Nissan Research

A08-19-0008 TB0571

Copyright © 2019 Thunderbird School of Global Management, a unit of the Arizona State University Knowledge Enterprise. This case was written by Prof. Dr. Markus Kreutzer and Valentin Pfeffer of EBS Business School, EBS Universität für Wirtschaft und Recht for the sole purpose of providing material for class discussion. It is not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. Any reproduction, in any form, of the material in this case is prohibited unless permission is obtained from the copyright holder.

Markus Kreutzer Valentin Pfeffer

The Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi Strategic Alliance: Past Accomplishments and Future Challenges

Background and Events Preceding the Alliance Formation On March 27, 1999, Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault, and Yoshikazu Hanawa, president of Nissan, signed a strategic alliance agreement between Renault and Nissan in Tokyo, thereby bringing a 10-month negotiation, which had started with an exchange of letters between Schweitzer and Hanawa in June 1998, to a successful end.1

Nissan was losing market share and was badly in debt; it needed a partner that could provide substantial financial support. Initially, the company’s aim was to find a partner that would invest $6 billion in order to reduce the difficulties its debt obligations had caused. Nissan had ended 1996 and 1998 with a net loss, its total unit car sales having decreased from 1994 to 1998. In addition, the company’s long-term debt exceeded its equity on its consolidated balance sheet from 1993 to 1998. In 1998, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s had given Nissan the lowest credit ratings still considered an investment grade, making decreasing its interest-bearing debt one of the company’s main goals. Conversely, Renault, the tenth largest automotive manufacturer in the world in terms of units manufactured in 1999 (see Exhibit 1), had a favorable financial performance, with positive net incomes and steadily growing revenues from 1997 to 2000.2

An alliance with Nissan, the eighth largest automotive manufacturer in the world, would give Renault the opportunity to increase its size and market power, thus supporting its growth.

Nevertheless, the two companies faced various hurdles during the negotiations preceding the alliance formation. First, each of the companies had to accommodate the needs of its multiple stakeholders: Renault those of the French state, and Nissan those of the Fuyo keiretsu. (A keiretsu is a group of Japanese firms that trades and conducts business together.) Furthermore, Nissan stipulated that the Nissan brand should be maintained, that jobs be preserved, that it be given assistance to restructure, and that its CEO should come from within the company. Negotiations were paused when Renault proved unwilling to provide the amount of financial support that Nissan required. In an effort to win more funds, Nissan talked to DaimlerChrysler and Ford. However, neither of these two companies was interested in investing in Nissan. Once it became clear that it could not find an alternative alliance partner, Nissan continued its negotiations with Renault.

Although Renault had gained a bargaining advantage, it did not take advantage of this. The Renault and Nissan negotiation approach was described as unconventional since it strongly relied on trust. Instead of relying exclusively on a strict due-diligence procedure, the negotiating parties tried to evaluate their ability to collaborate. After the two firms’ top management met several times, small teams of managers and engineers assessed the firms’ potential for synergies. These teams were given no formal goals but were advised to show respect and try to understand each other’s viewpoint. The Renault and Nissan management agreed that the firms had complementary resources and that an alliance would generate adequate synergies.3 Once the negotiations had been concluded, Louis Schweitzer, the Renault CEO, agreed to form an alliance with Nissan and to provide $5 billion in exchange for 36.8% of Nissan.

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On conclusion of the alliance with Renault, Hanawa asked Renault for managers with experience of cost reduction, marketing, and finance. Schweitzer sent Carlos Ghosn, who would be responsible for reducing Nissan’s costs.4 Ghosn, whom the media nicknamed “le cost killer,” had previously been involved in restructuring Renault to reduce costs. Born in Brazil and having studied in Lebanon, Ghosn had a background of two emerging economy countries. Before moving to Renault, the trained engineer had started his career at Michelin, where he proved a talented manager as the COO of Michelin’s South American division and later CEO of Michelin North America.5

The decade preceding the announcement of the Renault-Nissan alliance was filled with mergers and acquisitions in the automotive industry, such as the merger of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler in 1998. Mergers were considered the normal procedure for combining the strengths of two firms in the automotive industry. The DaimlerChrysler merger was aimed at allowing Chrysler to share parts and vehicle architectures with the German automotive group Daimler in order to reduce its costs when bringing new vehicles to market. In return, Daimler wanted to increase its market share in North America and broaden its scope of vehicle types. Daimler’s Mercedes-Benz targeted the luxury market, while Chrysler targeted the broader mass market. The DaimlerChrysler merger was predicted to initiate large synergies and, in 1999, it was well on track to meet the planned $1.4 billion synergies. However, it eventually became clear that the two companies had serious cultural differences and different approaches to management. While Daimler was more formal and bureaucratic and relied heavily on documentation, Chrysler developed ideas more spontaneously and used oral presentations to communicate plans. There were also huge pay differences, with Chrysler executives in America often earning more than twice as much as those at Daimler in Germany. Mercedes-Benz’s managers and engineers were reluctant to share their advanced knowledge with Chrysler, which received only a few parts from Daimler. Moreover, Daimler could not significantly increase its market share in North America. Although the merger of Daimler and Chrysler was

Exhibit 1. The 20 Largest Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles by Units Manufactured in 1999 and 2016

Sources: OICA. (2000). World Motor Vehicle Production by Manufacturer World Ranking 1999. Retrieved from http://www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/1999-statistics/; OICA. (2017). World Motor Vehicle Production: OICA Correspondents Survey (for 2016). Retrieved from http:// www.oica.net/category/production-statistics/2016-statistics/.

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This document is authorized for use only by Maria Stopchak in 7257 Global Intercultural Communication S20 taught by MYLES BASSELL, CUNY - Brooklyn College from Jul 2020 to Jan 2021.

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originally announced as a merger of equals, the transaction was, more accurately, an acquisition, with Daimler aiming to gain control over Chrysler. An example of Daimler’s dominance was the German executives’ decision to locate DaimlerChrysler’s headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. When Daimler sold 80.1% of Chrysler to the private equity investment firm Cerberus Capital Management in 2007, Dieter Zetsche, then Daimler CEO, acknowledged that the potential for synergies had been overestimated. Analysts commented that Daimler had been too optimistic and undertaken too little due diligence.6

Founding Principles and Objectives The Renault-Nissan alliance charter stated the principles that would guide the partners’ future cooperation. Their complementary strengths had to create mutual benefits for the alliance partners. The alliance would help both partners achieve growth and profitability. Although the cooperation would encompass numerous areas of operation, both brands would be maintained, and both the companies would be individual members of an equal partnership. The partners would trust and respect the other party’s identity and culture. The alliance charter assigned the right to select the alliance chairman and CEO to Renault.7 Given that France and Japan have different national cultures (see Exhibit 2), trust and respect were especially relevant principles.

