Order 1088937: Logistics

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HANDBOOK ON ENGINEERING LOGISTICS

Section 1. Introduction to Logistics Engineering

Chapter 1. Logistics from a Historical Perspective

Joel Sutherland

Lehigh University

Center for Value Chain Research

DEFINING LOGISTICS

Logistics is a word that seems to be little understood, if at all, by nearly anyone not directly

associated with this professional and very important discipline. Many, when hearing someone

say they work in the logistics field, associate it with some quantitative, technological, or

mathematical practice. Some even confuse logistics with the study of language (i.e. linguistics).

The fact is, logistics is a very old discipline that has been, currently is, and always will be,

critical to our everyday lives.

The origin of the term logistics comes from the French "logistique," which is derived from

"loger" meaning quarters (as in quartering troops). It entered the English language in the 19th

century.

The practice of logistics in the military sector has been around for as long as there have been

organized armed forces and is used to describe a very old practice: the supply, movement and

maintenance of an armed force both in peacetime and in battle conditions. Logistics

considerations are generally built in to battle plans at an early stage, for it is logistics that will

determine the forces that can be delivered to the theatre of operations, what forces can be

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supported once there, and what will then be the tempo of operations. Logistics is not only about

the supply of materiel to an army in times of war, it also includes the ability of the national

infrastructure and manufacturing base to equip, support and supply the Armed Forces, the

national transportation system to move the forces to be deployed, and its ability to resupply that

force once they are deployed.

The practice of logistics in the business sector, starting in the later half of the twentieth century,

has been increasingly recognized as a critical discipline. The first professional association of

logisticians was formed in 1963, when a group of practitioners and academicians formed the

National Council of Physical Distribution Management, which in 1985 became the Council of

Logistics Management, and then in 2004 the Council of Supply Chain Management

Professionals (“The Council”). Today, this organization has thousands of members around the

world. A sister organization, The International Society of Logistics (or SOLE), was founded in

1966 as the Society of Logistics Engineers. Today, there are numerous professional associations

throughout the world with essentially the same objectives: to conduct research, provide

education, and disseminate knowledge for the advancement of the logistics discipline worldwide.

The Council, early on, recognized that there was confusion in industry regarding the meaning of

the term logistics. Over the years, they have provided, and adjusted to changing needs, a

definition of logistics that is the most widely accepted definition worldwide. Just as important,

they recognized that the relationship between logistics and supply chain management was not

clearly understood by those who used these terms…often interchangeably. The Council struggled

with the development of a broader definition of logistics and its’ relationship to supply chain

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management that would be widely accepted by practitioners around the world. In 2003, the

Council published the following Definitions, and Boundaries & Relationships, for logistics and

supply chain management:

Definition of Logistics Management: Logistics Management is that part of Supply Chain

Management that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward and reverse

flow and storage of goods, services and related information between the point of origin and the

point of consumption in order to meet customers’ requirements.

Logistics Management - Boundaries & Relationships: Logistics Management activities

typically include inbound and outbound transportation management, fleet management,

warehousing, materials handling, order fulfillment, logistics network design, inventory

management, supply/demand planning, and management of third party logistics services

providers. To varying degrees, the logistics function also includes sourcing and procurement,

production planning and scheduling, packaging and assembly, and customer service. It is

involved in all levels of planning and execution – strategic, operational and tactical. Logistics

Management is an integrating function, which coordinates and optimizes all logistics activities,

as well as integrates logistics activities with other functions including marketing, sales

manufacturing, finance and information technology.

Definition of Supply Chain Management: Supply Chain Management encompasses the

planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion,

and all Logistics Management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and

collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service

providers, and customers. In essence, Supply Chain Management integrates supply and demand

management within and across companies.

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Supply Chain Management – Boundaries & Relationships: Supply Chain Management is an

integrating function with primary responsibility for linking major business functions and

business processes within and across companies into a cohesive and high-performing business

model. It includes all of the Logistics Management activities noted above, as well as

manufacturing operations, and it drives coordination of processes and activities with and across

marketing, sales, product design, finance, and information technology.

Business Logistics and Engineering Logistics

Before moving on, it is probably helpful to understand what differences exist between business

logistics and engineering logistics. The fact is, there are few, if any, significant differences

between the two except that logistics engineers are often charged with handling the more

‘mathematical’ or ‘scientific’ applications in logistics. For example, whereas the business

logistician might be concerned with building information systems to support supply chain

management, the logistics engineer might be looking for an optimal solution to a vehicle routing

problem within defined time windows. This is important to understand as examples are provided

throughout the remainder of this chapter.

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF MILITARY LOGISTICS

“Without supplies, no army is brave”

—Frederick II of Prussia, in his Instruction for his Generals, 1747

Business logistics is essentially an offshoot of military logistics. So it behooves us to look at the

military side of the logistical coin first. For war is not just about tactics and strategy. War is very

often about logistics.

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Looking at most wars throughout history, a point can be identified at which the victory of one

side could no longer be prevented except by a miracle - a point after which the pendulum was

tipped heavily to one side and spending less and less time on the other. Logistics is absolutely the

main factor that tends to tip the pendulum. The following examples illustrate the importance of

logistics in military campaigns of the past.

