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Hallyu as a Government Construct: The Korean Wave in the Context of Economic and Social Development

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Introduction

Commonly regarded as the popularity of Korean[1] popular culture overseas, *Hallyu*—the Korean Wave—is also considered a phenomenon of cultural production that has been used to promote Korean interests overseas, particularly in East and Southeast Asia. The *Hallyu* has so far consisted of various forms of production, which have, to some extent, been able to work synergistically with each other.[2] Productions include film and television presentations, pop music and dance, fashion and cosmetics, video games, and food. Many of these sectors are combined within a single production through product placement and endorsement. They are part of a new phase of economic development that emphasizes the role of intellectual property and creativity in the production process and, hence, the decoupling of the cost of production and retail price. The marketing component of *Hallyu* products is instrumental in widening the cost-price gap and has also been used to promote Korea and Korean society in a friendly and nonthreatening manner, thereby promoting tourism and the consumption of other Korean products. The result has been a blossoming of interest in the country verging in some cases on hysteria and the elevation of its thoughts and deeds to a higher level—Korea joined the rich person's club, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 1996, but it is the *Hallyu* that has persuaded Asian countries at the societal level that Korea

is really part of the developed, western world. This has had considerable impact on the soft power that can be deployed overseas in further promoting national interests in the areas of diplomacy, investment, education, and trade. This has been facilitated by such developments as the liberalization of media around Asia from the mid-1990s, when the *Hallyu* first became notable. Two television dramas from this period, *What Is Love All About?* and *Stars in My Heart*, as well as the Korean content on the music video station Channel V led the way in China and other nations that were showing such foreign content for the first time.[3] Prior to this, international awareness of popular Korean cultural production was almost zero.

That the *Hallyu* has unfolded in this way is neither a surprise nor a coincidence. Instead, just as in the case of the first phase of the rapid economic development, the conditions for development were put in place by the state and its agencies while private sector corporations and individuals have taken advantage of those conditions in inventive and sometimes unexpected ways. Again, just as in the case of the first wave of development, *Hallyu* practitioners have eventually become sufficiently internationalized as to free themselves from the influence of the Korean state and to act independently. However, even as independent international actors, many *Hallyu* practitioners prefer to remain consistent with the methods that brought them their success because of the benefits of joint branding across different products and sectors. Those who ignore their home support in favor of devoting themselves to their international supporters have found themselves criticized and their popularity wane.[4] Actor Kwon Sang Woo, for example, star of the television series *Stairway to Heaven*, was forced into public apology for what was perceived to be an overly brief "hit-and-run" visit to Korea, when fans felt they deserved more chance to interact with him and that he should have demonstrated more love for the country.

This chapter investigates the *Hallyu* as a deliberately fostered manifestation of economic development and considers its purpose, development, and nature as a marketing phenomenon and as the result of a distinctive form of industry policy. It is argued that understanding the nature of *Hallyu* requires accepting that it is seen as a deliberate policy to internationalize Korean cultural products in a variety of different fields in a way that enables different media to act in synergistic ways with each other. Products include television drama and pop music, cinema and animation, computer games, classical music, food, and fashion. There are clear commercial advantages to having a variety of elements within the overall brand of "Korean culture," not least of which is to attempt to capture support from different segments of the target market. These different sectors of the same industry are promoted through a strong online capability that has been facilitated by the early and substantial commitment of the

Korean government to investing in its internet capacity. The Korean Culture and Information Service (KOCIS) makes this clear:

> We have long since come to view culture and arts as "industries," and as popular culture has assumed pride of place, pure art has sometimes been dismissed as culture for a small minority. But popular culture has a hard time flourishing without a foundation in pure art that traces its history back into the past. That art provides the roots, and solid roots lead to richer and sweeter fruits of popular culture.[5]

The vision is, therefore, one of authentic Korean culture that will give rise to a flowering of cultural productions in different but related fields that can be marketed to the world as part of a unified, fully realized brand.