France is, for example, known for its 35-hour working week, while Japan is known for its very long working hours. In 2004, the strategic alliance formulated three strategic objectives. The first was to be among the top three carmakers in terms of product and service quality in the markets in which the alliance competed. Second, the alliance aimed at being among the top three carmakers in terms of technology. The partners would accomplish this by combining their complementary areas of strength. Third, the alliance set the objective to be among the top three carmakers in terms of profitability. This objective involved increasing the alliance’s operating profit by increasing its sales growth and ensuring its profits’ stability.

Renault’s main motive for the alliance was to increase its scale in order to become more competitive globally. Reaching a critical size to compete in the global automotive industry would have been far more difficult if the company had to rely on organic growth. An additional Renault motive was that collaborating with Nissan would simplify and accelerate the company’s expansion into international markets. At the time of the alliance formation, Renault depended heavily on the European and French markets. However, Renault could use Nissan’s experience to expand into Peru, Australia, and Taiwan (see Exhibit 3). Furthermore, Renault hoped to learn from Nissan, which was known for its engineering,8 and to benchmark its production process against that of a larger car manufacturer.

Exhibit 2. Geert Hofstede’s Six Dimensions of National Culture— France, Germany, Japan, and United States

Source: Hofstede Insights. (2018). Geert Hofstede’s Six Dimensions of National Culture—Country Comparison. Retrieved from https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/.

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Exhibit 3. Alliance Worldwide Production Sites—2002 and 2019

Exhibit 3a.

Source: Renault Nissan. (2003, pp. 6-7). Renault-Nissan Alliance 2003. Retrieved from https://www.nissan-global. com/EN/DOCUMENT/PDF/ALLIANCE/HANDBOOK/2003/arriance_hb2003.pdf. Note: This map is from the earliest yearly alliance report and shows the production sites of Renault and Nissan in 2002.

Exhibit 3b.

Sources: Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2019). Alliance Website: About Us. Retrieved from https://www. alliance-2022.com/about-us/. Renault Nissan. (2017, pp. 2-3). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and-figures-2017.

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Nissan’s main motive for the alliance was that it needed to obtain capital to survive. The troubled car manufacturer also needed a partner to revive and facilitate its restructuring process. Nissan explicitly asked for managerial support for the restructuring process. Similarly to Renault, Nissan hoped to expand into additional international markets through the alliance. For example, Nissan planned to gain access to the Mercosur market (a South American trade bloc) and start manufacturing in Spain with the help of Renault. Nissan was eager to learn from Renault’s design capabilities to improve its cars’ style. Nissan also wanted to learn from Renault’s efficient selection of suppliers, as the company had restructured its supply chains in the past and could source supplies very cost effectively.9 Nissan paid relatively high prices for supplies, because it relied primarily on a group of suppliers with which it had long-standing relationships. Some of these suppliers were in a keiretsu with Nissan. Before the alliance, Nissan suppliers were partially integrated into the company via its equity investments in them. These relationships led to supply prices above the market average.10

A common motive of both car manufacturers was the vision that, through their alliance, they could share risks and R&D costs. They used a shared platform for small cars from 2002 onwards. The partners also sought to gain economies of scale by pooling their production volumes. A critical size was required to compete with their industry rivals. In the years preceding the alliance, size and synergies were becoming increasingly important in the automotive industry. The Daimler-Chrysler merger, for example, showed that the major car manufacturers were searching for ways to create synergies through mergers and acquisitions. Automotive groups were trying to increase their scales in areas such as production volume, procurement, and engineering.11 By combining forces, the alliance partners could neutralize smaller competitors, as size and scale could create barriers to competition. Owing to its size, the alliance had greater bargaining power when facing its suppliers. The partners helped each other and searched for areas that could be converged during the 2008 global liquidity crisis. The alliance also

Exhibit 3c.

Source: Own illustration based on the information from the maps in Exhibit 3a and Exhibit 3b. Note: This map visualizes the differences between 2002 and 2019.

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allowed the partners to pool their skills and capabilities to develop new products and services; their sharing capabilities allowed the partners to increase their speed to market.

Major Areas of Cooperation Under the condition that he would receive the authority to make decisions relatively independently, Ghosn accepted the task of moving from Renault to Nissan in order to supervise Nissan’s restructuring process. To turn Nissan around, he introduced a program called the Nissan Revival Plan. Following this plan, Ghosn took several actions that helped Nissan eliminate its problems and overcome its difficulties. The first step he took before becoming COO of Nissan in June 1999 was taking two months to interview managers, employees, engineers, and Nissan dealers in order to identify the company’s most critical problems. Ghosn allowed the press to join Nissan’s annual shareholder meeting for the first time; he was very transparent about the company’s problems and clearly communicated the changes that it required. For example, Ghosn informed the press that Nissan had been losing market share for 26 years, but that he was, nonetheless, confident that the company employees had what it takes to return the company to profitability. To show his commitment, he stated that he and the Nissan management would resign if Nissan was not profitable by 2001. Part of the Nissan Revival Plan was changing reports and management meetings’ language to English, with all employees subsequently offered language training. Ghosn did not try to implement the planned standard ideas from before his transfer to Nissan. Instead, he installed cross-functional teams comprising line managers from different countries and departments and gave them the responsibility for finding solutions to the identified problems in areas such as purchasing, engineering, and R&D. The cross-functional teams, which had a maximum of ten members, were encouraged to think creatively. They were told not to be afraid of suggesting unconventional ideas if these would help Nissan grow or save costs. It was made clear that profitability was the primary objective.

When Nissan’s Revival Plan was announced, Ghosn explained that Nissan could not maintain its keiretsu ties and that it would sell the shareholdings it had in its suppliers. The company’s car design team, which was previously part of the engineering department, was relocated and put under the supervision of the vice president of brand identity. Furthermore, during the course of the Revival Plan, Ghosn instructed the vice president of finance to clean the books and create transparency concerning the firm’s liabilities. In addition, provisions were made for the company’s pension plan, which had not been sufficiently funded. Restructuring Nissan’s finances and taking liabilities properly into account led to a record loss in fiscal year 1999.12 Ghosn initiated a reassessment of all of Nissan’s operation procedures. An obvious problem was that Nissan’s costs were too high. Forty-three of Nissan’s 46 products were not profitable. Ghosn announced that Nissan would only introduce new products in the future if there was a strong possibility of profitability. The company’s headcount was reduced by 21,000 positions, while three assembly units and two powertrain units were shut down to reduce costs. However, to avoid upsetting employees and the public, Nissan tried to implement the job reductions in a socially acceptable way by using early retirement and part-time work.13 This increased the manufacturing resources’ utilization from 53% to 82%. As a part of the turnaround, Ghosn, with the help of cross-functional teams, aimed to reduce Nissan’s purchasing costs by 20%. A combined Renault-Nissan Purchasing Organization (RNPO) was established in 2001 to lower the alliance’s purchasing costs by creating economies of scale, with 30% of the alliance’s purchasing being handled jointly shortly afterwards.

