REVIEW 3

- -

1

261

Source: Hedley Bull ( 1977) T/,e Anarchical Society: A Study of Order i11 World Politics. Basingstoke, Macmillan, pp. 57-74.

ull claims that order in any society is maintained by its members through a ommon interest in the elementary goals of social life. This is achieved by accep-

ting cert:iin rules, norms and practices which shape the conduct of individual actors. Although these rules and norms may not always be as formally articulated as they often are in western societies, they are however understood as legitimate and binding. Bull asserts that international society is no different in this respect from any other form of society. Although international society is commonly thought of as anarchical it none the less exhibits a range of institu­ tions which are valued by its members. This position suggests that Grotius is his clas.sical intellectual forcbcarer.

Order in the modern state

Within the modern state an institution, or set of connected institutions, is available to help make elementary social rules effective: government. A govern­ ment is distinguished from other institutions within the modern state by its ability to call on physical force. On the one hand, it possesses actual force at its disposal that is overwhelming in relation to that which is commanded by any other group. On the other hand, it possesses a near monopoly of the legitimate use of force: apart from certain residual rights of self-defence that are accorded

BULL

to the individual, only the government is able to employ force while being regarded by members of the society at large as within its rights in doing so. It is just as important to a government that its use of force should be legitimate as that it should be overwhelming. These two aspects of a government's coercive power are connected inasmuch as the collapse of a government's legitimacy may make possible a combination of force against it such that its force is no longer overwhelming. Insurgent groups show that they understand this interconnection when they devote as much attention to undermining the government's right, in the eyes of the population, to use force, as to combating that force with force of their own.

The government helps to make elementary social rules effective within the modern state by carrying out all the functions that were outlined in the last sec­ tion. It is not only by the government that these functions are carried out; individuals and groups other than the state also undertake them. But the role of the government in promoting the effectiveness of elementary social rules is a cen­ tral one.

(i) The government makes rules - not always in the sense that it invents them , . ,' ~-- or first states them - but in the sense that it fixes upon them society's imprimatur

or stamp of approval. In the modern state this process of rule-making results in a special set of rules which we refer to as 'the law', While the making of rules in the modern state is formally the function of the legislatJre, it is familiar that the rule-making or legislative function is carried out not only by legislatures but by administrative bodies, whose formal function is the translation of law into orders, and judicial bodies, whose formal function is the interpretation of laws rather than the making of them.

(ii) The government helps to communicate the rules to those who are bound by them. The publication of statutes and court records, the actual enforcement of the rules by the prosecution of offenders, the work of the police in apprehen­ ding, deterring or punishing offenders, all contribute to the spreading of an awareness of what rules are treated by society as rules of law.

(iii) The government also administers or gives effect to the rules, translating them from general principles into requirements that particular persons do or refrain from doing particular things. This is formally the function of the executive branch, but a specialised branch is not necessarily presupposed by this function, which is in fact normally carried out by other arms of the government as well.

(iv) The government is able to interpret the rules - to resolve uncertainties about the validity of rules, their meaning or their relationship to one another - principally through its judicial arm.

(v) The government is able to enforc~ the law through the use, and the threat of the use, of the police and armed forces and through the sanctions imposed by the courts. Particular legal rules may not be backed up by explicit sanctions, but the legal system as a whole is underpinned by the government's coercive power.

(vi) The government can contribute to the legitimisation of the rules, the

262 A READERIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND POLITICAL THEORY - acceptance of them as valuable in themselves, by the influence it has over educa­ tion and public information, the powers of persuasion of its own leaders, and its ability to project itself as the symbolic embodiment of the values of the society and to mould the political culture in a manner favourable to acceptance of the rules as legitimate.

(vii) The government may also adapt the rules to changing circumstances and demands by having its legislature repeal or amend old laws and enact new ones, and by having its administrators execute the law and its judges interpret it in such a way as to change its content.

(viii) The government carries out the function of 'protection' of the rules through the political actions it takes to set the social scene in such a way th.at the rules will continue to operate. The invocation of armed forces to crush arts· ing or expel a foreign invader exemplifies this 'protection'. So do measures .taken by the government to appease political di~satisfaction, to remove social .or economic grievances, to suppress irreconcilable agitators or to heal social cleavages or bridge antagonisms that threaten to bring about the breakdown of society.