Industry Policy

Industry policy may be broadly defined as the set of actions and policies that a state is able to enact to promote the efficient and successful operation of businesses operating within its jurisdiction. This includes the provision of infrastructure (hard, soft, and virtual), specialized government agencies and funding bodies, tailored educational opportunities, and incentives to companies to undertake more research and development and value-adding activities. Originally, industry policy was intended to promote the specific interest of home country companies but since membership of the World Trade Organization and agreement of bilateral and multilateral treaties require equal treatment to all firms, it has become more common for industry policy to offer more or less similar treatment to everyone. In any case, internationalized companies are now frequently detached from attachment to a specific country as had once been the case. Instead, states may use special economic zones (SEZs) as places where particular privileges will be offered to all who wish to invest there on the graduated sovereignty principle[6] that means a differential relationship between state and firm based on location.

Often derided as "picking winners," at which governments are considered to be less effective than market transactions,[7] industry policy has been regularly used in East Asia as a means of promoting rapid economic development with considerable success.[8] Chang,[9] reviewing industrial policy as it has been practiced in the region, identified nine specific areas in which government has been active, including the coordination of complementary investments, the coordination of competing investments, policies to ensure scale economies, and regulations on import of technology and investment that were appropriate to the very specific conditions

appertaining at the time of enactment. Government acts in a number of ways, therefore, to promote certain types of economic activities and provides access to enabling technology (e.g., infrastructure) and general purpose technology (e.g., digitalization, computers) such that firms entering the market have a better chance of overcoming constraints to efficiency and to growth that so many companies would otherwise face and so are able to contribute to national economic and social development. An example of how this has worked successfully is with the online computer game industry. The Korean government provided incentives to companies to enter the market, made advanced educational opportunities available in relevant fields, provided support to national-level competitions and media exposure to help to overcome societal resistance to games-playing as a career choice, and enabled coordination with other industrial sectors to ensure the competencies and skills obtained could be embedded in the economy as a whole.[10]

Despite laws that have been instituted to limit game-playing,[11] which for some people is dangerously addictive, in a way similar to gambling, the video or computer game industry has continued to flourish. Companies such as Nexon and NCsoft have flourished in this environment and have demonstrated their capacity to provide hugely popular game environments through innovations such as the Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (MMORPGs) and the use of the microtransaction business model to replace subscriptions.[12] In 2010, US$1.6 billion worth of video games accounted for more than 50 percent of the country's exports in the contents (i.e., intellectual property) category and this sector was by far the most important sector of the creative industries. Continued investment and innovation in this area remains considerably important as the games industry has begun the migration to mobile platforms and more open business models—that is, the ability of individuals to market and sell apps through easy-to-access international markets—which has brought new means of growth and change. Computer application also offers a platform for merchandising creative and media content of all sorts, and the ability to enable the public to connect more conveniently and comprehensively with media figures is an important component of the overall experience. It is argued here that effective use of government policy has assisted the creative industries as a whole and has contributed to the success of the *Hallyu* internationally as part of deliberate strategy.

Government Support for the *Hallyu*

Korean society has been enormously influenced by external powers throughout its history. For centuries, the Chinese influence was the

strongest and many sinicized institutions in the territory bear testament to this. From 1910–1945, the Korean peninsula was occupied and colonized by the Japanese as a part of a brutal campaign to dominate East Asia. The subsequent Cold War period and beyond saw the northern part intellectually dominated by Marxist-Leninism from the former Soviet Union and China, while the southern half has been the recipient of strong and pervasive American influences that have done so much to transform society. The preceding Yi dynasty as well as the Japanese colonial period and the US-influenced postwar controls all featured extensive state intervention as a deliberate strategy for governance and development and this precedent was followed into the period of rapid economic growth.[13] The economic model selected for growth—import-substituting, export-oriented manufacturing—looked outward not just for markets but also for items to produce. Much of the manufacturing in the early part of this period was made possible by the importing of foreign-made goods and then reverse engineering them until local firms worked out how to make acceptable variants.[14] The flow of information was, therefore, from the external to the internal and, while this was a necessary part of the struggle to obtain the means of survival, nevertheless, it represented something of an affront to national pride. For Koreans to reverse this information flow, even if only in part, is not just a significant achievement for a set of people but one that also has implications for communications theory.[15] In common with theories of structural dependency, through which Korea's position has also been described, communications theory has struggled to accommodate changes in the relative positions of senders and receivers and the directions of flow between them. The Korean transition demonstrates how this can happen in practice. After all, the first television station in Korea was the American Forces Korea Network (AFKN), which was very influential in providing commercial cultural products to the Korean people. Now Korean products are seen on international media networks in many parts of the world.[16]