Over the years, purchasing has remained one of the alliance’s most important areas of cooperation. The RNPO is responsible for purchasing and selecting suppliers and has purchased all of the alliance’s required commodities since 2009. The synergies that the RNPO created increased significantly when the alliance partners started using common vehicle platforms, powertrains, and parts. A new firm, the Avtovaz-Renault-Nissan Purchasing Organization, was created in 2015 to combine and administrate the alliance’s purchasing activities in Russia. Previously, Renault-Nissan had established a shared warehouse in Russia in 2008. After the alliance’s inclusion of Mitsubishi in 2016, it hoped to save even more purchasing costs in the future.14

The alliance’s R&D activities included sharing platforms for cars that Renault and Nissan produced. In 2008, more than 50% of the cars that Renault and Nissan sold used common platforms. The two companies have continuously made an effort to share parts while preserving the design characteristics that make the brands unique. For example, the carmakers announced that they would share their cars’ temperature- and audio-controlling systems. One aim of sharing parts was to decrease the purchasing costs.15 The alliance also

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shared nonvisible parts, such as air-conditioning controls and gearboxes, to create economies of scale and to reduce R&D and manufacturing costs. Among others, sharing R&D activities helped the alliance make use of complementary capabilities during its development of powertrains. Furthermore, Renault had expertise in diesel engine development and Nissan in gasoline engine development. The partners therefore exchanged their existing engines and gearboxes, and started developing new, common engines and gearboxes that both partners would use. For example, a diesel engine that Renault had originally designed was used for the Nissan Qashqai, and the Renault Laguna was equipped with a Nissan gasoline engine. The alliance also collaborated on R&D to reduce CO2 emissions, increase the environmental friendliness of the alliance’s cars, increase passenger safety, and develop technology for electric vehicles.

In the area of engineering, the common module family (CMF) is one of the most important cooperation projects. The Nissan March, which was first sold in 2002, and the Nissan Kubistar/Renault Kangoo, which was sold as a double-badged vehicle in Europe in 2003, were early examples of vehicles that used the Renault-Nissan alliance’s common platforms (see Exhibit 4).

Vehicles that belonged to one of the CMFs consisted of the five modules: engine, cockpit, front underbody, rear underbody, and electronics. The CMF allowed the alliance to build a wider spectrum of vehicles by using a smaller set of parts. The alliance planned for 70% of its vehicles to belong to a CMF by 2020. Renault-Nissan estimated that the CMF could decrease purchasing costs by up to 30% and engineering costs by up to 40%. These cost savings could be used to generate greater customer value by including additional desirable features to the cars while maintaining a competitive price.

CMFs were introduced in three segments. The first segment was called CMF-A and comprised small vehicles with low fuel consumption. CMF-A targeted customers in expanding markets. For example, the Renault Kwid and the Datsun redi-GO, which Nissan manufactures, were both sold in India and both belonged to CMF-A. The second segment, CMF-B, included medium-size cars. The third segment was called CMF-C/D and included larger vehicles such as SUVs and crossovers. Cars that belonged to CMF-C/D were the Nissan X-Trail, Nissan Qashqai, Renault Espace, and Renault Megane. The CMFs allowed the alliance to use cross production to manufacture cars belonging to one brand in factories for a different brand.

The Renault-Nissan alliance standardized production. Renault learned significantly from Nissan and adopted parts of its production system, which helped Renault increase its productivity by 15%. The two companies developed the Alliance Integrated Manufacturing System (AIMS) together and shared best practices in production. By sharing its production capacity and, thus, avoiding excess capacity, the alliance improved its plant utilization. For example, the Nissan Rogue was manufactured in a Renault Samsung factory in South Korea.16 Furthermore, the alliance used cross-production to manufacture Nissans in Renault’s factory in Brazil and produce Renaults in Nissan plants in South Africa, Mexico, and Spain.

Exhibit 4. Examples of Cars in the Common Module Family (CMF)

Sources: Information on models and CMFs from Renault Nissan. (2017). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/ releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and- figures-2017. Images retrieved from:

rena http://strongauto.net/wp-content/uploads/images/

ult-kangoo_5889.jpg http://www.japaneserides.com/wp-content/

uploads/2011/08/Nissan-Kubistar.jpg https://www.ibtimes.co.in/after-kwid-redi-go-cmf-

platform-based-sedan-works-report-682115 https://www.meinauto.de/nissan/neuwagen/353-

qashqai/angebote/qashqai https://www.meinauto.de/renault/neuwagen/megane/

angebote/renault-megane-5-tuerig

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Renault and Nissan benefited from their geographic complementarities and used the alliance to expand their geographic scopes. The partnership allowed both firms to establish operations in all relevant geographical markets and enabled each partner to enter markets in which the other partner was already present. Renault was well established in Europe, North Africa, and South America, and Nissan in Japan, North America, Mexico, China, and the Middle East. For instance, when Renault entered Mexico, it benefited from Nissan’s experience.17 Still, the individual partners focused on different markets and did not compete strongly against each other. Comparing Renault’s top six countries of 2016 unit sales to Nissan’s top six countries, the two firms had no country in common (see Exhibit 5).

This shows that even today, Renault and Nissan still focus on different geographic areas. The alliance is jointly working on increasing its market share in emerging markets. For example, Renault-Nissan has a plant in Brazil, South America’s most important market. The alliance has Avtovaz and Renault plants in Russia, a large shared plant in India, and, in 2016, Renault opened a plant in China in a joint venture with Dongfeng Motor, which had been a Nissan partner in China since 2013.

