMA-001228, MEMA-0012312, MEMA-0013022 (on fi le with Select Comm.). 7 Id. 8 Interview with Mitchell and Booth. 9 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Sheriff, Plaquemines Parish, LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview
with Jiff Hingle]. 10 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, Deputy Attorney Gen. and Gen. Counsel, State of AL Emergency Mgmt. Agency, in
Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005). 11 EM2000 Messages, No. MEMA-0011924 (on fi le with Select Comm.). 12 Tiger Team Katrina Report, LA Nat’l Guard at 27 (Nov. 2, 2005) (on fi le with Select. Comm.). 13 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LtC. Jacques Thibodeaux and Col. Mark Mouton, LA Nat’l Guard, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton]. 14 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 5 (Statement of William L. Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer). 15 Id. at 125-26 (Statement of Mayor Tommy Longo, Waveland, Miss.). 16 Id. at 125-27 (Statement of Mayor Tommy Longo, Waveland, Miss.). 17 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Hancock County Emergency Operations Ctr. personnel, in Hancock County, Miss. (Oct. 11-14, 2005). 18 Interview with Bobby Strahan. 19 Interview with Jiff Hingle. 20 Id. 21 Dan Baum, Deluged, When Katrina Hit, Where Were the Police?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 9, 2006 at 54 [hereinafter Deluged Article]. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. at 52. 25 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lonnie Swain, Deputy Chief, New Orleans Police Dep’t, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with Lonnie Swain]. 26 Interview with Mitchell and Booth. 27 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 226 (statement of C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA). 28 Interview with Mitchell and Booth. 29 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Thomas Enright, Assistant Attorney Gen., Public Prot. Div., LA Dep’t of Justice, in New Orleans, LA
(Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Thomas Enright]. 30 Deluged Article at 54. 31 Interview with Lonnie Swain. 32 Stealing for Salvation, (MSNBC Television News Broadcast, Aug. 31, 2005). 33 Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2005 [hereinafter Pandemonium Article]. 34 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Dir., Homeland Sec., City of New Orleans, in
New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Terry Ebbert]. 35 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton; Interview with Terry Ebbert; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Nicholas Gachassin, First
Assistant Attorney Gen., LA Dep’t of Justice, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Nicholas Gachassin]. 36 David Carr, More Horrible Than Truth: News Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005 [hereinafter Carr Article]. 37 Interview with Nicholas Gachassin; Interview with Thomas Enright. 38 Daily Video Teleconferences among offi cials dated Aug. 25 – Sep. 4, 2005 at 15 [hereinafter Daily VTC]. State and local offi cials from each of
the impacted areas met daily with offi cials from, among other agencies, FEMA, and Nat’l Hurricane Center. 39 Id. at 6. 40 Dec. 14, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 214 (Statement of Terry Ebbert). 41 Id. at 226 (Statement of Mayor Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA). 42 Carr Article; Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, Katrina Takes Toll on Truth, News Accuracy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005; Beth Gillin, Katrina
Spawned Rumors; Media Ran with Them, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 28, 2005. 43 Id. 44 Id. 45 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton. 46 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) at 196 (statement of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief of the Nat’l Guard Bureau) [hereinafter Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing].
47 Pandemonium Article. 48 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton.
262 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
49 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Capt. Jeff Winn, New Orleans Police Dep’t., New Orleans, LA, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 26, 2006).
50 Id. 51 Id. 52 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 196-97 (statement of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief of the Nat’l Guard Bureau). 53 Interview with Thibodeaux and Mouton; Interview with Nicholas Gachassin; Interview with Terry Ebbert. 54 Interview with Nicholas Gachassin. 55 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff, Offi ce of the Governor of LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 6, 2005). 56 EMAC Operations Manual (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter EMAC Ops Manual]; Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with EMAC personnel,
in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with EMAC]; EMAC website: What Is EMAC. www.emacweb.org/?9 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006).
57 EMAC Ops Manual; Telephone Interview with EMAC; EMAC website: What Is EMAC. www.emacweb.org/?9 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 58 Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996). Hawaii has not ratifi ed EMAC. (E-mail
correspondence from EMAC personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 13, 2005) (5:14 p.m.)). 59 EMAC Ops Manual. 60 EMAC website: How Does EMAC Work. www.emacweb.org/?142 (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 61 Id. 62 Telephonic Interview with EMAC. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Id. 67 E-mail correspondence from EMAC personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 19, 2005) (5:25 p.m.). 68 Presentation Materials prepared by EMAC personnel, EMAC Responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Oct. 4, 2005). 69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Master Log of EMAC Requisitions (unaudited draft). 72 Telephone Interview with EMAC. 73 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 5 (Statement of William L. Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer); Interview by Select
Comm. Staff with William Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 6, 2005). 74 Hurricane Situation Report 54, Miss. Emergency Management Agency (Sept. 10, 2005 at 1500 hours); updated Miss. Guard numbers from
Miss. Nat’l Guard Daily Recap (Oct. 11, 2005). 75 EMAC Assistance to Miss., Nat’l Emergency Mgmt. Ass’n (Nov. 3, 2005). 76 Oct. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 133 (statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Homeland Def.). 77 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 111 (statement of William L. Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer). 78 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Col. Marvin E. Curtis, Jr., Assistant Comm’r, Dep’t of Public Safety, State of Miss., in Jackson, Miss. (Oct.
2005). 79 Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 111 (statement of William L. Carwile, former FEMA Fed. Coordinating Offi cer) (“[I]n addition to the
relief we got from the things that Mississippi brought to bear, the state of Florida which prepositionalized things up at the Panhandle, they bought us time too, because it would have been much worse had it not been for the things we got from Florida.”).
80 Hurricane Situation Reports, Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (Sept. 2, 2005 at 1200 hours; Sept. 6, 2005 at 0200 hours); Dec. 7, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 2 (Statement of Governor Haley Barbour, State of Miss.).
81 EMAC Assistance to Miss., Nat’l Emergency Mgmt. Ass’n (Nov. 3, 2005). 82 E-mail correspondence from Patrick Rhode to Casey Long and Brooks Altshuler (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:46 p.m.). 83 Id. 84 Daily VTC at 9 (Sept. 2, 2005). 85 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Federal Bureau of Investigation [hereinafter FBI] personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15,
2005) [hereinafter Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI]; The Jackson Field Div. covers the entire state of Miss. and has 10 Resident Agencies located in: Southaven, Oxford, Tupelo, Columbus, Greenville, Meridian, Hattiesburg, Macomb, Gulfport, and Pascagoula (E-mail correspondence from FBI personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 5, 2005) (6:10 p.m.)) [hereinafter Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI].
86 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI. 87 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 28 Interview with FBI]; Dec. 15
Telephone Interview with FBI. 88 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI. 89 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 90 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 91 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel (Jan. 27, 2006). 92 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives [hereinafter ATF] Summary of Signifi cant Activity (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter ATF
Summary of Signifi cant Activity]. 93 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with ATF]. 94 Interview with ATF. 95 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 96 Id.
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97 Interview with ATF; E-mail correspondence from ATF personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 7, 2005) (11:47 a.m.) [hereinafter E-mail from ATF]. The offi ce in Shreveport oversaw the administrative functions of the Shreveport, Little Rock, Jackson, and Oxford, Miss. Field Offi ces. (E-mail from ATF).
98 Interview with ATF. 99 E-mail from ATF. 100 Interview with ATF; Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 1, 2005). 101 Response from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Nov. 23, 2005)
[hereinafter Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response]. 102 Hurricane Katrina Drug Enforcement Agency [hereinafter DEA] COOP Assessment (DAG000000223) (Jan. 26, 2006). 103 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 104 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with DEA, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005). 105 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 106 Response from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with U.S. Marshal Service [hereinafter USMS] personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with USMS]. An Operational Mgmt. Team (OMT) oversees USMS’ national response. There are OMTs located throughout the United States. A Chief Deputy, the highest ranking career Marshal in the district is in charge of the OMT. Each OMT has a core group of eight personnel. (Interview with USMS).
107 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 108 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [hereinafter ICE] in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter Nov. 16 Interview with Interview with ICE]. 109 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ICE personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 2 Interview with ICE]. 110 U.S. Customs and Border Prot. [hereinafter CBP] Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30 (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30]; CBP
Hurricane Katrina Support and Operations PowerPoint (Sept. 20, 2005). 111 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 112 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with CBP personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with CBP]; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-
Sept. 13 (Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13]. 113 E-mail correspondence to Select Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Jan. 26, 2006) (1:35 p.m.). 114 Fed. Air Marshal Serv. [hereinafter FAMS] Timeline prepared for Select Comm. Staff (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter FAMS Timeline]. 115 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FAMS personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with FAMS]; FAMS Timeline. 116 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Fed. Bureau of Prisons [hereinafter BOP] personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with BOP]; Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 117 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 118 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 119 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 120 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 27 Telephone Interview with FBI]; Nov. 23
Dep’t of Justice Response. 121 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. There are four Rapid Deployment teams located in: New York City, Wash., D.C., Los Angeles, and Miami.
The teams are comprised of 160 people with different specialties. They are equipped to respond and be self suffi cient for seven days on their own. (Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI]).
122 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 123 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI. 124 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. The Law Enforcement On-Line Internet site is not available to the general public. Law enforcement entities
from around the country must have a password to access the FBI’s information. (Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI). 125 Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI. 126 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 127 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview with ATF. 128 Interview with ATF. 129 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 130 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview with ATF. 131 Response from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 21, 2005). The
day by day breakdown is as follows: Aug. 30 (24), Aug. 31 (17), Sept. 1 (32), Sept. 2 (16), Sept. 3 (33), Sept. 4 (38), Sept. 5 (11), Sept. 6 (13), Sept. 7 (39), Sept. 8 (10), Sept. 9 (6), Sept. 10 (5), Sept. 11 (4), Sept. 12 (4). (Id.).
132 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 133 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 134 Id. Police Dep’ts included: Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Biloxi Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, and Harrison
County Sheriff’s Dep’t. 135 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 136 Id. 137 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; E-mail correspondence from Ronald R. Grimes, DHS to Gerald Garren, et al, (Sept. 6, 2005) (5:27 p.m.). Miss.
entities assisted by ICE: Miss. Highway Patrol, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Harrison County Sheriffs Offi ce, Waveland Police Dep’t, Bay St. Louis Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Hancock County Sheriffs Offi ce, and Jackson County Sheriffs Offi ce. (Id.; Dec. 2 Interview with ICE).
138 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 139 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13.
264 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
140 Interview with FAMS. 141 FAMS Timeline. 142 Interview with FAMS. 143 FAMS Timeline. 144 Interview with FAMS. This included, meeting arriving buses, helicopters, trucks, and ambulances; canvassing evacuees for information on
those left behind in New Orleans; handwriting manifests for the New Orleans International Airport departing fl ights; pre-screening and loading passengers; crowd control; baggage handling; air traffi c control; operating heavy equipment to facilitate blocking and dispatching aircraft; hand-carrying hundreds of sick, injured and elderly passengers on to departing aircraft; working with FEMA triage personnel to carry patients on stretchers for medical evaluation; delivering patients to the “Expected to Die” and morgue holding areas; and assisting in other medical emergencies. (Id.).
145 Additional Info. Relating To Secret Service [hereinafter USSS] Contributions Toward Response and Recovery Efforts Associated With Hurricane Katrina (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS]; Additional Info. Relating To USSS Contributions Toward Response and Recovery Efforts Associated With Hurricane Katrina (Dec. 7, 2005).
146 Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS. 147 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 148 Interview with BOP; Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 149 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. A total of 54 BOP personnel were responsible for the transportation. These personnel were detailed from
the Federal Correction Complex (FCC) in Beaumont, TX; FCC Forrest City, Arkansas; FCC Yazoo City, MS; FCC Oakdale, LA; the United States Penitentiary in Pollock, LA; the Federal Detention Center in Houston, TX. (Id.).
150 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with BOP. 151 Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2793.1 (2005)). 152 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 153 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI; Dec. 5 Telephone Interview with FBI; Letter from Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Miss., to all state and local law
enforcement offi cers (Sept. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 9 Governor Barbour letter]. The Governor’s request was made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10513, which authorizes the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. (Id.).
154 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI (citing order issued pursuant to MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-15-1 (2005)); Sept. 9 Governor Barbour letter. The Governor’s request was made under the Miss. Emergency Mgmt. Law § 33-15-11(10). (Id.).
155 Interview with ATF. 156 28 U.S.C. § 564 (2005). 157 Order No. 2778-2005 from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. to USMS, Dir., Sept. 3, 2005 [hereinafter Gonzales Order to Dir. USMS]. 158 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 159 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 160 Interview with CBP. 161 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 162 FAMS Timeline. 163 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 164 E-mail correspondence from Bill Mercer to Bill Mercer (ODAG) (Sept. 8, 2005) (6:04 p.m.). 165 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response (citing 28 U.S.C. § 533). 166 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10501). 167 Id. 168 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Heads of Fed. Law Enforcement Agencies (Sept. 2, 2005). 169 Letter from Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Miss., to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 3, 2005). The Governor’s request was
made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10513, which authorizes the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. (Id.).
170 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Haley Barbour, Governor, State of Miss. (Sept. 3, 2005); Gonzales Order to Dir. USMS.
171 Letter from Kathleen Blanco, Governor, State of LA, to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. (Sept. 3, 2005). The Governor’s request was made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. (Id.).
172 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Kathleen Blanco, Governor, State of LA (Sept. 4, 2005); Order No. 2779-2005 from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. to Deputy Attorney Gen. (Sept. 4, 2005).
173 Letter from Kathleen Blanco, Governor, State of LA, to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. and Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 6, 2005). The Governor’s request was made under the Emergency Law Enforcement Assistance provisions of the Justice Assistant Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a state. (Id.).
174 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen., to Kathleen Blanco, Governor, State of LA (Sept. 7, 2005). 175 Letter from Michael Chertoff, Sec’y, Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., to Kathleen Blanco, Governor, State of LA (Sept. 7, 2005). 176 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 177 Nov. 16 Interview with ICE; Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 6,
2005) [hereinafter Dec. 6 Interview with FBI]. 178 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 179 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 180 Id. 181 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 182 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 183 Id. 184 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.
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185 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 186 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 187 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI; Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 188 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 189 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 190 Id. 191 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. The assignments were as follows: District 1: ATF/ DEA, District
2: FBI/Border Patrol’s Tactical Units (BORTAC), District 3: Federal Protective Service, District 4: ICE, District 5: USMS/DEA/BORTAC, District 6: FBI/ATF, District 7: FBI/DEA/BORTACT, and District 8: ATF. (Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI).
192 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 193 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 194 Id. 195 Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 196 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 197 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 198 Dec. 6 Interview with FBI. 199 Id. 200 Id. 201 Id. 202 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE; Dec. 6 Interview with FBI.
266 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“It’s like being in a Third World country.
We’re trying to work without power.
Everyone knows we’re all in this together.
We’re just trying to stay alive.”
Mitch Handrich
Registered Nurse Manager at Charity Hospital1
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MEDICAL CARE
Medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and diffi culties coordinating efforts
Summary
Public health preparedness and medical assistance are critical components to any disaster response plan
Hurricane Katrina tested the nation’s planning and
preparedness for a major public health threat and
highlighted the importance of strong cooperation
and partnerships among health agencies at all levels
of government. The threat of any type of disaster
emphasizes the need for planning and practice. Public
health preparedness and medical assistance are critical
components to any disaster response plan — the faster
the health community responds, the more quickly control
strategies can be developed and appropriate treatments can
be identifi ed. And the faster human suffering is diminished.
The annual hurricane season is a continuous
challenge to public health infrastructures and a strain on
resources. As seen in the preparation for and response
to Katrina, medical personnel, supplies, and equipment
were in constant need in the Gulf coast region. Despite
defi ciencies in coordination, communication, and
capacity, public health and medical support services
effectively treated a massive and overwhelming evacuee
population. Federalized teams of medical fi rst responders
were deployed to the affected region to provide assistance.
Millions of dollars worth of medical supplies and assets
were consumed. Some Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) assets, like the Federal Medical Shelters,
had never been used or tested prior to Katrina but were
deployed and were, for the most part, considered effective.
Despite diffi culties, the medical assistance and
response to Hurricane Katrina was a success. Thousands
of lives were saved because of the hard work and enduring
efforts of public health offi cials and medical volunteers.
Poor planning and preparedness, however, were also too
big a part of the story, resulting in delays and shortages of
resources, and loss of life in the region.
This chapter outlines what medical personnel and
supplies were pre-positioned, and deployed post-landfall,
to the affected area and how those assets were utilized.
It explains the plans in place prior to Hurricane Katrina
for health care facilities and shelters. The fi ndings in this
chapter conclude several defi ciencies in public health and
medical response plans exist at all levels of government
and within medical care facilities. Ultimately, better
planning and initiative would have resulted in a more
proactive, coordinated, effi cient, and effective response.
Personnel
HHS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
have the capabilities to mobilize and deploy teams of
medical personnel to disaster areas. HHS controls the
Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, the Medical
Reserves Corps, and personnel from its agencies such as
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),
National Institutes of Health, Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, and the Food
and Drug Administration. DHS, specifi cally FEMA,
has direct control over the National Disaster Medical
System (NDMS), which supplies and organizes teams
of medical personnel in each state who stand ready to
deploy at any moment. Unfortunately, limited numbers of
personnel were pre-positioned prior to landfall, and most
deployments were delayed until after the storm hit and
the magnitude of devastation was realized.
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Supplies
In addition to medical personnel, HHS, FEMA, and the
Department of Defense (DOD) have medical supplies at
their disposal to respond to a public health emergency.
HHS has control over the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS), a national repository of pharmaceuticals and
medical supplies. NDMS personnel teams are always
accompanied by large caches of supplies and drugs. DOD
has a mobile medical unit capability as well. Limited
amounts of supplies, however, were staged in the region
prior to landfall. Several offi cials argued the magnitude
of the storm’s devastation could not have been predicted,
and the amount of supplies needed was unknown until
the fog cleared. Despite that argument, more supplies and
personnel could have been pre-positioned prior to landfall.
Evacuation plans, communication, and coordination must be executed well for effective response
During the days following Hurricane Katrina, around the
clock media coverage of patients and staff trapped in New
Orleans hospitals inundated television screens across the
country. The nation watched in horror. How long would
it take for evacuations to begin? And why had these
hospitals not evacuated before the storm?
The Select Committee focused part of its medical
investigation on these questions, as well as the
overarching issues of impaired communications and lack
of coordination. The Select Committee acknowledges this
chapter does not tell the story of every hospital devastated
by Hurricane Katrina. Nor does it include every detail of
the communications and coordination diffi culties which
impeded the medical response.
Rather, this chapter provides fi ndings based on an
in-depth examination of specifi c plans in place before the
storm, and a timeline of events that actually took place
after the storm. Similarly, the Select Committee recognizes
this section of the report focuses on the evacuations of
New Orleans medical facilities in particular. Because New
Orleans hospitals and facilities experienced the most
complete failure of equipment and communications,
and because the need to evacuate New Orleans hospital
patients was so extreme, the Select Committee chose these
institutions as its focal point.
Evacuations
As it stands, Louisiana hospitals and nursing homes are
responsible for having and implementing their own
emergency evacuation plans. The Louisiana Hospital
Association (LHA) does not provide specifi c emergency
response or evacuation guidance and said, with respect to
protecting patients and staff, the primary priority for all
hospitals is to “shelter in place” versus evacuate. Hospitals
are, however, expected to comply with requirements
set forth by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations.2
The majority of hospital CEOs, as well as state and
local medical personnel with whom the Select Committee
met, cited time and money as two key factors infl uencing
their decision about whether to evacuate patients from
a shelter or medical facility prior to a hurricane. Time is
critical given that the majority of hospital and Department
of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) plans call for
evacuation decisions to be made anywhere from 36 to
72 hours in advance of a hurricane’s projected landfall
— hospitalized patients require a signifi cant amount of
time and staff to be moved safely. In the case of Hurricane
Katrina, the then Methodist Hospital CEO, Larry Graham,
said when he realized Hurricane Katrina was going to
hit New Orleans, there simply was not enough time to
evacuate patients.
The second much-discussed factor, cost, is perhaps
even more critical to the decision. Expenses for evacuating
a hospital are astronomical, and in the case of for-profi t
hospitals, these costs are not reimbursable by FEMA. In
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most cases hospitals say that given their cost/risk analyses,
it makes the most economic sense to ride out a storm and
protect patients within the hospital rather than evacuate
them. For example, going to Code Grey alone (without
factoring in evacuation expenses), costs Louisiana State
University’s hospitals $600,000 per day.3 Many members
of the New Orleans medical community likewise made
the point, had Hurricane Katrina not resulted in such
catastrophic fl ooding, their facilities would have been
prepared, and their decision not to evacuate patients
would have been the most prudent course of action. With
the factors of time and money in mind, this chapter seeks
to understand evacuation plans in place prior to Katrina,
and preparedness levels of hospitals and the government
to fully evacuate New Orleans medical facilities.
Communication and Coordination
Medical responders and coordinating offi cers from the
government, hospitals, and private entities, cited non-
existent or limited communication capabilities as a
primary obstacle to their response. Emergency plans in
place prior to Hurricane Katrina did not prevent oversights
and confusion in procedures for ensuring functional and
suffi cient communications equipment in the event of a
disaster. A comparison of the VAMC plans for Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama, for example, demonstrates
they are not standardized — some pieces of VAMCs’
communications plans do clearly outline the who, what,
where, and when of keeping communication systems
operating, while other VAMC plans leave many questions
unanswered. Most VAMC and hospital emergency plans,
reviewed by Select Committee staff do not have one
separate section devoted to communications preparation.
The LHA and its hospitals rely on multiple phone
service providers, and all LHA hospitals rely on an
emergency two-way radio such as Hospital Emergency
Area Radio (HEAR) or 800 MHz radio.4 This chapter
describes how VAMC and hospital emergency plans
address emergency communications and equipment,
as well as exactly how such plans and equipment failed
medical responders when they most needed it.
One of the most common and pervasive themes in
the response to Hurricane Katrina has been a systematic
failure of communications at the local, state, and federal
levels — a failure that hindered initiative. The accounts
of New Orleans medical facilities and special needs
shelters are no exception, underscoring how failed
communications with the outside threatened the safety of
medical staff and the lives of their patients. It was diffi cult
to ascertain a clear timeline of communication capabilities
and failures for medical fi rst responders and personnel.
Institutions did not have time to collect information
for hourly or even daily reports of how communication
equipment and systems were working or not. Medical
responders and personnel simply did not have adequate
communications capabilities immediately following the
hurricane. The majority of cell phones were rendered
inoperable because they could not be recharged. Satellite
communications were unreliable, and the distribution of
satellite phones appeared insuffi cient.
Government agencies also encountered problems
with coordination due to red tape and general confusion
over mission assignments, deployments, and command
structure. On a large scale, command structure presented
problems when HHS, the coordinating agency for
Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8), and NDMS, the
system that houses most of the resources needed for a
medical response, did not share an understanding of
who controlled NDMS during the emergency. Confusion
resulted when these two entities were operating separately,
albeit with efforts to coordinate with each other. On a
smaller scale, e-mails from fi rst responders and medical
personnel immediately following the storm refl ect
coordination problems. Misunderstandings about
deployment orders and mission assignments resulted
in streams of e-mails expressing uncertainties and
frustrations.
ESF-8 Background
HHS is the “principal agency for protecting the health
of all Americans and providing essential human
services, especially for those who are least able to help
Time is critical given that the majority of hospital and Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) plans call for evacuation decisions to be made anywhere from 36 to 72 hours in advance of a hurricane’s projected landfall
270 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
themselves.”5 As such, HHS plays a role in the emergency
management process. Under the National Response Plan
(NRP), ESF-8 provides for the federal government to
augment state and local resources and assist in response.
Upon activation, ESF-8 “provides the mechanism for
coordinated federal assistance to supplement state,
local, and tribal resources in response to public health
and medical care needs (to include veterinary and/or
animal health issues when appropriate) for potential or
actual Incidents of National Signifi cance and/or during a
developing potential health and medical situation.”6
The Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness serves on behalf of the Secretary to
coordinate the HHS preparation for, response to, and
efforts to prevent public health and medical emergencies
or disasters. ESF-8 is tasked with the assessment of public
health and medical needs, including behavioral health,
conducting public health surveillance, and the provision
and deployment of medical care personnel and medical
equipment and supplies.7
As the designated primary agency for ESF-8, HHS is
responsible for:
■ Orchestrating federal support within their functional
area for an affected state;
■ Providing staff for the operations functions at fi xed and
fi eld facilities;
■ Notifying and requesting assistance from support
agencies;
■ Managing mission assignments and coordinating with
support agencies, as well as appropriate state agencies;
■ Working with appropriate private-sector organizations
to maximize use of all available resources;
■ Supporting and keeping other ESFs and organizational
elements informed of ESF operational priorities and
activities;
■ Executing contracts and procuring goods and services as
needed;
■ Ensuring fi nancial and property accountability for ESF
activities;
■ Planning for short-term and long-term incident
management and recovery operations; and
■ Maintaining trained personnel to support interagency
emergency response and support teams.8
While HHS has a number of internal assets to
supplement state, local, and tribal government entities,
the NRP lists a number of additional external assets for
HHS to use in coordinating the federal response. Support
agencies under ESF-8 include DHS (FEMA and NDMS),
DOD, VA, and the Department of Transportation (DOT).
Finding: Deployment of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive
Federalized teams were deployed and provided assistance in several locations after landfall
Thousands of people in the Gulf region were treated
and hundreds of lives were saved due to the services
provided by medical personnel in response to Hurricane
Katrina. However, with few medical personnel teams
pre-positioned prior to landfall, public health offi cials
scrambled to mobilize and deploy personnel teams after
the storm hit the Gulf coast. As a result, medical assistance
in some areas was unnecessarily delayed by hours, even
days. Personnel and supplies are readily available to
decision-makers. With a few exceptions, the deployment
of medical personnel was reactive, not proactive as most
assets were not utilized until after the need was apparent.
Ultimately, public health and medical support services
were effectively but ineffi ciently delivered. Below is a
comprehensive assessment of when and where medical
personnel were deployed in the Gulf coast region to
provide medical treatment and care.
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NDMS
FEMA is home to the NDMS. The mission of NDMS is to
maintain a national capability to deliver quality medical
care to the victims and responders of a domestic disaster.9
NDMS has medical, mortuary, and veterinarian assistance
teams located around the country. These specialized teams
include:
■ 45 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), groups
of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel
capable of providing medical care following disasters;
■ 11 Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams
(DMORTs), which consist of private citizens with
specialized training and experience to help in the
recovery, identifi cation and processing of deceased
victims;
■ Four National Medical Response Teams, to deal with
the medical consequences of incidents potentially
involving chemical, biological or nuclear materials;
■ National Pharmacy Response Teams and National
Nurse Response Teams, which include pharmacists
and nurses to assist in mass-dispensing of medications
during disasters along with mass vaccination
campaigns.
■ Five Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams, clinical
veterinarians, pathologists, animal health technicians,
microbiologists and others who assist animal disaster
victims and provide care to search dogs; and
■ Three International Medical Surgical Response Teams,
highly specialized teams, trained and equipped to
establish free standing fi eld surgical facilities anywhere
in the world.10
Fully operational DMATs have the ability to triage
and treat up to 250 patients per day for up to three days
without resupply.11 Within four hours of alert status,
DMATs should be able to fi eld a full 35-person roster.
Within six hours after activation, DMATs should be
deployment ready.12
Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, NDMS only
staged nine of its 45 DMATs in the Gulf coast region.13
Three DMATs and a Management Support Team were pre-
positioned in each of the following locations: Anniston,
Alabama, Memphis, Tennessee, and Houston, Texas.
According to FEMA offi cials, the Superdome in New
Orleans was the fi rst NDMS assignment because it was
a designated special needs shelter.14 DMAT Oklahoma
1 (OK-1 DMAT) was pre-staged in Houston, Texas on
August 27 in anticipation of the storm. OK-1 DMAT
efforts will be discussed more thoroughly in a later section
of this chapter. In addition to OK-1 DMAT, other teams at
the Superdome included NM-1, CA-6, and RI-1.
WA-1 DMAT from Washington was one of the few
teams activated and deployed prior to landfall. It was
staged in Houston and was poised to move to its mission
assignment post-landfall, which ended up being Louis
Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans (New
Orleans Airport).15
FEMA activated OR-2 DMAT from Oregon on August
30 and immediately began treating patients when the
team arrived at the New Orleans Airport on the afternoon
of September 1.16 As previously mentioned, every DMAT
includes a large cache of medical supplies and equipment.
It is much easier to move personnel than supplies.
Although the OR-2 DMAT’s cache left Portland on August
31, it took almost fi ve days for the three trucks of supplies
to reach the airport.
By August 31, three DMATs, WA-1, CA-4, and TX-4,
had arrived at the
New Orleans Airport,
where evacuated
patients were being
received.17 Eventually,
eight DMATs would
be stationed there to
help provide medical
care during the
patient movement
operations in New Orleans.18 The medical treatment
provided and specifi c actions taken by the DMATs
operating at the airport will be discussed in a later section
of this chapter.
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With Mississippi’s hospital infrastructure decimated
after Hurricane Katrina, nine DMATs and seven DMAT
Strike Teams were sent to the state to provide medical
care and augment the remaining functioning hospitals.19
Mississippi’s State Health Offi cer, Dr. Brian W. Amy,
testifi ed that, “through coordination with the National
Disaster Medical System, we positioned DMAT teams
at every affected hospital and Strike teams at overfl ow
hospitals in the affected areas. Of the 17,649 reported
injuries, DMAT teams treated 15,500 patients in the initial
days after landfall.”20
In general, at most locations DMATs were deployed, the
teams were met with overwhelming demand for patient
assessment and treatment. Many of the teams operated
under extreme fatigue with limited medical supplies,
inadequate amounts of food and water, intermittent
electricity, and no air-conditioning.
DMORTs, teams of private citizens with specialized
training and experience to help in the recovery,
identifi cation and processing of deceased victims, were
sent to the Gulf coast to assist in the recovery process of
dead bodies. A standard DMORT team is comprised of
31 medical and forensic volunteer personnel with specifi c
training in victim identifi cation, mortuary services, and
forensic pathology and anthropology methods. DMORTs
include a combination of medical examiners, coroners,
pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records,
fi ngerprint technicians, forensic odentologists, dental
assistants, radiologists, funeral directors, mental health
professionals, and support personnel.21 Fully operational
DMORTs should be able to deploy within 24 hours of
notifi cation.
With only two Portable Morgue Units (PMU) in
NDMS, one was sent to Louisiana and the other to
Mississippi. PMUs are equipped to support DMORT
services when no local morgue facilities are available. Each
is manned by four DMORTs. FEMA did not have enough
DMORTs and was forced to contract for additional
personnel. HHS worked closely with DMORTs and FEMA
by embedding Public Health Service (PHS) personnel in
each team. A PHS senior offi cer and mental health offi cer
were assigned to assist each DMORT.22
On Thursday, September 1, 27 Region II DMORTs
prepared to leave for Anniston, Alabama, a site designated
as the eastern
staging point for the
DMORT response.23
On Monday,
September 5, one
week after landfall,
HHS Assistant
Secretary for Public
Health Emergency
Preparedness Stewart
Simonson requested “ample mobile mortuary services
throughout the affected region.”24 An order for 200
mobile mortuary trucks was issued, with 130 designated
to Louisiana and 70 to be delivered to Mississippi.25 By
the next day, mortuary services were being established
in St. Gabriel, Louisiana with 96 personnel.26 FEMA
and Louisiana collaborated on drafting a body recovery
plan which required the approval of then FEMA Director
Michael Brown and Louisiana’s newly appointed state
medical examiner.27 In Mississippi, mortuary services
were established at the Naval Air Station in Gulfport. By
September 6, one DMORT had set up facilities there.
U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps
The U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned Corps,
one of the seven uniformed services of the United
States, is comprised of highly-trained and mobile health
professionals who carry out programs to promote good
health, understand and prevent disease and injury, assure
safe and effective drugs and medical devices, deliver
health services to federal benefi ciaries, and supply health
expertise in time of war or other national or international
emergencies.
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All Corps offi cers on deployment rosters were notifi ed
by the U.S. Surgeon General’s offi ce via e-mail on
Saturday, August 27 that Hurricane Katrina could be a
catastrophic event creating the need for medical assistance
in the Gulf coast after landfall.28 At the time of the e-mail,
there was “no assessment of what will be needed at this
point, but they will potentially ask the feds for medical,
mental health, and pharmaceutical support, as well as
EHOs, environmental and civil engineers to support the
obvious needs for water, waste water and sewer, as well as
infrastructure problems.”29 Commissioned Corps offi cers
were asked to stand by and prepare for deployment as
public health needs became apparent.
According to a briefi ng with U.S. Surgeon General, Vice
Admiral Richard H. Carmona, PHS had pre-positioned 38
offi cers on Sunday, August 28 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
and Biloxi, Mississippi.30 It was originally planned for
the PHS offi cers to be stationed in New Orleans, but they
were unable to get there before Hurricane Katrina made
landfall. PHS offi cers were on the ground in New Orleans
by late Monday, August 29.
Carmona suggested coordination with PHS,
FEMA, and NDMS was diffi cult. HHS had trouble
with tracking DMAT mission assignments and with
staffi ng and communication. Despite the assignment
of a Commissioned Corps offi cer liaison to FEMA to
coordinate medical activities, coordination between the
two agencies was lacking.31
PHS helped reestablish a public health infrastructure for
some communities in the Gulf coast region. For example,
when New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin laid-off a majority of
the city’s public health employees, PHS helped to fi ll the
gaps. “Public health services were never federalized—PHS
just provided a federal presence. But the federal presence
was absolutely stabilizing,” Carmona said.32
By September 9, more than 1,000 PHS Commissioned
Corps offi cers had been deployed to the region in support
of the Hurricane Katrina medical response, making it
the largest response in Corps history. More offi cers were
deployed in response to Katrina than after 9/11 and
the anthrax postal incident in 2001.33 Commissioned
Corps offi cers supplemented several medical response
assignments. They worked side-by-side with the DMATs
at the New Orleans Airport; staffed the Federal Medical
Shelters at several locations in the Gulf coast; assisted
with CDC activities; accompanied SNS assets; and helped
provide mental health services to the affected region.
In general, PHS is a valuable operational asset to HHS
and was a critical component to the medical response to
Hurricane Katrina. However, despite having the capability
to mobilize Commissioned Corps offi cers at anytime, PHS
failed to deploy a signifi cant number of offi cers to the
region prior to landfall.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
The CDC is a component of HHS that assists in carrying
out its responsibilities for protecting the health and
safety of all Americans and for providing essential human
services, especially for those people who are least able to
help themselves.34 CDC controls the SNS, large quantities
of medicine and medical supplies to protect the American
public if there is a health emergency severe enough to
cause local supplies to run out.
Before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, CDC activated
the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) on August
25.35 CDC personnel were on the ground in Louisiana
with a Technical Advisory Response Unit (TARU) which
accompanies SNS supplies.36 In anticipation of the need
to provide emergency medical services, 27 pallets37 of
medical supplies were pre-positioned on the ground
prior to landfall.38 On Sunday, August 28, these items
were pulled from SNS with the mission assignment for
some supplies to be delivered to the Superdome in New
Orleans.39 CDC also staffed and readied 12 teams of 20
people each to be deployed once the request from states
for help was received.
CDC was responsible for deploying personnel and SNS
assets, assisting state and local public health authorities
with communicating food and water safety information,
conducting disease surveillance, providing immunizations
to displaced residents, and helping reestablish public
health services in affected areas. Immediately following
the hurricane, CDC’s biggest concern was the risk of
food-borne and water-borne illnesses.40 CDC worked
with the Louisiana Offi ce of Public Health to assess
reports on an outbreak of cholera and partnered with
1,000 PHS Commissioned Corps Offi cers had been deployed to the region in support of the Hurricane Katrina medical response, making it the largest response in Corps history.
274 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
the Environmental Protection Agency and local health
departments to assess environmental risks of toxins and
chemicals in the water and air. CDC also worked with
DOD to provide mosquito-control resources in most of
the affected areas. Teams were deployed to both Louisiana
and Mississippi on a mosquito spray mission.
CDC provided access to Infl uenza, Tetanus-Diptheria,
Hepatitis A, and Hepatitis B vaccines to areas that were
lacking them by coordinating the delivery, distribution,
and administration of over three million doses of vaccine,
with one million of the doses obtained from SNS.41 When
New Orleans lost its public health department due to
layoffs, CDC sent over 100 medical personnel to help
reestablish services, conduct surveillance, and improve
communication.42
HHS Credentialed Volunteer Health Professionals
HHS designed a system that assists state and locals in
verifying the credentials of volunteer healthcare workers.
While stimulating the creation of over 900 medical teams,
it also created confusion at the state level. Overall though,
HHS was successful in mobilizing and credentialing
medical professionals who volunteered in the Gulf
coast following Hurricane Katrina. PHS set up a Katrina
database to credential and verify medical professionals.
With the help of
private companies,
such as Kaiser
Permanente, over
3,400 volunteers
were processed
and over 1,000
volunteers were
deployed.43 The
database was
linked to state
databases and a national databank, allowing PHS to use
existing information to help verify credentials. HHS also
established a website (https://volunteer.hhs.gov) and
toll-free number (1-866-KATMEDI) to help identify health
care professionals and relief personnel to assist in Katrina
relief efforts.44
The Medical Reserve Corps has a medical volunteer
database where medical volunteers are pre-credentialed
and can be activated within 24 hours. Carmona oversees
this database as well as the response of the volunteers
HHS calls upon. HHS was able to link its database to
state databases in order to confi rm volunteer credentials.
Both HHS and Carmona stressed the importance of
volunteers linking up with pre-existing rescue teams rather
than acting independently. The Surgeon General’s offi ce
likewise had generated a separate database for people who
wanted to volunteer supplies or equipment.
Setting up a mechanism to allow individual medical
personnel to volunteer was a useful tool initiated
by HHS. The database was such a success that by
September 3, an internal e-mail from HHS indicated
“VOLUNTEERS SHOULD NO LONGER BE REFERRED TO
[email protected], they should be directed
to the https://volunteer.ccrf.hhs.gov/ and instructed to
complete a volunteer application.”45 These credentialed
volunteers heavily supplemented medical services in
the Gulf coast region and were an important part of the
medical response.
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
As part of the public health and medical response,
the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration (SAMHSA) mobilized personnel to
support state mental health program directors in their
efforts to conduct needs assessments, provide services,
support ongoing administrative operations, access
fi nancial assistance and prepare for long-term assistance.46
SAMHSA deployed Disaster Technical Assistance Center
teams to provide information and supplement state and
local disaster response planning, review disaster plans,
conduct literature reviews, and offer mental health
support services.47 On Wednesday, September 7, SAMHSA
created a “Crisis Hotline” to provide victims with 24
hour access to counseling and mental health resources.48
Additionally, on Tuesday, September 13, HHS Secretary
Micheal O. Leavitt announced $600,000 in emergency
grants to Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, and Mississippi to
ensure mental health assessment and crisis counseling
are available in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina.49 The
states have used the money to support clinical assessments
and provide psychiatric and nursing services, medications,
brief interventions, crisis case management, and short-
term residential support.
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Finding: Poor planning and pre-positioning of medical supplies and equipment led to delays and shortages
Equipment and supplies were in heavy demand
immediately following the hurricane and could not be
quickly replenished by state, local, and federal resources.
As detailed in other sections of this report, most shelters,
hospitals, and fl ooded areas were without electricity and
adequate supplies of potable water and food for days
after Katrina made landfall. With only nominal amounts
of medical supplies pre-positioned by FEMA and HHS, a
great deal of medical provisions had to be supplied after
Katrina made landfall. In areas like New Orleans, it took
days to respond to the catastrophe and deliver medical
supplies to the Superdome and Convention Center.
The delays were a result of poor planning. Obviously,
supplies should be protected during the storm and
staged in safe and secure locations for easy access post-
landfall. Despite being unable to predict the magnitude of
devastation from the storm, more supplies and equipment
should have been pre-positioned and accessible to state
and local offi cials immediately following landfall. Below
is a detailed assessment of the different medical supplies
and equipment that were provided to the Gulf coast in
response to Hurricane Katrina.
States were heavily dependent on CDC/SNS for medical supplies
SNS 12-Hour Push Packages
As previously stated, the SNS is a national repository of
antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support
medications, IV administration, airway maintenance
supplies, and medical/surgical items.50 The SNS
has 12-hour Push Packages (Push Packs), caches of
pharmaceuticals, antidotes, and medical supplies designed
to provide response to a public health emergency within
12 hours. CDC estimates that each Push Pack costs $6
million, weighs almost 50 tons, and includes over 100
different kinds of supplies.51 Push Packs are confi gured to
be immediately loaded onto either trucks or commercial
aircraft for the most rapid transportation. A Boeing 747
aircraft or seven tractor trailers are needed to move a
single Push Pack. A TARU accompanies the Push Pack to
coordinate with state and local offi cials and ensure SNS
assets are effi ciently received and distributed upon arrival
at the site.52 TARU is simply a team of technical advisors
to supervise the transfer of Push Pack contents to the
receiving state.
Push Packs can be deployed at the request of a
governor and independently of the NRP. Mississippi was
the only state to request a Push Pack from CDC. The
Push Pack arrived in Mississippi on Friday, September
2, four days after Katrina passed through the state.53 As
Amy testifi ed, “within 12 hours of a call and my offi cial
request, eight tractor-trailers rolled into Mississippi
loaded with medical supplies for affected Mississippi
hospitals.”54 Push Packs were originally designed to
respond to a bioterrorist attack, so they included items
that were not relevant to treating the medical needs of
Katrina evacuees. As a result, some of the Push Pack
materials went unused. For this reason, CDC informed
state and local offi cials they could request supplies and
materials from SNS without requesting a full Push Pack.55
Although Mississippi was the only state to request a Push
Pack, other states still tapped resources and supplies from
SNS. CDC fi gured out a way early on to prevent the waste
of resources and ensure the most appropriate medical
supplies were being allocated and delivered.
Also, CDC began to move towards more focused
deliveries from existing inventories outside of SNS and
acquired materials from private partners, as thousands
of critical supplies were needed.56 The Director for
the Coordinating Offi ce for Terrorism Preparedness
and Emergency Response at CDC, Dr. Richard Besser,
suggested creating Push Packs for major public health
disruptions other than bioterrorism. This could ensure the
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most appropriate medical supplies and equipment arrive
to the affected area fi rst and would also prevent the waste
of supplies that are not relevant to certain public health
emergencies.57
Temporary medical operations staging areas were assembled and utilized
Federal Medical Shelters
Federal Medical Shelters (FMS) were a new component
to the HHS hurricane response introduced following
Katrina’s landfall. These are rapidly deployed, minimal
care medical kits capable of housing, triaging, and holding
displaced patients. Each FMS is a 250-bed emergency
shelter with a pharmaceutical suite, designed to provide
care to patients for three days before the need to re-supply
and re-stock materials.58 An FMS is usually set up in a
large space like an airport hanger or gymnasium with
some provisions supplied by the SNS. FMS facilities are
not designed for comprehensive community care needs;
they are designed to offer last-resort care and support
during situations in which normal, day-to-day operations
are disrupted. FMS were developed to both augment
hospitals and serve as quarantine stations.
Under the orders of
Simonson, FMS began
readying supplies and
personnel on August
27, and one FMS
was sent to Camp
Beauregard, Louisiana
on August 28.59
From there, the FMS
continued on to Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton
Rouge, and on the evening of Tuesday, August 30, the FMS
at LSU began operations staffed by PHS commissioned
Corps offi cers. FMS were also staged at Fort Polk Army Base
in central Louisiana, Eglin Air Force Base near Pensacola,
Florida, the Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi,
and the Mississippi Air National Guard Station in Jackson,
Mississippi.60 Additionally, the New Orleans Airport was
the site of an FMS and helped provide acute medical care
to evacuated patients from surrounding hospitals and the
Superdome. The National Institutes of Health in Bethesda,
Maryland set up a critical care facility for the sickest patients
evacuated from the Gulf coast region.61
Essentially, these shelters were used to augment
hospitals in the Gulf coast and help with the surge
capacity of Katrina evacuees. Although Simonson thought
the shelters were under-utilized in response to Katrina, he
believed the exercise proved FMS are a valuable asset to
be used in future public health emergencies. Despite this,
only one was pre-positioned while most were readied and
deployed in the days following landfall. Precious time was
wasted because public health offi cials lacked initiative.
Prior to Katrina, FMS was only an idea on paper and
had never been put into practice. The temporary medical
shelters had never been tested in simulated drills or
exercises, so it was initially unclear how FMS would
perform and if their use would be effective.62 Simonson
said he believed HHS held two exercises to test FMS last
year. He did not believe them to have been extensive or
to have simulated disaster-like conditions.63 The tests
were held simply to time setup of facilities and processes.
Despite the opportunity to truly test FMS at two federally
mandated exercises, one in April 2005 and the other held
in 2003, HHS did not seize the opportunity to assess and
evaluate them.64
Expeditionary Medical Support Systems
The Air National Guard also supplied medical personnel
and equipment to the Gulf coast region in response to
Hurricane Katrina. Similar to FMS, Expeditionary Medical
Support System’s (EMEDS) mission is to provide front
line, fi eld hospital care in the event of a catastrophe or
terrorist attack where local facilities are too overwhelmed
to adequately treat patients.65 EMEDS operate and
function like brick and
mortar hospitals and have
operating rooms, dental,
pharmacy and lab services,
intensive care units,
and other facilities and
equipment. These mobile
hospitals have a 25-bed capacity and can be set up and
ready to receive patients within 24 hours.66 Traditionally,
EMEDS are primarily for military personnel but, in
response to Katrina, EMEDS were utilized to provide
medical treatment to thousands of civilian victims.
On Thursday, September 1, the Air Force deployed an
EMEDS to provide medical assistance at the New Orleans
Airport. Upon arrival, the EMEDS team set up and began
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assisting the DMATs who had already established a
make-shift facility.67 At the New Orleans Airport EMEDS
teams helped other government agencies and civilian
medical teams provide treatment and health care to those
individuals transported to the airport. EMEDS teams
also assisted with aeromedical evacuations. According to
Colonel Richard Bachman, who directed the Air Force’s
medical assistance in the Gulf region, “the EMEDS is to
set up rapidly, treat, stabilize, and then air evacuate people
out. It’s a 25-bed hospital, but we took care of 2,500
people in two days, so the number of beds is essentially
irrelevant, because we weren’t holding them and providing
long-term treatment….We never practiced hospital care in
an airport terminal without tents or [having] equipment
being overwhelmed by thousands of patients in the dark
without air conditioning.”68 Despite the unfavorable
conditions, EMEDS and other medical personnel stationed
at the airport completed an enormous patient movement
operation in a very brief window of time.
The Air Guard set up an additional mobile military
hospital at the Convention Center to take the place of
Charity Hospital and provide medical services to military
personnel while other facilities are out of commission.69
The Mississippi Air National Guard established an EMEDS
to augment services of the badly damaged Hancock
County Medical Center 70 The EMEDS was set up in the
parking lot of that medical center and treated 47 patients
before it was demobilized in late September.
State Mobile Hospital Units
As one of the few self-contained mobile hospitals in the
U.S., the Carolina MED-1 mobile hospital was federalized
and deployed to Waveland, Mississippi. Carolina MED-
1 has complete emergency room and operating room
capabilities with 100 hospitals beds and functions exactly
like a brick and mortar hospital.71 It was staffed by a team
of volunteers from the Carolina Medical Center, PHS
offi cers, and other medical volunteers. Waveland was
completely decimated by Katrina and was in desperate
need of medical facilities and personnel to treat residents.
In total, Carolina MED-1 treated almost 5,000 patients
and is considered one of the success stories of the medical
response to Hurricane Katrina. Amy described Carolina
MED-1 as an “invaluable asset to Mississippi’s most hard
hit area in Hancock County.”72
On Friday, September 2, Simonson wrote an e-mail
asking the state of Nevada to transport its mobile medical
facility (NV-1) to the New Orleans Airport.73 He intended
NV-1 to serve as a federalized hospital facility to provide
medical care. Upon arrival at the airport, though, NV-1 was
told its assets were no longer needed and was eventually
directed to Gulfport, Mississippi where it was set up with
support staff from the Nevada Hospital Association, PHS
offi cers, and volunteer health professionals.74 When asked
why he waited until September 2 to order NV-1 to New
Orleans, Simonson recalled there was some confusion as to
whether Mississippi had already requested use of NV-1.75
Simonson said ultimately NV-1 was used in Mississippi
and that it was diffi cult to initially assess where assets were
needed most.76 In total, NV-1 saw almost 500 patients by
the end of September. Both of these mobile hospitals were
considered extremely valuable assets to the public health
response after Hurricane Katrina.
Finding: New Orleans was unprepared to provide evacuations and medical care for its special needs population and dialysis patients and Louisiana offi cials lacked a common defi nition of “special needs”
Defi ning “Special Needs”
New Orleans has the largest special needs population in
Louisiana. But the Louisiana Medical Director and State
Health Offi cer, Dr. Jimmy Guidry, and the Director of the
New Orleans Health Department, Dr. Kevin Stephens,
never offered a clear or consistent defi nition of “special
needs.” According to Guidry, special needs people are
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defi ned as not requiring
hospital care, but not
appropriate for a general
population shelter either.77
Stephens, on the other
hand, indicated the state
has a list outlining what
criteria constitute a special
needs patient. Among the
most important, Stephens
said, a patient with special
needs is someone who
requires intermittent
electricity to sustain life.78
In fact, the list to which
Stephens referred says the
state of Louisiana has one
set of criteria for classifying special needs persons, while
Jefferson Parish has another.79 The state defi nes Category
I special needs persons as “patients who are acutely ill
and need to be admitted to a hospital as a patient during
an emergency evacuation of the area.” Jefferson Parish
classifi es Category I special needs people as “patients who
do not yet need to be admitted, but whose condition
will probably deteriorate during an evacuation.” These
patients are to be taken to a trauma hospital. Aside from
Jefferson Parish having a defi nition of Category I special
needs that differs from the state’s defi nition, confusion
also arises in determining whether Jefferson Parish’s
criteria for Category II special needs people also applies to
Louisiana. Category II is for “patients with limited needs
and assistance who require special needs sheltering during
an emergency evacuation of the area. These will be sent to
non-trauma hospitals.” Again, it is unclear whether this
category is specifi c to Jefferson Parish or if it applies to the
entire state.
Additionally, the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness
(OEP) Director for Plaquemines Parish, Jesse St. Amant,
was adamant that nursing home patients are considered
“special needs patients.”80 Neither Guidry nor Stephens
concurred, and nursing home patients are not listed
within Louisiana or Jefferson Parish’s special needs
categories.81
Stephens stated New Orleans does not keep a list
to identify special needs persons in advance of an
emergency.82 St. Amant, however, keeps a database of
Plaquemines Parish’s special needs patient population
and interviews each patient about specifi c requirements
for transportation, medications, and other special needs.
He has pre-arranged contracts to address these needs
and operates on an annual budget of approximately
$300,000.83 Stephens said New Orleans uses statistics
from the health care community (such as the number
of patients on dialysis) to reach its estimate that New
Orleans has 1,000 special needs persons. Interestingly,
a September 6 EOC Report indicated the state estimated
dialysis patients alone were greater than this fi gure,
saying the “State projects approximately 1,200 dialysis
patients.”84 Additionally, the emergency coordinator in
Jefferson Parish, which is an adjacent suburb of equivalent
population to New Orleans, said they have a potential of
45,000 special needs patients—41,000 more patients than
the estimate given by Stephens. 85
Sheltering and Evacuating Special Needs Patients
State offi cials from the Governor’s Offi ce, the Department
of Health and Hospitals (DHH), and the Department
of Transportation and Development said all parishes,
New Orleans included, were responsible for managing
special needs evacuations.86 New Orleans designated the
Superdome as a special needs shelter, and Stephens said
New Orleans’ plan focuses on transporting special needs
people from their homes to the Superdome. Special needs
patients were to be collected throughout neighborhoods,
using Rapid Transit Administration buses, and taken to
the Superdome — despite the fact New Orleans does not
keep a list of such patients.87
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Guidry says the state bused 200 special needs people
from the Superdome to LSU hospitals in Baton Rouge
on Sunday before landfall.88 According to state offi cials,
the New Orleans plan never called for the use of school
buses for evacuation, so in their opinion, criticisms
about school buses lined up underwater and unused are
unfair. Additionally, state offi cials say New Orleans never
requested state assistance or buses to help with this effort
(even though Guidry indicated the state did, in fact, assist
in this manner).89
At the federal level, FEMA Deputy Federal Coordinating
Offi cer Scott Wells said he interpreted special needs
to be anyone needing assistance, whether they were
impoverished or medically disabled.90 To his knowledge,
the state and the parishes made no signifi cant attempts
to evacuate special needs persons, although he indicated
there may have been efforts to shelter them. The need to
shelter special needs people in the Superdome showed
the state and city had not taken steps (to which they had
agreed during the Hurricane Pam exercise) to coordinate
the movement and sheltering of these people farther
north, away from the Gulf, Wells said.91 The requirement
for medical evacuations after the storm was an indication
the pre-landfall evacuation was not successful.
Parish offi cials outside New Orleans also described
their efforts to identify and evacuate special needs
patients. According to the Plaquemines Parish sheriff,
before the start of hurricane season, the parish solicits
people to register if they have special needs for
evacuation.92 For Katrina, school buses were used to pick
up and move these special needs registrants to a shelter
in Belle Chasse, Louisiana. According to the Jefferson
Parish emergency management director, their emergency
operations plan also includes provisions for special needs
people. The parish conducts a triage by telephone to
determine which people with special needs require shelter
within a parish hospital. Those who qualify are given a
password for admittance. For Hurricane Katrina, there
were 12,000 such people identifi ed and sheltered.93
Dialysis Patients
Although dialysis patients were part of his defi nition of
special needs persons, Stephens initially acknowledged
the Superdome did not have the personnel, facilities,
or supplies to provide dialysis.94 Nor did it have food
appropriate for diabetics. He said although dialysis
patients were discouraged from going to the Superdome
for this reason, several went anyway. Stephens further
stated dialysis patients were among the fi rst patients
evacuated by helicopter.
In a subsequent meeting, however, Stephens gave
completely different information. He said New Orleans
has an evacuation plan specifi cally designed for dialysis
patients so they know the medical facility to which they
are assigned during an emergency.95 He contradicted
his early statement (dialysis patients were present in the
Superdome) when he told the Select Committee the
city’s evacuation planning worked virtually perfectly,
and no dialysis patients went to the Superdome. To
his knowledge, Stephens said all dialysis patients were
evacuated to their pre-assigned medical facilities. Of
interest, the defi nition of Category II special needs
persons, mentioned above for Jefferson Parish and
possibly the entire state, includes “kidney dialysis”
patients.96
The Superdome
Although Louisiana owns the Superdome, New
Orleans runs it with assistance provided by the state,
the Department of Health and Hospitals, and the
Department of Social Services when needed.97 The city
is also responsible for drafting and
implementing a plan for its use
during an emergency.
Since 1998, New Orleans has
used the Superdome to shelter
citizens with special needs during
hurricanes.98 For Hurricane Isadore
in 2002, supplies were pre-staged,
and the facility was staffed for 400
patients. Despite these preparations,
though, only 27 special needs
patients were identifi ed and treated.
During Hurricane Ivan, in September
2004, the Superdome was again opened as a special
needs shelter and received just 32 patients.99 The small
number of special needs patients at the Superdome during
these two hurricanes gave New Orleans offi cials a false
indication of how many patients to expect for Hurricane
Katrina. As a result, the city was ill-prepared.