What these miscellaneous political acts have in common is that they are all directed towards the preservation of order, not by directly upholding or implementing the rules, but by shaping, moulding or managing the social environment in which the rules operate in such a way that they have the oppor· tunity of continuing to do so. They belong to a sphere of action which the rules themselves may not regulate and may even impede, but which their operation nevertheless presupposes.

Order in primitive stateless societies

Order within the modern state is the consequence, among other things, of government; order among states cannot be, for intern~ti~~al society is an ~n~r­ chical society, a society without government. But pr1m1t1ve stateless societies also present this spectacle of 'ordered anarchy', ~nd it ~s worth c?nsidering the resemblances and differences between the ways m which order 1s created and maintained in the one case and in the other.

Apart from the attention given by political theorist~ to noti?nal. stateless societies and the largely speculative accounts of them given by h1stor1anssuch as Main~ and Maitland, primitive stateless societies were not subject to em,pirical observation and systematic analysis until they attracted the att~nuo~ . of twentieth-century anthropologists.1Primitive societies that have been 1dent1fie~ as stateless by the latter include the Nuer, the Western D1nka and the Mandan of southern Sudan, the Tallensi of Northern Nigeria, the Bwamba of Uganda, the Lugbara of Uganda and Congo and the Konkomba to Togoland. All ?f thes_e societies are without a government in the sense ?efi~ed above ~nd are.' '". ~dd1- tion, without central political institutions - !eg1Slauve,executive or 1ud1c1al-

BULL 263 - of any kind. Indeed, it is said of some of them that they contain no specialised political roles at all; while there are persons or bodies within them, such as heads of a family or lineage group or a village, that fulfil political roles, these roles are not formally distinguished from the other roles they have. The distinctions which outside observers draw between the political, the local, the kinship or the ritualistic roles of these persons or groups may have no meaning in the culture of the societies themselves.

At the same time these societies clearly exhibit order in the sense that conduct within them conforms to elementary goals of social coexistence. In the shaping of this conduct rules play a vital part, and their effectiveness depends on the carrying out of the order-maintaining functions of making these rules, com­ municating, administering, interpreting, enforcing, legitimising, adapting and 'protecting' them. In the absence of any central authority, however, these func­ tions are carried out solely by groups - such as lineage groups and locality groups - into which these stateless societies are divided.

Rules do not emanate from any central rule-making authority but arise out of the practice of lineage or locality groups in their relations with one another, become embodied in 'custom' and are confirmed by moral and religious belief. Custom or established practice is of course also a familiar source of rules in cen­ tralised political systems; in primitive stateless societies it is the only source of rules.

Conformity to these rules is brought about by conditioning and inertia, by 'moral' sanctions such as public ridicule and reprobation, and by ritual or super­ natural sanctions, such as cursing by the elders of a tribe. In societies that are culturally homogeneous, especially if they are small societies, sanctions such as these will often be sufficient in themselves.

Where such sanctions are insufficient to deter or punish violations of rules, there may be a resort to 'self-help' on the part of groups within the society which take upon their own shoulders the responsibility of determining that there has been a breach of the rules, and of attempting to enforce them. The killing of a member of a lineage or locality group, for example, may lead that group to undertake a retaliatory killing of the guilty party or another member of his group. In circumstances in which the bonds between the groups are very strong, the legitimacy of the retaliation may be accepted on both sides and the matter brought to an end. But in others the legitimacy of the act may be disputed, and a sustained conflict, based on both sides on the exercise of subjectively legitimate self-help, may develop.

Since both groups will be interpreting the rules, and the facts of the case, on their own behalf (or on behalf of one of their members) their judgement is likely to be imperfect. Since, moreover, their ability actually to enforce the rules will depend on the amount of force at their command and their will to use it, the enforcement of the rules is bound to be' uncertain. Yet the recourse to self-help does not represent disregard of the rules and the descent of the groups concerned into a Hobbesian state of nature; it represents the operation of a system in which these groups are assuming the functions of interpreting, applying and enforcing

- .·.. 264 A READERIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSANO POLITICAL THEORY

the rules. Moreover, in doing so they are confined by rules limiting the activity of self-help itself. . . .

