

4

Third-World Liberationism and Other Cold War Isms: No End to Ideology

In most Western societies, the ideological controversy is dying down.

Raymond Aron (1955)

It might have been generally thought that the time had come for the world, and particularly for the Third World, to choose between the capitalist and socialist systems....[But] the Third World ought not be content to define itself in the terms of the values which have preceded it.

Frantz Fanon (1961)

I believe that with all the dislocations we know from our experience, there also exists an extraordinary opportunity to form for the first time in history a truly global society carried on by the principle of interdependence.

Henry Kissinger (1975)

4.1. World War and the Global Imaginary

World War generated in the minds of hundreds of millions of people around the world a profound sense of rupture with the preceding era. Even the vast swath of death and destruction wrought by the Great War paled in comparison to the unfathomable levels of physical devastation left behind on three continents by the global conflagration of 1939–45. Tens of millions of soldiers and civilians had perished. As US Secretary of State Dean Acheson later noted in his memoirs, "The whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the

nineteenth century was gone."¹ Aside from its historical significance as humanity's most destructive armed conflict, the World War also marked a crucial phase in the evolution of the global imaginary. To be sure, its rise occurred as a tentative and uneven process, at times surging forward only to be forced to retreat by sudden reassertions of the obstinate national imaginary. The ascent of the global *esprit général* was initially most palpable in the industrialized parts of the world, while popular movements in the developing world utilized the rallying cry for "national liberation" as a battering ram against the crumbling edifice of European colonialism. Still, the political forces in the developing world could hardly avoid situating their national struggle within the globalizing social imaginary of the Cold War era. At the same time, however, the innovative ideas of political leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, Julius Nyerere, and Kwame Nkrumah had considerable influence in shaping the ideological landscape in both the capitalist world and the communist world.

What, exactly, were the dynamics that made the World War such an important tipping point in the evolution of the global imaginary? Before we can suggest a response, however, we need to raise an even more fundamental question: how do social imaginaries change in the first place? In his recent explorations of the subject, Charles Taylor argues that new ideas and theories generated by social elites sometimes manage to seep into the dominant social imaginary: "Now it often happens that what starts out as theories held by a few people may come to infiltrate the social imaginary, first of elites perhaps, and then of the whole society."² But Taylor also emphasizes that the transformative power of such ideational clusters depends to a significant degree on their correspondence to their existing social contexts. Taking root in people's minds in response to experienced needs, these new ideas become applied in the expanding sphere of common action. Defining ever more sharply the contours of the changing political world, they eventually congeal into "the taken-for-granted shape of things, too obvious to mention." Thus rejecting the false dichotomy between theoretical and material forces as rival causal mechanisms, Taylor instead argues that "ideas always come in history wrapped up in practices, even if these are only discursive practices." He goes on to discuss the French Revolution as a crucial historical example when elite-engineered principles of remaking community as a modern nation gradually changed social practices among broad strata of the population. These altered practices—together with the implicit understandings they created—formed the basis for further modifications of theory, which, in turn, impacted practice and so on. Hence, as we have emphasized

in previous chapters, these mutually reinforcing dynamics represent the engine driving “the profound transformation of the social imaginary in Western societies, and thus of the world in which we live.”³

Just as the late eighteenth-century revolutions and the ensuing decades of warfare ushered in the national age, the World War served as a crucial catalyst for the birth of the global era. Destabilizing the Eurocentric system of Great Powers that had grown to maturity in the preceding epoch, the war helped to open the dominant national imaginary to penetration by new ideas and practices taking the entire globe as their frame of reference. Thus, the mid-century conflict served as a globalizing force in a number of ways.⁴ First, unlike the Great War that had remained largely confined to Europe and the Mediterranean region, the World War raged as a global contest in multiple theaters stretching from the icy waters of Scandinavia to the jungles of sub-Saharan Africa, and from the green pastures of the British Isles to the volcanic islands of Japan. For a brief moment, the war even reached the Atlantic shores of the United States in the form of German submarine-conducted stealth reconnaissance missions. In the vast stretches of the Pacific, hostilities extended as far south as the Australian port of Darwin, which sustained heavy damage during Japanese air raids in 1942. The names of places that saw decisive war action—Tobruk, El Alamein, Pearl Harbor, Midway, Iwo Jima, Coral Sea, Rangoon, Imphal, Leyte, Chungking, Port Moresby, Kursk, Stalingrad, or Hiroshima—were etched into the minds of hundreds of millions who realized that the fate of their own nations was sealed in far-distant locations whose names they could hardly pronounce.

