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Heuristicsandbiasesincybersecuritydilemmas.pdf

Heuristics and biases in cyber security dilemmas

Heather Rosoff • Jinshu Cui • Richard S. John

Published online: 28 September 2013

� Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Abstract Cyber security often depends on decisions

made by human operators, who are commonly considered a

major cause of security failures. We conducted 2 behav-

ioral experiments to explore whether and how cyber

security decision-making responses depend on gain–loss

framing and salience of a primed recall prior experience. In

Experiment I, we employed a 2 9 2 factorial design,

manipulating the frame (gain vs. loss) and the presence

versus absence of a prior near-miss experience. Results

suggest that the experience of a near-miss significantly

increased respondents’ endorsement of safer response

options under a gain frame. Overall, female respondents

were more likely to select a risk averse (safe) response

compared with males. Experiment II followed the same

general paradigm, framing all consequences in a loss frame

and manipulating recall to include one of three possible

prior experiences: false alarm, near-miss, or a hit involving

a loss of data. Results indicate that the manipulated prior

hit experience significantly increased the likelihood of

respondents’ endorsement of a safer response relative to

the manipulated prior near-miss experience. Conversely,

the manipulated prior false-alarm experience significantly

decreased respondents’ likelihood of endorsing a safer

response relative to the manipulated prior near-miss

experience. These results also showed a main effect for age

and were moderated by respondent’s income level.

Keywords Cyber security � Framing effect � Near-miss � Decision making

1 Introduction

Individual users regularly make decisions that affect the

security of their personal devices connected to the internet

and, in turn, to the security of the cybersphere. For

example, they must decide whether to install software to

protect from viruses and hackers, download files from

unknown sources, or submit personal identification infor-

mation for web site access or online purchases. Such

decisions involve actions that could result in various neg-

ative consequences (loss of data, reduced computer per-

formance or destruction of a computer’s hard drive).

Conversely, other alternative actions are available that

could protect individuals from negative outcomes, but also

could limit the efficiency and ease of use of the personal

device.

Aytes and Connolly (2004) propose a decision model of

computer-related behavior that suggests individuals make a

rational choice to either engage in safe or unsafe cyber

behavior. In their model, individual behavior is driven by

perceptions of the usefulness of safe and unsafe behaviors

and the consequences of each. More specifically, the model

captures how information sources, the user’s base knowl-

edge of cyber security, the user’s relevant perceptions (e.g.,

interpretations of the applicability of the knowledge), and

the user’s risk attitude influence individual cyber decision

making.

H. Rosoff (&) Sol Price School of Public Policy, University of Southern

California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

e-mail: [email protected]

H. Rosoff � J. Cui � R. S. John Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events

(CREATE), University of Southern California, Los Angeles,

CA, USA

J. Cui � R. S. John Department of Psychology, University of Southern California,

Los Angeles, CA, USA

123

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

DOI 10.1007/s10669-013-9473-2

This paper reports on two behavioral experiments, using

over 500 respondents, designed to explore whether and

how recommended cyber security decision-making

responses depend on gain–loss framing and salience of

prior cyber dilemma experiences. More specifically, we

explored whether priming individuals to recall a prior

cyber-related experience influenced their decision to select

either a safe versus risky option in responding to a hypo-

thetical cyber dilemma. We hypothesized that recall of a hit

experience involving negative consequences would

increase feelings of vulnerability, even more so than a

near-miss, and lead to the endorsement of a risk averse

option. This result has been reported in the disaster liter-

ature, which has shown that individual decision making

depends on prior experiences, including hits, near-misses

(events where a hazardous or fatal outcome could have

occurred, but do not), and false alarms (Barnes et al. 2007;

Dillon et al. 2011; Siegrist and Gutscher 2008). Further-

more, damage from past disasters has been shown to sig-

nificantly influence individual perceptions of future risk

and to motivate more protective and mitigation-related

behavior (Kunreuther and Pauly 2004; Siegrist and Gut-

scher 2008; Slovic et al. 2005).

We anticipated that the effect of prior near-miss expe-

riences would depend on the interpretation of the prior

near-miss event by the respondent. This expectation was

based on near-miss research that has shown that future-

intended mitigation behavior depends greatly on the per-

ception of the near-miss event outcome. Tinsley et al.

(2012) describe two near-miss types—a resilient and vul-

nerable near-miss. A resilient near-miss is as an event that

did not occur. In these situations, individuals were found to

underestimate the danger of subsequent events and were

more likely to engage in risky behavior by choosing not to

take protective action. A vulnerable near-miss occurs when

a disaster almost happened. New information is incorpo-

rated into the assessment that counters the basic ‘‘near-

miss’’ definition and results in the individual being more

inclined to engage in risk averse behavior (the opposite

behavior related to a resilient near-miss interpretation). In

the cyber context, we expected that respondents who fail to

recognize a prior near-miss as a cyber threat would be more

likely to recommend the risky course of action. However, if

respondents view a recalled near-miss as evidence of vul-

nerability, then they would be more inclined to endorse the

safer option.

In the case of a recalled prior false-alarm experience,

one hypothesis known as the ‘‘cry-wolf effect’’ (Breznitz

2013) suggests that predictions of disasters that do not

materialize affect beliefs about the uncertainty associated

with future events. In this context, false alarms are believed

to create complacency and reduce willingness to respond to

future warnings, resulting in a greater likelihood of

engaging in risky behavior (Barnes et al. 2007; Donner

et al. 2012; Dow and Cutter 1998; Simmons and Sutter

2009). In contrast, there is research showing that the public

may have a higher tolerance for false alarms than antici-

pated. This is because of the increased credibility given to

the event due to the frequency with which it is discussed,

both through media sources and informal discussion, thus,

suggesting that false alarms might increase individuals’

willingness to be risk averse (Dow and Cutter 1998). We

anticipated that recall of prior false alarms would likely

make respondents feel less vulnerable and more willing to

prefer the risky option, compared with the near-miss and

hit conditions.

In our research, we also anticipated that there would be

some influence of framing on individual cyber decision

making under risk. Prospect theory and related empirical

research suggest that decision making under risk depends

on whether potential outcomes are perceived as a gain or as

a loss in relation to a reference point (Kahneman and

Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1986). A common

finding in the literature on individual preferences in deci-

sion making shows that people tend to avoid risk under

gain frames, but seek risk when outcomes are framed as a

loss.