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The city’s plans call for the Superdome to house only
special needs patients — not the general public.100 For
Hurricane Katrina, the special needs area was established
in the southeast and southwest quadrant ballrooms,
where some supplies were pre-positioned.101 According
to Superdome and Sports Arena General Manager Glen
Menard, the Superdome’s only “pre-positioned” supplies
were goods leftover from a July event which the city
requested remain in place.102 Menard also said he placed
two refrigerators and power generators in the southeast
and southwest quadrants of the Superdome, which were
designated as the medical care areas.
By the Sunday before landfall, over 400 special needs
patients were evacuated to Baton Rouge using 10 para-
transport vans and three city buses.103 For the 8,000-
10,000 people who remained in the Superdome, there
were federal, state civilian, National Guard, and city
medical personnel to provide care. But this contingent
proved too small to provide care for the multitude of
people who eventually sought refuge there. After the
fl ooding, but before evacuation of the Superdome, it is
estimated 23,000 people were sheltered there.104
As the crowd grew, it became increasingly diffi cult
for the facility to care for special needs patients — the
Superdome only contained enough personnel and
supplies to care for approximately 1,000 people.105
Section 132, next to the Superdome’s First Aid Station,
was used for evacuees in need of general medical
attention.106 With severe overcrowding of evacuees
and fl ooding from roof leaks, the rest of the crowd was
moved to elevated bleachers. Menard said eventually the
special needs patients were further evacuated from the
Superdome to the Sports Arena.
DMAT OK-1 departed from LSU to the Superdome
on the evening of August 29.107 Upon arrival, the
National Guard told DMAT OK-1 it wasn’t needed
inside, redirecting the team to the Sports Arena, which
is attached to the Superdome by two open-air walkways.
DMAT OK-1 fi nally set up operations at the Sports Arena
late that night and began receiving patients the morning
of August 30. The establishment of this DMAT came 36
hours after FEMA reported serious medical problems in
the Superdome, including 400 people with special needs,
45 to 50 patients in need of hospitalization, and the rapid
depletion of supplies.108
Evacuations fi nally began on August 31, and medical
workers prepared records for their patients. In the
end, though, those records were lost in the confusion.
Evacuation of the Superdome concluded on September
3. Six people died in the Superdome—fi ve for medical
reasons and one from suicide.
Convention Center
Similar to the Superdome, the Ernest N. Morial
Convention Center (Convention Center) is the property
of the state of Louisiana. However, the Convention
Center was never intended to serve as a shelter of any
kind — special needs or otherwise — so there were no
medical capabilities in place prior to the storm.109 When
asked by the media about conditions at the Convention
Center, Brown said, “(W)e learned about that (Thursday),
so I have directed that we have all available resources to
get that convention center to make sure that they have
food and water and medical care that they need.”110 The
Convention Center
General Manager
Warren Reuther,
however, does not
recall the provision
of any medical
assistance for the
evacuees at his
facility.111
Reuther is
an appointee of
Governor Kathleen
Babineaux Blanco
and says his
responsibilities are to oversee the Convention Center
and protect its assets.112 Despite the fact the Convention
Center was not intended as a shelter, evacuees seeking dry
land arrived there, and upon fi nding the glass entry doors
locked, broke in. Reuther estimates between 18,000 and
25,000, perhaps even 30,000 people, eventually gathered
at the center.
The Superdome only contained enough personnel and supplies to care for approximately 1,000 people.
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During the storm, Reuther and approximately half
a dozen of his public safety staff remained in place,
attempting in vain to maintain order as evacuees fi lled
almost every area of the building.113 The Convention
Center was quickly overwhelmed, running on reduced
emergency power until all power was lost when fuel ran
out on the night of August 30. Public bathrooms became
overloaded, and problems were compounded by loss
of water pressure. Hallways became the de-facto toilets.
Walk-in refrigerators were emptied on the fl oor, and many
evacuees began bringing their own food and alcohol into
the building. Almost 32,000 chairs were broken or lost,
90,000 square yards of carpeting were destroyed, and
the facility’s infrastructure was damaged. Gunshots were
reportedly heard, and Reuther and his staff were forced to
hide from the crowds.
Evacuations at the Convention Center began Friday,
September 2 and continued until Sunday, September
4. Despite Reuther’s assertion medical assistance never
arrived, a DOD
e-mail indicated
medical teams
were established
and operating at
the Convention
Center on Saturday,
September 3.114
Medical needs were
unclear because of
poor communication
and situational awareness. The number of evacuees
continued to increase at the Convention Center as
evacuations at the Superdome concluded. People left at
the Superdome were directed to the Convention Center,
where they would later be evacuated. Throughout the
ordeal, Reuther saw no deliveries of food, water, or other
supplies. At one point, he called Blanco but received no
answer. He also never saw Nagin throughout the ordeal.115
A Doctor’s First-hand Account
Dr. Gregory Henderson is a Tulane University and
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine graduate. He
lives in New Orleans and is the Associate Chairman of the
Ochsner Clinic Foundation Department of Pathology and
Laboratory Medicine. He was set to begin his new job at
Ochsner on September 1.116
Henderson happened to be attending a physician
leader retreat for Ochsner staff on Friday, August 26 and
Saturday, August 27, at the Ritz-Carlton hotel on Canal
Street when the meeting was cut short because of the
impending landfall of Hurricane Katrina.117 He evacuated
his family to Jackson, Mississippi and chose to stay at the
hotel so he could remain close to their home.
By the morning of Tuesday, August 30, the Ritz-Carlton
was surrounded by three to fi ve feet of water and Canal
Street was fl ooding.118 There was a hotel announcement
that anyone who needed medical care should report to the
hotel’s French Quarter Bar. Fortunately there was another
medical conference involving medical specialists (seven
physicians, a physician’s assistant, and pharmacists)
taking place at the hotel. The impromptu medical team
had already started to organize a list of medicines and
supplies they might need. Looking outside and talking to
the police, he realized looting was occurring outside the
hotel, and it appeared the looters were armed. Henderson,
along with a family practice physician, pharmacist, and
two offi cers from the New Orleans Police Department
(NOPD), waded across Canal Street through waist-high
water to the Walgreens pharmacy across the street. They
were able to break into the pharmacy and began stuffi ng
insulin, drugs, and medical supplies into plastic garbage
bags. There was a confrontation with the looters, who
were held back at gunpoint by the offi cers. Henderson was
able to carry three bags of supplies back to the hotel.
He set up a make-shift clinic at the hotel for the next
24 hours. The majority of the patients were seeking
prescription refi lls, a lot of which he did not have.119
He subsequently opened another “clinic” when NOPD
moved their operational headquarters and command and
control center from the Ritz-Carlton to the Sheraton hotel
across the street.
He was told by NOPD that Tulane, University, and
Charity Hospitals were taking on water and basically
inoperable and was asked by an NOPD captain if he
could stay and take care of several hundred police offi cers
who had set up camp at the Sheraton.120 Henderson
was dispatched with a team of armed offi cers and took
additional supplies, including insulin, from a second
Walgreens pharmacy. Many patients Henderson treated
had “generalized anxiety disorders, not unexpected as
most of the police had lost homes and some had lost
family members and yet still were on the job.” There
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were also many cases of hypertension and diabetes. “I
remember thinking it seems like the majority of the
NOPD were hypertensive and type II diabetic. I took a
lot of blood pressures, listened to a lot of hearts, and
refi lled a lot of beta-blocker, calcium channel blocker,
and diuretic prescriptions. I cleaned and dressed a lot of
superfi cial wounds. I gave a lot of insulin shots,” he said.
Henderson had forgotten to take rubbing alcohol
and used Wild Turkey bourbon to sterilize the injection
sites.121 He also distributed the antibiotic, Cipro, and
treated several skin rashes which were so severe some
police offi cers had to walk around in underwear. He
believed the severe contact dermatitis may have resulted
from exposure to toxins in the water. Katrina Rash, they
began calling it.
In the meantime, police offi cers told him stories of
rapes and murders at the Convention Center, but because
of the lack of communications, they were essentially
unable to do anything about it or even confi rm the
rumors.122 On September 1, under NOPD escort,
Henderson went to his new offi ce at the Ochsner Clinic to
collect additional medical supplies.
On the way back to the Sheraton, he asked an NOPD
captain to drive by the Convention Center.123 There, he
saw “thousands upon thousands of people collected on
the boulevard in front of the convention center. There
were the infants to the elderly in wheelchairs. There were
many elderly lying on sheets and blankets on the median.
There were screaming men, women, and children and
dazed quiet and confused men, women, and children.
Most were African-American, but many were white.” The
NOPD captain was minimally armed and refused to let
Henderson get out of the car, but promised to bring him
back with armed escort.
Henderson, accompanied by Offi cer Mark Mornay,
returned to the Convention Center where he treated
dehydrated infants, mothers, and “hundreds” of elderly
confi ned to wheelchairs.124 One woman in a wheelchair
had deep epidermal ulcerations and two gangrenous toes,
and there was nothing he could do for her. He saw three
children have seizures because they ran out of medication.
He saw and treated a severe asthma attack by only
coaching the child’s breathing. He saw diabetics who had
been without insulin, oral hypo-glycemics, and dialysis for
days. Mornay told Henderson he could not be responsible
for his safety after dark, so they returned to the Sheraton.
Finding: Most hospital and VAMC emergency plans did not offer concrete guidance about if or when evacuations should take place
The South Central VA Health Care Network (VISN 16)
outlines preparedness and response procedures in the
event of a hurricane in its Emergency Management
Program Standard Operating Procedure NO. 10N16-1.125
This section provides the Network Director’s Offi ce, as
well as the Emergency Operating Centers, with much
leeway regarding the assignment of specifi c responsibility
to personnel. Facilities threatened by a hurricane are
instructed to “contact their home healthcare patients,
especially those that are oxygen or ventilator dependent,
and PBHC to determine if they intend to evacuate of
(sic) come to the facility.” Additionally, “Threaten (sic)
HCSs/VAMCs will be required to evaluate all patients and
determine patients that can be moved to other facilities
along with special needs (oxygen/suction/ventilator/IV/
etc.) requirements by either ground or air transportation.”
A VAMC is instructed to have made fi nal evacuation
decisions within 36 to 48 hours prior to landfall.126 The
number of patients evacuated should depend on how
much threat the hurricane poses to the facility. If the VAMC
does decide to evacuate patients, the evacuations should be
completed 24-hours prior to a hurricane’s landfall.
The VAMC Biloxi, Mississippi Emergency Plan
addresses hurricane evacuation protocol more
methodically but still gives confusing directions regarding
if or when the facility should be evacuated in anticipation
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of a hurricane’s landfall. Also absent is specifi c
information about evacuation transportation.
The plan begins by stating, “The basic planning tenet
for hurricanes includes a total evacuation of the Gulfport
Division.”127 The VA health care system is instructed
to work in “close cooperation” with “Alabama and
Mississippi to provide evacuation vehicles and facilities
for use prior to storm strike.”
When a hurricane enters the Gulf of Mexico and/or
is 96 hours or less away from landfall, “the Gulfport
Division will be evacuated entirely.”128 When a hurricane
is within 72 hours of making landfall, the facility is
instructed to prepare for evacuations on short notice.
When a “storm/hurricane enters the Gulfport (sic)
of Mexico and is 48 hours or less away from landfall
at Biloxi/Gulfport,” the plan indicates the VAMC
Director and the VISN 16 Director are to determine
when evacuations will begin. The plan notes, however,
“Evacuation may not be required and is not automatic.”
If the directors do choose to evacuate, all patients must
be moved when the storm is “24 hours or less away from
landfall at Biloxi/Gulfport.”
Chapter I of the VAMC New Orleans Emergency
Management Plan outlines procedures for total evacuation
of patients and staff.129 The plan indicates the evacuation
procedures in this section “will be used for any situation
requiring internal transfer of patients or total evacuation
of patients from the Medical Center,” so while not clearly
stated, it appears this plan should be used in the event of
a hurricane.
VAMC patients and staff are directed to evacuate to
the ground level. While this plan is more detailed than
the VAMC Biloxi plan, it does not account for potential
fl ooding whereby the street exit and the ground fl oor of
the parking garage would be inaccessible.130 In terms of
exactly how to evacuate, the plan states, “Exact evacuation
procedures to be followed will be dictated by the nature
of the disaster and the extent of damage to the Medical
Center buildings.”
If a full-scale evacuation is necessary, the plan says
patients “may be transferred to the VA Medical Center,
Alexandria, LA.131 Transportation of patients to outside
facilities will be accomplished by means of commercially
owned buses, ambulance services, government lease
vehicles or any other means available from outside
sources (i.e., National Guard, City of New Orleans).”
The plan does not include more detailed information
on which services to call upon fi rst or what, if any,
transportation agreements have already been made.
Likewise, there is no indication of which hospitals should
be used in such an emergency if the hospitals in the
immediate surrounding area are not operational.
Chapter III states when a Hurricane Watch is
established, the VAMC Chief of Staff should coordinate
the “relocation of specialty care patients to other facilities
if necessary.”132 Beyond this call for initial coordination
with “other facilities,” there is no outline for when or
specifi cally how to evacuate patients. Additionally, the
plan calls for the evacuation plan from Chapter I be
used in the event of fl ooding. Again, the fi ve previously-
described pages outlining evacuation procedures in
Chapter I do not provide guidance on steps to take in the
event of fl ooding.
The Emergency Management Manual for the Medical
Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) covers
both University and Charity Hospitals.133 The manual
says the Emergency Management Program Coordinator
is responsible for developing, implementing, and
monitoring all aspects of the emergency program. The
manual provides summary information about evacuation
procedures during an emergency, but like the VAMC
plans, does not provide concrete information on whether
facilities should evacuate in anticipation of a hurricane.
The MCLNO plan states if the CEO (or the designee)
so decides, “patients shall be evacuated to an area of safety
by whatever means are available. Formal agreements will
be in place with ambulance services and neighboring
facilities to transfer patients as necessary. All personnel
will be trained in evacuation procedures.”134 The reader
is then directed to reference the Emergency Management
Evacuation Policy, Reference #1026, for LSU’s ambulance
contract, transfer, and vendor agreements. (The Select
Committee was not provided with a copy of the
Emergency Management Evacuation Policy.)
The plan devotes an entire section to evacuation
procedures and provides step-by-step instructions to
specifi c personnel.135 For a total facility evacuation, it says,
“Formal agreements will be made for the following…”
and goes on to list ambulance contract agreements,
transfer agreements, and vendor agreements for special
needs. Decisions regarding the transfer of patients to other
facilities may be made as early as 96 hours in advance of a
potential hurricane. By 72 hours prior to potential landfall,
the plan calls for decisions to be made regarding transfers.
284 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Methodist Hospital uses the Hurricane Preparedness
Plan established by the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness.136 This plan suggests hospitals may begin
evacuation preparations when there is a slow-moving
Category 3, a Category 4, or a Category 5 hurricane
within 72 hours of landfall (and is predicted to make
landfall within 100 miles of New Orleans). The CEO
or his designee has the authority to call for evacuation.
Actual evacuations may begin up to 60 hours in advance.
At 60 hours, the plan says, “Make arrangements for at
least two fl at-bottom type boats in the event of severe
fl ooding conditions” and to fuel vehicles to capacity. The
announcement of total or partial evacuation is called,
if applicable, no later than 24 hours in advance. The
Director of Facility Services, 12 hours prior to landfall, is
to “ensure emergency vehicles and boats are in position
and ready for immediate use.”
There is also a section of the overall Hurricane
Preparedness Plan devoted entirely to evacuations (The
Hurricane Evacuation Plan) which states, “…evacuation
from the Hospital will be a ‘last resort’ measure and will
be carried out only when a mandatory evacuation is
directed by the appropriate authority, or when a situation
arises which places patients and staff unquestionably
in harm’s way. The threat of a direct strike by a major
hurricane certainly creates such a situation, and
evacuation may be necessary to protect the safety of
patients and attending staff.”137
If evacuation takes place prior to a hurricane,
Methodist has written transfer agreements with two
hospitals outside the major hurricane danger zone.138 This
section provides the contact information for Lifeguard
Transportation Service, Inc. and Acadian Ambulance and
Air Med Services — the two companies with whom the
hospital has written transportation agreements. If these
services are overwhelmed, the plan instructs the hospital
to call the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness.
As illustrated by these plans, hospitals and VAMCs
lacked suffi cient guidance for if and when they should
evacuate their patients in anticipation of a hurricane. They
also did not follow the limited guidance they did have.
Finding: New Orleans hospitals, VAMC, and medical fi rst responders were not adequately prepared for a full evacuation of medical facilities
After New Orleans fl ooded, city medical centers needed
to be evacuated. On September 2, Good Morning America
showed the desperation of people trapped inside hospitals,
reporting on a banner hanging from Charity Hospital that
read, “Stop the lying and get us the hell out of here.”139
Flood waters prevented hospitals from receiving supplies or
personnel, and some private hospitals, such as Methodist,
say medical supplies and fuel tanks being airlifted to them
by their corporate headquarters were being intercepted
by FEMA.140 Many hospital emergency power generators
were located at ground level or lower (often below sea
level) and were subject to fl ooding. To make matters worse,
fuel pumps were often placed at ground level, and fuel
storage tanks (with limited fuel capacity) were frequently
below ground level.141 Three acute care hospitals in the
New Orleans area remained operational, four maintained
some limited function, and 21 were not operational,
closed, or evacuated. In hospitals that lost power like
Methodist, pulmonary ventilator systems and other medical
equipment requiring electricity became inoperable. Patients
requiring ventilators were sustained by hand pumps.142
State and FEMA
urban search and
rescue teams were sent
to help the hospitals
evacuate, but they
were intercepted by
people trapped in the
fl oodwaters and on
rooftops.143 While
Guidry said hospital
evacuations were a
huge logistical success
People were trapped inside hospitals, with a banner hanging from Charity Hospital that read, “Stop the lying and get us the hell out of here.”
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— they evacuated 12,000 patients by Saturday,
September 3 — they did not seem like a huge success
to the many patients awaiting rescue.
Hospital and VAMC Evacuation: Their Stories and Timelines of Events
Evacuations from VAMCs for Hurricane Katrina have
received mostly favorable attention, particularly in
comparison to the evacuation diffi culties encountered by
other New Orleans hospitals and shelters. “We had people
on ventilators, we had liver patients, ambulatory patients,
and every patient that we evacuated from every one of our
facilities made it through this evacuation,” VA Secretary
R. James Nicholson said.144
On Monday, August 29, the VAMC Biloxi domiciliary
patients and nine members of the medical staff were
evacuated to VAMC Tuscaloosa, leaving 904 patients,
staff, and family members sheltered in VAMC Biloxi.145
VAMC Gulfport
patients were
transferred to
other facilities
before the storm
made landfall.
VAMC New
Orleans did not
mass evacuate
prior to the
storm, and during the two days that followed, August 30
and 31, its evacuation plans were activated. Five fi ve-ton
trucks were used in cooperation with DOD’s air transport
staff and HHS to evacuate 98 patients to the New Orleans
Airport on September 1. From there, the patients were
fl own to the Houston, Jackson, and Alexandria VAMCs.
At this time, efforts were also underway to evacuate the
remaining 94 patients and 367 staff and family members
at VAMC New Orleans. By Friday, September 2, all
patients, staff, and family members were evacuated from
VAMC New Orleans.
Donald Smithburg, CEO of LSU Health Sciences
Center/Health Care Services Division, and approximately
20 members of his staff provided a detailed account of the
evacuation of their facilities, Charity Hospital (Charity)
and University Hospital (University).146 Smithburg went
to Baton Rouge to staff the state EOC on the Saturday
before the storm, and on Sunday at 7:00 a.m., he activated
Code Grey but decided against calling for evacuation.
At 5:30 a.m. on Monday morning, University lost
electrical power. Charity followed, losing power at 8:00
a.m.147 Both hospitals began using their emergency
generators just two to three minutes after the power
failures. Charity’s generators and electrical equipment
were located in the basement, and LSU offi cials said they
knew Charity would probably lose emergency power if
severe fl ooding occurred. The waters continued rising
over the course of Monday, and late that night, Charity
lost its emergency generators. Unlike Charity, University’s
emergency generator and electrical equipment were
housed on the second fl oor, considered high enough to
avoid fl ooding and low enough to avoid wind damage.
University lost emergency power anyway, and both
hospitals were left in darkness and without the means to
care for their patients.
On Tuesday, August 30, Louisiana Wildlife and
Fisheries evacuated nine of the 17 Intensive Care Unit
(ICU) patients at University and four from the Charity
campus.148 Evacuation efforts were suspended, however,
due to reports of gunfi re and impending nightfall. On
Wednesday, August 3, at 3:00 a.m., LSU received a request
from the state OEP to prepare a patient roster. Offi cials
were told patients should be triaged to red, yellow, and
green status (red, critical; green, stable), and LSU staff
gathered the necessary information manually. Later that
morning, the state OEP notifi ed them via the HEAR
system to prepare for evacuation, but evacuation aid never
arrived. At 11:00 a.m., Charity was notifi ed its evacuation
was to begin in 30 minutes, but by 4:00 p.m., they were
still awaiting word from the National Guard regarding
potential evacuation. That evening, the hospitals were
notifi ed the water level was too high for evacuation via the
National Guard’s fi ve-ton trucks.
Further complications arose on Thursday, August
31 when LSU was told evacuation orders were on hold
due to rumors of violence and potential harm to rescue
workers.149 An e-mail between HHS employees that
morning confi rms this: “Patient evacuation has been
hampered by security issues on patient movement. It is
unsafe for patient movement to continue without security
provided.”150 LSU was told evacuations would resume
after the arrival of federal troops. Smithburg said the Coast
Guard and National Guard were evacuating people in the
most immediate danger, so LSU was not a top priority.
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Evacuations for
University and
Charity patients
and staff began
on Friday,
September 1
at 8:00 a.m.
and noon,
respectively. The U.S. Coast Guard arrived by helicopter.
Patient evacuations were facilitated by the Coast Guard,
Louisiana and Florida Wildlife and Fisheries, NOPD,
and state police. HHS e-mails that morning also indicate,
“today’s priorities are Charity and University Hospitals.”
A total of 167 patients were evacuated from University
and approximately 200 from Charity.151 LSU indicated
that all of these patients were sent with paper records and
three patients died due to the storm; two were ventilator
patients who died on the roof of the hospital during
evacuations.
Larry Graham, CEO for Pendleton Memorial Methodist
Hospital (Methodist), monitored the storm on his own
and stated he received no calls from the city or state
government.152 On Friday at 5:00 p.m., he believed
the storm would miss New Orleans, but on Saturday,
he realized there was going to be a problem. He began
contacting all hospitals with which Methodist had transfer
agreements, but none would admit patients due to
concerns about how the storm might affect them. All of
Methodist’s agreements are with hospitals in Louisiana
or Mississippi because all patient transport is handled
via ground ambulance. He likewise indicated Methodist
is a “for-profi t” hospital, meaning it does not receive
FEMA funding and is responsible for the costs of airlifting
patients. Even with such funding, however, Graham is not
sure evacuation measures are practical. In anticipation of
Hurricane Ivan, Methodist evacuated over 30 ICU patients
over a total of 45 hours. However by Saturday, August 27,
Methodist did not have time for an evacuation of this scale.
Methodist housed a total of 750 people during
Hurricane Katrina, including 130 patients.153 Twenty-
eight were ICU patients with 12 patients on ventilators,
and 16 were dialysis patients. Chalmette Medical Center
(Chalmette), Methodist’s sister hospital located 12 miles
away, evacuated its six ICU patients to Methodist. The
remaining people at Methodist were staff, family, and
people who had sought shelter in the hospital from the
storm.
Like University and Charity, Methodist’s emergency
generators failed after the storm.154 The generators were
located on the roof, but the fuel pumps had fl ooded.
Graham cut power in all areas that were deemed “not
critical,” and they hand-ventilated patients requiring
oxygen. The next day, they began hand-carrying fuel to the
generators. Chalmette’s generators were located on ground
level. At the time, however, Tim Coffey, the then CEO of
Chalmette, believed the facility was sound.
On Sunday, August 28, ambulances were supposed to
be en route to the hospital, but Graham said they were
commandeered by government offi cials.155 Methodist’s
parent company, Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS),
located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, was sending the
hospital supplies, including fuel and water, via helicopter.
The supplies never arrived because, as Methodist and UHS
believe, FEMA intercepted the cargo. Army offi cers and
FEMA offi cials arrived on Tuesday, and Graham informed
them he needed assistance with evacuations. The offi cials
assured him they would return but never did. Throughout
the ordeal, Methodist had the assistance of 12 National
Guardsmen as well as police forces that stayed for security
reasons. Post-Katrina evacuations started taking place
on Wednesday, August 31 because Methodist’s corporate
offi ce contracted with private companies. The diffi culties
the hospital encountered were still enormous, though, as
a September 2 e-mail from a Methodist doctor to HHS
staff indicates:
“Contrary to what has been reported on the news,
Methodist Hospital, including Albert and Maxine
Barrocas have not been evacuated, and the details are
grisly. FEMA has been intercepting supplies sent to
the hospital, and patient and staff evacuations have
essentially ceased.
If anyone can help bring attention to this problem,
please help us. Below are some facts related to us
by the staff at the hospital during one of the few
occasions we have been able to talk to them.
■ 600 People in hospital
■ 13 patients on gurneys
■ Staff is dehydrating
■ FEMA is DIVERTING support being sent in by
UHS (owners of hospital) away from the hospital
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■ Temperature is 110 degrees with humidity
■ NO fuel left to operate th!!e hospital tower (sic)
■ NO communication with National Guard to
coordinate evacuation of patients
■ Having to feed 500+ non-patient refugees — they
are very close to rioting for the balance of food water
and supplies
■ NO power, NO communication
■ Everything is manual — no xray — running out of
supplies
■ Patients are on the 2nd fl oor and 3rd fl oor —
having to carry patients up the stairs and helicopters
didn’t come back
■ Without power, the ventilator dependant patients
are being manually bagged in 1 hour shifts by staff
■ Refusing to take gurney patients
■ FEMA is commandeering all supplies and all
private efforts to get supplies including fuel, food,
water
■ Governor is misrepresenting what is going on
■ Snakes in hospital
■ Rashes on staff from water
■ Losing nurses as result of dehydration
■ Need FEMA to land on roof and prove what they
are saying is correct
■ No security—uprising for f!!ood, water and
supplies (sic)
■ Governor did not allow for the evacuation of
hospitals and now won’t help
■ Uprising of refugees”156
Graham said the evacuations at Methodist were
completed late on Friday, September 2.157 He also stressed
that mid-way through the evacuation, he learned patients
who were triaged to the New Orleans Airport were not
receiving adequate care. He began withholding patients
who were supposed to be taken to the airport because
Methodist was in a position to provide them with better
care. He cited this as a primary “critical issue” — the
evacuation of patients to locations unable to provide
medical care. Coffey added that Chalmette doctors who
went to the New Orleans Airport to offer their services
were turned away by DMATs who said they were not
credentialed in the NDMS physician database.
On September 20, an offi cial from Tenet Healthcare
(Tenet), Memorial Hospital’s (Memorial) parent
company, told CNN the National Guard evacuated some
patients from Memorial before the fl ooding began on
Tuesday, August 30.158 The next morning, Wednesday,
Tenet reported to CNN that it asked New Orleans
local authorities for assistance in evacuating critically
ill patients but was told it would have to hire private
companies. Later that day, Tenet says local authorities
and good samaritans provided limited assistance with
evacuations by boat. On Thursday, helicopters hired by
Tenet airlifted approximately 400 patients, employees,
and evacuees from Memorial to another Tenet-owned
hospital in Slidell, Louisiana. Tenet indicated fl ights
were suspended overnight after reports of sniper fi re, but
evacuations resumed, and were completed, by the end of
the day on Friday, September 2.
Louis Armstrong International Airport
The medical operation at the New Orleans Airport was chaotic due to lack of planning, preparedness, and resources
After patients were
evacuated from medical
facilities, most were
taken to the New
Orleans Airport, which
served as a hospital for
the sick, a refuge for
thousands, and the hub
of medical evacuations
and airlifts.159 There
were two separate
missions at the airport.
The fi rst was attending
to the medial needs of
evacuees and the second
was processing evacuees
not needing medical
attention. According to
OR-2 DMAT, evacuees
who needed medical
treatment were triaged,
treated, and prepared
for transports. People
not requiring medical AP P
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care were processed and prepared for transport to shelters
in other states by commercial aircraft. In total, over
21,000 displaced persons not requiring medical care were
evacuated.
“Overnight, we turned New Orleans’ airport into the
busiest helicopter base in the entire world. At any given
time, there were at least eight to 10 helos off-loading on
the tarmac, each fi lled with 10 to 40 survivors at a time,
with 10 circling to land . . . It was a non-stop, never-
ending, 24-hour-a-day operation,” said Dr. Hemant
Vankawala, a member of the Dallas DMAT deployed to the
New Orleans Airport.160
Medical patients
arrived by truck,
bus, ambulance, and
helicopter with little
or no information
or records about
their conditions.
The medical
personnel at the
New Orleans Airport
were challenged by
the sheer number
of patients and the lack of information about patient
medical histories. By August 31, three DMATs had arrived
at the airport.161 Eventually, eight DMATs would be
stationed at the New Orleans Airport to help provide care
during patient movement operations in New Orleans.162
The Air Force also deployed an EMEDS team, on Thursday,
September 1, to augment the medical assistance operation
in place at the airport.163 These EMEDS teams also assisted
with aeromedical evacuations.
An OR-2 DMAT after-action report described medical
facilities established in the upper and lower levels of
the west terminal of the airport.164 These facilities were
supplied and staffed by DMATs and PHS offi cers. The
fl ow of patients was constant, and it is estimated the
entire medical operation at the New Orleans Airport
treated approximately 3,000 patients who were eventually
evacuated by military aircraft to other facilities. Some
DMATs believe the number was much greater — as high as
6,000 to 8,000 patients.165
Despite the treatment and evacuation of thousands, the
medical operation at the New Orleans Airport was chaotic
due to lack of planning, preparedness, and resources.
FEMA offi cials did not conduct an adequate assessment
of the situation before deploying DMATs. Upon arrival,
many teams were confused about where to place assets
and how to integrate into the existing operation. Many
DMATs arrived before their cache of supplies, limiting
their ability to do their work. According to Vankawala,
medical personnel were operating with a limited amount
of supplies and a generator with only partial power. “All
we could do was provide the barest amount of comfort
care. We watched many, many people die. We practiced
medical triage at its most basic — black tagging the sickest
people and culling them from the masses so that they
could die in a separate area,” Vankawala said.166
TX-1 and TX-4 DMATs, which were among the fi rst
to arrive, had equipment that was not updated and
could not link together other critical equipment, such as
ventilators.167 Similarly, one team member from OR-2
DMAT observed “fi ve different models/brands of glucose
monitors, all using their own proprietary test strips that
weren’t interchangeable. The CA-4 cache, which was
current, arrived later and supplemented these caches.”168
OR-2 DMAT reached the conclusion that, “there
didn’t appear to be a clear plan for dealing with the
approximately 25,000 evacuees who arrived at the airport.
“We practiced medical triage at its most basic — black tagging the sickest people and culling them from the masses so that they could die in a separate area,” Vankawala said.
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There was insuffi cient food, water, and sanitation.”169
One team member said evacuees were being taken from
a dehumanizing experience (fl ooding and rescue) and
placed into an equally dehumanizing environment at the
New Orleans Airport.
Finding: The government did not effectively coordinate private air transport capabilities for the evacuation of medical patients
The Association of Air Medical Services (AAMS),
comprised of 300 mostly private air transportation
providers, represents 85 percent of all hospital transport
capabilities.170 In coordination with the Center for
Transportation Injury Research, AAMS has a database
called the Atlas and Database of Air Medical Services
(ADAMS)— a web-based, interactive database listing these
air medical services (rotary and fi xed wing aircraft) and
receiving hospitals. The database is updated annually,
funded by the Federal Highway Administration, and
receives technical support from the National Highway
Traffi c Safety Administration. In response to Hurricane
Katrina, there was only one governmental request for
access to ADAMS.171
Nevertheless, AAMS companies provided support
for medical evacuations of both hospitals and nursing
homes in Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath. They were not
used for pre-landfall evacuations and provided most of
their resources without offi cial contracts with hospitals.172
Authorities were slow to establish a system for fi ltering
evacuation requests. Confusion and indecision about
evacuations led to delays.
AAMS said FEMA did not help their efforts.173 On
the morning of August 30, FEMA tasked Carla Brawley,
a Department of Transportation contractor, to fi nd
and secure air medical resources.174 Brawley contacted
Acadian Air Ambulance (Acadian) fl ight coordinator, Mike
Sonnier, to request resources. Acadian is the largest air
ambulance provider in Louisiana. An AAMS after-action
report stated,
“According to Mr. Sonnier, sometime later that
morning the National Guard Air Boss (name
unknown) contacted Mr. Sonnier at Acadian and
tasked him to serve as his civilian equivalent. Mr.
Sonnier and Acadian air ambulance was then
tasked with coordinating missions into and out
of New Orleans airspace, coordinating requests
for air evacuations from many of the New Orleans
area hospitals, and also serving as the main contact
between civilian providers and the lone FAA
contracting offi cer that was tasked for this job by
the Department of Transportation for FEMA.”
By the end of the day, approximately 50 medical
helicopters and 13 fi xed-wing aircraft were in New
Orleans.175 While the fi rst air evacuation took fi ve hours,
coordinators were in place to expedite the process on
Wednesday. Over the next 96 hours, approximately 2,000
air medical evacuations were coordinated through AAMS
members.176 Acadian estimates it was responsible for 800
of these evacuations.177 AAMS members accomplished
these evacuations despite diffi culties in communication
and coordination. Poor use of assets and lack of
coordination prevented additional evacuations. AAMS
estimates it could have been able to move up to 7,000
patients if a better system had been in place.178 “The fi rst
72 hours was chaos,” said one AAMS member.179
The majority of requests came directly from hospitals,
such as Tulane University Hospital and Charity Hospital,
because they were not receiving help through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).180
On August 29, Hospital Corporation of America Division
President Dave Smith requested AirHeart Air Ambulance
of Sacred Heart Health System help with evacuations of
Tulane. Smith said fuel for the generators was running low
and fl oodwaters were approaching the facility.181
The following morning, Tuesday, Tulane University
Hospital requested assistance with transporting “two
specialty pediatric patients” from New Orleans to Little
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Rock, Arkansas.182 The Arkansas Children’s Hospital and
its affi liate, Angel One Transport, responded along with
other children’s hospitals.183 Fixed wing aircraft were
provided by two hospitals in Texas: Texas Children’s
Hospital in Houston and Cook Children’s Hospital in
Fort Worth, and Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas
City, Missouri. Additionally, Miami Children’s Hospital
provided a helicopter to assist with the evacuation of “13
critically ill PICU (Pediatric Intensive Care Unit) patients
and family members.” Tulane also directly contacted
Florida-based Air Methods Lifenet Division that same day
for evacuation assistance. In addition to these requests,
personal networking also proved valuable in the absence
of formal agreements. On August 31, a doctor who lived
in Hawaii and had attended Tulane University, contacted
a colleague at Tulane University Hospital. Together, these
two doctors coordinated the assistance of Hawaii Air
Ambulance. AAMS donated helipad coordinators to aid in
effi ciency and were able to evacuate 200 patients by noon
on Friday, September 2.184
Compared to New Orleans, AAMS involvement in
Mississippi was markedly different. Air Methods Lifenet
Division summarized their experience in Mississippi
by saying, “During the entire Katrina experience in
Mississippi, there was no federal command and control or
coordination of resources across the whole area. Attempts
to coordinate with FEMA rescue operation center in
Jackson, Mississippi were rebuffed by federal offi cials there
who stated clearly that all air evacuations in Mississippi,
medical and USAR, had been federalized. And that no
civilian medical aircraft were needed.”185
John Dickerson, the FEMA EOC representative in
Mississippi, declined offers from one AAMS agency to
provide 25 helicopters to Mississippi. The Mississippi
EOC had requested support, through EMAC, from Florida
air transport agencies.186 Johnny Delgado, program
manager of Baptist Health South Florida, Baptist Health
Air Transport, and a Board Member of AAMS, had a crew
and was ready to fulfi ll the request. They were en route
to Gulfport, the meeting point for air medical evacuation
support agencies, but were turned back. Dickerson told
them because the response was now federal, private
agencies are not allowed to assist. However, a different
AAMS company dealt with the Mississippi EOC directly
and was able to provide support to the state.187
Finding: Hospital and VAMC emergency plans did not adequately prepare for communication needs
The Biloxi, Mississippi VAMC Emergency Plan states when
a hurricane is in the Gulf of Mexico and is 24 hours or less
away from landfall, the Facilities Management Services
(FMS) “will distribute emergency communications
equipment. The facility’s HF/VHF radios will be ready to
be set up in the Director’s Conference Room.”188 This part
of the emergency plan does not, however, indicate which
FMS team member is responsible for the distribution,
including what specifi c equipment is to be distributed
and to whom. Instead, the plan says FMS should develop
its own Service Supplemental Hurricane Plan (SSHP) to
address these issues.
The SSHP lists communication preparations and
available equipment.189 In addition to providing
emergency communications equipment, the FMS is
responsible for ensuring there are adequate linens, the
Recreation Hall is set up as an employee shelter, and
evacuation services are in place. VAMC Biloxi says its FMS
team typically includes four to six people (two or three
craftsman and two or three housekeepers) to handle this
wide range of operations.190
The plan also lists the VAMC’s communications
capabilities but does not mention satellite phones
discussed previously in the SSHP. It relies “primarily upon
the use of telephones” and focuses on a telephone system
designed exclusively for internal communications.191
Two-way radios are designated for specifi c personnel,
but the plan recognizes limits to radio capabilities,
stating, “The limited number of radios and single voice
transmission, however, combine to impose several
restrictions.” The radios are intended as back-up to the
inter-offi ce telephone system. The VAMC plan relies on
landline telephones and the Hospital Emergency Area
Radio (HEAR) Network System to communicate with the
Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and outside world.
The VAMC New Orleans Emergency Management
Plan also depends on the HEAR Network System for
communication with area hospitals and ambulances.192
The Chief of Police Services is to maintain a “pool”
of Motorola radios, the exact number of which is
not specifi ed but will be used upon activation of the
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 291
emergency plan. Radios should be distributed to 11 staff
members, all of whom are designated in the plan. The
plan also indicates radios will operate for about eight
hours before needing to be charged and provides the
frequency at which these radios operate. The failure
response section does not mention potential power
failures, and in turn, the inability to recharge the radios.
Additionally, no section of the plan addresses when the
two-way radios should be distributed in preparation
for the storm. In fact, the Hurricane section of the
plan fails to mention radios or refer the reader to the
communications chapter.
The Veterans Health Information Systems and
Technology Architecture (VISTA) Contingency Plan
cites hurricanes as a “high probability” threat.193 A
telecommunications contingency plan included within
the VISTA plan lists responsibilities and procedures
for personnel in charge of communications during a
telephone system failure. This plan indicates hand-held
radios and/or cell phones will be used if landlines do not
work and details who distributes the radios as well as who
or what areas receives them. A total of 26 areas within
VMAC New Orleans are to be provided with two-way
radios (one radio per area), but there is no indication
of how these radios should stay charged in the event
power is lost. Additionally, “a cache of cellular phones are
maintained by CIM Service Line Director . . . . ” The exact
number is not specifi ed, but the plan states eight areas are
“designated as fi rst priority to receive cellular telephones.”
As with the two-way radios, there is no planning for how
to keep these cellular phones charged in the event that
power is lost.
Charity and University use the Emergency Management
Manual for the Medical Center of Louisiana at New
Orleans.194 The hospitals depend on two-way radios,
cell phones, HEAR Radio, HRSO Radio, 800MZ
Radio, and HAM Radio links for internal and external
communications backup.
Methodist’s Disaster and Emergency Preparedness
Plan charges the Hurricane Preparedness Control
Center with establishing and maintaining emergency
communications.195 The control center is assigned
special telephone extensions as well as backup telephone
numbers in case landlines fail. HEAR radio equipment,
including the backup system, should be tested when
a storm is more than 72 hours away. At 72 hours, the
director of Facility Services is to designate the radio
operator’s availability and “ensure operator adequately
(sic) trained.” At 60 hours before landfall, battery supplies
are checked. When the storm is 24 hours from landfall,
the director of Facility Services provides the maintenance
supervisor with a two-way radio unit. When the storm
is 12 hours away, the director of Facility Services should
“position emergency equipment supplies and prepare for
immediate operations” and conduct a “fi nal check of the
emergency power system.” He or she is also supposed to
ensure the radio operator is on duty and has contact on
the HEAR system.
Methodist’s plan takes into account the potential
for fl ooding as a result of a Category 3, Category 4, or
Category 5 hurricane stating, “Flooding conditions to some
extent can almost certainly be expected to accompany a
hurricane.196 Several recent studies and surveys by hurricane
forecasting experts indicate that the entire New Orleans
area is extremely vulnerable to “catastrophic fl ooding”
as a result of a major storm.” If fl ooding is predicted or
reported, the CEO is instructed to shut down telephone
communications equipment and reassign communications
attendants to the Control Center.197 As such, all
communications would obviously be lost.
These hospital and VAMC emergency plans lack a
clear communications section, often leaving unanswered
questions about what communications capabilities are
in place, who is responsible for the equipment, and how
to respond if power is lost. As a result, Gulf coast medical
facilities were left without appropriate equipment or a
proper understanding of how to implement an effective
emergency communications plan.
Finding: Following Hurricane Katrina, the inability of VAMC New Orleans and hospitals to communicate impeded their ability to ask for help
Hospital executives said in Katrina’s aftermath, hospital
emergency area radio HEAR systems simply did not
work.198 Cell phones worked occasionally and allowed
them to get in touch with the Louisiana Hospital
Association, which in turn contacted the OEP on
their behalf. The primary source of information was
292 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
television.199 In an interview with CNN on September 30,
Dr. Albert Barrocas, a physician at Methodist, said, “We
were trapped, communications was a big issue. The fact
that we could not bring family and patients together, a lot
of them were separated. The majority were separated. We
did not even know where these people were going to.”200
The Director of VA Veterans Integrated Service Network
16 (VISN 16), Robert Lynch, tells a similar story. “There
was no plan in Biloxi and New Orleans. Hard-working
people did a lot of workarounds with a lot of creativity.
We’re going to learn from that,” he said.201 VISN 16
lost communications through its telephone landlines,
operated by Sprint, during the storm. Lynch indicated
that satellite phones worked sporadically and only when
outside. In Biloxi, reports indicate only one cellular
tower remained, and cell phone users could only make
calls — not receive them. The VA worked around the
communication failures by establishing a schedule for
employees to be outside with satellite phones.202
Smithburg said that on Sunday at 7:00 a.m., the
hospital set up an incident command center in its board
room for communications.203 The following day, the
hospital went to Code Grey, and HAM operators arrived
at the hospital. LSU had a point of contact at the OEP,
but after the storm, LSU couldn’t receive information
from the OEP or FEMA. On Monday, August 29,
Smithburg reported that Nextel and cell phone service
were temporarily lost on the University campus, and text
messaging was “intermittent.”
Smithburg cited inadequate Health Resources and
Services Administration grant funding as the primary
reason for communication failure and said the LHA
receives the federal grant money and allots it to Louisiana
hospitals.204 While the grants were helpful for supplying
Motorola phones and a HAM network, he believes
the funding for LSU was disproportionately small in
comparison to its needs and patient load.
In the days following Hurricane Katrina, Gulf coast
hospitals and VAMCs were responsible for hundreds
of patients, some of whom were in critical condition.
Without necessary communications capabilities, these
facilities were almost completely isolated from fi rst
responders and the outside world. Incapacitated and
without supplies, many struggled to provide care and keep
patients alive until help arrived.
Finding: Medical responders did not have adequate communications equipment or operability
Inadequate communications and situational awareness among and within federal agencies contributed to a diminished understanding of the health needs of affected populations
On October 20, Stephens told the Associated Press,
“Anything that could go wrong in communications went
wrong.”205 Interviews with health offi cials and countless e-
mails from ESF-8 agency personnel support his statement.
Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, cell phones
and landlines were not working, blackberries were not
dependable (and in some cases, unavailable), and satellite
telephone capabilities were not suffi cient.
In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, Stephens oversaw
the placement of an incident command trailer inside the
Superdome.206 Immediately following the storm, he said
landlines, the only mode of communication for his team,
worked just fi ve to 10 percent of the time. By Wednesday,
cell phones began working intermittently but not enough
to meet their communication needs, and despite his
initial preparations, Stephens said these communication
failures “weren’t anticipated at all.”
Colonel Kenneth K. Knight, Chief of the Air Force
Medical Operations Center presented a timeline that
showed similar diffi culties — its communication systems
were inoperable until September 1.207 On this date, the
Air Force medical response timeline says there were, “Few
working landlines and cell phone success [was] spotty.” It
was not until four days after the storm, on September 2,
the “cell phone network [was] improving.”
Likewise, Colonel Falk, an Air National Guard Surgeon,
cited communications as the number one area needing
Hospital executives said in Katrina’s aftermath, hospital emergency area radio system (HEAR) simply did not work.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 293
improvement.208 Both the Air National Guard and Army
National Guard experienced almost a total failure in
communications. The Army satellite system was not
working, and personal cell phones (service provided by
Verizon) were the only means of contact. Likewise, the
National Guard Bureau’s “After Action Review” indicates
communication failures adversely affected situational
awareness. It states, “Lack of situational awareness was
caused largely by the loss of communications. The lack
of communications and diffi culties with interoperability
of equipment between forces as well as between the
military and civilian leadership also hampered the rapid
generation of EMAC requests. Poor communications also
resulted in a lack of visibility of available assets in nearby
states.”209
National Guard Bureau Chief Lieutenant General
Steven Blum indicated many guardsmen were equipped
with outdated radios, and it was impossible for them to
communicate with the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division
and 1st Calvary Division. “You don’t want two units
operating in the same area, doing the same function, that
can’t coordinate their efforts because they don’t have the
communications equipment,” Blum said.210
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of HHS, Offi ce of
Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Dr. Robert Blitzer,
said communications were initially a big problem.211
The command center used land lines and cell phones,
and Blitzer also ordered a mobile communications
center, which was deployed from Washington, D.C.
to Atlanta and then to Baton Rouge. Blitzer had not
needed to deploy the mobile communications center
for the previous four hurricanes that hit Florida. HHS
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Health and
Emergency Preparedness, Dr. Gerald Parker, knew of just
one satellite phone, located on the command bus, and
said all SERT leaders “probably” had one.212 Simonson
said he thought there were two satellite phones per SERT,
but for every satellite phone call that was successful, there
were probably six failed attempts.213
Communication failures also affected NDMS. NDMS
Chief Jack Beall said not only did his staff not have
enough equipment, the operability of the equipment
they had was “in and out.”214 Satellite phones worked
only when trucks containing the satellite equipment were
pointing in the right direction. But as Beall said, “When
you have people dying, there’s no time to mess with
satellite phones.” Overall, his Nextel cell phone was his
best option for communicating, but when he or his staff
worked in the Superdome, it was “total blackout.” Efforts
to remedy this problem began on September 3, with
NDMS working to reach agreements with private cellular
companies for the provision of “communications on
wheels.”215
OR-2 DMAT also cited communications as a key
obstacle — particularly the operability of cell phones
and interoperability of radios inside the New Orleans
Airport.216 “There is an over reliance on cellular phones
for communications. The cellular infrastructure was
severely damaged during Katrina and cell phone service
was initially unavailable . . . . ,” OR-2 DMAT reported.
Radios also proved insuffi cient — the JT-1000 radios
provided for the team could not contact radios in
distant areas of the airport. Similarly, the team had no
communication with security personnel via radio until the
Forest Service provided Bendex King radios.
The breakdowns in communication experienced
by government offi cials are illustrated in ESF-8 agency
personnel e-mails. These e-mails show correspondence
was almost non-existent until August 31, and diffi culties
sending and receiving messages persisted well into the
fi rst week of September. On August 31, a SERT member
e-mailed the EOC and said, “My BB doesn’t work at all, any
communications with me will have to be through cell.”217
In Mississippi, a September 3 e-mail from the Gulfport
Field Command Center indicates, “No phones or power as
of now. Cells sometimes, Nextel service best. T-mobile not
good for BBs at this area but do work other locations.”218
On September 5, a week after the storm, e-mails indicate
that communications had not signifi cantly improved. A
CDC employee wrote the EOC saying, “Our folks in the
fi eld only have access to blackberry now. (The phone lines
are going in and out and faxes are very diffi cult to send).”219
Much attention has been paid to lack of operability
and the inability of fi rst responders to connect with
each other through the equipment they had. Some
responders, however, were having diffi culties just getting
the equipment itself. A SERT team member on her way
to Baton Rouge e-mailed HHS offi cials on September 5
saying she needed a cell phone and blackberry. A response
from an HHS offi cial states, “We do not issue Blackberry’s
to individuals for deployments (and we don’t have any
anyway), we have also exhausted our total cache of
phones, so we have absolutely nothing to issue. If things
294 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
change, I will advise you.”220 Likewise, the OR-2 DMAT
report says there were an insuffi cient number of Motorola
JF-1000 radios for their convoy, and other teams who did
not have access to radios at all “encountered safety-related
issues due to a lack of communications.” The radios and
satellite phones inside the FEMA trucks were also of no
use to DMAT teams, as they had not been programmed.221
From lack of equipment, to inoperability, to failure
to program satellite phones, communications proved to
be one of the greatest obstacles to the Hurricane Katrina
medical response. Critical time was wasted. And energy
that should have been spent treating patients was instead
spent on repeated, and often times unsuccessful, attempts
to communicate.
Finding: Evacuation decisions for New Orleans nursing homes were subjective and, in one case, led to preventable deaths
“We see where there are gaping holes in our system. It
has become clear that no one was evaluating these plans
in any real sense. The system provides no check and
balance.”
—Louisiana State Representative Nita Hutter222
Like its hospitals, Louisiana’s nursing homes (all privately
owned, with the exception of two) are responsible for
having their own evacuation plans.223 These plans are
required to be updated annually, and before the start
of hurricane season each year, DHH sends a reminder
letter. DHH also checks to ensure every Louisiana nursing
home submits a plan; however, media reports indicate
DHH cited only one nursing home in the past year for
submitting an inadequate plan.224
Most plans encourage patients’ families to help with
evacuations, and several southeast Louisiana nursing
homes have agreements with nursing homes in northern
Louisiana for the transfer of residents after evacuations.225
The statewide occupancy of Louisiana nursing homes
is roughly 70 percent, which allows evacuated nursing
homes to fi nd bed space elsewhere. Before Hurricane
Katrina’s landfall, 19 nursing homes evacuated their
residents. After the fl ooding in New Orleans, an additional
32 nursing homes evacuated. One nursing home, Saint
Rita’s, did not evacuate at all, and 35 residents died.
Overall, it is estimated that 215 people died in New
Orleans nursing homes and hospitals as a result of Katrina
and failed evacuations.226
Three Louisiana Nursing Homes
Michael Ford is CEO and owner of three nursing homes
in the New Orleans area — Riverbend Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center (Riverbend), located in Plaquemines
Parish, Metairie Health Care Center (Metairie), located in
Jefferson Parish, and Waldon Health Care Center (Waldon),
also located in Jefferson Parish.227 Combined, these nursing
homes house close to 360 patients. Ford is also the Vice
President of the New Orleans region of the Louisiana
Nursing Home Association (LNHA) and is a member
of the Plaquemines OEP. According to Ford, all nursing
homes’ emergency plans must be approved by the state.
Riverbend’s emergency plan calls for the establishment of
a pre-determined evacuation site, usually in a church gym
in Kentwood, Louisiana, for both staff and patients. Ford
has evacuated his nursing home patients once before, in
anticipation of Hurricane Ivan, using an 18-wheel fl at bed
trailer equipped with air conditioning and a generator. The
experience was trying, with the patients sitting “on a bus for
eight hours to go one hundred miles,” but he also says it
gave him and his staff experience for Hurricane Katrina.
Ford received notice of the mandatory evacuation
for Plaquemines Parish on the Saturday before Katrina
made landfall. Jesse St. Amant, the OEP Director for
Plaquemines Parish, declared the evacuation at 9:00 a.m.
on August 27 and said, “If they don’t leave, I tell ‘em
they’re going to die in place.”228 Despite the diffi culties
moving patients for Hurricane Ivan, Ford listened to St.
Amant and evacuated his nursing home in Plaquemines.
Evacuation of Riverbend to the church in Kentwood was
assisted by approximately 25 church volunteers, who
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moved patients by carrying them on mattresses. Ford
eventually relocated all but 50 of his patients to a wing
he rented at Kentwood Manor Nursing Home. The rest
were taken to one of Ford’s other two nursing homes
in Jefferson Parish. It took almost six weeks to fi nd
accommodations and move everyone.229
Ford decided against evacuating Metairie, thinking
it would withstand the storm. Subsequent fl ooding,
however, forced him to evacuate 115 patients.230 Using
Wildlife and Fishery department boats and a Louisiana
Army National Guard two and a half ton truck, patients
were taken to higher ground on the interstate. Buses from
the New Orleans’ EOC collected some patients on the
evening of August 29 and took them to a staging area
in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Ford had some pre-existing
contracts for housing his patients elsewhere, but he moved
them to the fi rst available locations — all of which were in
Louisiana. By mid November, patients from Metairie were
moved to the Waldon facility (which was not evacuated
for Katrina), where they remain today.
St. Rita’s Nursing Home
The night before landfall, Ford had a phone conversation
with Mabel Mangano, who co-owns St. Rita’s Nursing
Home with her husband. “I’m staying,” she told him.231
Media reports indicate the Manganos were so confi dent
about the safety of St. Rita’s, they invited staff, friends, and
relatives to use it as a shelter.232
The Manganos and their 78 patients remained in the
nursing home throughout the storm, and like many in
New Orleans, thought they were safe after the hurricane
passed.233 But the fl oodwaters began to rise — eight to
nine feet in 30 minutes — and the Mangano’s grandson
swam out and brought back a boat. They began putting
patients on mattresses fl oating like rafts.
On September 13, the Manganos were charged with 34
counts of negligent homicide.234 Attorney General Charles
Foti’s September 14 press release stated the “charges stem
from Mable Mangano and Salvador Mangano, Sr.’s alleged
failure to evacuate St. Rita’s Nursing Home, contrary to
the facility’s own evacuation plan and in violation of the
St. Bernard Parish’s mandatory evacuation. Additionally,
subsequent to the mandatory evacuation order, authorities
offered to send two buses and drivers to evacuate residents
from the facility and the Manganos allegedly declined this
offer.”235
The News-Star, a Monroe, Louisiana newspaper, says
despite these charges, “the Manganos did not abandon
St. Rita’s during the fl ooding. Nor did they seal the fate
of their elderly residents by strapping them to their beds
before leaving, as was widely reported. They worked
alongside their staff and a few Good Samaritans during
the frantic rescue effort . . . . ”236 Parish residents may
soon be the judge.
Finding: Lack of electronic patient medical records contributed to diffi culties and delays in medical treatment of evacuees
Although HHS partnered with the AMA to establish a website allowing physicians and pharmacists to electronically access the prescription records of patients affected by Katrina, few patients or health care providers had access to medical records or a common medical record system
As Hurricane Katrina tore through the Gulf coast region,
it destroyed millions of pages of paper fi les and patient
medical records in doctor offi ces, clinics and hospitals.
Thousands of patients displaced from the region by the
storm lacked medical records and were forced to depend
on memory and knowledge of their medical history,
allergies, and other important information.
“If they don’t leave, I tell ‘em they’re going to die in place.”