Alexander the Great

Alexander the Great and his father Philip recognized the importance and improved upon the art

of logistics in their time. Philip realized that the vast baggage train that traditionally followed an

army limited the mobility of his forces. In order to compensate he made the troops carry their

own weapons, armor, and some provisions while marching, minimizing the need for a

transportation infrastructure. Oxen and oxcarts were not used as they were in many other

campaigns during earlier “ancient” times. Oxen could achieve a speed of only 2 miles per hour,

their hooves were unsuitable for carrying goods for long distances, and they could not keep up

with the army's daily marches, which averaged 15 miles per day. The army did not use carts or

servants to carry supplies, as was the practice of contemporary Greek and Roman armies; horses,

camels, and donkeys were used in Alexander's baggage train because of their speed and

endurance. As necessary, road builders preceded the army on its march to keep the planned route

passable.

Alexander also made extensive use of shipping, with a reasonable sized merchant ship able to

carry around 400 tons, while a horse could carry 200 lbs (but needed to eat 20 lbs of fodder a

day, thus consuming its own load every ten days). He never spent a winter or more than a few

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weeks with his army on campaign away from a sea port or navigable river. He even used his

enemy's logistics weaknesses against them, as many ships were mainly configured for fighting

but not for endurance, and so Alexander would blockade the ports and rivers the Persian ships

would use for supplies, thus forcing them back to base. He planned to use his merchant fleet to

support his campaign in India, with the fleet keeping pace with the army, while the army would

provide the fleet with fresh water. However, the monsoons were heavier than usual, and

prevented the fleet from sailing. Alexander lost two-thirds of his force, but managed to get to a

nearby port where he re-provisioned. The importance of logistics was central to Alexander's

plans, indeed his mastery of it allowed him to conduct the longest military campaign in history.

At the farthest point reached by his army, the river Beas in India, his soldiers had marched

11,250 miles in eight years. Their success depended on his army's ability to move fast by

depending on comparatively few animals, by using the sea wherever possible, and on good

logistic intelligence.

The Roman’s

The Roman legions used techniques broadly similar to the old methods (large supply trains, etc.),

however, some did use those techniques pioneered by Philip and Alexander, most notably the

Roman consul Marius. The Romans' logistics were helped of course, by the superb

infrastructure, including the roads they built as they expanded their empire. However, with the

decline in the Western Roman Empire in the Fifth Century AD, the art of warfare degenerated,

and with it, logistics was reduced to the level of pillage and plunder. It was with the coming of

Charlemagne in the Eighth Century AD, that provided the basis for feudalism, and his use of

large supply trains and fortified supply posts called 'burgs', enabled him to campaign up to 1,000

miles away, for extended periods.

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The Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire did not suffer from the same decay as its western

counterpart. It adopted a defensive strategy that, in many ways, simplified their logistics

operations. They had interior lines of communication, and could shift base far easier in response

to an attack, than if they were in conquered territory - an important consideration due to their fear

of a two-front war. They used shipping and considered it vital to keep control of the Dardanelles,

Bosphorous and Sea of Marmara; and on campaign made extensive use of permanent magazines

(i.e. warehouses) to supply troops. Hence, supply was still an important consideration, and thus

logistics were fundamentally tied up with the feudal system - the granting of patronage over an

area of land, in exchange for military service. A peacetime army could be maintained at minimal

cost by essentially living off the land, useful for Princes with little hard currency, and allowed

the man-at-arms to feed himself, his family and retainers from what he grew on his own land and

given to him by the peasants.

Napoleon in Russia

As the centuries passed, the problems facing an army remained the same: sustaining itself while

campaigning, despite the advent of new tactics, of gunpowder and the railway. Any large army

would be accompanied by a large number of horses, and dry fodder could only really be carried

by ship in large amounts. So campaigning would either wait while the grass had grown again, or

pause every so often. Napoleon was able to take advantage of the better road system of the early

nineteenth century, and the increasing population density, but ultimately still relied upon a

combination of magazines and foraging. While many Napoleonic armies abandoned tents to

increase speed and lighten the logistics load, the numbers of cavalry and artillery pieces (pulled

by horses) grew as well, thus defeating the objective. The lack of tents actually increased the

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instance of illness and disease, putting greater pressure on the medical system, thus putting

greater pressure on the logistics system due to larger medical facilities needed and the need to

expand the reinforcement system.

There were a number of reasons that contributed to Napoleon’s failed attempt to conquer Russia

in 1812. Faulty logistics considered a primary one. Napoleon's method of warfare was based on

rapid concentration of his forces at a key place to destroy his enemy. This boiled down to

moving his men as fast as possible to the place they were needed the most. To do this, Napoleon

would advance his army along several routes, merging them only when necessary. The slowest

part of any army at the time was the supply trains. While a soldier could march 15 - 20 miles a

day, a supply wagon was generally limited to about 10 - 12 miles a day. To avoid being slowed

down by the supply trains, Napoleon insisted that his troops live as much as possible off the land.

The success of Napoleon time after time in Central Europe against the Prussians and the

Austrians proved that his method of warfare worked. However for it to work, the terrain must co-

operate. There must be a good road network for his army to advance along several axes and an

agricultural base capable of supporting the foraging soldiers.