To increase their synergies, the alliance members combined several functions in 2014. By 2017, the “engineering, manufacturing and supply chain management, purchasing, and human resources” functions were managed centrally at the alliance level. In 2015, the alliance recorded new synergies worth €4.3 billion, anticipating €5.5 billion’s worth in 2018, where synergies are defined as cost savings plus revenue increases generated by cross-leveraging knowledge and resources. In 2019, the alliance announced that it had realized synergies of €5.7 billion in 2018 and that it aimed to increase the amount of yearly synergies to €10 billion in 2022.18 The alliance divided synergies into product-related synergies and non-product-related synergies. Engines and gearboxes developed in cooperation represented a product-related synergy. The alliance’s vehicles had gasoline, diesel, or electric powertrains, ensuring that all major types of powertrains were available for its vehicle range. In 2017, 75% of the alliance’s cars used powertrains that were shared among the alliance partners. Various teams were established to save costs in the fields of logistics, customs and trade, information systems and technology, and cross-production to create non-product-related synergies. Logistics teams merged those tasks that customers did not see, such as shipping, which created synergies worth €220 million in 2011. As early as 2002, the cross-company logistics teams developed global logistics strategies for the alliance and searched for possibilities to reduce costs in the areas of shipping, warehousing, and supply parts management. A customs and trade team later lowered the collaboration’s customs duties in 2012 by setting best-practice standards within all the alliance’s locations. The alliance also used shared IT systems. The Renault-Nissan Information Systems (RNIS) firm was created to unify and maintain the alliance’s information systems and data bases. RNIS created a list of common soft- and

Exhibit 5. Renault and Nissan’s Top 10 Markets by Units Sold in 2016

Source: Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2017). Renault-Nissan Alliance Delivers Significant Growth in 2016, Extends Electric Vehicle Sales Record. Retrieved from https://www.alliance-2022.com/news/renault- nissan-alliance-delivers-significant-growth-in-2016-extends-electric- vehicle-sales-record/.

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hardware suppliers, established a shared data model to provide information about materials and production parts, and installed an alliance communication broadband network called “Alliance Worldwide Backbone.” Combined sales and marketing projects were another example of non-product-related synergies. The alliance’s combined sales and marketing effort succeeded in having Renault-Nissan chosen to provide Danone with a fleet of more than 15,000 vehicles. Danone chose Renault-Nissan due to its diverse range of vehicles. The alliance also secured fleet contracts from ATOS, Merck, Orange, and Mondelez.

Alliance Governance To lead the alliance activity and facilitate the alliance’s strategic planning, the firm Renault-Nissan B.V. was founded in 2002 as a joint corporation based in the Netherlands. This governing entity functioned as the alliance’s board, and Renault and Nissan each had a 50% ownership share. Renault-Nissan B.V. held 100% of the firms RNPO and RNIS, which were responsible for the alliance’s combined activities in the areas of purchasing and information services. Since Nissan needed financial support in 1999, Renault initially bought 36.8% of Nissan Motor, 15.2% of Nissan Diesel, and fully acquired five Nissan financial entities in Europe for $5.4 billion. In 2002, Renault increased its investment and subsequently held 44.3% of Nissan, while Nissan bought 15% of Renault’s equity—without any voting rights. The partners had equal decision rights on the alliance’s governance board (see Exhibit 6). In 2016, Mitsubishi was added to the Renault-Nissan alliance when Nissan bought 34% of Mitsubishi’s shares.

From 2005 until 2018, Carlos Ghosn was the president of the alliance board. After being appointed president and CEO of Renault in May 2005, Ghosn was simultaneously CEO of both Renault and Nissan. This made Ghosn the first executive to lead two Global 500 firms at the same time. He remained CEO of both alliance partners for more than 11 years until he passed the CEO role of Nissan to Hiroto Saikawa in April 2017 and became chairman of the Nissan board of directors.19 Ghosn wanted to focus on reviving Mitsubishi.20 Mitsubishi was included in the alliance in 2016 and was striving to recover from reputational difficulties. Saikawa, who is the same age as Ghosn, started working for Nissan in 1977 and previously held roles such as co-CEO of Nissan, chief competitive officer (CCO) of Nissan, and executive general manager of RNPO. Saikawa also served on Renault’s board as a Nissan representative for a decade, until 2016.21 Ghosn prepared Saikawa to take a leading role at Nissan by working with him for many years. Besides Ghosn, both Renault and Nissan had four representatives on the alliance governance board from 2015 to 2017. The topics that the alliance board usually discussed were mid-term plans, investments that affected the strategy, and partnerships with third firms. In addition, the board discussed the commonalities of the alliance partners’ products and reviewed product plans. Usually, the alliance board held no more than eight meetings per year.

Exhibit 6. Structure of Equity Holdings of the Alliance Partners in 2017

Source: Renault Nissan. (2017, p. 6). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance-facts-and- figures-2017.

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In the past, Renault-Nissan had installed several commissions to govern the alliance. An International Advisory Board, consisting of 10 members and chaired by Schweitzer and Hanawa, prepared proposals and advised the alliance board on issues concerning its global strategy.22 Cross-company teams and cross-functional teams, which Ghosn first introduced during the Nissan turnaround, were two important governance mechanisms that the alliance used. The two types of teams had interdependent roles. While the cross-functional teams were responsible for implementing Renault and Nissan’s individual renewal plans, the 11 original cross-company teams were responsible for maximizing the alliance’s synergies and comprised 10 middle management members. There were cross-company teams for regional areas (e.g., Europe and South America) and functional areas (e.g., purchasing, technology, powertrains, and light commercial vehicles). In 2008, there were 19 cross-company teams which each had two leaders, one from each partner. Functional task teams helped the cross-company teams and worked on support functions, such as establishing processes and standards. In keeping with the alliance’s governance structure, the cross-functional teams exchanged information with the cross-company teams, which reported to the alliance board, which, in turn, the Alliance Coordination Bureau supported. The Alliance Coordination Bureau, with offices in Paris and Tokyo, planned the board meetings and coordinated all of the alliance’s teams and governing commissions. Managers were assigned to the cross-company teams on merit, and Ghosn was personally involved in selecting them.23 Alliance Steering Committees in the areas of engineering, overseas markets, and finance supervised the cross-company teams and the functional task teams. Finally, there were task teams that worked on specialized alliance projects until a particular problem was solved. The scope of the commissions governing the alliance’s assignments was adjusted as the alliance evolved. New types of teams were created, and old teams dissolved, once objectives were accomplished.

The alliance board worked with the team of Alliance Directors, which was installed in 2009 in response to the economic recession and whose goal was to create additional synergies by identifying new opportunities for cooperation. Each Alliance Director was responsible for organizing the cooperation of partner firms in one functional area, such as finance, powertrain planning, or marketing communications. Furthermore, the Alliance Directors were responsible for informing the management of Renault, Nissan, or the alliance board of developments that could be potentially harmful for the planned synergies. In 2014, the alliance had 12 Alliance Directors. The Alliance Executive Vice Presidents constituted an additional alliance governing authority. From 2015 to 2017, there were four Alliance Executive Vice Presidents who oversaw the converged functions: (1) technology development; (2) manufacturing, engineering, and supply chain management; (3) purchasing; and (4) human resources. In addition to the four Alliance Executive Vice Presidents, the alliance also had five Alliance Senior Vice Presidents in 2019.

Alliance Evolution With Renault’s help, Nissan soon recovered from its financial difficulties. At the beginning of the alliance, a common language had to be found and both partners made a continuous effort to discover new ways of creating mutual value. As time passed, the alliance developed several new partnerships with other automotive companies.

