

Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology
Second Edition

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and Cigdem Kagitçibasi

VOLUME 1
Theory and Method

VOLUME 2
Basic Processes and Human Development

VOLUME 3
Social Behavior and Applications

性相近 習相遠

Basic human nature is similar at birth;
Different habits make us seem remote.

From the *San Zi Jing*

Second Edition



Handbook of
Cross-Cultural Psychology

VOLUME 1
THEORY AND METHOD

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1

HISTORY OF CROSS-CULTURAL AND CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Introduction

In treating the history of a relatively young discipline like cross-cultural psychology, one faces the problem of transcending the temporal limits as well as the actual self definition of this subdiscipline of general psychology that was institutionalized during the sixties (cf. Klineberg, 1980; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1990). United by the common goal to internationalize at least the empirical base of psychology by exploring the similarities and differences of human psychic organization and functioning all over the globe, cross-cultural psychology has defined itself during the past decades not so much by referring to epistemological, theoretical, or content related features, but rather by pointing to its function as a particular methodological strategy of mainstream psychology (Brislin, 1983): "... cross-cultural psychology is defined primarily by its method. ... Thus, it is our methodology that we must turn to in order to seek our identity as a discipline. ... " (Berry, 1980, p. 1).

Consequently, a historical consideration that would like to avoid restricting itself to the activity of the protagonists of cross-cultural psychology as such, has to refer to predecessors who do not share the methodological and disciplinary presuppositions of scientific mainstream psychology. It is this perspective—one of widening both the scope of the phenomena and the defining criteria—that we share with other historical reflections on the development of cross-cultural psychology (Jahoda, 1990; Segall et al., 1990; Klineberg, 1980). They also looked for their ancestors within the history of the general anthropological discourse on universals and on the diversity of mankind.

On the other hand, the very title of the present chapter reveals that thirty years of comparative cross-cultural research have led to a critical discussion about the initial approach, and to a rediscovery of a more socioculturally oriented tradition in psychology (Boesch, 1991; Cole, 1995; Eckensberger, 1995; Shweder, 1990). This reappraisal, which saw the introduction of the term 'cultural psychology', prompted the current debates on the name of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). The central role of the principle of comparison as the general "name-giving" feature of the association is being called into question (Lonner (1992) and the subsequent discussion). Although 'cultural psychology' is still far from being a unitary theoretical system (Krewer, 1993; Lucariello, 1995; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993), the different approaches developing under this banner have produced a growing awareness that both cross-cultural psychology and general psychology as it is established as a scientific discipline need a widened perspective in order to take the culture-inclusiveness of human psychic development better into account (Dasen, 1993; Eckensberger, 1993; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1979; Price-Williams, 1980; Rogoff & Morelli, 1989; Harkness & Super, 1987; Valsiner, 1989).

This widened perspective seems to be more compatible with a historical reconstruction, because it integrates the necessarily broader scope of a culture-related anthropological discourse during different historical periods. Both perspectives—cross-cultural and cultural psychology—in their attempt to analyze, ex-

plain, and understand human behavior in different cultures, have to cope with two basic problems; these are "... the diversity of human behavior in the world and the link between individual behavior and the cultural context in which it occurs" (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992, p. 1).

Our historical review focuses on this tension between diversity and the search for universals. On the one hand it is concerned with the uniqueness of the relationship between culture and mind and, on the other hand, with the analysis of differences by means of the comparative method. All these perspectives have promoted and nourished anthropological discourse during different historical periods.

Because psychology, as a scientific discipline, is a product of mainly western anthropological reflection and its institutionalization in different disciplines, our attempt to trace the origins of culture-related psychology will be necessarily a somewhat ethnocentric enterprise, dealing with the western search to understand oneself in the mirror of others. Accordingly, we shall start with a brief chronological overview of the anthropological reflection during Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. For each period, we shall focus on three aspects: first, the conceptions of mankind and its diversity; second, the role of other cultures in shaping and underpinning the concept of one's own humanity; and finally the sociohistorical contexts of encounters between different peoples. After this overview of the "prehistory" of relevant ideas, we will turn to the first empirical field studies at the beginning of the 20th century. Then, the main research interests of cross-cultural studies between the two world wars will be summarized, a period marked by scant interest in such studies.

Finally, the onset of cross-cultural psychology, its institutional conditions, and its changing foci of interests will be outlined. As Klineberg (1980) stated in the previous edition of this handbook: "There is no specific date that can be identified with the onset of interest in cross-cultural comparisons" (p. 34). Nevertheless, there is a growing variety of research styles and approaches from the sixties till today. Since Klineberg's review, a number of new topics have developed (cf. dominant value studies, indigenous psychologies, everyday cognition, psychology of acculturation, multicultural management), and cultural psychology—as mentioned above—was also not yet on the map at that time. Thus, in 1980 it was still possible to give a broad survey of major fields of activity in cross-cultural psychology. In the meantime, the range of activities has expanded to such an extent that it is impossible to provide an adequate picture within a brief framework. Accordingly, we shall leave the detailed discussion of more recent research orientations to the respective specialized chapters of the *Handbook* and shall focus more on their historical foundation than on their actual trends.

In a separate section we shall not only point to some enduring methodological debates that have been a prominent feature of the growth of cross-cultural psychology, but also to the relationship between anthropology and psychology. The latter was crucial for the early "culture-and-personality" school and its follower, "psychological anthropology," and also for the emerging cultural psychology.

We shall finish by outlining some recurrent ideas and problems of cross-cultural and cultural reflection on the human mind. These key issues appear as stable elements in changing theoretical and methodological guises: the ethnocentric foundation of theories of mind and culture; the allegedly remarkable sensory acuity and lack of cognitive competence of "savages;" the relationship between language and thought, between environment and the stage of cultural development, between reason and morality, and finally between character (mentality) and culture.

Origins of Ideas about Humanity and Human Diversity

Antiquity and the Middle Ages

Classical Greek and Roman thinking and, even more so, the dominant ideology of the Middle Ages were generally marked by little interest in other peoples. These peoples were mostly interpreted as the complete opposite of one's own order of human existence, which was regarded as the best—or even only—realization of humanity. Accordingly, when taken into account at all, diversity was generally interpreted as distance from the level of "real" human existence.¹ According to the Greek ethnocentric concept of humanity, the best realization of the divine plan were the Greek city-states ("polis"). As the complete opposite to the Greek city dweller, the general image of the "Non-Greek," the "Barbar," was not favorable. The term "bar-bar" was used to imitate foreign languages that the Greeks found incomprehensible and hence interpreted as unintelligible noises, like the twittering of birds as Herodotus described them. But there were also many other negative characteristics attributed to the Barbar, such as being crude, uneducated, unreasonable, lawless, cruel, passionate, immoral, and so forth. Later on, many of these "barbarian characteristics" were to find their continuation in the general image of the savage as the counterpart of the civilized Westerner—an image the traces of which can still be detected in popular stereotypes of our days (Jahoda, 1995). During the Middle Ages this ethnocentric definition of humanity was determined by the dogma of Christian ethnohistory. During that period its canonical worldview had to be accepted against all empirical evidence.

According to Christian monogenist cosmogony, the image of unknown, non-Christian peoples was prestructured by the belief that the distant heathens would be monstrous races living on the border of the empire of God; they were viewed as the degenerated descendants of Noah's condemned son Ham, or as the devil's peoples, Gog and Magog. These images of the monstrous character of foreign peoples was also influenced by a second opposition to the medieval ideal of the civilized knight, namely the pagan savage, the wild man living in the woods, naked, animal-like, and devoid of all social norms. These fabulous images shaped the ethnographic collections of that period, whose main interest was that of uncritically presenting abnormal variants of human diversity. Thus, there is a more than a millenium-old tradition of fabulous, fantastic races in written and drawn constructions of the non-European other. From Plinius the Elder's (23–79

A.D.) *Historia naturalis* to Isodore's *Etymologies* (622/23), Bartholomew's *De Proprietatibus* (13th century), the *Schedel'sche Weltchronik* (1493) and to some extent even later (Lafitau, 1724), one can find examples of the same monstrous creatures: the "Blemmyae" with faces on their chests, the "Cynocephali" with dog heads who communicate by barking, the "Sciopods" with a huge foot that they used as a sunshade while lying on their backs, or the one-eyed Arimaspi.

But besides these similarities there are nevertheless some important differences between the concept of diversity in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. During the Middle Ages the uncritical use of hearsay and tales about monstrous races was embedded in dominant ideology: it was used to support the all-embracing dogma of Christian ethnotheory. Thus, the authority of the Holy Scriptures suppressed and devalued any empirical contradiction of this worldview from the outset.

In opposition to this firmly closed horizon, many classical writings aimed at unraveling the order of things without any prior dogmatic point of reference. Moreover, many classical reports about other regions had to present factual information about lands and peoples for military and administrative purposes resulting from the expansion of the Greek, and later Roman, empires. In that context, the beginnings of some ethnographic descriptions and theoretical reflections on the diversity of mankind can be detected, which remained nearly forgotten till the dawn of the Renaissance.²

The most outstanding example of this tradition is the work of Herodotus (460–359 B.C.), often referred to as the father of ethnography and historiography. His collection of information on geography, striking peculiarities, culture (habits), and history was carefully evaluated by cross-checking different sources of information. He was probably also the first author to point explicitly to the universality of the ethnocentric foundations of our judgments of other peoples. As a forerunner of theorizing on general stages of the adaptation of humans to their environment, he distinguished the stages of hunters, nomadism (with cattle-breeding), lower forms of agriculture, and finally civilization (built on higher forms of agriculture and a state-like organization and administration).

During the periods of sophistic and stoic Enlightenment, there was a debate on universal criteria for defining the sameness of mankind, independent of cultural origin. As the predecessor of the idea of psychic unity of mankind during the European Enlightenment, Greek education ("paideia") was introduced by Isokrates (5th century B.C.) and later by Cicero (106–43 B.C.) to distinguish between different degrees of civilization. During the stoic period the notion of "cosmopolitanism" was advanced by Zenon (336–264 B.C.) to develop a vision of panhuman civilization.

The idea of environmental determinism, including climate and astrological constellation, as a means of explaining diversity was also widespread among Antiquity's philosophers (Hippocrates, 460–359 B.C.; Ptolemaeus, 2nd century B.C.). But there were also early versions of diffusionist approaches, tracing back the exchanges between different peoples as a source of cultural development (Herodotus, 460–359 B.C.; Polybios, 201–120 B.C.). Finally, the work of Poseidonus

(135–51 BC) attempted to capture the particularity of peoples by referring to a holistic concept of a dominant psychological feature basic to each people's institutions and habits. He distinguished the "thymos" of northern peoples dominated by emotionality, passion, and courage from the prevailing "logos" of the southern peoples (including Rome and Greece) that is marked by a predominance of reflection, moderation, and control. Apart from his environmentalist stance, his approach resembles the configurationalist ideas of the culture-and-personality school during the first half of our century.

The Renaissance Transition towards Diversity

Between the end of the intellectually dark period of the Middle Ages and the onset of the Enlightenment—basically in the 15th and 16th centuries—there were essential changes in the dominant conceptions of the human being, leading to a new interest in human diversity.³ The partial cracking of the all-embracing theological shell entailed a new ideology of human self-confidence, highlighting human creative potential, individual responsibility for oneself, and humanistic values such as freedom, equality, and self-realization. The decline of the feudal societal order was pushed forward by the onset of the mercantile and capitalist systems. In philosophy, the comparative look backwards to classical Antiquity presupposed the capacity of "distance-taking," an important condition for localizing "the others" in time and space in order to have a better understanding of one's own position in individual and social life.

Probably the most important factor that increased the awareness of human diversity during the Renaissance was the growing number of contacts with other peoples due to the waves of conquests, discoveries, and mercantile relations with distant countries. Although reports of travellers were still strongly influenced by scholastic images of other peoples, a new interest in realistic accounts of other sociocultural forms of human life came into being. However, these more realistic accounts were greatly influenced by the particular perspectives and goals of travellers, conquerors, and missionaries who, in their turn, shaped the resulting vision of other peoples.

The reports of the conquerors were often relatively factual, describing the indigenous peoples encountered as part of those natural conditions one must take into account to achieve a successful exploitation of material resources. Whether these images were favorable depended heavily on the willingness of these peoples to comply with their invaders: When they resisted, the scholastic images of the savage were recalled; when they were friendly and hospitable, they were described (often with an expression of some surprise) as good-natured, submissive and (stupidly) generous (as a prototypical example, refer to the diary of Columbus (1492/1981)).

The missionaries' contact necessarily led to a more intensified and interpersonal concern with other peoples. To convert them to Christian belief, first one had to recognize their humanity, which was officially done by the bull of Pope Paul III in 1537. He declared that the indigenous peoples are "true humans, ca-

pable of receiving the Catholic faith and sacraments." As a consequence of their living in indigenous communities, the missionaries developed the first ethnographic and comparative approaches for the analysis of language, customs, and kinship systems (DeLery, Sahagun in the 16th century, Lafitau in the late 17th, but still in the same tradition). Furthermore, they were the promoters of a critical debate on the murderous politics of Europeans in the New World, and the first defenders of the respect for general human rights and for local moral principles. The Dominican monk Bartholome De Las Casas and Montaigne's writings (the latter from an armchair position) are the most striking illustrations of this discourse. Diversity in this context was used to call into question one's own moral standards of behavior and paved the way for the debates on the relativity or universality of moral principles.

Finally, there was another aspect of the Renaissance's reception of human diversity that is worth mentioning: the more popular view of other peoples continued the interest in the curiosities and abnormalities of mankind and kept the monstrous and fabulous creatures of the Middle Ages alive. The popular travel books of that time, such as the famous *Cosmographia* by Sebastian Münster (1544), as well as the first compositions of the so-called "cabinets de curiosité," were expressions of this newly awakened interest in "alien others." In general, the Renaissance's propensity to capture the wonders of the world resulted in the production of various collections, composed of those descriptions of the manifold expressions of nature.

In sum, it is certainly justified to consider the Renaissance concept of humanity and diversity as being at the threshold of a new science of man. One has, however, to point out the half-way character of the period's insights. In spite of the new interest in empirical reports about other peoples, their focus remained mainly descriptive, and interest in collections was still influenced by classical images. Because of this mixed perspective, the Renaissance descriptions of other peoples foreshadowed many stereotypes and hidden assumptions about the nature and character of the non-European humanity, which later became more or less unconscious starting points for empirical studies. But there was - even as far as the great thinkers of that time are concerned—a general acceptance of the belief in the basic unchangeable order of beings and things attributed to the divine plan of creation. Consequently, what was still essentially missing was the idea of exploring the dynamics and the development of this order. As this question had not yet been put, human beings and their diversity were not considered from the perspective of those causal, natural laws determining their progress and decline as natural and cultural beings. This became the central focus of the following Enlightenment period.