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Kindred Hospital in New Orleans was one of the few
facilities in the Gulf coast with electronic patient medical
records. When Kindred evacuated 54 patients following
Katrina, the hospital was able to send patients’ medical
records electronically to other Kindred operated facilities
in Baton Rouge and Houston where the patients had been
transferred.237 Additionally, Kindred was able to print and
mail hard copies of a patient’s electronic medical history
for those who were evacuated to non-Kindred facilities.238
Eighty pediatric cancer patients from the Gulf coast
were evacuated to St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital
(St. Jude) in Memphis, Tennessee.239 The hospital was
tasked with tracking down oncologists who fl ed fl ooded
New Orleans with treatment records to ensure appropriate
treatment for the pediatric patients. Additionally,
doctors at St. Jude were forced to rely heavily on parents’
recollection and notes of their children’s treatments.
“I honestly feel quite comfortable that the worst-case
scenario is we delayed treatment” for some children, Dr.
Joseph Mirro said. But there was “a lot of fl ying by the seat
of your pants to get it right.”240
According to Stephens, all medical fi les and
documentation made regarding the treatment and
medical attention provided to evacuees in the Superdome
were lost.241 This contrasts sharply with how patients’
medical information was handled at the Astrodome in
Houston. Thousands of the evacuees at
the Superdome and Convention Center
were transferred to the Astrodome without
any paper or medical fi les. Volunteers in
Houston were tasked with documenting
patient information and registering evacuees
to create new electronic medical records.
The Harris County Hospital District created
a large clinic in the Astrodome, which
included 80 computer terminals to aid in
registering patients and recording their
medical history and information.242 By
September 9, records had been created for
approximately 8,000 Katrina evacuees.243
Additionally, the American Medical Association (AMA),
National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA),
and several other organizations collaborated to launch
the KatrinaHealth.org prescription medication network
in September. The network is a secure online service to
help physicians and authorized healthcare providers
access medication and dosage information for Katrina
evacuees.244 The network allows and authorizes physicians
and pharmacies to provide prescription refi lls, or prescribe
new medications.245 It facilitates coordinated care and
helps to avoid potential medical errors by providing access
to patient information. The AMA provides physician
credentialing while NCPA provides authentifi cation of
pharmacists and pharmacies.246
Because the VA has developed an electronic patient
record system for its facilities, electronic records for over
50,000 New Orleans VAMC patients were downloaded
to tapes and transferred to the VAMC in Houston.247 The
Houston VAMC was able to reconfi gure and restore them
after the New Orleans VAMC evacuation. The records chief
for the South-Central VA Healthcare Network said, “Every
single thing on that computer was saved.”248
Hurricane Katrina showed that physicians are often
our “second” responders. They, too, need the support of
sophisticated IT systems, enabling them to respond to a
crisis quickly and retrieve and share critical records and
“I honestly feel quite comfortable that the worst-case scenario is we delayed treatment” for some children, Mirro said. But there was “a lot of fl ying by the seat of your pants to get it right.”
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information. The emerging public health threats of the
21st Century require the seamless fl ow of information at
all levels of government. The need for better integration
of IT into the healthcare industry was highlighted by
thousands of Katrina evacuees with no medical patient
records.
HHS has made recent efforts to support digital health
recovery for the Gulf coast. In November, HHS announced
partnerships with the Southern Governors’ Association
and DHH to accelerate electronic health records in Gulf
states to create accessible, accurate medical records and
medical information.249 These partnerships will help
physicians, medical practices, and hospitals rebuild
medical records for their patients as they return to the
region. However, National Coordinator for Health
Information Technology, Dr. David Brailer, said, “Making
patient data accessible to authorized physicians, whether
it is following a hurricane or as part of routine care,
remains a challenge that must be addressed.”250
Finding: Top offi cials at HHS and NDMS do not share a common understanding of who controls NDMS under ESF-8
On a larger scale, the command structure between HHS
and the NDMS was problematic. ESF-8 is implemented
by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness at HHS; however, NDMS is housed and
operates under FEMA (DHS) authority. For Hurricane
Katrina, NDMS was activated by FEMA on August 25.251
According to the FEMA Offi ce of General Counsel,
activation of NDMS would certainly have “stood up”
ESF-8.252 However, there is no evidence of action
under ESF-8 until August 27, when HHS fi rst convened
conference calls.253 During a natural disaster or public
health emergency, HHS and NDMS communication and
coordination is essential for an effective response.
According to Simonson, coordinating the public
health response under ESF-8 was “a strain without
operational control and logistical support.”254 He says
the relocation of NDMS left HHS with few operational
assets. Despite HHS responsibility for coordinating the
federal response to public health emergencies, HHS only
has PHS Commissioned Corps, SNS, and other smaller
functions under its command. Unlike NDMS, none of
HHS remaining assets are confi gured for a quick response.
Instead, HHS assets are meant to sustain existing medical
services and infrastructures. Simonson also indicated
that without direct control over NDMS assets, the
effi ciency and effectiveness of ESF-8 is crippled. With
modest operational assets, Simonson noted HHS lacked
situational awareness, saying, “HHS lost its fi eld network
to FEMA when NDMS was moved to DHS.”255
As executor of ESF-8, Simonson attempted to
coordinate the pre-positioning of medical assets prior to
Katrina’s landfall.256 He spoke directly to Stephens on
Saturday, August 27 and Sunday, August 28 to ask what
supplies the Superdome needed. As a result of those
conversations, Simonson called then Acting Director of
the Response Division Edward G. Buikema at FEMA to
“aggressively advocate” DMATs, water, ice, and MREs be
positioned in the Superdome prior to landfall. Simonson
believed it would have been much easier to task NDMS
if those assets had been under his direct control. When
asked about attempts at coordination between the two
agencies, Simonson said NDMS participated in ESF-8
conference calls, but despite its participation, acted as an
asset of FEMA without coordinating mission assignments
with him.
An e-mail from a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Liaison at DOD, Mark Roupas, to Assistant Secretary for
Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale on August
29, however, suggests Simonson did have a say in NDMS’
activation. Roupas says: “ . . . . DHHS is trying to decide
which health care approach is better: 1) activate NDMS
and move the patients out of the state or 2) move medical
beds and personnel into the affected area and treat there.
DHHS medical planners are meeting with Mr. Simonson
at 6pm to discuss and decide which course of action to
accept. If the decision is to move the patients via NDMS,
then DHHS will activate the NDMS system. If the decision
is to treat intrastate, then we should expect a formal RFA
for -500 beds and personnel support.”257 This e-mail begs
the question: how was the primary coordinator of medical
response unaware that FEMA had activated NDMS on
August 25?
Simonson believes ESF-8 should be more “clearly
articulated.”258 He also believes the relocation of NDMS
to DHS in 2003 undermined NDMS effectiveness.
298 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Since its transfer, funding for NDMS has been stagnant,
with millions of dollars being siphoned off to support
“unidentifi ed services.”259 NDMS has lost two-thirds
of its staff since 2003. “There is room for substantial
improvement in coordination between NDMS and the
rest of ESF-8. Either ESF-8 should be directly responsible
for NDMS or ESF-8 should be moved to where NDMS is
located,” Simonson said.260
Beall disagreed and told a much different story about
the coordination between NDMS and HHS.261 He said
HHS has the authority to move NDMS and its assets
under ESF-8 and that, to his knowledge, NDMS did not
deploy any assets, with the exception of pre-positioning,
without a direct order from HHS. He said HHS and
NDMS were in close coordination throughout the
operation, and that any coordination issues were more
likely a result of internal diffi culties within HHS — not
between HHS and NDMS. He believes NDMS relocation
to FEMA allows the system to “lean forward” more than it
could under HHS.
How these two senior offi cials view the coordination
and authorities for HHS and NDMS speaks for itself.
Without a clear understanding of who has functional
jurisdiction over NDMS, coordination of the system and
all of its assets was certain to result in failures.
The OR-2 DMAT report illustrates command structure
confusion, and general coordination problems, between
NDMS and the DMAT teams it managed at the New
Orleans Airport. OR-2 DMAT members reported a number
of command-related issues, including:
■ ICS/NIMIS (or any form of an organized internal
command and control structure) was not implemented
by FEMA/NDMS at the airport. (Some attempts to use
ICS were made by FEMA/NDMS following the arrival of
a Forest Service overhead team, but were generally not
that effective.)
■ There was no formalized unifi ed command established
between the many participating agencies until late in
the response.
■ No safety offi cer was initially appointed at the
command level (in a very unsafe environment).
■ Roles, responsibilities, and reporting structure of the
two MSTs (Baton Rouge and Airport) were never
clearly articulated. It was unclear what role the PHS
representative at the airport had.
■ Liaisons with military and civilian entities participating
in relief efforts at the airport were never established.
■ There did not appear to be any initial interfacing at a
management level with knowledgeable local medical
providers, public health offi cials, and local emergency
providers.
■ There appeared to be a lack of communications
between the Airport MST and Baton Rouge MST as well
as NDMS headquarters.
■ Information was not being effectively communicated to
the DMATs from either of the MSTs.
■ There was considerable friction between DMATs and
the MSTs. An ‘us and them’ attitude was prevalent.
■ Only one fulltime FEMA/NDMS employee was present
at the airport MST (arriving after operations had
started). All other Airport MST staff were taken from
onsite DMATs, reducing the number of team personnel
for patient treatment and operations support.
■ Inexperienced leaders were placed in an overwhelming
and chaotic environment that caused their effectiveness
to rapidly deteriorate.
■ Management decisions that were being made were not
based on the best interests of the patients.
■ There was inadequate equipment available to produce
the copies and paperwork FEMA was requiring.262
The OR-2 DMAT report further states, “FEMA/NDMS
operations at the airport were extremely disorganized
compared to parallel military and Forest Service
operations.” Tensions between FEMA/NDMS and DMATs
is an ongoing problem and “continues to compromise
the effi ciency of operations due to a lack of trust between
both parties.”263
Beall agreed there was tension and speculated DMAT
members are accustomed to being in control of their
environments and are not used to taking orders from
federal offi cials.264 He also said most of the FEMA NDMS
offi cials deployed during Katrina and giving orders
to DMATs were unseasoned and their inexperience
contributed to the friction.
Historically, the mission of DMATs was to rapidly deploy
and set up self-supporting fi eld hospitals and provide
medical care within the fi rst 72 hours after a disaster before
the arrival of other federal assets.265 Alternatively, FEMA has
historically operated under the assumption that state and
local offi cials are the fi rst line of defense during the initial
72 hours following a disaster until a federal response can
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 299
be coordinated. The NDMS response to Katrina suggests
that FEMA was unable to support the historical rapid-
deployment capability of NDMS.266
Finding: Lack of coordination led to delays in recovering dead bodies
The lack of coordination among agencies also contributed
to delayed recovery of dead bodies in the Gulf coast
region. According to ESF-8, HHS is responsible for
victim identifi cation and mortuary services. HHS has
authority to ask DHS and DOD to assist in providing
victim identifi cation and mortuary services; establishing
temporary morgue facilities; performing victim
identifi cation by fi ngerprint, forensic dental, and/or
forensic pathology and anthropology methods; and
processing, preparation, and disposition of remains.267
The most experienced personnel in this area are a part
of NDMS under the authority of FEMA and DHS. DOD
also has signifi cant expertise in mortuary affairs and mass
fatality management.
Despite having this authority, HHS was slow to respond
and coordinate efforts with DOD and DHS. On Sunday,
September 4, DOD sent an e-mail to DHS recognizing the
need to assist overwhelmed state and local authorities in
victim identifi cation. The e-mail provided a brief analysis
of the situation in the Gulf coast region and said, “If this
analysis is correct, it’s not if, but when and how DOD will
be asked to assist in the mortuary affairs response.”268 The
e-mail further says DOD has developed “potential plans on
what kind of requirements will be needed and how DOD
can provide response support. Currently we have identifi ed
the potential missions of search and recovery, remains
transport to establish human remains collection points,
and assistance with DNA capture analysis.”269 The e-mail
recommends a meeting between DHS, HHS, FEMA, and
DMORT to discuss coordination among agencies and the
commercial sector. It is unclear if and when this meeting
took place. What is clear, however, is DOD essentially took
the lead in coordinating an operational mortuary affairs
plan, which was originally the responsibility of HHS.
Following the e-mail from DOD, HHS personnel
recognized the need for an “integrated ESF-8 response”
and devising a “coordinated way to collect and share
information.”270 When asked why it took an e-mail
from DOD six days after Katrina’s landfall, Simonson
responded, “HHS was not involved in discussions
with actual body recovery. FEMA, DOD, and Kenyon
International Emergency Services (Kenyon), a mortuary
services contractor, were in discussions for recovery
services and it was unclear who was in charge of the
recovery effort.”271 ESF-8 is not responsible for recovering
bodies but is responsible for mortuary services. As a result,
HHS “had to wait for certain discussions to be made
before going ahead with specifi c decisions. Everyone
was frustrated with how slow the initial discussions
were going.”272 Before HHS can coordinate victim
identifi cation and other mortuary services, FEMA, DOD,
and state offi cials must have a recovery plan in place.
Body recovery was no less confused. For days, bodies
went uncollected as state and federal offi cials remained
indecisive on a body recovery plan. With state and local
offi cials utterly overwhelmed by the disaster, they were
initially more focused on rescuing Katrina’s survivors than
recovering dead bodies. By September 5, inaction was
causing frustration. “Number 1 issue is body collection,”
Army Colonel John J. Jordan, military assistant to Brown
at FEMA, wrote in an e-mail that day.273 Jordan continued,
“This issue must be addressed, and frankly, there is
operations paralysis at this point. FEMA is pushing State
to see what they want to do, and indications are that
Governor is involved in some of the decisions, especially
regarding interment.” A week later, Blanco publicly
blamed FEMA for the delay and its inability to sign a
contract with Kenyon for body collection services.274
Kenyon later signed a contract with the state.275
One week after landfall, on September 5, Simonson
requested “ample mobile mortuary services throughout
the affected region.”276 An order for 200 mobile mortuary
trucks was issued with 130 designated to Louisiana and
70 to be delivered to Mississippi.277 By the next day
mortuary services were being established in St. Gabriel,
Louisiana with 96 personnel.278 FEMA and Louisiana
collaborated on drafting a body recovery plan which
required the approval of Brown, and the Louisiana “newly
appointed” state medical examiner.279 In Mississippi,
mortuary services were established at the Naval Air Station
in Gulfport. By September 6, one DMORT had set up
facilities at the Naval Air Station. Body recovery was an
enormous task that took several months to complete. Each
home in the affected area was inspected twice for bodies.
Mortuary services continue in the region as remains are
identifi ed and returned to families.
300 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Finding: Deployment confusion, uncertainty about mission assigments, and government red tape delayed medical care
“Coordinating all of those agencies isn’t a simple thing and [is] very diffi cult to practice. We sit down and do tabletop exercises where we go over who’s going to do what, but a disaster of this magnitude is something that is very diffi cult to simulate or really practice. So, we rely on really well-trained, capable people that can adapt and adjust to whatever the situation is to get the job done.”
— Colonel Richard Bachmann, U.S. Air Force280
In the wake of Katrina, fi rst responders worked tirelessly
— days and nights in miserable conditions — to provide
medical care to thousands of hurricane victims. The
coordination of these medical personnel, supplies,
and equipment proved to be a daunting task. At one
point, a frustrated member of the CDC Division of
Emergency Operations wrote: “The approval process for
a bottle of aspirin seems to be the same as for a 500 bed
hospital.”281 From confusion about mission assignments
and deployments, to broader misunderstandings about
command structure, coordination was undoubtedly an
obstacle to the Gulf coast medical response. Coordination
efforts were impeded, and in turn, these impediments
adversely affected the overall medical response.
Deployment Assignments
Hundreds of e-mails were sent from medical fi rst
responders to government offi cials expressing confusion
and frustration over their deployment orders. On Friday,
September 2, a PHS offi cer in Oregon sent an e-mail
saying, “I’ve got supervisory approval and have had my
bags packed and ready in the trunk of my car to leave at a
moment’s notice since Tuesday. Is there anything further
you can tell me?”282 On September 5, a Food and Drug
Administration employee e-mailed the PHS coordinating
offi cer saying,
“I’m deploying tomorrow. I don’t have any
information about the mission and whether my
role has changed from the original (FMCS MST 4
– there has been some issues with travel and just
got my itinerary tonight so not sure if those issues
were due to a change in assignment). I’ve gotten a
phone call from a member of my team looking for
direction and I don’t know what to tell him. Please
provide any information you can.”283
Another PHS offi cer wrote, “Once again, sorry to
bother you. However, what is the status of this mission?
From the email I received earlier this week things
were supposed to happen in 24-72hrs. At your earliest
convenience, could I please get an update on this?”284
There was also confusion within government ranks
regarding who had the authority to deploy offi cers and
what offi cers had already been approved for deployment.285
An internal PHS e-mail sent September 1 stated,
“We are receiving reports from one Warden
indicating that many of his staff are deployed. The
problem is they are not on our Master list that we
have been providing to OFRD. Can you provide
me your latest deployed roster identifying the BOP
offi cer/assets. I am thinking maybe these offi cers are
on August or September rosters???”286
An August 30 e-mail from the chief of the Coast Guard
medical division said,
“I apologize for the confusion of the rosters with
CG offi cers that were released earlier. It appears
that all PHS offi cers were required to go to a
website and register yesterday AM per the attached
email. Many offi cers did this without knowing that
registering automatically noted agency approval for
a CCRF mission. I attempted to register without the
agency approval box clicked in order to provide CG
comments. The website only allowed submission
with this box clicked positive . . . kind of a Catch-
22.”287 A member of OFRD wrote FEMA saying,
“This offi cer is stationed in AR and is not on our list
of offi cers deployed. Who deployed him?”288
There was also limited visibility between agencies.
An e-mail from a CDC employee to HHS/OS staff and
CDC staff on September 9 stated, “Since OSHA is Labor
Dept we have no visibility on their deployments at this
time…could be they will link up with NIOSH team when
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 301
they all arrive, but we may well not know anything.”289
This correspondence refl ects the absence of updated and
accurate lists of who was available for deployment, who
was not available, and who had already been deployed.
Mission Assignments
As late as September 22, evidence of confusion remained
about who was in charge of what aspects of the response.
An HHS incident manager wrote, “. . . . it appears that the
POC for the 250 ambulances is no longer the State EMS
Director Terry Bavousett, but has changed to the three
names below. Please get your representative at the JFO
to address this ASAP or the ambulances will end up at
Reliant Park instead of the locations that Terry Bavousett
has requested.”290 The FEMA liaison to CDC wrote, “I
might be the only one — I doubt it — but I’m really
confused with the structure within CDC/DEOC for this
operation. Can you send out a team structure list of team
leads as well as their DEOC schedule?”291
Clarity about missions was also lacking in the medical
response to Hurricane Katrina—as evidenced by the lack
of planning for the United States Navy Ship (USNS)
Comfort. The USNS Comfort is a medical treatment
facility with a primary mission of supporting medical
needs for the military and serve as hospital facilities
as part of a humanitarian effort.292 It has a 1,000 bed
capacity with 80 beds designated for an intensive care unit
and 12 operating rooms. The Select Committee received
varying cost estimates for operating costs for the USNS
Comfort. According to the U.S. Northern Command,
operating costs for the USNS Comfort are roughly
$82,910 per day underway and $29,155 a day pier side.293
However, a Philadelphia Inquirer article states, “When on
full operational status, the daily costs exceeds $700,000 a
day, according to the Navy.”294
Originally destined for New Orleans to provide
medical care to storm victims, the Comfort was redirected
on September 9. “The Comfort is now headed for
Pascagoula, Miss due to the lack of a medical mission
in NO. Do not have anticipated arrival at that site, but
SOC will advise when they get the information. Decision
has been made that two cruise ships will now be used
to house state workers.”295 That same night, clarifi cation
about a mission assignment was never received. An e-mail
exchange between HHS employees states, “USNS comfort
docked today in Pascagoula. I listened in to most of the
conference call and nobody could seem to think of a
mission for them. State Health Dpt was clear that they had
nothing at this time.”296
Additionally, the redirection of 250 ambulances
required a signifi cant number of approvals. An HHS
incident manager wrote, “I have just been informed by
FEMA HQ that Jack Colley or Dr. Sanchez the originators
of the request will need to approve the change in the
location of the delivery of the ambulances. Would you
please contact your representatives at the JFO and ask that
they confi rm the location change with Reliant Stadium to
the two staging areas noted in your e-mail with either the
ESF# 7&8 representatives. GSA will then confi rm back to
you the delivery locations and times.”297
Government Red Tape
Bureaucratic red tape also stood in the way of the medical
response. The OR-2 DMAT report states, “The team was
activated on the afternoon of Tuesday, August 30, and
given instructions to be in Houston the next day, August
31. Because of the policy of making individual travel
arrangements (see below), the last team member arrived in
Houston shortly after midnight on September 1. The team
departed for Baton Rouge in rental SUVs and vans at 5:00
a.m. on September 1. During the drive, team commanders
had several phone conversations with other teams at the
New Orleans Airport who stated the team was urgently
needed due to the large number of patients. Instead of
heading directly to the airport, the team was requested
to fi rst stage at LSU. After staging for nearly two hours,
the team received an escort to the New Orleans Airport,
arriving at approximately 3:30 p.m. Roughly 48 hours had
elapsed since the activation order and the team arriving
at the incident.”298 The report further says that because
team members were deployed individually, their medical
response was delayed.
F E
M A
302 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
On September 2, the Special Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Jon
G. Ferko, wrote McHale saying Blanco was withholding
medical supplies until she received President Bush’s word
Louisiana would be reimbursed. The e-mail to McHale says:
Sir,
Some information that I thought you should know:
My brother is on the ground at the health and
human services command center in Baton Rouge.
He says the situation is ‘grave’ — he and his team
are working desparately to save lives without
medical supplies – he said he doesn’t even have a
bandaid.
His team spoke with the Governor of LA and she
refuses to release ANY amount of funds for supplies
until POTUS assures her of reimbursement. The
team down there does not know who to work
through to release funds – and this is the federal
command team.
I felt that you should have this info – my brother
actually called home in tears because they can’t do
anything to stop the loss of life….299
Conclusion
The numbers do not lie. Thousands of lives were saved, a
tribute to the medical professionals and volunteers who
worked around the clock under enormously grueling
conditions. Yet, there is another, more sobering realization
that can’t be ignored either. Those numbers could —
should — have been even greater. It wasn’t a lack of effort
that hindered their success. It was a lack of planning, lack
of initiative, and lack of response.
There were not, for example, nearly enough medical
personnel teams in position prior to landfall, which led
to unnecessary delays in getting the right equipment and
supplies to the right people. FEMA and HHS needed to
plan for the worst. Instead, they scrambled for supplies in
an effort that was often times uncoordinated. In too many
cases, it was too late. Clearly New Orleans residents with
“special needs” paid a disproportionate price. Neither
the Louisiana Medical Director and State Health Offi cer,
nor the Director of the New Orleans Health Department,
could clearly defi ne the “special needs” population, much
less adequately provide for it.
From the storm’s impending landfall through the
fl ooding of New Orleans, confusion grew over if, and
when, hospital, VAMC, and nursing home evacuations
should occur. Time was rushing by, lives were in jeopardy,
and even when evacuations were fi nally deemed necessary,
these institutions were not prepared to do it effi ciently.
One possible solution would have been better utilization
of private fi rms to aid in evacuations. It was the answer in
a few instances, but it could have been the answer in so
many more. In all, an estimated 215 people died in New
Orleans nursing homes and hospitals as a result of Katrina
and failed evacuations.
Compounding problems for medical responders was
poor communication and coordination. So poor, in fact,
that at times, the only way to receive information was
through television. And the lack of access to medical
records, or a common, electronic medical record system,
led to delays in treating evacuees. Suffering was also
prolonged as attempts at coordination, within and
between government agencies, proved frustrating and
inadequate. Confusion arose over mission assignments
and command structure. Medical offi cers and volunteers
had little information about their deployment orders,
many waiting for days with their bags packed and
ready. And while some medical teams waited, without
equipment or supplies to care for patients, state and
federal offi cials squabbled over reimbursement.
Thousands of American men and women selfl essly
gave their time, money, and expertise to save lives.
Unfortunately, lack of preparation, reticence to act, and
confusion over coordination are all part of the story as
well. Though there was the will, the medical response to
Hurricane Katrina showed there wasn’t always a way. The
initiative of men like Mike Ford and Jesse St. Amant was
the exception to the rule. ■
A P
P H
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IL L
H A
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 303
1 Adam Nossiter, It’s Like Being in a Third World Country: Hospitals in fl ood zone struggle to save lives, ASSOC. PRESS (New Orleans, LA) Aug. 31, 2005.
2 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LA Hosp. Ass’n, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 10 Interview with LA Hosp. Ass’n]. 3 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LA State Univ. [hereinafter LSU] Health Care Services Div., in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006). “Code
Grey” refers to the section of the hospital’s emergency management plan that prepares the hospital for extremely severe weather. (Id.). 4 Nov. 10 Interview with LA Hosp. Ass’n. 5 HHS: What We Do at http://www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 6 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., National Response Plan, (Dec. 2004) at ESF #8 – Public Health and Med. Services Annex [hereinafter NRP]. 7 Id. 8 Id. at ESF-iii. 9 Welcome to NDMS at http://ndms.dhhs.gov/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 10 Press Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency [hereinafter FEMA], NDMS Serves The Needs Of Hurricane Victims (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter
Dec. 8 FEMA Press Release]. 11 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Nat’l Disaster Med. Sys. [hereinafter NDMS] (Nov. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with
FEMA and NDMS]. 12 Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) Basic at http://www.fema.gov/preparedness/resources/health_med/dmat_basic.htm (last visited Jan.
5, 2006). 13 Interview with FEMA and NDMS. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 After Action Report from OR-2 Disaster Med. Assistance Team [hereinafter DMAT] (Sept. 25, 2005) available at, http://www.democrats.reform.
house.gov/story.asp?ID=984 (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report]. 17 Interview with FEMA and NDMS. 18 Press Release, FEMA, NDMS Demobilizes After Serving The Needs Of Hurricane Victims (Dec. 30, 2005). 19 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services [hereinafter HHS] and Miss. Dep’t of Health [hereinafter MDH], Hurricane Katrina Medical Support/
Demobilization/Transition Plan for the State of Mississippi, (Jan. 2006) at 3. 20 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 2 (written
statement of Dr. Brian W. Amy, Miss. State Health Offi cer) [hereinafter Dr. Brian Amy written statement]. 21 “Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT),” at http://www.fema.gov/preparedness/resources/health_med/dmort.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2006). 22 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Vice Admiral Richard H. Carmona, U.S. Surgeon Gen., in Wash., DC (Nov. 22, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with Surgeon Gen. Carmona]. 23 E-mail correspondence from Cliff Oldfi eld, Commander of DMORT Region II, to Barbara Butcher, Offi cer of Chief Medical Examiner, NYC
et al. (Sept. 1, 2005) (2:27 p.m.). 24 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager ESF#8 7P-7A Watch, HHS, to EST-ESF08-A, et al. (Sept. 5, 2005) (9:46
p.m.). 25 Id. 26 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager ESF#8 7P-7A Watch, HHS, to Robert Blitzer, et al. (Sept. 6, 2005) (6:35
a.m.). 27 Id. 28 E-mail correspondence from John Mallos (OS) on behalf of CCRF-Response (OPHS), to CCRF-Response (OPHS) (Aug. 27, 2005) (6:02 p.m.). 29 Id. 30 Interview with Surgeon Gen. Carmona. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 E-mail correspondence from Marc Wolfson (HHS/OS) to ASPA, et al., (Sept. 8, 2005) (12:06 p.m.). 34 About CDC: Home Page at http://www.cdc.gov/about/default.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 35 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Richard E. Besser, Dir. of Coordinating Offi ce for Terrorism Preparedness Emergency Response, Ctrs.
for Disease Control and Prevention [hereinafter CDC], in Wash., DC (Nov. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with CDC]. 36 Id. 37 Press Release, HHS, HHS Supports Medical Response to Hurricane Katrina (Dec. 30, 2005). A pallet includes: “basic fi rst aid material (such
as bandages, pads, ice paks, etc.), blankets and patient clothing, suture kits, sterile gloves, stethoscopes, blood pressure measuring kits, and portable oxygen tanks.” (Id.).
38 Interview with CDC. 39 E-mail correspondence from KC Decker, HHS/OS, to Andrew Stevermer, et al., (Aug. 28, 2005) (5:51 p.m.). 40 Interview with CDC. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Interview with Surgeon Gen. Carmona. 44 Press Release, HHS, HHS Releases Website and Toll Free Number for Deployment by Health Care Professionals (Sept. 3, 2005). 45 E-mail correspondence from Lakeisha Jones, HHS/OS, to Lakeisha Jones, et al., (Sept. 3, 2005) (6:02 p.m.). 46 Press Release, HHS, HHS Designates First Medical Shelters and Provides Vital Medical Supplies and Medical Assistance (Sept. 2, 2005)
[hereinafter HHS Designates First Medical Shelters Release]. 47 About SAMHSA DTAC at http://www.mentalhealth.samhsa.gov/dtac/about.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
304 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
48 Press Release, HHS, Crisis Hotline Available for Victims of Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 7, 2005). 49 Press Release, HHS, HHS Awards $600,000 in Emergency Mental Health Grants to Four States Devastated by Hurricane Katrina (Sept. 13,
2005). 50 Strategic National Stockpile at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Strategic Nat’l Stockpile website]. 51 Interview with CDC. 52 Strategic Nat’l Stockpile website (last visited Jan. 7, 2006). 53 HHS Designates First Medical Shelters Release; E-mail correspondence from Stewart Simonson, Assistant Sec’y, Offi ce of Public Health
Emergency Preparedness, HHS, to MOL, HHS/OS, et al. (Sept. 2, 2005) (12:28 a.m.). 54 Dr. Brian Amy written statement at 5. 55 Interview with CDC. 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 Id. 59 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Stewart Simonson, Assistant Sec’y, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, HHS, in Wash., DC
(Jan. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with HHS]. 60 Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Health-Sys. Pharmacists, Medical Shelters Provide Care to Hurricane Victims (Sept. 2, 2005) [hereinafter ASHP
Press Release]. 61 Delthia Ricks, Outfi tting Makeshift Hospitals: Medical Supplies are Being Sent from National Stockpile to Set Up Dozens of Temporary Centers,
Newsday.com, Sept. 6, 2005, available at www.newsday.com. 62 Interview with HHS. 63 Id. 64 ASHP Press Release. 65 News from The Adjutant General’s Dep’t at http://www.kansas.gov/ksadjutantgeneral/News%20Releases/2005/05-079.htm (last visited Jan. 7,
2006). 66 Master Sgt. Bob Haskell, Air Guard Response to Katrina’s Challenges, THE OFFICER, Nov. 2005. [hereinafter Air Guard Response Article]. 67 Sandra Basu, DoD Provides Care to Spell Hurricane Relief, U.S. Medicine, Inc, Oct. 2005, available at www.usmedicine.com [hereinafter DOD
Provides Care Article]. 68 Id. 69 Air Guard Response Article; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Warren Reuther, Gen. Manager, Ernest N. Morial Convention Ctr. in New
Orleans, LA (Dec. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with Warren Reuther]. 70 E-mail correspondence from Matthew Payne, HHS/OS to Robert Blitzer, HHS/OS, et al. (Sept. 28, 2005) (2:02 p.m.) [hereinafter Sept. 28
Matthew Payne E-mail]. 71 Id. 72 Dr. Brian Amy written statement at 5. 73 E-mail correspondence from Stewart Simonson, Assistant Sec’y, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, HHS, to Dep’t of Public
Safety personnel, State of Nevada, (Sept. 2, 2005) (6:08 p.m.). 74 Sept. 28 Matthew Payne E-mail. 75 Interview with HHS. 76 Id. 77 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Jimmy Guidry, Med. Dir., Dep’t of Health and Hosps., State of LA, in New Orleans, LA (Dec. 19,
2005) [hereinafter Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Guidry]. 78 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Kevin Stephens, Dir., New Orleans Health Dep’t., in New Orleans, LA (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter
Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens]. 79 City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Annex 1A La. Offi ce of Homeland Sec. and Emergency Preparedness Shelter Operations Plan
(Revised July 2000) [hereinafter City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness]. 80 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Michael Ford, Vice President, New Orleans Region, LA Nursing Home Ass’n, Michella Ford, Facility
Services Dir., Riverbend Nursing and Rehabilitation Ctr., and Jesse St. Amant, Dir., Emergency Preparedness, Offi ce of Homeland Sec., Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al.].
81 City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness. 82 Nov. 9 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 83 Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al. 84 E-mail correspondence from Lakeisha Jones, OS, to John Babb, OS, et al. (Sept. 6, 2005) (7:31 a.m.). 85 Interview by Select Comm. staff with Walter Maestri, Dir. of Emer. Mgmt., Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005). 86 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Jimmy Guidry, Med. Dir., Dep’t of Health and Hosps., State of LA, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005)
[hereinafter Nov. 7 Interview with Dr. Guidry]. 87 Nov. 9 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 88 Nov. 7 Interview with Dr. Guidry. 89 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gordon Nelson, Assistant Secretary for Operations, Dep’t of Transp. and Dev. in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov.
4, 2005); Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 14, 2005) at 242 (statement Ray Nagin, Mayor, City of New Orleans) [hereinafter Dec. 14 Select Comm. Hearing].
90 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005). 91 Id. 92 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Sheriff, Plaquemines Parish, LA, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Interview
with Sheriff of Plaquemines Parish, LA]. 93 Id.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 305
94 Nov. 9 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 95 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 96 City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness. 97 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Guidry. 98 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Glen Menard, Gen. Manager, New Orleans Superdome and Sports Arena, in New Orleans, LA, (Dec. 19,
2005) [hereinafter Dec. 19 Interview with Glen Menard]. 99 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 100 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Guidry. 101 Dec. 19 Interview with Glen Menard; Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 102 Dec. 19 Interview with Glen Menard. 103 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 104 See generally, Daily Video Teleconferences among offi cials dated Aug. 25 - Sept. 4, 2005 [hereinafter Daily VTC]. State and local offi cials from
each of the affected areas met daily with offi cials from, among other agencies, FEMA, and the Nat’l Hurricane Ctr. 105 Dec. 19 Interview with Glen Menard. 106 Telephonic Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Glen Menard, Gen. Manager of the New Orleans Superdome and the Sports Arena, in Wash.,
DC (Jan. 27, 2006). 107 Interview with FEMA and NDMS. 108 Larry Margasak, Government Prepares for Next Big Disaster, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 1, 2006. 109 Interview with Warren Reuther. 110 The Big Disconnect on New Orleans, CNN.com, Sept. 2, 2005, available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/katrina.response/ (last visited
Jan. 30, 2006). 111 Interview with Warren Reuther. 112 Id. 113 Id. 114 E-mail correspondence from John J. Jordan, COL, U.S. Army to John Yingling, et al. (Sept. 3, 2005) (8:53 a.m.). 115 Interview with Warren Reuther. 116 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Gregory S. Henderson, M.D., PhD., Ochsner Clinic Found., in New Orleans, LA (Jan. 19, 2006). 117 Id. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Id. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. 124 Id. 125 Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, S. Cent. VA Health Care Network (VISN 16) Emergency Mgmt. Program Standard Operating Procedure, NO. 10N16-1
(Sept. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Sept. 30 Veterans Affairs Document]. 126 Id. 127 Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., Biloxi, State of Miss., Miss. Emergency Plan (Section A) (2005) at A-5 [Biloxi Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Plan]. 128 Id. at A-7. 129 Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr., City of New Orleans, State of La., Emergency Mgmt. Plan at I-1 [New Orleans Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Plan]. 130 Id. at I-7. 131 Id. at I-10. 132 Id. at III-6. 133 Med. Ctr. of LA at New Orleans (MCLNO), the Emergency Management Manual (2005) [hereinafter MCLNO Plan]. 134 Id. 135 Id. 136 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Hurricane Preparedness Plan, used by Pendleton Methodist Hosp. (2003) at 9 [New Orleans
Hosp. Hurricane Plan]. 137 Id. at 1. 138 Id. at 3. 139 Hospital Cries Out for Help New Orleans Charity Hospital (Good Morning America television broadcast, Sept. 2, 2005). 140 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Larry Graham, former CEO, Pendleton Methodist Hosp. in New Orleans, LA (Dec.19, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with Larry Graham]. 141 Nov. 10 Interview with LA Hosp. Ass’n. 142 Interview with Larry Graham. 143 Nov. 7 Interview with Dr. Guidry. 144 Elizabeth White, Veterans Affairs’ Hurricane Efforts Heralded, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 9, 2005. 145 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, in Wash., DC (Nov. 4, 2005); Press Release, Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA Evacuates
Patients from Hurricane Area (Sept. 2, 2005). 146 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Donald Smithburg, CEO, LSU Health Sciences Ctr./Healthcare Services Div., in New Orleans, LA (Dec.
19, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 19 LSU Interview]. 147 Id. 148 Id. 149 Id.
306 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
150 E-mail correspondence from KC Decker, HHS/OS to Erin Fowler, HHS/OS (Sept. 1, 2005) (9:06 a.m.). 151 Dec. 19 LSU Interview. 152 Interview with Larry Graham. 153 Id. 154 Id. 155 Id. 156 Email correspondence from Jennifer Young, HHS/OS to Alex Azar and Stewart Simonson, HHS/OS (Sept. 2, 2005) (10:50 a.m.). 157 Interview with Larry Graham. 158 CNN NewsNight with Aaron Brown (CNN Television Broadcast, Sept. 20, 2005). 159 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 160 Hemant Vankawala, A Doctor’s Message from Katrina’s Front Lines, (National Public Radio, Sept. 2005), available at www.npr.org (last visited Jan.
30, 2006) [hereinafter A Doctor’s Message, Hemant Vankawala]. 161 Interview with FEMA and NDMS. 162 Dec. 8 FEMA Press Release. 163 DOD Provides Care Article. 164 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 165 Id. 166 A Doctor’s Message, Hemant Vankawala. 167 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff with the Assoc. of Air Med. Services personnel in Wash., DC (Oct. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Briefi ng with Air Med.
personnel]; Assoc. of Air Med. Services, Air Medical Community Response to Hurricane Katrina Disaster: Hospital Evacuation and Patient Relocation by Helicopter and Fixed Wing Aircraft Report (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Air Med. Report].
171 Id. 172 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel. 173 Id. 174 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel; Air Med. Report. 175 Id. 176 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel. 177 Air Med. Report. 178 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel. 179 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel. 180 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel; Air Med. Report. 181 Id. 182 Air Med. Report. 183 Id. 184 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel; Air Med. Report. 185 Air Med. Report. 186 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel; Air Med. Report. 187 Briefi ng with Air Med. personnel. 188 Biloxi Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Plan. 189 Biloxi Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Plan (SSHP Appendix). 190 Id. 191 Id. 192 New Orleans Veterans Affairs Med. Ctr. Plan. 193 Id. 194 MCLNO Plan. 195 New Orleans Hosp. Hurricane Plan. 196 Id. 197 Id. 198 Interview with Larry Graham. 199 Id. 200 American Morning (CNN Television Broadcast, Sept. 30, 2005). 201 Stephen Losey, Katrina Response Marred by Communication Failures, FED. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Communications Failures Article]. 202 Communications Failures Article. 203 Dec. 19 LSU Interview. 204 Id. 205 Randolph Schmid, Lack of Disease Outbreak Following Katrina ‘Amazing,’ to Health Director, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 20, 2005). 206 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 207 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with COL Kenneth Knight, Chief, Air Force Med. Operations Ctr., in Wash., DC (Oct. 13, 2005). 208 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with COL Faulk, Air Nat’l Guard Surgeon, in Wash., DC (Oct. 7, 2005). 209 National Guard Bureau, [Hurricane Katrina: After Action Review Observations] (undated). 210 Communications Failures Article.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 307
211 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Robert Blitzer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, in Wash., DC (Oct. 10, 2005).
212 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Gerald Parker, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, in Wash., DC (Oct. 10, 2005).
213 Interview with HHS. 214 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jack Beall, Chief, Nat’l Disaster Med. System, in Wash., DC (Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 23 Interview
with Jack Beall]. 215 Id. 216 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 217 E-mail correspondence from Mark Hansey to EOC IST (Aug. 31, 2005) (3:12 a.m.). 218 E-mail correspondence from Ron Burger to EOC Report (Sept. 5, 2005) (7:41 a.m.). 219 E-mail correspondence from Edwin Shanley, CDC Liaison, to EOC Report (Sept. 5, 2005) (3:34 p.m.). 220 E-mail correspondence from Robert Lavender, HHS/OS, to HHS personnel (Sept. 5, 2005) (3:24 p.m.). 221 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 222 Roma Khanna, Nursing Homes Left Residents With Weak Safety Net, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Dec. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Nursing Homes
Article]. 223 Nov. 7 Interview with Dr. Guidry. 224 Nursing Homes Article. 225 Id.; Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al.; Nov. 10 Interview with LA Hosp. Ass’n. 226 Katrina: New Orleans DA to Investigate Hospital Deaths, NAT’L J. GROUP, AMERICAN HEALTH LINE (Jan. 18, 2006). 227 Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al. 228 Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al; Plaquemines Parish Gov’t, Phase 1 Mandatory Evacuation Notice (Aug. 27, 2005) (9:00 a.m.). 229 Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al. 230 Id. 231 Id. 232 Reports Show Staff Tried to Save Lives at St. Rita’s, NEWS-STAR, Monroe, LA (Nov. 29, 2005) at 1A [hereinafter St. Rita’s Article]. 233 Jan. 19 Interview with Michael Ford, et al. 234 Press Release, Offi ce of Attorney General, State of LA, Nursing Homes Owners Surrender to Medicaid Fraud Control Unit Investigators (Sept.
13, 2005). 235 Id. 236 St. Rita’s Article. 237 Marianne Kolbasuk McGee, Storm Shows Benefi t, Failures of Technology, INFO. WEEK, (Sept. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Failures of Technology
Article]. 238 Id. 239 Lauran Neergaard, Katrina Highlights Need for Computerized Medical Records, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 13, 2005) [hereinafter Need for
Computerized Medical Records Article]. 240 Id. 241 Dec. 19 Interview with Dr. Stephens. 242 Failures of Technology Article. 243 Id. 244 “Katrina Health,”available at www.katrinahealth.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2006). 245 Id. 246 Id. 247 Need for Computerized Medical Records Article. 248 Id. 249 Press Release, HHS, HHS Enters Into Agreements to Support Digital Health Recovery for the Gulf Coast (Nov. 17, 2005). 250 Id. 251 Interview with FEMA and NDMS. 252 E-mail correspondence from Pamela Williams, DHS, to Jay Lerner (Jan. 27, 2005) (6:41 p.m.). 253 Interview with HHS. 254 Id. 255 Id. 256 Id. 257 E-mail correspondence from Mark Roupas, USACE Liaison to Paul McHale, HON, OSD (Aug. 29, 2005) (5:54 p.m.). 258 Interview with HHS. 259 Minority Staff Of House Comm. On Gov’t Reform, Special Investigations Div., 109th Cong., Report On The Decline Of The National Disaster
Medical System (2005). 260 Interview with HHS. 261 Jan. 23 Interview with Jack Beall. 262 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 263 Id. 264 Jan. 23 Interview with Jack Beall. 265 Congressional Research Service [hereinafter CRS], Rep. No. 33096 at 5 (Oct. 4, 2002). 266 Id. at 24. 267 NRP at ESF#8.
308 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
268 E-mail Correspondence from John Nesler, Dep’t of Def. [hereinafter DOD] to Millard Bell, DHS (Sept. 4, 2005) (12:56 p.m.). 269 Id. 270 Id. 271 Interview with HHS. 272 Id. 273 E-mail correspondence from John Jordan, U.S. Army to Army, DHS, and NORTHCOM personnel (Sept. 5, 2005) (10:03 a.m.). 274 Lara Jakes Jordan, Slow Removal of Katrina Bodies Caused by Louisiana Governor’s Indecision, Memos Say, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 27, 2005). 275 Id. 276 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager, HHS/SOC to FEMA and HHS personnel (Sept. 5, 2005) (9:46 p.m.). 277 Id. 278 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager, HHS/SOC to Robert Blitzer, HHS/OS and other personnel (Sept. 6, 2005)
(6:35 a.m.). 279 Id. 280 DOD Provides Care Article. 281 E-mail correspondence from Phil Navin, Div. of Emergency Operations, CDC to EOC Report and personnel (Aug. 30 2005) (8:00 p.m.). 282 E-mail correspondence from Andy Hunt, Commander, USPHS to John Mallos, BSN, RN, LCDR, USPHS, OSG (Sept. 2, 2005) (1:06 p.m.). 283 E-mail correspondence from David Elder, FDA to John Mallos, BSN, RN, LCDR, USPHS, OSG (Sept. 4, 2005) (11:17 p.m.). 284 E-mail correspondence from John Mallos, BSN, RN, LCDR, USPHS, OSG to Kurt Kesteloot, Environmental Engineer, USPHS (Sept. 4, 2005)
(6:18 p.m.). 285 E-mail correspondence from John Mallos, BSN, RN, LCDR, USPHS, OSG to [email protected] (Sept 1, 2005) (7:58 p.m.). 286 E-mail correspondence from Nick Makrides, BOP GOV to John Mallos, USPHS (Sept. 1, 2005) (8:32 a.m.). 287 E-mail correspondence from Mark Tedaesco, USCG/USPHS to John Mallos, USPHS, OSG (Aug. 30, 2005) (5:12 p.m.). 288 E-mail correspondence from John Mallos, BSN, RN, LCDR, USPHS, OSG to FEMA and HHS personnel (Sept. 5, 2005) (7:01 a.m.). 289 E-mail correspondence from Robert Blitzer, OS to OS staff (Sept. 9, 2005) (10:35 a.m.). 290 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager, HHS/SOC to HHS personnel (Sept 22, 2005) (2:48 a.m.). 291 E-mail correspondence from Edwin Shanley, CDC Liaison to Debra Townes, CDC (Sept 7, 2005) (8:35 p.m.). 292 http://www.comfort.navy.mil (last visited Jan. 26, 2006). 293 Response from U.S.N. Command to Select Comm. Staff (Oct. 26, 2005). 294 Henry J. Holcomb, Rerouted: Sen. Lott of Miss. Steps into Divert Hospital Ship, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 10, 2005 at A01. 295 E-mail correspondence from Bruce Burney, CDC to CDC personnel (Sept. 9, 2005) (7:41 a.m.). 296 E-mail correspondence from Gregory Banner, HHS/OS to KC Decker, HHS/OS (Sept. 9, 2005) (10:39 p.m.). 297 E-mail correspondence from Keith Holtermann, Incident Manager, HHS/SOC to HHS and TX personnel (Sept. 22, 2005) (12:44 a.m.). 298 Sept. 25, OR-2 DMAT After Action Report. 299 E-mail correspondence from Jon Ferko, Special Assistant to Paul McHale (Sept. 2, 2005) (1:27 p.m.).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 309
310 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“We were then lured to the so-called evacuation points. This was several
days after the hurricane had struck. The city was fl ooded ... They loaded
us onto military trucks after they told us they would take us to shelters
where our basic needs would be met.”
“We were in a wide open space along the interstate and under the
Highway 10 causeway. The overpass provided little shade, however ...
It was early September and still extremely hot. Our skin blistered. My
mother’s skin is still not fully healed.”
Leah Hodges
New Orleans Citizen and Evacuee
Select Committee Hearing, December 6, 2005
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SHELTER AND HOUSING
Long-standing weaknesses and the magnitude of the disaster overwhelmed FEMA’s ability to provide emergency shelter and temporary housing
Summary
Like food and water, shelter is a basic human need.
Hurricane Katrina transformed thousands of people’s
lives into a battle for survival — and, for some, fi nding
adequate shelter proved at least as diffi cult as fi nding
something to eat or drink.
Katrina, of course, was a powerful storm that hit
vulnerable areas, requiring more than traditional
solutions for immediate shelter and, later, temporary
housing. Louisiana and Mississippi immediately were
faced with thousands and thousands of the suddenly
homeless, without the ability to provide emergency shelter
or longer-term housing for all of them. Within a month,
44 states had played a role in sheltering the evacuees from
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
But it is clear state and local governments in the areas
most affected by the hurricanes were not adequately
prepared. They failed to learn important lessons from
the Hurricane Pam exercise, and lacked the necessary
information about temporary housing. Shelters of last
resort, designed for people to take refuge in the immediate
hours before and after landfall (such as the Superdome),
were not of suffi cient capacity. Instead, the Superdome,
itself located in a fl oodplain, had to bear a burden for
which it was not prepared. The New Orleans Convention
Centre, never planned as a shelter, became one out of
sheer necessity and improvisation.
There was no comprehensive database of available
shelters, which only complicated relief efforts. There
were also delays in getting people out of shelters and
into temporary housing. And FEMA’s strategy of ordering
200,000 trailers and mobile homes shortly after the storm
was blind to the nation’s manufacturing capacity of 6,000
units per month.
Housing issues remain a tremendous concern
for residents of the Gulf coast affected by Hurricane
Katrina. Local elected offi cials in both Louisiana and
Mississippi remain disappointed in FEMA’s pace in setting
up temporary housing. Debate over how long rental
assistance will continue rages on. The question of where
to build, or re-build, in the Gulf coast is the subject of
great debate, both locally and nationally, as is who will
pay for it. However, the long-term housing challenges
in the Gulf coast are beyond the scope of the Select
Committee’s inquiry and are not covered in this report.
Our charge was to examine the immediate response, not
the recovery. We are certain the longer-term issues will
continue to be discussed by others in Congress.
“Scooter: Please see below. The trailer idea is worse than I
originally thought. Per the data below, the last batch of the
trailers that we are now purchasing will be coming off the
production line in approximately 3.5 years.”
E-mail from Neil S. Patel, Staff Secretary to the
Vice President, to Charles P. Durkin, Personal Aide to the
Vice President, (apparently destined for Chief of Staff J.
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Jr.), September 9, 2005
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Finding: Relocation plans did not adequately provide for shelter. Housing plans were haphazard and inadequate
Shelter needs overwhelmed state and local governments
Initially, Hurricane Katrina displaced more than a million
Gulf coast residents. As in most natural disasters, some
evacuees only needed short-term shelter and were able to
return home after the immediate crisis passed. However,
because of the magnitude of the storm, hundreds of
thousands remained displaced — for days, weeks, even
months. Many are homeless today.
For example, Louisiana had
563 American Red Cross or state
emergency shelters with a peak
population of 146,292 in the early
days following Hurricane Katrina’s
landfall.1 Additionally, Louisiana
had 10 special needs shelters
that housed 2,480 persons.2
In Mississippi, initial damage
estimates projected 120,000
individuals needing emergency
temporary housing.3 A month
after the storm, 44 states and the
District of Columbia have been
given emergency declarations to
cover expenses related to sheltering
evacuees forced from their homes
by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.4
In a catastrophic event like
Katrina, many evacuees may be displaced for a longer
than normal period of time or may permanently lose
their housing. As FEMA and state offi cials learned from
the Hurricane Pam exercise, temporary housing was an
area of weakness.5 Deputy FCO Scott Wells noted there
were several follow-up items from the Hurricane Pam
Exercise that state and local governments failed to execute,
including developing more detailed concepts and plans
on sheltering and temporary housing.6 Similarly, Alabama
state and local government plans lack information about
temporary housing.7
Finding: State and local governments made inappropriate selections of shelters of last resort. The lack of a regional database of shelters contributed to an ineffi cient and ineffective evacuation and sheltering process
The evacuation of millions of people prior to Hurricane
Katrina’s landfall created an urgent need to identify, and
direct people to, suitable shelters. Offi cials had worried
about the high number of people who would ignore
hurricane evacuation orders in coastal areas.8 Indeed,
thousands of people in New Orleans did not obey the
mandatory evacuation order.
Shelters of last resort — places
for persons to be protected
from the high winds, storm
surge, and heavy rains, but
with little or no water or food
— were needed for those who
did not or could not evacuate
the area.
A shelter of last resort is
intended to provide the best
available survival protection
for the duration of the
hurricane only.9 In Louisiana,
emergency operations plans
required shelters of last resort
to be located outside of the
fl oodplain, or have the ability
to locate on fl oors elevated
above fl ood potential, and have
a hurricane wind resistant structure.10 The Superdome was
used as a shelter of last resort even though it was located
in a fl oodplain. In addition, the Superdome roof suffered
extensive wind damage, demonstrating that it was not a
hurricane wind resistant structure.
Many residents who took refuge in the Superdome
found conditions there unbearable. Some tried to leave,
only to fi nd themselves trapped by the fl oodwaters that
surrounded the hulking structure. Cleo Fisher, an 86-year-
old resident of Bywater, told a local newspaper that he left
the dome to try to get some heart medications.11 He didn’t
F E
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get far — and, in fact, had to be rescued after he fell into
the nearby water — but he did not want to return inside,
either.12
“It’s worse than being in prison in there,” he said.
“They don’t have nothing for me.”
Even some of the police offi cers and military personnel
charged with keeping order inside the dome became
frustrated with the lack of organization.
“This plan,” said one police offi cer, “was no plan.”13
Although some local emergency plans call for the
identifi cation of local shelters, in a multi-state disaster,
a compilation of available shelters in the region may be
more appropriate. Government offi cials did not have a
comprehensive database from which to identify suitable
and available shelters; therefore, identifi cation of alternate
shelter locations was done on an ad hoc basis.14 Because
of the lack of a database of shelters, local, state, and
federal offi cials have had a diffi cult time identifying the
numbers and locations of displaced individuals.15 This
lack of information has complicated the relief effort, and
led to the ineffi cient use of shelter resources.
The lack of a comprehensive means for tracking
evacuees has exacerbated diffi culties in reuniting family
members and in determining accurate counts of people
so as to more accurately provide for their needs 16 Out of
human nature, evacuees tend to go to the most convenient
and familiar shelter they can fi nd, even though it may be
inadequate. A database could be a helpful resource for
planning and providing emergency public information.
Similar initiatives have been proposed previously during
the Cold War as part of civil defense, such as Crisis
Relocation Planning.17
Finding: There was inappropriate delay in getting people out of shelters and into temporary housing — delays that offi cials should have foreseen due to manufacturing limitations
Dr. Gavin Smith told a congressional committee that
“[w]ithout the rapid provision of temporary and
permanent housing solutions, recovery will be slowed or
fail to occur in a manner that meets the needs of disaster
victims . . ..”18 Although temporary housing efforts
in the wake of Katrina have far exceeded any previous
effort, individuals remained in shelters for unacceptably
long periods of time. Temporary housing efforts have
fallen short of meeting demand. Federal, state, and local
agencies failed to implement a successful program to
shelter and place many evacuees in temporary housing.
FEMA established a Housing Area Command
to oversee all temporary housing operations across
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.19 Although this
group began identifying available land prior to landfall,
temporary housing efforts suffered from delays. A
Mississippi recovery offi cial hailed FEMA for “the fastest
deployment of temporary housing units to a disaster-
stricken area since the program was established,” but also
noted the effort has not been good enough.20 Specifi cally,
he noted that operational and long-term planning and
inter-organizational coordination remains unrealized,
and the current approach is not suffi cient to address the
needs of communities and states following a catastrophic
disaster like Hurricane Katrina.21
Due to the massive need for temporary housing, the
federal government put together a plan that included
a combination of old and new housing strategies,
including housing people in trailers and on cruise ships.22
Evacuees tend to go to the most convenient and familiar shelter they can fi nd, even though it may be inadequate.