Resort to force by these groups in response to what they 1udge to be a VI_olat1on of the rules is accepted throughout these societies as legitimate. There 1s not a general right to self-help, available to any individual or group within the society;

< ' only those groups that are entitled to resort to violen~e may do so. T~e force which they employ, if it is legitimate, may only be used 1n response to a v1olauon of rights. The nature of the force employed, mor_eover, is limited, for example by the principle that rctaHa~ion must be pr?p.ort1?nate '.~ the offenc_e ..

Acts of self-help in prim1t1ve stateless socieues, ,n add1uon to prov1dmg rules with a coercive sanction, also serve two further functions, to which Roger Masters has drawn attention: they 'serve to unite social groups and to maintain legal and moral criteria of right and wr?ng'. 2 J::lot only do_ they help, by,g~l­ vanising a group in support of violent acuon against an outside group, to mam­ tain its cohesion, they are also, in addition to bein_g an attemp_t to enforce a r~le against this particular violation, a means of restating the rule itself, of underlin- ing its continued validity and enduring imp?rtance. ,

Primitive anarchical societies clearly have important resemblances to interna­ tional society in respect of the maintenance of order. In both ca~es some elem~nt of order is maintained despite the absence of a central authority commandmg overwhelming force and a monopoly of the legitim~te use of it. In ~oth cases, also this is achieved through the assumption by pamcular groups - lineage and locality groups in primitive stateless societies, sovereign states in international society - of the functions which, in a modern state, the go_vernmen'. (b~t not the government exclusively) carries out in making rules effective. In pr1m1t1ve anar­ chical society, as in international society, order depends upon a fundamental or constitutional principle, stated or implied, whi~~ singles ?utcertain groups _as the sole bodies competent to discharge these political functions. In both soc1et1~s the politically competent groups may legitimately use force in defence of the'.r rights while individuals and groups other than these must look to the prm­ lege/ politically competent groups for protection, rather than resort to force

themselves. . In primitive anarchical societies, as in international s~ciety, th~ relauons bet­

ween these politically competent groups are themselv_es c,rcun:iscnbedby a struc­ ture of acknowledged normarive principles, even at t1mes of violent Struggle. But in both there is a tendency, during these periods of Struggle, for the structure of rules to break down, and the society to fall apart to such an ext~nt tha~ t_he warring tribes or states are better described as a number of contending soc1et1es than as a single society, Finally, in both primidve anarc_hical society and modern international society there are factors operatmg, oumde the structure of rules itself inducing the politically competent groups to conform to them. These include the factors of mutual deterrence or fear of unlimit~d conflic_<, th~ for~e of habit or inertia the long-term interests they have (consciously rat1onal,sed IO the modern world: and intuitively felt in primitive soc~ety) in pre.serv.ing a system of collaboration, whatever their short-term interest m destroymg 11.

BULL 265 - However, the differences between international society and primitive stateless

societies are also remarkable. In the first place there are crucial differences bet­ ween the units that are politically competent in the two sorts of society. The state in international society is sovereign in that it has supreme jurisdiction over its citizens and its territory. The lineage or locality groups which exercise political

t: powers in primitive society, by contrast, do not have any such exclusive rights in relation to the persons that make them up, and usually have a less clearly defined relationship to territory.

A given lineage group does not necessarily exercise exclusive authority over the persons of which it is composed. In some stateless societies lineage groups are divided into segments, and within them there is a constant process of segmen­ tation and merging. Segments of a lineage which are units at one level merge into l?rger seg~ents at others. Whereas at one level these units may be in competi­ tion, at higher levels they are united as subordinate parts of a larger segment. These shifting combinations and divisions illustrate what has been called 'the principle of complementary opposition' in primitive stateless societies.

' Politically competent units in primitive anarchical societies are so related that while any two of them are in conflict for certain purposes they are combined for c_e~tainother purposes. Thus, on the one hand, each unit engages in conflict suf­

·'

ficient to generate a sense of identity and maintain its internal cohesion, but on the other hand there is no relationship of conflict between units that is not overlaid with some element of co-operation also.

Nor do politically competent units in primitive anarchical societies possess exclusive jurisdiction over precisely defined territories. The view of Sir Henry Maine that in primitive societies political solidarity arose only out of ties of blood and never out of common possession of a tract of territory has been rejected by modern anthropologists, who contend that primitive societies are bas.ed ~n_both blo?d and territory.' But the lineage groups that carry out order­ ma1ntammg functions m the stateless societies that have been considered do not hav~ exclusive rights to tracts of territory defined by precise, accepted boundanes.