Daimler AG and the Renault-Nissan alliance started a partnership in April 2010. Their cooperation gradually intensified and encompassed 13 large projects in 2017. For example, Mercedes-Benz four-cylinder gasoline engines, which are used in Mercedes’ and Infinitis, are produced at a Nissan factory in Tennessee, USA; and electric engines manufactured by Renault are used for the Renault ZOE, the Smart Fortwo, and the Smart Forfour. Daimler bought 3.1% of Renault as part of the collaboration and 3.1% of Nissan. Renault and Nissan each acquired 1.55% of Daimler’s shares.

Renault-Nissan internationalized into many new geographical markets. The alliance started operations in Indonesia, Myanmar, Nigeria, Algeria, Mexico, and Argentina. In 2012, the Renault-Nissan alliance bought a controlling stake in the joint venture Alliance Rostec Auto B.V. This enabled Renault to acquire the Russian car manufacturer Avtovaz, which had sold 284,807 cars under its Lada brand in 2016. In 2013, the alliance announced that it wanted to increase its growth and remain a market leader in Africa. Renault-Nissan subsequently entered into a contractual agreement with the Stallion Group to have cars assembled in Nigeria and to strengthen its position in Africa.

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Not all of the alliance’s projects were successful. In 2008, Renault-Nissan partnered with the Indian firm Bajaj Auto Limited, which had previously made two-wheeled and three-wheeled vehicles, to develop a low-cost car for the Indian market. The partnership’s initial plan was for Bajaj to develop a low-cost car that Renault-Nissan would brand and market. The partners were apparently unable to agree on the planned vehicle’s specifications and the cooperation with Bajaj was officially terminated in 2013.24 Previously, Renault also failed in the Indian market with the Mahindra Renault Logan. In a joint venture with the firm Mahindra & Mahindra, Renault tried to sell a low-cost car in India. However, the Mahindra Renault Logan was too expensive compared to the cars of local competitors, such as Maruti Suzuki or Tata, because 50% of the parts, such as the engines, were imported from France and not locally sourced.25

In the past few years, the alliance’s future vision developed into taking the lead in creating a world with zero exhaust emissions. To move toward this goal and stay competitive, the alliance invested in the areas of electrification, autonomous driving, and connected cars. To realize this vision and to accomplish its connected mobility goals, the alliance acquired the French software development firm Sylpheo in 2016. In the same year, a partnership was announced with Microsoft with respect to connected mobility.

When the alliance started its research into electric vehicles, Renault benefited from Nissan’s experience with battery technology. In 2016, the Renault-Nissan alliance sold 424,797 electric cars. The following year, their Nissan Leaf had the highest number of total units sold among electric cars by 2017. By including Mitsubishi, the alliance increased its sold electric vehicles by 8% from 2015 to 2016. The market for pure electric vehicles did not develop as fast as Renault-Nissan anticipated. Critics claimed that the alliance was too optimistic about pure electric vehicles and that it realized too late how important an available infrastructure is for plug-in electric vehicles’ viability. Renault-Nissan started investing in electric vehicle technologies relatively early compared to other automotive groups. In 2008, the alliance partnered with the firm Better Place to test the concept of switchable batteries in electric vehicles. This project used Renault’s electric car, the Fluence Z.E. Better Place started building a network of battery-changing stations in Israel and Denmark, as the distances traveled by car in these countries are relatively small, which meant that electric vehicles’ short ranges were less problematic. The Better Place project was the first major attempt to establish a system of exchangeable batteries for electric cars. Better Place’s idea was to circumvent long charging times and electric cars’ short reach. The firm built QuickDrop stations where customers could exchange their Fluence Z.E.’s battery for a fully charged battery in less than five minutes. The Renault Fluence Z.E. was the only car with which Better Place’s battery exchange stations were compatible. In 2009, Renault and Better Place announced that they aimed to sell 100,000 Fluence Z.E.s by 2016. However, by 2013, Renault had only sold 1,000 Fluence Z.E.s in Israel and 240 in Denmark. Owing to the low demand, the partnership between Renault and Better Place was terminated in 2013 and Better Place went bankrupt. The project ultimately failed because there was not enough demand for Better Place’s service.26

Besides exploring battery-powered electric vehicles, the Renault-Nissan alliance also explored fuel-cell electric vehicles. Fuel-cell electric vehicles’ electric engines are fueled with hydrogen and do not emit harmful exhaust fumes. In 2013, a partnership was announced between Daimler, Ford, and Renault-Nissan with the aim of developing the technology needed to bring reasonably priced fuel-cell electric vehicles to the mass market after 2017, whereby each partner would invest an equal amount in the project. Individually, each of the three partner companies had experience with the development of fuel-cell electric vehicles. The partners planned to create synergies by developing a common fuel-cell electric vehicle system that could be used under different brands.27 However, by 2019, the partners had not yet launched a fuel-cell electric vehicle successfully. Daimler and Ford chose to terminate the partnership, with Renault-Nissan subsequently agreeing to terminate the fuel- cell technology collaboration. While Ford planned to continue investing in the R&D of fuel-cell electric vehicles independently, Daimler and Renault-Nissan announced that, in the future, they wanted to concentrate their investments in the development of battery-powered electric vehicles. Renault-Nissan’s competitors, Toyota and Hyundai, maintained their plans to invest in fuel-cell electric vehicles.28

Adding Mitsubishi to the Alliance In October 2016, Nissan bought 34% of Mitsubishi’s shares and a partnership was announced between Nissan and Mitsubishi. Following Nissan’s investment in Mitsubishi, Carlos Ghosn became the chairman of Mitsubishi Motors’ board of directors in December 2016. Thereafter, the alliance started referring to itself as the Renault-

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Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance.29 Two broad goals were set when Mitsubishi was included in the strategic alliance: to reestablish trust in the Mitsubishi brand, and to improve the firm’s financials.30

In 2016, Mitsubishi encountered increasing difficulties after it had to admit that it had lied about its cars’ fuel economy and emissions. This led to a scandal and Mitsubishi was unable to avoid taking a loss in the 2016 fiscal year, although the firm had been profitable the previous eight fiscal years.31 Since Mitsubishi had manipulated emission tests since 2013, the 468,000 cars that it manufactured as a contractor for Nissan were also implicated. Nissan and Mitsubishi formed a joint venture in 2011 to manufacture kei cars, which were limited in size and engine power, and popular in Japan. In this joint venture, Mitsubishi was responsible for producing cars for Nissan.32 In the past, Mitsubishi had repeatedly received bad press due to its negative actions. For example, in 2000, it admitted that it kept safety problems secret, which then led to one of Japan’s largest car recalls. Carlos Ghosn explained that the recurrence of scandals at Mitsubishi indicated that problems were addressed too superficially in the past. He announced that Mitsubishi’s problems would be investigated rigorously. “I will be insisting to make sure that we go to the root causes of the problem,” he said. Ghosn clarified that identifying and correcting the problems in Mitsubishi’s organizational culture and attitude quickly would be a priority.

Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi’s ambition was to repeat the Renault-Nissan alliance’s success. Ghosn was certain that this was possible as the enlarged alliance had the advantage that, in 2016, Mitsubishi still had reserves of $2.4 billion. Nonetheless, Mitsubishi’s management believed that its capital surplus was insufficient to realize the firm’s long-term strategic goals without external help.

Mitsubishi is the automotive producer with the longest history in Japan, having manufactured its first car in 1917. In 2016, Mitsubishi sold the most plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) in Europe. Mitsubishi sold 30,000 PHEVs on the European market in 2015 and 21,000 PHEVs in 2016. In 2017, Mitsubishi had 29,000 employees and 17 manufacturing plants. When the company joined the Renault-Nissan alliance, it announced that no job cuts were planned, that its CEO, Osamu Masuko, would remain in office, and that Ghosn would take a supervisory role to help Mitsubishi with governance-related tasks. It was reported that Nissan paid $2.29 billion for its shares in Mitsubishi. Part of the agreement was that Ghosn and three other Nissan managers would become members of Mitsubishi’s board, which subsequently comprised 11 directors in total in 2017.33 With Mitsubishi, the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance became one of the largest automotive groups in the world (see Exhibit 7), selling approximately 10 million vehicles in 2016 and bringing the alliance very close to its goal of becoming one of the global top three auto groups in terms of cars sold.

Nissan and Mitsubishi did, however, have a previous history of cooperation. In 2013, the Renault-Nissan alliance announced plans for a more extensive cooperation with Mitsubishi in North America. The planned areas of collaboration of the 2016 Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance were purchasing, plant utilization, technology, and marketing. Ghosn announced that there would be “massive” synergies for Mitsubishi and substantial synergies for Nissan. The joint synergies were estimated to be ¥24 billion (≈ €187.47 million) in 2017 and ¥60 billion (≈ €465.77 million) in 2018.34

The shared, state-of-the-art distribution center that the Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi alliance opened in July 2018 in Melbourne, Australia, was an example of how it wanted to create synergies and was their first common distribution center. This new distribution center was not only the three alliance partners’ main warehouse in Australia, but also that of the Infiniti brand, which belonged to the alliance. It was strategically located, used industry-leading technologies to move parts quickly and efficiently, and created synergies by increasing the productivity, efficiency, and accuracy of the partners’ distribution process. In addition, it operated 24 hours per day, housed about 100,000 parts, and employed over 90 staff members.35

Ways Forward: Sustaining the Alliance and Planning Its Future Ghosn, who was a key figure in the Renault-Nissan alliance’s success and president of its board since 2005, was arrested at the airport after returning to Tokyo in November 2018. Ghosn was charged with not disclosing $43 million in remuneration from Nissan between 2010 and 2015. In Japan, since 2010, CEOs have been required to report their earnings.36 When Ghosn was arrested, he was the chairman of Nissan’s board of directors. Nissan’s CEO, Hiroto Saikawa, said that Ghosn had not only underreported his earnings, but also used Nissan’s money to

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cover personal investment losses of $16 million. Furthermore, Ghosn was criticized for allegedly specifically creating a Nissan-owned firm to finance his personal housing in Tokyo, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, and Beirut. In the context of his arrest, newspapers reported that Ghosn had previously stated that he was dissatisfied with his compensation, which was low by Western standards, although it was very high by Japanese standards.37 For example, Ghosn’s compensation was much higher than that of Toyota’s CEO. Renault initially held on to Ghosn as its CEO, but the Nissan and Mitsubishi boards quickly voted to remove him as the chairman of their firms. Thierry Bolloré was appointed the interim Renault CEO a few weeks after the incident at Tokyo airport. At the first alliance board meeting after Ghosn’s arrest, the partners agreed that the CEOs of Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi would share the alliance leader role. Saikawa announced that the leaders of the alliance partners fully agreed on the alliance’s future direction. Thereafter, the Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi leaders assured their investors and employees that the alliance had been very successful in the past and that the partners remained strongly committed to it. Although Renault had the right to select the alliance chairman and CEO, the alliance board chose to split the role of alliance leader to avoid power conflicts and to postpone the selection of a new alliance chairman and CEO. After it became clear that Ghosn would not resume his roles at Renault, Thierry Bolloré became CEO of Renault in 2018, and Jean-Dominique Senard was appointed chairman in January 2019.38 Carlos Ghosn’s arrest brought considerable turmoil to Nissan. In February 2019, Nissan announced that the Ghosn affair led to ¥9 billion (≈ €70 million) in costs, and the disturbances caused by Ghosn’s arrest were named as one reason for having to lower earnings expectations for the current fiscal year.39 In September 2019, it became public that Saikawa, one of the main figures in Ghosn’s downfall, had received illegitimate compensation as well. Although he claimed ignorance about this, Saikawa resigned from his role as Nissan’s CEO.40

Exhibit 7. Automotive Firms 2016 Sales (in million units)

Source: Renault Nissan. (2017, p. 8). Alliance Facts & Figures 2017. Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan-global.com/releases/infographic-renault-nissan-alliance- facts-and-figures-2017.

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After Ghosn’s arrest, for several months there was uncertainty about how the alliance would make decisions. In March 2019, the three CEOs of the alliance partners and the new chairman of Renault announced a new consensus-based alliance operating board at a press conference at Nissan’s headquarters in Yokohama. Some principles concerning how the alliance planned to use the new board were defined and published in a one-page memorandum of understanding (MOU). In addition to delineating some new governance principles, the MOU declared a new start of the alliance. The new alliance board, which consisted of the chairman of Renault and the CEOs of Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi, replaced the old board (i.e., Renault-Nissan B.V.). The MOU stated that the chairman of Renault would be the chairman of the new alliance board and that the alliance board would make decisions based on consensus. The new alliance board planned to meet once per month.41 The shareholding structure of the alliance remained unchanged.

An apparent challenge facing the alliance was Nissan’s expressed dissatisfaction with having less power than Renault. According to newspaper reports, Ghosn was planning to merge Renault and Nissan before he was arrested. Nissan managers, such as Hiroto Saikawa, however, opposed such a merger. The media reported that Renault dominated the alliance when Ghosn was the alliance leader and that this led to disagreement between the Japanese and the French stakeholders. The unequal cross-shareholding setup meant that Renault earned more from its investment in Nissan stocks than vice versa. In 2017, 54% of Renault’s net income came from its investment in Nissan.42 Renault’s dominant position in the alliance had caused disputes in the past, because Nissan was the partner with higher revenues, higher unit sales, and higher profits (see Exhibit 8).