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Additionally, FEMA used hotels to serve as temporary
emergency lodging, utilizing 85,000 rooms nationwide
at the program’s peak.23 However, state and local offi cials
complained of poor coordination by FEMA on these
temporary housing solutions.24 Immediately following
the storm, FEMA contracted with cruise ships to provide
transitional housing for hurricane victims close to the
disaster area.25 Many evacuees rejected this option,
something that perhaps could have been avoided if
there had been better coordination beforehand. Many
individuals felt they needed to focus on fi nding jobs and
obtaining permanent housing.26
Although FEMA began strategic housing planning
before Katrina’s landfall, and the private sector mobilized
quickly to fi ll FEMA’s manufactured housing demand,
many issues also have plagued the relocation into
this form of temporary housing. Mississippi Federal
Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) William Carwile testifi ed that
over 24,000 travel trailers and mobile homes had been
occupied in Mississippi.27 FEMA logistics has reported that
nine trains a week have been carrying approximately 90
trailers per train into the Gulf region. And, on January 11,
2006, FEMA announced that nearly 62,000 travel trailers
and mobile homes were serving as temporary homes for
Hurricane Katrina and Rita victims.28 This number nearly
tripled the number of units used following all of last year’s
Florida hurricanes and far outnumbered any housing
mission in FEMA’s history.29
Despite this commendable effort, housing still falls
short of the overwhelming need. There are still delays
in getting evacuees into trailers once they are delivered,
due to among other things infrastructure, zoning, and
environmental issues.30 In Mississippi, the lack of working
utilities for private sites and environmental and zoning
issues with group sites have delayed the installation of
travel trailers and mobile homes.31
FEMA’s strategy of ordering 200,000 trailers and mobile
homes shortly after the storm was blind to the nation’s
manufacturing capacity of 6,000 units per month. On
Friday, September 9, staff to the Vice President and Offi ce
of Management and Budget (OMB) offi cials ratcheted up
concerns about FEMA’s decision to rely on trailers and
mobile homes to house displaced residents.32 Special
Assistant to the Vice President Marie Fishpaw wrote in an
e-mail to Patel:
FEMA have (sic) set up arrangements to order
200,000 units of trailers (and mobile homes) and
committed up to $500 million to do so. They want
to get 30,000 units (79% of the existing market)
soon. FEMA plans to order another 100,000 units.
OMB and OVP staff remain skeptical about this
strategy. The nation can produce 6,000 units
per month. There is probably some capacity
for expansion (possibly by about 10%) to meet
increased demand, but we don’t know how much.
That means most of these units won’t be available
for months. Further, some states, including
Louisiana, are balking at the idea of large (25,000
units, as proposed by FEMA) trailer parks. We got all
this info from OMB career staff.33
That message was then forwarded, apparently intended
for then Chief of Staff to the Vice President, “I Lewis
Libby, Jr.: “Please see below. The trailer idea is worse than
I originally thought. Per the data below, the last batch of
the trailers that we are now purchasing will be coming off
the production line in approximately 3.5 years.”34
Finding: FEMA failed to take advantage of HUD’s expertise in large-scale housing challenges
FEMA has been working in partnership with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of
Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to meet the challenge
of fi nding and securing suffi cient rental assets to meet
the huge demands created by mass evacuations. By early
Housing still falls short of the overwhelming need. There are still delays in getting evacuees into trailers once they are delivered, due to among other things infrastructure, zoning and environmental issues.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 315
FEMA has shown fl exibility by
allowing those individuals to
be eligible for additional rental
assistance, use of a voucher system
similar to the one administered by
HUD could have prevented this
mistake.
In this case, FEMA failed to
take full advantage of HUD’s
expertise and perspective on
large-scale housing challenges,
such as the agency’s experience
with voucher programs. HUD and
public housing authorities have the
expertise and infrastructure to help
non-HUD clients during disasters.
Conclusion
Despite this Herculean effort, state offi cials feel there
has been a lack of coordination within the interagency
community causing delay in relocating and housing
people.45 Although the federal government has shown
some ingenuity in coming up with unique solutions such
as lodging on cruise ships, and orchestrated the largest
mobilization of temporary housing units in history, both
of these solutions have proven inadequate.
Carwile, the Mississippi FCO, noted the need for taking
a new look at housing solutions:
In Mississippi, while temporary housing has
been provided in numbers far exceeding any
previous effort, this success is obscured by the
overwhelming need and an exceptionally long
period of time that people remain in shelters.
New methodologies must be examined and
implemented to take care of Americans in need of
humane housing while in a catastrophic event.46
The devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina was
heartbreaking enough for the people who lost their
homes. Sadly, however, the days and weeks and months
that followed provided little relief. The government plans
for their shelter were far from adequate. ■
December 2005, 5,000 displaced families had been placed
in federal housing of some sort.35 USDA has offered units
from their own inventory, placing 974 families from
Louisiana alone.36
Additionally, FEMA has concluded an inter-agency
agreement with the VA to rent unused VA housing units
to evacuees, and FEMA is pursuing a similar arrangement
with Fannie Mae.37 On September 12, 2005, FEMA signed
an Interagency Agreement with HUD.38 This agreement
identifi ed and made available 5,600 HUD single-family
homes.39 Hundreds of disaster victims have made these
homes their temporary residences, including 207 families
in Texas.40
FEMA and HUD have also partnered on the Katrina
Disaster Housing Assistance Program (KDHAP), a
transitional housing assistance program funded by FEMA
and administered by HUD and the network of public
housing authorities. Through KDHAP, HUD is providing
vouchers to evacuees previously receiving public housing
assistance, as well as evacuees who were homeless prior to
the hurricane.41 By December 2005, nearly 15,000 families
received rental assistance through KDHAP.42
In contrast, FEMA has used direct payments to
evacuees to provide rental assistance to more than
500,000 applicants, totaling more than $1.2 billion.43
Unfortunately, many displaced households received their
initial rental assistance before receiving mailed guidance
and did not use this assistance for housing, but instead
used it to meet other disaster-related needs.44 Although
STAFF PHOTO
316 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Hearing on Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Before the Comm. on Financial Services Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 109th Cong. (Jan. 13-14, 2006) at 3 (written testimony of Scott Wells, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for LA, FEMA) [hereinafter Jan. 13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing].
2 Id. 3 Id. (written testimony of James N. Russo, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for MS, FEMA) at 3. 4 FEMA, 2005 Federal Disaster Declarations, http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2005 (last visited Jan.12, 2006). 5 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA and Louisiana State offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 6 Interviews by Select Comm. Staff with FEMA offi cials in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 3-10, 2005). 7 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, State of AL Emergency Operations Plan, Oct. 1, 2000. 8 Timothy R. Brown, Miss. Governor Declares State of Emergency as Katrina Nears, LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Columbus, GA, Aug. 27, 2005. 9 State of LA Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1B, Southwest LA Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, (July 2000)
at VI-1. 10 State of LA Emergency Operations Plan Supplement 1C: Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan, (July 2000). 11 Gordon Russell, Refuges Find Dome An Intolerable Refuge, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 1, 2005, 5. 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 DHS HSOC SPOT Report prepared by Matthew Thompson, NRCC (Aug. 31, 2005). 15 Jan Moller, La. seeks help compiling evacuee shelter database, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 10, 2005, A-7. 16 Shankar Vedantam and Dean Starkman, Lack of Cohesion Bedevils Recovery, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 18, 2005, A01. 17 B. Wayne Blanchard, FEMA, American Civil Defense 1945-1984: The Evolution of Programs and Policies, (National Emergency Center Monograph
Series Vol. 2, No. 2, 1985) at 19-20. 18 Jan. 13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing (written testimony of Dr. Gavin Smith, Director, Offi ce of Recovery and Renewal, Offi ce of
Gov. Barbour) at 2. 19 FEMA News Release, FEMA Contracts to Provide Housing Relief for Displaced Hurricane Victims, Sept. 8, 2005. 20 Jan. 13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing (written testimony of Gavin Smith) at 1. 21 Id. 22 Rick Weiss, Victims’ Next Homes: Cruise Ships, Trailers, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 5, 2005, A15. 23 Jan. 13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing (written testimony of Scott Wells) at 4. 24 Audio recordings of Hurricane Katrina Conference Calls, LA State Emergency Operations Center (Aug. 26-28, 2005, Sept. 9, 2005). 25 FEMA, News Release, Temporary Housing for Hurricane Katrina Evacuees Includes Cruise Ships, FEMA Reports, Sept. 4, 2005. 26 Shankar Vedantam and Dean Starkman, Lack of Cohesion Bedevils Recovery, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 18, 2005. 27 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Dec. 7, 2005) at 8 (written
testimony of William L. Carwile, III, former Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Hurricane Katrina Response and Initial Recovery Operations: MS). 28 FEMA, By the Numbers: FEMA Recovery Update for Hurricanes Katrina & Rita, Jan. 11, 2006. 29 Id. 30 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Gary Moore, Director of Logistics, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Jan. 9, 2006). 31 Jan.13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing (written testimony of James N. Russo) at 7. 32 See Aimee Curl, Federal-Local Confl icts Keep Victims Out of FEMA Trailers, FEDERAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006. 33 E-mail correspondence from Marie Fishpaw, Special Assistant to the Vice President, to Neil Patel, Staff Secretary to the Vice President, (Sept. 9,
2005) (1:41 p.m.). 34 E-mail correspondence from Neil Patel to Charles Durkin, (Sept. 9, 2005) (1:49 p.m.) 35 Hearing on Housing Options in the Aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Before the Comm. on Financial Services Subcomm. on Housing and
Community Opportunity, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 12 (written testimony of David Garratt, Acting Director, Recovery Division, EMA) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Financial Services Comm. Hearing].
36 Id. at 12. 37 Id. 38 Id. (written testimony of Brian Montgomery, Assistant Secretary for Offi ce of Housing/Federal Housing Commissioner, HUD) at 4. 39 Id. 40 Id. (written testimony of David Garratt) at 13. 41 Id. at 13-14. 42 Id. (written testimony of Brian Montgomery) at 6. 43 Id. (written testimony of David Garratt) at 6. 44 Id. at 6-7. 45 Jan.13-14, 2006 Financial Services Comm. Hearing (written testimony of Gavin Smith) at 1. 46 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operational Professionals, Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, 109th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 37 (testimony of William L. Carwile, III, former Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Hurricane Katrina Response and Initial Recovery Operations: MS).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 317
318 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“[O]ne of the lessons that we need to learn from this catastrophic event
is that we do need to get better about marshaling those assets and moving
them around. I will tell you up front, FEMA has a logistics problem, we
have a problem understanding all the time. I can point out where our
stuff is and I can point out where it’s supposed to go to; I can’t always
tell you that it actually got there.” Michael D. Brown
Former FEMA Director
Select Committee Hearing, September 27, 2005
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LOGISTICS AND CONTRACTING
FEMA logistics and contracting systems did not support a targeted, massive, and sustained provision of commodities
Katrina overwhelmed the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) management and overloaded its logistics
system. Response and relief personnel had little visibility
into available federal assets and resources. The process
for requesting assistance could not support the volume
of requests, and the technology supporting that process
proved inadequate. Federal, state, and local offi cials
requested assistance outside existing channels with little
coordination and communication. “[M]anagement by
crisis would be the best way I could put it,” said Kip
Holden, Mayor of East Baton Rouge Parish.1
By September 9, Congress had passed legislation
providing over $63 billion to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) for disaster relief.2 The
circumstances and urgent needs created by Hurricane
Katrina provided signifi cant opportunity for fraud and
mismanagement, and the DHS Offi ce of Inspector General
(OIG) estimates the cost to recover from the storm and
rebuild the affected areas could exceed $200 billion.3
As of November 30, 2005, $19.3 billion has been
obligated to needs resulting from Hurricane Katrina.4 The
funds have been used to relieve the immediate suffering
of individuals and families, clear debris, reimburse federal
agencies for the costs of technical and direct assistance,
and support federal operations such as search and rescue,
and delivery of consumables. The $19 billion has been
obligated as follows:
■ $8 billion for human service needs including
unemployment compensation, personal needs that
are not met by insurance, and temporary housing
(including vouchers for hotel/motel rooms and mobile
homes);
■ $2.2 billion for debris removal, public building repair
and replacement, and damage inspections;
■ $4.4 billion for technical and direct assistance provided
by federal agencies;
■ $14.7 million for inspections and hazard mitigation;
and,
■ $4.7 billion for administrative expenses, almost $3
billion of which has been obligated for mission
assignment operations undertaken by other federal
agencies at the direction of the federal offi cer
responsible for coordinating response activities.5
Despite this outpouring of funds, procurement
offi cials struggled to balance the competing and
confl icting demands of local and elected offi cials. On
October 21, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin complained
about the time-consuming amount of federal oversight
accompanying the federal dollars going to contracts and
local governments. He said
[t]he money is sitting in the doggone bank. . . .
We can’t use it, and as soon as they gave us the
money, they sent a team of auditors and said,
‘If you spend this money, we’ll be watching you
real close. . . .’ So we’re gun shy about how we
use this money . . . .6
and
[w]e just got these huge multinational companies
that are using the shield of, ‘We’ve got to work
quick,’ [rather than] trying to fi nd local contractors.7
The Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO)
is undertaking a review of Katrina relief contracting
“[Hurricane Katrina] was beyond the capacity of the state and local governments, and it was beyond the capacity of FEMA. It was the largest natural disaster ever to strike the United States — 92,000 square miles. Logistics were falling apart.”
320 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
activities. GAO’s review includes acquisition planning,
communication of responsibilities between various
entities, contract management, and the use of emergency
acquisition authorities. GAO briefed the Select Commitee
on their review efforts, which will complement the
fi ndings of this report.
Finding: FEMA management lacked situational awareness of existing requirements and of resources in the supply chain. An overwhelmed logistics system made it challenging to get supplies, equipment, and personnel where and when needed
When President Bush authorized a federal emergency
declaration for Mississippi and Alabama on Sunday,
August 28, in response to these states’ requests, then-
FEMA Director Michael Brown said he began to
“predeploy all the assets [including] the medical teams,
the urban search and rescue teams, the emergency
response, the management teams, the rapid needs
assessment teams, prepositioning the water, the Meals
Ready to Eat, the ice, the tarps.”8 However, given that
landfall occurred on Monday, August 29, this was too late
to begin the pre-deployment process.
FEMA leadership acknowledged this lack of planning.
“[Hurricane Katrina] was beyond the capacity of the state
and local governments, and it was beyond the capacity of
FEMA,” said Brown. “It was the largest natural disaster ever
to strike the United States — 92,000 square miles. Logistics
were falling apart.”9 When FEMA did arrive, representatives
sometimes were empty-handed. “[W]hen FEMA fi nally
did show up, everybody was angry because that is all they
had was a Web site and a fl ier. They didn’t have any real
resources that they could give,” reported Senator Pryor
following visits and conversations with victims.10
Brown’s testimony outlined some of the resources
FEMA had in place. Prior to landfall FEMA had 14
trailer loads of Meals Ready to Eat (“MREs”) at Camp
Beauregard, Louisiana, four trailers in Moffi t, 42 in Forth
Worth, 15 trailer loads in Fullersville, 75 at two locations
in Atlanta, three in Cumberland, Maryland, 15 in
Charlotte, North Carolina, six in Eastover, South Carolina,
46 in Palmetto, Georgia, 15 in Homestead, Florida, at the
airbase, 10 in Meridian, and two at the Superdome.11
Some suggested these resources should have been more
readily available. Rep. Chip Pickering said “[most MREs]
were [prepositioned] across the region, only a few in
Meridian and a few in New Orleans, and that should have
been closer, I think, to the storm.”12 Rep. Gene Taylor
pointed out the provisions were too far away from the
FEMA team, questioning
[w]hat part of the FEMA plan envisioned that the
fi rst responders in Hancock County and in much
of the Mississippi Gulf Coast would have to loot
the local grocery store and loot the local Wal-Mart
in order to feed themselves, would have to loot the
local Wal-Mart in order to have a change of clothes?
What part of your plan was that?13
Brown, however, strongly rejected the contention of
having relief items in the immediate impacted areas,
saying expectations must be realistic:
[T]he last thing I’m going to do is to put equipment
or manpower in place where they themselves
become victims and then cannot assist the people
they are there to assist. You cannot, you cannot
physically — I don’t think you can do it statutorily
or any other way — say to any victim in this
country that the minute you come out of your
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abode, your home, your shelter, whatever it is, that
the Federal Government is going to be there with a
meal ready to eat for you. That is an unreasonable
expectation. So what we do is we preposition
those supplies so that we can move them in and
help them. And that’s why the FEMA plan, that’s
why the basic emergency management system
says you should, as an individual, take personal
responsibility and be prepared to be on your own
for perhaps up to 2 or 3 days. If Congress expects
the Federal Government to be able to supply every
individual food and water immediately following
a catastrophe or a disaster, then this committee
in Congress needs to have a serious public policy
debate about what the role of FEMA and the
Federal Government is in disasters.14
According to the Director of the Mississippi Emergency
Management Agency (MEMA), Robert Latham, the federal
logistics system failed in the days immediately following
Hurricane Katrina, leaving state offi cials without adequate
supplies of food, water, and ice for emergency shelters.15
FEMA representatives working with MEMA requested 450
trucks of water and ice, and 50 trucks of MREs. When
less than 15 percent of the requested supplies arrived,
state emergency responders were forced to purchase
the commodities on the commercial market or obtain
supplies from neighboring states.16
Mississippi offi cials had to deal with shortages of
commodities for the fi rst nine to ten days after landfall.17
Fortunately, Mississippi offi cials had purchased supplies for
Hurricane Dennis (July 2005) that were not used. Similarly,
Florida offi cials
had pre-positioned
considerable resources
to be used in the Florida
Panhandle,18 which,
until Friday, August
26, was where Katrina
was projected to make
landfall. Commodities
were provided by
Governor Bush to
Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour under the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and offered
some relief to the victims in Mississippi’s coastal counties.19
Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) Bill Carwile
speculated the shortages were the result of an overly
centralized logistics system overwhelmed by the
requirements of the three large disasters: Hurricanes
Dennis, Katrina, and Rita. Mississippi offi cials asked
permission to purchase (on their own) commodities
from elsewhere to supplement those being provided by
the centralized system. Carwile said he was authorized by
FEMA Director Michael Brown to make these purchases.20
According to the Director of the Alabama Emergency
Management Agency (AEMA), Bruce Baughman, a better
contracting process for essentials and commodities
is needed.21 In the days before Katrina made landfall,
when offi cials submitted commodity requirements for
Alabama for items such as water, ice, MREs, these requests
were unilaterally reduced by FEMA offi cials – often so
refl exively that it appeared to be part of standard FEMA
procedure. Baughman said their initial requests were
carefully and precisely tailored to meet the actual needs of
Alabama. Tim Payne, AEMA Branch Chief and Emergency
Management Program Coordinator, said in advance
of Katrina, their needs assessment concluded Alabama
would require 100 trucks of water and 100 trucks of ice.22
In response to this request, FEMA made available only 17
trucks of water and 16 trucks of ice.
Frequently during the Alabama response to Katrina,
FEMA did not follow through with AEMA’s requests for
supplies and emergency support.23 It appeared FEMA
did not have the ability to track commodities within
its own logistics system. To defend against commodity
shortfalls in future emergencies, Alabama recently issued a
Request for Proposals for key commodities and materials
needed for an effective emergency response.24 Baughman
suggested having standing contracts in place and supplies
FEMA has a logistics problem, we have a problem understanding all the time. I can point out where our stuff is and I can point out where it’s supposed to go to; I can’t always tell you that it actually got there.
FEMA
322 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
at the ready so the
states would not
again fall victim
to an inadequate
FEMA response
or supply
shortages due
to other market
competitors in
times of crisis.25
Payne identifi ed 12 categories of items that need to be on
hand to effectively deal with an emergency.26
According to Brown, “one of the lessons that we need
to learn from this catastrophic event is that we do need
to get better about marshaling those assets and moving
them around. I will tell you up front, FEMA has a logistics
problem, we have a problem understanding all the time.
I can point out where our stuff is and I can point out
where it’s supposed to go to; I can’t always tell you that it
actually got there.”27
These problems are not new, however. FEMA’s
“bureaucratic slowness” in securing long-term housing
and loans, removing debris, and getting basic assistance
and reimbursement were “‘huge problems that have been
very frustrating,” stated Florida Governor Jeb Bush before
the House Homeland Security Committee.28 Getting
one truckload of ice from Atlanta to Florida in 2004
took a series of separate contracts that caused needless
delays. “‘FEMA’s logistics program is broken and needs
to be fi xed. . . . I can say with certainty that federalizing
emergency response to catastrophic events would be a
disaster as bad as Hurricane Katrina,” Governor Jeb Bush
testifi ed. “If you federalize, all the innovation, creativity
and knowledge at the local level would subside.’”29
It should be noted FEMA used existing resources,
procedures, and staff to organize and conduct a massive
civil logistics operation beyond any this country has seen
before. Over 11,000 trucks of water, ice, and meals were
moved into the disaster region during the month after
landfall. This is more than three times the number of
trucks used during all hurricanes in 2004.30 FEMA tried,
but Katrina’s magnitude exposed signifi cant weakness and
ineffi ciencies in the process.
Finding: Procedures for requesting federal assistance raised numerous concerns
Requests for federal assistance go through a standard
process. Local government offi cials submit their requests
to the state, and, if state offi cials cannot meet the request,
they forward appropriate requests to federal offi cials.31 In
Louisiana, state and local emergency management offi cials
manage requests for assistance during disasters using
specially-designed commercial software called “E-Team.”32
E-Team is a web-based system and can be accessed from
any computer with internet connectivity. According to
Matt Farlow of Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security
and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) Information
Technology Division, Louisiana has used E-Team since
2000 and LOHSEP personnel are well-experienced in its
use.33 In addition to using E-Team to register and track
parish requests, the Louisiana Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) also uses it to send out e-mail alerts and
notifi cations to parishes.
The parish-to-state process is much the same as the
state-to-federal process. The parishes declare emergencies
and request assistance from the state.34 The parishes
register their requests for assistance with the state directly
via the internet with E-Team. However, according to state
offi cials, not all parish offi cials know how to use E-Team
well: “They don’t know all the bells and whistles.”35 Parish
offi cials can also register requests to the state by telephone
or radio. If the parish communicates a request outside
E-Team, by voice, e-mail, or fax communications, then the
state EOC offi cials enter that request into E-Team.
The state receives the parish requests for assistance
and determines whether the requests can be met from a
nearby parish or with state resources.36 If so, LOHSEP tasks
that mission to another state agency. The state can also
request assistance from nearby states through the EMAC.37
When a state makes an EMAC request to another state,
it is undertaking an obligation to pay that state for that
assistance.38 FEMA has a mechanism to later reimburse
appropriate costs to the requesting state, which the state can
use to repay the sending state. Finally, if the state cannot
meet the request from its own or other state resources, the
state can prioritize the various requests and pass them on to
FEMA’s logistics program is broken and needs to be fi xed.
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FEMA offi cials. The state is supposed to make such requests
after it has already reviewed its own capabilities.
FEMA offi cials determine whether to accept or reject
the state request.39 This determination is documented. A
request might be rejected for a number of reasons, such
as not being appropriate, a state getting the resources
from elsewhere, or a state canceling a request while
FEMA offi cials are considering it. In some cases, a state
request might be made verbally to expedite assistance, but
FEMA offi cials expect the paperwork to soon follow. The
paperwork from the state certifi es that the state will pay its
share of the requested assistance.
Once FEMA accepts the request and agrees to meet it,
offi cials use a system called NEMIS (National Emergency
Management Information System).40 FEMA does not use
E-Team. NEMIS is used by FEMA offi cials to track the
request within the federal government and all requests
FEMA offi cials accept are entered into this system.
FEMA can meet the request from its own resources and
capabilities, from other federal agencies, or from private
contractors. If FEMA offi cials task another federal agency
with the request, that is known as a “Mission Assignment”
(or MA), whereby the task is assigned to the other agency.
Mission Assignments to another federal agency
could also be passed on to a private contractor. This is
done because some agencies have more expertise and
experience in contracting for certain types of items. For
example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
contracts for debris removal.41 Some federal agencies,
including FEMA, have pre-existing contracts that can be
modifi ed quickly to add additional items. NEMIS is used
to track the request and completion of the mission, as
well as to track spending and reimbursement later by
FEMA offi cials.42
In Louisiana there was widespread confusion about the process for obtaining federal assistance. In addition, the catastrophic nature of the disaster overwhelmed the existing procedures and systems
Louisiana state and parish offi cials said degraded
communications and the effective loss of parish E-Team
software forced them to deviate from normal procedures
for requesting federal assistance.43 These problems also
made it diffi cult for the state EOC to check on the status
of specifi c tasks assigned to state agencies. State offi cials
complained about FEMA’s non-automated process that
made tracking status diffi cult. State offi cials also noted
they had included FEMA on their E-Team license, but
during Katrina the FEMA staff assigned to the EOC were
not familiar with the E-Team system. This had not been
the case in earlier hurricanes, when FEMA staff assigned
to the EOC knew how to use E-Team.44 State offi cials
also complained about weaknesses in tracking the
transportation and estimating arrival of FEMA-contracted
commodities. FEMA offi cials have acknowledged these
weaknesses.45 Further, state offi cials said the federal
government contributed to the problem when other
federal agencies tasked FEMA directly rather than having
requests go from parish to state to FEMA and then onto
appropriate federal agencies.46 According to Governor
Blanco’s chief of staff, Andy Kopplin, the governor had
to go beyond the normal LOHSEP and FEMA process
because these processes were too bureaucratic and
impracticable.47
Parish offi cials were universally critical of FEMA for
providing relief commodities late.48 There were clearly
misunderstandings of what constituted an offi cial request
for assistance. The Jefferson Parish Emergency Manager,
Walter Maestri, said he directly communicated his
needs before landfall in a conference call to the EOC,
where FEMA personnel were present.49 In his view, this
constituted a request for assistance. However, both the
State Coordinating Offi cer (SCO) and the FCO said
while the purpose of these conference calls was to share
information, they were not considered valid ways for a
parish to make a request.50
New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, Col.
Terry Ebbert, also said the existing systems for requesting
assistance does not work during a catastrophic disaster.51
The system assumes the parish knows what it wants,
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324 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
the state knows what it wants, and both have the
communications capabilities to make requests of FEMA.
Ebbert said the current system is a “pull” system in which
parishes must make requests to pull an item from the
state and federal government. However, the parishes were
too overwhelmed and their communications were too
degraded to allow this to work. In a catastrophic disaster,
FEMA needs a “push” system in which FEMA offi cials
anticipate needs (e.g., for food, water, medical supplies,
ice, tarps, generators) and push the commodities to the
parishes without receiving the request. Under such disaster
circumstances, it would be better to have too much of
something than too little; the excess items can always be
shipped elsewhere or stored for the next disaster.52
As such, Ebbert was “shocked” to hear FEMA Director
Michael Brown say the local parishes never got FEMA
commodities because they never asked for them.53 In his
opinion, FEMA offi cials should have known what was
needed from their own experience. Similarly, Governor
Blanco’s chief of staff, Andy Kopplin, said the state had
to go beyond both LOHSEP’s and FEMA’s bureaucratic
processes for requesting and providing assistance.54
However, parish offi cials also acknowledged their
emergency managers were overwhelmed. Plaquemines
Parish Sheriff Jiff Hingle said his parish emergency manager
was completely overwhelmed and unable to cope with the
situation.55 Hingle found he and the parish president had
to make all requests for assistance through other channels
because the normal system was not functional.
FEMA offi cials Scott Wells and Tony Robinson put much
of the blame on the state, saying the standard request for
assistance process was not working because the state was
incapable of analyzing and prioritizing requests.56 Wells
and Robinson said many of the requests from parishes
came up through channels to the EOC, but state offi cials
appeared “overwhelmed” and they “lost control.” The EOC
did not attempt to prioritize such requests, did not try to
fi gure out if the requests could be met from state resources,
and did not go through EMAC channels to see if other
nearby states could provide the assistance. The EOC just
passed the unfi ltered requests on to FEMA offi cials. Wells
said the FCO staff did a quick analysis of parish E-Team
requests the EOC was passing on unfi ltered to FEMA, and
found many inappropriate items, such as writing tablets.
According to Wells, these requests were inappropriate
because the state should not be relying on FEMA for basic
items that are otherwise easily obtainable.
Parishes were frustrated by the degraded
communications and their desperate need for assistance.
Robinson said while the parishes were still able to
communicate requests to the EOC (via radio or other
means), they were not able to use E-Team.57 The EOC was
not systematically entering the requests into E-Team, so
the state could not track or check the status later, which
led to many parishes becoming frustrated. The parishes
probably blamed FEMA offi cials for any delays in getting
assistance because they had communicated their requests
and assumed the EOC had duly registered these requests
and passed them on to FEMA offi cials. Many of the highly
publicized parish requests for commodities such as for
food and water assistance may have never even reached
FEMA offi cials.
Some confusion arose because states and not the
parishes are supposed to make requests to FEMA.58
It was Louisiana’s responsibility to take these parish
requests, combine them with similar requests, determine
whether the state could meet them, prioritize them, and,
if appropriate, make requests to FEMA. That process,
where the state enters the request into its E-Team
system, allowing formal registry and tracking of status
and completion, is the only way to provide an orderly
processing of requests. Using verbal requests, without
documenting them in a formal process, leads to chaos,
particularly in a large disaster where there are hundreds
New Orleans Director of Homeland Security, Terry Ebbert, was “shocked” to hear FEMA Director Michael Brown say the local parishes never got FEMA commodities because they never asked for them. In his opinion, FEMA offi cials should have known what was needed from their own experience.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 325
or thousands of local requests for assistance. If the parish
is unable to use E-Team because of communications or
power diffi culties, the state EOC (which, in fact, retained
power during the hurricane and its aftermath) could have
still entered them into E-Team. Then the state should
perform its review, and, if appropriate, pass the request
on to FEMA. It was the state’s job, not FEMA’s, to take
down any parish requests from conference calls and enter
them into the system. FEMA offi cials saw these conference
calls serving the function of information sharing and
situational awareness, not substitutes for the parish-to-
state and state-to-federal formal request process.
Interoperability between state and federal automated systems
FEMA FCO staff said there is no automatic or electronic
interface between state systems (such as E-Team) and the
FEMA system (NEMIS).59 Both systems, if used correctly,
have independent capabilities to track requests for
assistance and determine their status. The two systems
meet in the EOC, where the E-Team requests are converted
into NEMIS. However, there is no way for the state EOC
offi cials to use E-Team to track the status of their request
in NEMIS, nor any way for the federal FCO offi cials to
use NEMIS to check information on the E-Team requests
originating at the local level.
According to FEMA offi cials involved in the response to
Hurricane Katrina, the breakdown of a unifi ed command
structure at the state EOC level hampered FEMA’s ability
to meet state and local requests for commodities.60
Without a unifi ed command, some state and local offi cials
began submitting commodity requests outside FEMA’s
normal logistics channels. FEMA, in turn, started fulfi lling
such requests on an “ad-hoc” basis before these requests
were properly authorized or logged into its logistics
system.61 When supply requests and subsequent supply
distributions were not logged, FEMA could not accurately
keep track of the resources it staged at regional facilities.62
As a result, supplies and equipment were delivered not
according to specifi cations, delivered late, or not delivered
at all, and priority needs were not met.
In his testimony before the Select Committee, Brown
acknowledged these logistical problems and the need for a
better tracking system. He said if
[y]ou don’t have a unifi ed command, [you] kind
of go into an ad hoc mode. So we hear that, for
example, County X is requesting fi ve truckloads
of Meals Ready to Eat, so we will then fi gure out
that, okay, we have got four available, so we are just
going to ship four into that county . . . .63
Then, “[another county] may send in a legitimate
request for fi ve trailer loads [and] you think they are still
there because no one has yet entered in the [trailers] that
have gone out.”64
When supply requests and subsequent supply distributions were not logged, FEMA could not accurately keep track of the resources it staged at regional facilities. As a result, supplies and equipment were delivered not according to specifi cations, delivered late, or not delivered at all, and priority needs were not met.
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Management lapse
According to Holden, lack of “knowledge and
understanding by many agencies paralyzed the efforts” to
provide an orderly and effi cient response, and required
paperwork also “hindered immediate action and
deployment of people and materials to assist in rescue and
recovery efforts.”65 Pre-positioned federal assets critical to
the operations of hospitals were never received. Resources
from the Strategic National Stockpile, despite requests, were
never locally deployed due to bureaucratic red tape.66
According to Carwile, “[i]n any operation, particularly
in a chaotic environment, there needs to be a balance
between ‘going outside the system’ and following a plan
and a procedure.”67 Carwile suggested “there needs to be
a well-disciplined, systematic approach based on a solid
plan that is suffi ciently fl exible for a variety of situations.
Experienced personnel know where the pitfalls are and
can make decisions where fl exibility is required. Doctrine,
policies, training, and exercises should be developed that
meet the needs of a trained and ready workforce.”68
Even Brown experienced bureaucratic frustrations.
Rather than have FEMA’s food provision efforts oriented
almost exclusively toward securing MREs, Brown sought
to devise an arrangement in which distributors or retailers
would deliver meals or groceries, like those that would
ordinarily be conveyed to typical commercial outlets,
directly to shelters. Brown testifi ed he came to believe
we were too focused on meals ready to eat. The
issue was food, not the MREs. So we came up
with what we thought was this brilliant idea
that we would utilize Wal-Mart or some grocery
distribution system because they are accustomed to
going to these 7-Elevens, [and other] convenience
stores, to replenish them all the time . . . . 69
Brown said FEMA started “trying to do a contract to do
that very thing [but] ran into a bureaucratic wall [so much
that] I fi nally had to scream at some people on the phone,
[‘]just make it happen, I don’t care, just do the contract
and make it happen.[’]”70
According to Carwile, over the past four years, there
has been no operational doctrine developed by FEMA. He
said, as a consequence
[t]here is no clear understanding of the
responsibilities of each level (Washington, the
Regions, and deployed Emergency Response
Teams) and how they are to interact. This lack of
operational doctrine results in unacceptable levels
of overlap, double and triple ordering of resources,
and long video teleconferences and conference calls
[which can] disrupt fi eld operations.”71
Carwile believes “well-understood and defi ned
operational methodologies based on doctrine would
minimize the need for lengthy conferences and would
achieve other effi ciencies.”72
Alabama offi cials said FEMA offi cials lacked
management skills.73 Nobody with FEMA seemed to
know what assets existed and how to marshal them, they
said. FEMA does not have a robust lessons learned/after
action program to assist in the refi ning and reorganizing
of processes. Instead, FEMA seemed to move from one
emergency to the next without incorporating any formal
reviews.
Alabama offi cials recommended FEMA adapt its training
requirements to allow states to use monies targeted for
state training exercises for after-action reviews of actual
emergency-related operations.74 One offi cial echoed the
thoughts of many AEMA personnel when he said the state
was better prepared for Katrina by virtue of its experiences
with previous hurricanes within the last year, notably
Dennis (July 2005) and Ivan (September 2004).75
Carwile suggested the logistics supply system was
overly centralized and recommended allowing the state to
contract with private entities to provide logistical support
and commodities distribution services, with the federal
share of costs reimbursed by FEMA.76
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Select Committee Members stated and Brown agreed
FEMA should develop a formal planning and logistics
process similar to that developed by the Department
of Defense (DOD).77 Some offi cials have suggested the
DOD simply assume a larger role in logistics, or even
take control outright.78 Although recognizing the value
of DOD assistance, Brown indicated DOD involvement
would not be appropriate for smaller events. “I think that
the Army can help FEMA in that regard,” Brown said. “I
would rather see it remain within FEMA because logistics
is something that you need in every disaster, the smallest
one that FEMA might be involved in to the largest; and I
don’t want to see us utilize the military in all of those.”79
However, According to Carwile
[t]he factors contributing to the slow delivery of
commodities should be examined and addressed
for future disasters. Possible solutions [include]
much better planning between State and Federal
emergency management logisticians and
operations personnel, the assistance and advice
of DOD strategic logistics planners, and much
more robust private sector partnerships, e.g., the
US Army LOGCAP or USAF AFCAP programs.
It is also possible for states to enter into their
own contractual agreements with the private
sector for procurement and delivery of response
commodities. The federal share is reimbursable
by FEMA and Florida routinely enters into such
agreements.80
Rep. Bill Shuster pointed out the private sector provides
the best relief model and, while government agencies such
as the DOD are excellent with logistics, “[s]ome of our
private companies . . . are even better and our military
learns from [these companies because they] know exactly
what’s in a truck. They know exactly where it’s moving.”81
For their part, private sector fi rms expressed the need
for a get-it-done-and-ask-questions-later mentality. The
director of Business Continuity Global Security for Wal-
Mart said “[f]lexibility in our plans, fl exibility in our
structure, and fl exibility of our Associates is paramount
to success.”82 Southern Company’s plans provide “for
fl exible and decentralized authority to make decisions as
close as possible to the disaster.”83 They demonstrated
creativity in helping restore fuel service to Chevron
pumps, in helping expand their communications system
to assist other companies, and in the way they used their
“family services plan” to provide emergency services to
employees.84
Starwood hotels worked to engineer a way to pump
water into the hotels, knowing the city’s water system
wouldn’t be up and running for some time.85 They
also contracted at the last minute for security to protect
their hotels from looting. IBM provided services to
governmental and non-governmental organizations as
needed on the ground.86 These services ranged from
temporary housing to websites and missing persons
registries including the CNN Safe List, which it hosted.87
FEMA’s Information Technology Systems are unable to support large-scale logistical challenges
The technology used to manage FEMA’s logistics system
may be partly to blame. FEMA’s Logistics Information
Management System III (LIMS III) is used to manage the
agency’s inventory of equipment and supplies.88
A recent DHS OIG report found FEMA’s computers were
overwhelmed during the 2004 hurricane season, which
hindered disaster-recovery efforts, delayed emergency
supply shipments, and put emergency-response personnel
at risk.89 The report found during August and September
2004, when four hurricanes struck Florida, the IT system
could not track essential commodities such as ice, water,
and tents.90
According to the report, LIMS III is not integrated
with other FEMA IT systems such as the database used to
identify and deploy personnel to disaster sites.91 Nor can it
share information across federal, state, and local agencies.
LIMS III was designed, however, to track “accountable
property” such as bar-coded cellular phones and pagers,
not “bulk commodities.”92 Although LIMS III contains
information on the quantity and location of emergency
supplies, it does not indicate when they will be shipped
or when they should arrive.93 In Florida, emergency
personnel tracked items on spreadsheets and spent hours
calling trucking companies to determine the status of
goods in transit.94
Brown received this DHS report several weeks before
Hurricane Katrina, but he and FEMA Chief Information
Offi cer Barry West rejected the OIG’s fi ndings, calling the
report’s characterizations “inaccurate.”95 According to a
FEMA spokesperson, “[FEMA’s] [l]ogistics-support systems
328 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
have presented us with some concerns over the past 18
months, and we are addressing this.”96
During Katrina relief efforts, FEMA tested a system
using global-positioning technology to track trucks
transporting commodities.97 FEMA also is installing an
intranet-based electronic document system to replace
paper documents and improve data sharing among agency
offi cials via an intranet.
The DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate, which FEMA was part of, established an
enterprise architecture offi ce in 2003 and hired a chief
enterprise architect in 2004 to develop a system to tie in
the directorate’s system with the rest of DHS.98 Of the
Katrina federal aid package, $4.6 billion is designated
for FEMA logistics, search and rescue, and emergency
supplies.99
Private sector fi lls void
Several tractor-trailers were strategically located throughout
the region by various offi cials and organizations to collect
local contributions, which were then sent to a warehouse
for collection and distribution.100 When the fi rst of 14
packed trailer loads arrived, volunteers unloaded the fi rst
two and quickly realized much more assistance was needed
to effi ciently process the donations and prepare them for
distribution.101 A clear plan for the organized collection,
sorting, storing and distributing of such a large volume of
goods was not in place, however.
Local offi cials turned to the private sector. “Once we
started seeing that we were going to have this enormous
infl ux of material, we knew that there was no one better
in the world for distribution and collection than Wal-
Mart Corporation. So we made some calls. And they
immediately sent down some folks. And they showed us
how to arrange a warehouse and they made it spin like
a top,” according to the Mayor of Fayetteville, Arkansas,
Dan Coody.102
Several companies had existing disaster plans which
eased the challenges they faced. Southern Company
has a separate plan for each category of hurricane, and
each year they conduct a major disaster simulation.103
Before the storm hit, Southern Company had already
pre-positioned trailers, caterers, laundry facilities, and
11,000 people for their response. Starwood developed a
crisis management plan which “structures preparedness
and response at the Corporate, Division, and Hotel levels”
and defi nes responsibilities for each level of employee.104
Wal-Mart keeps an Emergency Operating Center up and
running 24 hours a day, every day of the year.105 As one
IBM executive noted “[a]dvanced planning of people,
tools, and technology . . . is vital and important.”106 IBM
had its Crisis Response Team on the ground four days in
advance of Katrina, which worked with FEMA, the states,
and private entities, providing a list of the services they
could provide.
Ad Hoc response
In Fayetteville, Arkansas, individuals who had traveled
there to stay with family or friends began to stop by
the distribution center “in search of fi nancial aid, food,
clothes and other assistance,” recalled Coody.107 Offi cials
had not anticipated receiving evacuees at the distribution
center and were not sure how to respond. They had heard
stories of survivors being bounced from place to place or
from town to town, so they took it upon themselves to
fi nd answers, information, and assistance for everyone
who needed it.
Offi cials and volunteers pulled boxes off pallets and
made food and clothes available to these displaced
individuals.108 They moved all relief agencies into the
distribution center offi ces to make a one-stop location
where evacuees could get various types of assistance and
support, and set up a “store” where people could shop for
what they needed, free of charge.109
In addition, relief supplies were shipped from the
Fayetteville distribution facility to the Salvation Army
staging warehouse in Corsicana, Texas.110 It was eventually
F E
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destined to aid the stricken areas of Louisiana and
Mississippi. Many of these shipments were sponsored
by local businesses and churches and were arranged by
making direct contact with community members in the
affected areas. Fayetteville offi cials also learned many
rural areas were not receiving adequate support and were
still in desperate need of various items that were in stock.
This spurred offi cials to focus their large-scale distribution
efforts on rural Louisiana.
Coody testifi ed while Fayetteville had food, water,
wheelchairs, baby supplies and many other items
on pallets and ready to go, communicating and
coordinating the movement of supplies to these areas
was a challenge.111 He said the distribution center had not
received “any communications from the State or Federal
level about the needs in these areas.”112
Although Fayetteville offi cials wanted to send goods
where they were needed, arranging transportation also
proved to be a problem. Nonetheless, Coody recounted
some success in arranging deliveries including that they
asked J.B. Hunt and other trucking fi rms, [‘c]an you
please donate your time and some drivers to load
up this trailer that we have . . . ready to go and take
it to a particular town in Louisiana?[’]” And they
said, [‘]sure[’], . . . .113
In another instance, Bogalusa, Mississippi had
requested water and baby food from Fayetteville.
Coincidentally, a truck arrived from Kansas City, and the
driver announced, “I have got a load of baby food and
water and I am [being] told to get off the road because I
am overloaded.”114 The mayor said
[as soon as] we saw what we had, we gave him a
map and we said, [‘t]his is where you need to go,[’]
and we sent [the items] on their way. As they pulled
into Bogalusa and off-loaded food [—] baby food,
adult food [—] and everything else, people started
opening packages and eating food directly off the
truck because they had not had any food in three
days.115
Coody reported the realization that Fayetteville had
the necessary supplies in stock previously but had “no
knowledge” or “no real infrastructure to get it there” was
disturbing, and “it broke our hearts.”116
Finding: The failure at all levels to enter into advance contracts led to chaos and the potential for waste and fraud as acquisitions were made in haste
Concerns have been raised with respect to how FEMA
awarded its contracts in the immediate aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina and regarding the contract vehicles it
had in place before landfall.117 In the weeks following
Katrina, more than 80 percent of FEMA’s $1.5 billion
in contracts were awarded on a sole-source basis or
pursuant to limited competition.118 Many of the contracts
awarded were incomplete and included open-ended or
vague terms. In addition, numerous news reports have
questioned the terms of disaster relief agreements made
in such haste. Questions have also been raised about
USACE’s awarding of contracts with limited competition
for debris removal and clean up.119
In the face of the massive destruction caused by
Katrina, acquisition personnel acted to meet pressing
humanitarian needs, contacting fi rms in an effort to
provide immediate relief to survivors and to protect life
and property. Many of these fi rms were called into action
on a sole-source basis under acquisition provisions that
allow the government to acquire urgently needed goods
and services in emergency situations. These fi rms provided
emergency housing and shelter for victims and emergency
personnel, to start debris cleanup, and to secure property
from further damage.
F E
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The Shaw Group Inc., Bechtel National Inc., CH2M
Hill, and Dewberry Technologies were engaged by
FEMA to provide emergency housing and shelter for
victims, to start the cleanup of hazardous waste, and
begin restoration of the transportation infrastructure.
Before Katrina struck, however, FEMA had only one
contract in place relevant to the Katrina response for
temporary housing. Immediately after the disaster, USACE
competitively awarded contracts for debris removal
to ACI/AshBritt, Inc., Environmental Chemical Corp.,
Central Environmental Services, and Phillips & Jordan,
Inc. through an emergency competition, which resulted in
the submission of 22 proposals.120
FEMA executed few, if any, written contracts during
what offi cials called “the real nightmare emergency”
(Aug. 29-Sept. 15).121 The circumstances surrounding their
contract awards made it diffi cult for FEMA to understand
fully the contract specifi cs. FEMA simply instructed
companies to begin work and submit vouchers for
payment. FEMA used this method for the acquisition of
food, ice, buses, and other supplies. This could raise issues
of enforceability, which will need to be resolved when
written contracts are issued.
FEMA’s contracting practices were described by state and
local offi cials as “problematic.”122 Louisiana offi cials cited
lack of FEMA oversight and management in the awarding
of contracts. Further, state offi cials suggested there were
no performance-based standards under the contracts and
suggested under “time and materials” contracts, the longer
the contractor takes to perform the necessary service, the
more money the fi rm stands to make.
Rep. Jefferson also conveyed complaints from
Louisiana offi cials about FEMA’s failure to contract out
the mortuary and body recovery effort.123 This was a
particularly sensitive issue because New Orleans Mayor
Ray Nagin was predicting thousands of casualties.124 State
offi cials reported FEMA implemented a contract with
Kenyon International in the immediate aftermath of the
hurricane. According to offi cials, Kenyon was not given
the support it needed from FEMA to meet its objectives
and ended up pulling out of the contract. Ultimately,
Louisiana contracted with Kenyon directly.125
When asked whether FEMA had contracts in place for
disaster-related supplies, including tarps, ice, generators,
and temporary shelters, Brown equivocated, stating they
had some contracts in place for provision of MREs, water,
ice, temporary housing, and some of the trailers. In other
cases, however, FEMA had to “start buying off the street to
meet the demand.”126
By the end of September, it was reported that 80
percent of the contracts — and half of the $3.2 billion
spent — had been awarded without full and open
competition.127 The agency awarded 60 percent of its
contracts without full competition in October 2005, 68
percent in November 2005, and 50 percent in the fi rst half
of December.128
The Select Committee heard testimony from
representative companies that contracted with FEMA
and USACE to provide immediate response and recovery
requirements to the federal government. Carnival Cruise
Lines provided temporary housing; The Shaw Group
provided, among other services, “blue roof” emergency
tarps to cover storm-damaged homes; Landstar System
provided transportation support, including trucks for
supplies and busses for evacuees; AshBritt provided debris
removal services; Innotech provided emergency packaged
meals.129
Typical contracting issues
The experiences of The Shaw Group are typical of the
issues raised by contractors in the aftermath of Katrina.
The company is a $3+ billion company with 20,000
employees worldwide. According to company offi cials,
Shaw performed $800 million in federal work last
year, and contracts for Hurricane Katrina and Rita relief
have been the fi rm’s biggest undertaking.130 Shaw was
originally awarded two separate $100 million contracts:
the fi rst by the USACE and the second by FEMA. Shaw
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 331
is participating in competitive procurements for FEMA
requirements which, originally, were awarded on a
sole-source basis. USACE contracts (including blue roof
and rapid response contracts) were awarded on a non-
competitive basis.131 Overall, most of Shaw’s business
comes from USACE ($300 million), followed by DOD,
DOE, and the EPA.
The Friday before the storm, the Shaw Group was asked
by another fi rm to conduct damage assessments and
inspections.132 They were also contacted by FEMA and
the USACE to begin work. They established a command
center in Baton Rouge run by a retired general who served
as the point of contact for all requests. FEMA placed a
contract specialist within Shaw’s operations to help with
compliance and other issues. Offi cials were unsure if other
companies were offered FEMA assistance as well but said
they offered to provide Shaw personnel at FEMA.
According to company offi cials, Shaw’s existing blue
roof contract uses the highest number of workers from the
impacted areas of any fi rm project.133 Last year, Shaw took
Louisiana contractors to Florida, which made preparations
and response for this event easier. Their rapid response
contract has expanded over the years and was activated by
the USACE. Shaw was not successful in a bid for a debris
removal contract.
Shaw offi cials raised several concerns, which were
typical of the issues raised by several contracting fi rms:134
■ Liability—Shaw offi cials expressed concern that
the federal government might hold them liable
for environmental issues arising from pumping
contaminated water out of the city.
■ Changing Requirements—FEMA tasked Shaw with
securing temporary housing, which the company began
doing, before FEMA offi cials changed their minds.
Although they did not lose money, the company did
lose time and goodwill.
■ Contract Signing and Follow-through—Shaw offi cials had
problems getting contracts signed by the appropriate
agency offi cials. Although all the contracts have since
been signed, payments from FEMA remain slow.
Because Shaw’s subcontractors are generally small
businesses with tight cash fl ow, they cannot wait long
for payment. Shaw also had to turn down certain
projects because it had no indication from FEMA that
it would be paid. The Stafford Act requires that the
federal government give preference, if practicable, to
local businesses.135 However, this was largely not done
and, according to Shaw offi cials, some local companies
have since gone out of business. For example, debris
removal contracts were given to Minnesota, California,
and Florida fi rms.
■ Confl icts of Interest—Shaw offi cials continue to struggle
with the propriety of working for FEMA and for the
parishes. Offi cials indicated complications could arise if
FEMA hires them to asses a situation, and then a parish
hires them for rebuilding using FEMA money.
■ Bonding—Shaw offi cials did not know what the
bonding requirements were for Katrina recovery work.
However, they noted few small subcontractors are
bonded to levels necessary to enable them to perform
major contracts.
Oversight and proposed reforms to address outstanding issues
Although some emergency awards were made on a sole-
source basis, they do not constitute the majority of those
awarded in support of the relief efforts. Nevertheless,
FEMA recognized the need to revisit non-competitive
contracts issued quickly immediately after the storm.136
Shortly after emergency needs arose, DHS’s Chief
Procurement Offi cer (CPO) requested the OIG to begin
overseeing FEMA’s acquisition process.137 The DHS-
IG assigned 60 auditors, investigators, and inspectors
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and hired additional oversight personnel. DHS-IG
staff reviewed the award and administration of all
major contracts, including those awarded in the initial
efforts, and the implementation of the expanded use of
government purchase cards.138 The staff are continuing
to monitor all contracting activities as the government
develops its requirements and as the selection and
award process unfolds. In addition, 13 different agency
OIGs have committed hundreds of professionals to the
combined oversight effort, with a signifi cant part of the
oversight provided by DOD, the various service audit
agencies, and criminal investigative organizations.139
To ensure that any payments made to contractors are
proper and reasonable, FEMA has engaged the Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to help it monitor and
oversee payments made and has pledged not to pay on
any vouchers until each one is fi rst audited and cleared.140
In addition, DHS’s CPO met with each of the large Katrina
contractors to impress upon them the need to ensure all
charges are contractually allowable, fair, and reasonable.
Finally, the GAO has sent a team to the Gulf coast area
to provide an overall accounting of funds across the
government and evaluate what worked well and what
went wrong at the federal, state and local levels.
FEMA has indicated it will revisit non-competitive
arrangements made immediately after the storm.141 In
addition, on September 16, FEMA instituted its Phase II
plan. Under this arrangement, competitive procurements
for relief efforts will be reconstituted and revitalized.142
DHS offi cials indicated FEMA would formalize the
original emergency agreements to establish clearly the
terms and prices and then review all the requirements
and decide whether any particular contract needs to be
completed in the short term. If there is a continuing
need for the requirement, the initial contract will be left
in place only long enough for a competition to be held.
The competitively awarded contracts will then replace the
original arrangement. FEMA offi cials plan to ensure as
much of the work as possible goes to local small fi rms.143
Procurement offi cials acknowledged the initial
contracting response was poor, with little planning and
inadequate resources.144 However, these same offi cials
stated the procurement system had suffi cient fl exibility to
meet the challenge posed by Katrina.
Finding: Before Katrina, FEMA suffered from a lack of suffi ciently trained procurement professionals. DHS procurement continues to be decentralized and lacking a uniform approach, and its procurement offi ce was understaffed given the volume and dollar value of work
FEMA’s grossly understaffed acquisition unit was not
ready for the Katrina disaster.145 FEMA had 55 acquisition
slots, and procurement offi cials think it should have had a
minimum of 172.146 Further, only 36 of the 55 slots were
actually occupied. FEMA is one of the DHS agencies that
are not under the control of the DHS chief procurement
offi cer, thus the FEMA acquisition offi ce reported to
Michael Brown. As of the time of the interview, FEMA
was relying upon staff from the central acquisition offi ce,
comprised of 60 acquisition personnel and led by a
member of the Senior Executive Service. Regardless, the
offi ce was understaffed.147
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the OIG had repeatedly
cited as a major challenge the lack of consistent contract
management for large, complex, high-cost procurement
programs.148 DHS procurement continues to be
decentralized and lacking a uniform approach.149 DHS
has seven legacy procurement offi ces that continue to serve
DHS components, including FEMA.150 Notably, FEMA has
not been reporting or tracking procurements undertaken
by its disaster fi eld offi ces, and its procurement offi ce
remains understaffed given the volume and dollar value of
work. The CPO recently had established an eighth offi ce
called the Offi ce of Procurement Operations to meet the
procurement needs of the rest of DHS.151
FEMA had 55 acquisition slots, and procurement offi cials think it should have had a minimum of 172. Further, only 36 of the 55 slots were actually occupied.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 333
Louisiana offi cials also noted a shift during the Katrina
recovery of the personnel FEMA placed in charge of
contracting and logistical decisions.152 Instead of relying
on FEMA’s regional personnel, with whom the state is
accustomed to working in the aftermath of a disaster,
FEMA sent headquarters offi cials to the affected areas to
make key contracting and logistical decisions, causing
the process to become more bureaucratic. For example,
adding individuals to FEMA’s Individual Assistance
Program has been problematic, according to local
offi cials.153
In the past, the FCO from Region VI was able to add
individuals in the fi eld. With Katrina, however, state
offi cials had to send the request to FEMA headquarters,
which has become, some say, “gridlocked.”154 Further,
as previously mentioned, Louisiana state and local
offi cials also criticized FEMA contracting.155 They said the
focus seems to be shifting from the local FCO to FEMA
headquarters and becoming more bureaucratic in the
process.
Finding: Ambiguous statutory guidance regarding local contractor participation led to ongoing disputes over procuring debris removal and other services156
Under the Stafford Act,157 federal contracts with private
fi rms for debris clearance, distribution of supplies,
reconstruction, and other activities must give preference,
to the extent feasible and practicable, to organizations,
fi rms, and individuals from the area affected by the
disaster or emergency.158 However, there is no statutory
guarantee that, after a major disaster or emergency,
recovery and reconstruction work will be awarded to
businesses, organizations, and individuals, regardless of
where they are from.