It is notable that this process appears to have involved the recreation of societal forms and historical facts in new interpretations and reinterpretations of reality in line with the process of creative destruction.[17] This process has been found to be successful in recasting Korea and Korean society in a more positive light than before. In Taiwan, for example, the perception of Korea was negatively affected by the withdrawal of diplomatic relations in 1992. However, this perception has been replaced by a more positive one of a progressive society balancing cultural heritage and the contemporary urban lifestyle.[18] As might be expected, this is also a contested view with some observers detecting a second stage of cultural hegemony reconstructed along capitalist lines—that is, what once was a

form of colonization or hegemony by physical force has now become one of soft power that consumers have chosen to impose upon themselves. There is also, presumably, a limit on the extent to which more Korean content can be accommodated within the public imagination before interest fades and attention is diverted elsewhere. In the case of animation, for example, the labor-intensive nature of production means that it takes a great deal of time and money for a project to be completed. This tends to mean that commissioning decisions are quite conservative and usually mean that what has been successful previously will be tried again. Since Japanese *manga* styles have captured the public imagination, further adoption of Japanese memes and tropes in animated films remains likely[19] and the scope for Korean innovations is likely to remain limited in this area.

Government support has been provided in a variety of ways, including the use of diplomatic resources and networks, fostering social solidarity behind the concept of promoting Korean culture internationally, matching the education system to the needs of selected industries, promoting an environment that rewards creativity and innovation in production, and providing assistance to companies seeking to work in the area. It began, formally, with a cabinet meeting in 2005, at which the government recognized the importance of the creative contents industries and put in place a plan to support them on a systematic basis to support all sectors, following in the footsteps of the online computer games sector. It was understood that the industry lacked a central focus and good quality information and research and these problems were to be addressed by the establishment of a graduate school specializing in Culture Technology, from which other activities could be coordinated.[20] From this starting point, coordination of activities across agencies and policy-implementing bodies has spread and provided incentives for private sector bodies to cooperate. Whereas once the Korean government might have demanded compliance, now the market-based economy requires governments to provide decent opportunities and incentives for independent individuals and organizations to participate in government-led schemes. This has required a different mode of operation that has, nevertheless, been no less successful than in the past. The following sections explore the ways in which *Hallyu* has been managed and influenced by the Korean government.

Internationalization and Regionalization

The internationalization of Korean cultural products has taken place primarily within the East Asian region, which stretches from Korea in the north via Japan and China down to the states of Southeast Asia as well as some success with diasporic communities and niche markets. In

other words, this is the region most affected by Chinese norms and cultural practices that have helped to structure family and social lives and the ways relationships are created and reproduced. As a result, people in the region can more easily understand the dynamics of the personal and familial relationships within the context of contemporary modernization and urbanization that constitutes the body of most of the popular television soap operas that have flourished. This can be asymmetrical in nature, as the features of a soap opera may not be received well on the reverse flow. For example, Thai soap operas often cover much of the same material as the Korean ones but also contain some supernatural elements and slapstick humor often associated with unsophisticated countryside dwellers and these are features that are no longer considered desirable in more sophisticated societies such as Korea. In other words, Korean productions are able to make use of shared cultural properties and assumptions that can be popular in numerous societies, and producers have the ability to deploy these properties astutely and successfully. Within management studies, this phenomenon is referred to as "psychic distance" and it is used to measure the conceptual distances between societies as a means of determining the relative ease of marketing products in the distant markets.[21] There is a clear link here between information flows and psychic distance. The success of American media producers in advertising the nature of American daily life and the aspirations of individuals and families through the institutions of Hollywood, MTV, and the like has made it more possible for American companies to market their consumer goods successfully in countries that have consumed the media content first. It would be preferable for those companies if the media content were to constitute a form of cultural hegemony that would have the effect of excluding competition from elsewhere by erecting entry barriers for the industry. On the other hand, of course, the presence of successful creative content can create a beachhead in an overseas market that can be exploited by other firms following in the wake of the leader. In the early stage of Korean industrialization, its large companies spent their advertising budgets to a large extent on simply presenting the names of those companies—Hyundai, Samsung, and LG, principally—so that overseas people unfamiliar with Korea and the Korean language would become accustomed to the sound and appearance of it to the extent that the language would no longer represent so much of a barrier. That same reliance on well-known and well-established international norms (i.e., the tropes of modern popular culture) has been useful in circumventing problems of "otherness" in the *Hallyu*. When it comes to commercial success, therefore, the Korean government and firms have been quite willing to sacrifice authenticity for accessibility.