Because the politically competent groups in primitive stateless societies are not sovereign over persons and territory, but are related less exclusively than is the modern state to the persons that belong to them and to areas of land, they appear to have a less self-sufficient existence and to be less introverted or self-regarding than are the members of the society of states.

A ~econd point of con:rast is that whereas modern international society, esp~c1_ally at the present time, is culturally heterogeneous, primitive stateless societ1es are marked b~ a high degree of cultural homogeneity. By a society's culture we mean 11s basic system of values, the premises from which its thought and action derive. All primitive societies appear to depend upon a common culture; stateless societies appear to depend upon it 10 a special degree. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard came to the tentative conclusion, on the basis of the African syste'.".s they studie~, that a high degree of common culture was a necessary cond1t1on of anarchical structures, while only a central authority could weld

266 A READERIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND POLITICAL THEORY• together peoples of heterogeneous cultu_re. <B~t the ~ociety of sovere!~n states .­ or, as it has sometimes been called, the mclustve society, today a_ pohttcal fabric that embraces the whole of mankind - is par excellence a society that IS cul· turally heterogeneous. ,

A third point of contrast is that primitive stateless so~ieties rest not stmply on a culture that is homogeneous but also on one that includes the ele~ent of magical or religious belief. 'The social_ system', Fortes ~nd Evans-Pmchard wrote, 'is, as it were, removed to a mysttcal plane, where It figures as a system of sacred values beyond criticism or revision ... hence the wars or feuds bet· ween segments of a society like the Nuer or the Tallensi are kept within bounds by mystical sanctions.' 5 International society, by contrast, is part of the modern world, the secular world that emerged from the collapse of ecclesiastical a~d religious authority. The various substitutes that have been br?ught forward tn the last three centuries in the attempt to validate or authenticate the rules of international society - the natural law, the customary practice of states, the 'nteresrs or 'needs' of states, the law common to 'civilised states' - are all inferior : 0 religious authority in terms of their power to produce social coh~sion be~ause they are all subject to question and debate. The moral bases of 1nt_ernat1onal society may be less brittle than those of primitive sociedes,. ~~t s~b1ect to the shattering impact that was made by Christian and Islamic c1V1hsat1~ns on sub· Saharan African and Oceanic systems, more able to absorb new intellectual challenges and preserve some measure o_f continuity. B~t they d? not approach a magical or religious system of valu~s '". terms of th~,r soc1~l impact ..

Finally, there are gross differences in s,ze between inte'.nattonal_ soc,ety and primitive stateless societies. The Nuer, the largest-scale society studied ~y Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, numbered 300,000 in an area of 26,000 square miles. The society of states embraces all mankind and all the ear~h. ,

Together, what is shown by these points of contrast IS ~hat '.h~ (orces mak_mg for social cohesion and solidarity are very much stronger in pr1m1t1ve anarch1~al societies than in international society. The less exclustve and self-regarding nature of the political units of which primitive stateless societies are co'."posed, their cultural homogeneity, the underpinning of their rules by magical and religious belief, and their small and intimate nat~re, all indicate _that t_hou~h government is Jacking in these syst_e~s, an i~presstve ?egreeof social solidarity is not. The maintenance of order ,n mternattonal society has to_ take plac_e not only in the absence of government but also in the absence of social sohdamy of this sort.

Order in international society

The maintenance of order in world politics depends, in_ the first instan~e, oncer· tain contingent facts which would make for order even 1f state! w~re ~1thout any conception of common interests, common rules or common 1nst1tut1ons- even if, in other words, they formed an international system only, and not also an

BULL 267

international society. A balance of power, for example, may arise in an interna· tional system quite fortuitously, in the absence of any belief that it serves com· mon interests, or any attempt to regulate or institutionalise it. If it does arise, it may help to limit violence, to render undertakings credible or to safeguard governments from challenges to their local supremacy. Within international society, however, as in other societies, order is the consequence not merely of contingent facts such as this, but of a sense of common interests in the elemen· tary goals of social life; rules prescribing behaviour that sustains these goals; and institutions that help to make these rules effective.