The Enlightenment

In spite of the different national foci and temporal culminating points, there were important commonalities in the European Enlightenment period from the 17th to the 19th century, which laid the foundations of our current human scientific dis-

ciplines. This shift towards a scientific study of human beings and their various forms of existence was based on a new trust in the human capacity of empirical observation and critical reflection as the "royal road" to knowledge about the material and living worlds. Kant's (1784) slogan in responding to the question what "Enlightenment" means, perfectly illustrates this awakened self-confidence in the human capacity of exploring and understanding himself and his own conditions of life: "Have the courage to make use of your own reason."

The Enlightenment discussion on humanity and its diversity was deeply shaped by the controversy about the double destiny of man as a natural and cultural being. The complete range of man's potential existence modes was conceptualized as a spatial and temporal system ranging from the savage to the civilized state of human life (Duchet, 1971; Gusdorf, 1972). This broad anthropological perspective made some important assumptions necessary, which are still at the center of our methodological debates on cross-cultural comparison. The general "imposed etic" (Berry, 1989) of the Enlightenment philosophers of the 18th century was the presupposition that human beings are endowed with reason. Reason was thought to be the essential feature of the human creature. It constituted the core of two basic assumptions about the unity and equality of mankind which generally characterize the anthropological thinking of that period: the belief in what came later to be referred as the "psychic unity of mankind," and an attempt to grasp the universal history of mankind.

The firm belief in a mental endowment common to all human beings became the base for a comparative consideration of human diversity in different places and different historical periods, as Hume, prototypically for most of the Enlightenment philosophers, put it:

It is universally acknowledged, that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages, and that human nature still remains the same, in its principles and operations. . . . Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in that particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles in nature." (Hume, 1784/1894, p. 358).

Thus, the Enlightenment philosophers were mainly driven by the idea of looking for similarities. Diversity was interpreted as constituting different steps on the scale of the universal history of mankind. These developmental stages ranging from savagery to civilization were explained as the result of environmental or societal conditions that promote or hinder the free unfolding of human reason.

Considering the question of how "otherness" was understood, it is interesting to point out that this equating of spatial and temporal distances can be regarded as a characteristic feature of the western "incorporation" of other cultures. By keeping a distant position and excluding a feeling of commonality that is the normal condition of mutual understanding between humans, the cultural other was condemned to remain an object of analysis (Fabian, 1983). The climax of this interpretative scheme of confounding spatial and historical distances was

certainly reached by the social evolutionary theorists of the late 19th century (Langness, 1974).

But the 18th century was dominated by the idea of the general progress of mankind, passing through the stages of development of hunting and fishing, pastoralism and animal husbandry, agriculture, and finally commerce and manufacture. The core differences between these stages were, apart from the variant subsistence types, the acquisition of spoken and written language, of the concept of property, and the type of social and political order. As the motor of these changes, reference was made either to external environmental conditions or to an innate internal propensity to improve continuously. Furthermore, psychological changes ("new wants") resulting from the respective social and economic orders were considered as potential sources of progress. Thus, the basic dimensions of our actual concept of culture, that are, on the one hand, culture as a system of customs and ritualized behaviors with its respective institutional order and, on the other hand, culture as a shared mentality of a particular group, became of central importance to explain human diversity.

The travellers' reports then available were largely used by the Enlightenment philosophers to fill in their stages of the development of mankind with realistic and empirically founded examples of human variety. In order to reconstruct the progressive development of mankind and to localize the place of their own society within universal history, the Enlightenment philosophers used different images of savage peoples for their argumentation. While generally accepting a certain progress in the past, savage forms of living were mostly considered as immature, deficient stages of human development. This position found its clearest expression through representatives of the optimistic belief in the inevitability of human progress, prototypically incorporated by Condorcet's *Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind* (1794). The first stages describe the "natural human" as dull, incapable of using reason and of establishing a collective social order, imprisoned by the impediments of nature and by mystical beliefs, and fully occupied by daily problems of subsistence.

But there were also more positive descriptions of savage life and mind focusing on the unspoiled character of natural man, his pure character not yet distorted by the constraints of the clerical and aristocratic system. This position was prototypically laid out in Rousseau's *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité de l'homme* (1755). He considered the "natural peoples" as nearer to the ideal state of the natural man, whom he constructed as a fictional model in order to outline the two fundamentals of human progress: self-preservation and compassion, which could only unfold if not hampered by external constraints. Accordingly, he interpreted the stages of civilization and socialization as a process of suppressing and distorting this human potential.

In sum, the Enlightenment reception of reports about savage life oscillated between the extremes of understanding distant forms of life: idealization and rejection. This range, delimited by the noble savage and the uncivilized barbarian, foreshadowed those emotional extremes still existing today when one is confronted with different cultures. They occur either on a scientific, a political, or an

interpersonal level, reflecting the range between an ethnocentric and alienated relation to one's own society and the concomitant range between xenophobia and a preference for the exotic with respect to foreign cultures (Erdheim, 1987; Koepping, 1975; Theye, 1985). In addition to a brief sketch of some general features of the Enlightenment discussions about human diversity⁴, we shall try to trace back more specific sources of the cultural and cross-cultural point of view during this period. It should be clear from our description so far that the dominant perspective of Enlightenment philosophy was highly compatible with cross-cultural psychology's model of man. Nevertheless, there was a group of thinkers skeptical about a purely natural and universal foundation of human psychic functioning, believing that the human sphere is *sui generis*. In many respects, these "dissenters" set out the prolegomena of what is now discussed under the banner of cultural psychology.

Predecessors of Cultural Psychology

The protagonists of this rebellion against the Enlightenment (Shweder, 1984) did not establish a consistent school of thought, but shared some important common ideas and conceptions. They were all convinced that humanity and its development could not be adequately understood merely by considering its natural dispositions. For them, human development on the individual as well as on the social plane could only be properly studied by taking into account the fact that the human mind is always shaped by, and embedded in, its sociocultural achievements. Accordingly, human capacities to create collective means of communication and cooperation, especially language, became for them the central criteria for distinguishing between the human and animal orders. Man was not only regarded as a being naturally endowed with reason, but also as a social and emotional creature, because these capacities were essential for mutual understanding and establishing a social order.

Since sociocultural achievements became the major focus of interest, the "dissenters" turned more to the study of particular human groups and their specific forms of social and cultural order. Their work was mostly built on theoretical speculations based on their interpretations of the ethnographic material then available. They made hardly any attempt to carry out empirical studies of their own.

The intricate relationship between the development of mind and culture, which is crucial for sociohistorical approaches, was for the first time explicitly stated by Vico (1724). His work was largely ignored by his contemporaries, but today he is often credited with having created the "plot structure" of the sociohistorical perspective (Berlin, 1982; Shotter, 1986). The aim of his *New Science* was to reconstruct the history of human ideas and the principles of social evolution.

Vico interpreted the history of mankind as consisting of repeated cycles of progress and regression between the divine, the heroic and the fully human stage, which occur in what he called "a world of nations." He tried to reconstruct past stages on the basis of what he saw as their predominant modes of symbolic communication, from poetic and metaphoric to rational. Understanding the history

of nations was possible, he argued, because history itself had been created by human beings and "its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind" (Vico, 1724/1948, p. 331). Accordingly, the organizing principle of his assumed stages of human development were essentially psychological ones underlying the dominant mode of symbolic communication. He considered the symbolic systems (myths, art, customs, religion and, most importantly, language) as the key to inferring the ways of thinking and feeling of past cultures. This approach later became the "royal road" of "Völkerpsychologie." Thus, he anticipated a central postulate of current adherents to the cultural psychological position: namely, that the human mind is not a constant, but a function of specific socio-historical conditions establishing "context-specific competencies" (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983) or "multiple realities" (Shweder, 1990); and that it has therefore to be studied also by historical and ethnological approaches.

This line of thought was continued by the leading figure of the Romantic rebellion against the mainstream Enlightenment position, Gottfried Herder. He represented the sceptical German reception of Enlightenment philosophy, which was blamed for its dogmatic and arrogant overrating of reason, neglecting all other facets of the human psychic constitution. The general aim of his *Ideas on the philosophy of the history of mankind* (1784–1791) was to outline "the history of human soul in general, in periods and peoples." The concrete realization of this general history was seen as embodied in particular groups or communities, the "Völker" (peoples). They were characterized by a shared language and historical tradition, which was the foundation and, at the same time, the product of the mentality of its members, the "Volksgeist." As a conceptual tool for grasping the particularity of a group's shared mental characteristics, the "Volksgeist" foreshadowed in some respects the concept of the "basic personality structure" of the culture-and-personality school in the first half of the 20th century. In general, Herder's work postulated many principles which were to become central orientations of American cultural anthropology after Boas.

Herder's particularistic stance was accompanied by a positive evaluation of the diversity of human cultures as an important condition for the unfolding of humanity. Consequently, he was an ardent defender of a cultural relativistic position: "Thus, nations change according to place, time and their inner character; each carries within itself the measure of its perfection, incommensurable with others" (Herder, 1784/1969, vol. 4, p. 362).

Language played a prominent role in Herder's vision of the unfolding of human capacities in concrete historico-cultural groups. This idea was elaborated by the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, who is often credited with having founded the tradition of "Völkerpsychologie." Humboldt's aim was to explore the mentality of peoples by a comparative study of linguistic systems. He interpreted language not only as an indicator of a certain kind of mentality, but as its constitutive factor or even as its synonym: "Language is the outer appearance of the mentality of peoples; their language is their mentality and their mentality is their language; one can hardly overemphasize their identity" (von Humboldt, 1830–35/1985, p. 67, translation by the authors). His main idea, that people who share a

language develop a similar subjectivity, a "Weltanschauung" (worldview), foreshadows in essence what later became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis.

The first formal program of Völkerpsychologie was presented in 1860 by Lazarus and Steinthal as an introduction to the first issue of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft* (Journal of Völkerpsychologie and Philology).⁵ Their ambitious goal was to unravel the relationship between basic psychic processes and the mental processes linked to collective life in human societies. They introduced Völkerpsychologie as "the science of the Volksgeist, that is the theory of the elements and laws of the mental life of peoples" (Lazarus & Steinthal, 1860, p. 7). The general task of Völkerpsychologie was divided in two parts: on the one hand, a historical study of mankind as a whole to unravel the general laws governing the change and development of the mind (folk-historical); on the other hand, the study of particular mentalities of different peoples in order to investigate the factors producing specific manifestations of these general laws ("psychological ethnology"). These two basic perspectives somewhat resemble the dual goal of recent cross-cultural psychology, namely the search for similarities and for differences using generalization and differentiation studies respectively (Eckensberger, 1990).

Lazarus and Steinthal's program is not very enlightening as far as methodological approaches are concerned. Hence it is not surprising that their journal between 1860–1890 contained very few empirical studies (Krewer & Jahoda, 1990). Most articles were theoretical speculations, about a third treated philological themes, and a fifth was confined to religion and folklore. If there were any references to specific countries or regions, the articles very rarely dealt with any places outside Europe.

On a theoretical level, the main problem with which Lazarus and Steinthal grappled can still be regarded as a perennial and unsolved one for the cultural sciences. It relates to the double nature of cultural meaning systems as part of individual psychic organization, and as a "superorganic" feature of collective life. In terms of Lazarus and Steinthal's conceptions there was a tension between localizing the Volksgeist in the minds of the individual members of a Volk ("the inner activity common to all individuals"), and simultaneously also in collective phenomena of various kinds. In that respect, their program perfectly parallels an existing controversy concerning the definition and use of the concept of culture in the human sciences (Krewer, 1990; Jahoda, 1984, 1993; Rohner, 1984; Segall, 1984).

The Lazarus and Steinthal proposal was also heavily criticized by Wundt (1888) before he himself began publication of the ten volumes of his Völkerpsychologie in the first decade of the 20th century. In his opinion, Völkerpsychologie should analyze the universal aspect of the development of higher mental processes in their culture-historical contexts. He pleaded for a much more focused and more psychologically oriented Völkerpsychologie. Wundt's own ideas are difficult to summarize because they are scattered throughout his enormous mass of writings.⁶ In fact, few of his theoretical reflections are explicitly formulated in the ten volumes on Völkerpsychologie published at the end of his scientific career. The idea of supplementing his individual psychology by

Völkerpsychologie had obviously already emerged at the beginning of his academic work (Graumann, 1980).

Wundt claimed that individual psychology would not be a sufficient theoretical frame to explore the higher mental functions, because these depend upon the collective form of existence of human beings and on the modes of cooperation evolved for this purpose. This basic idea strongly resembles the sociohistorical and symbolic interactionist approaches of our days.

In that perspective, Wundt's Völkerpsychologie was presented as a kind of socio-evolutionary psychology that extended individual development into the sphere of cultural development. But this dependence of individual psychology on Völkerpsychologie was only one side of the coin, because Wundt (1908) also pointed out the fundamental importance of the principles governing individual consciousness for cultural development and the study of collective human achievements: "In so far as Völkerpsychologie can find any psychological laws of independent content, these will always be applications of principles valid for individual psychology. . . . Thus, only the individual psychology and Völkerpsychologie together constitute the whole of psychology." (Wundt, 1908, vol. 3, p. 227-8). This view of the mutual interdependence of individual psychology and Völkerpsychologie is also mirrored in Wundt's units of analysis for exploring the shared collective experiences of cultural groups. In much the same way as language can be regarded as the collective enlargement and structuring of individual cognition, so myths structure collectively individual feelings; and finally customs can be interpreted as the collective shaping of individual volition (Wundt, 1908).

The dialectics between individual and collective psychology in Wundt's approach represents in some way a basic dilemma of psychology having to deal with a subject that is a natural as well as a cultural/historical being. This ancient philosophical controversy about whether psychology is a natural or a cultural science has recently reappeared in the debate between cross-cultural and cultural psychologists (Krewer, 1993).

Given this subtle discussion of the role of a cultural scientific perspective for psychology, it is disappointing to find only a huge collection of ethnographic material and few insights into new theoretical and methodological perspectives for psychology in the ten volumes of Wundt's Völkerpsychologie. Neither Wundt himself, nor any follower, ever tried to realize Wundt's program empirically. In mainstream psychology—contrary to the "grandfather" role attributed to Wundt's work on individual psychology—it was usually ignored and forgotten, and only recently rediscovered in the context of a new wave of interest in culture. One of the reasons for this neglect of Völkerpsychologie was certainly that mainstream psychology generally aimed at establishing itself as a natural scientific discipline, along the lines of the dominant ideology of the Enlightenment.

Cross-Cultural Psychology's Ancestors

As mentioned earlier, the dominant model of man as a natural creature endowed with reason corresponds in many ways to the basic model of cross-cultural psy-

chology. From this perspective, human diversity was conceptualized as a variation on the same theme, and it was this theme that constituted the focus of interest. Evidence of how up-to-date such an approach is can be seen when comparing Poortinga, van de Vijver, Joe, and Van de Koppel's (1987) plea to peel the onion called culture with Geertz's description of the Enlightenment's model of man. "In this conception, man is a composite of "levels," each superimposed upon those beneath it and underpinning those above it. As one analyses man, one peels off layer after layer, . . . Strip off the motley forms of culture and one finds the structural and functional regularities of social organization. . . . Peel off the psychological factors and one is left with the biological foundations—anatomical, physiological, neurological—of the whole edifice of human life" (Geertz, 1970, p. 50/51).