Prospect theory is discussed in the security literature,

but empirical studies in cyber security contexts are limited

(Acquisti and Grossklags 2007; Garg and Camp 2013;

Helander and Khalid 2000; Shankar et al. 2002; Verendel

2008). Among the security studies that have been con-

ducted, the results are mixed. The work by Schroeder and

colleagues on computer information security presented at

the 2006 Information Resources Management Association

International Conference found that decision makers were

risk averse in the gain frame, yet they showed no risk

preference in the loss frame. Similarly, in a 1999 presen-

tation about online shopping behavior by Helander and Du

at the International Conference on TQM and Human Fac-

tors, perceived risk of credit card fraud and the potential for

price inflation did not negatively affect purchase intention

(loss frame), while perceived value of a product was found

to positively affect purchase intention. We anticipated that

gain-framed messages in cyber dilemmas would increase

endorsement of protective responses and loss-framed

messages would have no effect on the endorsement of

protective options.

We also explored how subject variables affect the

strength and/or the direction of the relationship between the

manipulated variables, prior experience and gain–loss

framing, and the dependent variable, endorsement of safe

or unsafe options in response to cyber dilemmas. For

example, one possibility is that the relationship between

prior experience and risk averse behavior is greater for

individuals with higher self-reported victimization given

518 Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

123

their increased exposure to cyber dilemma consequences.

Another possibility is that the relationship between the gain

frame and protective behavior would be less for younger

individuals because they are more familiar and comfortable

with the nuances of internet security. We anticipated that

there would be some difference in the patterns of response

as a function of sex, age, income, education, job domain,

and self-reported victimization.

The next section of this article describes the methods,

results, and a brief discussion for Experiment I, and Sect. 3

describes the methods, results, and a brief discussion for

Experiment II. The paper closes with a discussion of

findings across both experiments and how these results

suggest approaches to enhance and improve cyber security

by taking into account user decision making.

2 Experiment I

We conducted an experiment of risky cyber dilemmas with

two manipulated variables, gain–loss framing and primed

recall of a prior personal near-miss experience, to evaluate

individual cyber user decision making. The cyber dilem-

mas were developed to capture commonly confronted risky

cyber choices faced by individual users. In addition, in

Experiment I, the dependent variable focused on the advice

the respondent would provide to their best friend so as to

encourage more normative thinking about what might be

the correct response to the cyber dilemma. As such, each

cyber scenario described a risky choice dilemma faced by

the respondent’s ‘‘best friend,’’ and the respondent was

asked to recommend either a safe but inconvenient course

of action (e.g., recommend not downloading the music file

from an unknown source), or a risky but more convenient

option (e.g., recommend downloading the music file from

an unknown source).

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Design overview

In Experiment I, four cyber dilemmas were developed to

evaluate respondents’ risky choice behavior using a 2

(recalled personal near-miss experience or no recall control

condition) by 2 (gain versus loss-framed message) mixed

model factorial design with two dichotomous subject

variables: sex and self-reported victimization. Each par-

ticipant received all four dilemmas in a constant order.

Within this order, each of the four treatment conditions was

paired with each of the four dilemmas and counterbalanced

such that each of the dilemmas was randomly assigned to

each of the four treatment conditions.

After each cyber dilemma, respondents were asked to

respond on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to

6 = strongly agree) whether they would advise their ‘‘best

friend’’ to proceed in taking a risky course of action.

Responses of 1–3 indicated endorsement of the safe but

inconvenient option, while responses of 4–6 indicated

endorsement of the risky but expedient option. Following

the four cyber dilemmas, respondents were given four

attention check questions to determine whether they were

reading the cyber scenarios carefully. In addition, basic

demographic information was collected as well as infor-

mation on each respondent’s personal experience and self-

reported victimization, if any, with the topics of the cyber

dilemmas.

2.1.2 Scenarios and manipulations

The four cyber dilemma scenarios involved the threat of a

computer virus resulting from the download of a music file,

the use of an unknown USB drive device, the download of

a Facebook application, and the risk of financial fraud from

an online purchase. Gain–loss framing and primed recall of

a prior personal experience were manipulated independent

variables. The framing messages were used to describe the

potential outcome of the risky cyber choice. The gain-

framed messages endorsed the safe, more protective rec-

ommendation. For example, for the download of a music

file scenario, the gain frame was worded as ‘‘If she presses

‘do not proceed,’ she may avoid the risk of acquiring a

virus that will cause serious damage to her computer.’’

Conversely, the loss-framed messages endorsed the risky

option/choice. For the download of a music file scenario,

the loss frame was worded as ‘‘If she presses ‘proceed,’ she

may risk acquiring a virus that will cause serious damage to

her computer.’’ The experimental design also included a

manipulation of primed recall of a prior personal experi-

ence. Respondents either recalled a near-miss experience of

their own before advising their friend, or did not (a control

condition). In each near-miss experience, the respondent’s

dilemma was similar to the situation faced by their best

friend and the consequences of the threat were benign. A

complete description of the four scenarios, including the

near-miss and gain–loss framing manipulations, is pro-

vided in Table 1.

2.1.3 Subjects

The experiment was conducted using the University of

Southern California’s Psychology Subject Pool. Students

participated for course credit. Of the 365 students who

participated in the experiment, 99 were omitted for not

answering all 4 of the attention check questions correctly,

resulting in a sample of 266 respondents. Most, 203 (76 %)

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529 519

123

Table 1 Summary of four scenarios and manipulations (Experiment I)

Scenario 1: Music File Scenario 2: USB Scenario 3: Facebook Scenario 4: Rare Book