Common interests

To say that x is in someone's interest is merely to say that it serves as a means to some end that he is pursuing. Whether or not x does serve as a means to any particular end is a matter of objective fact. But whether or not xis in his interest will depend not only on this but also on what ends he is actually pursuing. It follows from this that the conception of interest is an empty or vacuous guide, both as to what a person does do and as to what he should do. To provide such a guide we need to know what ends he does or should pursue, and the conception of interest in itself tells us nothing about either.

Thus the criterion of'national interest', or 'interest of state', in itself provides us with no specific guidance either in interpreting the behaviour of states or in prescribing how they should behave - unless we are told what concrete ends or objectives states do or should pursue: security, prosperity, ideological objectives or whatever. Still less does it provide us with a criterion that is objective, in the sense of being independent of the way state ends or purposes are perceived by particular decision-makers. It does not even provide a basis for distinguishing moral or ideological considerations in a country's foreign policy from non-moral or non-ideological ones: for x can be in a country's interest if it serves as a means to a moral or ideological objective that the country has.

However, the conception of national interest or interest of state does have some meaning in a situation in which national state ends are defined and agreed, and the question at issue is by what means they can be promoted. To say that a state's foreign policy should be based on pursuit of the national interest is to insist that whatever steps are taken should be part of some rational plan of action; an approach to foreign policy based on the national interest may thus be contrasted with one consisting simply of the uncritical pursuit of some established policy, or one consisting simply of unconsidered reactions to events. A policy based on the idea of the national interest, moreover, may be contrasted with one based on a sectional interest, o; one based on the interests of some group wider than the state, such as an alliance or international organisation to which it belongs. To speak of the national interest as the criterion at least directs our attention to the ends or objectives of the nation or state, as against those of some other group, narroweror wider.

BULL 269 --268 A READERIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND POLITICAL THEORY The maintenance of order in international society has as its starting-point the

development among states of a sense of common interests in the elementary goals of social life. However different and conflicting their objectives may be, they are united in viewing these goals as instrumental to them. Their sense of common interests may derive from fear of unrestricted violence, of the instability of agreements or of the insecurity of their independence or sovereignty. It may have its origins in rational calculation that the willingness of states to accept restric· tions on their freedom of action is reciprocal. Or it may be based also on the treatment of these goals as valuable in themselves and not merely as a means to an end - it may express a sense of common values as well as of common

interests.

. . Rules

In international society, as in other societies, the sense of common interests in elementary goals of social life does not in itself provide precise guidance as to 1 what behaviour is consistent with these goals; to do this is the function of rules. ' These rules may have the status of international law, of moral rules, of custom or established practice, or they may be merely operational rules or 'rules of the game', worked out without formal agreement or even without verbal com· munication.Itis not uncommon for a rule to emerge first as an operational rule, then to become established practice, then to attain the status of a moral principle and finally to be incorporated in a legal convention; this appears to have been the genesis, for example, of many of the rules now embodied in multilateral treaties or conventions concerning the laws of war, diplomatic and consular

status, and the law of the sea. The range of these rules is vast, and over much of this range they are in a state

of flux. Here we shall mention only three complexes of rules that play a part in

the maintenance of international order. First, there is the complex of rules that states what may be called the fun-

damental or constitutional normative principle of world politics in the present era. This is rhe principle that identifies the idea of a society of states, as opposed to such alternative ideas as that of a universal empire, a cosmopolitan com· munity of individual human beings, or a Hobbesian state of nature or state of war, as the supreme normative principle of the political organisation of mankind. It is emphasised elsewhere in this study that there is nothing historically inevitable or morally sacrosanct about the idea of a society of states. Nor does this idea in fact monopolise human thought and action, even in the pre· sent phase; on the contrary, it has always had to do battle with competing prin· ciples, and does so now. Order on a world scale, however, does require that one or another of these basic ideas should be clearly in the ascendancy; what is incompatible with order on a world scale is a discord of competing principles of

universal political organisation. On the one hand, the idea of international society identifies states as members