This edifice of human life had to be unravelled by the scientific quest to understand both nature and human nature by assuming a determinism governed by natural laws. It was the attempt to transfer the successful Newtonian model from physics to human affairs that led to a machine-like, mechanical understanding of human beings as prototypically realized in La Mettrie's (1748) *L'homme machine*.

Locke's (1690) *Essay concerning human understanding* laid the foundation of the empiricist conception of the human mind as a product of processing and associating experiences and sensations. In the first book of his *Essay*, he referred to different reports on distant peoples in order to argue against the assumption of innate ideas put forward by Descartes, who claimed the universality of innate religious beliefs. Among French Enlightenment scholars Locke's "tabula rasa" conception of the human mind was spread by the writings of Condillac who further elaborated the principles of "sensationalism." In his *Traité des sensations* (1754) he used a "thought experiment" of a statue originally only endowed with a sense of smell. He then tried to show how all mental processes are built on these basic sensations. These are then compared and associated by means of different modes of attention until the state of complex cognitive operations is achieved. This model of a passive-receptive apparatus led to an increased interest in the malleability of human beings. Thereby sociocultural influences on human development and the limits and possibilities of educational interventions became a major focus of concern. Anticipating the ideas of classical behaviorism, attention turned for instance to the cases of "wild children" (Lane, 1985; Malson, Itard, & Manonni, 1972) in order to empirically investigate a state of nature without the experience of human community and the process of becoming civilized.

Whereas this intellectual climate paved the way for a comparative interest in the conditions of life of other peoples, one had to wait till the end of the 18th century for the first systematic empirical attempts to study human diversity. It was an interdisciplinary group of scientists, called the "Société des Observateurs de l'Homme" (1799–1805), which can be regarded as the first cross-cultural scientific association. Its wide-ranging theoretical and empirical work has been rediscovered and is accessible in different languages (Copans & Jasmin, 1994; Jahoda, 1992; Moravia, 1977; Stocking, 1968). The "Observateurs" consisted of a group of outstanding contemporary scientists from different disciplines. Their ambitious

common goal was dedicated to the "physical, moral and intellectual aspects of the science of man" as the Société's founder, Louis-François Jauffret, declared in his introductory *Mémoires*. They were united by the conviction that unsubstantiated theories had to be replaced by empirical observation. Jauffret's introduction formulated the broad anthropological scope of the "Observateurs de l'Homme": their interest encompassed the study of comparative anatomy; the analysis of the relationship between external conditions and the development of the human being; the exploration of different customs, habits, and forms of collective life; and finally the different forms of moral (in our terms, psychological) expressions and their relationship to the physiological constitution (a question attributed in our days to psychosomatic approaches).

In order to realize these aspirations, the empirical and comparative study of human diversity became the "royal methodological road," at home and abroad. Accordingly, at home interest shifted towards representatives of other ethnic groups, whose physiological and moral characteristics were studied. In that context, the above-mentioned cases of wild children became a preferred object of observation and discussion of the Société, because they represented in a sense a real-life version of Condillac's statue, a version that develops psychologically by processing and associating new sensory input. The famous case of Victor of Aveyron served for many years as an object of empirical studies for the physician Itard and the psychiatrist Pinel, who were engaged in an early form of what we today call the nature-nurture controversy to explain the mental retardation of Victor. In order to investigate human diversity abroad, the Société's members participated in the preparation of expeditions to systematically observe varieties of the human condition. In this context, the first versions of field manuals for empirical cross-cultural observations were developed. Dégérando's *Considérations sur les diverses méthodes à suivre dans l'observation des peuples sauvages*, which was written as a guide for the anthropological observations during Baudin's expedition to Australia (1800-1804), foreshadowed in many respects current reflections on the goals and methods of ethnographic fieldwork. It was a plea for a positivist approach to human diversity, explicitly warning of the ethnocentric pitfalls related to the observation of other peoples and the potential distortions by the presence of participant observers. Dégérando's detailed collection of domains of inquiry and observations almost reads like a first draft of a table of contents of a handbook in cross-cultural psychology: he proposed, among other things, an analysis of the savage's sensations (perception), association of ideas, foresight, reflection (cognitive processes and language), opinions and judgement (belief systems, morals and conventions), attention and reflective needs (emotion and motivation, the cognitive part being integrated!), imbecility (psychopathology) and the moral education of children (developmental niche). For each domain (selected according to Condillac's sensationist theory) several important questions were defined and various hints concerning methodological strategies were offered. Because of the unfortunate external circumstances of the voyage, this field manual could not be put into effect during Baudin's expedition. Nevertheless, the member of the Société who participated in the enterprise and represented the sciences

of men, François Peron, was the first to test a cross-cultural differential hypothesis using experimental methods. As far as empirical studies of other peoples are concerned, another member of the "Observateurs" has to be mentioned, namely Volney. He used his firsthand information about the life of the North-American Indians to argue against the armchair theories then prevailing about these peoples. His account of indigenous social organization and mentality can be interpreted as a forerunner of the later culture-and-personality approaches (Mauviel, 1988).

Due to political changes and a general shift in the intellectual climate, these early predecessors of empirical cross-cultural studies of human diversity were forgotten for more than a century. The 19th-century conception of the variety of human forms of life was marked by two important changes of perspective, diverting dominant interest away from what we understand as cross-cultural psychology's major goals.

First, there was a strong orientation towards a biological explanation of differences between human groups as distinct "races" having separate origins (Banton, 1987). This emphasis on differences rather than similarities arose in part from efforts at empirical classification (of the living world in general and humans in particular), based initially on the "Great chain of beings." The great taxonomists of the 18th century, like Buffon, Linnaeus, or Blumenbach still defended the idea of the unity of all human forms. But the craniological approaches, which became dominant from the first half of the 19th century onward, attributed the supposed mental inferiority of savages to genetically determined anatomical features. Such ideas are not altogether extinct even at the end of the second millennium (Rushton, 1995).

Second, belief in the general progress of mankind was replaced by two main alternative views. One was that of the above-mentioned race theorists who claimed that each race had a separate origin (polygenism). The other view granted a common origin, but one that was located in the far distant past and claimed that an irreversible diversification had taken place. The latter idea, although not necessitated by Darwinian theory, was not incompatible with it; and polygenists made use of it for their purpose. In such biologically oriented discourse, cultural variations were treated as secondary manifestation of inferiority due to race differences. While race theories were dominant, others like Pritchard in Britain, or Waitz and Bastian in Germany, opposed them and maintained the Enlightenment tradition of psychic unity. A related strand of thought was philological, concerned with the evolution of languages. From mid-19th century onward this became fused with the socio-evolutionary theories of Comte, Spencer, Tylor, and Frazer. Although they were partly influenced by ideas about race, the major thrust of their argument was that climatic and socioeconomic factors, operating over a long time span on a basically uniform human psyche, had produced the existing cultural variations; savages were merely less advanced along the evolutionary path. The social evolutionists prepared the ground for empirical studies, which began during the latter part of the 19th century. This concludes the prehistory, and the second part will deal with outstanding figures and some more recent trends.

Early Pioneers

Edward Burnet Tylor (1832–1917)

Tylor, often regarded as the father of anthropology, framed the famous definition of culture:

Culture or Civilization, taken in its widest ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society. The condition of culture among the various societies of mankind, in so far as it is capable of being investigated on general principles, is a subject apt for the study of laws of human thought and action. (1871/1958, p. 1).

Note the phrase "laws of human thought," implying that these are universal, and so he also regarded the linear progressive development, at differing rates, of all human groups. In the absence of historical information social evolutionists believed that this sequence could be reconstructed by the "comparative method," which entailed looking at the features of contemporary peoples at varying stages of development and thereby teasing out uniform causes. Tylor (1889) proposed a quantitative approach to this problem in a paper read at a meeting in 1888. His aim was to investigate "the development of institutions" by systematic cross-tabulation, in order to demonstrate clusters of customs that must have been the result of general causes, essentially psychological in character. Also present at the meeting was Galton, who pointed that some of the "adhesions" (read "correlations") may be the result of geographical propinquity and consequent borrowing; this is still known as "Galton's problem" (cf. Naroll, 1973). The comparative method was later applied by Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg (1930) in what they sub-titled "an essay in correlation." The idea was subsequently taken up by the American anthropologist G. P. Murdock who created a massive database of all world cultures known as the "Human Relations Area Files" (HRAF). The HRAF has become an important tool for "hologeistic" research, testing hypotheses across a wide range of cultures.

By then, of course, the method had long become entirely divorced from the social evolutionism from which it had originated. The demise of the theory was largely due to the influence of the German-born American anthropologist Franz Boas (1858–1942) to whom we shall return.

Francis Galton (1822–1911)

Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, was the originator of the study of psychological differences between individuals and groups. In his *Hereditary genius* (1869/1914) he devised a scheme for the "classification of men according to their natural gifts," under which he included both "general power" and "special aptitudes." He devised a scale ranging from A (very low) to G (very high), and in the latter part of the book attempted an assessment of "the comparative worth of different races" on that basis. For this purpose he made certain simplifying assumptions

about the distribution of abilities within races. On this basis he rated the ancient Greeks some two grades above contemporary Anglo-Saxons, and the "Lowland Scotch and English North country men . . . a fraction of a grade superior to that of the ordinary English . . ." (1914, p. 328). The African Negroes he ranked two grades below the English, and the Australian Aborigines one grade below Negroes. This sketchy summary might convey the impression that his ratings were arbitrary and merely a function of the racial prejudice so common at the time. Prejudice probably played some part, but Galton also considered a variety of factors, as may be illustrated in relation to Negroes. He began by stating that "If the negro race in America had been affected by no social disabilities, a comparison of their achievements with those of the whites in their several branches of intellectual effort, having regard to the total number of their respective populations, would give the necessary information. As matters stand, we must be content with much rougher data." (1914, pp. 326/7). He then went on to say that there were some outstandingly able Negroes, and many others well above the average of Whites. On the other hand he adduced several supposed reasons why the bulk of Negroes should be considered well below that average; for instance he cited the then generally accepted view that a high proportion of Negroes are half-witted. Galton himself had travelled extensively in Africa, making careful observations. He made use of those in his studies of what he called the "visualising faculty," by which he meant what we now call "space perception": "Among the races that are thus gifted are the commonly despised, but, as I confidently maintain from personal experience, the much underrated Bushmen of South Africa." (Galton 1883/1928, p. 70). Similarly, he attributed to Eskimos the ability "to see vast tracts of country mapped out in their heads" (p. 72). These observations have since been confirmed by more recent work in cross-cultural psychology (cf. Berry, 1966). Galton was also interested in problems of what we would call "acculturation" of "savages" to civilized life and issued a questionnaire on the topic (cf. Jahoda, 1980), though no results were ever published.

William Halse Rivers (1864–1922)

Rivers was an experimental psychologist at Cambridge when he was invited by the anthropologist Alfred C. Haddon to take part in the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits (New Guinea) in 1898. Rivers in turn recruited two other psychologists, William McDougall and C. S. Myers, but his was the major contribution. At the time Rivers was still under the influence of social evolutionary theory, especially Herbert Spencer's version which held that "primitives" expend most of their mental energy on perception and therefore have not developed the higher cognitive processes. Accordingly, the research program, on which Rivers consulted Galton, concentrated on sensory functioning. It covered a remarkably wide range, including many measures of sensory acuity (visual, auditory, and tactile), designed to test the century-old belief that "savages" were closer to animals in possessing a much higher degree of sensory acuity than Europeans. Among other topics were colorvision, color blindness, color nomenclature, sensitivity to pain, discrimination of weights, and motor skills.

It is neither possible nor necessary to say much about the findings, with a few exceptions. What is of major concern in the present context is the methodological sophistication displayed by Rivers and his colleagues, in what must be remembered was the first systematic effort to study "primitives" by psychological methods. All their methods had either been adapted or specially devised for the particular circumstances. Communication was initially in "pidgin English," but they gradually acquired relevant vernacular terms. They were well aware of the need to "sell" their work and "the natives were told that some people had said that the black man could see and hear etc., better than the white man, and that we had come to find out how clever they were. . . ." (Rivers, 1901, p. 3). Men received a reward of a stick of tobacco for a morning's work, children sweets; moreover, medical services were provided for the inhabitants. Even though motivated to do their best, attention would flag when the procedure was lengthy, and pauses were introduced to reduce the effects of fatigue. An increase in "mean variation" (the precursor of standard deviation) over a session was taken as an index of decreasing attention. To control for this, repeated testing was done at different times of the day. On the whole Rivers was confident of the reliability of his measures: "In fact, I believe that the results are in some cases even more consistent than those made by civilized people, and especially by students of psychology. The latter, when asked to make a given measurement, are very apt to begin to speculate about what they are asked to do and allow their knowledge to influence their judgements" (Rivers, 1901, p. 6). It should be mentioned here that Titchener (1916) in a critical article questioned not merely many of Rivers' conclusions as unsubstantiated, but expressed doubts as to whether it is possible in principle to conduct valid experimental research in the field. Essentially he argued that such research cannot be replicated, since no two field situations are alike. His was probably the first attempt at a radical critique of cross-cultural methods. Returning to Rivers, he was faced with the problem of ascertaining ages, often still encountered. He used a variety of devices for rank-ordering, since people usually knew relative ages. He was also well aware that differential familiarity with materials affects the outcome of comparisons, and for this reason introduced practice sessions. Thus he commented that Murray Islanders, as compared with adults from Aberdeen, benefited more rapidly from practice in pitch discrimination.

Rivers displayed considerable ingenuity in devising new approaches. For instance, for the purpose of assessing color preferences he organized discussion groups, checking this (with what are now called "unobtrusive methods") by noting the colors of the cloths worn. A similar approach was used for color nomenclature, where he sought to link an alleged defective sensitivity to blue to the nature of color names. This is one of the areas intensively studied more recently. The other is that of visual illusions, where it had been thought that "savages," being stupid, would be more readily deceived. By showing that Europeans are more susceptible to certain types of illusions, Rivers not only disposed of that notion, but provided the inspiration for the extensive work of Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966).

Rivers' studies were followed up by taking advantage of the presence at the 1904 St. Louis Fair of "primitives" from several parts of the world. F. G. Bruner

(1908) produced a lengthy and detailed report concluding that the hearing of whites, contrary to prevailing beliefs, is superior to that of "primitives." Woodworth (1910), who had also tested people on various sense modalities, disagreed, confirming in most respects Rivers' results. Unlike Rivers, Woodworth never published the details of his procedures (Hayslip, 1973).

