Literature Review 3

- -

1

261

Source: H edley B

ull ( 1977) T/,e A narchical Society: A

Study of O rder

i11W orld P

olitics. B asingstoke, M

acm illan, pp. 57-74.

ull claim s that order in any society is m

aintained by its m em

bers through a om

m on interest in the elem

entary goals of social life. T his is achieved by accep-

ting cert:iin rules, norm s and practices w

hich shape the conduct of individual actors. A

lthough these rules and norm s m

ay not alw ays be as form

ally articulated as they often are in w

estern societies, they are how ever understood

as legitim ate and binding. B

ull asserts that international society is no different in this respect from

any other form of society. A

lthough international society is com

m only thought of as anarchical it none the less exhibits a range of institu-

tions w hich are valued by its m

em bers. T

his position suggests that G rotius is his

clas.sical intellectual forcbcarer.

O rder in the m

odern state

W ithin the m

odern state an institution, or set of connected institutions, is available to help m

ake elem entary social rules effective: governm

ent. A govern-

m ent is distinguished from

other institutions w ithin the m

odern state by its ability to call on physical force. O

n the one hand, it possesses actual force at its disposal that is overw

helm ing in relation to that w

hich is com m

anded by any other group. O

n the other hand, it possesses a near m onopoly of the legitim

ate use of force: apart from

certain residual rights of self-defence that are accorded

B U

LL

to the individual, only the governm ent is able to em

ploy force w hile being

regarded by m em

bers of the society at large as w ithin its rights in doing so. It

is just as im portant to a governm

ent that its use of force should be legitim ate as

that it should be overw helm

ing. These tw o aspects of a governm

ent's coercive pow

er are connected inasm uch as the collapse of a governm

ent's legitim acy m

ay m

ake possible a com bination of force against it such that its force is no longer

overw helm

ing. Insurgent groups show that they understand this interconnection

w hen they devote as m

uch attention to underm ining the governm

ent's right, in the eyes of the population, to use force, as to com

bating that force w ith force

of their ow n.

T he governm

ent helps to m ake elem

entary social rules effective w ithin the

m odern state by carrying out all the functions that w

ere outlined in the last sec- tion. It is not only by the governm

ent that these functions are carried out; individuals and groups other than the state also undertake them

. B ut the role of

the governm ent in prom

oting the effectiveness of elem entary social rules is a cen-

tral one.

(i) T he governm

ent m akes rules -

not alw ays in the sense that it invents them

, . ,' ~--

or first states them -

but in the sense that it fixes upon them society's im

prim atur

or stam p of approval. In the m

odern state this process of rule-m aking results in

a special set of rules w hich w

e refer to as 'the law ', W

hile the m aking of rules

in the m odern state is form

ally the function of the legislatJre, it is fam iliar that

the rule-m aking or legislative function is carried out not only by legislatures but

by adm inistrative bodies, w

hose form al function is the translation of law

into orders, and judicial bodies, w

hose form al function is the interpretation of law

s rather than the m

aking of them .

(ii) T he governm

ent helps to com m

unicate the rules to those w ho are bound

by them . T

he publication of statutes and court records, the actual enforcem ent

of the rules by the prosecution of offenders, the w ork of the police in apprehen-

ding, deterring or punishing offenders, all contribute to the spreading of an aw

areness of w hat rules are treated by society as rules of law

. (iii) T

he governm ent also adm

inisters or gives effect to the rules, translating them

from general principles into requirem

ents that particular persons do or refrain from

doing particular things. T his is form

ally the function of the executive branch, but a specialised branch is not necessarily presupposed by this function, w

hich is in fact norm ally carried out by other arm

s of the governm ent

as w ell.

(iv) T he governm

ent is able to interpret the rules - to resolve uncertainties

about the validity of rules, their m eaning or their relationship to one another -

principally through its judicial arm .

(v) T he governm

ent is able to enforc~ the law through the use, and the threat

of the use, of the police and arm ed forces and through the sanctions im

posed by the courts. Particular legal rules m

ay not be backed up by explicit sanctions, but the legal system

as a w hole is underpinned by the governm

ent's coercive pow er.

(vi) T he governm

ent can contribute to the legitim isation of the rules, the

262 A

R E

A D

E RIN

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L R

E LA

TIO N

SAN D

P O

LITIC A

L TH E

O R

Y

-acceptance of them as valuable in them

selves, by the influence it has over educa- tion and public inform

ation, the pow ers of persuasion of its ow

n leaders, and its ability to project itself as the sym

bolic em bodim

ent of the values of the society and to m

ould the political culture in a m anner favourable to acceptance of the

rules as legitim ate.