When Napoleon crossed the Nieman River into Russia in June 1812, he had with him about

600,000 men and over 50,000 horses. His plan was to bring the war to a conclusion within

twenty days by forcing the Russians to fight a major battle. Just in case his plans were off, he had

his supply wagons carry 30 days of food. Reality was a bit different. Napoleon found that Russia

had a very poor road network. Thus he was forced to advance along a very narrow front. Even

though he allowed for a larger supply train than usual, food was to be supplemented by whatever

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the soldiers could forage along the way. But this was a faulty plan. In addition to poor roads, the

agricultural base was extremely poor and could not support the numbers of soldiers that would

be living off the land. Since these 600,000 men were basically using the same roads, the first

troops to pass by got the best food that could easily be foraged. The second troops to go by got

less, and so forth. If you were at the rear, of course there would be little available. The Russians

made the problem worse by adopting a scorched earth policy of destroying everything possible

as they retreated before the French. As time went by, soldiers began to straggle, due to having to

forage further away from the roads for food and weakness from lack of food.

The situation was just as bad for the horses. Grazing along the road or in a meadow was not

adequate to maintain a healthy horse. Their food had to be supplemented with fodder. The

further the army went into Russia, the less fodder was available. Even the grass began to be

thinned out, for like food the first horses had the best grazing, and those bringing up the rear had

it the worse. By the end of the first month, over 10,000 horses had died!

Poor logistics, leading to inadequate food supplies and increasingly sick soldiers, decimated

Napoleons army. By the time Napoleon had reached Moscow in September, over 200,000 of his

soldiers were dead. By the time the army crossed into Poland in early December, less than

100,000 exhausted, tattered soldiers remained of the 600,000 proud soldiers who had crossed

into Russia only five months before.

World War I

World War I was unlike anything that had gone before it. Not only did the armies initially

outstrip their logistics systems with the amount of men, equipment and horses moving at a fast

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pace, but they totally underestimated the ammunition requirements, particularly for artillery. On

average, ammunition was consumed at ten times the pre-war estimates, and the shortage of

ammunition became serious, forcing governments to vastly increase ammunition production. But

rather than the government of the day being to blame, it was faulty pre-war planning, for a

campaign on the mainland of Europe, for which the British were logistically unprepared. Once

the war became trench bound, supplies were needed to build fortifications that stretched across

the whole of the Western Front. Given the scale of the casualties involved, the difficulty in

building up for an attack (husbanding supplies), and then sustaining the attack once it had started

(if any progress was made, supplies had to be carried over the morass of “no-man's land”), it was

no wonder that the war in the west was conducted at a snail's pace, given the logistical problems.

It was not until 1918, that the British, learning the lessons of the previous four years, finally

showed how an offensive should be carried out, with tanks and motorized gun sleds helping to

maintain the pace of the advance, and maintain supply well away from the railheads and ports.

World War I was a milestone for military logistics. It was no longer true to say that supply was

easier when armies kept on the move due to the fact that when they stopped they consumed the

food, fuel and fodder needed by the army. From 1914, the reverse applied, because of the huge

expenditure of ammunition, and the consequent expansion of transport to lift it forward to the

consumers. It was now far more difficult to resupply an army on the move. While the industrial

nations could produce huge amounts of war materiel, the difficulty was in keeping the supplies

moving forward to the consumer.

World War II

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World War II was global in size and scale. Not only did combatants have to supply forces at ever

greater distances from the home base, but these forces tended to be fast moving, and voracious in

their consumption of fuel, food, water and ammunition. Railways proved indispensable, and

sealift and airlift made ever greater contributions as the war dragged on (especially with the use

of amphibious and airborne forces, as well as underway replenishment for naval task forces). The

large-scale use of motorized transport for tactical re-supply helped maintain the momentum of

offensive operations, and most armies became more motorized as the war progressed. After the

fighting had ceased, the operations staffs could relax somewhat, whereas the logisticians had to

supply not only the occupation forces, but also relocate those forces that were demobilizing,

repatriate Prisoners Of War, and feed civil populations of often decimated countries.

World War II was, logistically, as in every other sense, the most testing war in history. The cost

of technology had not yet become an inhibiting factor, and only a country’s industrial potential

and access to raw materials limited the amount of equipment, spares and consumables a nation

could produce. In this regard, the United States outstripped all others. Consumption of war

material was never a problem for the USA and its allies. Neither was the fighting power of the

Germans diminished by their huge expenditure of war material, nor the strategic bomber

offensives of the Allies. They conducted a stubborn, often brilliant defensive strategy for two-

and-a-half years, and even at the end, industrial production was still rising. The principal logistic

legacy of World War II was the expertise in supplying far off operations and a sound lesson in

what is, and what is not, administratively possible.

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During World War II, America won control of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans from the German

and Japanese navies, and used its vast wartime manufacturing base to produce, in 1944, about 50

ships, 10 tanks, and 5 trained soldiers for every one ship, tank, and soldier the Axis powers put

out. German soldiers captured by Americans in North Africa expressed surprise at the enormous

stockpiles of food, clothing, arms, tools, and medicine their captors had managed to bring over

an ocean to Africa in just a few months. Their own army, though much closer to Germany than

the American army was to America, had chronic shortages of all vital military inventory, and

often relied on captured materiel.