Scenario Your best friend has contacted you

for advice. She wants to open a

music file linking to an early

release of her favorite band’s

new album. When she clicks on

the link, a window pops up

indicating that she needs to turn

off her firewall program in order

to access the file

Your best friend has contacted you

for advice. Her computer keeps

crashing because it is overloaded

with programs, documents and

media files. She consults a

computer technician who

advises her to purchase a 1

terabyte USB drive (data storage

device) to free up space on her

computer. She does her research

and narrows down the selection

to two choices

Your best friend has contacted you

for advice. She has opened her

Facebook page to find an app

request for a game that her

friends have been really excited

about. In order to download the

app, access to some of her

personal information is required

including her User ID and other

information from her profile

Your best friend has contacted you

for advice. She is going to buy a

rare book from an unknown

online store. The book is highly

desirable, expensive and only

available from this online store’s

website. By deciding to purchase

the book online with her credit

card, there is a risk that her

personal information will be

exploited which can generate

unauthorized credit card

charges. Her credit card charges

$50 for the investigation and

retrieval of funds expended

when resolving fraudulent credit

card issues

Gain

framing

If she presses ‘‘do not proceed,’’

she may avoid the risk of

acquiring a virus that will cause

serious damage to her computer

The first USB drive when used on

a computer other than your own

has a 10 % chance of becoming

infected with a virus that will

delete all the files and programs

on the drive. The second drive is

double the price, but has less

than a 5 % chance of becoming

infected with a virus when used

on a computer other than your

own

If she chooses not to agree to the

terms of the app, she is

protecting her private

information from being made

available to the developer of the

app

If she decides not to buy the book,

she may save up to $50 and the

time spent talking with the credit

card company

Loss

framing

If she presses ‘‘proceed,’’ she may

risk acquiring a virus that will

cause serious damage to her

computer

The first USB drive when used on

a computer other than her own

has a 5 % chance of becoming

infected with a virus that will

delete all the files and programs

on the drive. The second drive is

half the price but has more than

a 5 % chance of becoming

infected with a virus when used

on a computer other than her

own

If she chooses to agree to the terms

of the app, she risks the chance

of her private information being

made available to the developer

of the app

If she decides to buy the book, she

may lose up to $50 and the time

spent talking with the credit card

company

Near-miss

experience

As you consider how to advise

your friend, you recall that you

were confronted by a similar

situation in the past. You

attempted to open a link to a

music file and a window popped

up saying that you need to turn

off your firewall program in

order to access the file. You

pressed ‘‘proceed’’ and your

computer immediately crashed.

Fortunately, after restarting your

computer everything was

functioning normally again

As you consider how to advise

your friend, you recall that your

USB drive recently was infected

with a virus after being plugged

into a computer at work. You

contacted a computer technician

to see if there was any way to

repair the drive. The technician

was able to recover all the files

and told you that you were really

lucky because normally such

drives cannot be restored

As you consider how to advise

your friend, you recall that you

once agreed to share some of

your personal information in

order to download an app on

Facebook. The developers of the

app made your User ID publicly

available and because of this you

started to receive messages from

strangers on your profile page.

You were very upset about the

invasion of your privacy.

Fortunately, you discovered that

you could change the privacy

settings of your profile so that

only your friends could access

your page

As you consider how to advise

your friend, you recall that you

once purchased a rare book from

an unknown online store. You

were expecting the book to

arrive 1 week later. About

2 weeks later, you had yet to

receive the book. You were very

concerned that you had done

business with a fake online store.

You contacted the store’s

customer service who

fortunately tracked down the

book’s location and had it

shipped with overnight delivery.

Question Below please indicate your level

of agreement with the statement

‘‘You will advise your best

friend to press ‘‘proceed’’ and

risk acquiring a virus that will

cause serious damage to her

computer’’

Below please indicate your level

of agreement with the statement

‘‘You will advise your best

friend to buy the first USB drive

that has a 10 % chance of

becoming infected with a

virus.’’/’’You will advise your

best friend to buy the second

USB drive that has a greater than

5 % chance of becoming

infected with a virus’’

Below please indicate your level

of agreement with the statement

‘‘You will advise your best

friend to download the app and

risk having her private

information made available to

the app developer’’

Below please indicate your level

of agreement with the statement:

‘‘You will advise your best

friend to purchase the book

online and risk having her

personal information exploited’’

520 Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

123

of the respondents, were female. Respondents ranged in

age from 18 to 41 years (95 % percentile is 22 years old).

Table 2 shows a summary of personal experience and

self-reported victimization associated with each of the four

cyber dilemmas. All respondents reported having been a

victim of one of the four cyber dilemmas. Twenty-four

percent of respondents further reported being a victim of

one or more of the four cyber dilemmas. We coded whether

the respondent had ever been victimized by one of the four

scenarios as a variable of self-reported victimization.

2.2 Results

Raw responses (1–6) were centered around the midpoint

(3.5) such that negative responses indicate endorsement of

the safe option, and positive responses indicate endorse-

ment of the risky option. Mean endorsement responses for

each of the four treatment conditions are displayed in

Fig. 1. The negative means in all four conditions indicate

that subjects were more likely to endorse risk averse

actions compared with the risky alternative. 1

In addition, a 2 (recalled personal near-miss experience

or no recall control condition) by 2 (gain vs. loss-framed

message) by 2 (sex) by 2 (self-reported victimization)

4-way factorial ANOVA was used to evaluate respondents

endorsement of risky versus safe options in cyber dilem-

mas. Analyses were specified to only include main effects

and 2-way interactions with the manipulated variables.

Preliminary data screening was conducted, and q–q plots

indicated that the dependent variable is approximately

normally distributed.

Results indicated that the near-miss manipulation was

significant, F (1, 260) = 7.42, p = .01, g2 = .03. Respondents who received a description of a recalled near-

miss experience preferred the safe but inconvenient option

to the risky, more expedient option. No main effect was

found for the gain–loss framing manipulation, suggesting

that respondents were indifferent between safe versus risky

decision options when the outcomes were described as

gains or losses from a reference point. There also was a

significant interaction between the framing and near-miss

manipulations: F (1, 260) = 4.01, p = .05, g2 = .02. As seen in Fig. 1, the near-miss manipulation was much larger

under the gain frame compared with the loss frame.

Basic demographic data also was collected to assess

whether individual differences moderated the effect of the

two manipulations. A significant main effect was found for

sex: F (1, 260) = 3.81, p = .05, g2 = .01; Sex’s cohen’s d are 0.33 for gain framing without near-miss, 0.09 for gain

framing with near-miss, 0.18 for loss framing without near-

miss, and 0.19 for loss framing with near-miss. Female

respondents were more likely to avoid risks and choose the

safe option. No significant main effect was found for self-

reported victimization. Also, none of the interactions were

significant; sex and framing, sex and near-miss experience,

victimization and framing, and victimization and near-

miss.