Second, military success depended more than ever on the effective formation of transnational alliances. Take, for example, the prolonged siege of the German-held Italian fortress of Monte Cassino. On February 14, 1944, an Allied infantry attack on the former monastery involved Americans of various ethnic backgrounds, Eastern European volunteers, New Zealand Maoris, Nepalese Gurkhas, and members of various Indian ethnic groups.⁵ Similarly, the German High Command was forced to extend its search for allies to far-distant corners of the earth. It must have taken the racist leaders of the Third Reich some time to digest the obvious lesson that the ultimate success of their European operations depended on the ability of their Japanese brothers-in-arms—supposedly belonging to an “inferior race” of mere “culture-bearers”—to vanquish the American forces on the other side of the globe.

Third, the ultimate defeat of the Axis powers and the discovery of their unspeakable crimes against civilians and “undesirables” of all kinds took

a heavy toll on the central claims of their political belief systems. In the postwar era, it became close to impossible for any ideology—old or new—to build a mass-following on an explicitly racist translation of the national imaginary. In fact, the term “nationalism” was now laden with ominous meanings that conjured up haunting images of raving dictators in military uniforms and emaciated corpses piled up in the ghastly extermination camps of Eastern Europe. The American public’s growing unease with racist political belief systems, together with the desegregation of the military, was a major factor in the demise of the Jim Crow system in the South. Even the brutal South African apartheid state eventually collapsed under the combined weight of unfavorable world opinion and stringent international economic sanctions. Although the ideological link between race and nation continued to operate in various regional and local settings, it had lost much of its former appeal by the end of the century.

Fourth, the three major Allied war conferences of Teheran (1943), Bretton Woods (1944), and Yalta (1945) laid the foundation of a global political and economic order that divided the planet into expansive “spheres of influence” cutting across national borders. In the sleepy New England town of Bretton Woods, the major economic powers of the West led by the United States jettisoned the protectionist policies of the interwar period and struck a compromise that combined international economic integration with national policy independence. Their strong commitment to the expansion of trade and economic cooperation reflected their shared belief in the effectiveness of global commercial interdependence as a bulwark against another devastating economic crisis or a new world war. The successful establishment of binding rules on international economic activities resulted in the creation of a stable currency exchange system in which the value of participating currencies was pegged to the American dollar worth one thirty-fifth of an ounce of gold. Bretton Woods also set the institutional foundations for the creation of three new international economic organizations. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established to administer the global monetary system. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later known as the World Bank, provided loans for Europe’s postwar reconstruction (in the late 1950s, however, its purpose was expanded to fund major industrial projects in the developing world). And the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the first global trade organization charged with fashioning and enforcing multilateral trade agreements (in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged as its successor). The

creation of these institutions served as clear evidence for the growing impact of global designs on the national imaginary.

Finally, many of the technological innovations that would contribute to the late twentieth-century compression of time and space were the direct result of war-related activities. An abbreviated list of these inventions includes airplanes powered by jet engines; guided missiles like the German V-1 "flying bomb" and the V-2 rocket; basic radar and sonar systems; digital electronic machines like Harvard University's Mark I computer, used by the US Navy for gunnery and ballistic calculations; the microwave-generating magnetron; synthetic rubber; supersized ships made of welded steel; streamlined production lines; and so on. Even the Internet—the most celebrated hallmark of the global age—originated in secret US war communication projects that underwent further development in the Cold War era in response to pathbreaking Soviet satellite technology.