Across the world, America's wartime ally, the Soviet Union, was also out-producing Germany

every single year. Access to petroleum was important - while America, Britain, and the Soviet

Union all had safe and ready access to sources of petroleum, Germany and Japan obtained their

own from territories they had conquered or pressed into alliance, and this greatly hurt the Axis

powers when these territories were attacked by the Allies later in the war. The 1941 Soviet

decision to physically move their manufacturing capacity east of the Ural mountains and far from

the battlefront took the heart of their logistical support out of the reach of German aircraft and

tanks, while the Germans struggled all through the war with having to convert Soviet railroads to

a gauge their own trains could roll on, and with protecting the vital converted railroads, which

carried the bulk of the supplies German soldiers in Russia needed, from Soviet irregulars and

bombing attacks.

The Korean War

The Korean War fought between the US-led coalition forces against the communists offered

several lessons on the importance of logistics. When the North Korean Army invaded South

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Korea on June 25, 1950, South Korea, including the US, was caught by surprise. Although there

were signs of an impending North Korean military move, these were discounted as the prevailing

belief was that North Korea would continue to employ guerrilla warfare rather than military

forces.

Compared to the seven well-trained and well-equipped North Korea divisions, the Republic of

Korea (ROK) armed forces were not in a good state to repel the invasion. The US 8th Army,

stationed as occupation troops in Japan, was subsequently given permission to be deployed in

South Korea together with the naval and air forces already there, covering the evacuation of

Americans from Seoul and Inchon. The US troops were later joined by the UN troops and the

forces put under US command.

In the initial phase of the war, the four divisions forming the US 8th Army were not in a state of

full combat readiness. Logistics was also in a bad shape: for example, out of the 226 recoilless

rifles in the 8th Army establishment, only 21 were available. Of the 18,000 jeeps and 4x4 trucks,

55 percent were unserviceable. In addition, only 32 percent of the 13,800 6x6 trucks available

were functional.

In the area of supplies, the stock at hand was only sufficient to sustain troops in peacetime

activities for about 60 days. Although material support from de-activated units was available,

they were mostly unserviceable. The lack of preparedness of the American troops was due to the

assumptions made by the military planners that after 1945 that the next war would be a repeat of

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World War II. However, thanks to the availability of immense air and sea transport resources to

move large quantities of supplies, they recovered quickly.

As the war stretched on and the lines of communication extended, the ability to supply the

frontline troops became more crucial. By August 4, 1950, the US 8th Army and the ROK Army

were behind the Nakton River, having established the Pusan perimeter. While there were several

attempts by the North Koreans to break through the defense line, the line held. Stopping the

North Koreans was a major milestone in the war. By holding on to the Pusan perimeter, the US

Army was able to recuperate, consolidate and grow stronger.

This was achieved with ample logistics supplies received by the US Army through the port at

Pusan. The successful logistics operation played a key role in allowing the US Army to

consolidate, grow and carry on with the subsequent counter offensive. Between July 2nd and

July 13th, a daily average of 10,666 tons of supplies and equipment were shipped and unloaded

at Pusan.

The Korean War highlights the need to maintain a high level of logistics readiness at all times.

Although the 8th Army was able to recover swiftly thanks to the availability of vast US

resources, the same cannot be said for other smaller armies. On hindsight, if the 8th Army had

been properly trained and logistically supported, they would have been able to hold and even

defeat the invading North Koreans in the opening phase of the war. The war also indicates the

power and flexibility of having good logistics support as well as the pitfalls and constraints due

to their shortage.

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Viet Nam

In the world of logistics, there are few brand names to match that of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the

secret, shifting, piecemeal network of jungle roadways that helped the North win the Vietnam

War.

Without this well thought-out and powerful logistics network, regular North Vietnamese forces

would have been almost eliminated from South Vietnam by the American Army within one or

two years of American intervention. The Ho Chi Minh Trail enabled communist troops to travel

from North Vietnam to areas close to Saigon. It has been estimated that the North Vietnamese

troops received sixty tons of aid per day from this route. Most of this was carried by porters.

Occasionally bicycles and horses would also be used.

At regular intervals along the route the North Vietnamese troops built base camps. As well as

providing a place for them to rest, the base camps provided medical treatment for those who had

been injured or had fallen ill on the journey.

In the early days of the war it took six months to travel from North Vietnam to Saigon on the Ho

Chi Minh Trail. But the more people who traveled along the route the easier it became. By 1970,

fit and experienced soldiers could make the journey in six weeks.

From the air the Ho Chi Minh Trail was impossible to identify and although the United States

Air Force tried to destroy this vital supply line by heavy bombing, they were unable to stop the

constant flow of men and logistical supplies.

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The North Vietnamese also used the Ho Chi Minh Trail to send soldiers to the south. At times, as

many as 20,000 soldiers a month came from Hanoi in this way. In an attempt to stop this traffic,

it was suggested that a barrier of barbed wire and minefields called the McNamara Line should

be built. This plan was abandoned in 1967 after repeated attacks by the North Vietnamese on

those involved in constructing this barrier.