of this society and the units competent to carry out political tasks within it,

~:~~:~:\~~~e;~(~ ~:~i;~•;:i:o~~~e ;ts basic rules effective; it thus excludes 0

state, such as universal authoritie~ :~~:e ~~:ts:~t~~~a\ g:~~u~~~~h~r-t~n the

~~~,:~a~:;~;tt:tiit~~~t:;:::~~:~!e:;ttybet:;~~i%~ntifies the rJations~i~ to common institutions; it thus excludes~~: co~;:p:::~;~~rf2dp~ol.mt' mitred mere arena or state of war. 1 1cs as a

po;e~si:,u;!~;aer~t::;: ~ri~ciple _of int~rnational order is presup-::n:~~~;io;~~ themselves the rights or compet~nces ;' Y_ac:,of s o sta_tes - in arrogating to in combining with each other'tO this e: pr_mcop~ ~cton m "'.orld politics, and or sub-state groups to wrest thes . h d, '~ resost1ng the claims of supra-state

~his principle and provide eviden:/~~ i:::,:tr:~;:i~te;~es fr_on: t~e~ - dis~lay on a n~mber of basic rules of international law. Thus lt h e tronc1~ e IS cdont~med doctrine that states are the onl or the . . as ee.n t e pre ommant international law· that they alt h p~nc'.p~I bearers of rights and duties in that its source lie; in the conse:te /ve t e rig t to us~ force to uphold it; and principle, however, is prior to int~rn:t~:e:;i'xpressed on custom_ or treaty. The tion of international law• it is 'f . law, or to any particular formula­ moral, customary and op~ration:ti' ~st on a wh~le c?m~lex of rules - legal, constant development In th f . _t os not a static pronc,ple, but is subject to meet the challenge of doctri:eso:~-a~ve stars o~in~er~ational society, it had to groups other than the state to a ,c ~roe ~,me t e '.'~ht of individuals and of the present time it faces a simil!'~:~.'tfe~;:~ersal pohtocal organisation; and at

Second, there are what may be call d ' h I guidance supplied by the constitut' t' _t : rues of coexistence', Given the international society, these rules s;~:• prone,~): as to who _a_re the me~bers of istence. They include first of all h ut the m,n,mum conditions of their coex­ of violence in world ~olitics Th' t e cfmple~ of rules which restrict the place violence to sovereign states a~d toe~e ru _es see to confine the legitimate use of

0 violence to a particular ko'nd of .' ny ot to

th der agents by confining legitimate

. v10 1ence ca 11e 1war' d b · violence that is waged on the auth . • an Y treaung war as rules seek to limit the c omy of a sovereign state. Furthermore, the

legitimately begin a war, ~~:'!x~~p~rbos;s f~r. which ~ sovereign state can cause, as maintained by the nat ~ I yd equ~rmg that It be begun for a just states system, or by requirin tha~~i"b~~w ocmnes of the f~rmative era of the had been tried first as insis~ed by th Cegun only ~fter certain other procedures rules also have sou~ht to restrict the ema~v:n~nt \.the Leagu~ of Nations. The war, for example by insisting that war b n r '~ w ,c~ sovereign states. conduct the end pursued or in such a wa econ ucted on a way proporuonate to no more violen~e than necessa: a; to sp~r~ non-combatants, or so as to employ

the geographical spread of a wa:·by:;t~ttr • th~ ru_lehs hJve sought to restrict and belligerents in relation t ' h IS mg t e rig ts and duties of neutrals

o one anot er. There is a further complex of rules f . .

behaviour appropriate to sustain th lo fcohexmen~e which prescribes the e goa O t e carrying out of undertakings.

- ·. A READERIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND POLITICAL THEORY270

Tl 1,.1'..it: rnl,· '"'' 111 wnt ~r.mamla, \ornctimco;, \ccn a\ a prec;uppor;itionof the I:,:

11 i

11 :1 1 ; 1111,, :11111 ,,,1111,:timt:, n, a (ir'it principle of it, e\tablic;hed the presump·

tiwi 011wliidi aJ,,11c I lu.:1c c.::111 at all. Subc:r· he point in entering into agr~c111cntc; Jin:1tc or cpialifying rules concern whether or not goo~ faith_n~ed be keptw1~h hcrcticc; or infidel-;, wl1cthcr or not agreement~ remain valid in changing cir­ cu111stanccsn11<lwho is the judge as to whether or not the)' have changed, whether or not and in what sense agreements are valid that are imposed by force, what rhe circumstances are in which a party to an agreement can be released from it, what are the principles according to which agreements should be inter­ preted, whether or not and to what extent a new government succeeds to the obligations of irs predecessors, and so on. . . .

The rules of coexistence also include those which prescribe behav10ur that sus­ tains the goal of the stabilisation of each state's control or jurisdiction ~ve'.irs own persons and territory. At the heart of this complex of rules 1s the pnnc1ple that each state accepts the duty to respect the sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction of every other state over its own citizens and domain, in return for the right to expect similar respect for its own sovereignty from oth:r stat:•· A corollary or near-corollary of this central rule is the rule that stares will nor intervene forcibly or dictatorially in one another's internal affairs. Another is the rule establishing the 'equality' of all states in the sense of their like enjoyment of like rights of sovereignty. .

Third, there is the complex of rules concerned to regulate co-operation among states - whether on universal or on a more limited scale - above and beyond what is necessary for mere coexistence. This includes the rules that facilitate co­ operation, not merely of a political and strategic, but also of a soci~I and economic nature. The growth in this century of legal rules concerned with co­ operation between states in economic, social, commu?ications ~nd enviro?men· ral matters exemplifies the place of rules of co-operation and will be cons,dered later (see Chapter 6).