The atomic bomb, of course, was both the most spectacular and terrifying of the war-related technologies. Nothing did more to convince people of the linked fate of geographically and politically separated nations than the nuclear obliteration of two Japanese cities and nearly 200,000 of their inhabitants, most of them civilians. "Hiroshima has shaken the whole world," a disingenuous Stalin confided to his inner circle immediately before ordering his top scientists to catch up with the Americans. US President Harry Truman put the implications of nuclear globality in stark terms: "[T]he human animal and his emotions change not much from age to age. He must change now or he faces absolute and complete destruction and maybe the insect age or an atmosphereless planet will succeed him."⁶ But the full global impact of the nuclear arms race did not reveal itself until the 1950s with the successful detonation of hydrogen bombs. Operating on the principles of atomic fusion, these devices were hundreds of times more powerful than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Despite these weapons' potential for mass destruction, the quite realistic prospect of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union nonetheless prevailed, revealing the magnitude of the rupture with traditional conceptions of "international" conflict. Thermonuclear warfare would spell not only the end of humanity but also the annihilation of nearly all forms of life on earth. More than anything, it was this recurring nightmare of total planetary destruction that forced people around the world to think beyond the nation in terms that captured the new reality of global interdependence. The scope of "high-consequence risks"—those manufactured by humans as a result of their intervention into the

conditions of social life and nature—had been dramatically expanded by the atomic bomb. No longer contained by the geography of the national age, these manufactured risks had become globalized.⁷

4.2. The Globalization of the Cold War and the Emergence of the Three-World Order

The 1945 conferences in Yalta and Potsdam laid the foundations for a new geopolitical world order based on diametrically opposed political belief systems that competed for influence on the rest of the world. As the doomed German dictator had prophesied during his last days in the Berlin bunker, “The laws of both history and geography will compel these two Great Powers [the United States and Soviet Russia] to a trial of strength, either militarily or in the fields of economics and ideology.”⁸ Their wartime marriage of convenience in shambles at the conclusion of hostilities, the two superpowers seemed to be heading for certain confrontation. However, they could no longer afford to act in accordance with Carl von Clausewitz’s early nineteenth-century dictum that war was the continuation of political activity by other means. Gone was the old certainty that armed conflict would always lead to victory for some nations and defeat for others. The impossibility of fighting each other militarily without risking mutual destruction—a frightening scenario eventually known by its fitting acronym, MAD (“Mutually Assured Destruction”)—left the superpowers with only two options, both of which were implemented with great regularity throughout the Cold War. First, the United States and the Soviet Union might choose to engage in *limited* warfare, either directly or through dependent third parties. Naturally, direct military confrontation was a risky business, for it harbored the danger of escalation and ultimate nuclear confrontation. Accordingly, the antagonists sought to avoid this option, though they came dangerously close to pulling the nuclear trigger, if only briefly, during the Korean War and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Fortunately, both Moscow and Washington blinked and instead continued to exercise their safer second option of engaging in limited warfare by proxy, in the process transforming the newly emerging nations of the global South into the volatile flash points of the Cold War.

Second, in their insatiable hunger for greater power, security, and prestige, the superpowers could exercise the option of complementing indirect warfare with an all-out ideological contest. Realizing that the

likelihood of changing the political beliefs and values of the other side was close to zero, the antagonists directed their struggle for hearts and minds primarily toward those people whose political imagination was not yet fully captured by either capitalist liberalism or collectivist communism. United in their rejection of old-fashioned European colonialism, Moscow and Washington offered the developing world competing paths to modernity rooted in the same Enlightenment ideals of science and rationality. Having supposedly "worked" in their respective national contexts, Russian communism and American liberalism were seen by their codifiers as eminently exportable to the rest of the world. Thus seeking to globalize their respective ideologies, the superpowers ended up globalizing the Cold War, with each side utterly convinced that the superiority of its worldview would ultimately reveal itself in the "development" and "progress" of its adoptive nation. As Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad notes, "Locked in conflict over the very concept of European modernity—to which both states regarded themselves as successors—Washington and Moscow needed to change the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent states proved fertile ground for their competition."⁹ Hence, it would be a grave mistake to limit the role of ideology in the Cold War to that of a superficial mask hiding more profound material interests. Ideology functioned as a crucial factor in an epic contest that was just as much about showcasing the global applicability of liberal or communist ideas and values as it was about economics or geopolitics: "Ideas, values, and belief systems were at the heart of the struggle that defined the second half of the twentieth century."¹⁰