It was also reported that Nissan’s stakeholders were similarly dissatisfied with the French government being Renault’s largest shareholder. Nissan’s stakeholders feared that the French government would use its power to support the French economy before considering the alliance’s best interests. In an interview about the alliance’s

Exhibit 8. Comparison of Measures of Size: Renault vs. Nissan

Source: Revenue and Net Income figures retrieved from Thomson Reuters’s Worldscope database. Revenues and Net Income figures were converted to U.S. dollars using the WM/Reuters exchange rates of the 31st of May of each year, respectively. Production figures retrieved from http://www.oica.net.

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future after Ghosn’s arrest, the French economy and finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, explained: “I do not want any change in the balance of power between Renault and Nissan or the levels of cross-shareholdings.”43

New developments in areas such as autonomous driving, electric vehicles, and car sharing are transforming the automotive industry. To strengthen its growth and its competitiveness in the future, the alliance announced a strategic initiative called Alliance 2022 in September 2017 and introduced a new logo. The main aims of Alliance 2022 were to double the yearly synergies to €10 billion, sell 14 million cars yearly, and increase the alliance’s revenues to $240 billion per year. These goals would be accomplished by intensifying the use of shared platforms, powertrains, and technologies. More than nine million alliance cars (about 64% of the targeted sales for 2022) would use one of the four shared-car platforms by 2022. Common powertrains were planned for 75% of the alliance’s cars. Furthermore, the alliance aimed at developing leading capabilities in autonomous driving and planned to launch 40 autonomous driving vehicles before 2022. The alliance also aimed at becoming one of the dominant providers of autonomous driving services for public transit and car-sharing. In 2017, cooperation was announced with the Japanese firm DeNA at the CES in Las Vegas to develop driverless vehicles. In September 2018, the alliance announced a partnership with Google aimed at developing an advanced infotainment system to be implemented in new Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi cars. This partnership was revealed on the anniversary of Alliance 2022’s announcement to demonstrate the alliance’s ambitions to realize its connected mobility goals.44 Using Android as the operating system of the new infotainment system would allow customers to use “Google Maps, the Google Assistant, and the Google Play Store” and provide access to a large number of applications. In addition, Google Assistant would provide users with voice control for the infotainment system’s functions, phone calls, and text messages. It would also be compatible with Apple iOS devices and connect to the alliance’s cloud to update the software and investigate problems remotely. Collaborating with Google would allow the alliance to offer attractive advanced infotainment systems for its customers.

The alliance had to answer a number of key questions. How would the new consensus-based alliance board make decisions in questions where there was no consensus among the CEOs of Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubishi? Apart from the new alliance board, how should the alliance’s governance structure be adjusted? Which innovation projects were most important to stay competitive in the changing automotive industry, and did the alliance have the required capabilities?

After the new alliance board was formed, media outlets reported that Renault wanted to hold on to the idea of a merger of Renault and Nissan.45 Was further integration required, and how could this be accomplished while satisfying all relevant stakeholders? Several automotive companies were cooperating to share the R&D costs for new technologies (see Exhibit 9).

Exhibit 9. Ties Between Manufacturers in the Automotive Industry (Cars manufactured in 2017 in millions)

Source: WirtschaftsWoche. (2019). Grafik: Das Machtgeflecht der internationalen Autokonzerne. Retrieved from https://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen/auto/grafik-das-machtgeflecht-der-internationalen-autokonzerne/24426512.html. (Translation: WirtschaftsWoche. (2019). Illustration: Network of the most powerful international auto groups.)

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Should the alliance try to convince a fourth major automotive company to join the alliance to gain additional scale? In May 2019, Renault received an offer to merge with Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA). Only a short time later, FCA withdrew its offer because it perceived the conditions demanded by the French government as unattractive.46 Renault and the French government voiced their disappointment about the stopped merger negotiations with FCA, and the media reported that it was not out of the question that merger negotiations could be resumed at a later point in time. Nissan managers disapproved the plans, and it was unclear how a Renault- FCA merger would have affected the relationship between Renault and Nissan.47 Would it be possible for the alliance partners to find a way to collaborate with FCA that would be beneficial for both Renault and Nissan? Creating a closer tie with FCA might also be a way to prevent a merger of FCA with another large competitor (such as PSA). So far, the alliance partners’ managers agreed that it was worthwhile thinking about these questions in order to map out the alliance’s future, as the collaboration of Renault and Nissan had been rewarding in the past and had the potential to bring many opportunities in the future.