Table 2 Summary of experience and victimization

Scenario (N = 266) Personal

experience

Previous

victimization

Music file download 205 (77 %) 40 (15 %)

USB drive 110 (41 %) 12 (4.5 %)

Facebook App

download

253 a

(95 %) 3 (1 %)

Online purchase 259 (97 %) 18 (7 %)

Overall (at least once) 265 b

(100 %) 64 (24 %)

a An app is downloaded from Facebook at least once a week

b There is one missing value

1 Since the four scenarios are in a constant order, a second analysis

was run that ignored the manipulated factors and included scenario/

order as a repeated factor. A one-way repeated measure ANOVA

found a significant scenario/order effect: F (3, 265) = 30.42,

p \ .001, g2 = .10. Over time, respondents were more likely to endorse the risky option. Because the nature of the dilemma scenario

and order are confounded, it is impossible to determine whether the

significant main effect indicates an order effect or a scenarios effect or

a combination of both. The counterbalanced design distributed all 4

combinations of framing and prior experience recall evenly across the

four scenario dilemmas. Order and/or scenario effects are independent

of the manipulated factors, and thus are included in the error term in

the ANOVA.

-1.4

-1.2

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

Control Near-missM e a n

E n

d o

rs e m

e n

t o

f S

a fe

v s . R

is k y A

d v ic

e

Near- miss

Advice by Framing and Near-miss

Gain

Loss

Risky

Safe

Framing

Fig. 1 Mean endorsement of risky versus safe responses to cyber threats by gain–loss frame and prior near-miss

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529 521

123

2.3 Discussion

The results of Experiment I suggest that respondents’ cyber

security recommendations to their best friend were signif-

icantly influenced by the personal experience recall

manipulation. More specifically, respondents who recalled

a near-miss experience were more likely to advise their

best friend to avoid making the risky cyber choice com-

pared with their no recall counterpart. This finding is

consistent with Tinsley et al. (2012) definition of a vul-

nerable near-miss—an ‘‘almost happened’’ event that

makes individuals feel vulnerable and, in turn, leads to a

greater likelihood of endorsing the safer option.

Respondents who recalled a near-miss experience were

even more likely to advise their best friend to take the safer

course of action if they also received the gain message.

Comparatively, the loss frame had a negligible effect on

the primed recall prior experience manipulation. That is,

respondents who received the loss frame were as likely to

recommend the risk averse course of action to their best

friend regardless of whether their prior experience was a

near-miss or not. This finding suggests that people will be

more risk averse when they are exposed either to a recall of

a prior near-miss and/or a loss frame. The combination of

no prior recall of a near-miss and a gain frame did produce

less risk averse responses. This suggests a highly interac-

tive, synergistic effect, in which the frame and the near-

miss recall substitute for each other.

In addition, sex and prior victimization were found to

have no moderating effect on the relationship between cyber

dilemma responses and the two manipulated variables.

Cyber dilemma decision making was found to significantly

vary by respondents’ sex, but not by self-reported victim-

ization. The results suggest that females make more pro-

tective decisions when faced with risky cyber dilemmas

compared with males. This pattern has been replicated in

cyber research in an experiment of online shopping services

where males demonstrated a greater tendency to engage in

risky behavior online (Milne et al. 2009). Disaster risk per-

ception studies also have shown that risks tend to be judged

higher by females (Flynn et al. 1994; Bateman and Edwards

2002; Kung and Chen 2012; Bourque et al. 2012) and that

females tend to have a stronger desire to take preventative

and preparedness measures compared with males (Ho et al.

2008; Cameron and Shah 2012).

3 Experiment II

The primary purpose of Experiment II was to expand the

primed recall prior experience manipulation to compare

three prior cyber experiences: a near-miss, a false alarm,

and a hit involving a loss of data. The prior cyber experi-

ence recall prime for Experiment II involved experiences

of a good friend, rather than the respondents’ past experi-

ences (used in Experiment I). We also posed all questions

using a loss frame to enhance the ecological validity of the

cyber dilemmas posed, the consequences of which are

naturally perceived as losses from a status quo. The

dependent variable was also changed for Experiment II.

Each respondent was asked to report whether they would

select the safe or risky option in response to their own

cyber dilemma, as opposed to providing advice to their best

friend involved in a risky cyber dilemma as in Experiment

I. One interpretation of the finding from Experiment I that

respondents generally favored the safe option was that they

were possibly more risk averse in advising a friend com-

pared to how they would respond to their own cyber

dilemma. By posing the dilemma in the first person, we

sought to characterize how respondents would be likely to

respond when facing a cyber dilemma. The cyber dilemmas

were also described in a more concrete fashion for

Experiment II, including a ‘‘screenshot’’ of the dilemma

facing the respondent.

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Design overview

In Experiment II, three cyber dilemmas were constructed to

evaluate respondents’ risky choice behavior using one

manipulated variable, recall of a friend’s false alarm, near-

miss or hit experience. In addition, six individual differ-

ence variables were included in the design: sex, age,

income, education, job domain, and self-reported victim-

ization. Each participant received all three dilemmas in a

constant order. Each of the three primed recall prior cyber

experiences was paired with one of the three scenarios in a

counterbalanced design such that each of the cyber

dilemmas appeared in each of the three treatment condi-

tions with equal frequency.

After each cyber dilemma, respondents were asked to

respond on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to

6 = strongly agree) regarding their intention to ignore the

warning and proceed with the riskier course of action.

Following all three cyber dilemmas, respondents were

given three attention check questions related to the nature

of each dilemma. Respondents also were asked to provide

basic demographic information and answer a series of

questions about their experience with computers and cyber

dilemmas, such as their experience with purchasing from a

fraudulent online store, being locked out from an online

account, or having unauthorized withdrawals made from

their online banking account.

522 Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

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3.1.2 Scenarios and manipulations

The three cyber dilemma scenarios involved the threat of

causing serious damage to the respondents’ computer as a

result of downloading a music file, installing a plug-in for

an online game, and downloading a media player to legally

stream videos. The scenarios were written to share the

same possible negative outcome—the computer’s operat-

ing system crashes, resulting in an unusable computer until

repaired. Establishing uniformity of consequences across

the three scenarios reduced potential unexplained variance

across the three levels of the manipulated variable.

Experiment II also included screenshots of ‘‘pop-up’’

window images similar to those that would appear on the

computer display when the cyber dilemma is presented.

These images were intended to make the scenarios more

concrete and enhance the realism of the cyber dilemma

scenarios.

Primed recall of a friend’s prior cyber experience was

the only manipulated variable in this experiment.