Rules of this kind prescribe behaviour that is appropriate not to the elemen­ tary or primary goals of international life, but rar~er to tho~e m?re a~vanced or secondary goals that are a feature of an international society 1n which_ a con­ sensus has been reached about a wider range of objectives than mere coexistence. Nevertheless, these rules may be said to play a role in relation to international order, inasmuch as the development of co-operation and consensus among states about these wider goals may be expected to strengthen the framework of coexistence.

This is nor the place to expound these three complexes of rules in full, or to examine rhe problems of interpreting them or reconciling the conflicts between them. Nor is it appropriate here to consider which of them has the status of law, which the status of moral rules, which should be seen as customary or as opera­ tional rules, nor to rrace the historical evolution through whic~ these rules h~ve passed from one of these embodiments ro a~other, and sometimes back_again. Ir is sufficient ro note that the vast and changing corpus of rules and quas,-rules, of which those cited are part of the central core, provide the means whereby

BULL 271 - international society moves from the vague perception of a common interest to a clear conception of the kind of conduct it requires.

Institutions

In international society it is the members of the society themselves - sovereign states - which are chiefly responsible for performing the functions of helping to make the rules effective; they do so in the absence of either a supreme govern­ ment, which is able to undertake these functions in the modern state, or the degree of solidarity among themselves that characterises the performance of these functions by politically competent groups in primitive stateless societies. In this sense it is states themselves that are the principal institutions of the society of states.

Thus states undertake the function of making the rules, or legislating, by signi­ fying their consent to them. Rules of general application, like the rules of coex­ istence, arise out of custom and established practice, and are in some cases confirmed by multilateral conventions. Rules that apply only to particular groups of states may also arise out of custom and established practice - as do the operational rules of crisis avoidance and management now being evolved by the great powers - but they may also be the subject of explicit agreements or treaties.

States communicate the rules through their official words, as when they state that they respect the legal principle of the sovereignty of states, or the moral prin­ ciple of national self-determination, or the operational rule that great powers should not interfere in each other's spheres of influence. But they also com­ municate the rules through their actions, when they behave in such a way as to indicate that they accept or do not accept that a particular rule is valid. Because the communication of the rules is in the hands of states themselves, and not of an authority independent of them, the advertisement of the rules is commonly distorted in favour of the interests of particular states.

States administer the rules of international society inasmuch as executive acts ancillary to the rules themselves are performed either by themselves (as when particular states are designated as the depository stares for a treaty, or the guarantors of a neutralisation arrangement, or the arbiters of a dispute) or by international organisations which are responsible to them (as when organisa­ tions are set up to implement agreements concerning international post and telecommunications, or a host of other matters),

Each state provides its own interpretation of the rules - legal, moral or opera­ tional. Even in the case of legal rules, a state relies on its own legal advisers, and there is no conclusive way in which disagreements about interpretation can be settled by an independent authority. The interpretation of moral or of opera- tional rules is even more uncertain. '

The enforcement of the rules, in the absence of a central authority, is carried our by states, which may resort to acts of self-help, including acts of force, in defence of their rights under operational, moral or legal rules. Because states are

-272 A READER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSAND POLITICAL THEORY frequently not in a position to carry out effective action in defence of their rights, the enforcement of the rules is uncertain. Because of the low degree of consensus or solidarity among states, actions which the state committing them sees as self­ help or rule-enforcement are frequently not viewed as such by international society at large.

States undertake the task of legitimising the rules, in the sense of promoting the acceptance of them as valuable in their own right, by employing their powers of persuasion and propaganda to mobilise support for them in world politics as a whole. At the present time an important means to the legitimisation of rules is to have them endorsed by international assemblies and international organisations.