Richard Thurnwald (1869–1954)

Seemingly unaware at the time of Rivers' studies, the German ethnologist Richard Thurnwald was engaged on fieldwork in Melanesia between 1906 and 1909. Although not a trained psychologist, he was interested in what he called "ethnic psychology" and carried out a number of small-scale studies as a kind of sideline to his main ethnographic work. Unburdened by the preconceptions of social-evolutionary theory, he decided on some pilot investigations of what we would call cognitive functioning (Thurnwald, 1913). His aim was to bring together ethnology and psychology, and he may thus be regarded as a precursor of what was much later to become psychological anthropology. For that purpose he reckoned that psychophysical studies of sensory processes were unimportant compared with an understanding of differences in higher mental functioning. His approach was ingenious, and in some respects remarkably in advance of his time. For instance, he was the first to employ the method of serial reproduction later associated with Bartlett (cf. Jahoda, 1989). Although much less well known outside his native Germany than Rivers, his contribution was far from negligible and deserves to be better remembered.

Frederic C. Bartlett (1886–1969)

Bartlett was a student of Rivers, which explains the direction of his interests that first found expression in his *Psychology and primitive culture* (1923). In it he argued against the still prevailing ethnocentrism, but it was essentially a rather general and speculative work without empirical data. A decade later he became more directly involved, as he explained in his classic work *Remembering*: "A visit to Africa gave me the opportunity to carry out some first-hand observation on social recall in the relatively little studied group of Swazi natives. Whatever else this part of the work may amount to, I think it may fairly be claimed to point to a type of field investigation for the psychologist which has been strangely neglected, but which might readily yield results, not only of theoretical, but also of great practical importance and value" (1932, p. vi). These were prophetic words, ignored at the time. The book contains the first empirical studies of cultural influences on memory, carried out in both field and laboratory.

An Example: Psychological Research in Africa

A survey of worldwide psychological research during the first half of the 20th century would be a mammoth undertaking that is well beyond our means. However, the existence of excellent bibliographies focusing on Africa makes it possible to roughly outline the major lines of work in that continent. Of the three

main sources available, Andor (1966) lacks an unambiguous classification of articles, Irvine, Sanders, and Klingelhofer (1970) do not cover years prior to 1950, and therefore the work of Hoorweg and Marais (1969) has been used.

Out of a total of some sixty studies reported for the period up to 1949, more than half were concerned with either IQ-testing as such or discussions (often with few if any data) of African learning ability; a single important exception is dealt with more fully below. About one-third of the studies concern the performance of African children at school. The remainder is largely clinical, though if one counts contributions made by psychiatrists (which have been excluded) the proportion would be higher. Experimental studies are conspicuous by their absence, unless one includes work by Thouless (1933) on perception, done with African students in Britain, or a study by an anthropologist originally trained in psychology (Nadel, 1937).

Generally, it will be seen that apart from IQ-testing the total amount of cross-cultural work over half a century was practically negligible, and that in spite of the fact that psychologists were active in the European countries with colonial possessions in Africa. The reasons for this indifference are probably twofold: psychologists other than those concerned with individual and group differences were at the time, even more than now, convinced that theirs was a universalist science; and then there was the simple fact that few, if any, psychologists had any opportunity for a career in Africa. The one important exception, referred to above, was South Africa where professional psychology existed. One educational psychologist, affiliated with the National Bureau for Educational and Social Research, wrote a report in which he claimed that African children in early adolescence are some four or five years inferior in educability, as judged by IQ tests, than European children. A powerful refutation of this absurd claim was published in a book by Biesheuvel (1943), who subsequently became one of the most distinguished occupational and cross-cultural psychologists. The early post-war years remained rather fallow, but thereafter began a surge that is evident from Table 1-1, covering the decade of the 1950s.

**TABLE 1-1 Psychology in Africa 1950-1959:
Numbers of publications (of a total of 187)
dealing with various topics**

Occupational	36
IQ tests and similar ("learning ability")	34
Clinical	26
Social	21
Developmental	18
Experimental	14
Educational	13
Personality/Motivation	11
Projective techniques	10
Effects of malnutrition	3

It will be seen that some three times more was done during that decade than during the whole of the preceding half century. Moreover, the range of topics became greatly widened, a change for which several factors were responsible. The dominance of occupational psychology reflects the intense activity of the National Institute of Personnel Research in South Africa and to a lesser extent that of institutions like the Institut Français de l'Afrique Noire (IFAN). The category "IQ tests and similar" now covers a much greater proportion of occupational ability testing, and clinical work by psychologists also increased, notably in the francophone territories. There was also a great surge in nonapplied research, due in considerable part to the founding of new universities to which psychologists (initially in very small numbers) came to be recruited. Lastly, a trickle of researchers from outside Africa began, notably from the United States where there had been a long tradition of black-white comparisons. Although it is of course not suggested that this African example is representative of the world output of cross-cultural research, it is probably typical of a period of increasingly rapid expansion. It should also be noted that until the 1970s, when the number of black African psychologists had begun to increase, the bulk of research in Africa had been undertaken by expatriates or South African whites.

Psychology in India and Latin America⁷

In these countries, unlike the situation in Africa, indigenous psychologists existed and were active during the postwar years. While they sometimes collaborated with (mainly North American) colleagues, independent contributions became increasingly common. Similarly, while at the outset "transplanted" western psychology was dominant and much of the work was imitative and consisted of replications, this also began to change toward the end of the period considered here.

In India much of the early work was prompted by doubts as to whether the findings of "borrowed" psychology were valid under the very different socio-cultural conditions of the Indian subcontinent. This concerned studies in a variety of spheres such as reaction time, perception, and moral judgments—very different from the African research conducted by expatriates with its strong emphasis on intelligence testing. Much of the work dealt with applied fields such as problems of morale and effective supervision in industrial organizations (Bose, 1955, 1958; Ganguli, 1954, 1961) and factors affecting job satisfaction (Sinha, 1958). Many of these studies were not directly comparative, but others were, such as Sinha (1963) on manifest anxiety and Minturn and Lambert (1964) on child-rearing practices. Generally, aspects of child development became a salient topic during the 1960s (Verma et al., 1969; Muralidharan, 1971), but Piagetian studies came later. Lastly, special mention should be made of a pioneering study by Sinha (1969) of motivation among a rural population, which anticipated the "cultural psychology" approach. From the 1970s onward cross-cultural psychology blossomed into a vigorous area of research activity (Mittra, 1972; Pareek, 1981; Pandey, 1988; see also Sinha chapter in this volume).

Latin America has a long tradition in psychology, and as early as 1920 a psychologist in Lima used the Binet-Simon Test with Peruvian children. After the translation of Freud's work in 1923 the influence of psychoanalysis became important, as reflected, for instance, in studies of black Brazilians (Ardila, 1982, 1994). Such scattered early studies were not comparative, and the impetus for the beginnings of cross-cultural studies stemmed from the foundation in 1951 in Mexico of the Inter-American Society of Psychology. By the time of the third congress of the Society, which took place in Austin, Texas, the general tenor of the contributions had a pronounced cross-cultural flavor (Gilbert, 1956). In successive congresses this tendency became progressively more marked, and a distinctive new approach focusing on the concept of "sociocultural premises" was introduced by Diaz-Guerrero (1963, 1964). The presidential address of the eleventh congress was entitled "Cross-cultural studies in psychology," which epitomized the overall theme (Natalicio, Hereford, & Natalicio, 1967). Lastly, special mention should be made of one of the most comprehensive comparative (Mexican versus US) studies ever undertaken, which employed a longitudinal overlapping design with a sample of children aged between 7 and 18 years, which started with work by Diaz-Guerrero (1964) and was later published as a book (Holtzman, Diaz-Guerrero, & Swartz, 1975). As evidenced, from the 1950s onward a lively concern with cross-cultural issues developed in Latin America, which has also been documented by Ardila (1968, 1982).

The Institutionalization of Cross-Cultural Psychology

The 1960s saw a continuing expansion at an accelerated rate, reflected in the growth of publication outlets: the *Journal of Social Psychology* published many early cross-cultural studies; the *International Journal of Psychology*, largely devoted to cross-cultural and cross-national topics, first appeared in 1966, to be followed in 1970 by the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Enough material was by then available for the publication of a series of books of readings, the first and least well known among these being a collection of translations from French sources (Wickert, 1967). Under the aegis of the International Biological Programme several cross-cultural psychologists under the editorship of Biesheuvel (1969) were invited to contribute to a manual concerned with "practical knowledge of cross-cultural testing and its problems." This showed a recognition of special cross-cultural expertise by a prestigious international body. The International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology was established in 1972 with Jerome Bruner as the president. A year later the *Annual Review of Psychology* for the first time included a chapter on "psychology and culture" (Triandis, Malpass, & Davidson, 1973). In terms of publication outlets and an institutional basis, cross-cultural psychology had "arrived" by the mid-1970s. In 1984 it was formally established also in the francophone scientific community by the foundation of ARIC ("Association pour la recherche interculturelle").

However, as far as university curricula are concerned, the acceptance of the relevance of culture for psychology has been exceedingly slow and patchy; the

gains achieved by the mid-90s have not been negligible, but neither have they been very substantial. There are several reasons for this reluctance, and possibly the major one is the threat posed by cross-cultural psychology to the supposed universality of psychological "laws" based on studies in western industrial countries. Surveying the overall trends in cross-cultural psychology from Rivers to the present, certain features stand out. While Rivers followed well-controlled experimental procedures, this approach fell largely into abeyance for some sixty years. Most of the work during that period tended to be loosely descriptive, without any guiding theory or hypotheses. It was either oriented toward practical problems in the colonial setting, or chiefly concerned to demonstrate "differences" (read "deficiencies") between non-western peoples and Europeans. This was usually done by comparing either performances or responses on some kind of scale by Europeans and non-Europeans, and often adducing a more or less ad hoc (and often "racial") interpretation of the differences found.

One notable exception was the work of Luria in Uzbekistan during the early 1930s. Its theoretical basis was the Russian socio-historical school of Vygotsky, which in turn goes back to Marx and Hegel, though in addition Vygotsky drew his inspiration from Janet, Lévy-Bruhl, and Wundt. Unlike the then prevailing preoccupation with intelligence testing, Luria was concerned with modes of cognitive functioning, especially syllogistic reasoning and its relationship to formal schooling. Since its results were at the time regarded as politically unsound, it was not published for more than a generation until the political climate had changed (Luria, 1976). The Vygotskian socio-historical theory inspired Michael Cole, who was largely responsible for introducing it into the West. Trained as an experimental psychologist, his early work in West Africa was conducted basically along the lines of cross-cultural psychology. However, as he himself explained (Cole, 1978), he began to have doubts about the assumptions underlying much of cross-cultural psychology and some loss of faith in conventional experimentation in that field. The theories of Vygotsky and Luria led him to a fundamental rethinking of the nature of "culture" and its relation to the human mind, and also of the ways in which these issues could be investigated. Hence he moved from "cross-cultural" to what is now known as "cultural" psychology, but his position is in some respects very different from that adopted later by Shweder (1990).

Returning to the main line of cross-cultural psychology, this did not take off again until after the Second World War. The most outstanding turn towards more rigorous research was the effort by Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits (1966) to provide explanations for the old findings by Rivers concerning visual illusions. Their hypothesis that ecological factors were responsible was largely confirmed, and from then onward and for more than two decades ecological theorizing remained prominent. Unlike their interpretation of a direct effect of ecology on perceptual processes, later studies saw ecology as determining modes of subsistence, which in turn tended to shape culture or at least set certain constraints on it. For a period psychological differentiation became a key concept linking ecology with culture and individual development; but eventually in a large-scale critical project (Berry et al., 1986) it failed to come up to its initial promise. Roughly

the same period also saw a burgeoning interest in the cross-cultural testing of Piagetian theory, whose origins will be examined in more detail in the following section. Moreover, the cross-cultural study of infant and child development also came to be pursued in alternative theoretical contexts (e.g., Vygotsky and attachment theory), all of which yielded valuable fresh insights. As far as social psychology is concerned, much attention has lately been devoted to acculturation studies, and cultural differences in individual and group behaviour have been analyzed in terms of "individualism-collectivism." The latter, it should be noted, is essentially a descriptive concept, the question as to why cultures come to be located in particular segments of this dimension being so far left open. Other topics displaying more continuity over several decades have been perception, memory, and other cognitive processes.

The Beginnings of Piagetian Studies

In his earliest writings Piaget, influenced by Lévy-Bruhl, put a great deal of emphasis on what we would now call socio-cultural factors. For instance, he argued (Piaget, 1928) that "primitive mentality" is less socialized than our own. There followed a phase when this stance appears to have been largely abandoned, the theory being presented as though it had been a purely psychobiological one. Perhaps this impression is misleading, but what is certain is that most publications of that period scarcely contain any mention of possible cultural variations. During the 1950s Piaget took part in discussions on child development (Tanner & Inhelder, 1960) attended also by Margaret Mead. It is likely that her persuasive arguments made some impact. At any rate, his own contribution, while still under the heading of "psychobiological development" was marked by a distinct change of tone:

As regards the cultural and social aspect, we may recall how Margaret Mead, who proposed repeating in New Guinea certain of our intelligence tests (conservation, spatial relations, etc.) was in agreement with the theory according to which the stages of reactions to these tests might be the same as regards the order of succession, but might be very different as regards average ages or even the non-attainment of higher levels. And this implies that social factors are constantly interacting with other factors . . . all this is self-evident (Tanner & Inhelder, 1960, p. 5).

In fact Margaret Mead's (1932) work with Manus children of the Admiralty Islands had been a pioneering study of animism. Her radically negative conclusions were, however, generally not supported in numerous subsequent replications inspired by Piaget. Early ones include Dennis (1943) with Zuni and Hopi children, and Jahoda (1958) with Ga, Ewe, and Fante ones in Ghana. In 1959 an unpublished Ph.D. thesis by D. M. G. Hyde at the University of London dealt with the development of the concept of number among children in Aden. This

was followed by Price-Williams's (1961) work on concepts of conservation of quantity with Tiv children in Nigeria, and Goodnow's (1962) Piagetian study with Hong Kong Chinese children. A few years later Piaget (1966) gave his full blessing to such efforts, going so far as to concede that his theory must remain "conjectural" as long as it has not been verified cross-culturally. Thereafter followed an almost exponential expansion of cross-cultural Piagetian studies across the globe, largely confirming a uniform sequence of stages though not their chronology in terms of age (Dasen, 1972). In order to explain such developmental differences, research turned to the analysis of factors influencing cognitive performance in different cultures. These included ecological settings, the kinds of objects present in the children's environments, and the pattern of everyday activities (Dasen & Heron, 1981). These lines of research meshed with the socio-historical approach, which focused on the functional relationship between situational demands and cognitive competencies, stressing context-specificity in structuring cognitive development (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983).

While cognitive development has been by far the most important topic of cross-cultural research, mention should also be made of Kohlberg whose (1958) thesis on "moral thinking" was based on Piaget's (1932) classical work on moral judgment. Kohlberg postulated a more elaborate series of stages of "moral reasoning" which he regarded as universal. The outcome of numerous cross-cultural tests of this claim remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the existence and invariant sequence of most of Kohlberg's stages could be demonstrated in many cultures and the often presumed western bias of his morality concept (e.g., Simpson, 1974) could not be firmly established. On the other hand, cross-cultural research revealed that Kohlberg's key choice of the justice principle is not as comprehensive as theoretically assumed: there are other ethical principles like filiation, cosmic orientation, or collective happiness (Eckensberger 1993; Eckensberger & Zimba in this *Handbook*; Edwards, 1981, 1986; Snarey, 1985).