(vii) T he governm

ent m ay also adapt the rules to changing circum

stances and dem

ands by having its legislature repeal or am end old law

s and enact new ones,

and by having its adm inistrators execute the law

and its judges interpret it in such a w

ay as to change its content. (viii) T

he governm ent carries out the function of 'protection' of the rules

through the political actions it takes to set the social scene in such a w ay th.at

the rules w ill continue to operate. T

he invocation of arm ed forces to crush arts·

ing or expel a foreign invader exem plifies this 'protection'. So do m

easures .taken by the governm

ent to appease political di~satisfaction, to rem ove social .or

econom ic grievances, to

suppress irreconcilable agitators or to heal social cleavages or bridge antagonism

s that threaten to bring about the breakdow n of

society. W

hat these m iscellaneous political acts have in com

m on is that they are all

directed tow ards the preservation of order, not by directly upholding or

im plem

enting the rules, but by shaping, m oulding or m

anaging the social environm

ent in w hich the rules operate in such a w

ay that they have the oppor· tunity of continuing to do so. T

hey belong to a sphere of action w hich the rules

them selves m

ay not regulate and m ay even im

pede, but w hich their operation

nevertheless presupposes.

O rder in prim

itive stateless societies

O rder w

ithin the m odern state is the consequence, am

ong other things, of governm

ent; order am ong states cannot be, for intern~ti~~al society is an ~n~r-

chical society, a society w ithout governm

ent. B ut pr1m

1t1ve stateless societies also present this spectacle of 'ordered anarchy', ~nd it ~s w

orth c?nsidering the resem

blances and differences betw een the w

ays m w

hich order 1s created and m

aintained in the one case and in the other. A

part from the attention given by political theorist~ to noti?nal. stateless

societies and the largely speculative accounts of them

given by h1stor1anssuch

as M ain~ and M

aitland, prim itive stateless societies w

ere not subject to em ,pirical

observation and system

atic analysis until they attracted the att~nuo~ . of tw

entieth-century anthropologists. 1Prim itive societies that have been 1dent1fie~

as stateless by the latter include the N uer, the W

estern D 1nka and the M

andan of southern Sudan, the T

allensi of N orthern N

igeria, the B w

am ba of U

ganda, the L

ugbara of U ganda and C

ongo and the K onkom

ba to T ogoland. A

ll ?f thes_e societies are w

ithout a governm ent in the sense ?efi~ed above ~nd are.' '". ~dd1-

tion, w ithout central political institutions -

!eg1Slauve,executive or 1ud1c1al-

B U

LL 263

- of any kind. Indeed, it is said of som

e of them that they contain no specialised

political roles at all; w hile there are persons or bodies w

ithin them , such as heads

of a fam ily or lineage group or a village, that fulfil political roles, these roles are

not form ally distinguished from

the other roles they have. T he distinctions

w hich outside observers draw

betw een the political, the local, the kinship or the

ritualistic roles of these persons or groups m ay have no m

eaning in the culture of the societies them

selves. A

t the sam e tim

e these societies clearly exhibit order in the sense that conduct w

ithin them conform

s to elem entary goals of social coexistence. In the shaping

of this conduct rules play a vital part, and their effectiveness depends on the carrying out of the order-m

aintaining functions of m aking these rules, com

- m

unicating, adm inistering, interpreting, enforcing, legitim

ising, adapting and 'protecting' them

. In the absence of any central authority, how ever, these func-

tions are carried out solely by groups - such as lineage groups and locality

groups - into w

hich these stateless societies are divided. R

ules do not em anate from

any central rule-m aking authority but arise out of

the practice of lineage or locality groups in their relations w ith one another,

becom e em

bodied in 'custom ' and are confirm

ed by m oral and religious belief.

C ustom

or established practice is of course also a fam iliar source of rules in cen-

tralised political system s; in prim

itive stateless societies it is the only source of rules.

C onform

ity to these rules is brought about by conditioning and inertia, by 'm

oral' sanctions such as public ridicule and reprobation, and by ritual or super- natural sanctions, such as cursing by the elders of a tribe. In societies that are culturally hom

ogeneous, especially if they are sm all societies, sanctions such as

these w ill often be sufficient in them

selves. W

here such sanctions are insufficient to deter or punish violations of rules, there m

ay be a resort to 'self-help' on the part of groups w ithin the society w

hich take upon their ow

n shoulders the responsibility of determ ining that there has

been a breach of the rules, and of attem pting to enforce them

. T he killing of a

m em

ber of a lineage or locality group, for exam ple, m

ay lead that group to undertake a retaliatory killing of the guilty party or another m

em ber of his

group. In circum stances in w

hich the bonds betw een the groups are very strong,

the legitim acy of the retaliation m

ay be accepted on both sides and the m atter

brought to an end. B ut in others the legitim

acy of the act m ay be disputed, and

a sustained conflict, based on both sides on the exercise of subjectively legitim ate

self-help, m ay develop.

Since both groups w ill be interpreting the rules, and the facts of the case, on

their ow n behalf (or on behalf of one of their m

em bers) their judgem

ent is likely to be im

perfect. Since, m oreover, their ability actually to enforce the rules w

ill depend on the am

ount of force at their com m

and and their w ill to use it, the

enforcem ent of the rules is bound to be' uncertain. Yet the recourse to self-help

does not represent disregard of the rules and the descent of the groups concerned into a H

obbesian state of nature; it represents the operation of a system in w

hich these groups are assum

ing the functions of interpreting, applying and enforcing

- .·..

264 A

R E

A D

E RIN

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L RE LA

TIO N

SA N

O P

O LITIC

A L TH

E O

R Y

the rules. M oreover, in doing so they are confined by rules lim

iting the activity of self-help itself.