The award of federal contracts for disaster or
emergency assistance activities are, in general, governed
by the standard competitive bidding statutes that apply
to all government contracting activities. The Stafford Act,
however, contains a “local preference” provision, which
can be implemented by the inclusion in a solicitation of
a clause creating a price preference for local fi rms or by a
set-aside that only permits local fi rm to compete.159 The
implementation is at the discretion of the contracting
offi cer. Signifi cantly, the Stafford Act local preference is
not a guarantee that local fi rms will be awarded recovery
contracts.160
Similarly, prime contractors are often required to
give preference to local subcontractors.161 USACE Acting
Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, Colonel
Norbert Doyle, suggested there is some uncertainty as
to the geographical preferences allowed and required by
the Stafford Act.162 Another offi cial testifi ed that different
laws are necessary,163 and stated “[the Stafford Act is] like
bringing a donkey to the Kentucky Derby.”164
Numerous public offi cials have complained about
the small number of local fi rms given relief contracts,
particularly with regard to debris removal. AshBritt, the
Florida-based prime contractor for debris removal in
Mississippi, was awarded a contract in early September by
USACE.165 According to AshBritt offi cial Randy Perkins,
the company was one of 22 fi rms that bid for USACE
debris removal contracts. AshBritt won the Louisiana and
Mississippi debris removal contracts, making the fi rm the
only contractor for that job in those states. AshBritt was
notifi ed of the award 72 hours after the RFP was advertised.
The debris removal contracts have a $150 million
ceiling at $30 million per year, and were intended by
USACE to get work underway as soon as possible, with
the agency reassessing the requests later.166 USACE’s delay
in issuing RFPs was understandable given the disaster,
according to Perkins.167 He stated, it costs “hundreds of
thousands of dollars to keep pre-existing contracts in
F E
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334 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
place, and fi rms receive no funding for this upkeep, which
represents a free insurance policy for USACE,” and few
companies can secure the bond necessary to perform such
a large-scale project.168
AshBritt offi cial Perkins says he encountered political
“fallout” from local offi cials because the company is
not based in Mississippi or Louisiana.169 The Select
Committee was not able to substantiate his allegation,
however. Perkins also discussed recieving mixed messages
from local offi cials and ”offi cials in D.C.” While state
offi cials told him “just get the debris out,” he indicated
offi cials in D.C. sent the message to “hire local workers.”
Although the company’s contract with the government
does not require it to hire local workers, Perkins says local
contractors recieve 80 percent of AshBritt’s payments to
sub-contractors.170 Although this percentage seems to
differ from data provided in USACE progress reports, the
Select Committee was not able to substantiate the actual
level of debris removal work provided by the local sub-
contracting community.
Brown suggested the scale of the disaster and the
complexity of the response require a large fi rm’s expertise:
Debris is a huge issue. Debris is one of those issues
that is fraught with local politics. It’s fraught with
fraud, waste and abuse [and] in cleaning up debris
in a situation like Katrina, you really have to have
experts overseeing that global perspective because
you have hazardous waste. You have the whole
issue of private property versus public property
. . . . So I would caution us about going down a
path that says we’re going to have all locals do it.
I know, in my subdivision, the local garbage folks
are very adept at picking up my trash twice a week,
and they’re pretty good about hauling out debris
after a storm or something. But in the kind of
debris removal we’re talking about in Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida from last year and this year,
you really need to have a substantial company
overseeing that, to not only protect the taxpayers,
but to make sure it’s done right.171
Later Brown said, “in a small town that’s hit by a
tornado and you have to clean up 45 blocks, city blocks,
that’s one thing. Here, where you’re cleaning up entire
cities, it’s a different issue. So I would just caution that we
approach that systematically.”172
Even if this point is conceded, it appears that, despite
the Stafford Act’s preference provision, only a fraction
of the money being spent in Mississippi is going to
subcontractors based there, according to press reports
citing documents from FEMA and USACE: 173
■ Of approximately $3.1 billion FEMA had awarded by
Nov. 4, only $52.4 million, or about 1.7 percent, had
gone to Mississippi fi rms.
■ Of the $476 million that has been spent by the Corps
of Engineers in Mississippi as of Nov. 2, about 28.5
percent has gone to Mississippi companies through
direct contracts and subcontracts.
■ Of the $164 million AshBritt has been paid so far by
the Corps, only about $30 million, about 18 percent,
has made it to Mississippi subcontractors.
However, Perkins said AshBritt has far exceeded its
contractual requirements for hiring local, small, and
minority-owned businesses.174 “People don’t understand
that the general administrative costs are very high. It
takes a lot to manage one of these projects,” according
to Perkins. “We have a tremendous amount of quality
control people and logistical support and we need to pay
for their housing.”175 He said the data released by USACE
do not refl ect the involvement of Mississippi businesses
because there are several major contractors from the state
that he called “team members,” who are helping the
company administer the overall contract. He said AshBritt
also has provided “hundreds” of administrative jobs to
Mississippians.
Use of local fi rms
Some have suggested FEMA’s policies need to be changed
to have local contractors in Gulf states ready to begin
recovery work well before hurricane season.176 For
instance, instead of hiring the USACE to manage debris
removal, states susceptible to hurricanes could prepare
lists of businesses who meet federal standards to remove
debris or haul trailers, thereby enabling local governments
to award their own contracts. Local governments are more
likely to go with local contractors and local governments
have been able to get the job done more quickly and
cheaply.177
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 335
As of December 2005, of the nearly $8 billion expended
by all direct contracts with the federal government,
only fi ve cents of every dollar reached Mississippi prime
contractors.178 Expenditure rates show DHS (including
FEMA) has spent $4,150,359,361, with 3.5 cents for every
dollar contracted directly to Mississippi businesses. A
January 23, 2006 USACE report reported USACE awarded
over $2.3 billion in Katrina contracts with 3.54 percent of
total contract dollars going to Mississippi businesses.
Rep. Pickering noted
Congress wrote the Stafford Act to maximize the
impact of federal dollars by giving preference
to local contractors, strengthening the damaged
economy and providing jobs to communities and
victims of the disaster. . . . Mississippians have the
ability, capacity and personal incentive to do this
work. We want to rebuild and restore our home
state, and these federal contracts will help our
economy more through local contractors than
sending the money to out-of-state corporations.179
Current federal policy discourages local governments
from assuming responsibility for debris removal.180 Local
offi cials are responsible for a cost share of 10 to 25 percent
(depending on the magnitude of the disaster) if they use
their own contracts. However, if USACE contractors are
used, the reimbursement for the life of the debris removal
effort is 100 percent with no cost share. Communities
removing their own debris have been notifi ed they will
incur a 10 percent cost share beginning March 16, 2006.181
Additionally, the specter of a federal audit can be
very intimidating for local offi cials, especially for rural
communities and those that have incurred major
damage. Risk can be avoided by simply signing on with
USACE, even if it is more costly and offers less control.
For example, USACE is removing debris in Waveland,
Mississippi and other locations at a reported cost of
approximately $23 per cubic yard.182 Nearby Gulfport
hired its own contractor at $14.95 per cubic yard183 and
appears to be making faster progress.184 Gulfport’s action
is particularly bold given their signifi cant loss of ad
valorem tax base. Finally, the $8.05 per cubic yard margin
is particularly substantial given the 40 million cubic yard
debris removal requirement in Mississippi alone.
Ambiguities regarding the implementation of local
contractor preference under the Stafford Act should be
resolved. In addition, clear, unambiguous remedies and
penalties for failure to meet such statutorily mandated
preferences may need to be considered.
FEMA response to local participation issue
In response to these concerns, FEMA plans a two-pronged
approach.185 First, FEMA will competitively award
multiple fi ve-year technical assistance contracts to small
disadvantaged businesses for recovery work in the Gulf
states, with evaluation preferences keyed to the location
of both the prime contractor and subcontractors in
the affected areas. Second, FEMA plans a full and open
competition for multiple fi ve-year contracts to provide
technical assistance support on a national basis for
disaster response and recovery. Under this competition,
FEMA will require that these prime contractors meet
signifi cant small business subcontracting goals, including
the preference for local businesses as provided under the
Stafford Act.
Through this strategy, FEMA hopes to provide a diverse
group of companies the opportunity to contract with
FEMA for the Gulf coast hurricane recovery by adding
prime contracting opportunities for small disadvantaged
businesses with a geographic preference for those
located in the Gulf states.186 The national competition
approach is intended to preserve subcontracting goals
and opportunities for small and disadvantaged businesses
as part of all prime contracts for future disasters. Both
strategies will emphasize the importance of using local
businesses, a critical piece of a successful economic
recovery in a disaster-ravaged area. Select Committee staff
did not receive detailed information on what efforts, if
any, USACE is planning for its long-term Katrina-related
acquisitions.
In addition, DHS representative Larry Orluskie said
FEMA is changing some of its policies.187 Recently, FEMA
announced it will set aside $1.5 billion under 15 contracts
worth up to $100 million apiece.188 Acting FEMA Director
David Paulison stated that priority would be given to
local contractors on the fi ve-year contracts for trailer
maintenance.189 Orluskie also cited the rebidding of
several large, prime contracts as evidence that the agency
is trying to be as transparent as possible in its contracting
336 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
process.190 Regarding the $100 million contracts held by
Bechtel, Fluor, Shaw, and CH2M Hill, agency offi cials said
the requests have been completed and will be awarded
again in February 2006.191
Nevertheless, Carwile testifi ed “[t]he Public Assistance
program provided under Section 406 of the Stafford Act
is far too cumbersome and time consuming in terms of
getting funds through the states down to the impacted
communities” and “could be totally revamped . . . .”
He said “[t]he program is one of the most diffi cult and
contentious aspects of disaster recovery,” and “the entire
issue of Federal reimbursement for debris removal should
be addressed in a comprehensive manner.”192
Finding: Attracting emergency contractors and corporate support could prove challenging given the scrutiny that companies have endured
When federal agency resources were overwhelmed and
existing contractors unable to meet the huge demands
created by the storm, federal offi cials turned to the
private sector for assistance. In an effort to meet pressing
needs by any means possible, federal offi cials looked to
alternative sources for food,
transportation, and housing.
Many of the fi rms approached
by agency offi cials had never
contracted previously with the
federal government. Housing
was one resource in short
supply. Offi cials considered
a variety of options to shelter
victims and fi rst responders,
and approached a number of
cruise ship operators.
According to Carnival
Cruise Lines representatives,
on Wednesday, August 24,
federal offi cials contacted the
company regarding chartering
ships.193 Carnival found this
unusual given that the fi rm had never served as a federal
contractor. “[W]e were watching just the total devastation,
and we felt very strongly that it was a situation where we
were in a position to help, and we very much wanted to
help,” stated Terry Thorton, a Carnival Vice President.194
The Military Sealift Command informed Carnival the
RFP was being issued. Carnival indicated it wanted to
“help” and responded to the RFP.195 Thirteen ships were
potentially available from Carnival and others. Four ships
ultimately met the RFP requirements (which included a
requirement for medical and pharmaceutical facilities),
three belonging to Carnival. Carnival received the RFP at
9 a.m. Friday, and the initial response was due two hours
later at 11 a.m. Carnival offered three ships, and negotiated
all day with “best and fi nal” offers provided at 9 p.m.
Carnival based its bid on projected cruise revenue
for six months out, and agreed it would reduce the
fi nal bill and provide a refund if, after an internal
audit by an independent accounting fi rm, it was found
Carnival earned more than it would have in the cruise
market.196 To make the ships available, Carnival canceled
approximately 100,000 existing reservations for which
travel agent fees still had to be paid. Carnival makes its
profi t from ticket sales and “add-ons” (drinks, shore
excursions, etc.) and not in the “time charter” business,
which is a comprehensive package of food, beverages, and
activities. In addition, it incorporated taxes into its offer,
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 337
which will be refunded if it is determined it does not owe
taxes under U.S. law.197
Despite these provisions, numerous public offi cials and
press reports have criticized the arrangement. Attention
focused on the ships when FEMA revealed it intended to
use them to house fi rst responders. At the time, housing
for fi rst responders was in short supply, and FEMA sought
out a variety of options. “I’m not sure that everyone on
this panel would have made the same choice that FEMA
made, but this was FEMA’s choice as to how they wanted
to house people . . . . And you’ve simply said, [‘]if you
want us to do this, here’s what the circumstances are,[’]
and FEMA said, [‘]that’s okay with us,[’] and we accept
that,” stated Rep. Jefferson.198 When appreciation was
expressed by Select Committee Members for Carnival’s
assistance, Carnival offi cials replied, “[t]hank you. Because
honestly, that’s one of the few times that we’ve really been
thanked for the effort . . . .”199
The intense public scrutiny could limit the willingness
of private sector companies to offer assistance during
future disasters. Several fi rms expressed the view that the
challenges associated with emergency contracting may
not be worth the trouble. Finally, unfounded negative
publicity harms company reputations. Public sector
missions divert company assets from primary missions
and could raise questions about whether a company was
meeting its fi duciary duty to shareholders. Given the
important role the private sector played in all aspects
of the response and recovery, any loss of private sector
involvement could be critical. ■
338 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
1 Hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its Victims Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. (Sept. 28, 2005) at 58 (statement of Melvin Holden) [hereinafter Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing].
2 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Major Mgm’t Challenges Facing the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rpt. of the Inspector Gen., DHS FY 2005 Performance and Accountability Rpt. (Dec. 2005) at 110, available at, http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-14_Dec05.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) [hereinafter DHS IG Rpt.].
3 DHS IG Rpt. at 111. 4 Amy Belasco, Cong. Research Service (CRS), Reallocation of Hurricane Katrina Emer. Approps.: Defense and Other Issues (Dec. 15, 2005) at CRS-3
[hereinafter CRS Approps Rpt.]. 5 Id. at CRS-3-CRS-4. 6 Frank Donze, Nagin decries slow pace of relief, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans, LA) Oct. 21, 2005 at 1. 7 James Varney, Want answers? Don’t ask FEMA, TIMES-PIC. (New Orleans, LA) Oct. 22, 2005 at 1. 8 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: The Role of the Fed. Emer. Mgm’t Agency Before Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2005) at 100 (statement of
Michael Brown, former Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response) [hereinafter Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing]. 9 Tom Gardner, Former FEMA director shoulders greater share of blame for Katrina failures, ASSOC. PRESS, Jan. 19, 2006. 10 Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 82 (statement of Sen. Mark Pryor). 11 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 65 (statement of Michael Brown). Note, each trailer contained 18,000 meals. 12 Id. at 150 (statement of Rep. Chip Pickering). 13 Id. at 65 (statement of Rep. Gene Taylor). 14 Id. at 66 (statement of Michael Brown). 15 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, in Jackson, MS (Oct. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter Latham Interview]. 16 Id. 17 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals Before Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t Affairs, 109th
Cong. (Dec. 8, 2005) at 6 (written statement of William L. Carwile) [hereinafter Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing]. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bruce Baughman, Director, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, in Clancy, AL (Oct. 11, 2005)
[hereinafter Baughman Interview]. 22 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tim Payne, Branch Chief and Emergency Management Program Coordinator, Alabama, in Clanton, AL
(Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Payne Interview]. 23 Baughman Interview. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Payne Interview. These items included transportation, water, ice, materials handling equipment, cots plus bedding supplies, sandbags, meals,
fuel, tarps, project management and logistics services, special needs beds, headquarters / offi ce coordination capabilities. 27 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 73 (statement of Michael Brown). 28 Frank Davies, Gov. Bush: Keep Disaster Response Local, HERALD (Miami), Oct. 20, 2005 at A-26 [hereinafter Herald Article]. 29 Id. 30 Briefi ng for Select Comm. Staff by Gary Moore, Director of Logistics, FEMA (Jan. 9, 2006). 31 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Scott Wells, Deputy FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 9, 2005),
[hereinafter Wells Interview]; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Tony Robinson, FEMA Operations Offi cer, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Robinson Interview].
32 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Matt Farlow, Chief Information Technology Division (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Farlow Interview].
33 Id. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 See Interview by Select Comm. Staff with LTC William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and
Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Doran Interview]; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jim Ballou, Operations Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Ballou Interview].
37 See Doran Interview; see also Ballou Interview. 38 See Wells Interview; see also Robinson Interview. 39 Robinson Interview. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 See Doran Interview; see also Ballou Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Dr. Walter Maestri, Emergency Manager for
Jefferson Parish, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Maestri Interview]; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jiff Hingle, Plaquemines Parish Sherriff, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Hingle Interview]; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Terry Ebbert, Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, in New Orleans, LA (Nov. 9, 2005) [hereinafter Ebbert Interview].
44 Farlow Interview.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 339
45 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 110 (statement by Michael Brown); see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Bill Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, in Washington, DC (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Lokey Interview].
46 See Doran Interview; see also Ballow Interview; see also Lokey Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Phil Parr, Dep. Fed. Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA, in Washington, DC (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Parr Interview].
47 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, in Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Kopplin Interview].
48 See Maestri Interview; see also Hingle Interview; see also Ebbert Interview. 49 Maestri Interview. 50 See, Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jeff Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, in
Baton Rouge, LA (Nov. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Smith Interview]; see also Lokey Interview; see also Wells Interview. 51 Ebbert Interview. 52 Id. 53 Id. 54 Kopplin Interview. 55 Hingle Interview. 56 See Wells Interview; see also Robinson Interview. 57 Id. 58 Id. 59 Robinson Interview. 60 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 106-107 (statement of Michael Brown). 61 Id. at 108 (statement of Michael Brown). 62 Id. at 110 (statement of Michael Brown). 63 Id. at 108 (statement of Michael Brown). 64 Id. at 110 (statement of Michael Brown). 65 Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 5-6 (written statement of Melvin Holden). 66 Id. at 7 (written statement of Melvin Holden). 67 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 9 (written statement of William Carwile). 68 Id. 69 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 164 (statement of Michael Brown). 70 Id. Note, Mr. Brown left FEMA shortly after this plan was devised. He testifi ed that he was unaware of whether this proposal was ultimately
implemented. Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 164 (statement of Michael Brown). 71 Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 9 (written statement of William Carwile). 72 Id. 73 Baughman Interview. 74 Baughman Interview; see also Interview by Select Comm. Staff with David Tranter, General Counsel for Alabama Emergency Management
Agency, in Clanton, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Tranter Interview]. 75 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Toby Roth, Chief of Staff to Governor Barbour, in Montgomery, AL (Oct. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Roth
Interview]. 76 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 6 (written statement of William Carwile). 77 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 149-150 (statement of Rep. Chip Pickering); see also Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 146
(statement of Michael Brown.). 78 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 150 (statement of Rep. Chip Pickering). 79 Id. at 149-150 (statement of Michael Brown). 80 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 6 (written statement of William Carwile). 81 Id. at 163 (written statement of William Carwile). 82 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response Before the Senate Comm. on Homeland Security and
Gov’t Affairs, 109th Cong. (Nov. 16, 2005) at 6 (written statement of Jason Jackson) [hereinafter Nov. 16, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing]. 83 Id. at 2 (written statement of David. M. Ratcliffe). 84 Id. at 5 (written statement of David. M. Ratcliffe). 85 Id. at 7-8 (written statement of Kevin T. Regan). 86 Id. at 3 (written statement of Stanley S. Litow). 87 Id. 88 Offi ce of Inspector General, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response Could Better Integrate Information Technology with
Incident Response and Recovery (Rpt. No. OIG-05-36), at 5 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter DHS IT Report]. 89 See generally, DHS IT Report; see also Laurie Sullivan, FEMA’s Foul-up; Report says agency’s computer systems failed to track supplies during last year’s
hurricane season, INFOR. WEEK, Oct. 3, 2005 [hereinafter FEMA Foul Up Article]. 90 FEMA Foul Up Article. 91 DHS IT Report at 21. 92 Id. at 3. 93 Id. at 27. 94 FEMA Foul Up Article. 95 DHS IG Report at 46. 96 FEMA Foul Up Article. 97 Id. 98 Id.
340 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
99 Katrina Spending Highlights, ASSOC. PRESS, Sept. 8, 2005. 100 Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 47 (statement of Dan Coody). 101 Id. 102 Id. at 79 (statement of Dan Coody). Mr. Coody further stated that Wal-Mart “immediately responded by sending two engineers to create a
warehouse system for our facility, a distribution center supervisor and two additional employees to oversee the operation. During peak hours we had over 100 volunteers, city employees, Wal-Mart employees, and work release inmates working side by side to organize the donations. The trailers were unloaded by Saturday [September 10], and the donations were ready for shipment by September 15.” Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 2 (written statement of Dan Coody).
103 Nov. 16, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 2 (statement of David Ratcliffe). 104 Id. at 2 (statement of Kevin T. Regan). 105 Id. at 1-2 (statement of Jason Jackson). 106 Id. at 22 (statement of Stanley S. Litow). 107 Sept. 28, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 48 (statement of Dan Coody). 108 Id. at 2-3 (written statement of Dan Coody). 109 Id. at 48 (statement of Dan Coody). 110 Id. 111 Id. at 49-50 (statement of Dan Coody). 112 Id. at 80 (statement of Dan Coody). 113 Id. at 80-81 (statement of Dan Coody). 114 Id. at 81 (statement of Dan Coody). 115 Id. 116 Id. 117 Renae Merle, Lack of Contracts Hampered FEMA; Dealing With Disaster on the Fly Proved Costly, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2005 at A01 [hereinafter
Contracts Article]. 118 Contracts Article. 119 Nov. 2, 2005, Select Comm. Hearing at 5 (statement of Chairman Tom Davis). 120 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Greg Rothwell, DHS Chief Procurement Offi cer, and Mui Erkum, Chief of Staff to Greg Rothwell, in
Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Rothwell / Erkum Interview]. 121 Id. 122 Smith Interview; see also Maestri Interview. 123 Smith Interview. 124 Id. 125 Id. 126 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 100 (statement of Michael Brown). 127 Chris Gosier, Another Katrina casualty: Competition; No-bid Contracting Surges for Recovery Work, FED. NEWS, Jan. 09, 2006 at 1 [hereinafter No-
bid Article]. 128 Id. 129 See generally Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing. 130 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Stephen Marlo, Vice President and Manager of Washington Operations and George Bevan, The Shaw
Group, in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Marlo / Bevan Interview]. 131 The blue roof program involves teams of contract personnel professionally installing high quality plastic sheeting over damaged roofs. This
was fi rst used extensively following Hurricane Andrew and again in Hurricane Georges in Puerto Rico, and, in 2004, in Florida. It enables families to reoccupy their houses until more permanent repairs can be made.
132 Marlo / Bevan Interview. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2005) [hereinafter Stafford Act]. 136 Rothwell / Erkum Interview. 137 Id. 138 Id. Procurement offi cials indicated that the $250,000 card threshold increase was unnecessary and did not plan to use it. 139 Rothwell / Erkum Interview. 140 Id. 141 Id. 142 Id. 143 Id. 144 Id. 145 Id. 146 Id. 147 Id. 148 Id. 149 See generally Rothwell / Erkum Interview. 150 Rothwell / Erkum Interview. 151 Gov’t Accountability Offi ce, Successes and Challenges in DHS’ Efforts to Create an Effective Acquisition Organization (GAO-05-179) (Mar. 2005) at 5. 152 Smith Interview. 153 Id.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 341
154 Id. 155 See Smith Interview; see also Maestri Interview. 156 During the Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing on contracting, Members posed questions that witnesses from DHS and FEMA were unable to
answer. Although they committed to providing answers to these questions as well as additional information, agency personnel failed to do so despite repeated inquiries. See generally, Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing.
157 Stafford Act. Note, the Stafford Act was fi rst enacted in 1974. 158 See Stafford Act at § 5150; see also Fed. Acq. Reg. (FAR) §§ 26.200 – 26.201. 159 See Stafford Act at §§ 5121-5206, which directs that preference be given “to the extent feasible and practicable” to businesses and individuals
from the affected areas. 160 See HAP Construction Inc., 98-2 CPD 76 (1998) (Gov’t Accountability Offi ce Decision No. B-280044.2) (Sept. 21, 1998). 161 See Stafford Act at §§ 5121-5206. 162 Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 88-89 (statement of Norbert Doyle). 163 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Hearing (statement of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordination Offi cer, FEMA (citing press reports) 164 Greta Wodele, FEMA offi cials: Military delayed Superdome evacuation, GOVEXEC.COM, Dec. 8, 2005. 165 Interview by Select Comm. Staff of Randy Perkins, Managing Vice President of AshBritt Environmental, Inc., in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14,
2005) [hereinafter Perkins Interview]. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 Id. 171 Sept. 27, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 150-151 (statement of Michael Brown). 172 Id. at 153 (statement of Michael Brown). 173 Joshua Cogswell, Doling of storm funds rapped, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Mississippi) Nov. 13, 2005 at 1A [hereinafter Storm Funds Article]. 174 Id. 175 Id. 176 See generally, Nov. 2, 2005, Select Comm. Hearing; see also Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing. 177 Id.; see also Press Release, Rep. Chip Pickering, regarding Contracting (Nov. 3, 2005). 178 Dep’t of Homeland Security, Report of U.S. Gov’t Direct Contracts, including FEMA, as provided by the HCIC, as of December 12, 2005. 179 Press Release, Rep. Chip Pickering, regarding Contracting and the Stafford Act (Dec. 21, 2005). 180 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Small/Local Business Update as of 1/23/06. 181 See, Mississippi; Major Disaster and Related Determinations (FEMA-1604-DR, Amendment 12) (Aug. 29, 2005, as amended Dec. 21, 2005). 182 Mike Brunker, Dust fl ies over Katrina’s Debris, MSNBC, Jan. 29, 2006. 183 Interview (Telephone) by Rep. Pickering Staff with Brent Warr, Mayor, Gulfport, MS from Washington, D.C. (Dec. 2005). 184 Select Committee Members who toured the Gulf coast in January 2006 agreed with this assessment. 185 Storm Funds Article. 186 Id. 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 190 Id. 191 Id. 192 Dec. 8, 2005 Senate Comm. Hearing at 7-8 (written statement of William Carwile). 193 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Jon K. Waldron and T. Michael Dyer, outside counsel for Carnival Cruise Lines, in Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Carnival Counsel Interview]. 194 Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 170 (statement of Terry Thornton). 195 Carnival Counsel Interview. 196 Id. 197 Id. 198 Nov. 2, 2005 Select Comm. Hearing at 172 (statement of Rep. William Jefferson). 199 Id. at 173-174 (statement of Terry Thornton).
342 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“While well intentioned, the volunteers never had a good grasp on security requirements for
fi nancial assistance distribution operations. On numerous instances, the ARC [American
Red Cross] volunteers would simply fi nd a vacant parking area and commence voucher
distribution operations. Immediately, crowds would gather and would overwhelm the
distribution site. The ARC would then call on the Guard for assistance.
“Repeated attempts were made to reinforce the need for prior coordination for site security.
It was not until mid-September that the ARC started coordinating these operations.”
Major General Harold A. Cross
The Adjutant General, State of Mississippi
In Response to Questions from Select Committee, November 22, 2005
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 343
CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
Contributions by charitable organizations assisted many in need, but the American Red Cross and others faced challenges due to the size of the mission, inadequate logistics capacity, and a disorganized shelter process
Summary
Following Katrina’s devastation, countless numbers of
charities provided billions of dollars in relief to those in
need. According to the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana
University, as of January 9, 2006, private donations,
including cash and in-kind gifts have reached $3.13
billion.1 According to the Government Accountability
Offi ce (GAO), the efforts of charitable organizations in
the Gulf coast represent the largest disaster response effort
in United States history.2
Under the National Response Plan (NRP), the American
Red Cross (Red Cross) is the primary agency responsible for
Emergency Support Function (ESF) #6, Mass Care, Housing
and Human Services. As the only nongovernmental
organization with lead agency responsibilities under the
NRP, the Red Cross plays the crucial role of helping to
provide food and shelter to disaster victims.
Katrina, however, was too much for the Red Cross.
The Red Cross was challenged to meet its responsibilities
under the NRP, as its $2 billion relief operation was 20
times larger than any previous Red Cross mission. Like
FEMA, the Red Cross did not have a logistics capacity
sophisticated enough to deal with a catastrophe of
Katrina’s size. The Red Cross was dependent on FEMA
and the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide
critical commodities such as kitchen supplies, water, and
food. The Red Cross was challenged by the sometimes
disorganized manner in which shelters were established.
Some shelters were unknown to the Red Cross until
after they were already opened by local offi cials. The Red
Cross was unable to staff some locally-operated shelters,
including the Superdome, because charity offi cials were
denied access.
Challenges aside, as of January 12, 2006, the Red Cross
reported it had raised $2 billion for Katrina relief, by far
the largest amount of money raised by a charity.3 The
Salvation Army had raised the second-highest amount,
$295 million.4 The Bush-Clinton Katrina Fund and
Catholic Charities were the next-largest fund raisers,
raising $137 and $100 million respectively.5 Other major
U.S. charitable organizations, including the United Way,
have also contributed meaningfully to the response and
recovery effort. One feature of the United Way’s response
has been its focus on restoring the network of local social
service agencies in the region.6
Many of the charities responding to Katrina worked
with each other to coordinate the delivery of a multitude
of services, including providing food, shelter, and medical
assistance.7 Charities have shared information through
daily conference calls and through electronic databases
that allow multiple organizations to obtain information
about services provided to hurricane victims.8
As much as any organization, public or private,
the Red Cross played a substantial role in the immediate
response to Hurricane Katrina. In what became a
$2 billion, 220,000-person enterprise, the relief efforts
undertaken by the Red Cross include the provision of
fi nancial assistance to 1.2 million families, encompassing
more than 3.7 million hurricane survivors.9 As of January
9, 2006, the Red Cross reported that since Katrina made
landfall, it had provided hurricane survivors with nearly
F E
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344 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
3.42 million overnight stays in nearly 1,100 shelters across
27 states and the District of Columbia.10 In coordination
with the Southern Baptist Convention,11 the Red Cross has
served more than 52 million meals or snacks to hurricane
survivors.12 The Katrina response is larger — 20 times so —
than any other Red Cross mission in its 125-year history.13
Pre-landfall actions
The Red Cross’ Gulf coast-area preparation was far along
two days before Katrina made landfall. As of 2:00 p.m.
on August 27, the Red Cross reported to the White House
and the Department of Homeland Security, among other
governmental organizations that it “has every resource at
its disposal on alert/moving in anticipation of this event
to include personnel, equipment, and materials.”14 Key
aspects of this preparation included:
■ Chapters across the region are opening shelters in
support of evacuations in all states.15
■ 275,000 HeaterMeals staged in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
■ 225,000 HeaterMeals staged in Montgomery, Alabama.
■ 15 sites being identifi ed to bring in big kitchens with
support of Southern Baptists to provide 300,000 meals
per day feeding capability.
■ All 14 Disaster Field Supply Center warehouses loading
supplies including 50,000 cots, 100,000 blankets,
comfort and clean-up kits.
■ All vehicles in the Red Cross fl eet across the country
are on alert for possible deployment and are being
dispatched to staging areas.
■ All 8 Emergency Communications Response Vehicles
(ECRVs) deployed to staging areas.
■ Red Cross staff deployed to NRCC, Region VI RRCC,
Region IV RRCC, ERT-As and other ESF #6 posts.16
By August 28, the Red Cross started to understand
the potential magnitude of Katrina. One of its Disaster
Operations Reports noted, if Katrina makes landfall at
its current pressure, “it will be the most intense storm
to hit the U.S. mainland.”17 Also on the same day it was
reported, “For the fi rst time ever, an ESF6 coordination
center will be set up tomorrow at American Red Cross
national headquarters to coordinate the deliver [sic]
mass care services with our governmental and non-
governmental organization partners.”18
Post-landfall actions
As Katrina made landfall on August 29, the Red Cross
was fully staffi ng all of the relevant state and federal
Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), including
Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, Georgia, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) Regions IV and VI’s Regional Response
Coordination Center (RRCC), FEMA’s National Response
Coordination Center (NRCC), as well as Emergency
Response Advance Element Teams (ERT-A) teams in
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.19 Sites for 25
kitchens for a total daily capacity of 500,000 people were
identifi ed and pre-staged.20 The Red Cross was also aware
of the increasing population at the Superdome, a shelter
of last resort it did not support.21 Figure 1 shows Red
Cross interactions with these various operations centers.
Figure 1:
Red Cross Involvement at Emergency Operations Centers
Sites for 25 kitchens for a total daily capacity of 500,000 people were identifi ed and pre-staged.
RED CROSS
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 345
Montgomery, Alabama Regional Headquarters
The day-to-day paid operations staff of the service area
coordinates the fundraising and communications and
provides the institutional knowledge of the affected
area.22 Armed with the right data, and knowledge of the
area, the information and resources management cell can
provide essential services to those in need.23
The Red Cross’ temporary, regional disaster
headquarters in Montgomery, Alabama serves Alabama,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and the Florida panhandle.24 The
facility serves, “triple functions:” (1) a volunteer and staff
shelter; (2) a warehouse for food and supplies; and (3) a
temporary regional corporate headquarters – basically a
hub for all relief operations in the Gulf coast region.25
The facility has been under lease for over a year, and
was used during the 2004 hurricane season as a base of
response operations for Hurricanes Dennis and Ivan.26
Following Hurricane Katrina, the facility was re-opened
Thursday, September 1, and was mostly operational
within 24 hours and completely operational within 72
hours.27 Skip Batchelor, a 20-year Red Cross veteran, said
the facility would remain operational through October
2005.28 The lifecycle of the emergency facility was,
therefore, about two months.29
Located in an old K-Mart building, the facility houses
all of the functions of a major corporation.30 Having the
appearance of large political campaign, there are hundreds
of folding tables and chairs divided into work areas by
function.31 Some functional areas included:32
Warehousing. Approximately 30 percent of the facility served as storage location for food stuffs and
supplies, including, cots, blankets, coolers, comfort
kits, and meals ready to eat (MREs).
Staff Shelter. At its peak the facility housed 450 Red Cross personnel (staff and volunteers).
Transportation. The facility’s parking lot was approximately 30 percent populated with large
rental trucks, most supplied by Budget, which
donated approximately 50 percent of the rental
trucks free of charge. Numerous truck drivers
reported each morning ready to drive goods to
various points of service in the region. The Red
Cross contracted with Shell to install an on site
gasoline supply for its vehicles. The Red Cross was
able to take advantage of wholesale pricing on this
gasoline.
Information Technology (IT). Work stations had computer, internet and telephony capability. There
was a central IT department that supported the
entire facility.
Real Estate. The Red Cross leased other facilities to serve as points of contact for client interaction.
Their real estate team located and secured these
properties.
Chapter Outreach. Personnel attempted to coordinate the fi eld needs with the resources
available at headquarters.
Jobs and Training. Served as a clearinghouse for job opportunities and training for the displaced.
Financial Assistance. Analysis of client needs and eligibility for fi nancial assistance.
FEMA interface. Provided assistance in connecting victims to FEMA.
Other NGO Coordination. Personnel worked to coordinate with the other key charities and non-
government organizations (NGOs) to ensure that
the clients are directed to and made aware of all
of the potential relief resources. The key charities
that clients are referred to include: Baptist Kitchens
F E
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346 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
(food), Mennonites (home rebuilding), VOAD –
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (various
local volunteers and other smaller relief entities,
many of which are faith-based), Catholic Charities,
and Habitat for Humanity (new homes).
Government Liaison. Government outreach to coordinate shelter operations, rescue and client
outreach.
Volunteer Coordination. At its peak, the facility processed 45,000 volunteers.
Data Entry. There appeared to be 60 to 100 work stations for data entry, half of which are paid
temporary workers and half are volunteers.
The ability of the Red Cross to rapidly open and
operate such a sophisticated facility in a short amount
time refl ects the sophisticated planning regime the Red
Cross has long had in place. The rapid standing up of the
facility was described by Laura Howe a Birmingham-based
Red Cross offi cial as the equivalent of opening a Fortune
500 company in a couple days time.33
The Red Cross, much like FEMA, did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated enough to deal with a truly catastrophic disaster the size of Katrina
The Red Cross was dependent on FEMA and DOD to
provide certain supplies—particularly food in the form of
MREs—so it suffered from all the weaknesses in the FEMA
and DOD supply chain discussed earlier.
The fl ooding of New Orleans became a reality on August
30 and the Mayor declared that “80 percent of the city is
under water and media sources report the water level is still
rising, due in part to broken levees and failed water pumps
in the city.”34 By 8:00 a.m. on August 30, the Red Cross
was operating 254 shelters for 41,013 people and serving
more than 63,000 meals a day.35 According to the Red
Cross’ periodic reporting documentation, these numbers
continued to grow. The largest number of meals served
in a day occurred on September 4, when nearly 946,000
meals were provided.36 Figure 2 shows the Red Cross daily
statistics for the number of shelters in operation, their
population, and the number of meals served per day.
Figure 2:
Red Cross Service Levels By Day
Red Cross
Figure 3 shows the daily shelter population for Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, and a fourth category with the
shelter population in all other states.
The Red Cross was encouraged by its pre-landfall
staging operation, deeming it largely a success.37 That
being said, the unprecedented devastation of Katrina,
both in terms of property damage and number of
Date Number Population Number Source of Shelters of Meals
August 26 6 584 1,209 DOSR #2
August 27 3 252 3,884 DOSR #4
August 28 3 244 4,454 DOSR #6
August 29 239 37,091 N/A DOSR #9
August 30 254 41,013 63,175 DOSR #11
August 31 259 52,719 114,413 DOSR #12
September 1 275 76,453 170,465 DOSR #14
September 2 308 94,308 N/A DOSR #17
September 3 361 96,178 137,588 DOSR #18
September 4 397 106,970 945,886 DOSR #20
September 5 413 124,617 618,938 DOSR #22
September 6 490 125,941 485,983 DOSR #24
September 7 504 143,712 669,271 DOSR #26
September 8 527 138,294 683,826 DOSR #28
September 9 510 101,381 534,864 DOSR #30
September 10 468 97,892 501,318 DOSR #32
September 11 443 88,883 491,751 DOSR #34
September 12 445 74,890 444,793 DOSR #36
September 13 348 62,931 359,816 DOSR #38
RED CROSS
Figure 3:
Daily Shelter Population By State
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 347
individuals affected, was much larger than the Red
Cross was equipped to handle. Its logistics system
was not sophisticated enough – especially with regard
to food service. Many problems were experienced in
obtaining enough food to satisfy client needs. Many of
the food orders processed through FEMA were either
inexplicably canceled or never satisfi ed. On follow-up, it
was discovered that many of the orders placed by the Red
Cross with FEMA were not refl ected in FEMA’s systems.38
FEMA’s logistics system was not sophisticated enough to
handle the volume Katrina triggered.
The Red Cross experienced substantial communication
issues with FEMA.39 The Red Cross relied on FEMA to
provide food, fuel, mobile refrigeration equipment,
portable toilets, and many other primary necessities to
operate its shelters.40 Ordinarily these needs are requested
by the Red Cross through the respective states.41 As
Katrina gathered force the Red Cross compiled requests
for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama among other
states.42 These requests refl ected predicted need levels
for food, MREs, water, fuel, and other indispensable
commodities.43 In Mississippi, the Red Cross requests
were cut substantially by FEMA middle management.44
Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President of Preparedness
and Response told Select Committee staff that the upper
management of FEMA, including Dan Craig, the Director
of the Recovery Division was responsive to Red Cross
needs, but the middle level personnel, who were described
as “FEMA’s mushy middle” proved to be unnecessarily
meddlesome.45 FEMA’s middle ranks, according to Becker,
canceled orders, lost orders and were the root cause of
many of the problems experienced in the fi eld.46 MREs
were ordered and were to be used to feed people during
the period before the feeding kitchens were up and
running.47 These MREs were canceled by FEMA under the
logic that the Red Cross had also ordered food for the
kitchens.48
The master log of offi cial requests made by the Red
Cross to FEMA under ESF #6 further reveals the ineffective
logistics system.49 The offi cial requests, called Action
Request Forms (ARFs), are processed through the FEMA
logistics system.50 A total of 99 ARFs were submitted
to FEMA by the Red Cross. Red Cross resource requests
are processed through the fi ve emergency coordination
centers – the NRCC at FEMA headquarters (18 ARFs),
the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) for
FEMA Region IV in Atlanta, Georgia (22 ARFs), the RRCC
for FEMA Region VI in Denton, Texas (9 ARFs), the Joint
Field Offi ce (JFO) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana (30 ARFs),
the JFO in Jackson, Mississippi (13 ARFs), and the JFO in
Austin, Texas (7 ARFs).
Given the enormous nature of the Katrina relief effort,
and the important role the Red Cross plays in the NRP,
99 requests is not an extraordinarily large number. FEMA,
however, could not handle these requests. Only 22 of the
99 ARFs were deemed “Received” by the Red Cross, and 8
were canceled or withdrawn.
A careful review of the master log suggests that
the logistics system did not work. Figure 4 is a table
identifying logistics problems.
Figure 4:
Offi cial Requests By The Red Cross to FEMA (selected).
RED CROSS
Chapter resources and self-reliance could be buttressed
by extending chapter self-reliance to 72 hours. Each
chapter is generally equipped to survive on its own for
Center Date Requested Resources Ordered What Occurred
NRCC August 30 700,000 MREs Received only
for AL and MS 400,000 and not
until September 8
did 600,000
additional MREs
arrive for MS.
NRCC September 1 300,000 MREs for LA Order canceled,
then un-canceled.
Product delivered
on October 8.
NRCC September 10 126 5-person security No security
teams needed (630 total) received.
for sites in MS
Reg. IV September 1-3 13 orders for “Kitchen Received, 10-14
Support,” which includes days after request
refrigerator, propane, was approved.
diesel, hand washing RC forced to
stations, porta potties, purchase items
water buffalo, among independently
other kitchen items. to ensure
continuous feeding.
Reg. VI September 1 9 orders for “Kitchen Not received.
Support” for Louisiana. Items purchased
Kitchens were for use in independently by
Alexandria, Baton Rouge, Red Cross.
Bogor, Covington,
Hammond, Kenner, and
Prairieville.
348 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
the fi rst 48 hours. If expanded to 72 hours, FEMA should
be able to assist the Red Cross at the national level in re-
stocking the pipeline.51
The Red Cross was challenged by the sometimes disorganized manner in which shelters were established
While the Red Cross has an established role in operating
shelters, many of the local governments set up ad hoc
shelters without notifying the Red Cross. In other cases,
the Red Cross was denied access to shelters.
The Red Cross has been criticized in both Mississippi
and Louisiana for a variety of reasons, from excessive levels
of bureaucracy to lack of suffi cient shelters and food.52
Becker said the root cause of many problems centered
on substantial incongruities between the state and local
political leadership on one hand and state emergency
management personnel on the other.53 Far too often state
emergency management personnel and local political
leadership were not aligned.54 The Red Cross would receive
one set of directions from the state and another from the
locals.55 Becker said, however, with independently elected
sheriffs, mayors, and county and parish commissioners,
this is not an easily avoidable problem.56 Many complaints
lodged at the Red Cross refl ected their policy of not
operating shelters in danger zones.57 Local political
leadership often feels compelled to open shelters in their
locales even when the entire county or parish is subject to
a mandatory evacuation order.58 The Red Cross has trouble
servicing these shelters, both from an access perspective
(the roads are sometimes inaccessible) and from an
identifi cation perspective (sometimes nobody tells the Red
Cross where the shelters are).59
The Mississippi National Guard had numerous issues
with the Red Cross. The primary complaint was the Red
Cross’ failure to establish a formal operations section in
accordance with the National Incident Management System
combined with the fact that the Red Cross is staffed almost
exclusively by volunteers. According to Major General
Harold Cross, the Mississippi Adjutant General:
While well intentioned, the volunteers never
had a good grasp on security requirements for
fi nancial assistance distribution operations. On
numerous instances, the ARC volunteers would
simply fi nd a vacant parking area and commence
voucher distribution operations. Immediately,
crowds would gather and would overwhelm the
distribution site. The ARC would then call on the
Guard for assistance. Repeated attempts were made
to reinforce the need for prior coordination for
site security. It was not until mid-September that
the ARC started coordinating these operations.
Also, the ARC had volunteers who attempted
to coordinate directly with subordinate Guard
units for shelter and distribution site security.
The Forward EOC operations offi cer met with
ARC representatives on numerous occasions to
defi ne the requirements for security taskings.
The ARC rarely adhered to these requirements.
Consequently, the National Guard stayed in a
reactive mode concerning security of distribution
sites and shelters and hundreds of man hours were
wasted. For future events, if the ARC would position
a senior operations representative in the Forward
Emergency Operations Center, many of the security
issues would be resolved. This senior person should
not rotate every few days.60
Cross also recommended the integration of NGO’s like
the Red Cross, into the Incident Command System.
GAO has testifi ed the Red Cross did not provide relief
in certain hard-to-reach areas because of safety policies.61
Similarly, media reports indicate the Red Cross was slow
to arrive in some small rural towns.62 The Mississippi
town of Pearlington, population 1,684, received no Red
Cross support for weeks.63 A Florida state disaster team
set up a shelter, but the Red Cross said it was unsafe
and declined to run it.64 In Pearlington, the Red Cross
declined to operate one shelter because it lacked a
dehumidifi er.65
Far too many shelters were unknown to the Red Cross,
making it diffi cult for it to deploy resources.66 Many of
these shelters were within the danger or surge zones,
including the Superdome. The Red Cross does not service
these “shelters of last resort,” as it would put its volunteers
in harm’s way.67 After Katrina passed, the Red Cross did
attempt to deliver provisions to the Superdome, but was
denied access.68 “The Homeland Security Department has
requested and continues to request that the American Red
Cross not come back into New Orleans. Right now access
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 349
is controlled by the National Guard and local authorities.
. . . We cannot get into New Orleans against their orders,”
Renita Hosler, a Red Cross spokesperson, told The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette.69
The Red Cross encountered many access problems
where local law enforcement would not permit entry
to establish a shelter.70 The Select Committee asked the
Red Cross for an accounting of the shelters utilized as
compared to the pre-approved shelter list,71 and for the
reasons behind any differences. The Red Cross provided
the Select Committee with a complete list of every
shelter in operation between the dates of August 25 and
September 30,72 but will not provide a specifi c listing
explaining why certain pre-approved shelters were not
used. Lori Polacheck, of the Red Cross general counsel’s
offi ce said this was too diffi cult an undertaking.73
The Red Cross was challenged by the magnitude and
chaos of the evacuation of people before landfall and after
the fl ooding in New Orleans. People were moved, either
by government agencies or on their own initiatives, all
over the country in a haphazard way, making it diffi cult
for the Red Cross to track and care for the needs of
evacuees.
From the Red Cross’ perspective, the transportation of
evacuees by FEMA was disorganized and uncoordinated.
As a primary provider in the feeding and sheltering of
the displaced, the Red Cross needed advance notice
of how many people it would be asked to serve. Many
problems were reported in this area. The information
communicated to the Red Cross by FEMA was unreliable.
There appeared to be no correlation between the
information communicated by FEMA and what actually
happened.74 Howe noted that often airplanes of
evacuees would arrive without any warning. Conversely,
it seemed to Howe, whenever warnings of arrivals were
communicated, the arrivals often failed to materialize.75
This has been chronicled in the press. The San Jose
Mercury News reported on September 8 that a plan to
send 1,000 evacuees to California had been put on
hold.76 The Red Cross, Catholic Charities, and the city
of San Francisco had spent days readying a shelter at
St. Mary’s Cathedral.77 On September 11 The Columbus
Dispatch reported a similar story; Columbus, Cleveland
and Cincinnati were set to take 1,000 evacuees on
September 8, but the in-bound fl ights were canceled
by FEMA.78 Evacuees were scheduled by FEMA to be
transported to Ohio. Fred Strathman, a spokesman for
the Ohio Emergency Management Agency, indicated to
the newspaper that the plan to send evacuees to Ohio was
delayed twice by FEMA and then apparently canceled.79
A spokesman for the Red Cross of Greater Columbus,
Lynn Cook said, “Are we a little tired of pumping things
up and taking them back down? Yeah.”80 Similarly, The
Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky reported that on
September 13, FEMA suspended evacuation fl ights due to
the unwillingness of evacuees to relocate so far from the
Gulf coast.81 According to the newspaper, on September
5, federal offi cials told Louisville that 500 evacuees would
be arriving at any time.82 The Red Cross had worked to
prepare a shelter and had stockpiled food and clothing.83
All for nothing.
More than any other hurricane, Katrina has produced a
large volume of seemingly permanent evacuees. The Red
Cross is now fi nding that a large number of evacuees are
not going home.84
The Red Cross has not escaped substantial public criticism
The Red Cross has not escaped substantial criticism.85 The
most obvious casualty of this criticism came on December
13, when its president, Marsha Evans, announced her
resignation.86 According to press accounts, even Evans
acknowledged the organization’s response to Katrina and
Rita had been uneven, “eclips[ing] even our direst, worst-
case scenarios.”87
At a December 13 hearing conducted by the House
Committee on Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee
to review the response by charities to Hurricane Katrina,
Louisiana Representative Jim McCrery was extremely
critical of the Red Cross:88
Hurricane Katrina, and the subsequent fl ooding
of New Orleans, displaced roughly one million
The Red Cross does not service these “shelters of last resort,” as it would put its volunteers in harm’s way.
350 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
people from their homes in Southeast Louisiana.
Tens of thousands of evacuees sought shelter in my
district. It was clear from the beginning that the Red
Cross simply did not have the sheltering capacity to
meet immediate needs. Small independent shelters
began popping up by the dozens across Northwest
Louisiana. At the peak, there were over forty shelters
in my district, while fewer than ten of those were
operated by the Red Cross. Red Cross had serious
trouble operating at least three of the larger shelters
in my district: Hirsch Coliseum in Shreveport,
LA, CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA, and
the Health and Physical Educational Building at
Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, LA.
Several days after Katrina’s landfall, the
American Red Cross asked a network of local
churches, led by the First Assembly of God, to take
over the Red Cross Shelter at Hirsch Coliseum in
Shreveport, LA. Steve Beyer, an Associate Pastor
with one of the churches, agreed to manage the
shelter until a replacement Red Cross manager
could be found. No one replaced him. Mr. Beyer
operated the Hirsch Coliseum shelter, where 6,200
people came through its doors, with only two Red
Cross volunteers for the fi rst two weeks. The Red
Cross asked church volunteers to wear Red Cross
shirts, I suppose to give the appearance that Red
Cross was operating the shelter.
The CenturyTel Center in Bossier City, LA,
opened as an independent shelter one week after
the storm in response to overwhelming need for
additional sheltering capacity. CenturyTel operated
on the backs of local government and community
organizations while it waited for certifi cation from
the American Red Cross. Even after the American
Red Cross moved in, local charities provided all of
the food for seven days until Red Cross could secure
food....
The American Red Cross shelter at Northwestern
State University was managed by the City of
Natchitoches and the Natchitoches Parish Sheriff’s
Department in conjunction with the University. Dr.
Bill Dickens, the shelter’s manager, had one Red
Cross volunteer to help service the 1,000 evacuees
housed each night at the site for the fi rst 10 days
following the storm. I should note that it took
seven days for this shelter to receive any of the
$60,000 in new bedding that was donated to the
local Red Cross chapter by General Motors. The
bedding sat unused in a Red Cross facility seventy
miles away in Shreveport, LA, despite the fact
that some evacuees in Natchitoches were sleeping
on the fl oor. The failure to get these resources
to the shelter in a timely fashion represents an
inexcusable breakdown in communication and
coordination within the Red Cross.
While the Red Cross could barely manage
its own network of shelters, the organization
offered little assistance to struggling independent
shelters. Dennis Butcher, the Offi ce of Emergency
Preparedness Director for Claiborne Parish, was
instructed by the Red Cross to fend for himself.
Mr. Butcher operated an independent shelter of
1,200 evacuees for over a month without any
assistance from the Red Cross. I wish Mr. Butcher’s
experience was unique, but the Red Cross also
refused requests for assistance from the Offi ce of
Emergency Preparedness Directors for Claiborne,
Sabine, Vernon and Webster Parishes. I also spoke
with OEP and other offi cials on the Mississippi
Gulf Coast who experienced similar treatment from
the Red Cross.89
But Katrina was bigger than the Red Cross
The response to Hurricane Katrina has been more
complex than any previous Red Cross-involved disaster.
The string of 2004 hurricanes in Florida was the previous
benchmark, when the Red Cross provided fi nancial
assistance to 73,000 families. During Katrina, the number
is up to 1.2 million families. In 2004 it provided 519,000
nights of shelter. During Katrina the fi gure currently
stands at 3.42 million. The 2004 hurricanes were attended
to by 35,000 volunteers; Katrina required 220,000
volunteers.90 The total estimated expenditures by the Red
Cross for Katrina-related aid is in excess of $2 billion.
Figure 5 compares Katrina and Rita to Hurricane
Season 2004.91
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 351
Figure 5:
Hurricane Season 2004 v. Katrina and Rita
RED CROSS
This $2 billion operation must be contrasted with
the Red Cross’ overall fi nancial model. According to its
2004 Annual Report, its operating revenues were just
over $3 billion.92 In 2004, its stated operating expenses
for domestic disaster services was $261 million. It is
unrealistic to expect any charitable relief organization to
instantaneously pivot in response to the might infl icted
by Katrina. As Katrina was too large for the emergency
management professionals in the state of Louisiana, the city
of New Orleans, and FEMA, it was as well for the Red Cross.
The Red Cross readily agrees it did not have a presence
everywhere throughout the affected region.93 The primary
mission of the Red Cross is to provide food, clothing, and
shelter to victims of disasters.94 Given its size, there are
misconceptions about its capabilities.95 The Red Cross
does not provide transportation, does not get involved
with search and rescue operations, does not participate
in evacuations, and does not provide medical care (other
than providing assistance with minor medical issues).96
In testimony before the House Committee on Ways
and Means Oversight Subcommittee, the Red Cross’
Becker said, “we fell short of being universally present
everywhere there was a need.”97 He continued, “Given
the number of people in need, our response was geared
toward places that we knew we could get to immediately
and places where we knew people were congregated. It
was our goal to reach the greatest number of people with
the most possible speed.”98
As a leading provider of food and shelter to those
affected by Katrina, the Red Cross is often asked why it
was not active within New Orleans, whether it be on the
ground, co-located with the search and rescue teams,
or in the shelters of last resort such as the Convention
Center and the Superdome. Becker addressed this in his
testimony:99
There were a number of questions regarding why
we did not re-enter the City of New Orleans.
The American Red Cross of Southeast Louisiana,
located in the City of New Orleans, heeded the
evacuation order called for by local authorities.
The chapter relocated to the town of Covington,
located on the north side of Lake Pontchartrain.
Our service delivery in New Orleans differed from
that provided to other affected areas in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. Under the Louisiana
State Plan, if a Category 3 or higher storm is headed
for Louisiana, 23 parishes, including Orleans
Parish, are to begin an evacuation inland. The
inland parishes, in cooperation with state agencies
and the American Red Cross, are to shelter evacuees
from “Risk Area Parishes,” as there are no shelter
sites that meet hurricane safety criteria within
Orleans Parish. In fact, it has been the policy of
the Red Cross that there are no safe areas south of
the I-10/I-12 corridor for a large scale hurricane.
The Louisiana Plan, which makes no reference
to the Red Cross operating shelters within the
city, enumerates eight distinct shelter types, plus
what is described as the “Refuge of Last Resort.”
The Convention Center and the Superdome
served as refuges of last resort. Under state plans,
these facilities are to open when local authorities
terminate an evacuation due to unsafe driving
conditions. These facilities are not operated by the
Red Cross. In practice, after the threat has passed,
the Red Cross at times staffs shelters of last resort,
providing services to people. We do not establish
Category Hurricane Katrina and Season 2004 Rita
Shelter Nights 519,000 3.42 million
No. of Families 73,000 1.2 million Provided With Financial Support
Meals and Snacks Close to 16.5 million More than Provided 52.6 million
Total Spent $130 million $2 billion
The Red Cross does not provide transportation, does not get involved with search and rescue operations, does not participate in evacuations, and does not provide medical care (other than providing assistance with minor medical issues).