The miracle of the Ho Chi Minh Trail “logistics highway” was that it enabled the “impossible” to

be accomplished. A military victory is not determined by how many nuclear weapons can be

built, but by how much necessary materiel can be manufactured and delivered to the battlefront.

The Ho Chi Minh Trail enabled the steady, and almost uninterrupted, flow of logistics supplies

to be moved to where it was needed to ultimately defeat the enemy.

Today

Just after World War II, the United States provided considerable assistance to Japan. Out of this,

the Japanese have become world leaders in management philosophies that bring about the

greatest efficiency in production and service. From organizations such as Toyota came the then

revolutionary philosophies of Just in Time (JIT) and Total Quality Management (TQM). From

these philosophies have arisen and developed the competitive strategies that world class

organizations now practice. Aspects of these that are now considered normal approaches to

management include kaizen (or continuous improvement), improved customer-supplier

relationships, supplier management, vendor managed inventory, collaborative relationships

between multiple trading partners, and above all recognition that there is a supply chain along

which all efforts can be optimized to enable effective delivery of the required goods and services.

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This means a move away from emphasizing functional performance and a consideration of the

whole supply chain as a total process. It means a move away from the silo mentality to thinking

and managing outside the functional box. In both commercial and academic senses the

recognition that supply chain management is an enabler of competitive advantage is increasingly

accepted. This has resulted in key elements being seen as best practice in their own right, and

includes value for money, partnering, strategic procurement policies, integrated supply chain /

network management, total cost of ownership, business process reengineering, and outsourcing.

The total process view of the supply chain necessary to support commercial business is now

being adopted by, and adapted within, the military environment. Hence initiatives such as 'Lean

Logistics' and 'Focused Logistics" as developed the US Department of Defense recognize the

importance of logistics within a 'cradle to grave' perspective. This means relying less on the total

integral stockholding and transportation systems, and increasing the extent to which logistics

support to military operations is outsourced to civilian contractors - as it was in the eighteenth

century.

From ancient days to modern times, tactics and strategies have received the most attention from

amateurs, but wars have been won by logistics.

THE EMERGENCE OF LOGISTICS AS A SCIENCE

In 1954, Paul Converse, a leading business and educational authority, pointed out the need for

academicians and practitioners to examine the physical distribution side of marketing. In 1962,

Peter Drucker indicated that distribution was the “last frontier” and was akin to the “dark

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continent” (i.e. it was an area that was virtually unexplored and, hence, unknown). These and

other individuals were early advocates of logistics being recognized as a science. For the purpose

of this section we define the science of logistics as… the study of the physical movement of

product and services through the supply chain, supported by a body of observed facts and

demonstrated measurements systematically documented and reported in recognized academic

journals and publications.

In the years following the comments of Converse and Drucker, those involved in logistics

worked hard to enlighten the world regarding the importance of this field. At the end of the

twentieth century, the science of logistics was firmly in place. Works by Porter and others were

major contributors in elevating the value of logistics in strategic planning and strategic

management. Other well known writers, such as Heskett, Shapiro, and Sharman, also helped

elevate the importance of logistics through their writings in the most widely read and respected

business publications. Because these pioneers were, for the most part, outsiders (i.e. not logistics

practitioners) they were better able to view logistics from a strategic and unbiased perspective.

The emergence of logistics as a science has been steady and at times even spectacular. Before the

advent of transportation deregulation in the 1980s, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, “traffic

managers” and then “distribution managers” had the primary responsibility for moving finished

goods from warehouses to customers on behalf of their companies. Little, if any, attention was

given to managing the inbound flows. Though many of these managers no doubt had the capacity

to add significant value to their organization, their contribution was constrained by the strict

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regulatory environment in which they operated. That environment only served to intensify a silo

mentality that prevailed within many traffic, and other logistics related, departments.

The advent of transport deregulation in the 1980s complemented, and in many cases accelerated,

a parallel trend taking place - the emergence of logistics as a recognized science. The rationale

behind this was that transportation and distribution could no longer work in isolation of those

other functional areas involved in the flow of goods to market. They needed to work more

closely with other departments such as purchasing, production planning, materials management,

and customer service as well as supporting functions such as information systems and logistics

engineering. The goal of logistics management, a goal that to this day still eludes many

organizations, was to integrate these related activities in a way that would add value to the

customer and profit to the bottom line.

In the 1990s, many leading companies sought to extend this integration end-to-end within the

organization - that is, from the acquisition of raw materials to delivery to the end customer.

Technology would be a great enabler in this effort, particularly the Enterprise Resource Planning

(ERP) systems and Supply Chain Planning and Execution systems that connect the internal

supply chain processes. The more ambitious of the leaders sought to extend the connectivity

outward to their trading partners both upstream and downstream. They began to leverage

Internet-enabled solutions that allowed them to extend connectivity and provide comprehensive

visibility over product flow.

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As we turned the corner into the 21 st century, the rapid evolution of business practices has

changed the nature and scope of the job. Logistics professionals today are interacting and

collaborating in new ways within their functional area, with other parts of the organization, and

with extended partners. As the traditional roles and responsibilities change, the science of

logistics is also changing. Logistics contributions in the future will be measured within the

context of the broader supply chain.