. .

. R

esort to force by these groups in response to w hat they 1udge to be a V

I_olat1on of the rules is accepted throughout these societies as legitim

ate. T here 1s not a

general right to self-help, available to any individual or group w ithin the society;

< ' only those groups that are entitled to resort to violen~e m

ay do so. T ~e force

w hich they em

ploy, if it is legitim ate, m

ay only be used 1n response to a v1olauon of rights. T

he nature of the force em ployed, m

or_eover, is lim ited, for exam

ple by the principle that rctaH

a~ion m ust be pr?p.ort1?nate '.~ the offenc_e

.. A

cts of self-help in prim 1t1ve stateless socieues, ,n add1uon to prov1dm

g rules w

ith a coercive sanction, also serve tw o further functions, to w

hich R oger

M asters has draw

n attention: they 'serve to unite social groups and to m aintain

legal and m oral criteria of right and w

r?ng'. 2 J::lot only do_ they help, by,g~l- vanising a group in support of violent acuon against an outside group, to m

am -

tain its cohesion, they are also, in addition to bein_g an attem p_t to enforce a r~le

against this particular violation, a m eans of restating the rule itself, of underlin-

ing its continued validity and enduring im p?rtance.

, P

rim itive anarchical societies clearly have im

portant resem blances to interna-

tional society in respect of the m aintenance of order. In both ca~es som

e elem ~nt

of order is m aintained despite the absence of a central authority com

m andm

g overw

helm ing force and a m

onopoly of the legitim ~te use of it. In ~oth cases,

also this is achieved through the assum ption by pam

cular groups - lineage and

locality groups in prim itive stateless societies, sovereign states in international

society - of the functions w

hich, in a m odern state, the go_vernm

en'. (b~t not the

governm ent exclusively) carries out in m

aking rules effective. In pr1m 1t1ve anar-

chical society, as in international society, order depends upon a fundam ental or

constitutional principle, stated or im plied, w

hi~~ singles ?utcertain groups _as the sole bodies com

petent to discharge these political functions. In both soc1et1~s the politically com

petent groups m ay legitim

ately use force in defence of the'.r rights

w hile individuals and groups other than these m

ust look to the prm -

lege/ politically com

petent groups for protection, rather than resort to force them

selves. .

In prim itive anarchical societies, as in international s~ciety, th~ relauons bet-

w een these politically com

petent groups are them selv_es

c,rcun:iscnbedby a struc- ture of acknow

ledged norm arive principles, even at t1m

es of violent Struggle. B ut

in both there is a tendency, during these periods of Struggle, for the structure of rules to break dow

n, and the society to fall apart to such an ext~nt tha~ t_he w

arring tribes or states are better described as a num ber of contending soc1et1es

than as a single society, Finally, in both prim idve anarc_hical society and m

odern international society there are factors operatm

g, oum de the structure of rules

itself inducing the politically com petent groups to conform

to them . T

hese include the factors of m

utual deterrence or fear of unlim it~d conflic_<, th~ for~e

of habit or inertia the long-term interests they have (consciously rat1onal,sed IO

the m

odern w orld: and intuitively felt in prim

itive soc~ety) in pre.serv.ing a system

of collaboration, w

hatever their short-term interest m

destroym g

11.

B U

LL 265

- H

ow ever, the differences betw

een international society and prim itive stateless

societies are also rem arkable. In the first place there are crucial differences bet-

w een the units that are politically com

petent in the tw o sorts of society. T

he state in international society is sovereign in that it has suprem

e jurisdiction over its citizens and its territory. T

he lineage or locality groups w hich exercise political

t: pow

ers in prim itive society, by contrast, do not have any such exclusive rights

in relation to the persons that m ake them

up, and usually have a less clearly defined relationship to territory.

A given lineage group does not necessarily exercise exclusive authority over

the persons of w hich it is com

posed. In som e stateless societies lineage groups

are divided into segm ents, and w

ithin them there is a constant process of segm

en- tation and m

erging. Segm ents of a lineage w

hich are units at one level m erge into

l?rger seg~ents at others. W hereas at one level these units m

ay be in com peti-

tion, at higher levels they are united as subordinate parts of a larger segm ent.

T hese shifting com

binations and divisions illustrate w hat has been called 'the

principle of

com plem

entary opposition' in

prim itive stateless societies.

' Politically com

petent units in prim itive anarchical societies are so related that

w hile any tw

o of them are in conflict for certain purposes they are com

bined for c_e~tainother purposes. T

hus, on the one hand, each unit engages in conflict suf-

·'

ficient to generate a sense of identity and m aintain its internal cohesion, but on

the other hand there is no relationship of conflict betw een units that is not

overlaid w ith som

e elem ent of co-operation also.

N or do politically com

petent units in prim itive anarchical societies possess

exclusive jurisdiction over precisely defined territories. T he view

of Sir H enry

M aine that in prim

itive societies political solidarity arose only out of ties of blood and never out of com

m on possession of a tract of territory has been

rejectedby m odern anthropologists, w

ho contend that prim itive societies are

bas.ed ~n_both blo?d and territory.' B ut the lineage groups that carry out order-

m a1ntam

m g functions m

the stateless societies that have been considered do not hav~ exclusive rights to tracts of territory defined by precise, accepted boundanes.