Some Methodological Debates

The simple comparisons of (usually) a European with a non-European group on some measures have been radically challenged by Campbell and Naroll (1961), on the grounds that any comparison of two natural groups can in practice seldom be adequately interpreted. The context in which they developed their discussion was Malinowski's critique of Oedipal theory, a perennial topic of debate. Since there are innumerable differences of various kinds between Trobriand and Vienna, many of these could provide alternative explanations that could not be ruled out; hence in such pairwise comparisons "other things" cannot be assumed to be equal, and therefore the significance of such results remains obscure. The minimum requirement is "triangulation," making it possible to show that certain relationships remain constant across three or more cultures.

Subsequently, one way in which the comparison of two natural groups can be rendered meaningful has been demonstrated by Rosch Heider (1972) in the con-

text of color focality. The hypothesis was that focal colors would be better recalled than non-focal ones, irrespective of cultural background or color lexicon. There are, of course, vast differences between the Dani and Americans, including a sharp contrast in color vocabulary (Dani have only two terms). It is thus not surprising that in absolute terms American subjects recalled far more colors than Dani subjects; but *relatively* better recall of focal colors was found in both sets of subjects.

Another issue, dealt with more fully in later chapters of this volume, concerns the logical status of "culture" from a methodological point of view. An early approach was that of Strodbeck (1964), who proposed that "culture" could be regarded as an experimental "treatment" for individual subjects. Perhaps the investigator has reason to believe that some kind of experience may affect individuals in a particular way; he may then search for a culture which can serve as a natural experiment to test this idea (cf. Berry, 1966). But Segall (1984) dismissed "culture" as an intolerably vague entity and proposed substituting sets of variables. He agreed with LeVine's (1970) suggestion that one should start with dependent variables: "first find a puzzle, then try to find the variables that solve it" (p. 129). But how do you find a worthwhile puzzle? This clearly depends on prior research having been done. It would be useful in this connection to distinguish between "hypothesis-generating" and "hypothesis-testing" research.

These kinds of discussions clearly indicate that the ideal-type cross-cultural psychology takes natural science as its model. The avowed object is to discover the causes of such cultural differences as may be encountered, and to tease out the universal psychological features underlying such surface differences. These aims are grounded in the positivist philosophy whose origins, together with that of its alternative, have already been sketched. This alternative has in recent years re-emerged under the banner of "cultural psychology." In its ideal-type version this implies a complete rejection of the natural science model in favor of the status of a *Geisteswissenschaft*, a humane discipline.

The Rise and Decline of the Culture-and-Personality School

In a seminal paper Boas (1896) attacked the basic assumption of social evolutionary theory, in particular the supposed uniformity of progressive development taken to be the outcome of the same psychic disposition responding to similar environmental contingencies. Boas argued that apparently similar cultural phenomena could have been produced by quite different historical, environmental, and psychological influences. The methodological consequence was that one should abandon global theorizing, concentrating instead on particular local cultures. This emphasis on historical and environmental factors also led him to criticize interpretations in terms of race (Boas, 1911). Among his students were Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, who each in their own way extended and reinterpreted Boas' environmental determinism. Unlike Tylor, who always referred to "culture" in the singular, they were concerned with particular cul-

tures; and under the influence of Gestalt psychology they saw them as specifically patterned and integrated. This suggested a parallel between the organization of a culture and that of a personality, an analogy carried furthest by Benedict (1934) who stated that culture is "personality writ large"; accordingly, she also used a typology derived from Jung to characterize cultures. Mead began as a psychology "Major" and in many of her field trips carried a psychological toolbox with her. Her early book on Samoa (1928) has the subtitle *A psychological study of primitive youth for Western civilisation* (revealing incidentally the axe she had to grind), and in an appendix the tests she used are listed. Her initial unbridled environmentalism, moderated later, led her to claim that human behavior is almost infinitely malleable.

The predominance of the "configurational" approach to culture and personality declined when Ralph Linton replaced Boas at Columbia University (Department of Anthropology) and ran seminars on the topic with Abram Kardiner, a neo-Freudian psychoanalyst. Their aim was to move from broad generalities to identifying the actual processes linking culture, ecology, and personality. They proposed a causal chain going from ecology to "primary institutions" (types of subsistence, households, and child training) to what they named "basic personality structure" (shared motivations and neuroses, etc.) to "secondary institutions" (religion, mythology, and other projective elements). While Kardiner directed the enterprise from Columbia, the anthropologists went into the field and collected data (which included Porteus Maze tests, children's drawings, and notably Rorschach protocols) to be subsequently analyzed (Kardiner et al., 1939, 1945). This model held out the promise of being able to unravel the dynamic interactions between subsistence, child training, and shared psychological characteristics. Unfortunately the model suffered from many weaknesses. As Melford Spiro once wrote, its juxtaposition of culture and personality was "a false dichotomy."

When the assumption of common "basic personality structure" was not merely incapable of being demonstrated empirically, but came to be questioned theoretically, Cora DuBois (1944/1961) suggested a shift to the notion of "modal personality." This implies that each culture has a personality type that occurs with the greatest relative frequency, which seems more plausible. Strict ascertainment of "modal personality" is, however, complicated by the shortcomings of personality measures and the practical difficulty of achieving representativeness in larger populations. One of the most interesting and sophisticated examples of this kind of approach was of LeVine (1966), who concentrated on levels of achievement motivation in three major Nigerian groups, namely Hausa, Ibo, and Yoruba. He postulated the following causal chain: status mobility system—parental values (concept of ideal successful man)—child rearing practices—frequencies of certain personality variables. His predicted decreasing order of nAch (Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa) was confirmed, a fact which embroiled him in controversy with the advent of the Biafran war. While the original culture-and-personality school faded away in the post-war period, the concern with the relationship between child training and personality persisted. Outstanding contributors in this sphere were John and Beatrice Whiting, who moved from initial use of the Human Relations

Area Files to an extensive program of systematic observations. An overview not only of their work, but that of most prominent others in that field can be found in Spindler (1978).

Relations between Psychology and Psychological Anthropology

As far as academic psychology is concerned, the relationship has been almost exclusively an asymmetric one. Most anthropologists have always recognized their need for a psychology (cf. Jahoda, 1982). Amateur as well as later professional ethnographers were expected to provide information about the psychological characteristics of the peoples they visited. As soon as psychological tools became available, anthropologists began to use them in the field. In the Hall of Pacific Peoples of the American Museum of Natural History, dedicated to Margaret Mead, her collection of psychological testing materials is displayed. Yet all this was before there was any "psychological anthropology" as such. The first use of that expression dates back to mid-19th century, when the notorious racist (and, incidentally, uncle of Rivers) James Hunt uttered these prophetic words in his retiring address to the Anthropological Society of London: "After a time, I think it will be found that the study of physical anthropology will be followed by researches in psychological anthropology." (Hunt, 1867, p. lxviii) Two years later Owen Pike commented that "without psychology there is no anthropology" (1870, p. xi). But it was not until 1961, when Hsu edited what appears to have been the first book with the title "psychological anthropology," that a new specialization was so named. Initially it was in fact a re naming of the culture-and-personality tradition, that had fallen into some disrepute. The need for such a special field had been recognized in 1931 by Malinowski, who had written: "Between the spheres of psychology and anthropology, there is today a No-man's-land. Whether or not this will ever be claimed a special branch of science, it must for the present be filled by workers in both fields making excursions towards the other's province. Nor should the serious worker in either field ignore or resent such excursions, for they may have much of value for him in indicating new lines of research" (Malinowski, 1931, p. xi).

Although Malinowski was based at the London School of Economics, his views were far from typical of British anthropology. From the 1930s until about the 1960s this was dominated by the Durkheimian ideology of Radcliffe-Brown, whose social-structural approach, contrasted with the cultural style of American anthropology, denied any relevance of psychology. One later British anthropologist remarked on the "phobic reaction to psychology and psychoanalysis of Radcliffe-Brown and his followers" (Lewis 1977, p. 2).

Similarly, early in the century French anthropology was predominantly physical. The distinguished psychologist Henri Piéron wrote an article in 1909 with the title *L'anthropologie psychologique* that invited French anthropologists to take advantage of what psychology then had to offer; there seems to have been no

response. The same was true in Britain of a paper by Sir Frederic Bartlett (1937) on *Psychological methods and anthropological problems*. The differences in American and European attitudes to psychology are probably to be accounted for by the enormous influence on American anthropology of Franz Boas, who from the early stages of his career onwards had a lively interest in the subject. During the later post-war period anthropological opinion in France and Britain changed. Radcliffe-Brown's dominance faded, and in France Lévi-Strauss echoed Owen Pike when he said "l'ethnologie est d'abord une psychologie." (Ethnology is first of all a psychology).

Returning to psychological anthropology, this has undergone substantial changes of direction during the past two decades or so. Originally it had remained fairly closely tied to its inheritance from the personality-and-culture school, with its psychoanalytic theories and projective techniques. The reason was that the academic theories of the period had little to offer towards an understanding of what Kluckhohn called "human nature in the raw," the behavior of people in their sociocultural contexts, their meanings and values which concern anthropologists. The coming of the "cognitive revolution" and the progress in developmental psychology changed all that, and they eagerly (perhaps sometimes excessively so) seized upon conceptual tools which, together with others from linguistics and biology, they came to regard as valuable and relevant. A convergence occurred whereby anthropologists from America and Europe, irrespective of whether or not they adopted the label "psychological," seized upon the new ideas. This may exemplified by a recent book on cognitive aspects of religious symbolism (Boyer, 1993): three, including the editor, are British; and the others are French, American, and Canadian. This cross-national rapprochement between anthropology and psychology unfortunately remains very one-sided. In a recent survey of developments in psychological anthropology (Schwartz, White, & Lutz, 1992) several of the contributors note regretfully that their acceptance of modern psychology has not been reciprocated. Few psychological texts cite any anthropological work, and though the contributors fail to mention it, this also applies largely to texts in cross-cultural psychology.

Continuing Foci of (Cross-) Cultural Interest from the Past Until Today

Our brief sketch of the history of cultural and cross-cultural psychology should have revealed recurring methodological approaches and theoretical ideas. Whether this may be considered the result of the universal psychic structure of the human beings involved in theory building (as Vico would have argued), or whether caused by the historical transmission of basic ideas, are moot issues. In any case, there is a lesson to be learned: being more familiar with the work of our historical ancestors not only helps to give a clearer awareness of our own hidden assumptions, but may also reduce the danger of a periodic re-invention of the wheel. Thus, to conclude, we would like to summarize some of these continuing themes of (cross)-cultural theory building and research.

The Cultural Bias of Human Self-Understanding

What is actually discussed under the title of the "emic-etic" problem, or the challenge of establishing equivalent forms of concepts and methods for cross-cultural analysis, has a long history in different guises. Ethnocentric distortions could be purely taxonomic, totally ignoring the status as a human being of the cultural other; or they could be evolutionary, considering otherness as an immature form of our actual existence; or they appear in our empirical approaches by measuring, observing, and conceptualizing the other through our lenses. Thus, in spite of their very different forms, all historical approaches to the analysis of human diversity seem to entail the inevitability of cultural reference points in attempts at human self-understanding.

Perception and Cognition

Until the end of the 19th century it was believed, on the basis of anecdotal evidence, that the sensory acuity of "savages" greatly exceeded that of Europeans. This notion was linked to the supposedly greater "animality" of savages. For a long time this remained merely part of the conventional wisdom, until Cuvier's "new biology" seemed to provide it with a scientific foundation. Some observers began to question this view during the latter part of the 19th century, and one of Rivers' chief aims in the course of the Cambridge expedition to the Torres Straits was to settle the issue. Rivers demonstrated the falsity of the belief and also carried out studies of illusion susceptibility, putting forward a hypothesis to explain the differences. After a lapse of about half a century this was taken up in the now classical work of Segall et al. (1966), which marked the start of modern cross-cultural studies of perceptual function.

The supposedly greater "animality" of "savages" also long entailed the view that they were ignorant and stupid, lacking in reason. This notion came to be modified by many of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, who saw in the savages the infancy of humanity, destined to continuous upward progress. They distinguished ignorance from stupidity: according to them, savages were ignorant in the sense that they had not yet achieved art and science, but they were not stupid. The possession of reason was regarded as an inherent characteristic of all humans, who differed only in the extent to which they were able to apply reason effectively. This view, which corresponds essentially to our own, largely came to be abandoned during the 19th century. Biological racism implied the permanent inferiority of the "lower races." The contrast can be nicely illustrated by a comparison: both Ferguson in mid-18th century, and Lubbock some hundred years later, gave similar accounts of the practical skills of savages. While the former sought thereby to show that they were far from stupid, the latter used it to exemplify their low levels of functioning. The social evolutionist Herbert Spencer argued that "primitives" were so preoccupied with perception that they had little mental energy left for reflection. This was a view Rivers had accepted at the time

of the Cambridge expedition, who therefore made no attempt to assess higher mental functioning, confining himself to sensory processes. Early in the 20th century Lévy-Bruhl put forward his (often misunderstood) thesis that the modes of thought of primitives were fundamentally different from those of westerners, though he did not suggest that they were stupid. In somewhat different form, the kinds of problems raised by him still remain central to many contemporary studies of cognition across cultures.

Language and Thought

The relationship between language and thought was extensively debated by 18th century philosophers, including such figures as Vico, Condillac, Maupertius, Monboddo, and Reid. Several of them pointed to the close connection between the language and the character or "spirit" of a people, especially Herder who regarded language as the embodiment of the *Volksgeist*, and Leibnitz. Wilhelm von Humboldt put forward a view that was fairly close to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, and toward the end of the 19th century Müller rather extravagantly argued for the identity of language and thought. Wundt regarded language as the product of higher cognitive processes, while Piaget (like Tylor before him) viewed such processes as to some extent separate from language. The relationship of language to culture and thought continues to be a prominent theme in psychological anthropology and to a lesser degree in cross-cultural psychology.

Reason and Morality

The notion that reason and morality go together is a very ancient one: reason is a necessary precondition for being able to make moral judgments. "Savages" were regarded as being devoid of both. The conjunction is implicit in the title of Chapter V of Darwin's *The Descent of Man*: "On the development of the intellectual and moral faculties during primeval and civilized times." Although this link had long been taken for granted, it was not until the work of Piaget and its elaboration by Kohlberg that the processes underlying it had been systematically examined. Since then cultural influences on "moral reasoning" have been extensively studied.