Respondents either recalled their friend’s near-miss, false

alarm or hit experience before deciding whether to select

the safe or risky option in response to the described cyber

dilemma. All potential outcomes were presented in a loss

frame, with wording held constant except for details spe-

cific to the scenario under consideration. For example, the

wording of the loss frame for the hit outcome of the

download a music file scenario was ‘‘She pressed ‘allow

access’ and her computer immediately crashed. She ended

up having to wipe the computer’s hard drive clean and to

reinstall the operating system.’’ The only modification

made for the installation of the plug-in scenario was

switching the words ‘‘allow access’’ to ‘‘run.’’ A complete

description of the scenarios, including the primed recall of

the friend’s prior experiences, is provided in Table 3.

3.1.3 Subjects

Three hundred and seventy-six US residents were recruited

through Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) to participate in

the experiment. Researchers have assessed the representa-

tiveness of AMT samples compared with convenience

samples found locally and found AMT samples to be

representative (Buhrmester et al. 2011; Mason and Suri

2012; Paolacci et al. 2010) and ‘‘significantly more diverse

than typical American college samples’’ (Buhrmester et al.

2011). Each respondent earned $1 for completion of the

experiment. After removing respondents who did not

answer all three of the attention check questions correctly

or completed the experiment in less than 7 min, the sample

consisted of 247 respondents. Five additional respondents

skipped questions, resulting in a final sample size of

N = 242. Table 4 includes a summary of sample

characteristics, including sex, age, income, education, job

domain, and self-reported victimization. Self-reported

victimization is defined in terms of experiences with four

types of negative cyber events: (1) getting a virus on an

electronic device, (2) purchasing from a fraudulent online

store, (3) being locked out from an online account, or (4)

having unauthorized withdrawals made from their online

banking account. Respondents also responded to a number

of experience questions that are summarized in Table 5 as

additional detail about the study sample.

3.2 Results

A mixed model ANOVA with one within-subject factor

(primed recall of a prior experience) and six individual

difference variables as between-subject factors were used.

This model included only the seven main effects and the

six 2-way interactions involving the manipulated within-

subject variable and each of the six between-subject vari-

able. Preliminary data screening was done; q–q plots

showed the scores on the repeated measures variable, prior

salient experience, to have an approximately normal

distribution. 2

Results show that the primed recall prior experience

manipulation had a significant effect on how respondents

intended to respond to the cyber dilemmas, F (1,

231) = 31.60, p \ .00, g2 = .12. Moreover, post hoc comparisons using the least significant difference (LSD)

test indicate that the mean score for the false-alarm con-

dition (M = 3.65, SD = 0.11) was significantly different

from the near-miss condition (M = 2.97, SD = 0.11) with

p \ .01, and the hit condition (M = 2.34, SD = 0.11) significantly differed from the near-miss and false-alarm

conditions with p \ .01. This suggests that respondents who received a description of a friend’s near-miss experi-

ence recall preferred the safer, risk averse option compared

with respondents who were primed to recall a friend’s prior

false-alarm experience. Respondents were found to be even

more likely to select the safe option when they were primed

to recall a friend’s prior hit experience. As displayed in

Fig. 2, the positive means for the false-alarm condition

indicate that respondents were more likely to engage in

risky behavior compared with the negative means for the

near-miss and hit conditions.

The analysis also included both main effects and inter-

action terms for six different subject variables, including

2 As in Exp I, a one-way repeated measure ANOVA shows there is a

significant scenario/order effect: F (2, 265) =4.47, p = .035, g2 = .02. Over time and/or scenario, respondents were more likely to endorse the

risky option. However, as in Experiment I, it is difficult to determine

whether the main effect is for the scenarios or the order effect. The study

design we used overcame this limitation by using a counterbalanced

design.

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529 523

123

T a

b le

3 S

u m

m a ry

o f

th re

e sc

e n

a ri

o s

a n

d m

a n

ip u

la ti

o n

s (E

x p

e ri

m e n

t II

)

S c e n

a ri

o 1

: M

u si

c F

il e

S c e n

a ri

o 2

: P

lu g

-i n

In st

a ll

S c e n

a ri

o 3

: U

n k

n o

w n

N e tw

o rk

S c e n

a ri

o Y

o u

w a n

t to

d o

w n

lo a d

a m

u si

c fi

le li

n k

in g

to a n

e a rl

y

re le

a se

o f

y o

u r

fa v

o ri

te b

a n

d ’s

n e w

a lb

u m

. W

h e n

y o

u

c li

c k

o n

th e

li n

k ,

th e

fo ll

o w

in g

w in

d o

w p

o p

s u

p :

If y

o u

p re

ss ‘‘

a ll

o w

a c c e ss

,’ ’

y o

u m

a y

ri sk

c a u

si n

g

se ri

o u

s d

a m

a g

e to

y o

u r

c o

m p

u te

r

Y o

u a re

in te

re st

e d

in p

la y

in g

a n

o n

li n

e g

a m

e th

a t

re q

u ir

e s

a p

lu g

-i n

to ru

n .

B e fo

re in

st a ll

in g

th e

p lu

g -i

n ,

th e

fo ll

o w

in g

w in

d o

w p

o p

s u

p :

If y

o u

c li

c k

‘‘ ru

n ,’ ’

y o

u m

a y

ri sk

in st

a ll

in g

a p

lu g

-i n

th a t

c o

u ld

se ri

o u

sl y

d a m

a g

e y

o u

r c o

m p

u te

r

Y o

u h

a v

e d

o w

n lo

a d

e d

a m

e d

ia p

la y

e r

to le

g a ll

y st

re a m

v id

e o

s fr

o m

y o

u r

c o

m p

u te

r. W

h e n

y o

u o

p e n

th e

p la

y e r,

th e

fo ll

o w

in g

w in

d o

w p

o p

s u

p :