B ecause the politically com

petent groups in prim itive stateless societies are not

sovereign over persons and territory, but are related less exclusively than is the m

odern state to the persons that belong to them and to areas of land, they appear

to have a less self-sufficient existence and to be less introverted or self-regarding than are the m

em bers of the society of states.

A ~econd point of con:rast is that w

hereas m odern international society,

esp~c1_ally at the present tim e,

is culturally heterogeneous, prim

itive stateless

societ1es are m arked b~ a high degree of cultural hom

ogeneity. B y a society's

culture w e m

ean 11s basic system of values, the prem

ises from w

hich its thought and action derive. A

ll prim itive societies appear to depend upon a com

m on

culture; stateless societies appear to depend upon it 10 a special degree. Fortes and E

vans-Pritchard cam e to the tentative conclusion, on the basis of the A

frican syste'.".s they studie~, that a high degree of com

m on culture w

as a necessary cond1t1on of anarchical structures, w

hile only a central authority could w eld

266 A

R E

A D

E RIN

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L R

E LA

TIO N

SAN D

P O

LITIC A

L TH E

O R

Y •

together peoples of heterogeneous cultu_re. <B ~t the ~ociety of sovere!~n states .-

or, as it has som etim

es been called, the m clustve society, today a_ pohttcal fabric

that em braces the w

hole of m ankind -

is par excellence a society that IS cul· turally heterogeneous.

, A

third point of contrast is that prim itive stateless so~ieties rest not stm

ply on a culture that is hom

ogeneous but also on one that includes the ele~ent of m

agical or religious belief. 'T he social_ system

', Fortes ~nd E vans-Pm

chard w

rote, 'is, as it w ere, rem

oved to a m ysttcal plane, w

here It figures as a system

of sacred values beyond criticism or revision ...

hence the w ars or feuds bet·

w een segm

ents of a society like the N uer or the T

allensi are kept w ithin bounds

by m ystical sanctions.' 5 International society, by contrast, is part of the m

odern w

orld, the secular w orld that em

erged from the collapse of ecclesiastical a~d

religious authority. T he various substitutes that have been br?ught forw

ard tn the last three centuries in the attem

pt to validate or authenticate the rules of international society -

the natural law , the custom

ary practice of states, the 'nteresrs or 'needs' of states, the law

com m

on to 'civilised states' - are all inferior

:0 religious authority in term s of their pow

er to produce social coh~sion be~ause they are all subject to question and debate. T

he m oral bases of 1nt_ernat1onal

society m ay be less brittle than those of prim

itive sociedes,. s~b1ect to the

shattering im pact that w

as m ade by C

hristian and Islam ic c1V

1hsat1~ns on sub·

Saharan A frican and O

ceanic system s, m

ore able to absorb new intellectual

challenges and preserve som e m

easure o_f continuity. B ~t they d? not approach

a m agical or religious system

of valu~s '". term s of th~,r soc1~l im

pact .. Finally, there are gross differences in s,ze betw

een inte'.nattonal_ soc,ety and prim

itive stateless societies. T he N

uer, the largest-scale society studied ~y Fortes and E

vans-Pritchard, num bered 300,000 in an area of 26,000 square m

iles. T he

society of states em braces all m

ankind and all the ear~h. ,

T ogether, w

hat is show n by these points of contrast IS ~hat '.h~ (orces m

ak_m g

for social cohesion and solidarity are very m uch stronger in pr1m

1t1ve anarch1~al

societies than in international society. T he less exclustve and self-regarding

nature of the political units of w hich prim

itive stateless societies are co'."posed, their cultural hom

ogeneity, the underpinning of their rules by m agical and

religious belief, and their sm all and intim

ate nat~re, all indicate _that t_hou~h governm

ent is Jacking in these syst_e~s, an i~presstve ?egreeof social solidarity is not. T

he m aintenance of order ,n m

ternattonal society has to_ take plac_e not only in the absence of governm

ent but also in the absence of social sohdam y of

this sort.

O rder in international society

T he m

aintenance of order in w orld politics depends, in_ the first instan~e, oncer·

tain contingent facts w hich w

ould m ake for order even 1f state! w

~re ~1thout any conception of com

m on interests, com

m on rules or com

m on 1nst1tut1ons-

even if, in other w

ords, they form ed an international system

only, and not also an

B U

LL 267

international society. A balance of pow

er, for exam ple, m

ay arise in an interna· tional system

quite fortuitously, in the absence of any belief that it serves com ·

m on interests, or any attem

pt to regulate or institutionalise it. If it does arise, it m

ay help to lim it violence, to render undertakings credible or to safeguard

governm ents from

challenges to their local suprem acy. W

ithin international society, how

ever, as in other societies, order is the consequence not m erely of

contingent facts such as this, but of a sense of com m

on interests in the elem en·

tary goals of social life; rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals; and institutions that help to m

ake these rules effective.