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Endnotes 1 Weiss, S. E. (2010). Negotiating the Renault-Nissan Alliance: Insights from Renault’s Experience. Retrieved from http:// weissnegotiation.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Renault-negons-Benoliel-bk-v2.1-SW-11pt-DBL-2010Sept20-final.pdf. 2 Some information in the case is derived from Renault (2000) and Nissan (1998, 2001) Annual Reports. 3 Some information throughout the case was taken from Tjemkes, B., Vos, P., & Burgers, K. (2018). Strategic Alliance Management (Section: “Case: Renault-Nissan”). 4 Maskery, M. A. (2008). Yoshikazu Hanawa: The Last Chief of an Independent Nissan Saved the Company by Selling It. Retrieved from http://www.autonews.com/article/20080519/OEM02/305199929/yoshikazu-hanawa. 5 Information about Carlos Ghosn was obtained from Khalaf, R. (2018). ‘Le Cost Killer’: The Relentless Drive of Carlos Ghosn. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/e3acccf2-6e20-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914; Levin, D. (2018). The Rise and Fall of Carlos Ghosn. Retrieved from http://fortune.com/longform/rise-and-fall-of-carlos-ghosn/; Encyclopedia of World Biography. (2018). Carlos Ghosn Biography. Retrieved from https://www.notablebiographies.com/supp/Supplement-Fl-Ka/ Ghosn-Carlos.html; and Renault. (2018). Carlos Ghosn—Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. Retrieved from https:// group.renault.com/en/our-company/leadership/board-of-directors/carlos-ghosn-2/. 6 Information on DaimlerChrysler was obtained from The Economist. (2000). The DaimlerChrysler Emulsion. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/briefing/2000/07/27/the-daimlerchrysler-emulsion; and Mateja, J. (2007). How Chrysler Marriage Failed. Retrieved from http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-15/news/0705141000_1_daimler-benz- cerberus-capital-management-carmakers. 7 Matsuda, K., Suzuki, I., & Nussbaum, A. (2018). Nissan-Renault Alliance to Be Led Jointly by CEOs after Ghosn. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-29/renault-nissan-affirm-commitment-to-two-decade-partnership. 8 Donnelly, T., Morris, D., & Donnelly, T. (2005). Renault‐Nissan: A Marriage of Necessity? Retrieved from https://www. emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/09555340510620339. 9 Flament, A.-C., Fujimura, S., & Nilles, P. (2001). Renault and Nissan: A Marriage of Reason. 10 Some information throughout the case was taken from Kittilaksanawong, W., & Palecki, C. (2015). Renault-Nissan Alliance: Will Further Integration Create More Synergies? 11 Hunter, M. L., & Doz, Y. (2016). The Renault-Nissan Alliance. 12 Some information throughout the case on Nissan’s turnaround was taken from Hughes, K. (2003). Nissan’s U-Turn: 1999-2001. Condensed Version of Redesigning Nissan. 13 Japan Times. (1999). Nissan Motor to Cut Five Factories, 21,000 Jobs. Retrieved from https://www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/1999/10/18/national/nissan-motor-to-cut-five-factories-21000-jobs/#.XQJXaI_gq70. 14 Facts and figures throughout the case are derived from the Alliance Facts and Figures reports, years 2003 through 2005, 2008, 2009, and 2013 through 2017. 15 Greimel, H. (2015). Nissan Vehicles to Use Common Visible Parts. Retrieved from http://www.autonews.com/article/20150131/ OEM01/302029953/nissan-vehicles-to-use-common-visible-parts. 16 Soble, J. (2012). Nissan to Produce Cars in South Korea. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/3d79cc16-d229- 11e1-ac21-00144feabdc0. 17 Groupe Renault. (2010). Renault Inside—Into the Renault-Nissan Alliance (Report). Retrieved from https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=DvgrQ_BtIO0&NR=1. 18 Groupe Renault. (2019). Groupe Renault Facts & Figures March 2019 Edition. Retrieved from https://group.renault.com/ wp-content/uploads/2019/04/factsfigures-2018.pdf. 19 Renault. (2018). Carlos Ghosn - Chairman and Chief Executive Officer. Retrieved from https://group.renault.com/en/our- company/leadership/board-of-directors/carlos-ghosn-2/. 20 Holder, J. (2017). Carlos Ghosn Steps Down as Nissan CEO. Retrieved from https://www.autocar.co.uk/car-news/industry/ carlos-ghosn-steps-down-nissan-ceo. 21 Information about Hiroto Saikawa was obtained from Nissan. (2017). Hiroto Saikawa. Retrieved from https://nissannews. com/en-US/nissan/usa/releases/hiroto-saikawa; Shirouzu, N., & Shiraki, M. (2018). Nissan’s Saikawa, a Hard-Nosed Leader, Takes Center Stage after Ghosn’s Ouster. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nissan-ghosn-saikawa-newsmaker/ nissans-saikawa-a-hard-nosed-leader-takes-center-stage-after-ghosns-ouster-idUSKCN1NR1W2; and Inagaki, K., & Campbell, P. (2018). Nissan’s Chief Hiroto Saikawa Shows Ruthless Streak. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/ f9992784-ef19-11e8-89c8-d36339d835c0. 22 Nissan. (2000). Renault and Nissan Set Up Their International Advisory Board. Retrieved from https://newsroom.nissan- global.com/releases/release-dcc008e47f3ada2edd329fd65e001688-renault-and-nissan-set-up-their-international-advisory- board?year=2000. 23 Ramaswamy, K. (2008). Renault-Nissan: The Challenge of Sustaining Strategic Change (in McGee, Thomas, & Wilson, Strategy Analysis and Practice, 2010). 24 Mukherjee, S. (2013). Renault-Nissan Shelves Small Car Project with Bajaj. Retrieved from https://www.business-standard. com/article/companies/renault-nissan-shelves-small-car-project-with-bajaj-112092600060_1.html. 25 Baggonkar, S. (2013). What Went Wrong with Logan. Retrieved from https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/ what-went-wrong-with-logan-109111000042_1.html. 26 Automotive News Europe. (2013). Renault Will End Better Place Partnership after Bankruptcy Filing. Retrieved from http:// europe.autonews.com/article/20130527/ANE/305279943/renault-will-end-better-place-partnership-after-bankruptcy-filing.

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27 Power Electronics. (2013). Daimler, Renault-Nissan, Ford Collaborate on Fuel-Cell Vehicle Technology. Retrieved from https:// www.powerelectronics.com/industry/daimler-renault-nissan-ford-collaborate-fuel-cell-vehicle-technology. 28 Manthey, N. (2018). Renault-Nissan Pull the Plug on Fuel Cell Cars. Retrieved from https://www.electrive.com/2018/06/18/ renault-nissan-pull-the-plug-on-fuel-cell-cars/. 29 Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2017). Alliance 2022: New Plan Targets Annual Synergies of €10 Billion and Forecasts Unit Sales of 14 Million and Combined Revenues of $240 Billion. Retrieved from https://www.alliance-2022.com/news/alliance- 2022-announcement/. 30 CNBC. (2016). Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn Plans Deep Dive to Repair Mitsubishi’s Image. Retrieved from https://www. cnbc.com/2016/10/20/mitsubishi-nissan-news-carlos-ghosn-on-how-to-help-mitsubishi-motors-get-back-on-track.html. 31 Wells, P. (2016). Mitsubishi Motors Projects First Loss in 8 Years. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/f1200cf6- 382f-11e6-a780-b48ed7b6126f. 32 Schreffler, R. (2016). Nissan CEO Ghosn Reviving Embattled Mitsubishi. Retrieved from https://www.wardsauto.com/ industry/nissan-ceo-ghosn-reviving-embattled-mitsubishi. 33 Mitsubishi. (2017). Management (as of August 1, 2017)—Members of the Board. Retrieved from https://www.mitsubishi- motors.com/content/dam/com/ir_en/pdf/anual/2017/annual2017-08.pdf; and Mitsubishi. (2016). Mitsubishi Motors Joins Renault-Nissan Alliance. Retrieved from https://www.mitsubishi-motors.com/publish/pressrelease_en/corporate/2016/news/ detailga23.html. 34 CNBC. (2016). Nissan CEO Carlos Ghosn Plans Deep Dive to Repair Mitsubishi’s Image. Retrieved from https://www. cnbc.com/2016/10/20/mitsubishi-nissan-news-carlos-ghosn-on-how-to-help-mitsubishi-motors-get-back-on-track.html. 35 Renault Nissan Mitsubishi. (2018). Global-First Alliance Distribution Warehouse Open for Business in Australia. 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This document is authorized for use only by Maria Stopchak in 7257 Global Intercultural Communication S20 taught by MYLES BASSELL, CUNY - Brooklyn College from Jul 2020 to Jan 2021.