If y

o u

p re

ss ‘‘

y e s,

y o

u m

a y

ri sk

u si

n g

a m

e d

ia p

la y

e r

th a t

c o

u ld

se ri

o u

sl y

d a m

a g

e y

o u

r c o

m p

u te

r

Y o

u r

e x

p e ri

e n

c e

Y o

u re

c a ll

th a t

y o

u r

fr ie

n d

to ld

y o

u sh

e w

a s

c o

n fr

o n

te d

b y

a si

m il

a r

si tu

a ti

o n

in th

e p

a st

. S

h e

w a s

a tt

e m

p ti

n g

to

o p

e n

a m

u si

c fi

le a n

d a

w in

d o

w p

o p

p e d

u p

sa y

in g

th e

p ro

g ra

m w

a s

b lo

c k

e d

b y

a fi

re w

a ll

Y o

u re

c a ll

th a t

y o

u r

fr ie

n d

to ld

y o

u sh

e o

n c e

d o

w n

lo a d

e d

a p

lu g

-i n

to p

la y

a n

o n

li n

e g

a m

e a n

d w

a s

w a rn

e d

p ri

o r

to in

st a ll

a ti

o n

th a t

th e

p u

b li

sh e r

c o

u ld

n o

t b

e v

e ri

fi e d

Y o

u re

c a ll

th a t

y o

u r

fr ie

n d

to ld

y o

u sh

e o

n c e

in st

a ll

e d

a

m e d

ia p

la y

e r

a n

d re

c e iv

e d

a w

a rn

in g

a b

o u

t a ll

o w

in g

a n

u n

k n

o w

n p

u b

li sh

e r

to m

a k

e c h

a n

g e s

to h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r

F a ls

e a la

rm S

h e

p re

ss e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

a c c e ss

’’ a n

d su

c c e ss

fu ll

y d

o w

n lo

a d

e d

th e

m u

si c

fi le

w it

h o

u t

a n

y d

a m

a g

e o

c c u

rr in

g to

h e r

c o

m p

u te

r

S h

e c li

c k

e d

‘‘ ru

n ,’ ’

a n

d su

c c e ss

fu ll

y p

la y

e d

th e

g a m

e

w it

h o

u t

c a u

si n

g a n

y d

a m

a g

e to

h e r

c o

m p

u te

r

S h

e p

re ss

e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

’’ a n

d su

c c e ss

fu ll

y u

se d

th e

p la

y e r

to

w a tc

h v

id e o

s w

it h

o u

t a n

y d

a m

a g

e o

c c u

rr in

g to

h e r

c o

m p

u te

r

N e a r-

m is

s S

h e

p re

ss e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

a c c e ss

’’ a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r

im m

e d

ia te

ly fl

a sh

e d

a b

lu e

sc re

e n

a n

d a u

to m

a ti

c a ll

y

re b

o o

te d

b e fo

re sh

e h

a d

ti m

e to

re a d

a n

y th

in g

.

F o

rt u

n a te

ly ,

fo ll

o w

in g

th e

re b

o o

t h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r w

a s

o p

e ra

ti n

g n

o rm

a ll

y

S h

e c li

c k

e d

‘‘ ru

n ’’

a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r im

m e d

ia te

ly fl

a sh

e d

a b

lu e

sc re

e n

a n

d a u

to m

a ti

c a ll

y re

b o

o te

d b

e fo

re sh

e

h a d

ti m

e to

re a d

a n

y th

in g

. F

o rt

u n

a te

ly ,

fo ll

o w

in g

th e

re b

o o

t h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r w

a s

o p

e ra

ti n

g n

o rm

a ll

y

S h

e p

re ss

e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

’’ a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r im

m e d

ia te

ly

fl a sh

e d

a b

lu e

sc re

e n

a n

d a u

to m

a ti

c a ll

y re

b o

o te

d b

e fo

re

sh e

h a d

ti m

e to

re a d

a n

y th

in g

. F

o rt

u n

a te

ly ,

fo ll

o w

in g

th e

re b

o o

t h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r w

a s

o p

e ra

ti n

g n

o rm

a ll

y

H it

S h

e p

re ss

e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

a c c e ss

’’ a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r

im m

e d

ia te

ly c ra

sh e d

. S

h e

e n

d e d

u p

h a v

in g

to w

ip e

th e

c o

m p

u te

r’ s

h a rd

d ri

v e

c le

a n

a n

d to

re in

st a ll

th e

o p

e ra

ti n

g sy

st e m

S h

e c li

c k

e d

‘‘ ru

n ’’

a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r im

m e d

ia te

ly

c ra

sh e d

. S

h e

e n

d e d

u p

h a v

in g

to w

ip e

th e

c o

m p

u te

r’ s

h a rd

d ri

v e

c le

a n

a n

d to

re in

st a ll

th e

o p

e ra

ti n

g sy

st e m

S h

e p

re ss

e d

‘‘ a ll

o w

’’ a n

d h

e r

c o

m p

u te

r im

m e d

ia te

ly

c ra

sh e d

. S

h e

e n

d e d

u p

h a v

in g

to w

ip e

th e

c o

m p

u te

r

c le

a n

a n

d to

re in

st a ll

th e

o p

e ra

ti n

g sy

st e m

Q u

e st

io n

B e lo

w p

le a se

in d

ic a te

y o

u r

le v

e l

o f

a g

re e m

e n

t w

it h

th e

st a te

m e n

t ‘‘

Y o

u w

il l

p re

ss ‘‘

a ll

o w

a c c e ss

’’ a n

d ri

sk

in st

a ll

in g

a fi

le th

a t

c o

u ld

se ri

o u

sl y

d a m

a g

e y

o u

r

c o

m p

u te

r’ ’

B e lo

w p

le a se

in d

ic a te

y o

u r

le v

e l

o f

a g

re e m

e n

t w

it h

th e

st a te

m e n

t ‘‘

Y o

u w

il l

c li

c k

‘‘ ru

n ’’

a n

d ri

sk in

st a ll

in g

a

p lu

g -i

n th

a t

c o

u ld

se ri

o u

sl y

d a m

a g

e y

o u

r c o

m p

u te

r’ ’

B e lo

w p

le a se

in d

ic a te

y o

u r

le v

e l

o f

a g

re e m

e n

t w

it h

th e

st a te

m e n

t: ‘‘

Y o

u w

il l

p re

ss ‘‘

a ll

o w

’’ ’

a n

d ri

sk u

si n

g a

m e d

ia p

la y

e r

th a t

c o

u ld

se ri

o u

sl y

d a m

a g

e y

o u

r

c o

m p

u te

r’ ’

524 Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

123

sex, age, level of education, income level, job domain, and

self-reported victimization. For the purpose of analysis, age

was collapsed into three levels: 18–29, 30–39, and 40 years

and older; education level was collapsed into three cate-

gories: high school and 2-year college, 4-year college, and

master’s degree or higher; and annual income level was

collapsed into three categories: below $30,000/year,

$30,000–$59,999/year, and $60,000/year and more.