C om

m on interests

T o say that x is in som

eone's interest is m erely to say that it serves as a m

eans to som

e end that he is pursuing. W hether or not x does serve as a m

eans to any particular end is a m

atter of objective fact. B ut w

hether or not xis in his interest w

ill depend not only on this but also on w hat ends he is actually pursuing. It

follow s from

this that the conception of interest is an em pty or vacuous guide,

both as to w hat a person does do and as to w

hat he should do. T o provide such

a guide w e need to know

w hat ends he does or should pursue, and the conception

of interest in itself tells us nothing about either. T

hus the criterion of'national interest', or 'interest of state', in itself provides us w

ith no specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how

they should behave - unless w

e are told w hat concrete ends or

objectives states do or should pursue: security, prosperity, ideological objectives or w

hatever. Still less does it provide us w ith a criterion that is objective, in the

sense of being independent of the w ay state ends or purposes are perceived by

particular decision-m akers. It does not even provide a basis for distinguishing

m oral or ideological considerations in a country's foreign policy from

non-m oral

or non-ideological ones: for x can be in a country's interest if it serves as a m eans

to a m oral or ideological objective that the country has.

H ow

ever, the conception of national interest or interest of state does have som

e m eaning in a situation in w

hich national state ends are defined and agreed, and the question at issue is by w

hat m eans they can be prom

oted. T o say that

a state's foreign policy should be based on pursuit of the national interest is to insist that w

hatever steps are taken should be part of som e rational plan of

action; an approach to foreign policy based on the national interest m ay thus be

contrasted w ith

one consisting sim ply of the

uncritical pursuit

of som e

established policy, or one consisting sim ply of unconsidered reactions to events.

A policy based on the idea of the national interest, m

oreover, m ay be contrasted

w ith one based on a sectional interest, o; one based on the interests of som

e group w

ider than the state, such as an alliance or international organisation to w

hich it belongs. T o speak of the national interest as the criterion at least directs

our attention to the ends or objectives of the nation or state, as against those of som

e other group, narrow eror w

ider.

B U

LL 269

- - 268 A

R E

A D

E RIN

IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L RE LA

TIO N

SAN D

P O

LITIC A

L TH E

O R

Y

T he m

aintenance of order in international society has as its starting-point the developm

ent am ong states of a sense of com

m on interests in the elem

entary goals of social life. H

ow ever different and conflicting their objectives m

ay be, they are united in view

ing these goals as instrum ental to them

. T heir sense of com

m on

interests m

ay derive from fear of unrestricted violence, of the instability of

agreem ents or of the insecurity of their independence or sovereignty. It m

ay have its origins in rational calculation that the w

illingness of states to accept restric· tions on their freedom

of action is reciprocal. O r it m

ay be based also on the treatm

ent of these goals as valuable in them selves and not m

erely as a m eans to

an end - it m

ay express a sense of com

m on values as w

ell as of com m

on

interests.

. . R

ules

In international society, as in other societies, the sense of com m

on interests in elem

entary goals of social life does not in itself provide precise guidance as to 1

w hat behaviour is consistent w

ith these goals; to do this is the function of rules. '

T hese rules m

ay have the status of international law , of m

oral rules, of custom

or established practice, or they m ay be m

erely operational rules or 'rules of the gam

e', w

orked out w

ithout form

al agreem

ent or even w ithout

verbal com ·

m unication.Itis not uncom

m on for a rule to em

erge first as an operational rule, then to becom

e established practice, then to attain the status of a m oral principle

and finally to be incorporated in a legal convention; this appears to have been

the genesis, for exam ple,

of m any of the rules now

em bodied in m

ultilateral treaties or conventions concerning the law

s of w ar, diplom

atic and consular status, and the law

of the sea. T

he range of these rules is vast, and over m uch of this range they are in a state

of flux. H ere w

e shall m ention only three com

plexes of rules that play a part in the m

aintenance of international order.

First, there is the com plex of rules that states w

hat m ay be called the fun-

dam ental or constitutional

norm ative principle of w

orld politics in the present era. T

his is rhe principle that identifies the idea of a society of states, as opposed to such alternative ideas as that of a universal em

pire, a cosm opolitan

com ·

m unity of individual hum

an beings, or a H obbesian state of nature or state of

w ar,

as the

suprem e

norm ative

principle of the

political organisation

of m

ankind. It is em

phasised elsew

here in this

study that

there is nothing

historically inevitable or m orally sacrosanct about the idea of a society of states.

N or does this idea in fact m

onopolise hum an thought and action, even in the pre·

sent phase; on the contrary, it has alw ays had to do battle w

ith com peting prin·

ciples, and does so now . O

rder on a w orld scale, how

ever, does require that one or another of these basic ideas should be clearly in the ascendancy; w