Character and Personality

The idea of "national character" is an ancient one. In the 18th century Montesquieu discussed it, and Hume wrote a celebrated essay on it. Herder put forward the concept of the "*Volksgeist*," which foreshadowed Shweder's version of contemporary cultural psychology. The determinants of national character were extensively discussed by Murray (1808), who took a remarkably modern view: "But I

think it evident that the characteristic qualities . . . are wholly unconnected with those external marks by which races are distinguished. . . . Mind is a more flexible substance, and yields more readily to the influence of altered circumstances." (p. 151). Nineteenth century travellers and missionaries reported regularly on the character of the peoples they had visited, though their accounts were usually rather simplistic and stereotypical. This may have been the reason why Galton (1877) proposed a more systematic approach. Interestingly, he suggested that since writers of fiction and plays are expert at depicting character, anthropologists should elaborate a typology derived from literature; and could form the basis for future more exact measurement.

Around the turn of the century a number of books were published in France on the "psychologie des peuples" that usually contained character sketches. These may be regarded as the precursors of more recent writings on national character, but not of the culture-and-personality school which had other sources. It was Wundt's *Völkerpsychologie* which prompted Freud to write *Totem and Taboo*, thereby inspiring the anthropologist Roheim to conduct psychoanalytically oriented field studies. Another impetus came from Boas who encouraged his students, notably Benedict and Mead, to examine "the way in which personality reacts to culture" (Boas, 1928, p. xiv). Subsequently Kardiner, a neo-Freudian, drew on both traditions in formulating his own approach which is most closely associated with the label of "culture and personality." The decline of that school was paralleled by an increasing resort to the Human Relations Area Files and the rise of what became known as "psychological anthropology."

There has been a resurgence of interest in aspects of the relationship between culture and personality, chiefly focusing on two domains. One is that of cultural variations in concepts of self and personhood, and the consequences in terms of psychological functioning of such variant "cultural selves" (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Marsella, DeVos & Hsu, 1985; Miller, 1994, in this handbook; Smith & Bond, 1993). The other concerns cultural options of identity management in the process of acculturation (Camilleri et al., 1990; Camilleri & Malewska-Peyre in this handbook; Liebkind, 1992).

Eco-Systems and Mind

Differences between peoples have long been attributed to environmental factors. Originally climate was regarded as the main determinant, but from the 18th century onward the emphasis shifted to modes of subsistence. During the 19th century Waitz used environmental arguments and coined the now well-worn phrase of the "psychic unity of mankind" in opposing the biological racists (cf. Jahoda, 1995). Marx stressed the effects of material conditions of life on mental functioning. His modern successors were Vygotsky and Luria, and they in turn inspired Cole's version of cultural psychology (Cole, 1990). In a somewhat different style an ecological approach to anthropology developed, which was subsequently taken up in cross-cultural psychology, notably by Berry (1966, 1994).

Conclusion: Continuity and Novelty

The preceding brief sketch illustrates the continuity of some dominant themes over long periods of time. Against such similarity of broad themes, which often fails to be adequately recognized, must be set the substantial changes that have taken place. Most of the earlier discussions, while often shrewd and insightful, remained in essence speculative and the evidence at best anecdotal. The advent of empirical studies has entailed the posing of more precise questions to which the answers had to be sought. New and powerful methods have been elaborated that make it possible to go beyond the establishment of links between disparate phenomena, by specifying the processes which constitute these links. This has resulted in the opening up of new fields that had previously barely been touched upon.

An interesting example is that of childhood. All the old writers took it for granted not only that "the child is the father of the man," but that children grow up to become members of a particular culture (as we would call it now). However, it never seems to have occurred to them that this was in any way problematic. Another sphere which had to await modern research is that of social behavior. Customs and beliefs were certainly described, sometimes in insightful ways, but few broader generalizations were attempted. Not surprisingly, in periods when Europeans regarded most others peoples as savages or barbarians devoid of reason, no one thought of the possibility of "indigenous psychologies." The current interest in these is a product of our very different intellectual climate. Yet this climate no doubt also imposes constraints on our own constructs, constraints that will become obvious only to future generations.

Endnotes

1. For detailed information about the predecessors of anthropology during Antiquity and the Middle Ages see Baldry, (1965); Friedman, (1981); Hodgen, (1964); Müller, (1972).

2. It remains to be mentioned that the Arab tradition of ethno- and historiographic description was well advanced as compared with European work of the Middle Ages (Voget, 1975). But as the Arabs were strongly influenced by the anthropological theorizing of classical Antiquity during this period, it is not surprising that they also shared the beliefs in monstrous races and unfavorable images of Blacks (Al-Azmeh, 1992).

3. For a detailed description of the Renaissance's conception of humanity see Garin (1990) and Rowe (1965). A rich documentation of the Renaissance's image of other peoples and an analysis of the reports of outstanding conquerors

and missionaries is offered by Bitterli (1991), Dickason (1984), Greenblatt (1990), Schmitt (1984), and Todorov (1985).

4. For more detailed information on the history of Anthropology see Bitterli (1991), Duchet (1971), Harris (1968), Jahoda (1992), Krewer (1992), Mühlmann (1986), Slotkin (1965), Stocking (1968, 1987), Voget (1975).

5. Lazarus (1851) already published the basic ideas about ten years earlier.

6. For a detailed analysis see Jahoda (1992), Oelze (1991), Schneider (1991).

7. We are greatly indebted to Professors Rogelio Diaz-Guerrero and Durganand Sinha, leading figures of cross-cultural research, who gave us the benefit of their unrivalled experience. We have freely borrowed from the accounts they very kindly made available.

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2

CULTURE AS ANTECEDENT TO BEHAVIOR

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Introduction

We present in this chapter the central underlying theoretical frameworks, assumptions, and unique characteristics, as well as criticisms, of the cross-cultural comparative approach in psychology. Also included are overviews of several current perspectives in cross-cultural psychology that have been described by their progenitors and practitioners as frameworks, models, theories, paradigms, or heuristic devices. Whatever they are called, all of them suggest specific orientations and methodologies designed to help explain interrelationships, at the level of the individual, between some aspect of culture and some psychological process or phenomenon. This general survey should bring the reader up to date on current thinking in cross-cultural psychology with respect to the various theoretical guidelines used by psychological researchers asking questions about the effect(s) that culture exerts on human behavior.

Historical Approaches

Our first task is to update Gustav Jahoda's chapter that appeared in the first edition of the *Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology* (Jahoda, 1980). Entitled "Theoretical and Systematic Approaches in Cross-Cultural Psychology," Jahoda summarized the main characteristics of the leading frameworks, theories, and models that had guided a generation of psychologists who attempted to make sense out of the complex relationships between culture, as an antecedent of thought and action, and human behavior. Jahoda organized his chapter around seven perspectives which, in the late 1970s when he reviewed the literature, were popular and influential in cross-cultural psychology. The following brief review of and commentary on Jahoda's chapter provides a background against which most of the more recent perspectives in cross-cultural psychology might be compared and contrasted.

When Jahoda began his review about 18 years ago he had the daunting task of finding threads of cross-cultural research activity that had been running through various disciplines for several decades. Because there were few books in the area and a scarcity of extensive and reliable organizations or networks of cross-cultural researchers to use as guides, Jahoda assumed the role of both synthesizer and critic. The perspectives Jahoda selected were culture and personality, achievement motivation, subjective culture, psychometric approaches, psychological differentiation, Piagetian genetic psychology, and experimental anthropology. This chapter includes a brief summary of what Jahoda identified as major theoretical and systematic approaches, with historical insights to help us understand and explain current perspectives.

Culture and Personality

The venerable "culture and personality" school was dominated for many years (1920–1945 in particular) by anthropologists, and especially by those who prima-

rily employed psychoanalytic theories and techniques in attempts to understand behavior in specific cultures (Piker, 1994). The basic idea was (and still is) that one's personality and one's culture are inextricably intertwined—not that one *exactly* defines the other, but that a powerful way to appreciate the characteristic mode of the behavior of other people is to understand the role their culture plays in influencing their behavior, a link with which it would be impossible to disagree. How and when and why this happens, however, is what makes the cultural sciences different from one another. Books by Hsu (1972) and Kaplan (1961) contain a good representation of the type of research done by anthropologists in the days when studies of culture and personality were dominant. Classic books by Kardiner (1939; 1945) were cited by Jahoda as examples of earlier thought and work by those who studied relationships between one's culture and one's characteristic mode of thought and behavior. The core of Kardiner's theory of basic personality is that *primary institutions* (such as kinship and socialization) form the *basic personality structure* of a society (Piker, 1994), which in turn leads to *secondary institutions* such as religion, art, and folklore.

The single most important development by scholars in the culture and personality area, in terms of its influence on cross-cultural psychology, was the research program developed by the cultural anthropologists John and Beatrice Whiting, Irving Child, and many of their colleagues and students. The most well-known research effort carried out by these researchers was the Six Cultures Project (e.g., Whiting & Whiting, 1975). The Whitings and their team sought to uncover causal connections between cultural phenomena and the behavior of members of cultures they studied. Accordingly, the primary focus was on the socialization of children and how child rearing practices varied as a function of family type (nuclear—extended) and type of economy (simple—complex). Thus the Whitings believed that any culture, with its specific environment and historical background, can be understood as a "maintenance system" that is antecedent to child-training practices that match the specific needs of each culture. These practices, in turn, lead to the development of certain personality "types," observable in a culture's "projective system," which in the psychoanalytic tradition includes such things as music, art, recreation, play behavior, crime and suicide rates, and so on.

The work of the Whitings and their colleagues resulted in one of the first attempts to develop a model explaining the various relationships between culture and the development of human personality. The model has been influential in generating hypotheses about connections between the individual and the society in which he or she has been socialized; it also influenced the development of more recent models in cross-cultural psychology—for example, the ecocultural model (discussed later in this chapter).

The Six Cultures Project has had continued significance on and importance for the development of cross-cultural psychology. For example, researchers who use systematic observation in naturalistic settings can thank those early efforts in developing such methods, for these techniques and procedures were a central part of data-gathering strategies used by the Whitings and their colleagues

(Longabaugh, 1980; Weick, 1985; Munroe & Munroe, 1994a, b). Also, the currently popular idea of the "developmental niche" proposed by Super and Harkness (1986, 1994; Volume 2, this *Handbook*) is a direct descendent of the Six Cultures Project.

Achievement Motivation

Followers of Henry Murray's neo-Freudian theory of personality, which was influential from the 1930s through the 1970s, made noteworthy contributions to the understanding of personality in Western societies. A major reason for this influence was the many creative ways that David McClelland attempted to establish connections between the need to achieve, one of Murray's psychogenic ("learned") needs, and various societal- and individual-level characteristics. McClelland focused especially on how aggregate levels of individual achievement motivation can be used to help explain a society's economic development (McClelland, 1961). Significantly influencing his research strategy was the line of sociological thinking supporting Max Weber's thesis that the Protestant work ethic was of utmost importance in the development of modern capitalism (Weber, 1904).

McClelland's approach in studying achievement motivation is an extension of the culture and personality school. This is so for two primary reasons. First, like other scholars, he attempted to explain diverse cultural approaches to child rearing. Second, a host of background factors—high achievement standards imbued by the family (especially the mother), low dominance by father, certain religious values, and a temperate climate, to name a few, were thought by McClelland and his colleagues to be involved in shaping a child's level of motivation. These factors were treated as "causative" variables. They caused children to compete for internalized standards of excellence, which in turn influenced a culture's rate of economic growth. Of course, the path of causality can be stated differently: A country's rate of economic growth and other indicators of achievement, and indeed a host of other ways that a country might be understood, can be traced to specific child-rearing practices and other background factors that might be seen as predictor variables.

Another reason why the study of achievement motivation is similar to the culture-and-personality approach lies in the idea of "projective systems"—that is, a person's motives or a society's motives can be understood by the ways in which a person's characteristic thought patterns, fantasies, and other products and artifacts are manifested in everyday behavior. Murray developed the Thematic Apperception Test to assess human motives, and that projective test became a mainstay in McClelland's research. Two books dealing with the achievement motive look at the "big picture" both contemporaneously and historically (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 1953; McClelland, 1961). A third book describes a large project that was designed to increase or to exploit need achievement in several cultures where achievement motivation has been, by standard Western definitions, rather low (McClelland & Winter, 1969).

Subjective Culture

All people have unique and characteristic ways of viewing the human-made parts of their societies. This has been called their *subjective culture*. Research on subjective culture can be traced to the work of the late psycholinguist Charles Osgood and his colleagues (Osgood, 1964; Osgood, May, & Miron, 1975). Osgood used the idea of subjective culture in a psycholinguistic sense. Thus studies of lexicons in various cultures, through the use of the "semantic differential technique" to measure affective meaning, led to a comparative base permitting the identification of both universals and cultural specifics in the connotative, or metaphorical, meaning that humans give to their world(s). Osgood carried out a rich and creative program of research throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. His work inspired many throughout psychology.

The psychologist who extended Osgood's research most visibly and energetically, albeit not in the psycholinguistic sense, was Harry Triandis. His book, *The Analysis of Subjective Culture*, written in collaboration with several colleagues in other countries, was among the first clearly cross-cultural psychological books to be published in the "modern" era of cross-cultural psychology (Triandis, 1972). The analysis of subjective culture involved searching for an understanding of how people from different societies perceive their respective social worlds. In his attempts to assess how people in assorted cultures "cut up the pie of experience" and otherwise view the human-made part of the environment, Triandis developed techniques to measure roles, attitudes, stereotypes, norms, beliefs, and values, all human activities that are central to the field of social psychology that he has represented for many years. Like the Six Cultures Project and McClelland's studies of achievement motivation, Triandis also developed a theoretical model of subjective culture, which postulated an array of psychological antecedents and behavioral consequents. Other approaches to comprehending various subjective cultures can be seen in Triandis's more recent efforts to deal with intercultural variations in terms of "cultural syndromes," which are characterized by concepts such as cultural complexity, cultural "tightness" and "looseness," and mainly individualism—collectivism (see Triandis, 1994, 1995). Studies of subjective culture have made their greatest impact by helping to stimulate the growth and development of culture-training programs (e.g., Brislin, Cushner, Cherrie, & Yong, 1986; Cushner & Brislin, 1996; Landis & Bhagat, 1996).

Psychometric Approaches

In selecting this category of research efforts that comprised a meandering, eclectic, yet distinctive thread running through the earlier years in cross-cultural psychology, Jahoda (1980) primarily sought to throw "new light on an old and still controversial problem, namely the intellectual abilities of people of different cultures" (p. 96). More specifically, in his review Jahoda focused on attempts to analyze the cognitive skills prevalent in different societies by examining the structure of mental abilities. The domain of psychometrics has been at once energetic,

popular, and controversial in cross-cultural psychology. Several influential books in the field—which more often than not were edited books resulting from various measurement-oriented conferences—had as a common denominator a desire to understand culture and its relationship to cognition, intelligence, and other dimensions of human performance (Cronbach & Drenth, 1972; Berry & Dasen, 1974; Irvine & Berry, 1983). More recent books continue the tradition of exploring ways in which culture and cognition interact (e.g., Altarriba, 1993).