Hallyu and National Prestige

When Korea reached the limit of what economic development could be achieved within the low-cost export-oriented manufacturing paradigm, which has been labeled the Middle Income Trap,[22] the effort was made to find ways to change the nature of the economic structure of the country. This effort took place in the context of moving toward democratization while keeping the military forces on something akin to a war footing. It also took place in the period of emergent neoliberalism that was brought fully into East Asia as the result of the 1997 financial crisis. During the low-cost manufacturing period, the Korean government was more or less able to use the large, diversified companies known as *chaebol* (literally "millionaires") as agents of national-level economic development, but as companies became internationalized, they freed themselves from this control and government had to look to other companies to provide their designs.[23] The Seoul Olympics of 1988 and the 2002 world cup shared with Japan went some way toward bringing Korean society to the attention of the world but there remained a gap between admiring the general level of order and organization in the country and appreciation of the cultural productions of Korean society.[24] Some Koreans in this period still held to the concept of Korea being the Ireland of Asia, in that people (men, in fact) enjoy the drinking, fighting, and singing parts of social life. These were not features that appeared to be exportable on a large-scale, not least because Irish-themed pubs had already cornered the market in the acceptable part of the international market. Under these conditions, therefore, it was necessary to construct a new form of Korean identity that could be marketed to the world and to do so through intellectual property associated to individuals and specific brands not associated with large companies.

Previously, *chaebol* had spent large amounts of money promoting their names so as to gain public awareness such that potential consumers would recognize them and be more receptive to purchasing consumer goods produced by these companies in a wide range of categories. The Korean government did a great deal to assist the *chaebol* to increase their strength and range of activities through providing access to important scarce resources, opening new markets overseas, and suppressing the interests of workers. It also assisted in promoting Brand Korea through state resources; that is, promoting Korea as a country, society, tourist destination, and place of manufacturing of reliable products as a means of enabling the *chaebol* to build upon their own successes. This is indicative of the commitment to the use of soft power in international relations. Soft power indicates various forms of nonmilitary means of influencing people in other countries so as to provide benefit for Korean companies, institutions, and agencies.

This is a logical response to the widespread Korean self-image as a nation and people that have regularly been attacked by foreign powers against which they have had very little military power to defend themselves. Soft power has, in other words, become a means for Korea to compete effectively in the world of international relations. An important part of the Korean character and culture has been forged as resistance, diligence in the face of hardships, and the valuing of important human relationships, particularly within the family. The soft power concept posits a world in which relationships between states or between the non-state institutions that can take the place of a state can be positive sum or win–win relationships. These institutions and companies may be competing for resources but it is understood that the resources for which competition takes place may be renewed or reinvented in new forms. It is far from necessary, in other words, to return to the Cold War period paradigm of realism, which posits monolithic states squaring up to each other and being prepared to use hard power (i.e., military force) to secure access to scarce resources.[25]

Hallyu fits into this situation as a means of opening new fields of sustainable competition within particular capitalist conditions. Popular media are a field of competition in which it is widely acknowledged that new products and new producers are constantly required and expected. To some extent, this is also associated with the fetishization of age and appearance within the world of media production; that is, the constant emphasis on youth and beauty means that new acts must constantly be promoted to replace the talent that has been in the public eye for several years and, particularly in the case of women, may be considered to be insufficiently youthful. A variety of studies have approached the issue of the objectification of women in visual media over the years and observed this trend under capitalist commodification of popular culture.[26]