hat is incom

patible w ith order on a w

orld scale is a discord of com peting principles of

universal political organisation. O

n the one hand, the idea of international society identifies states as m em

bers of this society and the units com

petent to carry out political tasks w

ithin it,

~:~i;~•;:i:o ;ts basic rules effective; it thus excludes

0 state, such as universal authoritie~ :~~:e ~~:ts:~t~~~a\ g:~~u~~~~h~r-t~n

the

~~~,:~a~:;~; tt:tiit~~~t:;:::~~:~!e:;tty bet:;~~

i% ~ntifies the rJations~i~

to com m

on institutions; it thus excludes~~: co~;:p:::~;~~rf2dp~ol.m

t' m

itred m

ere arena or state of w ar.

1 1cs as a

po;e~si:,u;!~;aer~t::;: ~ri~ciple _of int~rnational order is presup-

::n:~~~;io;~~ them

selves the rights or com pet~nces

;' Y_ac:,of s o

sta_tes - in arrogating to

in com bining w

ith each other'tO this e:

pr_m cop~ ~cton m

"'.orld politics, and or sub-state groups to w

rest thes . h

d, '~ resost1ng the claim s of supra-state

~his principle and provide eviden:/~~ i:::,:tr:~;:i~te;~es fr_on: t~e~ -

dis~lay on a n~m

ber of basic rules of international law . T

hus lt h e tronc1~ e IS cdont~m ed

doctrine that states are the onl or the

. .

as ee.n t e pre om

m ant

international law

· that they alt h

p~nc'.p~I bearers of rights and duties in that its source lie; in the conse:te

/ve t e rig t to us~ force to uphold it; and

principle, how ever, is prior to int~rn:t~:e:;i'xpressed

on custom _ or treaty. T

he tion of international

law • it is

'f .

law , or to any particular

form ula-

m oral, custom

ary and op~ration:ti' ~st on a w

h~le c?m ~lex of rules -

legal, constant developm

ent In th

f . _t os not a static pronc,ple, but is subject to

m eet the challenge of doctri:eso:~-a~ve

stars o~in~er~ational society, it had to

groups other than the state to a ,c

~roe ~,m e

t e '.'~ht of individuals and of the present tim

e it faces a sim il!'~:~.'tfe~;:~ersal

pohtocal organisation; and at

Second, there are w hat m

ay be call d ' h I

guidance supplied by the constitut' t' _t : rues

of coexistence', G

iven the international

society, these rules s;~:• prone,~): as to w

ho _a_re the m e~bers of

istence. T hey include

first of all h

ut the m ,n,m

um conditions of their coex-

of violence in w orld ~olitics

T h' t

e cfm ple~ of rules w

hich restrict the place violence to sovereign states a~d toe~e ru _es see

to confine the legitim ate use of

0 violence to a particular ko'nd of

.' ny ot to thder agents by confining legitim

ate .

v10 1ence ca 11e 1w

ar' d b

· violence that is w

aged on the auth .

• an Y treaung

w ar as

rules seek to lim it the c

om y of a sovereign state. Furtherm

ore, the

legitim ately begin a w

ar, ~~:'!x~~p~rbos;s f~r. w

hich sovereign state can

cause, as m aintained by the nat

I yd equ~rm

g that It be begun for a just states system

, or by requirin tha~~i"b~~w

ocm

nes of the f~rm ative era of the

had been tried first as insis~ed by th

C egun only ~fter certain other procedures

rules also have sou~ht to restrict the em a~v:n~nt \.the

L eagu~ of N

ations. T he

w ar, for exam

ple by insisting that w ar b n r '~ w

,c~ sovereign states. conduct the end pursued

or in such a w a

econ ucted on a w

ay proporuonate to

no m ore violen~e than necessa:

a; to sp~r~ non-com batants,

or so as to em ploy

the geographical spread of a w a:·by:;t~ttr

• th~ ru_lehs hJve sought to restrict

and belligerents in relation t '

h IS m

g t e rig ts and duties of neutrals o one anot er.

T here

is a further com

plex of rules f

. .

behaviour appropriate to sustain th lo fcohexm

en~e w hich prescribes

the e goa

O

t e carrying out of undertakings.

- ·.

A R

E A

D E

RIN IN

TE R

N A

TIO N

A L RE

LA TIO

N SA

N D

P O

LITIC A

L TH E

O R

Y 270

T l

1,.1'..it: rnl,· '"'' 111 w

nt ~r.m

am la, \ornctim

co;, \ccn a\ a prec;uppor;itionof the I:,:

11 i 11 :11

; 1111 ,, :1111 1 ,,,1111 ,:tim

t:, n, a (ir'itprinciple of it, e\tablic;hed the presum p·

tiw i 011 w

liidi aJ,,11 c I lu.:1c c.::111 at all. Subc:r·

he point in entering into agr~c111cntc; Jin:1tc or cpialifying rules concern w

hether or not goo~ faith_n~ed be keptw 1~h

hcrcticc; or infidel-;, w l1cthcr or not agreem

ent~ rem ain valid in changing cir-

cu111stanccsn11<lw ho is the judge as to w

hether or not the)' have changed, w

hether or not and in w hat sense agreem

ents are valid that are im posed by force,

w hat rhe circum

stances are in w hich a party to an agreem

ent can be released from

it, w hat are the principles according to w

hich agreem ents should be inter-

preted, w hether or not and to w

hat extent a new governm

ent succeeds to the obligations of irs predecessors, and so on.

. .

. T

he rules of coexistence also include those w hich prescribe behav10ur that sus-

tains the goal of the stabilisation of each state's control or jurisdiction~ve'.irs ow

n persons and territory. A t the heart of this com

plex of rules 1s the pnnc1ple that each state accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or suprem

e jurisdiction of every other state over its ow

n citizens and dom ain, in return for the right to

expect sim ilar respect for its ow

n sovereignty from oth:r stat:•· A

corollary or near-corollary of this central rule is the rule that stares w

ill nor intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another's internal affairs. A

nother is the rule establishing the 'equality' of all states in the sense of their like enjoym

ent of like rights of sovereignty.

. T

hird, there is the com plex of rules concerned to regulate co-operation am

ong states -

w hether on universal or on a m

ore lim ited scale -

above and beyond w