352 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
shelters in facilities that do not meet our criteria for
safety during landfall.
Consistent with State and local plans, and our
practice in previous disasters, we were asked by state
and federal offi cials not to enter New Orleans. While
we were in constant communication with local and
state authorities, it was not deemed safe for Red
Cross personnel to re-enter the city of New Orleans.
The Red Cross does not place our client evacuees,
staff, volunteers, or resources in harm’s way. It is our
practice to heed evacuation orders and assist those in
need of shelter outside of high-risk areas.
Additionally, it was the goal of local and state
offi cials to fully evacuate the city of New Orleans
after the storm passed. We were instructed by
authorities that, in addition to issues of safety,
if the Red Cross provided services to survivors
within New Orleans, it would discourage people
from heeding evacuation orders. At the direction
of public offi cials, we entered New Orleans in
a coordinated fashion to provide services at the
earliest possible time.
This was a diffi cult scenario for the Red Cross.
Eighty percent of our local Red Cross staff in the
Southeast Louisiana Chapter lost their homes to
Katrina, yet while they themselves were victims,
they desperately wanted to provide support to their
neighbors in need, and to this day they continue to
do so. We are still engaged in active operations in
the city.
Important assistance was provided by the Salvation Army, Catholic Charities, the United Way, and the National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
As the only charitable organization with primary
responsibility under the NRP, the Red Cross received
a lot of Select Committee attention. Beyond the Red
Cross, however, there was a vast network of charities
that contributed meaningfully to the response efforts
in the Gulf coast area. The important contributions
of organizations such as the Salvation Army, Catholic
Charities USA, the United Way, and the National
Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)
merit attention.
Salvation Army
The Salvation Army has been at the site of most major
natural disasters in America for more than a century.100
It has developed areas of expertise in disaster response:
mass feeding to survivors and emergency responders
immediately after a disaster has occurred; sheltering those
affected while tending to their spiritual and emotional
needs; and then, the continuation of social service
assistance to ensure the survivors have the means to move
back into some semblance of the routine known before
the disaster struck.101
In responding to those affected by Hurricane Katrina,
the Salvation Army staged personnel and equipment in
the states adjacent to the primary strike zone. Major Todd
Hawks of the Salvation Army, summarized some of the
key contributions the Salvation Army made to immediate
response efforts:
■ Loaded meals on 72 mobile canteens, each capable of
providing 5,000 hot meals per day, and two 54-foot
mobile kitchens, each capable of providing 20,000 hot
meals per day. We intended to dispatch these mobile
feeding units into those geographic areas determined
by FEMA to be the hardest hit, and to dispatch
additional units as needed.
■ Mobilized 200 offi cers, employees, and volunteers to
man these mobile kitchens.
■ Prepared to dispatch portable shower units, trucks
transformed into 1-stop shops called comfort stations,
and emergency response command stations for offi cers
to direct the response efforts.102
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 353
In the immediate aftermath of Katrina, the Salvation
Army facilitated mass feeding, moving mobile feeding
units into New Orleans, Biloxi, Gulfport, Mobile and
numerous other affected communities within hours after
the storm had passed.103 In total the number of mobile
canteens deployed numbered 178 and the number of fi eld
kitchens reached 11.104 Since Katrina struck, the Salvation
Army has served more than 5 million hot meals and more
than 7 million sandwiches and snacks to survivors and
fi rst responders.105 Although not a primary activity for the
Salvation Army, at its highest point, it operated 225 shelters
for more than 31,000 people.106
Catholic Charities
Catholic Charities USA is the membership association
of one of the nation’s largest social service networks.
Catholic Charities agencies provide vital social services
to people in need, regardless of their religious, social, or
economic backgrounds.107 As of January 6, 2006, Catholic
Charities had allocated more than $56 million to over 60
local Catholic Charities and other Catholic organizations
responding to the needs of families affected by the Gulf
coast hurricanes.108 In total, Catholic Charities USA has
raised $137 million to assist the network’s largest disaster
response effort in its history.109 Dozens of Catholic
Charities agencies and Catholic organizations have each
received disaster relief grants from Catholic Charities
USA, ranging from $6,000 to $25 million.110 Across the
nation, more than 80 local Catholic Charities are working
to meet the needs of hurricane victims.111 Relief efforts
have included: providing victims with food, fi nancial aid,
clothing, shelter, gas and retail store cards, and household
goods; helping with medical and prescription needs;
offering clean up assistance; helping victims work with
FEMA and other groups; and providing crisis counseling,
case management, transportation, job placement, and
temporary and long-term housing.112
United Way
United Way of America is the national organization that
provides leadership to approximately 1,350 community-
based United Way organizations. Each is independent,
separately incorporated, and governed by local
volunteers.113 As of December 15, 2005, the United Way
of America has raised $45 million to support hurricane
response and recovery efforts.114 Through its Hurricane
Response and Recovery Fund, the United Way has focused
its efforts on restoring the abilities of social service
agencies in the Gulf coast region.115 Many human services
organizations in the Gulf coast states suffered tremendous
damage to their facilities, which severely limited their
ability to provide services to those in need.116 United Ways
throughout the affected areas have worked with partner
agencies to ensure services such as emergency assistance,
food, clothing, housing and transportation are available
to those in need.117
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD)
NVOAD is a national charity umbrella organization
composed of approximately 40 charities that provide
services following disasters.118 As a designated support
agency under ESF #6, NVOAD is responsible for sharing
information with its member organizations regarding the
severity of the disaster, needs identifi ed, and actions taken
to address these needs.119 NVOAD coordinates planning
efforts by many voluntary organizations responding
to disaster.120 Member organizations provide a more
effective and effi cient service to the community in need by
agreeing to share information and combine resources.121
This cooperation has proven to be an effective way for a
multitude of organizations to work together in during an
emergency.122
During the immediate response to Katrina, NVOAD
organized daily conference calls with FEMA and other
federal government representatives and its member
F E
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354 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
organizations operating in the Gulf coast region.123
NVOAD also invited nonmember charitable organizations
that were providing relief to hurricane victims to
participate in these calls, which sometimes included
more than 40 organizations at once. During these calls,
both the federal government and charities were able to
provide information and answer questions about services
provided, needs identifi ed, and the organizations’ abilities
to meet these needs.124
Conclusion
Since August 29, charitable donations to Katrina relief
have exceeded $3 billion. Two-thirds of this amount has
been raised by the Red Cross. With its $2 billion relief
effort, the Red Cross has been able to fulfi ll many of its
obligations under the National Response Plan. Katrina,
however, overwhelmed the Red Cross. The Red Cross,
like FEMA, did not have a logistics capacity sophisticated
enough to fully support the massive number of Gulf
coast victims. Among other challenges, the Red Cross
was required to grapple with the sometimes disorganized
manner in which shelters were established. While it has a
well-defi ned role in operating shelters, many of the local
governments set up ad hoc shelters without notifying Red
Cross offi cials. In some cases, the Red Cross was denied
access to shelters. Despite falling short of being universally
present everywhere there was a need, the Red Cross and
numerous other charitable organizations performed
admirably and heroically in reaching the greatest number
of people with impressive speed. ■
F E
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A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 355
1 Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Gulf Coast Hurricane Relief Donations, http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Hurricane_Katrina. html (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Center on Philanthropy – Donations]; Spreadsheet, Center on Philanthropy, U.S. Organizations Providing Hurricane Relief Efforts (Jan. 9 2005) [hereinafter Center on Philanthropy – Spreadsheet].
2 Hearing to Review the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina Before Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2005) (written statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Dir., Educ., Workforce and Income Sec., U.S. Gov. Accountability Offi ce) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (written statement of Cynthia Fagnoni)].
3 American Red Cross, Facts at a Glance, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/hurricanes/2005/facts.html (Jan. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 12, 2006 Red Cross Facts at a Glance].
4 Center on Philanthropy – Donations; Center on Philanthropy – Spreadsheet. 5 Center on Philanthropy – Donations; Center on Philanthropy – Spreadsheet; Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (written
statement of Cynthia Fagnoni); Press Release, Catholic Charities USA, Catholic Charities USA, 13 Other Major Nonprofi ts Reaffi rm Commitment to Human Needs Aspect of Gulf Coast Recovery, Jan. 6, 2005, http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/news/content_displays.cfm?fuseaction=display_do cument&id=743&location=3.
6 Press Release, United Way, United Way Receives $10 Million Grant From Lilly Endowment For Hurricane Recovery and Rebuilding, Nov. 3, 2005 at http://national.unitedway.org/fi les/pdf/press_releases/Lilly_Endowment_Grant_FINAL_Nov_2005.PDF [hereinafter Nov. 3, 2005 United Way Press Release].
7 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (written statement of Cynthia Fagnoni). 8 Id. 9 Jan. 12, 2006 Red Cross Facts at a Glance. 10 American Red Cross, Facts at a Glance, http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/hurricanes/2005/facts.html (Jan. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 9, 2006
Red Cross Facts at a Glance]. 11 The Southern Baptist Convention provides the manpower and the kitchens, and the Red Cross provides supplies and logistics. Gabrielle
DeFord and Maryann Sinkler, Southern Baptists Help Feed Millions After Katrina, Sept. 14, 2005, http:www.redcross.org. 12 Jan. 9, 2006 Red Cross Facts at a Glance. 13 Hearing to Review the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina Before Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2005) (written statement of Joseph C. Becker, Senior Vice President Preparedness and Response, American Red Cross) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Joseph C. Becker)].
14 E-mail correspondence from Carol Hall, American Red Cross, to Kirstjen M. Nielsen, et al. (Aug. 27, 2005) (2:48 p.m.) [hereinafter Aug. 27, 2005 Hall E-mail].
15 A complete list of all pre-approved shelters for Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama was supplied to the Select Comm. The establishment of shelters is carefully planned for and part of the chapter disaster planning regime. See ARC 4496, Standards for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection (Jan. 2002); ARC Shelter Operations Management Toolkit (Sept. 2005); Complete Shelter Listings for Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.
16 Aug. 27, 2005 Hall E-mail. 17 American Red Cross, Disaster Operations Summary Report (DOSR) #7 at 2 (Aug. 28, 2005). 18 American Red Cross, DOSR#7 at 3 (Aug. 28, 2005). 19 American Red Cross, DOSR#9 at 3 (Aug. 29, 2005). 20 Id. at 2. 21 Id. at 1. 22 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Laura Howe and Skip Batchelor, American Red Cross, in Montgomery, AL (Oct. 11, 2005) [hereinafter
Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview]. 23 Id. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Id. 34 American Red Cross, DOSR#11 at 2 (Aug. 30, 2005). 35 Id. at 1. 36 American Red Cross, DOSR#20 at 3 (Sept. 4, 2005). 37 Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Joseph C. Becker, Sr. Vice Pres., Preparedness and Response, American
Red Cross, in Wash., DC (Oct. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview]. 38 Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 39 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id.
356 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
45 Id. 46 Id. 47 Id. 48 Id. 49 American Red Cross, ESF #6 Master Log at 2 (Dec. 22, 2005). 50 Id. 51 Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 52 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 53 Id. 54 Id. 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 The Select Comm. reviewed planning documentation from individual Red Cross chapters. Disaster Response Plans were submitted from
the following Red Cross chapters: Southeastern Louisiana (June 205), St. Bernard Parish Chapter (undated), Northwest Louisiana Chapter (June 2005), Northeast Louisiana Chapter (June 2005), Central Louisiana Chapter (Apr. 2002), South Central Mississippi Chapter (Sept. 2004), Mississippi Gulf Coast Chapter (Sept. 2005), Southeast Mississippi Chapter (Feb. 2003), and Alabama Gulf Coast Chapter (Jan. 1997). Statewide plans were received from the Red Cross in Alabama and Mississippi. The Red Cross is now organized into eight Service Areas, rather than by state. The state plans obtained by the Select Comm. from Alabama and Mississippi are now technically obsolete.
58 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 59 Id. 60 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama Before the Select Comm., 109th Cong. (Oct. 27, 2005) (written response to questions for the record of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, the Adjutant General, State of Mississippi.); Mississippi National Guard, Hurricane Katrina Narrative, Daily Logs (Aug. 2005 – Nov. 2005).
61 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (written statement of Cynthia Fagnoni). 62 Martha T. Moore, Red Cross in Critics’ Cross Hairs, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2005 [hereinafter Oct. 17 Moore Article]. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 Id. 66 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 67 Id. 68 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Joseph C. Becker). 69 Ann Rodgers, Homeland Security Won’t Let Red Cross Deliver Food, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 3, 2005; Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means
Oversight Hearing (Statement of Joseph C. Becker). 70 Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 71 Pre-approved Shelter Listings for Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 72 Hurricane Katrina Daily Shelter Populations, American Red Cross, Aug. 25, 2005 to Sept. 30, 2005. 73 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Lori Polacheck, Senior Counsel, American Red Cross, Wash., DC (Jan. 23, 2005). 74 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 75 Id. 76 Mary Anne Ostrom and Chuck Carroll, Feds Hold Off On Sending 1,000 Evacuees to California; Families Want to Remain Closer to Home, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 8, 2005 [hereinafter Sept. 8, 2005 Ostrom Article]. 77 Sept. 8, 2005 Ostrom Article. 78 Robert Vitale, With Few Evacuees Interested, Flights to Ohio Canceled, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 11, 2005 at A21 [Sept. 1, 2005 Vitale
Article]. 79 Sept. 1, 2005 Vitale Article. 80 Id. 81 Chris Kenning, Evacuee Airlift Not Coming To City, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), Sept. 14, 2005 at 1B [Sept. 14, 2005 Kenning
Article]. 82 Sept. 14, 2005 Kenning Article. 83 Id. 84 Oct. 11, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 85 See generally, Editorial, Red Cross Operations Due For A Tune-Up, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 2006 at A16; Jacqueline L. Salmon, Red Cross Bolstering
Minority Outreach; Recruitment a Priority After Storms Expose Sensitivity Gaps, THE WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2005 at A1; Jacqueline L. Salmon and Elizabeth Williamson, Red Cross Borrowing Funds For Storm Aid – Loan of $340 Million Comes as Nonprofi t Draws New Scrutiny, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005 at A1; Oct. 17 Moore Article; Josh Getlin et al., A Long Road To Recovery; Red Cross’ Huge Effort Not Without Critics; Defenders Say The Scope Of The Storms Pushed The Short-Term Aid Expert Out Of Its League, LA TIMES, Oct. 7, 2005, A1; Josh Getlin et al., Fundraising Phenom – Red Cross – Is Under Fire, LA TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005; Chad Terhune, Along Battered Gulf, Katrina Aid Stirs Unintended Rivalry, Salvation Army Wins Hearts, Red Cross Faces Critics; Two Different Missions, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 29, 2005 at A1; Associated Press, Despite Katrina Efforts, Red Cross Draws Criticism, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2005; Sean Gregory, Trying To Get It Right This Time, TIME, Sept. 26, 2005 at 24.
86 Press Release, American Red Cross, Marsha J. Evans Steps Down As American Red Cross President and CEO (Dec. 13, 2005). 87 David Cary, American Red Cross President Resigns, AP, Dec. 14, 2005. 88 Hearing to Review the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina Before Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 109th
Cong. (Dec. 13, 2005) (statement of The Honorable Jim McCrery) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Rep. McCrery)].
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 357
89 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Rep. McCrery). 90 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview; Facts at a Glance, American Red Cross website (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/
hurricanes/2005/facts.html. 91 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Joseph C. Becker). 92 American Red Cross, 2004 Annual Report at 8. For a third party view of the Red Cross’ fi nances, see Charity Navigator, http://www.
charitynavigator.org. 93 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Joseph C. Becker). 94 Oct. 14, 2005 Red Cross Interview. 95 Id. 96 Id. 97 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Joseph C. Becker). 98 Id. 99 Id. 100 Hearing to Review the Response by Charities to Hurricane Katrina Before Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means,
109th Cong. (Dec. 13, 2005) (statement of Major Todd Hawks, Public Affairs Secretary and Associate National Community Relations and Development Secretary, Salvation Army of America) [hereinafter Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Todd Hawks)].
101 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (statement of Todd Hawks). 102 Id. 103 Id. 104 Id. 105 Id. 106 Nov. 3., 2005 United Way Press Release. 107 Catholic Charities, About, http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/about/index.cfm?cfi d=6359238&cftoken=12248968. 108 Press Release, Catholic Charities USA, Catholic Charities USA, 13 Other Major Nonprofi ts Reaffi rm Commitment to Human Needs Aspect of Gulf
Coast Recovery (Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/news/content_displays.cfm?fuseaction=display_document&id=743&location =3 [hereinafter Jan. 6, 2005 Catholic Charities Press Release].
109 Jan. 6, 2005 Catholic Charities Press Release. 110 Id. 111 Id. 112 Id. 113 Press Release, American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and United Way, American Red Cross, Salvation Army, and United Way ‘Put People First’ When
Addressing Needs Of Hurricane Katrina Victims – Three Organizations Prepare for Next Disaster (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 23, 2005 Joint Press Release].
114 Center on Philanthropy – Donations; Center on Philanthropy – Spreadsheet. 115 Nov. 3, 2005 United Way Press Release. 116 Id. 117 Id. 118 Members of NVOAD are: Adventist Community Services, America’s Second Harvest, American Baptist Men USA, American Disaster Reserve,
American Radio Relay League, Inc. (ARRL), American Red Cross, Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team (AMURT), Catholic Charities USA, Center for International Disaster Information (formerly Volunteers in Technical Assistance), Christian Disaster Response, Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC), Church of the Brethren-Emergency Response, Church World Service, Convoy of Hope, Disaster Psychiatry Outreach, Episcopal Relief and Development, Friends Disaster Service, Inc., Humane Society of the United States International Aid, International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, International Relief Friendship Foundation (IRFF), Lutheran Disaster Response, Mennonite Disaster Service, Mercy Medical Airlift (Angel Flight), National Emergency Response Team, National Organization for Victim Assistance, Nazarene Disaster Response, Northwest Medical Teams International, Presbyterian Church (USA), REACT International, Inc., Society of St. Vincent de Paul, Southern Baptist Convention, The Points of Light Foundation, The Salvation Army, United Church of Christ-Wider Church Ministries, United Jewish Communities, United Methodist Committee on Relief, United Way of America, Volunteers of America, and World Vision. See NVOAD, Members, http://www.nvoad.org/membersdb.php?members=National.
119 Dec. 13, 2005 Ways and Means Oversight Hearing (written statement of Cynthia Fagnoni); NVOAD, About, http://www.nvoad.org/about.php [hereinafter Website Materials, About NVOAD].
120 Id. 121 Id. 122 Id. 123 Id. 124 Id.
358 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
“Order is indeed the dream of man, but chaos, which is only another word for dumb, blind, witless chance,
is still the law of nature.”
WALLACE STEGNER Crossing to Safety
“Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed.”
FRANCIS BACON
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 359
CONCLUSION
The preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina
should disturb all Americans. While the Select Committee
believes all people involved, at all levels of government,
were trying their best to save lives and ease suffering, their
best just wasn’t good enough.
In this report we have tried to tell the story of the
inadequate preparation and response. We cover a
lot of territory – from evacuations to medical care,
communications to contracting. We hope our fi ndings
will prompt the changes needed to make all levels of
government better prepared and better able to respond
the next time.
The resolution that created the Select Committee
charged us with compiling fi ndings, not recommendations.
But in reality that’s a distinction without a difference.
Moving from our fi ndings to legislative, organizational, and
policy changes need not be a long or diffi cult journey.
We are left scratching our heads at the range of
ineffi ciency and ineffectivness that characterized
government behavior right before and after this storm. But
passivity did the most damage. The failure of initiative cost
lives, prolonged suffering, and left all Americans justifi ably
concerned our government is no better prepared to protect
its people than it was before 9/11, even if we are.
How can we set up a system to protect against passivity?
Why do we repeatedly seem out of synch during disasters?
Why do we continually seem to be one disaster behind?
We have not found every fact nor contemplated all
successes and failures. What we have done over four
months is intensely focus on a three-week period,
uncovering a multitude of problems. We have learned
more than enough to instruct those who will now have to
craft and execute changes for the future.
We leave it to readers to determine whether we have
done a fair and thorough job, and whether we identifi ed
and supported fi ndings in a way that will foster change.
Some predicted we would place disproportionate blame
on one person or another, or that we would give some
others a pass. We hope it is clear we have done neither.
We have not sought to assign individual blame, though
it is clear in our report that some were not up to the
challenge that was Katrina. Rather, we have tried to tell the
story of government’s preparation for and response to a
massive storm, and identify lessons learned.
Our interaction with the White House illustrates this
point. Some insist the White House’s failure to provide,
for example, e-mails to and from the White House
Chief of Staff means we have insuffi cient information
to determine why government failed. That view exalts
political curiosity over the practical realities of a serious
investigation.
While our dealings with the White House proved
frustrating and diffi cult, we ended up with more than
enough information to determine what went wrong
there, to form a picture of a White House that, like many
entities, was overcome by the fog of war. There is a big
difference between having enough information to fi nd
institutional fault, which we do, and having information
to assign individual blame, which, in the case of the White
House, in large part we do not.
It’s the former that’s important if the goal is to
be better prepared the next time. This was not about
some individual’s failure of initiative. It was about
organizational and societal failures of initiative. There was
more than enough failure to go around:
■ Tardy and ineffective execution of the National
Response Plan.
■ An under-trained and under-staffed Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
■ A Catastrophic Incident Annex that was never invoked,
and doubt that it would have done the job anyway.
■ A perplexing inability to learn from Hurricane Pam and
other exercises.
■ Levees not built to withstand the most severe
hurricanes.
■ An incomplete evacuation that led to deaths and
tremendous suffering.
■ A complete breakdown in communications that
paralyzed command and control and made situational
awareness murky at best.
■ The failure of state and local offi cials to maintain law
and order.
■ Haphazard and incomplete emergency shelter and
housing plans.
■ An overwhelmed FEMA logistics and contracting
system that could not support the effective provision of
urgently needed supplies.
360 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The Select Committee encountered shortcomings and
challenges even among those response elements that
went relatively well and saved many lives. The military
performed an invaluable role once forces were deployed,
but encountered coordination problems with FEMA,
the National Guard, and state offi cials. State-to-state
emergency aid compacts were critical in restoring law
and order and accelerating relief supplies, but too many
people remain unfamiliar with the process. Contributions
from charitable groups were enormously helpful, but they
too were overwhelmed by the size of the storm.
Many of our fi ndings are mixed in nature. Evacuations
of general populations, for example, went relatively
well in all three states. But declarations of mandatory
evacuations in metropolitan New Orleans came late or
not at all, and that, coupled with the decision to shelter
but not evacuate the remaining population prolonged
suffering. We saw heroic examples of medical care and
patient needs being met under dire circumstances. But too
often the deployment of medical personnel was reactive,
not proactive.
The Select Committee acknowledges it was often
torn between sympathy and incredulity, compassion
and criticism. On the one hand, we understood Katrina
was so big and so devastating that death and chaos were
inevitable. We understood that top federal, state, and local
offi cials overlooked some steps and some needs in the
hours and days after landfall because they were focused on
saving lives. But on the other hand, a dispassionate review
made it clear that even an extraordinary lack of situational
awareness could not excuse many of the shortcomings
and organizational inaction evident in the documents and
communications the Select Committee reviewed.
Leadership requires decisions to be made even when
based on fl awed and incomplete information. Too
often during the immediate response to Katrina, sparse
or confl icting information was used as an excuse for
inaction rather than an imperative to step in and fi ll
an obvious vacuum. Information passed through the
maze of departmental operations centers and ironically-
named “coordinating” committees, losing timeliness and
relevance as it was massaged and interpreted for internal
audiences.
As a result, leaders became detached from the changing
minute-to-minute realities of Katrina. Information
translated into pre-cast bureaucratic jargon put more
than geographic distance between Washington and the
Gulf coast. Summaries and situation reports describing
the gross totals of relief supplies directed to affected areas
did not say when or how or to whom those desperately
needed supplies would be delivered. And apparently no
one asked.
Communications aren’t a problem when you’re only
talking to yourself.
The Select Committee believes too many leaders
failed to lead. Top aides failed as well, primarily in mis-
prioritizing their bosses’ attention and action. Critical
time was wasted on issues of no importance to disaster
response, such as winning the blame game, waging a
public relations battle, or debating the advantages of
wardrobe choices.
We have spared our readers a rehashing of unfl attering
e-mails involving Michael Brown and Governor Blanco
and others, as they have been given more than enough
attention by the media. We will pause only briefl y here to
urge future responders to make people, not politics, their
priority.
We further urge public offi cials confronting the next
Katrina to remember disaster response must be based
on knowledge, not rumors. Government at all levels lost
credibility due to inaccurate or unsubstantiated public
statements made by offi cials regarding law and order,
levee breaches, and overall response efforts.
The media must share some of the blame here. The
Select Committee agrees the media can and should
help serve as the public’s “fi rst informer” after disasters.
In the 21st century, Americans depend on timely and
accurate reporting, especially during times of crisis. But
it’s clear accurate reporting was among Katrina’s many
victims. If anyone rioted, it was the media. Many stories
of rape, murder, and general lawlessness were at best
unsubstantiated, at worst simply false. And that’s too bad,
because this storm needed no exaggeration.
As discussed in our report, widely-distributed
uncorroborated rumors caused resources to be deployed,
and important time and energy wasted, chasing down the
imaginary. Already traumatized people in the Superdome
and elsewhere, listening to their transistor radios, were
further panicked.
“The sensational accounts delayed rescue and
evacuation efforts already hampered by poor planning
and a lack of coordination among local, state, and federal
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 361
agencies. People rushing to the Gulf coast to fl y rescue
helicopters or to distribute food, water and other aid
steeled themselves for battle. In communities near and far,
the seeds were planted that the victims of Katrina should
be kept away, or at least handled with extreme caution,”
the Washington Post reported on October 5.1
Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum told the Select Committee
on October 27, “We focused assets and resources based
on situational awareness provided to us by the media,
frankly. And the media failed in their responsibility to get
it right. …we sent forces and capabilities to places that
didn’t need to go there in numbers that were far in excess
of what was required, because they kept running the same
B roll over and over….and the impression to us that were
watching it was that the condition did not change. But the
conditions were continually changing.”2
E-mails obtained by the Select Committee reinforce the
conclusion that top military offi cials were relying on news
reports for information – information used to plan and
deploy resources.3
The Select Committee does not mean to suggest
the media is solely responsible for responders’
lack of situational awareness, or the destruction of
communications infrastructure that thrust television into
the role of fi rst informer for the military as well as the
general public. Nor is the media solely responsible for
reporting comments from sources they believed to be
credible – especially top offi cials.
The Select Committee does, however, believe such
circumstances make accurate reporting, especially in
the period immediately after the storm, all the more
important. Skepticism and fact-checking are easier when
the sea is calm, but more vital when it is not.
As with so many other failures related to Katrina,
what’s most vexing is that emergency managers should
have known such problems would arise among the chaos.
Dr. Kathleen Tierney, head of the University of Colorado-
Boulder Natural Hazards Center, told Select Committee
staff that misleading or completely false media reports
should have been among the most foreseeable elements
of Katrina. “It’s a well-documented element of disaster
response,” she said. “What you do has to be based on
knowledge, not rumor, and you’re going to be faced with a
lot of rumors.”4
Benigno Aguirre, sociology professor at the University
of Delaware Disaster Research Center, told the Philadelphia
Inquirer, “It’s discouraging for those who spend their lives
studying disaster behavior that journalists so often get it
wrong.”5
Former FEMA Director Michael Brown told the Select
Committee one of his biggest failures was failing to
properly utilize the media as fi rst informer.
“I failed initially to set up a series of regular briefi ngs
to the media about what FEMA was doing throughout the
Gulf coast region,” Brown said at the Select Committee’s
September 27 hearing. “Instead, I became tied to the news
shows, going on the news shows early in the morning
and late at night, and that was just a mistake. We should
have been feeding that information to the press…in the
manner and time that we wanted to, instead of letting the
press drive us.”6
Finally, a word about public communications. Both the
message and the messengers were ineffective before and
after Katrina. Messages to the public were uncoordinated
and often confusing, leaving important questions
unanswered. Federal, state, and local offi cials did not have
a unifi ed strategy for communicating with the public.
Risk communication is a well-researched fi eld of
study. There are accepted core principles for successfully
communicating risks to the public. Information about
threats should be consistent, accurate, clear, and provided
repeatedly through multiple methods. It should be
timely. It should be specifi c about the potential threat. It
needs to get to people regardless of their level of access to
information.
The Select Committee heard loud and clear from Gulf
coast residents that the dangers of the coming hurricane
could have been presented in a more effective manner,
an issue which also carried racial and socioeconomic
implications. If people don’t hear a message from
someone they trust, they will be skeptical.
Doreen Keeler, a New Orleans resident who evacuated
before Mayor Nagin called for a mandatory evacuation,
told the Select Committee local offi cials should have
called for mandatory evacuations earlier, noting how
diffi cult it was to convince the elderly residents of New
Orleans to leave.7 “If a mandatory evacuation would have
been called earlier,” she said, “it would have been easier to
move seniors out of the area and many lives would have
been saved. It took me almost 24 hours to get my in-laws
to leave. Others tell the same story. The severity of the
storm was not stressed by elected offi cials.”8
362 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The relevant “elected offi cials,” we are sure, would
contest that. In fact they did, in testimony before the
Select Committee. But it’s the public perception of what
was stressed that’s important here. The failure of initiative
was also a failure of empathy, a myopia to the need to
reach more people on their own terms.
Four and half years after 9/11, Americans deserve more
than the state of nature after disaster strikes. With this
report we have tried to identify where and why chaos
ensued, so that even a storm the size of Katrina can be met
with more order, more urgency, more coordination, and
more initiative. ■
1 Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 5, 2005 at A8. 2 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness And Response By The Department Of Defense, The Coast Guard, And The National Guard Of Louisiana,
Mississippi And Alabama Before the Select Comm., 109th Congress (Oct. 27, 2005), (statement of Lt. Gen. H Steven Blum, Chief, Nat’l Guard Bureau).
3 See e.g., E-mail correspondence from 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain to Lt. General Russel Honoré (Aug. 29, 2005). 4 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with Kathleen J. Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Institute of
Behavioral Science, U. of Colorado at Boulder (Oct. 6, 2005). 5 Beth Gillin, Katrina Spawned rumors; media ran with them, THE PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 28, 2005 at A2. 6 Hearing On Hurricane Katrina: The Role Of The Federal Emergency Management Agency Before the Select Comm., 109th Congress (Sept. 27, 2005),
(statement of Michael D. Brown, former Undersecretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response, DHS). 7 Hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Voices from Inside the Storm Before Select Comm., 109th Congress, (Dec. 6, 2005) (written statement of Doreen
Keeler Tomlinson, resident of New Orleans, LA). 8 Id.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 363
APPENDICES
364 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 365
AAMC Association of American Medical Colleges
AAMS Association of Air Medical Services
ACI Advanced Contracting Initiative
ADAMS Atlas and Database of Air Medical Services
ADHS Alabama Department of Health Services
AEMA Alabama Emergency Management Agency
AEOC Alabama Emergency Operations Center
AEW Airborne Early Warning
AFB Air Force Base
AGR Active Guard and Reserve
AMA American Medical Association
AMR American Medical Response
ANG Alabama National Guard
APCO Association of Public-Safety Communications Offi cials
ARC American Red Cross
ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services
ARF Action Request Form
ARNG Arkansas National Guard
ARW Air Refueling Wing
ASAC Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ASDHD Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
ASH Assistant Secretary for Health
ASPHEP Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness (HHS)
ATCS Air Traffi c Control Squadron
AVCRAD Aviation Classifi cation and Repair Depot
ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (DOJ)
BAH Board of Animal Health
BOP Bureau of Prisons
BORSTAR Border Patrol Search Trauma and Rescue
BORTAC Border Patrol’s Tactical Unit
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure
BTS Border and Transportation Security (DHS)
CAS Client Assistance System
CBC Construction Battalion Command
CBCS Combat Communications Squadron
CBMU Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit
CBP United States Customs and Border Protection (DHS)
CBRNE Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives
CCP Citizen Corps Programs
CCRF Commissioned Corps Readiness Force
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
APPENDIX 1
366 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS)
CDT Central Daylight Time
CEM Comprehensive Emergency Management
CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CERT Community Emergency Response Teams
CEO Chief Executive Offi cer
CG Coast Guard
CIM Clinical Information Management
CIMG Crisis Incident Management Group
CIMRT Critical Incident Management Response Team
CIMST Critical Incident Management Support Team
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIRG Critical Incident Response Group
CIS COPS in Schools
CJIS Criminal Justice Information Services Division
CNU Crisis Negotiation Unit
CO Contracting Offi cer
COG Continuity of Government
CONOP Concept of Operations
COOP Continuity of Operations
COLTS Cells on Light Trucks
COPS Community Oriented Policing Services
COW Cells on Wheels
CP Command Post
CPO Chief Procurement Offi cer
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRS Congressional Research Service
CST Civil Support Team
CS Civil Support
CSEPP Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Plan
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCO Defense Coordinating Offi cer
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DHH Department of Health and Hospitals
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DMH Department of Mental Health
DMORT Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team
DOC United States Department of Commerce
DOD United States Department of Defense
DOE United States Department of Energy
DOJ United States Department of Justice
DOSR Daily Operations Summary Reports
DOT United States Department of Transportation
DPS Department of Public Safety
DRF Disaster Relief Fund
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 367
DRS Department of Rehabilitation Services-Vocational Rehabilitation
DTAC Disaster Technical Assistance Center
DUSM Deputy United States Marshall
DVD Digital Versatile Disc
DWI Disaster Welfare Information
ECRV Emergency Communications Response Vehicles
EEO Explosive Enforcement Offi cers
EHO Environmental Health Offi cer
ELT Evacuation Liaison Team
EMA Emergency Management Agency
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact
EMEDS Expeditionary Medical Support System
EMPG Emergency Management Performance Grant
EMWG Emergency Management Working Group
EMS Emergency Medical Services
EMT Emergency Medical Technician
EO Executive Order
EOC Emergency Operations Center
EOP Emergency Operations Plan
Executive Offi ce of the President
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
EPR Emergency Preparedness and Response
ERRS Emergency and Rapid Response Services
ERT Emergency Response Team
ERT-A Emergency Response Team Advance Element
ERT-N National Emergency Response Team
ERV Emergency Response Vehicles
ESAR-VHP Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals
ESF Emergency Support Function
ESF-1 Emergency Support Function #1 – Transportation Annex
ESF-2 Emergency Support Function #2 – Communications Annex
ESF-3 Emergency Support Function #3 - Public Works and Engineering Annex
ESF-4 Emergency Support Function #4 - Firefi ghting Annex
ESF-5 Emergency Support Function #5 - Emergency Management Annex
ESF-6 Emergency Support Function #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services Annex
ESF-7 Emergency Support Function #7 - Resource Support Annex
ESF-8 Emergency Support Function #8 - Public Health and Medical Services Annex
ESF-9 Emergency Support Function #9 - Urban Search and Rescue Annex
ESF-10 Emergency Support Function #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex
ESF-11 Emergency Support Function #11- Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex
ESF-12 Emergency Support Function #12 - Energy Annex
ESF-13 Emergency Support Function #13 - Public Safety and Security Annex
ESF-14 Emergency Support Function #14 - Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation Annex
ESF-15 Emergency Support Function #15 - External Affairs Annex
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FAMS Federal Air Marshal Service
368 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCI Federal Correctional Institution
FCC Federal Correction Complex
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Coordination Center
FCO Federal Coordinating Offi cer
FDA United States Food and Drug Administration (HHS)
FDOCC Forward Deployed Operations Command Center
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS)
FEOC Federal Emergency Operation Center
FEL Federal Explosive License
FFL Federal Firearms License
FHWA Federal Highway Administration (DOT)
FIRE Assistance to Firefi ghters Program
FMA Flood Mitigation Assistance
FMCS Federal Medical Contingency Stations
FMS Facilities Management Services
Federal Medical Shelter
FORSCOM United States Forces Command
FRP Federal Response Plan
FPS Federal Protective Services
FSS Federal Supply Service
FTE Full-time Employees
GAO United States Government Accountability Offi ce
GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service
GIS Geographic Information System
GSA United States General Services Administration
HAZMAT Hazardous Material
HCS Health Care System
HD Homeland Defense
HEAR Hospitals Emergency Alert Radio
HF High Frequency
HHS United States Department of Health and Human Services
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
HLT Hurricane Liaison Team
HMGP Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HQ Headquarter
HRT Hostage Rescue Team
Health Response Team
HSA Homeland Security Act of 2002
Alabama Homeland Security Act of 2003
HSC Homeland Security Council
HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSGAC Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 369
HSOP Homeland Security Overtime Program
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HUD United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAFIS Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identifi cation System
IAEM International Association of Emergency Managers
IA TAC Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contracts
ICE United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (DHS)
ICS Incident Command System
ICU Intensive Care Unit
iDEN Integrated Digital Enhanced Network
IEM Innovative Emergency Management, Inc.
IHP Individuals and Households Program
IIMG Interagency Incident Management Group
I/O Interoperability
IMT Incident Management Team
IPET Interagency Performance Evacuation Team
INS Incident of National Signifi cance
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ISO Information Security Offi cer
IT Information Technology
JAG Judge Advocate General
JCAHO Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations
JDOMS Joint Director of Military Support
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
JFO Joint Field Offi ce
JIC Joint Information Center
JIOC Joint Information Operations Center
JOC Joint Operations Center
JTF Joint Task Force
JPATS Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System
KDHAP Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program
LANG Louisiana National Guard
LDPSC Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections
LE Law Enforcement
LECC Law Enforcement Coordination Center
LES Law Enforcement Services
LETPP Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program
LFA Lead Federal Agency
LHA Louisiana Hospital Association
LIHEAP Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program
LIMS Logistics Information Management System
LNHA Louisiana Nursing Home Association
LNO Liaison Offi ce
LO Liaison Offi cers
LOHSEP Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
LRC Logistics Readiness Center
370 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
LSP Louisiana State Police
LSU Louisiana State University
LSUHSC Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center
LTG Lieutenant General
MA Mission Assignment
MARS Military Affi liate Radio Service
MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MBP Mississippi Board of Pharmacy
MCI Mass Casualty Incident
MCLNO Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans
MCT Mission Critical Team
MDAC Mississippi Department of Agriculture and Commerce
MDEQ Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality
MDT Maintenance Down Time
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MEMA Mississippi Emergency Management Agency
MEOP Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan
MERS Mobile Emergency Response Support
MERV Major Emergency Response Vehicle
MET Mobile Enforcement Team
MG Major General
MHz Megahertz
MMD Mississippi Military Department
MMRS Metropolitan Medical Response System
MMWR Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MP Military Police
MRC Medical Reserve Corps
MRE Meals Ready to Eat
MR-GO Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal
MSCA Military Support to Civil Authorities
MSDH Mississippi State Department of Health
MSNG Mississippi National Guard
MST Management Support Team
MSY Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport
MTSA Maritime Transportation Security Act
MVMA Mississippi Veterinary Medical Association
NAS Naval Air Station
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NBC Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCC National Coordinating Committee
National Coordinating Center for Communications
NCG National Coordination Group
NCH Natural and Cultural Resources and Historic Properties
NCPA National Community Pharmacists Association
NCS National Communications System
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 371
NCT National Coordinating Team
NDMS National Disaster Medical System
NEMA National Emergency Management Association
NEMIS National Emergency Management Information System
NENA National Emergency Number Association
NERPP National Emergency and Regional Response Plan
NG National Guard
NGB National Guard Bureau
NGBJOC Joint Operations Center at National Guard Bureau
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NHS National Hurricane Service
NIH National Institutes of Health (HHS)
NIMS National Incident Management System
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety Health
NIRT Nuclear Incident Response Team
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (DOC)
NOMIC New Orleans Maritime Interoperable Committee
NOOEP New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness
NOPD New Orleans Police Department
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
NORTHCOM United States Northern Command
NRCC National Response Coordination Center
NRP National Response Plan
NRP-CIA National Response Plan - Catastrophic Incident Annex
NRP-CIS National Response Plan - Catastrophic Incident Supplement
NRT National Response Team
NSF National Science Foundation
NSSE National Special Security Event
NVOAD National Voluntary Organizations Involved in Disaster
NWS National Weather Service
OBP Offi ce of Border Patrol
ODP Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness
OEP Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness
OFO Offi ce of Field Operations
OFRD Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment
OIG Offi ce of Inspector General
OIO Offi ce of International Operations
OMB Offi ce of Management and Budget
OMT Operational Management Teams
OPM Offi ce of Personnel Management
OPLAN MSSTAD Mississippi National Guard Operations Plan
OSD Operations Support Division
Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense
OSG Offi ce of the Surgeon General
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
OTD Operational Technology Division
372 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
OTU Operational Training Unit
OVP Offi ce of the Vice President
PACOM United States Pacifi c Command
PDM Pre-Disaster Mitigation
PSAP Public Safety Answering Point
PFO Principal Federal Offi cial
PHS United States Public Health Service
PMU Portable Morgue Units
POC Point of Contact
POD Plans of the Day
PPR Prevention, Preparedness, and Response
PSAP Public Safety Answering Points
RCPI Regional Community Policing Institute
RCT Regional Coordinating Team
RDD Reportable Disease Database
RED HORSE Rapid Engineer Deployable Operational Repair Squadron Engineer
RETCO Regional Emergency Transportation Coordinator
RFA Request for Assistance
RFP Request for Proposal
RRCC Regional Response Coordination Center
RTA Regional Transit Authority
SAC Special Agent-in-Charge
SAMHSA Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
SAR Search and Rescue
SATERN Salvation Army Amateur Radio Communications System
SBA United States Small Business Administration
SCO State Coordinating Offi cer
SCHIP State Children’s Health Insurance Program
SEOC State Emergency Operations Center
SERT State Emergency Response Team
Secretary’s Emergency Response Team (HHS)
SFLEO Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cers
SHARES Shared Resources High Frequency Radio Program
SHSGP State Homeland Security Grant Program
SLGCP State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
SLOSH Sea, Lakes and Overland Surges from Hurricanes
SMAC Statewide Mutual Aid Compact
SMS Short Message Service
SNS Strategic National Stockpile
SOG Special Operations Group
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SOU SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) Operations Unit
Statement of Understanding
SPEARR Small Portable Expeditionary Aerospace Rapid Response
SRT Special Response Team
SSA Social Security Administration
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 373
SSHP Service Supplemental Hurricane Plan
SHSS State Homeland Security Strategy
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
TAG The Adjutant General
TANF Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
TARU Technical Advisory Response Unit
TDD Training and Development Division
TDY Temporary Duty
TERT Telecommunications Emergency Response Taskforce
TMICC Transportable Multi-mission Communications Center
TOC Tactical Operations Center
TOPOFF Top Offi cials
TRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSP Telecommunications Service Priority
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority
UASI Urban Areas Security Initiative
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UHP Universal Hiring Program
UHS Universal Health Services, Inc.
UMC University of Mississippi Medical Center
USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USAR United States Army Reserve
USCG United States Coast Guard
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
USMS United States Marshals Service
USNS United States Navy Ship
USP United States Penitentiary
USPS United States Postal Service
USS United States Ship
VA United States Department of Veterans Affairs
VAMC Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center
VFC Vaccines for Children
VHF Very High Frequency
VISN 16 Veterans Integrated Service Network 16
VISTA Veterans Integrated Service Technical Architecture System
VOIP Voice Over Internet Protocol
VOAD Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster
VTC Video Teleconference
VTS Vessel Traffi c System
WCP Working Capital Fund
WH White House
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPD Witness Security and Prisoner Operations Division
374 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
APPENDIX 2
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 375
376 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Facts Reported to White House Homeland Security Council Staff Received WHK Bates No. Begin
Red Cross notifi es K. Nielsen at WH it expects Katrina to be a major hurricane. 8/27; 1:08 p.m. 5169 Red Cross stands ready to brief WH as requested.
HSOC reports: New Orleans evacuation ordered. Superdome to open, Nagin to commandeer any 8/28; 11:56 a.m. 12931 property or vehicle necessary to provide shelter or transport.
DHS infrastructure advisory sent to HSC. Advises likely fl ooding from Lake Pontchartrain due to surges 8/28; 11:59 a.m. 5217 from Cat 5 hurricane. If levee is breached, it is predicted to take 3 to 6 months to dewater New Orleans.
DHS forwards to WH diagrams of NO levee system. 8/28; 12:14 p.m. 12922
DHS Advisory re transportation. Buses not in use should be moved to high ground. Surge is predicted 8/28; 12:32 p.m. 5222 to exceed 20 feet. Levees to be breeched.
WH receives overview re capabilities of National Guard units from LA, AL, MS and FL. 8/28; 1:07 p.m. 9678
DHS forwards NO evacuation plan. 8/28; 5:00 p.m. 12934
HSOC reports: Katrina now Cat 5. Landfall expected at 8:00 a.m. 8/29. Coastal fl ooding as high as 28’. 8/28; 6:26 p.m. 5958
DHS sends WH comprehensive report [41 pages] on potential infrastructure impacts of a Cat 5 8/29; 1:47 a.m. 12072 hurricane on the Gulf coast. Damage estimates predicted as high as $10 billion.
HSOC reports: Katrina weakens to Cat 4. Coastal storm surge fl ooding of 18-22’ above normal tide 8/29; 6:10 a.m. 6509 levels, locally as high as 28 feet. Some levees in New Orleans could be overtopped.
DOD briefs WH re capabilities of DOD Civil Support. 8/29; 6:52 a.m. 9953
K. Nielsen advises federal agencies WH HSC will be available twenty-four hours a day through the 8/29; 10:58 a.m. 15770 duration of Hurricane Katrina. Bethany Nichols and Dan Kaniewski are identifi ed as additional WH staff monitoring Katrina.
DHS Watch Desk E-mails WH in re report from Maj Gen Landreneau. Extensive fl ooding along 8/29; 11:32 a.m. 14825 St. Claude and Claiborne avenues. Leak has developed in the Superdome. Five fl oors of windows at Charity Hospital have blown out and the fi rst fl oor of the hospital is fl ooded. The 911 Centers in St. Bernard and Orleans parishes have been shut down.
HSOC reports: Some LA Parishes have 8 to 10 feet of water. No levee failures reported. Approximately 8/29; 2:20 p.m. 16118 15,000 evacuees in Superdome. It is estimated 300,000 LA residents will be without power. Unspecifi ed numbers of LA and MS residents are stranded and awaiting evacuation in fl ooded areas.
HSOC reports: Preliminary reports indicate the levees have not been breached. Assessment still 8/29; 6:13 p.m. 6472 pending. Army Corps estimates if NO experiences extensive fl ooding it could take months to dewater the city. Such fl ooding will preclude damage assessments and restoration.
APPENDIX 3
SUMMARY OF WHITE HOUSE DOCUMENT REVIEW
These are examples of documents received by the White House (WH) Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff between
August 27 and September 3. The items logged do not refl ect the entire information fl ow to the White House, or all
documents provided to the Select Committee. Rather, they are meant to illustrate the type and range of information
known to the White House suggesting Katrina and the subsequent fl ooding of New Orleans (NO) was not a standard
emergency event. Yet the enormity of Katrina seemed not to have been fully understood by the White House until at least
Tuesday, August 30.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 377
Facts Reported to White House Homeland Security Council Staff Received WHK Bates No. Begin
HSOC reports: Marty Bahamonde reports the following after a helicopter over fl ight: Access to the 8/30; 12:02 a.m. 7158 city is impeded due to fl ooding to the north and east. I-10 Twin Span bridges to the east of Slidell are compromised in both directions. Portions of this bridge are buckled, askew and in some cases gone. No ability to enter NO from the east. West I-10 and I-610 junction connecting Jefferson and Orleans Parish is under water. Entrance from the north is not possible because roads are under water. Quarter mile breach in the levee near the 17th St. Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing free water to fl ow into the city. Levee in Meterie is in tact. Only one of the main pumps is reported to be operable but its longevity is doubtful. Flooding is greatest in the north and east in New Orleans. Homes are completely underwater. Hundreds of people were observed on roofs and balconies. A few bodies were seen fl oating in the water.
LA reports: No power; 911 system out; roof damage to Superdome; entire city fl ooded. 8/30; 6:00 a.m. 4057 St. Bernard & 9th Ward levee breached.
HSOC reports: Levee breach, 17th St. at Canal Blvd – exceeds 100 meters in length. Much of 8/30; 6:33 a.m. 11281 downtown and east NO is underwater, the depth of which is unknown. Flooding to a depth of 8-10 feet in Meterie and 6 feet in 9th Ward.
DHS Watch Offi cer E-mails WH and others that a 200 foot levee breach is being assessed. 8/30; 8:13 a.m. 6324
FEMA chart listing all task and ESF assignments. 8/30; 9:24 a.m. 6345
DHS Watch Offi cer E-mails WH with maps identifying locations of breached levees, highlighting two areas of concern, the levee at Tennessee St. and the levee at 17th St. 8/30; 10:23 a.m. 13330
K. Nielsen at WH e-mails Red Cross and acknowledges several federal partners have expressed a 8/30; 11:18 a.m. 16135 lack of situational awareness and are having problems getting logistics issues resolved.
FEMA requests evacuation of 15-25K from Superdome. 8/30; 11:50 a.m. 12712
DHS Watch Offi cers advises WH – Martial Law reportedly declared in Jefferson and Orleans Parishes. 8/30; 11:51 a.m. 6325 National Guard to assume responsibility.
DHS Watch Offi cers advises WH of distinction between the term “Martial Law” and “Law Enforcement 8/30; 2:08 p.m. 14853 Emergency” and further advises the latter term should be used.
HSOC reports: Army Corps reports 300 foot levee breach 100 meters south of Hammond St. bridge; 8/30; 2:19 p.m. 4088 Water from Lake Pontchartrain is pouring into NO through this breach; additional multiple levee breaches in NO to include Tennessee St. breach.
HSOC reports: Spot Report detailing levee breaches (maps included) south of Hammond St. bridge 8/30; 3:07 p.m. 6850 and near Tennessee St. bridge.
New Orleans: No power in NO, no 911, entire city fl ooded except French Quarter and Business district; 8/30; 4:00 p.m. 4092 Superdome has roof damage; the following levee breaches are reported: St. Bernard & 9th, Haynes Blvd Pump Station, and 17th St. Canal. Jefferson Parish: People searching for food; gas and chemical leaks; toxic, deep fl ood waters.
378 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Facts Reported to White House Homeland Security Council Staff Received WHK Bates No. Begin
HSOC reports: Army Corps indicates 300 foot breach approximately 100 meters south of Hammond 8/30; 7:26 p.m. 6545 Street Bridge. Three hundred feet of the east fl ood wall is missing and water from Lake Pontchartrain is pouring into NO. Vehicles cannot access this breach location. The plan is for helicopters to dump sand into the breach site. Additional levee breaches in NO exist, including Tennessee Street.
Memo from Sec. Chertoff distributed to Cabinet announcing Michael Brown as PFO. 8/30; 9:00 p.m. 6695
HSOC reports: Superdome needs to be evacuated; population is 12-15,000 people. 8/31; 2:00 a.m. 13833
HSOC reports: Waters continue to rise due to the breach of the 17th St. levee. 300 foot breach at present. Expectations are, without fi xing the breach, fl ooding will not stop until it reaches lake level. 8/31; 5:47 a.m. 12484
FEMA reports: Total cumulative shelter population is 54,378. 8/31; 7:21 a.m. 12503
DHS Watch Desk advise re a recent report from Bob Patrick, FTA’s NO Administrator: 8/31; 11:09 a.m. 14858 200 to 250 Regional Transportation District employees were stranded at their Canal St. facility due to fl ooding. All were self evacuated via air mattresses whereby they were able to paddle to shallow water. From there they waded in shallow water to the Convention Center. Bob Patrick estimates the entire city of NO will be fl ooded by day’s end.
HSOC reports: Rising water at Superdome is threatening to fl ood the generator which will cause 8/31; 12:54 p.m. 7080 power failure. The State of LA has requested assistance in evacuating Superdome.
HSOC reports: Astrodome site recommended as alternative shelter location for Superdome evacuees. 8/31; 6:25 p.m. 4177
HSOC reports: Signifi cant fl ooding continues throughout NO. 8/31; 6:31 p.m. 7388 17th St. levee breach in NO is ongoing and is currently two feet above fl ood stage. Southern region of MS is devastated and is currently out of fuel and water. Both Harrison and Hancock Counties experienced total destruction. 23,000 from the Superdome are being evacuated. 350,000 homes are estimated to have taken severe damage. Housing needs are estimated at 500,000 to 1 million. Widespread damage to utility systems and environmental impact will likely prevent habitation of the area for six month to one year. Pictures are included at bates nos. WHK7404 and 7405.
HSOC reports: 11 hospitals in varying stages of damage. Most have no power. 9/1; 12:15 a.m. 7584
Commodity Status – listing locations and commodity supplies. 9/1; 1:00 a.m. 6692
HSOC reports: NOPD has suspended search and rescue efforts and are focusing on securing the city 9/1; 5:50 a.m. 6756 from lawlessness. Pipeline from Plaquemines Parish is leaking an estimated 240 barrels of oil a day. A fatality collection site is being established in Baton Rouge. Levee breaches have not been repaired or blocked. Army Corps projects it could take months to dewater NO once the fl ooding ceases.
Aerial maps of fl ooded areas distributed by HSOC. 9/1; 5:52 a.m. 6775
K. Nielsen seeks update from DHS HSOC on news story re National Guardsman shot at the Superdome. 9/1; 10:06 a.m. 15834
FEMA chart listing all task and ESF assignments. 9/1; 11:05 a.m. 6580
K. Nielsen complains information arriving at WH HSC is stale, i.e., already updated by HSOC. 9/1; 11:24 a.m. 14760
K. Nielsen at WH requests DHS Watch Desk to follow up with a confi rmation of the cause of the 9/1; 12:41 p.m. 14903 downed helicopter.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 379
Facts Reported to White House Homeland Security Council Staff Received WHK Bates No. Begin
DHS Watch Desk reports a downed helicopter. 9/1; 12:56 p.m. 14900
DHS Watch Offi cer advises WH: NOPD reports Guardsman shot in Superdome bathroom following 9/1; 1:48 p.m. 12748 an altercation with an evacuee.
Flyover pictures sent to WH showing magnitude of damage. 9/1; 2:37 p.m. 10674
Hostage situation at Tulane Hospital reported. 9/1; 2:47 p.m. 12750
LA reports: Jefferson Parish has people on street searching for food. There are contaminated fl ood 9/1; 4:00 p.m. 5654 waters and the streets are impassable. Orleans Parish’s 911 system is inoperable. Entire City of NO is fl ooded except the French Quarter.
Availability of generators and MREs are insuffi cient due to overwhelming demand. 9/1; 6:00 p.m. 11653
National Guard deployed to assist with law and order. 9/1; 6:14 p.m. 14138 Signifi cant fl ooding continues in Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parish. 17th Street Canal levee breach is being repaired. Food and water airdrops are taking place through affected area.
E-mail trail beginning with Richard Davis at WH-HSC asking for specifi c operational response plans 9/1; 7:24 p.m. 11831 for attending to hospitals in danger.
Rajeev Venkayya of WH HSC e-mails offi cials at DHS re standing water hazards and resources 9/1; 8:43 p.m. 15373 available via CDC.
TSA personnel report trouble at MSY with maintaining order. 9/1; 10:19 p.m. 5588
Dan Ostergaard at DHS advises Richard Davis at WH that Katrina is a national disgrace. 9/1; 10:50 p.m. 15786
1,700 patients need to be evacuated from LA hospitals. 9/2; 4:21 a.m. 5183
DHS Briefi ng Points report FPS offi cers have walked the perimeter of the Convention Center and there 9/2; 5:44 a.m. 10919 are approximately 1,000 people there. “New Orleans Offi cers on scene and tactically prepared.”