Market Segmentation

Within Southeast Asia, in particular, K-pop has been specifically aimed at young people than elsewhere although some aspects such as television drama appeal to all age groups. Both genders are involved but emphasis has been placed on young women, who can both admire the clean and youthful good looks of the boy bands and singers and also celebrate their femininity through the emancipation offered by the performance of their peers. Female singers and performers are expected to look attractive and glamorous onstage and off but do not have the hypersexualized aspect of many contemporary western performers.[27] Their public personae and personal lives are expected to be equally decorous and neither threatening nor salacious. Their roles as ambassadors of the country are taken seriously,

and scrutiny, via social media, can be intense. This combination of factors has tended to mean that public careers can be limited in time and individuals retire to the private sphere where they have more freedom to live as they like and, of course, this can represent a graceful exit for women who might otherwise be considered too old to be permitted to continue. This is in addition to the vagaries of fame and fashion that mean that there is inevitably a measure of unpredictability about who becomes popular and for which performance. Some of the risk to investment that this unpredictability entails can be eliminated through careful selection of talent and image-molding to conform to already established successful models. Using talent show and reality TV models mean that potentially unsuccessful acts are weeded out at an early stage and those with higher potential launch their careers with a considerable amount of exposure and support already secured. Television shows of this sort give the impression that they reveal the true character of the people concerned, who can portray themselves as the kind of all-round character that is required for a successful career. Just as, therefore, the online computer games industry was incorporated into mainstream society to make it a sector from which the country could profit without equivocation, so too have young performers been integrated into the national effort by making them acceptable to all sectors of society. Performers remain respectful of social mores, including paying respect to elders and authority figures and symbols, at all times. They are portrayed as the face of Korea as the bourgeois Korean state would wish to see itself portrayed. Koreans use the concept of *uri* ("we") to project the sense of homogenous selfhood. However, this is a dynamic rather than a static concept and it can be used as a means of "reformulating national cultural identity in terms more accommodating to the outside."[28] Hence, in *Hallyu*, there is the regular resort to groups acting in harmony with each other, with peaceful resolution of conflicts and the importance of good manners as a means of navigating contemporary society and its problems. In *Dae Jang Geum* (Jewel in the Palace), the heroine faces rigid and discriminatory social and class structures during the Chosun Dynasty period but the fundamental decency of rulers and their willingness to promote meritocracy means that she is able to rise to the role of royal physician. On the way, she must balance her personal and professional life and, despite some setbacks, diligence and persistence allow her to achieve success. In the school romance drama *Monstar*, the protagonists are able to heal themselves of psychological damage caused by events in the distant past through hard work (as musicians) and through fostering and reproducing harmonious social relations with their colleagues.

This performance does not, of course, preclude the exchanges of the commercial world. Female performers may position themselves as sisters

and friends rather than rivals but they still have products to sell. Most of all, the performers are selling themselves as images of popular and successful young women in a complex contemporary society in which their traditional roles are constantly reinvented and reconfigured. It is also the case, of course, that young women in middle-class homes in urban surroundings are more likely to have disposable income and time beyond what would previously have been possible and so represent a better market opportunity than before. They may be more willing, as a result, to consume their heroines more completely by volunteering for the kind of cosmetic plastic surgery and skin-whitening techniques that are common among performers. In effect, by changing or attempting to change their appearance, the women are decontextualizing themselves and aspiring to enter a world of their own devising. In Thailand, this can be approached by becoming a "ting," as fans of Korean popular culture call themselves (the name derives from *ting-hu* or earlobe, which was used to measure the length of hair acceptable for Korean schoolgirls). Tings are both consumers of their heroines—the phenomenon really took off with the launch of Girls' Generation—and also potential friends or family members: "Since their debut until today, I've [a 33-year old female accounting manager ting] spent around 100,000 baht [c.US$3300] on the band, which includes postcards, posters, CDs, DVDs, photo books as well as airfare, hotels and even vitamins they've promoted."[29]

There are tings who have learned to speak Korean and travelled to the country to become graduate students there. They have followed in the footsteps of those Thai fans of Korean soap operas who spend their holidays going to Korea to find the places where particular scenes were shot and aimed to make themselves part of the world-experience of the show. Yet tings have a relationship with their heroines that they define as "love" and that does not routinely contain a sexual component. The performers may be role models in some ways but they are more likely to be seen as family members who must be cherished and protected as much as their success is to be celebrated. This is a phenomenon that includes people of all ages and levels of education. When the Korean actress and news anchor Ms. Jung-Sook Park turned doctoral student and gave a keynote presentation at Kyung-Hee University in Seoul in June 2012, she was a figure of consuming interest to the many Thai faculty members present in the audience. Dozens of academic papers are now appearing in a wide range of fields of study concerning the various implications of *Hallyu* and the ways it is produced and consumed.[30]