The results of the ANOVA indicated there was a sig-

nificant main effect for age: F (2, 231) = 4.9, p = .01,

g2 = .04, and no significant main effects for sex,

education, income, job domain, and self-reported victim-

ization. Figure 2 suggests that younger respondents com-

pared with older respondents were more likely to choose

the riskier option in cyber dilemmas across all 3 levels of

the primed prior recall experience manipulation.

Results also showed a significant interaction effect

between income and the primed prior recall experience

manipulation: F (2, 231) = 3.40, p = .01, g2 = .03. Fig- ure 3 indicates that respondents with higher income levels

(greater than $60 K per year) were less sensitive to the

primed recall of a friend’s experience. There was no

Table 4 Demographic information for AMT respondents

Demographic variable (N = 242) Variable response category Number and percentage of sample

Sex Male 108 (44.6 %)

Female 134 (55.4 %)

Highest level of education High school 65 (26.9 %)

2-year college 38 (15.7 %)

4-year college 102 (42.1 %)

Master’s degree 30 (12.4 %)

Professional (e.g., M.D.,

Ph.D., J.D.) degree

7 (2.9 %)

Personal gross annual income range Below $20,000/year 66 (27.3 %)

$20,000–$29,999/year 31 (12.8 %)

$30,000–$39,999/year 35 (14.5 %)

$40,000–$49,999/year 28 (11.6 %)

$50,000–$59,999/year 15 (6.2 %)

$60,000–$69,999/year 23 (9.5 %)

$70,000–$79,999/year 13 (5.4 %)

$80,000–$89,999/year 10 (4.1 %)

$90,000/year or more 21 (8.7 %)

Does your work relate to technology? I use computers normally but my

work has nothing to do with

technology.

172 (71.1 %)

My work is about technology 70 (28.9 %)

Victim of getting a virus on an electronic device Yes 165 (68.2 %)

No 77 (31.8 %)

Victim of purchasing from a fake online store Yes 15 (6.2 %)

No 221 (91.3 %)

I don’t shop online 6 (2.5 %)

Victim of failure to log into an online account Yes 85 (35.1 %)

No 157 (64.9 %)

Victim of unauthorized withdrawals from an online banking account Yes 44 (18.2 %)

No 198 (81.8 %)

Overall self-reported victimization None 46 (19.0 %)

One type 104 (43.0 %)

Two or more types 92 (38.0 %)

Age (years) Range 18–75

Percentiles 25th 27

50th 33

75th 44

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529 525

123

significant interaction effect between the manipulation and

the other five individual difference variables, including sex:

F (1, 231) \1, age: F (2, 231) = 1.84, p = .12, g2 = .02, education: F (2, 231) \1, job domain, F (1, 231) = 2.01, p = .14, g2 = .01, and self-reported victimization, F (2, 231) = 2.03, p = .09, g2 = .02.

3.3 Discussion

Responses to risky cyber dilemmas in Experiment II were

significantly predicted by the primed recall of a friend’s

prior cyber experience. Consistent with our hypotheses, the

more negative the consequence associated with the prior

cyber experience, the more likely the respondents were to

choose the safer course of action. In particular, respondents

who were primed to recall a prior near-miss or hit event

interpreted the experience as a sign of vulnerability com-

pared with the recall of a prior false alarm and, in turn,

were more likely to promote more conservative (safe)

endorsements of actions. In the case of false alarms, our

findings suggest that respondents were more likely to

endorse the risky alternative.

-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

False-alarm Near-miss Hit

M e a n

E n

d o

rs e m

e n

t o

f S

a fe

v s .

R is

k y O

p ti

o n

Salient Prior Experience

Endorsement by Age

18 - 29 years old

30 - 39 years old

40 years old and

older

Risky

Safe

Age

Fig. 2 Mean endorsement of risky versus safe responses to cyber threats by primed recall of friend’s prior experience and age

M e a n

E n

d o

rs e m

e n

t o

f S

a fe

v s .

R is

k y O

p ti

o n

Salient Prior Experience

Endorsement by Income Level

Income

Fig. 3 Mean endorsement of risky versus safe responses to cyber threats by primed recall of friend’s prior experience and income level

Table 5 Cyber-related responses for AMT respondents

Questions Response

category

Number and

percentage of

sample

Personal computer PC 213 (88.0 %)

Mac 28 (11.6 %)

Do not have a

personal

computer

1 (0.4 %)

Smartphone iOS 67 (27.6 %)

Android 95 (39.3 %)

Do not have a

smartphone

80 (33.1 %)

Protection software Yes 211 (87.2 %)

No 31 (12.8 %)

Have you ever downloaded free

music, an e-book, a movie, or a

television show from an

unfamiliar website found

through a Google search?

Yes 135 (55.8 %)

No 107 (44.2 %)

How often do you access your

social networking accounts

(Facebook, Twitter, Myspace,

MSN, Match.com, etc.)?

Every day 150 (62.0 %)

Once a week 35 (14.5 %)

Once a month 8 (3.3 %)

2-3 times a

month

10 (4.1 %)

Every couple

months

14 (5.8 %)

Once a year 4 (1.7 %)

Never 21 (8.7 %)

Have you ever clicked on an

advertisement and a window

popped up saying something

along the lines of

‘‘Congratulations, you are

eligible to win an iPad!’’?

Yes 122 (50.4 %)

No 120 (49.6 %)

Have you ever clicked on a link in

a suspicious email (e.g., an

email in a different language,

with an absurd subject)?

Yes 32 (13.2 %)

No 210 (86.8 %)

526 Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529

123

In addition, endorsement of safe versus risky resolutions

to the cyber dilemmas varied by respondents’ age,

regardless of the primed recall of a friend’s prior experi-

ence. Middle-aged and older respondents were more likely

to endorse the safe choice option compared with younger

respondents. Research on age differences is inconsistent in

the domain of cyber security related to privacy (Hoofnagle

et al. 2010), risk of data loss from a cyber threat (Howe

et al. 2012—‘‘The psychology of security for the home

computer user’’ in Proceedings of 2012 IEEE Symposium

on the Security and Privacy) or fear of a cyber threat

(Alshalan 2006). Our findings suggest that younger indi-

viduals’ extensive use and dependence on computers for

daily activities may result in the association of a greater

cost with being risk averse in response to cyber dilemmas.