CASE STUDY: THE GULF WAR

Background

The Gulf War was undoubtedly one of the largest military campaigns seen in recent history. The

unprecedented scale and complexity of the war presented logisticians with a formidable logistics

challenge.

On July 17, 1990, Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates of

overproduction of oil, thereby flooding the world market and decreasing its income from its sole

export. Talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapsed on August 1, 1990. On August 2, Iraq, with a

population of 21 million, invaded its little neighbor Kuwait, which had a population of less than

two million. A few days later, Iraqi troops massed along the Saudi Arabian border in position for

attack. Saudi Arabia asked the United States for help. In response, severe economic sanctions

were implemented, countless United Nations resolutions passed, and numerous diplomatic

measures initiated. In spite of these efforts Iraq refused to withdraw from Kuwait. On January

16, 1991, the day after the United Nations deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait expired,

the air campaign against Iraq was launched. The combat phase of the Gulf War had started.

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There were three phases in the Gulf War worthy of discussion: deployment (Operation Desert

Shield); combat (Operation Desert Storm); and redeployment (Operation Desert Farewell).

Logistics played a significant role throughout all three phases.

Operation Desert Shield

The coalition's challenge was to quickly rush enough troops and equipment into the theatre to

deter and resist the anticipated Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia. The logistical system was

straining to quickly receive and settle the forces pouring in at an hourly rate. This build-up phase,

Operation Desert Shield, lasted six months. Why the six-month delay? A large part of the answer

is supply.

Every general knows tactics and logistics are intertwined in planning a military campaign.

Hannibal used elephants to carry his supplies across the Alps during his invasion of the Roman

Empire. George Washington's colonial militias had only nine rounds of gunpowder per man at

the start of the Revolution, but American privateers brought in two million pounds of gunpowder

and saltpeter in just one year. Dwight Eisenhower's plans for the June 1944 invasion of

Normandy hinged on a massive build-up of war materiel in England. The most brilliant tactics

are doomed without the ability to get the necessary manpower and supplies in the right place at

the right time.

During the six-month build-up to the Gulf War, the United States moved more tonnage of

supplies - including 1.8 million tons of cargo, 126,000 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of ordnance -

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over a greater distance than during the two-year build up to the Normandy invasions in the

World War II.

Besides the massive amount of supplies and military hardware, the logistics personnel also had

to deal with basic issues such as sanitation, transport and accommodation. A number of these

requirements were resolved by local outsourcing. For example, Bedouin tents were bought and

put up by contracted locals to house the troops; and refrigerated trucks were hired to provide cold

drinks to the troops.

Despite the short timeframe given for preparation, the resourceful logistics team was up to the

given tasks. The effective logistics support demonstrated in Operation Desert Shield allowed the

quick deployment of the troops in the initial phase of the operation. It also provided the troops a

positive start before the commencement of the offensive operation.

Operation Desert Storm

It began on Jan 16, 1991 when the U.S. planes bombed targets in Kuwait and Iraq. The month of

intensive bombing that followed badly crippled the Iraqi command and control systems.

Coalition forces took full advantage of this and on 24 February 24, 1991 the much feared Marine

Divisions kicked off the ground campaign with a thrust into the heart of the Iraqi forces in

central Kuwait. The Saudi and Muslim Joint Forces - East attacked up the Kuwaiti coast line.

Meanwhile the U.S. 18th Airborne Corps and the French 6th Armored Division, making good

use of their high speed and mobility, rushed into Iraq on the far left. These initial attacks rolled

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over Iraqi positions and on the 25th of February were followed up with the US VII Corps with

the US 1st Infantry Division and the British 7th Armored Division attached.

To the logisticians, this maneuver posed another huge challenge. To support such a maneuver,

two Army Corps worth of personnel and equipment had to be transported westward and

northward to their respective jumping off points for the assault. Nearly 4,000 heavy vehicles

were used. The amount of co-ordination, transport means, and hence the movement control

required within the theatre, was enormous.

One reason Iraq's army was routed in just 100 hours, with few U.S. casualties, was that

American forces had the supplies they needed, where they needed them, when they needed them,

and in the necessary quantities.

Operation Desert Farewell

It was recognized that the logistical requirements to support the initial build-up phase and the

subsequent air and land offensive operations were difficult tasks to achieve. However, the sheer

scope of overall redeployment task at the end of the war was beyond easy comprehension. To

illustrate, the King Khalid Military City (KKMC) main depot was probably the largest collection

of military equipment ever assembled in one place. A Blackhawk helicopter flying around the

perimeter of the depot would take over an hour. While the fighting troops were heading home,

the logisticians, who were among the first to arrive at the start of the war, were again entrusted

with a less glamorous but important "clean up job". Despite the massive amount of supplies and

hardware to be shipped back, the logisticians who remained behind completed the re-deployment

almost six months ahead of schedule.