If the approach known as psychometrics is used in a more generic sense, which means the broad field of psychological testing, then this fourth of the seven frameworks that Jahoda summarized can boast by far the largest number of publications in the domain of cross-cultural psychology. The approach used in this domain is rather simple and straightforward: Select a test, scale, or device (or construct one) that is designed to measure a personality or cognitive dimension, translate it or otherwise modify it for cross-cultural comparative use, and employ it in attempts to discern similarities and/or differences across cultures. A large percentage of published cross-cultural research has relied on more or less traditional psychological testing to gather data that researchers assume will help them understand interactions between culture and behavior.

In the domain of personality measurement, there is a rather deep reservoir of literature that addresses a question of critical interest to clinicians and others who deal with culturally and ethnically diverse clientele: How does one measure the various dimensions of personality and pathology so that the measurements make sense cross-culturally? The cross-cultural study of affective disorders, especially depression, has received considerable attention (Kleinman & Good, 1985; Marsella, Hirschfeld, & Katz, 1987). Likewise, anxiety has been studied extensively across cultures (Spielberger, 1989; Spielberger & Diaz-Guerrero, 1976). There have also been many attempts, using psychometric procedures, to study a variety of other pathological or clinical conditions across cultures. For instance, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the most widely used paper-and-pencil measure of personality and pathology in the world, is extensively used by many in the clinical wing of psychology (Butcher & Graham, 1994). The current availability of 115 translations of the MMPI and/or MMPI/2, which have spread across at least 65 countries, attests to its popularity as a measure of important human characteristics. Dana (1993) and Lonner and Ibrahim (1996) review the cross-cultural use of psychological tests in clinical and other applied areas.

Psychological Differentiation

The late Herman A. Witkin developed a theory of psychological differentiation that posited individual differences in many domains of psychological functioning such as perception, spatial abilities, psychopathology, child-rearing, and interpersonal behavior (Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962).

Using differentiation theory, numerous attempts were made to account for much human behavior depending upon where one fell on a "cognitive style" continuum anchored on one end by a "field dependent" and on the other end by

a "field independent" mode of thinking, perceiving, and behaving. From the late 1960s through the early 1980s, Witkin's theory figured strongly in hundreds of research projects, many of them cross-cultural (Witkin & Berry, 1975; Berry, 1976; Witkin & Goodenough, 1981), and was an important element in Dawson's bio-social psychology (Dawson, 1971). Indeed, it was the transporting and testing of components of differentiation theory in other cultural and ethnic groups that breathed new life into research on cognitive style. To a large extent, the development of John Berry's ecocultural model (discussed later in this chapter) can be traced to his collaboration with Witkin, and a few years earlier, his work with John Dawson. Shortly after Witkin passed away in 1979, there was a noticeable drop in publications that used his ideas.

Piagetian Genetic Psychology

The field of developmental psychology has had an understandably strong influence on cross-cultural psychology (Best & Ruther, 1994). The dominant theory in the developmental domain of psychological research has been Piaget's genetic epistemology. Jahoda observed that this work "... constitutes what is perhaps the most comprehensive and substantial body of knowledge in psychology at present" (1980, p. 108). Note that he said in *psychology* and not just cross-cultural psychology, where its impact has also been substantial. Piaget's approach is a "natural" for cross-cultural extensions (which Piaget, 1966/1974, himself encouraged; cf. Jahoda & Krewer, this volume), because it concerns relationships involving stages and rates of cognitive development and a host of factors that might influence cognitive growth. This is so even though it assumes universality based on the fundamental biological foundation of human experience. Space constraints prevent going into Piagetian psychology in any detail, because the contributions have been so numerous, rich, and varied. There are excellent sources to consult (Dasen, 1972; Dasen, 1977; Segall, Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1990; Mishra's chapter in Volume 2 of this *Handbook*), in addition to Jahoda's summary.

Experimental (Cognitive) Anthropology

The publication of *The Cultural Context of Learning and Thinking* (Cole, Gay, Glick, & Sharp, 1971) some 25 years ago can be taken as the starting point of an approach that in several important ways has been at variance with some basic tenets of cross-cultural psychology. Led primarily by Michael Cole, researchers who follow this general approach have avoided traditional and standard cross-cultural testing and comparisons. Instead, they have placed a premium on exploring and understanding the specific context in which learning and thinking take place. As Jahoda noted, Cole and his colleagues emphasized the concept of the "psychic unity of humankind." The ideas of the Russian psychologist Vygotsky have particularly influenced their research. Skeptical about the reductionism and assumptions involved in traditional cross-cultural psychological research, the agenda of these researchers often has been to show that psychological processes

are common across the human species (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1981). They have argued that an understanding of psychological processes is best done as a result of detailed experimentation in specific cultural settings. To these researchers, "context" is not only paramount in influencing human behavior; behavior can *only* be conceptualized as embedded in specific sociocultural contexts. In this sense Cole and his associates have had a major impact on the development of cultural psychology. Thus, despite the fact that this culture-centered research has often been placed under the banner of cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Cole, 1989) it is perhaps more accurate to situate it under cultural psychology (see following) or cognitive anthropology (Bock, 1988; Miller, this volume). This approach was appropriately identified by Jahoda as one of the leading paradigms in the study of culture and human behavior. It continues to be influential, especially in the developmental area (Cole & Cole, 1993). Given the current interest in constructivism (Neimeyer, 1993), the approaches favored by cultural psychologists will continue to address many important questions regarding the nature of human thought processes and their cultural antecedents.

An Interim Commentary

When Jahoda started to work on his 1980 chapter, cross-cultural psychology as we know it today was barely more than a decade old. The International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, for instance, was just in its sixth year. As mentioned earlier, Jahoda had the challenging task of sifting through the publications produced by an entire generation of researchers who had shown at least some interest in the interface between culture and behavior. To a large extent, this generation had been extending to other cultures the different paradigms or theories that were developed in "mainstream" psychology. While this theory-extension and hypothesis-testing process continues to be a major purpose of cross-cultural psychology (Poortinga & Malpass, 1986; Malpass & Poortinga, 1986; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992), at the time of Jahoda's review there were only a few models that attracted much attention. These were already mentioned as the "psychocultural model" used in the Six Cultures Project, McClelland's achievement motivation research, and Triandis's ideas regarding the network of interrelationships in studies of subjective culture. Through collaboration with Witkin involving extensions of differentiation theory as well as his own research, Berry began developing his ecocultural model (see following discussion). We have seen research in two of the seven approaches summarized by Jahoda to fall off sharply after the death of Witkin in 1979 and after McClelland's interests turned elsewhere. Subjective culture survives primarily as a way to train people for intercultural encounters—though it has informed much of the recent work on cultural syndromes. Psychometric approaches are likely to be part of research efforts as long as psychologists see a need to measure such things as cognitive abilities and achievements, personality, and the generous range of psychological constructs that embraces all facets of human behavior. Piagetian approaches, still dominant

in part of cross-cultural developmental research, will no doubt continue for a long time to come, as will the pragmatic and empirical approaches of Cole and his colleagues. The records of all these approaches can speak for themselves. Collectively, they account for a significant percentage of cross-cultural psychological research.

Having reviewed the past, we now turn primarily to developments and progress since Jahoda's chapter. To appreciate the role played by cross-cultural psychology within the broad domain of psychology, one must become familiar with the basic, underlying characteristics of this particular type of inquiry. One should also be familiar with the several other perspectives in the social and behavioral sciences in which culture is prominently featured. What follows is a brief overview of the main components of these different ways to invoke culture as both a cause and consequence of human behavior.

Perspectives on Culture as Antecedent

There are four more or less psychological perspectives whose adherents focus on human culture as the paramount factor that shapes and influences thought and behavior. These orientations are cross-cultural psychology, cultural psychology, psychological anthropology, and indigenous psychology. All of them have made important contributions, and we assume that each will continue to maintain its own identity, but with considerable cross-over into the epistemological and methodological preferences taken by the other three. In this chapter we shall review the major features of cross-cultural psychology as well as some of its problems. Aspects of cultural psychology (Miller), indigenous psychology (Sinha), and anthropological approaches (Munroe & Munroe) are detailed in other chapters in this volume.

Cross-Cultural Psychology: Major Features and Goals

While it is difficult to define cross-cultural psychology to the complete satisfaction of all who identify with it, the various definitions that have appeared during the last quarter century contain many commonalities. Consider the following, which are amalgamations (not direct quotes) of assorted definitions found in the literature:

- It is interested in the nature and scope of human diversity at the level of the individual, and in reasons underlying such diversity; it is also interested in documenting psychological universals.
- The basic power of the cross-cultural method is that it capitalizes on extending the range of variation so that the widest possible range of settings where human behavior occurs might be incorporated into research designs.
- It assumes that one's culture is a major, if not the major, factor contributing to individual differences in behavior.

- It involves comparisons, either explicitly or implicitly, of behavior as it occurs in two or more cultural settings; if comparisons are made they must be based on equivalent methods of measurement.
- It is ultimately interested in the development of a psychology that will be much more "universal" in its scope and application than is the case at present.

Taking these commonalities together, we can see that cross-cultural psychology has much in common with so-called "mainstream" psychology. Both, after all, are interested in the study of individual differences and the sources of those differences; both (but to greatly varying degrees) recognize the important role played by the environment or context in shaping behavior; both use natural science methodologies and are typically guided by some current theory (or specific hypothesis derived from an extant theory); and both are interested in a psychology that includes broad topical coverage. Mainstream psychology, however, has been both culture-bound and culture-blind—a situation that was the main impetus in the development of cross-cultural psychology. At the scientific as well as practical level, the major difference between cross-cultural psychology and mainstream psychology is that in the former's process of extending the range of variation as far as possible, researchers are confronted with differences in behavior patterns that fit neither Western "common-sense" notions about behavior nor their formal and almost entirely Western theories. When pursuing cross-cultural investigations, a number of methodological problems enter the picture and must be resolved. Among the more important of these problems are those that involve a) the rationale used in the selection of cultures or ethnicities for the purpose of testing the limits of some theory, and b) the solution of problems associated with measures or procedures used during the study so that any comparisons made or conclusions drawn are based on equivalent data (cf. Van de Vijver & Leung, this volume). It follows from the above that the results of any particular study will be seriously, perhaps fatally, flawed if it can be shown that either in the selection of cultures or the measures used in a particular study the researchers did not pay adequate attention to the unique methodological, conceptual, and even logistical challenges that are always involved in sophisticated cross-cultural psychological research. More will be said later of these challenges.

A comprehensive definition of cross-cultural psychology is the one given by Berry et al. (1992, p. 2):

Cross-cultural psychology is the study of similarities and differences in individual psychological functioning in various cultural and ethnic groups; of the relationships between psychological variables and sociocultural, ecological, and biological variables; and of current changes in these variables.

The same authors summarize what they consider to be the major goals of cross-cultural psychology:

1. Testing the limits of psychological theory by extending to other cultures a particular theory and/or the hypotheses that may be generated from it in order

to determine how generalizeable the theory might be. This has been called the "transport and test" function. That is, a theory is transported to other cultures and tested in those contexts.

2. The exploration and discovery goal that includes examining variations of behavior not present in one's own culture and seeking explanations for such variations. In other words, failures to generalize (the first goal) should be explored in an effort to discover interesting variations of behavior that may then be "folded back" into the theory that guided the research in the first place.

3. The integration function, wherein the findings generated in pursuit of the first two goals can be combined in efforts to help develop a more universal psychology. In addition to the first goal of testing the generality of findings, several advantages of cross-cultural studies have been identified. For instance, cultures provide natural experiments.

Because cultures are not "manipulations" or clever laboratory replicas of real-world circumstances, the cross-cultural researcher can exploit this fact and do research in genuine settings. Also, cultures can serve the important function of unconfounding variables. In the past, many studies have been troubled because two or more variables have been confounded. The classic example of confounded variables involved Malinowski's (1927) research in the Trobriand Islands, an example that has served for years as a conceptual and methodological teething ring for budding cross-cultural psychologists. Using orthodox Freudian theory, Malinowski investigated the generality of Freud's "Oedipal" situation—the idea that a young boy is jealous of his father because they are competing for the affection of the same woman, who happens to be both the boy's mother and the father's lover. At least that is the way it was alleged to have been in Freud's Vienna. The Trobriand society provided anthropologist Malinowski with an alternative view; there Oedipal-like reactions were found for mother's elder brother, who happens to be the main disciplinarian of a boy in that society. The Viennese boys' "unresolved Oedipal conflict" could be seen as a reaction not to father-as-mother's lover but to father-as-disciplinarian. These two variables were unconfounded. It turned out that the Freudian Oedipal problem did not transport well to the Trobriands because it was the uncle that the boy feared and not his father.

Other advantages of cross-cultural psychology are 1) to study culture change and the effects it has on people, and 2) to aid in the reduction of ethnocentrism by the application of cross-cultural studies, an advantage high on the list of many cross-cultural social psychologists (Triandis, 1994). The more we know about human variations in behavior, and the reasons for those variations, the more enlightened and "worldly" we become (or the fewer reasons we have to believe that we are the center of all human activity, which is the essence of ethnocentrism). Yet another benefit of cross-cultural research is to use the accumulated results of research in culture-training programs (Brislin & Yoshida, 1994a, b). Most of the materials used by psychologists and educators who train people to work and live elsewhere are based on empirical cross-cultural research. For instance, Ptak, Cooper, and Brislin (1995) report that a survey of 94 professional culture

trainers revealed that they wish they would have had a better knowledge of Hofstede's (1980, 1991) work-related values when they were introducing their trainees to cultural variations in attitudes, beliefs, expectations, and values.

Kenneth Berrien (1970) exhorted cross-cultural psychologists to develop a "super-ego" in designing, conducting, and interpreting their research, and George Miller (1969) thought that psychologists should learn to "give their discipline away" as a means of promoting human welfare. In the spirit of their recommendations, we should learn to "give cross-cultural psychology away" in the context of applications to real-world problems of an applied nature such as represented by the above.

Psychology as it has developed and has been practiced in the psychologically dominant Western world is a relatively young branch of science. Its youth has meant that there has been insufficient time and international interest for it to have matured. Yet it is believed by most cross-cultural psychologists that it is possible, and indeed highly desirable, to develop a psychology that tries to establish what is universal and generalizeable in the tremendous cultural diversity of human behavior patterns. In principle, most cross-cultural psychologists believe that there are indeed general laws of human behavior, and that their discovery and documentation can only be realized if the goals of cross-cultural psychology are pursued.

Cultural Psychology: A Contrasting View

We now turn to an ongoing dialogue focusing on a central question in those aspects of psychology that assign culture a prominent role as an antecedent to behavior. The dialogue involves two juxtaposed yet remarkably similar perspectives: cultural psychology (see Miller's chapter, this volume) and cross-cultural psychology, both of which share a number of concerns while at the same time differing in several important ways with regard to conceptions of culture-behavior relationships as well as methods of inquiry.

In cross-cultural psychological research a hypothesis is tested by extending the range of variation (including other cultures or ethnic groups) according to the independent variable of interest (some aspect of the sociocultural or ecological context). Participants in the study are chosen by using appropriate sampling procedures, and one or more measures of the dependent variables are administered. Then the data are analyzed and interpreted.