Ironically, the globalization of the Cold War added to the growing problems of the competing grand ideologies. The harder the superpowers tried to prove the Truth of their ideological claims—sometimes at the price of military intervention—the greater the resistance generated in the form of "new ideologies" that emerged in both the West and the South. Given that American liberalism and Russian communism represented context-sensitive translations of the national imaginary, they struggled to make their ideas and values stick in an increasingly global environment. On the one hand, each superpower encouraged recipient countries to copy its ideology. On the other hand, however, they bristled when client states like Guatemala or Egypt chose to adapt those borrowed ideologies to their national contexts in rather idiosyncratic ways. Consequently, the globalizing dynamics of the Cold War fueled *both* the globalization of the European idea of sovereign nation-states (as reflected in the "United

Nations" model) *and* the affirmation of a postwar conceptual and geographical order that cut across national borders and divided the globe into three related, yet separate, "worlds": a liberal-capitalist First World led by the United States; a collectivist-communist Second World presided over by the Soviet Union; and a formally nonaligned Third World lacking a dominant center.¹¹

Predictably, this seemingly contradictory picture of independent and formally equal nation-states existing within communities of value that transcended the familiar national frame of reference is precisely what one would expect in the transformational period leading from the national to the global imaginary. People's identity as "nationals" began to intermingle with their new sense of belonging to one of these three worlds. National affiliation and national integration were no longer the sole markers of communal existence. Terms like "democracy," "capitalism," "communism," and "socialism" served as shorthand for geographical and political systems composed of "nation-states" that were nonetheless alleged to converge around a common set of ideological claims regardless of national differences.

The Kremlin, for example, continued its interwar Comintern strategy of portraying its brand of Marxism-Leninism as the only valid ideological formula for all "socialist" countries. But the ideological hegemony of the Soviet Union was openly challenged by Mao Zedong in the late 1950s. Recognizing that the Chinese peasantry possessed a much stronger revolutionary potential than the thin urban working class, Mao broke with Leninist principles by holding to his firm belief in the "spontaneous" and "proletarian" instincts of the rural masses. He went far beyond the revolutionary voluntarism of the Soviet founder by pushing the role of subjective forces in history to the point of arguing for their ability to alter the economic base: "In certain conditions, such aspects as the relations of production, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest themselves in the principal and decisive role." Mao's unshakable belief in the power of "correct ideas" translated into the publication of millions of copies of *Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong*. Waved in the air by his enthusiastic followers, the famous Little Red Book became the ubiquitous symbol of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. As the Great Leader told the crowds, "The proletariat . . . must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society."¹² Shattering the Soviet monopoly on communism, the influence of Maoism extended from the European "New Left"—particularly among

French thinkers like Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault who pushed Marxist theory into a poststructuralist direction—to revolutionary Third-World leaders like Kim Il-Song, Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara.

Many of these leaders—including Yugoslavia's Marshall Tito who pursued a socialist path independent of the Kremlin—met at the 1955 Bandung Conference in an impressive international display of Third-World solidarity. Calling for the end of colonial rule in all its manifestations, representatives of twenty-nine African and Asian nations vowed to strengthen their cultural and economic ties. Committed to the articulation of a common set of political principles based on their neutrality in the Cold War and a socialist path to modernity independent of the Soviet Union, they hoped to give ideological coherence to what six years later became the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.¹³ In his welcoming speech at the Bandung Conference, Indonesian President Sukarno impressed on the minds of the delegates that the fortunes of the developing world depended, first and foremost, on ideological unity: "I hope it [the conference] will give evidence of the fact that we Asian and African leaders understand that Asia and Africa can prosper only when they are united, and that even the safety of the World at large cannot be safeguarded without a united Asia-Africa."¹⁴ Eleven years later, Fidel Castro hosted the Tricontinental Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in Havana. The size of this gathering even surpassed the Bandung Conference, attracting representatives from the entire non-Western world in an impressive display of an anti-imperialist Third-World liberationism that was particularly critical of the United States. Although many of the delegates represented countries receiving material support from the Soviet Union, they nonetheless made strenuous efforts to signal their ideological independence from both Russia and China. Unavoidably, the attempt to stretch old radical formulas to fit the new vision of "Tricontinentalism" resulted in serious theoretical strains and contradictions. Even the speeches of charismatic leaders like Che Guevara were marred by confusing calls for a "true proletarian internationalism" to be fought by subaltern heroes prepared "to die under the flag of Vietnam, of Venezuela, of Guatemala, of Laos, of Guinea, of Colombia, of Brazil. . . ."¹⁵