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Throughout the war, the Commanding General, Norman Schwarzkopf, had accorded great

importance to logistics. Major General William G. (Gus) Pagonis was appointed as the Deputy

Commanding General for logistics and subsequently given a promotion to a three-star general

during the war. This promotion symbolized the importance of a single and authoritative logistical

point of contact in the Gulf War. Under the able leadership of General Pagonis, the efficient and

effective logistical support system set up in the Gulf War, from deployment phase to the pull-out

phase, enabled the U.S. led coalition forces to achieve a swift and decisive victory over the Iraqi.

Both at his famous press conferences as well as later in his memoirs, Stormin’ Norman called

Desert Storm a “logistician’s war,” handing much of the credit for the Coalition’s lightning-

swift victory to his chief logistician, General Gus Pagonis. Pagonis, Schwarzkopf declared, was

an “Einstein who could make anything happen,” and, in the Gulf War, did. Likewise, media

pundits from NBC’s John Chancellor on down also attributed the successful result of the war to

logistics.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF WAR

“Precision Guided” Logistics

In early attempts inside and outside of the Pentagon to assess the lessons learned from the Gulf

War, attention has turned to such areas as the demonstrated quality of the joint operations, the

extraordinary caliber of the fighting men and women, the incredible efficacy of heavy armor, the

impact of Special Forces as part of joint operations on the battlefield, and the success of

precision-guided weapons of all kinds. Predictably lost in the buzz over celebrating such

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successes was the emergence and near-seamless execution of what some have termed "precision-

guided” logistics.

Perhaps this is as it should be. Logistics in war, when truly working, should be transparent to

those fighting. Logistics is not glamorous, but it is critical to military success. Logisticians and

commanders need to know "what is where" as well as what is on the way and when they will

have it. Such visibility, across the military services, should be a given in military operations.

“Brute Force” Logistics

In 1991, the U.S. did not have the tools or the procedures to make it efficient. The Gulf War was

really the epitome of "brute force" logistics. The notion of having asset visibility - in transit,

from factory to foxhole - was a dream. During the Gulf War, the U.S. did not have reliable

information on almost anything. Materiel would enter the logistics pipeline based on fuzzy

requirements, and then it could not be readily tracked in the system.

There were situations where supply sergeants up front were really working without a logistics

plan to back up the war plan. They lacked the necessary priority flows to understand where and

when things were moving. It was all done on the fly, on a daily basis, and the U.S. Central

Command would decide, given the lift they had, what the priorities were. Although progress was

eventually made, often whatever got into the aircraft first was what was loaded and shipped to

the theater. It truly was brute force.

Even when air shipments were prioritized there was still no visibility. Although it is difficult to

grasp today, consider a load being shipped and then a floppy disk mailed to the receiving unit in

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the theater. Whether that floppy disk got where it was going before the ship got there was in

question. Ships were arriving without the recipients in the theater knowing what was on them.

Generally speaking, if front-line commanders weren't sure of what they had or when it would get

there, they ordered more. There weren't enough people to handle this flow, and, in the end, far

more materiel was sent to the theater than was needed. This was definitely an example of "just-

in-case" logistics. When the war ended, the logistics pipeline was so highly spiked that there

were still 101 munitions ships on the high seas. Again, it was brute-force logistics.

The result was the off-referenced "iron mountains" of shipping containers. There was too much,

and, worse yet, little, if any, knowledge of what was where. This led, inevitably, to being forced

to open something like two-thirds of all of the containers simply to see what was inside. Imagine

the difficulty in finding things if you shipped your household goods to your new house using

identical unmarked boxes. Since there were a great number of individual users, imagine that the

household goods of all of your neighbors also were arriving at your new address, and in the same

identical boxes.

That there was this brute force dilemma in the Gulf War was no secret. There just wasn't any

other way around it. The technology used was the best available. Desert Storm was conducted

using 286-processor technology with very slow transfer rates, without the Internet, without the

Web, and without encrypted satellite information. Telexes and faxes represented the available

communication technology.

“Flying Blind” Logistics

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This was an era of green computer screens, when it took 18 key strokes just to get to the main

screen. When the right screen was brought up, the data were missing or highly suspect (i.e. "not

actionable"). In contrast to today, there was no data coming in from networked data bases, and

there was no software to reconcile things. There were also no radio frequency identification tags.

In effect, this was like “flying blind”.

In fact, nothing shipped was tagged. Every shipment basically had a Government bill of lading

attached to it, or there were five or six different items that together had one bill of lading. When

those items inevitably got separated, the materiel was essentially lost from the system. Faced

with this logistics nightmare, and knowing that there was often a critical need to get particular

things to a particular place at a particular time, workarounds were developed.

As a result of our experience in the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DOD) has

subsequently been refining its technologies and testing them through military joint exercises and

deployments and contingencies in such places as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. Specifically, the

DOD has focused on the issue of logistics management and tracking and on how technology can

enable improvements in this mission critical area. The DOD has improved its logistics

management and tracking through policy directives and by engaging with innovative technology

companies in the development and leveraging of technical solutions.

The DOD now has clear knowledge of when things are actually moving…the planes, the ships,

what's going to be on them, and what needs to he moved. Communication is now digital and that

represents a quantum leap in capability and efficiency from the first war in Iraq. Operators now

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get accurate information, instantaneously, and where needed. The technology exists to absorb,

manage, and precisely guide materiel.

APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF WAR

Operation Enduring Freedom

While troops raced toward Baghdad in the spring of 2003, digital maps hanging from a wall

inside the Joint Mobility Operations Center at Scott Air Force Base, Ill., blinked updates every

four minutes to show the path cargo planes and ships were taking to the Middle East. During the

height of the war in Iraq, every one of the military's 450 daily cargo flights and more than 120

cargo ships at sea were tracked on the screen, as was everything stowed aboard them - from Joint

Direct Attack Munitions to meals for soldiers.

In rows of cubicles beneath the digital displays, dozens of military and civilian workers from the

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) looked at the same maps on their computer

screens. The maps, along with an extensive database with details on more than five million items

and troops in transit, came in handy as telephone calls and e-mail queries poured in from

logisticians at ports and airfields in the Persian Gulf: How soon would a spare part arrive? When

would the next shipment of meals arrive? When was the next batch of troops due? With just a

few mouse clicks, TRANSCOM workers not only could report where a ship or plane was and

when it was due to arrive, but also could determine which pallet or shipping container carried

what. In many cases, logisticians in the field also could go online, pull up the map and data and

answer their own questions.

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Vice Adm. Keith Lippert, director of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) says the war in Iraq

validated a new business model that moves away from "stuffing items in warehouses" to relying

on technology and contractors to provide inventory as needed. The agency, which operates

separately from TRANSCOM, is responsible for ordering, stocking and shipping supplies shared

across the services. In addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines have their own supply

operations to ship items unique to each service. The DLA supplied several billion dollars worth

of spare parts, pharmaceuticals, clothing and 72 million ready-to-eat meals to troops during the

war.

Military logisticians have won high marks for quickly assembling the forces and supplies needed

in Iraq. Advances in logistics tracking technology, investments in a new fleet of cargo airplanes

and larger ships, and the pre-positioning of military equipment in the region allowed troops to

move halfway around the world with unprecedented speed. Troops were not digging through

containers looking for supplies they had ordered weeks earlier, nor were they placing double and

triple orders in hopes that one of their requests would be acted upon, as they did during the Gulf

War in 1991. While the military transportation and distribution system may never be as fast or

efficient as FedEx or UPS, its reliability has increased over the past decade.

Nonetheless, challenges remain. Several changes to the way troops and supplies are sent to war

are under consideration, including:

• Further improvement of logistics information technology systems

• Development of a faster way to plan troop deployments

• Consolidated management of the Defense supply chain

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While TRANSCOM has gotten positive reviews for moving troops and supplies to the Middle

East, concerns have been raised about how the services moved supplies after they arrived in the

field.

Perhaps the most valuable logistics investment during the war was not in expensive cargo aircraft

or advanced tracking systems, but in thousands of plastic radio frequency identification labels

that cost $150 apiece. The tags, which measure 8 inches long by about 2 inches wide, contain

memory chips full of information about when a shipment departed, when it is scheduled to arrive

and what it contains. They are equipped with small radio transponders that broadcast information

about the cargo's status as it moves around the world. The tags enable the Global Transportation

Network to almost immediately update logistics planners on the location of items in the supply

chain.

These tags were a key factor in avoiding the equipment pileups in warehouses and at desert

outposts that came to symbolize logistics failings during the first Gulf War. The tags also saved

hundreds of millions of dollars in shipping costs, logisticians say. For example, British soldiers

spent almost a full day of the war searching cargo containers for $3 million in gear needed to

repair vehicles. Just as they were about to place a second order for the gear, a U.S. logistician

tapped into a logistics tracking system and was able to locate the supplies in the American supply

network.

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Rapid response to shifting requirements is clearly the fundamental challenge facing all

logisticians, as relevant in the commercial sector as it is in the military environment. The

commercial logistician requires the same thing that the combatant commander requires:

situational awareness. We all need an in-depth, real-time knowledge of the location and

disposition of assets.

Indeed, Wal-Mart, arguably the channel master for the world's largest, most globally integrated

commercial supply chain, has embarked on a passive RFID initiative that is very similar to the

Department of Defense's plans. The retailer mandated that suppliers tag inbound materiel with

passive RFID tags beginning at the case and pallet level. Wal-Mart established a self-imposed

January 2005 deadline to RFID-enable its North Texas operation, along with 100 of its

suppliers. The first full-scale operational test began on April 30, 2005. Based on the success

of this initial test Wal-Mart expanded its supplier scope and deployment plan for RFID to

200 more suppliers. Wal-Mart expects tags to be deployed in up to 13 distribution centers

and 600 Wal-Mart and Sam's Club stores by October 2005. Wal-Mart said that it expects

consumers to begin seeing more products that carry the EPCglobal symbol as it continues to

expand the number of suppliers using the tags every few weeks. The products that are

expected to be tagged include larger items such as lawnmowers and bicycles, as well as

electronic products. With Wal-Mart leading the charge, and driving industry compliance, it is

expected that this initiative will have a greater, and more far-reaching, impact on just the

retail supply chain. Virtually every industry, in every corner of the planet, will be

fundamentally impacted sometime in the not-too-distant future. Clearly the lessons learned

in military logistics are being applied to business logistics and as a result engineering

logistics.