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BUS 347 FINAL WRITTEN & ORAL CASE ASSIGNMENT

HARRIS V MAYFIELD INC

  

Plaintiff Mary Harris appeals the superior court's decision that defendant Mayfield, Inc., did not discriminate against her on the basis of sex when it fired her from her position as a chambermaid.

Defendant operates a ski resort in Stowe. Plaintiff began working for defendant as a chambermaid in August 2006. She has not had natural upper teeth since 2000, but had a set of dentures made before she went to work for defendant. She did not wear them, however, because they hurt her. During the fall of 2007, defendant hired Marguerite Pearson as its executive housekeeper, responsible for housekeeping schedules and standards, and reviewing staff performance. She participated in discussions on upgrading the image of the resort in order to obtain a "four-star" rating. Patty Clark, her supervisor, mentioned that the appearance of members of the housekeeping staff, including plaintiff, needed improvement, and Pearson communicated this concern to her staff members.

Pearson asked plaintiff to volunteer for layoff in October, but assured her that she would be rehired in six weeks. In the meantime, however, management personnel decided that plaintiff would not be allowed to return to work without dentures, despite her neat and clean appearance and her good work record. On November 24, Pearson sent plaintiff a letter informing her that Mayfield was concerned about upgrading "the way employees are seen by the public" and that "employees will be expected to have teeth and to wear them daily to work." Plaintiff called Pearson upon receipt of the letter and explained that she had dentures but had not been able to wear them because they did not fit. She asked to be allowed to return to work so that she could earn enough money to purchase a new set. Pearson told plaintiff that she could not come back to work without dentures, but that she would hold plaintiff's job open until December 21. The company fired plaintiff when she did not report to work on that date.

Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that defendant violated FEPA, 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-496, by firing her because of her sex. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the sex-discrimination claim and plaintiff claims that the trial court’s ruling on the motion was in error. Plaintiff's sex-discrimination claim asserts that defendant violated FEPA by requiring her to wear dentures as a condition of employment while no such requirement was imposed on male employees. FEPA is patterned on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the standards and burdens of proof under FEPA are identical to those under Title VII. She argues that summary judgment on this claim was improper on two grounds. First, plaintiff contends that there were material facts in dispute. We agree.

The trial court applied the shifting-burden analysis first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04. Under McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. This burden is a relatively light one. Establishing a prima facie case essentially raises a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

Under McDonnell Douglas, once plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Shifting the burden to the employer to rebut the prima facie case serves to frame the factual issue. If the employer meets its burden, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's proffered reason is a pretext.

In this case, the trial court ruled that plaintiff had established a prima facie case by showing that she was terminated because she did not wear dentures while two male employees working in the maintenance department were not required to wear dentures. It concluded, however, that defendant had rebutted the prima facie case by showing its employment decision was based on nondiscriminatory considerations. The court found that defendant legitimately imposed higher "grooming" standards for the housekeeping employees because employees in this department have direct contact with guests of the resort while those in the maintenance department have no similar contact. Consequently, the burden shifted back to plaintiff, and the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendant's nondiscriminatory reason was mere pretext. Thus, on cross motions for summary judgment, the court ruled for defendant.

Plaintiff disputes the court's finding regarding guest contact, maintaining that employees of both departments have similar guest contact. We agree that plaintiff's evidence indicated that one of the maintenance workers who had lost his teeth had contact with the public to the same extent as plaintiff. According to plaintiff, he met and spoke with guests in the parking lot and while shoveling the driveway. He also helped guests when their cars were stuck in the snow. In addition, plaintiff presented evidence indicating that other "grooming" standards, such as those regarding hair length, were not enforced against male employees. Taking plaintiff's allegations as true, we conclude that summary judgment for defendant was improper. The evidence indicates there is a factual dispute regarding employee-guest contact that is central in this case. We, therefore, hold that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the sex-discrimination claim.

 Reversed and remanded.

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