In this approach, *Hallyu* has followed many elements of the preceding Japanese model but has managed to avoid the scandalous connection between seemingly respectable young women in uniform and licentious

display. Research has suggested that, among international audiences, there is a sense of underlying cruelty in many of the productions of Japanese popular culture, which is often expressed in the form of violence against women, including sexual violence.[31] Whether this is justified or not, it has nevertheless undermined the marketability of many Japanese popular culture performers (or products) internationally. This is an area that the *Hallyu* industry has done its best to avoid and, if there have been examples of lapses of behavior or taste, these have been swiftly followed by tearful expressions of apology and, in some cases, the return to the height of respectability after what is deemed to be a suitable length of absence from the screen.[32] Rape allegations (actor Park Hi-Soo, who denied any wrongdoing), driving under the influence of alcohol (2PM's Nickkhun Buck Horvejkul), and causing outrage by inappropriate remarks (comedian Kim Hyun-Dong) are among the crimes considered in this category.

Nonthreatening popular performers may be deployed in a wide range of situations to promote a wide range of goods and services. There has been, for example, a notable crossover with the emergent Korean cosmetics industry, which positions itself as highly advanced in terms of technology, dedicated to specific Asian features and at a price that represents good value for money for the quality promised. Brands such as Skin Food, Etude, and Miss Ha have now become not just internationally known but have opened stores and stalls in shopping malls across the region. Members of Girls' Generation represent brands from the largest company, AmorePacific, while f(x) members model for Etude House. Cosmetic surgery in Korea has also become internationally established, following the economies of scope and scale made possible by the widespread acceptance of the practice as a legitimate means by which a woman might improve her income generation and mate attraction prospects.[33] This is a situation that has now spread to other East Asian countries as the levels of disposable income have risen there. For example, although the numbers are not exactly equivalent, figures from the International Society of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons (ISAPS) show that for 2011, China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand were all listed in the top 20 countries having the most aesthetic/cosmetic surgical procedures performed.[34]

Conclusion

The *Hallyu* has presented a falsified but palatable version of contemporary Korean society that has nevertheless been extremely popular throughout the region—too popular for the tastes of some people. There have been complaints based on nationalism and sometimes aesthetic grounds. For example, when the Japanese actor Sousuke Takaoka was dropped from

his agency after anti-*Hallyu* tweets, his cause was taken up by enthusiasts of the national flag and the imperial family in anti-Korea demonstrations.[35] The Taiwanese National Communications Commission, meanwhile, ordered a local station to show fewer Korean programs on the basis that there was not enough space for local productions.[36] *Hallyu* presents a version of reality that has been invented in part by the state in conjunction with the private sector, as a means of positioning Korea as a valuable potential partner in international markets and relations. It combines a measure of respect for the past and historical norms while embracing the modernity of contemporary capitalist accumulation. In some ways, the urgency of production and consumption has intensified since the first wave of rapid economic development featured products for which there was, on the whole, unmet demand. This is clearly not the case with cultural production, since there is plainly a surfeit of already existing items and, through the means of YouTube and similar channels, far more content is being added at a rate much greater than could ever be consumed by anybody. This makes for a competitive and disposable marketplace.

The length of time during which the *Hallyu* movement can sustain its competitiveness in the markets considered is an indeterminable factor. It would appear to be limited in nature owing to the intensive creative destruction operating in such sectors; as the history of popular culture has shown, few performers of the very many entrants and would-be entrants can maintain a prominent position for an extended period of time. Even the genre of a form or mode of performance rarely lasts beyond a decade or a generation of consumers and those artists with the highest reputations have reinvented themselves to meet new realities more than once. That the *Hallyu* movement incorporates products in an open-ended range of sectors suggests that it might be possible to extend its life cycle beyond what might be expected. It is still not clear, however, how long this can be continued and when, therefore, the Korean state will be called upon to put into play its next stage of economic development. The next stage is unpredictable in both time and nature; that is, it is not known when it will begin or what form it will take. However, given its response to the last two changes, to the manufacturing industry, and then the creative industries, it seems likely that the government will continue its stressful strategy of identifying an area and a means of competition in the designated target markets. Low labor-cost competitiveness gave way to innovation and design and then individual cultural successes led the way for a concerted campaign to promote the full range of artistic activities that can be employed. It would again be Brand Korea as a whole that will be deployed.

Notes

1. "Korea" here refers to the Republic of or South Korea.
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