States undertake the task of changing or adapting operational, moral and legal rules to changing circumstances, but have to do so in the absence of a universal legislative authority competent to rescind old rules and devise new ones, and with the handicap that there is often no consensus as to whether or not, or how, the rules should be changed. States change the rules by demonstrating, through their words or their actions, that they are withdrawing their consent from old rules and bestowing it upon new ones, and thus altering the content of custom or established practice. The operational rules observed by great powers, whereby they respect one anothers' spheres of influence in particular parts of the world, are rescinded or changed when these powers show by what they do or say that they no longer accept them, or regard their boundaries or limiting condi­ tions as having changed. The moral principle of national self-determination - the rule that states should be nation-states - came to displace that of dynastic legitimacy not by enactment of any legislative authority, but by war and revolu­ tion. In the changing of legal rules a part is sometimes played by multilateral con· ventions or treaties, but here also states change the old rules by violating or ignoring them systematically enough to demonstrate that they have withdrawn their consent to them. In other words, while the adaptation of the rules to changed circumstances is part of the process whereby order is maintained, it is itself often accompanied by disorder.

Finally, states undertake the task which, for want of a better term, has been called 'protection' of the rules. The rules which sustain order in international society can operate only if conditions obtain in the international political system that enable them to do so. In particular, they can operate only if that senseof common interests among states, which they seek to translate into a precise guide to conduct, continues to exist. The function of'protection' of the rules comprises all those things which states may do to create or maintain that state or condition of the system in which respect for the rules can flourish.

The 'protection' of the rules encompasses, first and foremost, those classical acts of diplomacy and war whereby states seek to preserve a general balance of power in the international system (and today a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence among contending nuclear powers); to accommodate or contain con­ flicts of ideology; to resolve or moderate conflicts of state interest; to limit or control armaments and armed forces in relation to interests perceived in

-BULL 273 international security; to appease the demands of dissatisfied states for what they regard as just change; and to secure and maintain the acquiescence of the smaller powers in the assumption by great powers of special rights and responsibilities.

These measures of 'protection' of the rules are not prescribed by the rules of coexistence, or by international law, in which some of the rules of coexistence are stated. Indeed, some of the measures which states take in the course of 'pro­ tecting' the rules may bring them into conflict with international Jaw. The activities that go to make up 'protection' of the rules of coexistence are themselves the subject of further bodies of rules, such as those which regulate the balance of power, diplomacy and the special position of the great powers.

ln carrying out these functions, states collaborate with one another, in varying degrees, in what may be called the institutions of international society: the balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial systern of the great powers, and war. By an institution we do not necessarily imply an organisation or administrative machinery, but rather a set of habits and practices shaped towards the realisation of common goals. These institutions do not deprive states of their central role in carrying out the political functions of international society, or serve as a surrogate central authority in the inter­ national system. They are rather an expression of the element of collaboration among states in discharging their political functions - and at the same time a means of sustaining this collaboration. These institutions serve to symbolise the existence of an international society that is more than the sum of its members to gi_ve substa.nce an~ perma?ence to _their collaboration in carrying out th; pol1t1cal functions of international society, and to moderate their tendency to lose sight of common interests.

Notes

1. See, for example, M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard,African Political Systems (Oxford University Press, 1940); John Middleton and David Tait (eds) Tribes Without Rulers, Studies in African SegmentarySystems (London: Routledge &Kegan Pa~I, 1958); an~ I. S~uthall, 'Stateless Societies', in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,ed. David L. Sills (New York: Fm Press,1968). Jam also indebted to Roger D. Masters's penetrating article 'World Politics as a Primitive Political System' World Politics,vol. XVI, no. 4 (July1964). '

2. Masters, 'World Politics as a Primitive Political System/ p. 607. J. See I. Schapera, Governmtlft and Politics in Tribal Societies (New York: Watts t 956)

c_h.1. For Maine's view see Ancitnt Law (London: John Murray, 1930) p. 144. 4. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, Africa,i Political Systems, p. 10. 5. Ibid., p. 18.