hat is necessary for m ere coexistence. This includes the rules that facilitate co-

operation, not m erely of a political and strategic, but also of a soci~I and

econom ic nature. T

he grow th in this century of legal rules concerned w

ith co- operation betw

een states in econom ic, social, com

m u?ications ~nd enviro?m

en· ral m

atters exem plifies the place of rules of co-operation and w

ill be cons,dered later (see C

hapter 6). R

ules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elem en-

tary or prim ary goals of international life, but rar~er to tho~e m

?re a~vanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society 1n w

hich_ a con- sensus has been reached about a w

ider range of objectives than m ere coexistence.

N evertheless, these rules m

ay be said to play a role in relation to international order, inasm

uch as the developm ent of co-operation and consensus am

ong states about these w

ider goals m ay be expected to strengthen the fram

ew ork of

coexistence. T

his is nor the place to expound these three com plexes of rules in full, or to

exam ine rhe problem

s of interpreting them or reconciling the conflicts betw

een them

. N or is it appropriate here to consider w

hich of them has the status of law

, w

hich the status of m oral rules, w

hich should be seen as custom ary or as opera-

tional rules, nor to rrace the historical evolution through w hic~ these rules h~ve

passed from one of these em

bodim ents ro a~other, and som

etim es back_again.

Ir is sufficient ro note that the vast and changing corpus of rules and quas,-rules, of w

hich those cited are part of the central core, provide the m eans w

hereby

B U

LL 271

- international society m

oves from the vague perception of a com

m on interest to

a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires.

Institutions In international society it is the m

em bers of the society them

selves - sovereign

states - w

hich are chiefly responsible for perform ing the functions of helping to

m ake the rules effective; they do so in the absence of either a suprem

e govern- m

ent, w hich is able to undertake these functions in the m

odern state, or the degree of solidarity am

ong them selves that characterises the perform

ance of these functions by politically com

petent groups in prim itive stateless societies.

In this sense it is states them selves that are the principal institutions of the society

of states. T

hus states undertake the function of m aking the rules, or legislating, by signi-

fying their consent to them . R

ules of general application, like the rules of coex- istence, arise out of custom

and established practice, and are in som e cases

confirm ed by m

ultilateral conventions. R ules that apply only to particular

groups of states m ay also arise out of custom

and established practice - as do

the operational rules of crisis avoidance and m anagem

ent now being evolved by

the great pow ers -

but they m ay also be the subject of explicit agreem

ents or treaties.

States com m

unicate the rules through their official w ords, as w

hen they state that they respect the legal principle of the sovereignty of states, or the m

oral prin- ciple of national self-determ

ination, or the operational rule that great pow ers

should not interfere in each other's spheres of influence. B ut they also com

- m

unicate the rules through their actions, w hen they behave in such a w

ay as to indicate that they accept or do not accept that a particular rule is valid. B

ecause the com

m unication of the rules is in the hands of states them

selves, and not of an authority independent of them

, the advertisem ent of the rules is com

m only

distorted in favour of the interests of particular states. States adm

inister the rules of international society inasm uch as executive acts

ancillary to the rules them selves are perform

ed either by them selves (as w

hen particular states are designated as the depository stares for a treaty, or the guarantors of a neutralisation arrangem

ent, or the arbiters of a dispute) or by international organisations w

hich are responsible to them (as w

hen organisa- tions are set up to im

plem ent agreem

ents concerning international post and telecom

m unications,

or a host of other m atters),

E ach state provides its ow

n interpretation of the rules - legal, m

oral or opera- tional. E

ven in the case of legal rules, a state relies on its ow n legal advisers, and

there is no conclusive w ay in w

hich disagreem ents about interpretation can be

settled by an independent authority. T he interpretation of m

oral or of opera- tional rules is even m

ore uncertain. '

T he enforcem

ent of the rules, in the absence of a central authority, is carried our by states, w

hich m ay resort to acts of self-help, including acts of force, in

defence of their rights under operational, m oral or legal rules. B

ecause states are

- 272 A R E

A D

E R

IN IN TE

R N

A TIO

N A

L RE LA

TIO N

SAN D

P O

LITIC A

L TH E

O R

Y

frequently not in a position to carry out effective action in defence of their rights, the enforcem

ent of the rules is uncertain. B ecause of the low

degree of consensus or solidarity am

ong states, actions w hich the state com

m itting them

sees as self- help or rule-enforcem

ent are frequently not view ed as such by international

society at large. States undertake the task of legitim

ising the rules, in the sense of prom oting

the acceptance of them as valuable in their ow

n right, by em ploying their pow

ers of persuasion and propaganda to m

obilise support for them in w

orld politics as a w

hole. A t the present tim

e an im portant m

eans to the legitim isation of rules

is to have them

endorsed by international assem