While most cross-cultural psychological research is not as tidy as this scheme, the strategy it suggests has received considerable attention in terms of what to do and what not to do (e.g., Berry et al., 1992; Lonner & Berry, 1986; Van de Vijver & Leung, in preparation; cf. also Van de Vijver & Leung, this volume). It can be and has been quite useful in helping to develop a better understanding of basic human processes, capacities, social interactions, and virtually all psychological topics. It also shows, as noted earlier, that cross-cultural psychological research is normally not very different from so-called mainstream and essentially experimental and reductionistic research.

The above approach, however, may not be adequate for the study of all forms of human behavior that vary across cultures. This is where epistemology enters the picture. As Jahoda (1994) observes, in cross-cultural psychological research "the independent variables do not usually exert their effects in a simple and direct manner of the stimulus-response type; rather . . . they are mediated in a complex and as yet still inadequately understood manner by such processes as socialization and the experiences of interaction with others." Jahoda continues by noting that these processes "take place within an overarching cultural framework, and to ignore this is to be guilty of gross oversimplification."

This is also where a number of subtle concerns regarding methods of inquiry and various procedural details enter the picture. For example, as Jahoda points out above, the status of culture as an independent variable has to be questioned. In classic experimentation, the researcher can "control" the nature and magnitude of the independent variable. In cross-cultural research, such control can, at best, only be approximated. Furthermore, key independent variables may operate differently in different societies. For instance, what is called the "independent variable" in a particular study may have a substantially different meaning in society A than it does in other societies; it may, in fact, have different meanings in all societies. How cross-cultural psychologists handle methodological problems such as the non-equivalence of samples, unintended differences in the meaning of stimuli, and cultural effects of researcher-subject interactions often involve complex matters (Van de Vijver & Leung, in preparation; Van de Vijver & Leung, this volume). Here we focus on the question of how and to what extent culture is to be understood by psychologists and, therefore, the role that culture should play in the field of psychology.

In what is frequently offered as a sharp contrast to research methods typically used by cross-cultural psychologists, cultural psychologists deal with culture and methodologies used to study it in somewhat different ways. Another citation of Jahoda can serve to define cultural psychology and to describe the contrast with the cross-cultural approach. Jahoda asserts that ". . . culture and mind interpenetrate each other, so that all behavior is inescapably cultural. It is therefore futile to try and decontextualize behavior in an attempt to get at universal invariants [a task he believes is assumed by cross-cultural psychologists], for humans without culture are inconceivable" (Jahoda (1992). Jahoda has, however, written that he thinks the two approaches are complementary, ". . . since both in their different ways seek to understand human behavior in context" (p. xi). He also believes that there is no sharp boundary between the two. The osmotic nature of this boundary can be seen in another definition of cultural psychology:

[It] seeks to discover systematic relationships between cultural and behavioral variables, asking whether individuals growing up in culture A tend to develop that culture's psychological qualities. The hallmark of cultural psychology is the attempt to understand individual psychological functioning in the cultural context in which it developed" (Berry, 1994, p. 120).

The above definition was given in the context of making distinctions between the goals of cultural psychology and ethnic psychology, the latter being yet another way to approach variations in the cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors of individuals who have undergone the acculturation process as members of a group who have joined, for one reason or another, a larger and dominant nation-state.

Ernest Boesch, a cultural psychologist who uses his complex and probing Symbolic Action Theory (Boesch, 1991) to explain behavior-in-context, was asked to comment on the differences between cultural and cross-cultural psychology. He argues (personal communication) that they are different "actions" carried out in similar fields—that is, in cultures foreign to the researcher. The typical cross-cultural psychologist, as Boesch sees it, is not primarily interested in a specific culture. In a paper detailing the "seven flaws of cross-cultural psychology," Boesch (unpublished manuscript) asserts that most cross-cultural psychologists are interested in a problem of general psychology; "culture" is taken as a "treatment," or an "independent variable." Cross-cultural psychologists desire to understand reasons behind cultural variation in general in an effort to help build a more universally acceptable psychology. Boesch believes that, by contrast, cultural psychologists desire to know the "fabric" of a specific culture; that is, to them culture is the primary focus. The questions asked by cross-cultural psychology tend to be restricted to specific interactions of variables, while cultural psychology focuses on "constellations."

What are constellations? The cultural psychologist would be interested in the forms of behavior within one specific culture and how these relate to other forms of behavior within that culture. In other words, he or she would be concerned with a detailed within-culture analysis of various constellations of interrelationships. Cultural psychologists would therefore have more in common with the typical anthropological method of "deep cultural immersion." They would be less interested in the pursuit of universals, and they would emphasize that standard psychological experimentation falls short in the quest to fathom the essential core of a particular society (cf. Miller, this volume; Greenfield, this volume).

The issue of comparativism also can be raised. Cultural psychologists tend to denounce the usually explicit comparative nature of cross-cultural psychological research, but comparativism in cultural psychology is present, even if only implicit. For instance, Shweder and Sullivan (1993) have said that "cultural psychology is, first of all, a designation for the comparative study of the way culture and psyche make each other up" (p. 488). They also describe other goals of cultural psychology. These include a reconsideration of "methods and procedures for studying mental states and psychological processes across languages and cultures." That goal has been central to cross-cultural psychology, and has been driven by another feature of cultural psychology about which cross-cultural psychological methodologists have expressed considerable concern: that "performance differences among human populations may arise from the partial translatability or limited commensurability of stimulus situations and materials" (Shweder & Sullivan, 1993, p. 489). The cumulative record of methodological books and treatises in cross-cultural psychology shows that these concerns have been central,

for many years, in research on cognition and other basic processes (e.g., Brislin, Lonner, & Thorndike, 1973; Berry & Dasen, 1974; Berry, 1980; Lonner & Berry, 1986; Berry et al., 1992) as well as in more applied areas (e.g., Brislin, 1989; Lonner & Ibrahim, 1996).

Many cross-cultural psychologists, including ourselves, would disagree with the assertion that they are more interested in the results of "treatments" than they are in the "fabric" or "core" of culture, that they are not interested in insights derived from "deep cultural immersion," and so on. Cole, a cultural psychologist, acknowledges this. In a chapter footnote, he says that he did "not want to give the impression that the views identified here are the only way to conceive of cultural psychology. For example, Berry (as cited by Cole, 1989, p. 282) defines cultural psychology as 'an analogous term to social, industrial, developmental (etc.) psychology. That is, it identifies an area of study which seeks to discover systematic relationships among cultural and behavioral variables'."

Psychological Anthropology

The field of psychological anthropology can claim as its pioneers some of the more influential thinkers in anthropology (Bock, 1994). While most psychologists probably are not very familiar with their impressive intellectual legacy, a generation or two of anthropologists were strongly influenced by the works of such giants as Abraham Kardiner, Ralph Linton, Bronislaw Malinowski, Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Edward Sapir. A contemporary spokesperson for this academic orientation, Robert Paul, says that in a "narrow" sense "the specialty [of psychological anthropology] within anthropology... seeks to look at that partial range of phenomena to which psychological methods and questions are particularly appropriate, just as economic anthropology is a specialty focused on those parts of socio-cultural reality to which economic activity can be applied" (Paul, 1994, p. 100). He goes on to say that in a broader sense the phrase "... designates an approach to anthropology as a whole which, in contrast to other approaches, accepts the view that individual human beings are in a strong sense autonomous agents endowed with certain specifiable capacities and subject to certain specifiable limits, who are able to set goals, and plan to follow strategies in pursuit of those goals" (p. 100).

Asserting that all anthropology is psychological and that all psychology is cultural, Bock (1988) identified four major schools and approaches of psychological anthropology:

- Psychoanalytic anthropology (orthodox and neo-Freudian)
- Culture and personality (e.g., basic and modal personality, national character)
- Social structure and personality (e.g., materialism and interactionism)
- Cognitive anthropology (e.g., primitive mentality, development, and ethnosemantics)

Of the above categories, only the latter includes names of individuals and their approaches with whom contemporary cross-cultural psychologists have considerable familiarity. Among them are Piaget, Witkin, Cole, and Price-Williams.

Borrowing notation from LeVine (1982), Bock (1988, pp. 101-102) summarized the ways in which different approaches have characterized the relationship between culture and personality:

Culture (C) may be viewed as caused by psychological states, motives, or complexes ($P \rightarrow C$); or the two may be considered virtually identical ($P = C$). In some approaches, personality is considered to be completely determined by cultural or social-structural conditions ($C \rightarrow P$). In others, personality is viewed as mediating between different parts of a culture, integrating its customs and institutions ($C_1 \rightarrow P \rightarrow C_2$). Finally, in one view, personality systems interact with sociocultural systems, and relative stability is attained only when psychological needs and social demands are 'congruent' ($P \leftrightarrow C$).

The edited book by Suarez-Orozco, Spindler, and Spindler (1994) contains several chapters that are representative of what psychological anthropologists do. In their preface to the book, the editors say that

This phenomenological, existential conception of the relation between human minds, environment, and culture is not new and indeed has been a preoccupation of intellectuals of various persuasions for centuries, probably in some form since the first stirrings of human consciousness. But while the rest of anthropology seems bogged down in the extreme relativism of cultural diversity, psychological anthropology minds the processes of minding and of human agency, and tends to the maintenance of sanity (as well as its breakdown) as humans impose their 'realities' on what is 'out there' (p. vii).

What is meant by the term "minding," and how does it differ from "mind"? It refers to commonalities in the "processing of thought, emotion, perception, and the dynamics of the psyche, such as transference, counter-transference, projection, and reaction formation, derived from the psychoanalytic model" (p. 4). As mentioned above, the writings of Freud, Piaget and others are prominent in the works of psychological anthropologists; considering especially the intricacies and complexities of psychoanalytic theory, one can readily see that Freudian-oriented psychological anthropologists would hardly be at a loss to explain the dynamics of a particular culture. The Six Cultures Project, mentioned earlier, is a good example of the kinds of research that psychological anthropologists do. In our opinion the reader of this chapter should become familiar with this particular anthropological subfield. We think that it has substantial similarities with "cultural psychology"; we also think that cross-cultural psychology owes a debt to this field for the insights it has provided regarding the nature of the human mind, and for its methodological operations, which almost always involve long-term forays into the field. We further believe that it is incumbent upon the cross-cultural psy-

chologist to understand the mutual methodological relevance of anthropology and psychology (Campbell, 1961) along with the historical and epistemological similarities, continuities, and differences involving psychology and culture (Jahoda, 1990, 1992; Jahoda & Krewer, this volume).

Indigenous Psychologies

Partially because of disappointment with the Western domination of psychology, and partially because of a concomitant belief that the Western-trained psychologist cannot really fathom with equal and deep understanding all other cultures, a growing interest in indigenous psychologies has recently emerged. Kim and Berry (1993, p. 2) define indigenous psychologies (plural is appropriate because ostensibly any group of people for whom the indigenous label applies can develop its own psychology) as "the scientific study of human behavior (or the mind) that is native, that is not transported from other regions, and that is designed for its people."

There are many psychologists who, while usually also identifying with cross-cultural psychology, are proponents of the growing phenomenon of the "indigenization" of psychology (see, for example, Durganand Sinha's chapter in this volume). Consider Diaz-Guerrero's (1993) assertion that one cannot fully understand the psychology of the Mexican unless and until one has a complete understanding of the "socio-historico cultural premises" that have shaped Mexico and its numerous peoples. It seems to us only logical that for a "psychology" to be completely indigenous it would have to be so culture-bound, so relative, and so heavily "emic" that the only understanding an outsider could hope for is to view it from afar, making no attempts to "reduce" it to common denominators for comparative purposes. The latter process would involve "etics," or some sort of reductionistic or categorization process that was not initiated by the developers of various indigenous approaches. However, both Enriquez (1993) and Berry and Kim (1993) suggest a way to chart the future by moving ahead with a "cross-indigenous" approach to forge a "universal" psychology—that is, to carry out an etic process.

In fairness to their analysis, however, it should be noted that in their opinion the development of a "universal" psychology is one of the goals of the indigenous psychology approach. While it may be helpful and interesting to discover threads of continuity and commonality among indigenous psychologists, one wonders why indigenous psychologies would have to be scrutinized and analyzed for this purpose. On the surface, it may seem somewhat contradictory to encourage the development of indigenous and unique psychologies on the one hand, and on the other hand to endorse the development of a strategy to examine them for commonalities! It can be argued, however, that a universal psychology might emerge only after indigenous psychologies are examined and their common elements identified. Here, potentially, we have the "ideal" situation: Indigenous psychologies that have been forged in, by, and for specific societies, but that also have been examined for common elements—elements that could well

serve either as bases for meaningful comparisons or as ways to help understand other societies.

Conceptualizations of Culture as Antecedent

As noted earlier in this chapter, a wide variety of primarily social psychological topics and the hypotheses they have generated continue to dominate the literature in cross-cultural psychology (Öngel & Smith, 1994). No single social psychological theme or theory, however, such as attribution theory or studies of leadership, has dominated the publication landscape during the last 15 years. On the other hand, within this same period several somewhat unrelated tributaries of research activity have been noteworthy as they are flowing into the main effluent of cross-cultural literature. We turn our attention to brief summaries of these streams of ongoing activity.

The overwhelming majority of the cross-cultural approaches to culture and psychology (e.g., Berry et al. 1992; Triandis, 1994), as well as many of the alternative perspectives (e.g., Shweder, 1990), assume explicitly that culture—however defined—is an antecedent to human thought and behavior. For example, Berry et al. (1992) have proposed that the major orientations in cross-cultural psychology tend to assume cultural explanations for psychological and behavioral differences among groups of people. A second, potentially quite different, approach that attempts to describe culture in terms of the constraints that "limit," rather than "determine," a group's behavioral repertoire also assigns antecedent status to culture (Poortinga, 1990). Finally, as described earlier, cultural psychology, an orientation that claims to be quite antithetical to cross-cultural psychology, makes similar assumptions. Shweder (1990, p. 1) states, for example, that "cultural traditions . . . regulate . . . the human psyche, resulting . . . in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion." It is difficult to see how the language used in this case to describe a "new" discipline differs fundamentally from that used by comparative researchers. At some level, it appears that nearly all social scientists in this field acknowledge that culture can play a crucial role in shaping virtually any aspect of human behavior.

This basic and widespread acknowledgment and agreement among researchers notwithstanding, there are significantly different ways in which a theoretically complex construction like "culture" can be conceptualized as an antecedent of other human phenomena. Unfortunately, the various orientations that give primacy to interactions between psychology and culture have not engaged in adequate debate on just what kind of an antecedent of human experience "culture" is (or ought to be). This may stem, at least in part, from the often adversarial positions historically taken by the relevant social and behavioral sciences (i.e., psychology, anthropology, and sociology) with regard to the ontological status of the construct. More important perhaps is the absence of competing comprehensive theoretical frameworks that provide alternative interpretations of the relationship between culture and the many varieties of human experience. Indeed, it