Younger individuals’ familiarity with computers likely

makes it easier for them to determine whether a cyber

dilemma is a real threat or a computer’s standard warning

message. In the same vein, their familiarity with computers

may also lead to a greater awareness of a major cyber

dilemma being a small probability event, the consequences

of which are likely to be repairable. Ultimately, younger

individuals do not perceive the unsafe option as overly

risky compared with the safe option.

Respondents’ income was also found to moderate the

effect of the primed recall of a friend’s prior experience

on respondents’ endorsement of safe versus risky

options. Of the three income levels, the wealthiest

respondents were the least sensitive to variations in the

primed recall of a friend’s prior cyber experience. In

the literature on cyber security, only a significant main

effect for income is reported. In a 2001 presentation by

Tyler, Zhang, Southern and Joiner at the IACIS Con-

ference, the research team reported findings suggesting

that higher income individuals have a lower probability

of considering e-commerce to be safe and therefore

avoid e-commerce transactions. Similarly, in a study by

Downs et al. (2008), respondents from more affluent

areas were reported to update their anti-virus program

more frequently than respondents from poorer areas,

further validating the tendency toward risk averse cyber

behavior for higher income individuals. Our finding

suggests that wealthier respondents were not as

impacted compared with the low and medium income

respondents by the primed prior recall experience

manipulation because they can afford to be riskier.

Their wealth allows them to have access to enhanced

baseline security measures. This creates a sense that

they are exempt from risks that apply to others and for

this reason, do not need to pay much attention to the

primed prior recall experiences and consequences.

Interestingly, there were no significant main effects or

interactions for the remaining four individual difference

variables, including sex, education, work domain, or

previous cyber victimization. The absence of main effects

for five of the six individual difference variables suggests

that respondents’ cyber dilemma decisions are determined

more by recall of prior cyber-related experiences, and not

by background of the decision maker, with the sole

exception of respondent age. The absence of interaction

effects for five of the six individual difference variables

suggests that the effect of primed recall of a prior expe-

rience is robust; respondent income was the sole moder-

ator identified.

4 Conclusion

Experiments I and II were designed to explore how com-

puter users’ responses to common cyber dilemmas are

influenced by framing and salience of prior cyber experi-

ences. Despite using two different dependent variables, the

advice the respondent would give to a friend (Experiment

I), and how the respondents themselves would respond to

cyber dilemmas (Experiment II), the extent to which the

two different questions elicit more or less risk averse

responses was found to be similar. The results indicate that

for prior near-miss experiences (the one manipulation

condition included in both experiments), the mean

responses were 2.39 and 2.97 for Experiments I and II,

respectively. This finding suggests that whether the

respondent was making a personal recommendation or

providing advice to a friend; the recalled experience

manipulation was found to significantly influence the

respondent’s endorsement of the safer cyber option. Simi-

larly, in prior cyber research, Aytes and Connolly (2004)

found that students were more attuned to cyber risks and

likely to take action against them when the primary source

of information was their own or friends’ experiences with

security problems.

The one inconsistent finding between the two experi-

ments is the effect of respondent sex on risky cyber choice

behavior. In Experiment I, females were found to be more

risk averse than males, while in Experiment II, sex was

found to be unrelated to whether respondents endorsed a

risky or safe option. Previous studies are also inconsistent

with respect to the role of sex in predicting cyber-related

behavior and decision making. At the 2012 Annual Con-

ference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational

Psychology, Byrne et al. report that women provided

slightly higher scores of behavioral intentions to click on a

risky cyber link, while Milne et al. (2009) found that males

had a greater tendency to engage in risky behaviors online.

In the context of security compliance, Downs et al. (2008)

report that males were more involved in computer security

management, such as updating their anti-virus software and

Environ Syst Decis (2013) 33:517–529 527

123

using pop-up blockers, while Herath and Rao (2009) found

women to have higher security procedure compliance

intentions, but were less likely to act on them.

One explanation for our inconsistent results related to

sex may be differences in the two populations sampled:

college students in Experiment I and a more diverse, AMT

sample in Experiment II. College samples tend to be more

sex stereotyped, such that risk tends to be judged lower by

men than by women, and females tend to have a stronger

desire to take preventative and preparedness measures

(Harris et al. 2006). This tends to be attributed to their lack

of real-world experiences; as evidenced by only a small

percentage of the sample, 24 %, have previously experi-

enced a cyber dilemma. By these assumptions, males

would be expected to be more risk seeking than females in

Experiment I. Conversely, the AMT sample consists of

older adults with more diverse backgrounds, as evidenced

in Table 5, which tends to blur the line between traditional

male and female stereotypes. In addition, 80 % of the AMT

sample had previously experienced a cyber dilemma, fur-

ther suggesting that shared experiences of males and

females could lead to the lack of sex differences found in

Experiment II.

Overall, these two experiments indicate that recall of prior

cyber experiences and framing strongly influence individual

decision making in response to cyber dilemmas. It is useful to

know about how prior experience and framing jointly

influence responses to cyber dilemmas. The implications of

our findings are that salience of prior negative experiences

certainly attenuates risky cyber behavior. We found that this

attenuation is greater for gain-framed decisions, and for low-

and middle-income respondents. Responses to cyber

dilemmas were determined more by proximal variables, such

as recall of prior experiences and framing, and were largely

robust to individual difference variables, with only a couple

of exceptions.

Given that safety in the cyber context is an abstract

concept, it would be worthwhile to further explore how

framing influences cyber dilemma decision making.

Additionally, this research design could be used to evaluate

differences across cyber dilemma contexts to examine the

robustness of the relationships identified in our research.

Such further research is warranted to better understand how

individual users respond to cyber dilemmas. This infor-

mation would be useful to cyber security policymakers

faced with the task of designing better security systems,

including computer displays and warning messages rele-

vant to cyber dilemmas.

Acknowledgments This research was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the National Center

for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events. However, any

opinions, findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this article

are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of

DHS. We would like to thank Society for Risk Analysis (SRA)

conference attendees for their feedback on this work at a session at the

2012 SRA Annual Meeting in San Francisco. We would also thank

the blind reviewers for their time and comments, as they were

extremely valuable in developing this paper.

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  • Heuristics and biases in cyber security dilemmas
    • Abstract
    • Introduction
    • Experiment I
      • Method
        • Design overview
        • Scenarios and manipulations
        • Subjects
      • Results
      • Discussion
    • Experiment II
      • Method
        • Design overview
        • Scenarios and manipulations
        • Subjects
      • Results
      • Discussion
    • Conclusion
    • Acknowledgments
    • References