blies and international

organisations. States undertake the task of changing or adapting operational, m

oral and legal rules to changing circum

stances, but have to do so in the absence of a universal legislative authority com

petent to rescind old rules and devise new ones, and

w ith the handicap that there is often no consensus as to w

hether or not, or how ,

the rules should be changed. States change the rules by dem onstrating, through

their w ords or their actions, that they are w

ithdraw ing their consent from

old rules and bestow

ing it upon new ones, and thus altering the content of custom

or established practice.

T he

operational rules observed by great pow ers,

w hereby they respect one anothers' spheres of influence in particular parts of the

w orld, are rescinded or changed w

hen these pow ers show

by w hat they do or

say that they no longer accept them , or regard their boundaries or lim

iting condi- tions as having changed. T

he m oral principle of national self-determ

ination - the rule that states should be nation-states -

cam e to displace that of dynastic

legitim acy not by enactm

ent of any legislative authority, but by w ar and revolu-

tion. In the changing of legal rules a part is som etim

es played by m ultilateral con·

ventions or treaties, but here also states change the old rules by violating or ignoring them

system atically enough to dem

onstrate that they have w ithdraw

n their consent to them

. In other w ords, w

hile the adaptation of the rules to changed circum

stances is part of the process w hereby order is m

aintained, it is itself often accom

panied by disorder. Finally, states undertake the task w

hich, for w ant of a better term

, has been called 'protection' of the rules. T

he rules w hich sustain order in international

society can operate only if conditions obtain in the international political system

that enable them to do so. In particular, they can operate only if that senseof

com m

on interests am ong states, w

hich they seek to translate into a precise guide to conduct, continues to exist. T

he function of'protection' of the rules com prises

all those things w hich states m

ay do to create or m aintain that state or condition

of the system in w

hich respect for the rules can flourish. T

he 'protection' of the rules encom passes, first and forem

ost, those classical acts of diplom

acy and w ar w

hereby states seek to preserve a general balance of pow

er in the international system (and today a relationship of m

utual nuclear deterrence am

ong contending nuclear pow ers); to accom

m odate or contain con-

flicts of ideology; to resolve or m oderate conflicts of state interest; to lim

it or control arm

am ents and arm

ed forces in relation to interests perceived in

- B

U LL

273

international security; to appease the dem ands of dissatisfied states for w

hat they regard as just change; and to secure and m

aintain the acquiescence of the sm aller

pow ers in the assum

ption by great pow ers of special rights and responsibilities.

T hese m

easures of 'protection' of the rules are not prescribed by the rules of coexistence, or by international law

, in w hich som

e of the rules of coexistence are stated. Indeed, som

e of the m easures w

hich states take in the course of 'pro- tecting' the rules m

ay bring them into conflict w

ith international Jaw . T

he activities that go to m

ake up 'protection' of the rules of coexistence are

them selves the subject of further bodies of rules, such as those w

hich regulate the balance of pow

er, diplom acy and the special position of the great pow

ers. ln carrying out these functions, states collaborate w

ith one another, in varying degrees,in w

hat m ay be called the institutions of international society: the

balance of pow er, international law

, the diplom atic m

echanism , the m

anagerial systern of the great pow

ers, and w ar. B

y an institution w e do not necessarily

im ply an organisation or adm

inistrative m achinery, but rather a set of habits and

practices shaped tow ards the realisation of com

m on goals. T

hese institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society, or serve as a surrogate central authority in the inter- national system

. T hey are rather an expression of the elem

ent of collaboration am

ong states in discharging their political functions - and at the sam

e tim e a

m eans of sustaining this collaboration. T

hese institutions serve to sym bolise the

existence of an international society that is m ore than the sum

of its m em

bers to gi_ve substa.nce an~ perm

a?ence to _their collaboration in carrying out th; pol1t1cal functions of international society, and to m

oderate their tendency to lose sight of com

m on interests.

N otes

1. See, for exam ple, M

. F ortes and E

.E . E

vans-P ritchard,African P

olitical System s

(O xford U

niversity Press, 1940); John M iddleton and D

avid T ait (eds) Tribes

W ithout R

ulers, Studies in A frican Segm

entarySystem s (L

ondon: Routledge & K

egan Pa~I, 1958); an~ I. S~uthall, 'Stateless Societies', in E

ncyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D

avid L. Sills (N ew

Y ork: Fm

Press,1968). Jam also indebted to R

oger D

. M asters's penetrating article 'W

orld Politics as a P rim

itive Political System ' W

orld P

olitics,vol. X V

I, no. 4 (July1964). '

2. M asters, 'W

orld Politics as a P rim

itive Political System / p. 607.

J. See I. Schapera, Governm tlft and P

olitics in T ribal Societies (N

ew Y

ork: W atts t 956)

c_h. 1. F or M

aine's view see A

ncitnt L aw

(L ondon: John M

urray, 1930) p. 144. 4. F

ortes and E vans-P

ritchard, Africa,i P olitical System

s, p. 10. 5. Ibid., p. 18.