Red Cross is operating no feeding kitchens in NO due to security concerns. 9/2; 6:00 a.m. 11756 Red Cross will not ask its volunteers to risk their personal safety.
WH advised of the willingness of states such as AK, AL and GA to receive evacuees. 9/2; 11:33 a.m. 15364
DHS notifi es WH, NO Convention Center population is 25,000 according to FEMA Region 6 RRCC. 9/2; 12:44 p.m. 5602 Limited food and water is available.
Red Cross estimates shelter population of 94,000. 9/2; 2:02 p.m. 16179
LA reports: Jefferson: Downed power lines, downed telephone and light poles, downed trees and 9/3; 12:00 p.m. 4522 limbs/debris and house debris. Lower water pressure or no water, gas/chemical leaks in air. Live wires, no commercial power in drainage pumps stations, toxic water, still some deep water in some neighborhoods, animal/reptile issues. West Bank business/apartment building burning to the ground, creeping water from the 17th St. Canal. Orleans: No power, 911 system down, EOC on emergency power and cell phones, Bayou Bienvenue reporting 20 foot storm surge. Lost contact with 4 pump stations. Entire city fl ooded, except French Quarter/West. Bank/Business district. Superdome is structurally okay, some roof damage. St. Bernard: No power; 911 center down, structure damage, glass breakage at shelters, roof torn off on high school gym shelter.
380 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
APPENDIX 4
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE GRANTS TO ALABAMA, LOUISIANA, AND MISSISSIPPI, FY 2003-2004
Emergency management assistance administered by FEMA includes providing funds for the reconstruction of damaged
public facilities, cash grants to victims of disasters, and access to temporary housing, among other types of aid. FEMA
also provides disaster planning and preparedness aid to state and local governments, and coordinates federal emergency
management activities.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government’s role in supporting emergency preparedness and management
was limited primarily to providing resources before large-scale disasters like fl oods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and
response and recovery assistance after such disasters. In response to the events of September 11, 2001, however, the federal
government has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments for planning, equipment, and training to
enhance the capabilities of fi rst responders to respond to terrorist attacks and to a lesser extent natural disasters. Indeed,
legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special emphasis on preparedness for terrorism, and DHS
has directed that the majority of fi rst responder grant funding be used to enhance fi rst responder capabilities to prevent,
protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, many grants can have all-hazards applications.
The following is a summary of all FEMA Hazard Mitigation, COPS, and ODP grants awarded in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi in Fiscal Years 2003-2004.
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs
FEMA administers three programs that provide funds for activities that reduce losses from future disasters or prevent the
occurrence of catastrophes. These hazard mitigation programs include the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program,
the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), and the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program.1 These programs enable
grant recipients to undertake activities such as the elevation of structures in fl oodplains, relocation of structures from
fl oodplains, construction of structural enhancements to facilities and buildings in earthquake prone areas (also known as
retrofi tting), and modifi cations to land use plans to ensure that future construction ameliorates, and does not exacerbate,
hazardous conditions.
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi received a total of $67,313,169 through the three hazard mitigation programs in fi scal
years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Following is a brief summary of the grants awarded in the three fi scal years:
■ Alabama received a total of $27,516,469 over the three year period through the three FEMA-administered hazard
mitigation programs, Louisiana received $31,221,099, and Mississippi $8,575,601;
■ FMA grants: the state of Louisiana received $1,625,909, the state of Mississippi received $3,207,573 (Alabama received
no FMA grants);
■ HMGP grants: the state of Alabama received a total of $20,486,277, Louisiana received $29,595,190, and the state of
Mississippi received a total of $5,368,030; and,
■ PDM grants: the state of Alabama received a total of $6,530,977 in FY2004 — no PDM funds were received by Alabama
in FY2003 or FY2005, and no PDM awards were made to Mississippi or Louisiana during the three year period.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 381
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Awards in FY2003
Flood Mitigation Assistance Program. A total of $1,100,109 was awarded to Alabama and Louisiana in FY2003 under authority of the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program. Mississippi received no funds through this program in
FY2003. Baldwin County, Alabama received $143,770 under the FMA program and spent the funds on private structure
elevation. No other county in Alabama received FMA funding. Louisiana received a total of $956,339 under the FMA
program and all grant recipients, including Jackson, Terrebonne, and East Baton Rouge parishes, used the funding for
private structure elevation.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. A total of $20,870,041 was awarded in FY2003 to two of the states under authority of Section 404 of the Stafford Act. No HMGP awards were provided in the state of Mississippi in FY2003. Alabama received
$338,524 and Louisiana received $20,531,517. Of this amount, $13,565,975 was awarded to Terrebonne parish for
elevation of private structures.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. No PDM awards were made to Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi in FY2003.
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Awards in FY2004
Flood Mitigation Assistance Program. A total of $646,947 was awarded to the three states in FY2004 under authority of the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) program. Alabama received $282,136, Louisiana $76,500, and Mississippi
$288,311. Again, the majority of the funding went to private structure elevation or private property acquisition.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. A total of $10,485,309 was awarded in FY2004 to the three states under authority of Section 404 of the Stafford Act. Alabama received $4,538,660 and mostly put it towards elevation of private structures or
acquisition of private or public real property. Louisiana was awarded $5,921,463. Most notably, $1,810,500 was awarded
statewide for the development of local multi-hazard plans. Assumption parish used its $15,000 to purchase generators.
Louisiana State University used its $94,685 for public awareness and education. And Jefferson Parish put its $634,938
award towards elevation of private structures.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. Only one state, Alabama, received FMA funding in only one of the three years, FY2004. Most of the funds received by the state (83% of the $6,530,977) were awarded to the City of Birmingham for the
acquisition of property in riverine fl ood plains.
FEMA Hazard Mitigation Awards in FY2005
Flood Mitigation Assistance Program. A total of $4,685,750 was awarded in the three states in FY2005 under authority of the FMA program. Alabama received a total of $73,309. Louisiana received nearly $600,000, $400,000 of which went to
the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for salaries and expenses. And Mississippi’s nearly
3,000,000 awarded funded private property acquisitions in the cities of Florence, Gulfport, Long Beach, Grenada, and Pearl
River County.
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. A total of $10,485,309 was awarded to the three states in FY2005 through the HMGP. Alabama received $15, 609,093. The funding went to generators, warning systems, and acquisition of private
or public real property and structures. Louisiana was awarded $3,142,210, which was used for public awareness and
382 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
education in Terrebonne and Assumption parishes and elevation of private structures in Ouachita and Livingston parishes.
And Mississippi was awarded $5,342,844, which it dispersed among several cities and counties, including Vicksburg,
Lauderdale, Brandon, and Jackson. The funds were spent primarily on acquisition of private and public real property.
Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program. No PDM awards were made to Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi in FY2005.
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Offi ce
The COPS Offi ce was created by Title I of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322).
The mission of the COPS Offi ce is to advance community policing in all jurisdictions across the United States. The COPS
Offi ce awards grants to state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies throughout the United States so they can hire and
train law enforcement offi cers to participate in community policing, purchase and deploy new crime-fi ghting technologies,
and develop and test new and innovative policing strategies.2 The COPS Offi ce has awarded more than $11.4 billion to
over 13,000 law enforcement agencies across the United States since it started awarding grants in 1994.3 As of the end of
FY2004, the COPS Offi ce has funded more than 118,000 community policing offi cers throughout the U.S.4
COPS Grant Programs
Below is a brief summary of the COPS grant programs under which funding was awarded to local law enforcement
agencies in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. In summary:
■ Alabama received $24,770,274 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Interoperability Communications, Law
Enforcement Technology, Universal Hiring Program (UHP), COPS in Schools (CIS), and Homeland Security Overtime
(HSOP) grant programs;
■ Louisiana received $23,495,114 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Interoperability Communications, Law
Enforcement Technology, UHP, CIS, Regional Community Policing Institute (RCPI) and Homeland Security Overtime
(HSOP) grant programs; and
■ Mississippi received $7,003,688 from FY2003 to FY2005 under the COPS Law Enforcement Technology, UHP, CIS, and
HSOP grant programs.
COPS Interoperable Communications Grant Program. The Interoperable Communications Grant Program provides funding to local communities to help them develop effective interoperable communications systems for public safety
and emergency service providers. The grant program funds projects that explore the use of equipment and technology to
increase interoperability and data sharing among law enforcement, fi re departments, and emergency medical services.
Some examples of projects that have been funded include:
■ Interoperability communications equipment for multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional public safety communications
projects;
■ Deployment of portable gateway networks;
■ Technology to upgrade or enhance the ability of law enforcement to improve the timeliness, effectiveness and accuracy
of criminal justice information exchanges; and
■ Other technology that can be demonstrated to signifi cantly increase interoperability within the public safety
community.5
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 383
COPS Law Enforcement Technology Grant Program. The COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program provides funding for the development of automated systems that help state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies prevent,
respond to, and investigate crime. The funding can be used by law enforcement agencies to purchase technology that
advances crime analysis, intelligence gathering, and crime prevention in their communities.6 The technology grants allow
law enforcement agencies to purchase technology that does not fall under the Interoperable Communications Grant
Program.7
COPS Universal Hiring Program (UHP). UHP provides funding to state, local, and tribal governments for the salaries and benefi ts of newly hired offi cers who engage in community policing. Law enforcement agencies can use UHP funding
to hire new law enforcement offi cers to work in community policing or to redeploy a comparable number of veteran
offi cers into community policing. UHP funding can also be used to help law enforcement agencies partner with local
communities to develop innovative ways to deal with long-standing problems. UHP was created in 1995 when COPS
merged their Funding Accelerated for Smaller Towns (FAST) and Accelerated Hiring, Education and Deployment (AHEAD)
Programs.8 Funds awarded under this program are used to pay 75 percent of a newly hired, entry-level offi cer’s salary and
benefi ts up to $75,000 per offi cer over the course of the three-year grant period. The agency is expected to pay the other 25
percent of the offi cer’s salary and benefi ts, unless they are able to obtain a waiver because of extreme fi scal hardship.
COPS in Schools (CIS). The CIS grant program provides funding to local law enforcement agencies so they can hire new or additional school resource offi cers to engage in community policing activities in and around primary and secondary
schools.9 The CIS grant program provides an incentive for the local law enforcement agency to collaborate and develop
partnerships with the school to use community policing efforts to combat school violence. Jurisdictions that apply for
funding must show they have primary law enforcement authority over the schools identifi ed in their application and do
not have the ability to implement the program without federal assistance. Funds awarded under this program are used to
pay the salary and benefi ts of a School Resource Offi cer up to $125,000 per offi cer over the course of the three-year grant
period. Any costs over the $125,000 per offi cer are expected to be covered by the local jurisdiction.
Homeland Security Overtime Program (HSOP). HSOP provides funding to cover the overtime pay for offi cers engaging in homeland security and community policing activities.10 The funds are meant to supplement the local law enforcement
agency’s current overtime budget. HSOP funds can be used to pay for offi cer overtime during homeland security training
sessions or other law enforcement activities designed to prevent acts of terrorism or other drug-related violent crime. HSOP
funds can be used to support overtime efforts for non-supervisory, sworn personnel. Funds cannot be used for civilian or
community service offi cers. HSOP grantees are expected to contribute 25 percent in matching funds.
Regional Community Policing Institutes (RCPI). RCPI funds are used to establish Regional Community Policing Institutes. RCPIs are training centers funded by COPS that teach a range of courses from homeland security and domestic
preparedness to police integrity. RCPIs also provide technical assistance for local law enforcement agencies.11 There is a
network of RCPIs across the United States that provide training to local law enforcement agents.12 The Gulf Coast RCPI
provides training and technical assistance in all aspects of community policing to local law enforcement in Louisiana,
Alabama and Mississippi.
384 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
COPS Funding Awarded to Jurisdictions in Alabama
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, jurisdictions in the state of Alabama received a total of $9,567,867 from the COPS Offi ce. COPS funding awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama in FY2003 was done under three different grant programs, as shown
in Table 1. A total of eight Law Enforcement Technology grants were awarded in Alabama, for a total of $1,855,820 in funding. A total of nine UHP grants were awarded in Alabama, for a total of $7,638,363 in funding. Only one HSOP grant
was awarded in Alabama in the amount of $73,684.
Table 1: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Alabama in FY2003
Agency Grant Program Funding Alabama Dept. Of Public Safety Law Enforcement Technology $174,000.00
Choctaw County Emergency Management Agency Law Enforcement Technology $198,700.00
City of Harselle Law Enforcement Technology $69,545.00
Huntsville Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $347,725.00
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $469,750.00
Limestone County Board Law Enforcement Technology $49,675.00
Town of Rogersville Law Enforcement Technology $49,675.00
University of Alabama-Huntsville Law Enforcement Technology $496,750.00
Alabama Dept. Of Public Safety UHP $5,625,000.00
City of Troy UHP $70,021.00
Town of Coosada UHP $73,981.00
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $750,000.00
Lake View Police Dept. UHP $152,052.00
Madison Police Dept. UHP $450,000.00
Marengo County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $297,288.00
City of Troy UHP $70,021.00
Tuscaloosa County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $150,000.00
Mobile County Board of Commissioners Homeland Security Overtime $73,684.00
Total Awarded $9,567,867.00
Jurisdictions in Alabama received approximately 7.7 percent of the total amount of UHP funding awarded to all
jurisdictions in the United States by the COPS Offi ce in FY2003. However, jurisdictions in Alabama received slightly less
than one percent of the total amount of Law Enforcement Technology funding awarded by the COPS Offi ce for the fi scal
year. Likewise, only 0.1 percent of the total amount of HSOP funding awarded in FY2003 by the COPS offi ce went to
Alabama.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 385
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, jurisdictions in Alabama received a total of $8,695,875 from the COPS Offi ce. COPS funding awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama was done under four different grant programs, as shown in Table 2. Nine Law Enforcement Technology grants were awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama, for a total of $1,810,745 in funding. Three UHP
grants were awarded in Alabama, for a total of $571,169 in funding. Four CIS grants were awarded in Alabama, for a total
of $688,961 in funding. Only one Interoperable Communications Technology grant was awarded in FY2004 to Alabama,
in the amount of $5.625 million.
Table 2: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Alabama in FY2004
Agency Grant Program Funding St. Clair County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $98,948.00
Jefferson County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $98,948.00
Hanceville Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $19,790.00
Arab Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $14,842.00
Town of Douglas Law Enforcement Technology $9,895.00
Blount County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $34,632.00
Lexington Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $49,474.00
Jefferson County Medical Examiner Law Enforcement Technology $494,739.00
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama Law Enforcement Technology $989,477.00
City of Helena UHP $375,000.00
City of Midland UHP $121,169.00
Daphne Police Dept. UHP $75,000.00
Randolph County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $91,809.00
Scottsboro Police Dept. COPS in Schools $81,978.00
Wilcox County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $196,898.00
Marshall County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $318,276.00
Birmingham Police Dept. Interoperable Communications Tech. $5,625,000.00
Total Awarded $8,695,875.00
In FY2004, jurisdictions in Alabama received one percent of the total UHP funding awarded to jurisdictions nationwide by
the COPS Offi ce. Less than two percent of the total funding under the Law Enforcement Technology program and the CIS
program went to jurisdictions in Alabama in FY2004. However, 6.8 percent of the total amount of funding awarded under
the Interoperable Communications Technology program for FY2004 went to one jurisdiction in Alabama.
386 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, a total of $6,506,532 in COPS funding was awarded to jurisdictions in the state of Alabama. Funding awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama were made under three different COPS grant programs, as shown in Table 3. Thirteen grants, for a total of $2,821,800 in funding, were awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama under the Law Enforcement
Technology Program. One CIS grant was award in Alabama in the amount of $684,732. As in previous years, only one
Interoperable Communications Technology grant was awarded in Alabama in the amount of $3,000,000.
Table 3: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Alabama in FY2005
Agency Grant Program Funding Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama Law Enforcement Technology $147,996.00
Guin Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $39,466.00
Southside Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $19,733.00
Boaz Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $19,733.00
Morgan County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $78,931.00
Shelby County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $246,661.00
Mobile Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $246,661.00
Huntsville Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $295,993.00
Huntsville Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $493,322.00
Madison County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $493,322.00
Morgan County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $98,664.00
Jefferson County Criminal Courts Law Enforcement Technology $394,657.00
Tuscaloosa County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $246,661.00
City of Tuscaloosa COPS in Schools $684,732.00
Mobile Police Dept. Interoperable Communications Tech. $3,000,000.00
Total Awarded $6,506,532.00
Three percent of the Law Enforcement Technology grant funds awarded nationwide by the COPS Offi ce in FY2005 was
awarded to jurisdictions in Alabama. Approximately 1.4 percent of all CIS funding awarded by the COPS Offi ce for
the fi scal year was awarded to a jurisdiction in Alabama. The Mobile Police Department received three percent of the
Interoperable Communications Technology awarded by the COPS Offi ce in FY2005.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 387
COPS Funding Awarded to Jurisdiction in Louisiana
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, a total of $10,699,027 in COPS funding was awarded to jurisdictions in Louisiana. Funding awarded by COPS during the fi scal year was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 4. COPS awarded a total of eight Law Enforcement Technology grants in Louisiana, for a total of $2,493,685 in funding. COPS also
awarded four UHP grants in Louisiana for a total of $2,039,523 in funding. Three grants under the HSOP were awarded
in Louisiana for a total funding amount of $305,407. One grant was made to a jurisdiction in Louisiana under the
Interoperable Communications Technology Program for $5,510,412, and under the RCPI Program for $350,000.
Table 4: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Louisiana in FY2003
Agency Grant Program Funding Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin. Law Enforcement Technology $1,490,250.00
Slidell Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $49,675.00
Vernon Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $59,610.00
New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission Law Enforcement Technology $198,700.00
Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $49,675.00
St. Tammany Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $99,350.00
Harahan Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $49,675.00
Lafourche Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $496,750.00
Houma Police Dept. UHP $412,160.00
Lake Charles Police Dept. UHP $772,974.00
Port of New Orleans Harbor Police Dept. UHP $212,351.00
Quachita Parish Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $642,038.00
Slidell Police Dept. Homeland Security Overtime $48,833.00
Gretna Police Dept. Homeland Security Overtime $49,229.00
Quachita Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Homeland Security Overtime $207,345.00
New Orleans Police Dept. Interoperable Communications Tech. $5,510,412.00
Northwestern State University RCPI $350,000.00
Total Awarded $10,699,027.00
Jurisdictions in Louisiana received 1.3 percent of the total Law Enforcement Technology funding awarded by the COPS
Offi ce in FY2003. Also, jurisdictions in Louisiana received 2.1 percent of UHP funding awarded in the same fi scal year.
Jurisdictions in Louisiana received less than one percent of HSOP funding awarded in FY2003. However, the New Orleans
Police Department received 7.4 percent of the Interoperable Communications Technology funds awarded in FY2003.
Northwestern State University received 1.7 percent of the RCPI funds awarded in FY2003 by the COPS Offi ce.
388 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, a total of $5,306,337 in COPS funding was awarded to jurisdictions in Louisiana. Like FY2003, grants awarded in the state of Louisiana were made under four different grant programs, as shown in Table 5. COPS awarded a total of six Law Enforcement Technology grants in Louisiana for the fi scal year, for a total of $1,335,795.
COPS also awarded three grants under UHP in Louisiana for the fi scal year, for a total of $869,707. One grant was awarded
to a local agency under the CIS program, for $101,394, and under the Interoperable Communication Technology Program,
for $2,998,901.
Table 5: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Louisiana in FY2004
Agency Grant Program Funding Rapides Parish Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $148,422.00
Lafayette Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $49,474.00
Sunset Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $19,790.00
Town of Grand Coteau Law Enforcement Technology $29,684.00
City of Bastrop Law Enforcement Technology $989,477.00
New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission Law Enforcement Technology $98,948.00
Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $360,686.00
Gretna Police Dept. UHP $75,000.00
Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $434,021.00
City of Westwego COPS in Schools $101,934.00
City of Shreveport Interoperable Communications Tech. $2,998,901.00
Total Awarded $5,306,337.00
Jurisdictions in Louisiana received less than one percent of the total amount of Law Enforcement Technology and CIS
funds awarded by the COPS Offi ce in FY2004. Less than two percent of all UHP funding in FY2004 went to jurisdictions in
Louisiana. The City of Shreveport received 3.6 percent of the Interoperable Communications Technology funding awarded
in FY2004.
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, jurisdictions in Louisiana received a total of $7,453,750 in COPS funding. Like FY2003 and FY2004, awards made by the COPS Offi ce to jurisdictions in Louisiana were done under three different programs,
as shown in Table 6. Three awards were made under the Law Enforcement Technology grant program, for a total of $686,657. Only one award was made under the Interoperable Communications Technology Program, in the amount of
$5,999,184. Two awards were made by the COPS Offi ce under the RCPI program, for a total of $767,909.
Table 6: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Louisiana in FY2005
Agency Grant Program Funding New Orleans Metropolitan Crime Commission Law Enforcement Technology $98,664.00
Bastrop Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $246,661.00
Northwestern State University Law Enforcement Technology $341,332.00
Baton Rouge Police Dept. Interoperable Communications Tech. $5,999,184.00
Northwestern State University RCPI $600,000.00
Northwestern State University RCPI $167,909.00
Total Awarded $7,453,750.00
Jurisdictions in Louisiana received 0.5 percent of the total amount of Law Enforcement Technology funding awarded by
the COPS Offi ce in FY2005. The Baton Rouge Police Department received six percent of the total amount of Interoperable
Communications Technology funding awarded in FY2005. Also, Northwestern State University received fi ve percent of
RCPI funding awarded by the COPS Offi ce for FY2005.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 389
COPS Funding Awarded to Jurisdictions in Mississippi
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, a total of $3,251,953 was awarded by the COPS Offi ce in Mississippi. As shown in Table 7, funds awarded to jurisdictions in Mississippi by the COPS Offi ce were done under four different programs. Five Law Enforcement Technology grants were awarded in Mississippi during FY2003, for a total of $1,559,796. Seven UHP grants
were awarded in Mississippi, for a total of $1,325,545. Only one CIS grant, for $94,513, was awarded in Mississippi in
FY2003. Five HSOP grants were awarded in Mississippi for a total of $272,099.
Table 7: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Mississippi in FY2003
Agency Grant Program Funding Columbia Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $248,375.00
Leake County Board of Supervisors Law Enforcement Technology $94,383.00
Simpson County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $844,475.00
Warren County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $248,375.00
Wilkinson County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $124,188.00
Alcorn County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $75,000.00
DeSoto County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $299,067.00
City of Hattiesburg UHP $349,946.00
Pearl River Community College UHP $150,385.00
City of Sardis UHP $217,951.00
University of Southern Mississippi UHP $193,871.00
Vaiden Police Dept. UHP $39,325.00
Okolona Police Dept. COPS in Schools $94,513.00
Gulfport Police Dept. Homeland Security Overtime $139,759.00
Jackson County Sheriff’s Dept. Homeland Security Overtime $68,948.00
City of Sardis Homeland Security Overtime $20,803.00
City of Starkville Homeland Security Overtime $22,896.00
Mississippi State University Homeland Security Overtime $19,693.00
Total Awarded $3,251,953.00
Less than one percent of the total amount of Law Enforcement Technology, CIS, and HSOP funds was awarded to
jurisdictions in Mississippi in FY2003. Less than two percent of the UHP funds awarded by the COPS Offi ce were awarded
to jurisdictions in Mississippi.
390 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, a total of $2,271,770 was awarded to jurisdictions in Mississippi by the COPS Offi ce. As shown in Table 8, grants awarded to jurisdictions in Mississippi in FY2004 were done under three different programs. Three Law Enforcement Technology grants were made in Mississippi in FY2004, for a total of $444,557. Four UHP grants
were awarded in Mississippi, for a total of $912,130. Four CIS grants were also awarded in Mississippi in FY2004, for a
total of $915,083.
Table 8: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdictions in Mississippi in FY 2004
Agency Grant Program Funding City of Jackson Law Enforcement Technology $98,948.00
Jackson County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $98,948.00
Lee County Sheriff’s Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $246,661.00
Booneville Police Dept. UHP $75,000.00
City of Mound Bayou UHP $204,501.00
Pearl River County Sheriff’s Dept. UHP $412,500.00
City of D’Iberville UHP $220,129.00
Alcorn County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $103,192.00
Marion County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $251,769.00
Ripley Police Dept. COPS in Schools $195,082.00
Harrison County Sheriff’s Dept. COPS in Schools $365,040.00
Total Awarded $2,271,770.00
Less than one percent of all of the FY2004 Law Enforcement Technology grant funding went to jurisdictions in Mississippi.
Approximately 1.3 percent of UHP funding awarded by the COPS Offi ce in FY2004 was awarded to jurisdictions in
Mississippi. Less than two percent of all CIS funding for FY2004 went to jurisdictions in Mississippi.
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, a total of $1,479,965 was awarded to jurisdictions in Mississippi by the COPS Offi ce. As shown in Table 9, only two awards were made in Mississippi in FY2005, both under the Law Enforcement Technology program.
Table 9: COPS Grants Awarded to Jurisdiction in Mississippi in FY2005
Agency Grant Program Funding Yazoo City Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $493,322.00
Southaven Police Dept. Law Enforcement Technology $986,643.00
Total Awarded $1,479,965.00
Approximately 1.1 percent of all Law Enforcement Technology funding went to the two jurisdictions in Mississippi that
received funding in FY2005.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 391
Offi ce for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)
The Offi ce for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) was transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) by Section 430, Title IV of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296). ODP has primary
responsibility for United States government terrorism preparedness.13 ODP administers grants to state, local, and tribal
fi rst responder entities (such as law enforcement, emergency management, fi re departments, and emergency medical
services) that assist their preparedness activities. Since FY2003, ODP has awarded approximately $480 million to Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi fi rst responders.
Since September 11, 2001 funding appropriated by Congress for DHS programs to enhance fi rst responders’ capabilities
has largely emphasized enhancing capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8, however, direct DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national emergency
preparedness with a special emphasis on terrorism.14 As a result, DHS grant guidance for the State Homeland Security
Grant and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant programs, the two largest sources of DHS grants funds available to state
and local fi rst responders, is designed to support an all-hazards approach to planning, equipment, and training to enhance
the capabilities of fi rst responders to respond to terrorist attacks and to a lesser extent natural disasters.
ODP Grant Programs
A brief summary of ODP grant programs under which funding was awarded to fi rst responder entities in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi follows:
■ Alabama received $216,130,186, from FY2003 to FY2005 under the ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP), the Citizen Corps Programs (CCP), the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Assistance to Firefi ghters Program (FIRE), and the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program (EMPG);
■ Louisiana received $140,038,519, from FY2003 to FY2005 under the ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP), the Citizen Corps Programs (CCP), the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Assistance to Firefi ghters Program (FIRE), and the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program (EMPG); and
■ Mississippi received $123,583,324, from FY2003 to FY2005 under the ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program
(SHSGP), the Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (CIP), the Citizen Corps Programs (CCP), the Law Enforcement
Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), the Assistance to Firefi ghters Program (FIRE), and the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program (EMPG).
State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP). This assistance program provides fi nancial assistance to states and U.S. insular areas to prepare for terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The program authorizes
purchase of specialized equipment to enhance state and local agencies’ capability in preventing and responding to WMD
incidents, and provides funds for protecting critical infrastructure of national importance. This program provides grant
funds for designing, developing, conducting, and evaluating WMD exercises; developing and conducting WMD training
programs; and updating and implementing each state’s Homeland Security Strategy (SHSS).15
SHSGP funds may be used to plan for, design, develop, conduct, and evaluate exercises that train fi rst responders, and
to assess the readiness of state and local jurisdictions to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. Exercises must be threat-
and performance-based, in accordance with ODP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) manuals.
Exercises conducted with funds from this program must be managed and executed in accordance with HSEEP.16
Funds from this program may be used to enhance the capabilities of state and local fi rst responders through the
development of a state homeland security training program. Allowable training costs include establishment of WMD
training capacities within existing training academies, universities, and junior colleges.17
392 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
States are the only authorized applicants, with the following state and local entities eligible to receive funding:
■ Emergency management agencies or offi ces;
■ Homeland security agencies or offi ces;
■ Fire departments;
■ Law enforcement agencies;
■ Emergency medical services;
■ Hazardous material-handling personnel;
■ Public works agencies or offi ces;
■ Public health agencies or offi ces;
■ Governmental administrative agencies or offi ces; and
■ Public safety communications agencies or offi ces.18
Citizen Corps Programs (CCP). On January 29, 2002, President Bush issued an executive order19 which established the USA Freedom Corps. USA Freedom Corps’ mission is to increase opportunities for citizens by expanding and enhancing
public service. Within the USA Freedom Corps, the Citizen Corps program was established to coordinate volunteer
organizations, with the mission to make local communities safe and prepared to respond to any emergency situation.
Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) is the only program of the four which Citizen Corps administers that
provides grant funding to volunteer fi rst responders.
CERT trains people to be prepared to respond to emergency situations in their own local communities. CERTs are
groups of volunteers within communities that are trained by professional fi rst responders to assist in the event of a disaster.
CERT members give critical support to fi rst responders, provide immediate assistance to victims, and organize spontaneous
volunteers at a disaster site.
This program authorizes funding for training of CERT members only. The CERT program is a professionally instructed
course taught by a team of fi rst responders who have the requisite knowledge and skills. The course, taught to groups of
citizens within their communities, consists of two and a half hour sessions held one evening a week, over a seven week
period.20 States apply for a grant under this program, while any community that has established a Citizen Corps Council is
also eligible to receive funding from it.
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP). In the FY2004 DHS appropriations, Congress directed ODP to establish a local law enforcement terrorism prevention grant program for states and localities.21 This program
provides funds to support activities to establish and enhance state and local efforts to prevent and deter terrorist attacks.
Eligible program activities authorized include:
■ Information sharing to preempt terrorist attacks;
■ Target hardening to reduce vulnerability of selected high value targets;
■ Threat recognition to identify potential or actual threats; and
■ Intervention activities to interdict terrorists.
Approved costs for this program include, but are not limited to, personnel costs (including overtime as approved by
the state administering agency), equipment, systems, and related expenses.22 State and local law enforcement agencies are
authorized to apply for grant funding under this program.
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program (FIRE). This program awards one-year grants directly to fi re departments to enhance their abilities to respond to fi res and fi re-related hazards.23 The program seeks to support fi re departments that lack the
tools and resources necessary to protect the health and safety of the public and fi refi ghting personnel.24 At least fi ve
percent of the funds go to prevention programs, and recipients agree to contribute a 30 percent nonfederal match if the
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 393
local population is greater than 50,000, or 10 percent if the local population is 50,000 or less. Grant recipients may not
receive more than $750,000 for any fi scal year.25 The program’s grant application process is competitive, and applications
are peer reviewed by state and local fi re department offi cials.
FIRE program provides funds to support fi refi ghter safety, fi re prevention, emergency medical services, and fi refi ghting
vehicle acquisition. Individual fi re departments are eligible to apply for grants under this program.
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG). This program is designed to assist the development, maintenance, and improvement of state and local emergency management capabilities. It provides support to state and
local governments to achieve measurable results in key functional areas of emergency management.26
EMPG funds are used for emergency management personnel costs, travel, training, supplies, and other routine
expenditures for emergency management activities.27 Funds from this grant program may also be used for consequence
management preparedness projects and programs that develop and improve the capabilities of states and localities to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism involving WMD.28
States may use the funds provided through the EMPG to structure their individual emergency management programs
based on identifi ed needs and priorities for strengthening emergency management capabilities. States may also use EMPG
funds to develop intrastate emergency management systems that encourage partnership building among government,
business, and volunteer and community organizations.29 State emergency management agencies or offi ces are eligible
applicants and recipients of this grant program; additionally, state emergency management agencies may pass funds to
emergency management offi ces at the local level.
ODP Funding Awarded to Alabama
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, Alabama received a total of $61,348,493 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Alabama in FY2003 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: ODP Grants Awarded to Alabama in FY2003
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $31,200,000.00
Citizen Corps $500,000.00
Critical Infrastructure Protection $3,300,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $23,548,493.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,800,000.00
Total Awarded $61,348,493.00
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, Alabama received a total of $108,732,787 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Alabama in FY2004 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 11.
Table 11: ODP Grants Awarded to Alabama in FY2004
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $28,000,000.00
Citizen Corps $600,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program $8,300,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $68,932,787.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,900,000.00
Total Awarded $108,732,787.00
394 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, Alabama received a total of $46,048,906, in funding from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Alabama in FY2005 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 12.
Table 12: ODP Grants Awarded to Alabama in FY2005
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $17,000,000.00
Citizen Corps $200,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Protection Program $6,400,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $19,548,906.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,900,000.00
Total Awarded $46,048,906.00
ODP funding Awarded to Louisiana
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, Louisiana received a total of $51,048,654 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Louisiana in
FY2003 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 13.
Table 13: ODP Grants Awarded to Louisiana in FY2003
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $32,200,000.00
Citizen Corps $500,000.00
Critical Infrastructure Protection $3,300,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $12,248,654.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,800,000.00
Total Awarded $51,048,654.00
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, Louisiana received a total of $51,159,534 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Louisiana in FY2004 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 14.
Table 14: ODP Grants Awarded to Louisiana in FY2004
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $28,000,000.00
Citizen Corps $600,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program $8,300,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $11,359,534.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,900,000.00
Total Awarded $51,159,534.00
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 395
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, Louisiana received a total of $37,830,331 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Louisiana in FY2005 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 15.
Table 15: ODP Grants Awarded to Louisiana in FY2004
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $17,700,000.00
Citizen Corps $200,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program $6,400,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $10,630,331.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,900,000.00
Total Awarded $37,830,331.00
ODP Funding Awarded to Mississippi
Fiscal Year 2003. In FY2003, Mississippi received a total of $46,208,491 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Mississippi in FY2003 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 16.
Table16: ODP Grants Awarded to Mississippi in FY2003
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $25,000,000.00
Citizen Corps $400,000.00
Critical Infrastructure Protection $2,700,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $15,908,491.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,200,000.00
Total Awarded $46,208,491.00
Fiscal Year 2004. In FY2004, Mississippi received a total of $43,564,925 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Mississippi in FY2004 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 17.
Table 17: ODP Grants Awarded to Mississippi in FY2004
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $22,400,000.00
Citizen Corps $500,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program $6,700,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $11,564,925.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,400,000.00
Total Awarded $43,564,925.00
396 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
Fiscal Year 2005. In FY2005, Mississippi received a total of $31,109,908 from ODP. ODP funding awarded to Mississippi in FY2005 was done under fi ve different grant programs, as shown in Table 18.
Table 18: ODP Grants Awarded to Mississippi in FY2005
Grant Program Funding State Homeland Security Grant Program $14,200,000.00
Citizen Corps $200,000.00
Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program $5,200,000.00
Assistance to Firefi ghters Program $9,209,908.00
Emergency Management Performance Grant Program $2,300,000.00
Total Awarded $31,109,908.00
1 The programs are authorized in the following statutes: Flood Mitigation Assistance - 42 U.S.C. § 4104(c)-(d) (2005); Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - 42 U.S.C. § 5170(c) (2005); Pre-Disaster Mitigation - 42 U.S.C. § 5133 (2005).
2 U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. Offi ce [hereinafter DOJ COPS Offi ce], About Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. Offi ce, http:// www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=35, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005) [hereinafter About DOJ COPS Offi ce website].
3 DOJ COPS Offi ce website, Message from the Dir., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=37, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 4 About DOJ COPS Offi ce website. 5 DOJ COPS Offi ce, COPS Fact Sheet: Interoperable Communications Tech., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/mime/open.pdf?Item=947, (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005). 6 DOJ COPS Offi ce, COPS Tech. Grants, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=58, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 7 Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with DOJ COPS Offi ce personnel (Oct. 25, 2005). 8 DOJ COPS Offi ce, Universal Hiring Program, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=53, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 9 DOJ COPS Offi ce, COPS in Schools, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=54, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 10 DOJ COPS Offi ce, Homeland Sec. Overtime Program, http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=1023, (last visited Oct. 25, 2005). 11 Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with DOJ COPS Offi ce personnel (Nov. 21, 2005). 12 DOJ COPS Offi ce, Reg’l Cmty. Policing Insts., http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=229 (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (The website
provides a list of all Reg’l Cmty. Policing Insts. across the United States). 13 Homeland Sec. Act (2002), Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 14 Directive on Mgmt. of Nat’l Preparedness, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1822 (Dec. 17, 2003) (Known as Homeland Sec. Presidential
Directive/HSPD-8). 15 Offi ce for Domestic Preparedness, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fiscal Year 2004 State Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines and
Application Kit, 1 (2003). 16 Id. at 3. 17 Id. at 4. 18 Id. at 2. 19 Establishing the USA Freedom Corps, 67 Fed. Reg. 4869 (2002). 20 Emergency Mgmt. Inst., Community Emergency Response Team Overview, http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/CERT/overview.asp (last visited
Apr. 1, 2004). 21 2004 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137 (2003). 22 S. REP. NO. 108-86 (2003). 23 House REP. NO. 108-280 (2003) (In the conference report to accompany H.R. 2555, the Assistance to Firefi ghters grant program is to be
administered by the Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness. It also specifi es that the grant administration process will not be changed from the present procedures, to include peer review and involvement by United States Fire Admin).
24 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., FY2003 Assistance to Firefi ghters Grant Program Guidance, 2 (2003). 25 Floyd D. Spence Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for FY 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-398, § 1701, 114 Stat. 1654 (2000). 26 26 Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, FY2003 Emergency Management Performance Grant Program Guidance to
States, 2 (2003). 27 Id. at 6. 28 Id. at 8. 29 Id. at 9.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 397
APPENDIX 5
KEY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO KATRINA
The Federal Bureau of Investigations established a Tactical Operations Center and utilized its Fly Teams to assist in fi ngerprinting victims and potential recovery contractors
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) accomplished core mission functions in response to the hurricane by
establishing a Tactical Operations Center to support the FBI’s tactical teams. In addition, FBI Fly Teams assisted FEMA’s
Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team in identifying 112-115 hurricane victims by computerized fi ngerprint
matching. FBI Fly Teams also assisted FEMA in identifying 458 criminal histories out of 2,900 potential hurricane recovery
contractors through fi ngerprinting.
The FBI is the “principal investigative arm of the United States Department of Justice.” The FBI’s mission is to:
[U]phold the law through the investigation of violations of federal criminal law; to protect the United States
from foreign intelligence and terrorist activities; to provide leadership and law enforcement assistance to
federal, state, local, and international agencies; and to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is
responsive to the needs of the public and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States.1
The United States Attorney General can authorize the FBI to assist state and location authorities in a “law enforcement
emergency.”2 The FBI may provide public safety support to state and local authorities in a presidentially declared “major
disaster.”3
The FBI’s Law Enforcement Services Branch coordinates the Bureau’s preparation for and response to a domestic
emergency.4 Staff from all offi ces within this branch were utilized after Hurricane Katrina. In addition, the FBI called
upon its Administrative Services Division, Counterterrorism Division, Criminal Investigative Division, Cyber Division,
Directorate of Intelligence, Finance Division, Information Technology Operations Division, and Security Division.
There are approximately 225 employees assigned to the FBI’s New Orleans Field Offi ce, which has jurisdiction over all
FBI authority in the state of Louisiana.5 The FBI has fi eld offi ces in Jackson, Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama.6 As part of
the Jackson Field Offi ce, the FBI has Resident Agencies in Pascagoula, Hattiesburg, and Gulfport, Mississippi.7
On August 26, the Jackson Field Offi ce notifi ed each supervisor at its Resident Agencies to implement their hurricane
plans.8 This required installing hurricane shutters, securing vehicles, bagging computers and equipment, and locking the
safes. Authorized personnel on the Mississippi coast moved to the Jackson Field Offi ce.
By 6:00 p.m. on August 29, the Jackson Field Offi ce moved its traditional FBI operations to the Resident Agency in
Oxford, Mississippi.9 Also that evening, the FBI used an airplane to survey the damage to the Resident Agencies on the
coast. The Jackson Field Offi ce was able to electronically monitor the security alarms of its Resident Agencies in the
affected area. FBI personnel who remained on the coast were dispatched to the Resident Agencies and confi rmed that all
offi ces were still secure.
On August 29, after Katrina’s landfall, the Special Agent-in-Charge (SAC) of New Orleans and four other FBI agents
surveyed the damage to the New Orleans Field Offi ce.10 The roof suffered signifi cant damage, leaving sixty percent of the
top fl oor uncovered. Due to the sensitivity of documents housed in the Field Offi ce, the SAC and the four agents remained
at the building to ensure its security.
Because of the damage to the building, the SAC decided to move the New Orleans Field Division to the Louisiana State
Police (LSP) headquarters in Baton Rouge.11 An Assistant Special Agent-In-Charge (ASAC) from the New Orleans Field
Offi ce went to Baton Rouge while the New Orleans SAC stayed in New Orleans. The Operational Technology Division
398 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
(OTD) left Quantico, Virginia, with 16 FBI personnel to deliver communication equipment to the affected area so the New
Orleans Field Offi ce could communicate with FBI headquarters.12 FBI command vehicles — tractor trailers containing
mobile offi ces — were deployed to Baton Rouge and the Jackson Field Offi ce.13
Within 12 hours after Hurricane Katrina subsided, the Jackson Field Offi ce was in contact with all of its personnel.14 On
August 30, OTD dispatched a mobile command post to Mississippi. The Jackson ASAC participated in another airplane
survey of the area. The Jackson Field Offi ce offi ce manager left Jackson via car for the coast in order to assess damage to the
Hattiesburg Resident Agency. While the Hattiesburg building remained secure, the Pascagoula Resident Agency sustained
water damage to the ceiling, wall cavities, and carpet. The offi ce was able to secure a temporary facility through the Navy
free of charge. The Gulfport Resident Agency sustained similar water damage. The offi ce was located on the top fl oor of a
building and the attic of the building fl ooded. The FBI was able to work with government contractors to clean the offi ce,
and it was habitable by October 1.
The same day, Jackson Field Offi ce personnel met with several military offi cials to determine where the temporary FBI
command post should be located.15 The FBI decided on Keesler Air Force Base, as there was a hotel on the property with
showers and bathrooms. Some FBI personnel from the Jackson Field Offi ce were also Air Force reservists and they had
access to goods and services provided to Air Force employees.
On August 30, FBI headquarters offi cials put their Field Offi ces on alert that additional personnel were needed in the
affected area.16 Ten Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) agents from the Houston Division were deployed to New Orleans
to assist the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) SWAT.17 The agents from Houston brought a boat that enabled
them to transport personnel and supplies. The FBI SWAT agents relieved the New Orleans SAC and agents who had stayed
to secure the New Orleans Field Offi ce.
FBI personnel and equipment from Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) and OTD arrived on August 31 in Baton
Rouge and established a Command Post in Baton Rouge at the LSP headquarters.18 Among the equipment were tents that
FBI personnel used as shelter at the Command Post.19
By 2:00 a.m. on August 31, the FBI Command Post at Keesler Air Force Base was operational.20 FBI agents from the
Mobile and Miami Field Offi ces were deployed to work there. These agents assisted with health, safety, and welfare checks
on other agents and citizens in the area. FBI sent employee assistance personnel, most of whom had crisis management
backgrounds, to work with agents’ family members. The fi rst agents on the scene stayed the fi rst week after the hurricane.
After that, additional agents began rotating into the area. The second week, agents were deployed from FBI Headquarters
to the Command Post. SWAT from the Little Rock Field Offi ce were used to provide security at the Command Post and the
Resident Agencies in Mississippi’s affected area.
In a fortunate coincidence, the Command Post had an FBI employee who formerly worked for FEMA.21 This employee
checked in daily with FEMA in Jackson and on the coast and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency. The
Command Post also communicated with the Mississippi Bureau of Criminal Investigations, the Mississippi Highway
Patrol, and the Homeland Security Director for Mississippi, who was also the former FBI Jackson Field Offi ce SAC. The
agents at the Command Post worked with local police and sheriffs to respond to requests for assistance.
On September 1, CIRG deployed agents from the Dallas, Atlanta, Baltimore, and Houston SWAT teams and Hostage
Rescue Teams to continue to help NOPD control the affected area.22 The FBI was able to create a Virtual Command Center
for the Law Enforcement On-Line Internet site.23 All law enforcement nationwide were able to log onto the website and
receive daily situation reports regarding FBI relief efforts.24
The FBI established a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Sorrento, Louisiana on September 4.25 Kenneth Kaiser, the
Boston SAC, was deployed to Sorrento to oversee the TOC.
On September 3, the Laboratory Disaster Squad and the CJIS Fly Teams were deployed to St. Gabriel, Louisiana to
assist with FEMA’s National Disaster Medical System Center’s Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT).26
LSP, the National Guard, and local police were delivering deceased victims of the storm to St. Gabriel.27 The DMORT
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 399
was responsible for the handling of the bodies. The Fly Teams and the FBI’s Evidence Recovery Teams worked together
to submit the victims’ fi ngerprints electronically to CJIS and the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identifi cation System
(IAFIS) to search for identifying fi ngerprint matches.28 In total, 750 unidentifi ed bodies were brought to the DMORT and
112-115 bodies were identifi ed using IAFIS.29
Also on September 3, a fi nance employee was sent from FBI headquarters to the FBI Command Post at Keesler Air Force
Base.30 This enabled the agents in Mississippi to purchase gas from the Air Force. By September 4, all FBI personnel living
in the affected area of Louisiana were located.31
On September 5, CJIS Fly Teams helped FEMA fi ngerprint potential contractors for the Hurricane response.32 This took
place in Orlando and consisted of fi ngerprinting technology that identifi ed if contracting applicants had criminal histories.
The FBI and FEMA fi ngerprinted 2,900 potential contractors, detecting 458 criminal histories.
The FBI continued to deploy and assign personnel to assist state and local police.33 The Violent Gang Task Force from
the New Orleans Division worked out of the Gretna Police Department. Over 30 more agents coordinated with NOPD to
back up NOPD SWAT, FBI SWAT, and HRT Special Agents. The FBI’s Rapid Deployment Teams were sent to crisis sites to
assist with administrative issues.
The FBI also utilized its air assets in responding to Hurricane Katrina.34 They fl ew daily helicopter fl ights moving law
enforcement personnel, equipment, supplies, and evacuees.35 In addition, the FBI fl ew 12 missions utilizing its fi xed wing
assets for moving FBI personnel and equipment from Washington, D.C. to New Orleans and Jackson.36 There were 1,200
FBI employees involved.37 Seven hundred were deployed to the New Orleans area.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives secured buildings containing fi rearms, located and inspected all federal fi rearms and explosive licensees, recovered lost and stolen fi rearms, and disman- tled explosives in the New Orleans area
Following the hurricane, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) established a Critical Incident
Management Response Team (CIMRT). The CIMRT coordinates ATF’s law enforcement operations and ensures that ATF
continues its primary law enforcement missions. ATF located and secured buildings containing fi rearms, conducted
inspections to ensure the safety of all individuals licensed to use fi rearms and explosives, worked to match stolen or lost
fi rearms with their rightful owners, and dismantled explosives in New Orleans.
ATF’s mission is to “conduct criminal investigations, regulate the fi rearms and explosives industries, and assist other law
enforcement agencies.”38 This mission is in place so ATF’s work can “prevent terrorism, reduce violent crime and to protect
the public in a manner that is faithful to the Constitution and the laws of the United States.” ATF’s authority to respond to
domestic emergencies is found in the Gun Control Act of 1968, the National Firearms Act, the Arms Export Control Act,
and the Federal Explosives Laws.39
ATF’s involvement in the preparation for Hurricane Katrina began on August 23.40 Throughout that week, ATF
headquarters in Washington, D.C. coordinated with its Houston, New Orleans (which includes the entire states of
Louisiana and Mississippi), Nashville (which includes the state of Alabama), Tampa, and Miami Field Divisions to prepare
for Katrina’s landfall in Florida and the Gulf coast.41 On August 25 and 26, ATF headquarters ordered the evacuation
of ATF personnel in New Orleans and Mississippi, the New Orleans Special Agent in Charge (SAC) pre-identifi ed those
persons who were staying in the area, and those evacuating were instructed to call their immediate supervisor after the
storm.42
On August 29, as Katrina made landfall, ATF headquarters began notifying the Field Divisions closest to New Orleans
that assistance was needed.43 These Field Divisions were asked to identify resources and personnel to be detailed to the
affected area. Within eight hours, ATF identifi ed the Nashville, Houston, and Dallas Field Divisions as those to detail
personnel.44
400 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
On August 30, ATF personnel located in the affected area worked to assess the damage to ATF facilities on the Gulf
coast.45 The fi rst fl oor of ATF’s Biloxi Field Offi ce was destroyed and the second fl oor sustained signifi cant damage. The
New Orleans Division Offi ce, located on the fi fth fl oor of an offi ce building, was fl ooded when the levies broke.46
Due to signifi cant damage to the ATF’s facilities, a Continuity of Operations (COOP) site in Mandeville, Louisiana
was activated on August 30.47 The New Orleans Division Offi ce was relocated to Shreveport, Louisiana to resume its
responsibilities over the states of Louisiana and Mississippi.48 The Biloxi Field Offi ce was relocated behind the Harrison
County Sheriff’s Department building to a public safety compound.49
ATF also established CIMRT in Baton Rouge.50 A CIMRT is established at or near an incident to conduct on-scene
management, coordinate the law enforcement operations, and ensure that ATF continues its primary law enforcement
mission.51 Two Assistant Special Agents-In-Charge were responsible for CIMRT.
On August 30, ATF began contacting each ATF employee residing in the affected area.52 In addition, a Critical Incident
Management Support Team (CIMST) was created at ATF headquarters.53 A CIMST serves as the point of contact for CIMRT
at headquarters, coordinating large procurements of supplies and equipment, and lending technical support. One of ATF’s
three Deputy Assistant Directors for Field Operations was in command of CIMST.54 CIMST quickly began evaluating the
needs on the coast.55 All ATF personnel detailed to the affected area were instructed to bring enough food and water for a
week and to be prepared to sleep in their cars, in the event food and shelter did not reach the coast prior to their arrival.
Simultaneously on August 30, ATF headquarters formed the Emergency Management Working Group (EMWG).56 The
EMWG was tasked with handling non-law enforcement logistical needs arising out of the hurricane.57 The EMWG was
staffed with ATF support and COOP staff who worked on administrative issues, such as payroll, and coordinated with the
U.S. General Services Administration regarding building space.58 The EMWG held daily teleconferences with ATF stations
on the coast to assess the resource needs for personnel.59
On August 31, ATF Field Divisions in Atlanta, Dallas, and Miami dispatched their Command and Control vehicles to
Algiers and Mandeville, Louisiana and Biloxi, Mississippi.60 These are large Winnebago-style vehicles that hold mobile
command posts, work stations, and offi ce equipment, allowing ATF personnel to conduct meetings and maintain
communications.61 Also on August 31, CIMST became a twenty-four-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week operation at ATF
headquarters.62
An assessment of ATF’s Mobile fi eld offi ce was received on September 1.63 The fi eld offi ce’s fi rst fl oor was fl ooded.64 On
September 3, the Mobile fi eld offi ce and personnel were moved to Brookley Air Force Base, an inactive base in the Mobile
area.65
The fi rst group of ATF personnel detailed to the affected area arrived on Friday, September 2.66 Thirty-four members
of Special Response Teams (SRT) from the Dallas and Detroit Field Offi ces and seven SRT support staff were deployed to
Algiers. SRT are tactical teams specifi cally trained to handle high risk law enforcement and civil unrest.67 The SRT members
were sent to New Orleans to assist the NOPD, whose SWAT teams were down to 25 percent capacity. ATF set up a Tactical
Operations Command Post with satellite communications in the parking lot of a post offi ce in Algiers and SRT members
slept in the building.68 The NOPD was stationed at a school across the street from the post offi ce.69 The close proximity
enabled SRT and NOPD to coordinate their efforts.
On September 3, ATF helped the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) establish a detention center at the Greyhound Bus
Station in downtown New Orleans.70 The detention center was created to house individuals arrested for crimes committed
after the hurricane. ATF also provided security for the Assistant United States Attorneys assigned to the detention center.71
The detention facility was supported by staff from the Angola State Prison in Louisiana and the United States Attorney’s
Offi ce.72 The facility, which processed state and federal arrests, contained holding cells where arrestees stayed for
approximately 24 hours prior to being transported to Baton Rouge.73
Throughout the week, ATF continued to operate out of the COOP facility in Mandeville and CIMRT in Baton Rouge.74
ATF support staff worked to establish communications and information technology support at CIMRT, as well as locating
needed furniture and equipment.75 By September 7, CIMRT was fully operational.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 401
On September 6 and 7, 10 ATF agents were deployed to Biloxi, and 30 ATF agents were deployed to Gulfport.76 These
agents performed investigative roles, as well as assisting local police with fi rearms-related calls.77 No federal arrests were
made in Mississippi by ATF agents.78
On September 6, the Law Enforcement Coordination Center in Baton Rouge assigned ATF with enforcement activity in
the 1st and 8th police districts in the city of New Orleans.79 ATF also assisted the NOPD in New Orleans 6th district.
Throughout the period immediately following Katrina’s landfall, ATF was tasked with carrying out its mission, as well as
supporting state and local law enforcement.80 ATF instructed law enforcement personnel to locate and secure all buildings
containing fi rearms. ATF began to locate and conduct inspections to ensure the safety of all federal fi rearm and explosive
licensees. Due to the voluminous amount of fi rearms recovered during the week of August 30, ATF began the task of
matching up stolen or lost fi rearms with their legal owners. This process continues into 2006.
During search and rescue missions, law enforcement personnel discovered pipe bombs in some New Orleans homes.81
As a result, six Explosive Enforcement Offi cers were deployed to the city on September 12.82 The same day, ATF agents
secured a Federal search warrant for the residences so that offi cers could dismantle the explosives.
In the month of September, ATF assisted with 600 missions to reduce violent crimes and enforce fi rearms laws.83 Ten
individuals were arrested for violating federal fi rearms laws.84 During the course of searching for missing ATF personnel,
ATF offi cers rescued 26 people.85 In total, 301 ATF agents and support staff were deployed to the area affected by Hurricane
Katrina.86
The Drug Enforcement Administration provided Mobile Enforcement Teams to assist with violent missions, and the Offi ce of Diversion Control made exceptions for evacuees to receive prescription medications from neighboring states and established mobile replacement pharmacies
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) performed law enforcement functions and helped resolve prescription
medication issues arising from Hurricane Katrina. The DEA deployed Mobile Enforcement Teams (MET) — teams trained
to specialize in violent missions — from throughout the country. In addition, DEA’s Offi ce of Diversion Control worked
with the Boards of Pharmacy in affected and neighboring states to ensure that hurricane victims could receive refi lls on
current prescription medication. The DEA also worked with major chain pharmacies to establish mobile replacement
pharmacies for displaced individuals in need of medication.
DEA is charged with enforcing the nation’s narcotics laws.87 DEA derives its authority from the Controlled Substances
Act.88 The mission of DEA
is to enforce the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and bring to the criminal
and civil justice system of the United States, or any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and
principal members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or distribution of controlled
substances appearing in or destined for illicit traffi c in the United States; and to recommend and support
non-enforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illicit controlled substances on the domestic
and international markets.89
In the aftermath of Katrina, the Attorney General granted DEA additional authority to enforce all federal criminal
laws.90 The Attorney General also authorized DEA to help Louisiana state and local law enforcement offi cials enforce state
laws.91 DEA’s involvement with Hurricane Katrina began shortly before landfall.92 DEA Deputy Administrator Special
Agent Michele Leonhart was identifi ed as the “component” within the agency to implement and coordinate Katrina
response activities. Authority to discharge these responsibilities was delegated to the New Orleans Field Division Special
Agent in Charge (SAC), William Renton.
In anticipation of Katrina’s landfall, on August 26, Renton ordered the New Orleans Field Division closed.93 DEA
personnel were asked to evacuate the area.
402 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
The New Orleans Field Division and the Gulfport Resident Offi ce were severely damaged by the hurricane.94
Beginning immediately after the storm and continuing into Tuesday, the New Orleans Field Division began the process of
reconstituting its fi eld offi ce by accounting for and identifying the whereabouts of all Field Division personnel — some
of whom were in need of rescue.95 DEA teams were established to facilitate the rescues. In all, 63 DEA employees and
family members were rescued by DEA agents. The process of reconstituting its offi ce allows DEA to be most helpful in
undertaking other law enforcement roles and responsibilities related to the emergency at hand.96 After the New Orleans
Field Division personnel were located, DEA began assisting local law enforcement in the massive search and rescue
effort.97 Most of the Katrina-related DEA man hours were ultimately spent on search and rescue.98
On August 31, command centers were established at the Baton Rouge District Offi ce and in Mobile.99 At this time, DEA
headquarters mobilized Field Divisions from around the country, including agents from the Miami, Atlanta, St. Louis,
Dallas, and Houston divisions. These agents responded to Baton Rouge and Gulfport, Mississippi with supplies, including
food, water, chain saws, generators, tarps, ice, gasoline, satellite phones, and vehicles.
Headquarters designated the Offi ce of Aviation in Addison, Texas to serve as the Command Center for logistics
purposes, instructing fi eld divisions throughout the country to ship necessary supplies to Addison for eventual
transportation to the fi eld, principally the Baton Rouge and Gulfport areas.100 The Addison facility continued to play a key
logistics role throughout the DEA recovery effort, coordinating all transportation — including the use of seven DEA aircraft
— and supplies for the fi eld. The Command Center was staffed by 12 people from both the Offi ce of Aviation and the
Dallas Field Division, the Field Division with responsibility for the Addison Offi ce.
Flight missions were conducted to transport personnel and supplies and to survey the damage.101 Aerial photography
surveys assisted the recovery assignments taking place in the fi eld. Technical personnel were dispatched to re-establish
communication links where necessary. The Offi ce of Aviation fl ew over 280 missions with 14 pilots totaling 782 fl ight
hours, providing transportation and commodity support to local, state, and federal law enforcement throughout the
affected region.
On September 1, the New Orleans Field Division established an Operations Center in Mandeville, Louisiana at a local
high school.102 The Mandeville Operations Center coordinated the efforts of various federal, state, and local offi cials
throughout the greater New Orleans area. The Mandeville center coordinated the removal of fi rearms and sensitive items
from the New Orleans Field Offi ce.103 To assist SAC Renton, the DEA deployed Houston SAC James Craig.
Shortly after Craig’s arrival, Renton and he met with New Orleans city offi cials, including Mayor Nagin and law
enforcement offi cials to assess the law enforcement needs for the city.104 It was determined that federal law enforcement
agencies, such as DEA, FBI, and ATF, among others, would join the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) and the
Louisiana State Police in policing the city of New Orleans.105 Each NOPD district was staffed by federal law enforcement
representatives.
From August 30 to September 12, 251 DEA Temporary Duty agents reported from Miami, Atlanta, St. Louis, Houston,
and Dallas to provide law enforcement and search and rescue support as needed.106 On September 4, DEA deployed
personnel from the Atlanta Field Division as well as the Houston Mobile Enforcement Team (MET).107 METs are self-
contained, specially trained teams of eight to twelve agents that specialize in law enforcement missions involving
violence.108 These agents were then joined by the Charlotte MET on September 5, and the Miami MET on September 7.109
The METs helped state and local departments conduct routine law enforcement tasks, including patrols and search and
rescue missions.
On September 1, it was determined the DEA would be in charge of acquiring necessary fuel for DOJ vehicles.110 SAC
Craig oversaw this effort, which involved the bulk purchase of gasoline to be utilized by all DOJ agencies during the
recovery effort. DEA also coordinated the provision of motor vehicles for law enforcement purposes in the affected area.
Working with the U.S. Marshals Service, DEA provided approximately 30 vehicles for state and local police departments.
DEA also arranged for $200,000 from its asset forfeiture budget to be provided to its fl eet management group to move
seized vehicles into offi cial use.
DEA supported the communications needs of the affected area by supplying Government Emergency Telephone System
cards, satellite phones, and other communications equipment, including the installation of Wireless Priority Service.111
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 403
DEA’s Offi ce of Diversion Control played an important role throughout the response to Katrina.112 The Acting Deputy
Assistant Administrator for the Offi ce of Diversion Control was identifi ed to coordinate response activities. The goal was to
maintain the availability of controlled substances for medical uses to the affected region.
On August 31, DEA Diversion Control staff convened to review previously negotiated agreements between DEA and
FEMA, as well as agreements between DEA and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).113 These agreements facilitate
delivery of needed supplies by allowing for the waiver of certain regulations in times of emergency. DEA established
a point of contact within Diversion Control to coordinate, control and document allowances, waivers and regulatory
controls. The Diversion Control website (deadiversion.gov) was re-tooled to handle those affected by Katrina.
On September 1, DEA established contact with the Boards of Pharmacy in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, as well
as states receiving evacuees, including Florida, Texas, and Arkansas.114 The Boards of Pharmacy were told DEA was making
allowances for fi lling prescriptions upon presentation of a prescription bottle and based upon the professional judgment
of the pharmacist.
On September 2, James Crawford, the Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Administrator for Diversion Control,
began contacting major wholesalers to facilitate the processing of papers permitting these wholesalers to ship product
under expedited procedures.115 Throughout DEA’s Katrina response, Crawford and the Diversion Control offi ce worked to
streamline processes to ensure Katrina victims received the products they needed.
On September 6, Crawford began working directly with the major chain pharmacies, such as Rite Aid, CVS, Walgreens,
and Wal-Mart, to establish mobile replacement pharmacies and pharmacy trailers within shelter areas.116 Diversion
Control’s efforts continued through October 27, at which time the New Orleans Divisional Offi ce of Diversion Control
was reestablished.
The United States Marshals Service was responsible for protecting the Strategic National Stockpile, assisted in prisoner evacuations, accounted for and tracked federal judges in the affected area, and stood up a task force to locate violent parole and non-compliant sex offenders
The United States Marshal Service (USMS) focused on its core law enforcement missions following Katrina’s landfall
by locating and tracking federal judges in the affected area and creating a task force to locate violent parole and non-
compliant sex offenders. USMS helped the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) relocate 920 Louisiana inmates and assisted FEMA in
evacuating 3,510 individuals displaced by the hurricane. In addition, USMS helped the CDC protect the Strategic National
Stockpile.
USMS is the oldest federal law enforcement agency in the United States, established by the Judiciary Act of 1789.117
USMS is responsible for judicial and witness security, fugitive investigations, the transportation of prisoners and criminal
aliens, asset forfeiture, federal service of process and prisoner services.118
On August 29, the Assistant Director for the USMS Operations Support Division (“Assistant Director”) activated the
USMS Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Washington, D.C. in preparation for Hurricane Katrina.119 The Assistant
Director also placed four Operational Management Teams (OMT) and 33 USMS Inspectors, assigned to secure the Strategic
National Stockpile, on standby.120 CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile contains large quantities of medicine and medical
supplies to protect the United States in case a public emergency might result in the loss of local supplies.121
Following Katrina’s landfall, USMS began accounting for USMS personnel. OMT worked with the Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama district offi ces to account for them.122 Three Operational Medical Personnel were deployed to
the coast of Mississippi and New Orleans to assist USMS personnel. Command posts were created by OMT at the Special
Operations Group (SOG) Tactical Center at Camp Beauregard in Pineville, Louisiana, and at the District Offi ce in Jackson,
Mississippi.
Also on August 30, the Technical Operations Group Air Support Unit deployed six personnel, along with surveillance
planes, which were used to assess the damage to the USMS facilities in New Orleans.123 The federal court houses in New
Orleans and Gulfport and Hattiesburg, Mississippi were damaged.124 The Witness Security and Prisoner Operations
Division (WPD) and Marshals from the Middle District of Louisiana Offi ce helped the Orleans Parish evacuate prisoners
404 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
to other Louisiana Department of Corrections facilities.125 WPD and BOP relocated all USMS prisoners and assisted in
inmate removal from the Saint Charles Parish Jail.126
On the same date, the Assistant Director deployed 10 members of the OMT to New Orleans and southern Mississippi to
relieve district management.127 Marshals were deployed to Mississippi and New Orleans to protect the Strategic National
Stockpile.
While USMS’ response to Hurricane Katrina was ongoing, USMS’ original mission continued.128 Marshals in Louisiana
and Mississippi worked with the United States Attorneys for the districts affected by the hurricane to ensure that judicial
operations continued. USMS accounted for and tracked all federal judges in the affected area.
On August 31, the EOC received a FEMA request for USMS to provide security to the BellSouth facility in New
Orleans.129 According to USMS, the facility was designated by the Department of Homeland Security as a critical
infrastructure.130 This request was received through Emergency Support Function # 2 — Communications.131 The following
day, the Department of Justice authorized the mission and Deputy United States Marshals (DUSM) were deployed from
the Western Louisiana district to secure the facility.132
On September 1, USMS increased staff at the EOC to 18, and the center remained open 24 hours a day, seven days a
week.133 The Assistant Director placed approximately 50 Marshals and trainees at the USMS Training Academy in Glynco,
Georgia on standby. Five Marshals from the academy were deployed to provide security at the Biloxi Airport.
The same day, FEMA requested Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS) aid with evacuating
Katrina victims.134 JPATS began the process of relocating evacuees. From September 1 through 9, JPATS evacuated 3,510
individuals.135 JPATS also assisted BOP with the relocation of 920 Louisiana inmates to United States Penitentiary
Coleman-II in Florida.136
Also on September 1, the Attorney General authorized USMS to use previously seized assets to assist in operations.137
Seized vehicles were immediately deployed for use by state and local entities. USMS had possession of a convention center
in Montgomery, Alabama, which they turned over to the state to house evacuees.138
On September 2, CDC requested and received additional Marshals to protect a $5 million movement of the Strategic
National Stockpile.139 FEMA requested security for the FEMA Strike Teams. USMS responded with 16 Marshals. Twenty-
four SOG Marshals, USMS tactical teams, were deployed to the SOG Tactical Center to assist with tactical missions.
USMS continued to supplement its personnel on September 3 by sending four additional Marshals from the academy
to provide security of the Biloxi Airport’s control tower and surrounding areas and deploying an additional 10 operational
personnel to secure the Strategic National Stockpile.140 In addition, seven personnel were sent to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration’s Stennis Space Center in southern Mississippi to protect FEMA supply trailers there.141 Twenty
DUSMs were deployed to FEMA’s Joint Operations Center in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
On September 4, it became necessary to send 10 additional DUSMs to Stennis Space Center after reports were received
that a FEMA truck was stolen.142 The DUSMs stayed for one day to provide security. USMS deployed to Camp Shelby,
Mississippi to secure FEMA relief supplies and convoys.143
USMS supported (NOPD) by working with the 1st and 5th districts in New Orleans and responded to backlogged 911
calls.144 In addition, USMS redirected NOPD National Crime Information Center traffi c to the USMS Communications
Center. USMS created a task force responsible for locating violent parole and non-compliant sex offenders who were
unaccounted for following the hurricane.
USMS deployed more personnel to Mississippi on September 5 to assist local police and sheriff departments.145 They
provided security for 11 search and rescue teams, operated a missing person task force and a task force to locate sex
offenders, and protected the Mississippi fuel depot in Collins.
A total of 1,039 USMS were deputized as law enforcement offi cers to respond to Hurricane Katrina.146
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 405
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement provided Special Response Teams for tactical missions, assisted with thousands of 911 calls, and the Federal Protective Service inspected and secured federal buildings in New Orleans
Immediately following Katrina’s landfall, the Federal Protective Service (FPS), part of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) began providing protection to federal buildings by searching and securing those buildings in New Orleans
and the surrounding areas. ICE bolstered the hurricane response by providing Special Response Teams to work with the New
Orleans Police Department’s (NOPD) Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams on tactical missions. ICE also worked with
law enforcement to follow up on thousands of 911 calls that were unanswered during and following the storm.
ICE is a part of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate at DHS.147 ICE is the largest investigative arm of
DHS and its mission is to “prevent acts of terrorism by targeting the people, money, and materials that support terrorist
and criminal activities.” In addition, ICE is “responsible for identifying and shutting down vulnerabilities in the nation’s
border, economic, transportation and infrastructure security.”
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, FPS and the Federal Air Marshal Service were both under ICE’s jurisdiction.148 A long-
standing Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between FPS and FEMA designates FPS as the protective detail for FEMA
personnel when responding to emergencies.149 As a result of this MOU, ICE pre-deployed 30 FPS personnel in eastern
Texas, outside of Dallas, prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.150 They were able to move into the affected area the day
following the hurricane and assist FEMA responders with food and fuel needs. In addition, FPS is tasked with protecting
federal buildings.151 On August 29, FPS began surveying the damage to federal buildings in Louisiana, as well as helping
the NOPD with looters and disorderly conduct.152
The U.S. District Court and the Hale Boggs Federal Building, in New Orleans, were searched on August 30.153 The
buildings had minimal storm damage. However the entrance doors, which are accessed with card readers, were open due
to the power outage, so the doors were secured with chains and locks. FPS implemented around the clock high visibility
patrols for the buildings.
The F.E. Hebert Federal Building and the J.M. Wisdom Courthouse, in New Orleans, were searched on August 30.154 FPS
found no storm damage or security breaches to either building. Around the clock, high visibility patrols were initiated for
these buildings, as well.
Also on August 30, FPS searched the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Custom House.155 There was water
damage from the ceiling and two CBP employees were located inside the building. The entrance door was open due to
the power outage affecting the card reader. As a result of an inability to secure the building, FPS posted offi cers inside for
security. High visibility patrols were also implemented around the clock.
The Texaco Center, which houses staff for the U.S. Attorney’s Offi ce, and the Social Security Administration (SSA)
Westbank, in Gretna, Louisiana, both General Services Administration (GSA) leased buildings were surveyed on August
30.156 Neither building had breaches in security or external damage as a result of the storm. Both buildings were added
to FPS’ daily patrols. A GSA leased building at 1515 Poydras Street, which housed the SSA was unable to be searched on
August 30, as the fl ood level surrounding the building was too high.
On August 31, FPS searched the Federal Supply Service Depot Warehouse 2 in Harahan, Louisiana. FPS found no
security breech and no storm damage.157 The building was placed on FPS’ daily patrol. Five other GSA leased federal
buildings were also checked for breeches and damage and were placed on FPS’ daily patrol.
None of the ICE offi ces in Alabama was affected by Hurricane Katrina.158 The ICE Gulfport offi ce sustained no major
damage and was equipped with back up generators.159 ICE utilized the Gulfport offi ce to provide assistance to ICE
employees affected by the hurricane. Immediately following landfall, the San Antonio, Houston, Miami, and Tampa offi ces
coordinated sending supplies in tractor trailers to ICE’s Gulfport offi ce, which was made a staging site. ICE was able to
support hurricane victims and other federal law enforcement entities, like CBP and Border Patrol, by providing water, food,
MREs, generators, fuel, and personal items, like diapers.
406 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
In Mississippi, ICE agents and logistical teams worked with county sheriffs and city police forces by assisting patrols,
rescues, and searches.160 ICE helped the Mississippi Highway Patrol in the six southern counties of the state discourage
crime by increasing the profi le of law enforcement presence.161
From landfall until September 2, the ICE New Orleans fi eld offi ce worked on accounting for ICE personnel assigned to
the New Orleans, Lake Charles, Lafayette, Baton Rouge, and Gulfport offi ces and obtaining the needed supplies to restore
operations and respond to the hurricane.162 On September 2, ICE’s New Orleans Special Agent-In-Charge (SAC), Michael
Holt, contacted the New Orleans mayor and the chief of NOPD to offer ICE assistance. That day, a meeting was held
with SAC Holt, the mayor’s offi ce, the chief of police, and members of the city council. ICE agreed to support local law
enforcement in New Orleans’ 4th District, which is located on the west bank of the city on the Mississippi River. The 4th
District was still populated at this time, as it had not taken on water. SAC Holt stated that both the mayor and the chief of
police welcomed ICE’s offer for assistance.
ICE was able to assist the NOPD with tactical teams.163 The New Orleans Special Response Team (SRT) was on site in
the city on September 1. SRT teams from Chicago and San Antonio, consisting of 12 to 18 members, arrived the afternoon
and evening on September 2. By midnight of September 2, there were over 100 ICE agents in New Orleans preparing to
assist in the response to the hurricane.
The SRT teams were stationed in Kenner, Louisiana at a Louisiana State Trooper post.164 The Kenner Police Department
allowed the ICE agents to sleep in their jail. The agents slept on cots and were fed at a Kenner church.
SAC Holt stated no major violence or unrest was ongoing when ICE SRT began to coordinate with NOPD SWAT.165
Throughout the week, ICE agents were tasked with patrols and shifts with local law enforcement, worked to curtail looting,
assisted with evacuations, and followed up on the approximately 6,000 911 calls made during and after the hurricane.
ICE’s Tampa Field Offi ce provided three infl atable Zodiac boats that helped ICE personnel assist with transportation for
fi re departments and medical personnel and respond to rescue calls.
On September 3, ICE operations moved to the lobby of the Sheraton Hotel in New Orleans.166 NOPD was also housed
at the Sheraton.
At the daily law enforcement meetings at the Harrah’s Casino in downtown New Orleans, ICE agreed to also assist in
New Orleans’ 8th District.167 Much of the 8th District was still under water and included the business district and French
Quarter. As the National Guard had a heavy presence in the French Quarter, ICE restricted its mission to the parts of the
8th District outside of the French Quarter.
Throughout the response to Hurricane Katrina, SAC Holt had limited interaction with Governor Blanco’s offi ce.168
Coordination between ICE and locals was primarily handled with a colonel of the Louisiana State Police, and the NOPD
chief of police. SAC Holt stated that he had a very good relationship with the Mayor and the leadership of state and local
police.
As of December 2, ICE agents had made 234 arrests in Louisiana and over 150 arrests in Mississippi in response to
Hurricane Katrina.169 ICE’s mission to support the NOPD and re-establish stability and safety to the city of New Orleans
continued through December 23.
The U.S. Customs and Border Protection established a Forward Deployed Operations Command Center to coordinate all personnel movements, coordinated the entrance of relief supplies from foreign countries, secured the Louisiana State University Hospital, and its Air and Marine Branch served as air traffi c control for the Federal Aviation Administration
On September 1, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) utilized a CBP Air hanger in Hammond, Louisiana to
house a Forward Deployed Operations Command Center (FDOCC) to ensure that all CBP movements, law enforcement
and customs related, were coordinated. The FDOCC monitored CBP Air as it served as the air traffi c control over the
affected area, while FAA worked to restore its communication capabilities. CBP offi cers helped to secure the Louisiana State
University Hospital and facilitated an expedited entry of relief supplies from foreign countries.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 407
CBP is the “unifi ed border agency within the Department of Homeland Security.”170 CBP includes legacy U.S. Customs,
legacy U.S. Immigration, and the U.S. Border Patrol. CBP’s mission is to prevent “terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States, while also facilitating the fl ow of legitimate trade and travel.”
In preparation for Hurricane Katrina, the ports of Mobile and New Orleans activated their hurricane preparedness plans
on August 26.171 On August 27, the Hammond Air and Marine branch in Louisiana activated its hurricane evacuation
plan by moving CBP air assets to Shreveport, Louisiana, and Dallas.172 The same day, New Orleans Field Offi ce’s Mission
Critical Team (MCT) left New Orleans for Shreveport, Louisiana.173 On August 28, the Special Operations Division of the
Offi ce of Border Patrol began plans to deploy 100 agents to the gulf coast.174 The Miami and Tampa Field Offi ces deployed
relief teams to Panama City, Florida and the Atlanta and Houston Field Offi ces placed relief teams on stand by on August
29.175 The same day the New Orleans Field Offi ce’s MCT began to locate all CBP personnel living in the affected area.176
On the morning of August 30, the Border Patrol’s Tactical Unit’s (BORTAC) pre-deployment site survey team left for the
affected area, after a request to assist in evacuating the Superdome and for riot control.177 However, the agents also worked
other law enforcement functions and relief operations, such as distributing water, assisting with minor medical care, and
helping evacuees onto buses and helicopters.178
On August 31, in coordination with the Coast Guard, CBP Air deployed its Mobile Air Command Center.179 The
Command Center was responsible for providing all radar and communications in the affected area. In addition, CBP Air’s
director became the FEMA Regional Air Coordinator. Also on August 31, CBP deployed liaison offi cers from its Offi ce of
Anti-Terrorism to work out of FEMA Headquarters. The MCT moved to Memphis, Tennessee to continue operations in a
location not affected by Katrina.180
Between August 31 and September 12, CBP Air fl ew over 315 missions, accounting for 1,208 fl ight hours.181 Due to
downed systems, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) lost its ability to track and control air traffi c in the area. From
August 31 to September 8, CBP Air, based out of the Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, CA provided air traffi c
control in place of the FAA and served as an airborne repeater for critical law enforcement communications. During this
time, CBP Air accounted for the entry of 1,608 rotary and fi xed-wing aircraft into the area of operations. CBP Air also
assisted in humanitarian missions, providing water, food, and other essential supplies.
Border Patrol had 100 agents, along with CBP vehicles, emergency equipment, and lifesaving supplies, in Louisiana
by September 1.182 On the same day, CBP’s Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations, William S. Heffelfi nger
III, traveled to Louisiana to meet with CBP’s Offi ce of Field Operations (OFO) personnel in New Orleans. During this
meeting, the decision was made to place a FDOCC in Hammond, Louisiana.183 FDOCC utilized the airport hanger at
CBP’s Air and Marine Branch facility in Hammond.184 The hanger was built to withstand 200 mile per hour wind gusts.185
Heffelfi nger was designated as the Commanding Offi cer for the FDOCC, by then-CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner.186
The FDOCC was responsible for coordinating the CBP movements in the affected area, including BORTAC, Border Patrol
Search Trauma and Rescue (BORSTAR), CBP offi cers, Border Patrol Agents, Human Resources Management, and marine
and air assets.187
Within 36 hours, CBP had 40 computer terminals tracking all CBP missions. FDOCC used a map of Louisiana to
pinpoint each CBP mission.188 This information was sent to headquarters each day, along with a daily situation report
for the commissioner. The FDOCC held daily 9:00 a.m. meetings that included individuals from CBP air, operations,
procurement, information technology, and logistics and fi nance. Heffelfi nger then communicated CBP’s daily missions to
headquarters during a noon conference call each day.
On September 2, Border Patrol agents were sent to provide security at the Louisiana State University Hospital, which
served as the regional triage center.189 Border Patrol agents were also deployed to the New Orleans Airport to assist with
crowd control and security, and the decision was made to have BORSTAR accompany all CBP Air fl ights.
Also on September 2, OFO notifi ed three hundred CBP Offi cers throughout the country that they were to be deployed
to the FDOCC.190 One hundred offi cers deployed to FDOCC on both September 3 and 4. The CBP offi cers who arrived on
September 3, were responsible for reestablishing CBP operations and assisting CBP personnel living in the affected area.
On the same day, 169 generators arrived at FDOCC from the Atlanta and Miami Field Offi ces. 191 CBP began to coordinate
with FEMA on the arrival of 18-20 cruise ships.192
408 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
By September 4, all CBP employees were located.193 There were 458 CBP employees affected by Hurricane Katrina.194
Seventy percent suffered property damage and 15 percent lost their homes.
After Katrina’s landfall, CBP was unable to utilize the New Orleans Customs House, due to hurricane damage.195
CBP offi cers, Border Patrol agents, and a Rapid Response Team from the Houston Field Offi ce were deployed to secure
the Customs House, as the House contained a safe and a variety of contraband.196 On September 5, CBP reopened the
Customs House for CBP specifi c operations.197 Also on September 5, CBP provided protection for workers in a high crime
area who were responsible for repairing a gas line. In addition, the LECC assigned teams from CBP to work with the
NOPD precinct captains in the 2nd and 5th districts, along with the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division.
CBP worked with the FBI to stand up the morgue in St. Gabriele, Louisiana and 12 CBP offi cers took charge of the
morgue’s security on September 7.198 Throughout the end of the week and weekend, CBP worked to clear relief supplies
arriving from other countries.199 A relief convoy arrived from Mexico on September 8 and relief supplies from Canada and
Thailand arrived on September 10.200
On September 11, CBP placed another 250 CBP Offi cers and 100 Border Patrol agents on stand by.201 $2.2 million
in goods previously seized by CBP were delivered to the Red Cross and the Texas Methodist Church. The goods were
primarily counterfeit clothes and shoes confi scated during routine CBP missions.202
The number of CBP personnel deployed to the area affected by Hurricane Katrina peaked at 688 on September 9.203
CBP personnel remained at this number until September 13. During its 36-day response to Hurricane Katrina, CBP
performed 1,428 law enforcement and humanitarian missions.204
The Federal Air Marshal Service established security and oversaw the reopening of the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, adhered to their primary mission by fl ying on 165 outbound fl ights containing evacuees, and screened approximately 25,000 evacuees prior to fl ights
The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) played an important, even heroic role in the federal government’s response to
Hurricane Katrina. Securing the airport and transitioning it from a chaotic shelter of last resort back to a functioning
airport is one of the success stories of Katrina. At end, FAMS covered approximately 165 outbound fl ights, carrying nearly
25,000 evacuees on almost every type of fl ight: commercial, charter, military and other government agency-operated
aircraft.205 In the process of screening these 25,000 evacuees, FAMS confi scated an enormous amount of weapons and
ammunition — 68 fi rearms, 1,528 rounds of ammunition, 198 knives and machetes, several ballistic vests, and one Taser.
This was accomplished without any apparent decrease in FAMS nationwide primary mission.206
A component of DHS’ Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FAMS is responsible for the security of our
nation’s civilian aircraft.207 FAMS’ mission “is to be responsible for and protect air security and promote public confi dence
in our nation’s civil aviation system through the effective deployment of air marshals in order to detect, deter and defeat
hostile acts targeting U.S. air carriers, airports, passengers and crews.”208 At the time of the hurricane, the Director of FAMS
was Thomas D. Quinn.209 Director Quinn reported to Edmund S. “Kip” Hawley, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security
for TSA.210
FAMS’ involvement with Hurricane Katrina began during the week of August 21, the week before Katrina made
landfall.211 As part of its normal operating procedures, FAMS was preparing for disruptions in fl ight coverage due to the
impending severe weather conditions.212 A day after Katrina made landfall, on August 30, FAMS was advised through TSA
of deteriorating conditions at Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport.213 The airport was starting to receive
evacuees and was therefore becoming a shelter. On August 31, TSA’s Federal Security Director for the airport, Michael
Robinson, advised senior leadership at TSA that displaced victims of the Hurricane, including relocated hospital patients,
were evacuating to the airport in signifi cant numbers.214 In response to these developments, FAMS sent personnel —
drawing from FAMS’ Houston Field Offi ce — to the airport to assist the FSD as necessary.215
On September 1, as the effects of Katrina continued to mount, Director Quinn ordered the “stand-up” of the Katrina
Crisis Incident Management Group (CIMG) for 24-hour oversight of the situation.216 The CIMG, co-located with FAMS’
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 409
Mission Operations Center in Herndon, Virginia, is led by FAMS’ Offi ce of Flight Operations, and receives support from
staff of other directorates. During FAMS’ Katrina response, the CIMG was charged with identifying deployable personnel,
ensuring suffi cient assets and resources for the airport to enable onsite managers to fulfi ll their missions, and coordinating
with FAMS’ Director’s staff, TSA, FEMA, and others to provide a common operating strategy for evacuation operations.
Conditions at the airport continued to deteriorate as thousands of displaced persons sought refuge there.217 The airport,
however, was not prepared to be a shelter. There was no food, water, restroom facilities, or security. Consequently, when
FAMS personnel began to arrive, they needed to help restore order.218 By the late evening on September 1, FAMS began
initial deployment, including 54 from the Houston Field Offi ce, arriving by car. Also by late evening, evacuation fl ights out
of the airport were fully operational.
By Friday, September 2, the CIMG authorized FAMS personnel at the airport to expand their mission to include interim
law enforcement activities as well as all necessary activities to operate the airport.219 Personnel ramp-ups continued and
reached 215 FAMS by day’s end.220 By Saturday, September 3, evacuation fl ights were in full swing and FAMS personnel
levels reached 508.
On Sunday, September 4, FAMS began rotating its personnel out of the airport and relieved them with marshals from
fi eld offi ces around the country.221 It was on Sunday, also, that FAMS received reinforcements from command offi cers of
the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division as well as personnel from the U.S. Forestry Service. With the additional manpower,
FAMS and the 82nd Airborne established a Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) at the airport complete with a
telephone bank/call center, laptops, internet connectivity, and other technical gear that permitted the JIOC to function as a
command center.
The JIOC allowed FAMS to communicate with headquarters and throughout the region.222 As the JIOC became fully
operational, it permitted FAMS personnel to channel requests for help to the JIOC for tasking, most of which involved
alerting the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Department. As the JIOC evolved over time, FAMS’ involvement decreased, permitting
the 82nd Airborne to take the lead role in staffi ng this function.
FAMS’ staffi ng ramped down starting Monday, September 5 going from 499 on the 4th to 196 on the 5th.223 This
number dropped to 111 on September 11.
The United States Secret Service provided protection to the President, Vice President, and other protectees traveling to the affected area and was responsible for securing the credentialing process for the New Orleans Police Department and other state and federal law enforcement personnel
As the President, Vice President, Mrs. Cheney and Cabinet Secretaries traveled to the New Orleans and Mississippi after the
hurricane, the United States Secret Service provided protective details. In addition to this mission, the Secret Service used
its prior expertise to assist state and local law enforcement in providing new credentials for Louisiana law enforcement
agencies.
A component of DHS, the Secret Service is charged with providing protection to the President and Vice President, their
families, heads of state, and other individuals, including some members of the President’s Cabinet.224 In addition to its
protective duties, the Secret Service also has responsibilities relating to counterfeiting and wire fraud crimes.225 The Secret
Service also plans and implements security designs for designated National Special Security Events.226
The Secret Service’s principal involvement in responding to Hurricane Katrina related to providing protection to fi ve
of its protectees during trips to the affected region.227 In addition to these standard protective missions, between August
31 and September 15, the Secret Service provided 35 employees to the region to assist in implementing Continuity of
Operations Plans for the New Orleans Field Offi ce.228 All Secret Service Field Offi ces have such contingency plans in the
event the Field Offi ce is compromised.229
Secret Service personnel were also deployed to assist the NOPD and the Louisiana State Police (LSP) with credentialing
services for state and local law enforcement in the New Orleans area.230 On September 3, the Secret Service was asked by
the New Orleans Homeland Security Director, Terry Ebbert, and the Superintendent of the LSP, Colonel Henry Whitehorn,
to take control of the credentialing process.231 Louisiana and New Orleans offi cials had, during the 2002 Super Bowl,
410 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
worked with the Secret Service in implementing security. Having this experience, state offi cials were aware of the Secret
Service’s capabilities.232 The 2002 Super Bowl was designated as a National Special Security Event, and accordingly,
the Secret Service was responsible for all security operations, including the production and distribution of secure
credentials. The need for secure credentials for NOPD was a primary concern, as many police offi cers had lost their offi cial
identifi cation badges during the hurricane. Likewise, with large numbers of armed law enforcement offi cials — including
offi cers from numerous states and federal agencies — deploying to New Orleans, there was a signifi cant need to establish a
uniform credentialing scheme.
The Secret Service also manned a desk at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).233 Having a presence at the EOC
allowed the Secret Service to coordinate offi cial visits by the President and other protectees, as well as serving as a central
point of contact for credentialing questions.
The Bureau of Prisons transferred approximately 2,500 Louisiana inmates or detainees to facilities outside New Orleans and coordinated the delivery of clothing, water, and food to the affected area
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is “responsible for the custody and care of approximately 185,000 Federal offenders.”234
BOP “protects public safety by ensuring that Federal offenders serve their sentences of imprisonment in facilities that are
safe, humane, cost-effi cient, and appropriately secure.” BOP provided assistance to state and local corrections offi cials after
Hurricane Katrina by transporting and detaining inmates and detainees, as well as coordinating the delivery of clothing,
food, and water to the affected area.235
In preparation for landfall, BOP personnel from the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, located at BOP’s Central
Offi ce in Washington, D.C. and BOP’s South Central Regional Offi ce in Dallas monitored Hurricane Katrina’s path from
August 26 to August 29.236 The Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness is responsible for coordinating the evacuation and for
supporting correctional institutions in the areas affected by the hurricane.237
On August 29, the United States Marshal Service (USMS) requested assistance from BOP to transport USMS detainees
from Harrison and Pearl River County jails in Mississippi.238 BOP provided two buses and moved 70 USMS to jails in
Grenada and Madison Counties in Mississippi.
On August 30, BOP opened a command center at its South Central Regional Offi ce to assist the Louisiana Department
of Public Safety and Corrections (LDPSC) with transporting inmates out of New Orleans.239
During the fi rst week of September, BOP coordinated the delivery of inmate clothing, blankets, sheets, food, and water
from a number of Texas institutions.240 Trucks containing these supplies left Federal Correctional Institution Forth Worth
and Federal Correction Complex (FCC) Oakdale on September 3 and arrived in Baton Rouge.241 The same day, additional
supplies were sent to the Louisiana State Police headquarters in Baton Rouge from FCC Beaumont, Texas and FCC Forrest
City, Arkansas.
On September 5, the LDPSC Secretary requested that BOP provide 1,000 beds and transportation for Louisiana state
inmates.242 On September 8 and 9, BOP and USMS transferred 964 inmates to United States Penitentiary (USP) Coleman-
II, Florida.243 FCC Coleman houses low, medium, high security, and a female prison.244 USP Coleman-II is a newly built
part of the Coleman complex. As of December, 700 of these inmates remain incarcerated at USP Coleman.245
From August 30 to September 7, BOP transported approximately 2,500 inmates or detainees in Louisiana to facilities
outside of New Orleans.246 BOP used nine buses and one van provided from BOP facilities. Two BOP personnel from the
BOP offi ce that provided the vehicle accompanied the transport. The LDPSC supported BOP by providing security during
the transports.
During this time, BOP also assisted in removing 200 additional USMS detainees from Hoyle Reception Center, St.
Tammany Parish Jail, and the Dixon County Correctional Center to the Federal Detention Centers in Houston, and
Oakdale and Pollock, Louisiana.247 A total of 251 BOP personnel assisted in BOP’s response to Hurricane Katrina.248
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 411
1 Federal Bureau of Investigations [hereinafter FBI] Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/faqs/faqsone.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
2 Letter from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Tom Davis, Chairman, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Nov. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response] (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10501).
3 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5170). 4 Id. 5 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Nov. 28 Interview with FBI]; E-mail
correspondence from FBI personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 5, 2005) (6:10 p.m.)) [hereinafter Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI]. There are six satellite offi ces, called Resident Agencies, under the New Orleans Field Offi ce. The LA Resident Agencies are located in: Shreveport, Monroe, Alexandria, Lake Charles, Baton Rouge, and Lafayette. (Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI).
6 Id. The Jackson Field Offi ce covers the entire state of MS and has ten Resident Agencies located in: Southaven, Oxford, Tupelo, Columbus, Greenville, Meridian, Hattiesburg, Macomb, Gulfport, and Pascagoula. The Mobile Field Offi ce covers the entire state of AL and has nine Resident Agencies located in: Dothan, Monroeville, Montgomery, Selma, Opelika, Tuscaloosa, Gadsden, Huntsville, and Florence. (Id.).
7 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. The Pascagoula Resident Agency houses fi ve agents, two to three FBI support staff, and fi ve local police offi cers (Nov. 28 Interview with FBI).
8 Telephone Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI].
9 Id. 10 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 11 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 12 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 13 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 14 Dec. 15 Telephonic Interview with FBI. 15 Id. 16 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 17 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 18 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; (LA State Police [hereinafter LSP] permitted FBI access to the LSP Headquarters by verbal agreement). Dec. 5
E-mail from FBI. 19 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 20 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI. 21 Id. 22 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel (Jan. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 27 Telephone call
with FBI]. 23 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; (The Law Enforcement On-Line Internet site is not available to the general public. Law enforcement entities
from around the country must have a password to access the FBI’s information). Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 24 Dec. 5 Telephone call with FBI. 25 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 26 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response; Dec. 5 Telephone call with FBI; Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. (The request for the fi ngerprinting assistance for
the DMORT came via telephone from the Nat’l Disaster Medical Sys. Ctr. in Rockville, MD on Sept. 1. FBI Fly Teams are teams assembled to address specifi c incidents. The teams are typically pre-designated as Fly Teams and are issued personal equipment and receive medical evaluations that enable them to leave respond on short notice. In this case, the team was a group of individuals with a specialty in fi ngerprinting).
27 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 28 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 29 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 30 Dec. 15 Telephone Interview with FBI. 31 Jan. 27 Telephone call with FBI. 32 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 33 Id., Dec. 5 Telephone call with FBI. (There are four Rapid Deployment teams located in: New York City, Wash., D.C., Los Angeles, and Miami.
The teams are comprised of 160 people with different specialties. They are equipped to respond and be self suffi cient for seven days on their own).
34 Dec. 5 E-mail from FBI. 35 Id. (From Aug. 30 until Sept. 12, the FBI helicopters conducted 53 total fl ights, for a total of 163.1 fl ying hours). 36 Id. (Fixed wing assets include larger cargo or passenger planes). 37 Nov. 28 Interview with FBI. 38 About the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives [hereinafter ATF], http://www.atf.gov/about/mission.htm (last visited Jan. 21,
2006). 39 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 40 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity (Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity]. 41 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter
Interview with ATF]. 42 Interview with ATF. 43 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 44 Interview with ATF. 45 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity.
412 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
46 Interview with ATF. 47 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 48 Interview with ATF; E-mail correspondence from ATF personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 7, 2005) (11:47 a.m.) [hereinafter E-mail from
ATF]; (E-mail from ATF) (The offi ce in Shreveport oversaw the administrative functions of the Shreveport, Little Rock, Jackson, and Oxford, Miss. Field Offi ces).
49 Interview with ATF. 50 Id. 51 Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Telephone call with ATF]. 52 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 53 Interview with ATF; Telephone call with ATF. 54 Telephone call with ATF. 55 Interview with ATF. 56 Id. 57 Telephone call with ATF. 58 Id.; The Emergency Management Working Group was chaired by the Chief of Security and Emergency Programs Division (E-mail from ATF). 59 Interview with ATF. 60 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 61 Interview with ATF; Telephone call with ATF. 62 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 63 Id. 64 Interview with ATF. 65 E-mail from ATF. 66 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 67 Interview with ATF. 68 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview with ATF. 69 Interview with ATF. 70 Id. 71 Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with ATF personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 27, 2006). 72 Interview with ATF; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [hereinafter ICE] personnel, in Wash.,
D.C. (Dec. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 2 Interview with ICE]. 73 Dec 2 Interview with ICE. 74 Interview with ATF. 75 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 76 Id. 77 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview with ATF. 78 Interview with ATF. 79 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 80 Interview with ATF. 81 Id. 82 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity; Interview with ATF. 83 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 84 E-mail from ATF. 85 ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity. 86 ATF Katrina Deployments Doc. (Nov. 29, 2005). 87 Drug Enforcement Administration [hereinafter DEA] Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm [hereinafter DEA
website] (last visited Dec. 2, 2005). 88 Response from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response] (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.). 89 DEA website. 90 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response (citing 21 U.S.C. § 878 (a)(5)). 91 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10501). 92 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 93 Id. 94 Hurricane Katrina Drug Enforcement Agency COOP Assessment (DAG000000223) (Jan. 26, 2006). 95 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 96 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with DEA, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with DEA]. 97 Interview with DEA. 98 Id. From Aug. 30 through Sept. 28, DEA Special Agents assisted in over 3,400 search and rescues in LA and Miss. (Id.). 99 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 100 Id. 101 Id. 102 Interview with DEA. 103 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 104 Id. 105 Interview with DEA.
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 413
106 Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chairman Tom Davis, Select Comm., and Charlie Melancon, U.S. Congressman (Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 21 Dep’t of Justice Response]. (The day by day breakdown is as follows: Aug. 30 (24), Aug. 31 (17), Sept. 1 (32), Sept. 2 (16), Sept. 3 (33), Sept. 4 (38), Sept. 5 (11), Sept. 6 (13), Sept. 7 (39), Sept. 8 (10), Sept. 9 (6), Sept. 10 (5), Sept. 11 (4), Sept. 12 (4)).
107 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 108 Interview with DEA. 109 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 110 Id. 111 Id. 112 Id. 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response (Wholesalers included: McKesson, Bergen/Amerisource and Cardinal Health). 116 Id. 117 United States Marshals Service [hereinafter USMS] Oldest Federal Law Enforcement Agency, http://www.usmarshals.gov/history/oldest.htm
(last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 118 USMS Major Responsibilities of the USMS, http://www.usmarshals.gov/duties/index.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 119 Nov. 23 Dep’t of Justice Response. 120 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with USMS personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter Interview
with USMS]; (Interview with USMS. (An Operational Mgmt. Team (OMT) oversees USMS’ national response. There are OMTs located throughout the United States. A Chief Deputy, the highest ranking career Marshal in the district is in charge of the OMT. Each OMT has a core group of eight personnel).
121 Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Emergency Preparedness & Response, http://www.bt.cdc.gov/stockpile/ (last visited Jan 22, 2006). 122 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 123 Id. 124 Interview with USMS. The courthouses are located as follows: C-600 U.S. Courthouse, New Orleans, LA 70130; 2012 15th Street, Suite 302,
Gulfport, MS 39501; and 331 Federal Building, 701 Main Street, Hattiesburg, MS 39401. (E-mail correspondence from U.S. Dep’t of Justice personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 8, 2005) (5:16 p.m.)).
125 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 126 Id. 127 Id. 128 Interview with USMS. 129 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 130 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with USMS. 131 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 132 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with USMS. 133 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 134 Id. 135 Id.; Dec. 21 Dep’t of Justice Response. (The JPATS missions were conducted by 180 USMS personnel in 27 trips. The evacuees were moved
to the following cities: Dallas, TX; San Antonio, TX; Corpus Christi, TX; Houston, TX; Smyrna, GA; Nashville, TN; Aurora, CO; Fort Smith, AR; and Phoenix, AZ. The evacuations cost a total of one million dollars. It took 3,216.7 work hours and 99.2 fl ight hours to complete the evacuations. 62 U.S. Air Force medics and 35 FAMS were transported to New Orleans on JPATS return trips).
136 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. (JPATS fl ew the prisoners to Tampa, Florida for a total of 37.6 fl ight hours). 137 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with USMS. 138 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 139 Id. (There were eight FEMA Strike Teams, each consisting of: FEMA Executive, Pub. Info. Offi cer, U.S. Army Corp of Engineers Representative,
and a Community Relations Specialist). 140 Id. 141 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with USMS. 142 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 143 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with USMS. 144 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 145 Id. (Police Dep’ts included: Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Biloxi Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, and Harrison
County Sheriff’s Dep’t). 146 Id. 147 ICE website, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 148 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with ICE in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 16) [hereinafter Nov. 16 Interview with Interview with ICE]; E-mail from FAMS
personnel to Select Comm. staff Dec. 5, 2005. (Oct. 16, 2005, FAMS was moved to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within DHS).
149 Nov. 16 Interview with ICE; E-mail correspondence from ICE personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Dec. 8, 2005) (8:51 a.m.). 150 Nov. 16 Interview with ICE. 151 ICE website, Federal Protective Service, http://www.ice.gov/graphics /fps/index.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2006); E-mail correspondence from
ICE to Select Comm. Staff (Jan. 4, 2006) (11:31 a.m.) [hereinafter Jan. 4 E-mail from ICE]. 152 Jan. 4 E-mail from ICE. 153 Id. 154 Id.
414 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
155 Id. 156 Id. 157 Id. (The fi ve other GSA leased federal buildings were: Fisk Record Center, Dep’t of Agric., Galleria/SSA, SSA, and the FBI Building). 158 Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with ICE personnel (Jan. 26, 2006). 159 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 160 Id. 161 E-mail correspondence from Ronald R. Grimes, DHS to Gerald Garren, et al, (Sept. 6, 2005) (5:27 p.m.); Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. (Miss.
entities assisted by ICE. Miss. Highway Patrol, Gulfport Police Dep’t, Harrison County Sheriffs Offi ce, Waveland Police Dep’t, Bay St. Louis Police Dep’t, Long Beach Police Dep’t, Pass Christian Police Dep’t, Hancock County Sheriffs Offi ce, and Jackson County Sheriffs Offi ce).
162 Dec. 2 Interview with ICE. 163 Id. 164 Id. 165 Id. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Id. 169 Id. 170 U.S. Customs and Border Prot. [hereinafter CBP], Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/
mission/cbp.xml (last visited Jan 21, 2006). 171 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30 (Dec. 8, 2005) [hereinafter CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30]. 172 CBP Hurricane Katrina Support and Operations PowerPoint (Sept. 20, 2005) [hereinafter CBP PowerPoint]; CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 173 CBP PowerPoint. Each CBP Field Offi ce has a MCT. An MCT is comprised of a core group of personnel, including Human Resource specialists
who are responsible for running an offi ce from a new location. (Telephone call by Select Comm. Staff with CBP personnel (Jan. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Telephone call with CBP]).
174 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 249 CBP Border Patrol Agents were deployed to the affected area from Sept. 1-15, 2005. The Agents were deployed from the following Border Patrol Sectors/locations: Border Patrol Academy (2), Blaine (2), BORTAC HQ (9), Del Rio (46), Detroit (7), BP Air Ops HQ (10), El Centro (21), El Paso (23), Grand Forks (5), Houlton (3), OBP HQ (9), Havre (5), Laredo (28), Marfa (1), Miami (6), Rio Grande Valley (21), Ramey (3), San Diego (30), Spokane (6), Tucson (2), and Yuma (10). (Id.).
175 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with CBP personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with CBP]; CBP Timeline Aug. 24- Aug. 30. (Thirty support personnel were part of the relief teams from the Miami and Tampa Field Offi ces. Twenty support personnel were part of the relief teams from the Atlanta and Houston Field Offi ces).
176 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 177 Id. 178 Telephone call with CBP. 179 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 180 CBP PowerPoint; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13 (Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13]; E-mail correspondence to Select
Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Jan. 4, 2006) (1:13 p.m.). 181 E-mail correspondence to Select Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Jan. 10, 2006) (5:17 p.m.). 182 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 183 Interview with CBP. 184 Interview with CBP; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 185 CBP Protection PowerPoint. 186 Interview with CBP. 187 CBP Protection PowerPoint; CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 188 Interview with CBP. 189 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 190 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. 191 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 192 CBP PowerPoint; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 193 E-mail correspondence to Select Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Jan. 26, 2006) (1:35 p.m.). 194 Interview with CBP. 195 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13; Telephone call with CBP. 196 Telephone call with CBP. 197 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 198 CBP Protection PowerPoint; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 199 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 200 CBP Protection PowerPoint; CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 201 CBP Timeline Aug. 30-Sept. 13. 202 Telephone call with CBP. 203 E-mail correspondence to Select Comm. Staff from CBP personnel (Dec. 19, 2005) (4:17 p.m.). 204 CBP Timeline Aug. 24-Aug. 30. The missions resulted in 328 rescues, 59 arrests, 77 recovered bodies, and humanitarian aid to approximately
5,951 individuals. (Id.). 205 Fed. Air Marshal Serv. [hereinafter FAMS] Timeline prepared for Select Comm. Staff (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter FAMS Timeline].
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 415
206 Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FAMS personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Nov. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interview with FAMS]. FAMS believes as little as 1% of its ordinarily staffed fl ights were not staffed as a result of FAMS’ response to Katrina. The specifi c numbers of FAMS’ staffed fl ights and related personnel is classifi ed.
207 E-mail correspondence from FAMS personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Jan. 27, 2006) (1:51 p.m.). 208 Id. 209 Interview with FAMS; E-mail correspondence from FAMS personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Jan. 5, 2006) (9:14 p.m.) (Dir. Quinn retired on
Feb. 4, 2006). 210 Interview with FAMS. (At the time of Hurricane Katrina, FAMS was, as part of an overall DHS reorganization, being transitioned to
TSA’s authority from ICE, which is part of DHS’ Border and Transportation Security component. The practical realities of the impending reorganization meant that FAMS leadership was, during times relevant, unoffi cially reporting into TSA and Assistant Secretary Hawley. Senior leadership at TSA was in operational command at all times during the Katrina response, holding conference calls every four hours from 6:00 a.m. to midnight with the fi eld. That being said, since FAMS was offi cially reporting through ICE, offi cial reports and personnel statistics have FAMS as part of ICE and not TSA. FAMS offi cial transfer from ICE to TSA occurred on Oct. 16, 2005).
211 Id. 212 FAMS Timeline. 213 Interview with FAMS. 214 Interview with FAMS; FAMS Timeline. 215 FAMS Timeline. 216 Id. 217 Interview with FAMS. 218 FAMS Timeline. 219 Interview with FAMS. (This included, meeting arriving buses, helicopters, trucks, and ambulances; canvassing evacuees for information on
those left behind in New Orleans; handwriting manifests for the New Orleans International Airport departing fl ights; pre-screening and loading passengers; crowd control; baggage handling; air traffi c control; operating heavy equipment to facilitate blocking and dispatching aircraft; hand-carrying hundreds of sick, injured and elderly passengers on to departing aircraft; working with FEMA triage personnel to carry patients on stretchers for medical evaluation; delivering patients to the “Expected to Die” and morgue holding areas; and assisting in other medical emergencies).
220 FAMS Timeline. 221 FAMS Timeline; Email correspondence from FAMS personnel to Select Comm. Staff (Nov. 29, 2005) (5:27 p.m.) [hereinafter Nov. 29 Email
from FAMS]. (Eventually, personnel from every fi eld offi ce and headquarters would participate in FAMS’ Katrina response. FAMS has offi ces in Boston, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Wash., D.C., Charlotte, Orlando, Miami, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, Dallas, Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, and Seattle).
222 FAMS Timeline; Nov. 29 E-mail from FAMS. 223 FAMS Timeline. 224 18 U.S.C. § 3056. 225 18 U.S.C. § 470 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. § 3056(b). 226 18 U.S.C. § 3056(e). 227 Additional Info. Relating To Secret Service [hereinafter USSS] Contributions Toward Response and Recovery Efforts Associated With Hurricane
Katrina (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS]. (The fi ve protectees were: President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Mrs. Cheney, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. Michael Chertoff, and Treasury Sec’y John Snow. President Bush visited the affected area three times between Aug. 23 and Sept. 13. On Sept. 2, the President visited Mobile, AL; Biloxi, Miss.; and New Orleans, LA. On Sept. 5, the President visited Baton Rouge, LA. On Sept. 11 and 12, the President visited New Orleans, and Gulfport, Miss. On Sept. 8, the Vice President and Mrs. Cheney visited Gulfport, New Orleans and Baton Rouge. Sec’y Chertoff made three trips to the affected region, visiting Mobile, Biloxi, and New Orleans on Sept. 2, New Orleans on Sept. 4 and 5, and Gulfport, New Orleans, and Baton Rouge on Sept. 8. Treasury Sec’y Snow visited Biloxi on Sept. 9).
228 Additional Info. Relating To USSS Contributions Toward Response and Recovery Efforts Associated With Hurricane Katrina (Dec. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 7 Additional Info. Relating to USSS]. (The personnel deployment was divided into two phases, Aug. 31 through Sept. 9 as Phase I and Sept. 8 through Sept. 15 as Phase II. Seventeen employees were deployed for the fi rst phase and 18 for the second phase. These employees were drawn from the following Secret Service offi ces: Dallas Field Offi ce, Houston Field Offi ce, Memphis Field Offi ce, Charlotte Field Offi ce, Chicago Field Offi ce, Intelligence Div., Info. Res. Mgmt. Div., and Diplomatic Protective Div.. These offi ces each deployed one to three employees. The Houston Field Offi ce deployed fi ve employees for both phases).
229 Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS. 230 Id. (Interview by Select Comm. Staff with FBI personnel, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 6, 2005). (The FBI also was involved with credentialing
law enforcement offi cers). 231 Dec. 7 Additional Info. Relating to USSS; Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS. 232 Dec. 5 Additional Info. Relating to USSS. 233 Id. 234 Fed. Bureau of Prisons [hereinafter BOP] About BOP, http://www.bop.gov/about/index.jsp# (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 235 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5170 (a) and (b)). 236 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview by Select Comm. Staff with BOP personnel, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Interview
with BOP]. 237 Interview with BOP. 238 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 239 Id. 240 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with BOP.
416 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
241 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 242 Id. 243 Interview with BOP; Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 244 Interview with BOP. 245 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response. 246 Id. (A total of 54 BOP personnel were responsible for the transportation. These personnel were detailed from the Fed. Correction Complex
(FCC) in Beaumont, TX; FCC Forrest City, Arkansas; FCC Yazoo City, MS; FCC Oakdale, LA; the United States Penitentiary in Pollock, LA; the Fed. Det. Ctr. in Houston, TX).
247 Id. A break down of the bus and van transports: Aug. 30 — 2 bus runs, 1 van run; Aug. 31 — 14 bus runs; Sept. 1 — 34 bus runs; Sept. 2 — 9 bus runs; Sept. 3 — 2 bus runs; Sept. 4 — 2 bus runs; Sept. 5— 2 bus runs, 1 van run; Sept. 6 — 7 bus runs, 1 van run; Sept. 7— 2 bus runs).
248 Dec. 8 Dep’t of Justice Response; Interview with BOP (54 staff for bus movements out of New Orleans; 26 staff worked from the South Central Region Command Center; 6 staff for bus movements in southern Miss.; 165 staff for transport and delivery of supplies and equipment, inspection and maintenance of vehicles, mechanical services, liaison with command center in Baton Rouge; and 52 Pub. Health Servs. Offi cers).
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 417
APPENDIX 6
418 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 419
420 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 421
422 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 423
424 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 425
426 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
APPENDIX 7
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 427
428 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 429
430 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 431
432 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 433
434 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 435
APPENDIX 8
436 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 437
438 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 439
440 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 441
442 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 443
444 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 445
446 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 447
448 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 449
450 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 451
452 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 453
ASHÉ CULTURAL ARTS CENTER/BABA TUNJI
454 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
ASHÉ CULTURAL ARTS CENTER/BABA TUNJI
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 455
456 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 457
458 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 459
460 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 461
462 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 463
464 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 465
466 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 467
M C
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468 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 469
470 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 471
472 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 473
474 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 475
476 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 477
478 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 479
480 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 481
482 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 483
484 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 485
486 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 487
488 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 489
490 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 491
492 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 493
494 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 495
496 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 497
498 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 499
500 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 501
502 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 503
504 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 505
506 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 507
APPENDIX 9
508 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 509
510 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 511
512 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 513
514 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 515
516 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 517
518 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 519
520 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 521
522 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 523
524 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 525
526 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 527
528 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 529
530 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 531
532 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 533
534 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 535
536 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 537
538 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 539
540 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 541
542 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 543
544 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 545
546 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 547
548 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 549
550 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 551
552 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 553
554 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 555
556 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 557
558 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 559
560 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 561
562 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 563
564 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 565
566 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 567
568 A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE
A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE 569
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- Superintendent of Documents
- 2015-08-21T08:38:45-0400
- US GPO, Washington, DC 20401
- Superintendent of Documents
- GPO attests that this document has not been altered since it was disseminated by GPO