The rising global imaginary called for more suitable ideological articulations, which began to emerge in rudimentary form in the 1960s. Flowing across national borders more easily as a result of fledgling global communication technologies, these "new ideologies" undermined the dominant thesis that ideology had come to an end in the West and

frightened the stagnant communist regimes in Russia and Eastern Europe. The Kremlin responded forcefully with increased repression and citizen surveillance, whereas Maoist China resorted to a state-engineered Cultural Revolution that threatened to spin out of control. In the Third World, the codifiers of national liberationism continued to build their ideological alternatives to Western capitalism and Soviet communism as conceptual mixtures of various socialist ideals anchored in their powerful assertion of multiple civilizations. But the humanist visions of figures like Mahatma Gandhi, Frantz Fanon, or Che Guevara often conflicted with their pragmatic imperatives of nation-making. Despite these inherent tensions, their political imagination provided vital nourishment for the evolution of the so-called new ideologies in the West. Let us turn to a more detailed examination of these ideological innovations in the Third and First Worlds.

4.3. Third-World Liberationisms: Gandhism and Fanonism

By the end of the tumultuous 1960s, nearly fifty Third-World “nations” with a population surpassing a quarter of the world’s inhabitants had won political independence from their former European and American colonial masters. Their struggle against Western imperialism—aptly defined by the Chinese nationalist leader Sun Yat-Sen as “the policy of aggression against other countries by means of political force”—had begun in earnest with the 1905 surprising defeat of the Russian Empire by Japan.¹⁶ Even Westernized elites like young Mohandas Gandhi, known in his Anglophile circle of friends for his bravura renditions of “God Save the King,” began to question the cultural assumptions of European liberalism as a result of the Japanese victory. Praising the Japanese soldiers for their acts of bravery and self-sacrifice, the Indian pacifist highlighted the significance of such “oriental” virtues in his own philosophy of nonviolence.

As we noted in Chapter 3, the Great War represented another early milestone in the process of decolonization. The horrific bloodletting in Europe fatally undermined the pretense of rational and moral superiority that stood at the core of what Michael Adas has called the European “civilizing mission ideology.” Formulations of this discourse of domination varied widely from colonial administrators who stressed the internal pacification and political order that European colonization imposed upon “backward peoples” suffering from incessant warfare and despotic rule to those missionaries and reformers who saw religious conversion and education

as the centerpieces of the Western civilization effort.¹⁷ Encapsulated in John Stuart Mill's claim that liberty had no application whatsoever to "backward races," the civilizing mission ideology thrived on numerous assertions of difference between colonizers and colonized. Universalistic ideals of liberalism were inscribed with specific cultural practices anchored in contingent notions of history, civilization, and nationhood. Translating the national imaginary in this fashion allowed British liberals like Mill not only to present themselves as members of a "mature society," but also provided them with a seemingly benign justification for their exclusionary practices toward the colonial Other. But the heavy blows inflicted by the Empire of Japan on the Western imperialist powers in the World War further strengthened nativist criticisms of the European civilizing mission discourse. As Frank Furedi suggests, "Many Africans, Asians and Caribbeans were delighted by the spectacle of a colored nation dishing it out to Europeans."¹⁸ In the immediate aftermath of the war, anti-imperialist forces received further support from the superpowers whose denouncement of the old European colonial arrangements served as a necessary preamble to their ideological competition for the Third World.

But European nations were reluctant to let go of their prized possessions. In most cases, it took colonial subjects decades to shake off their imperialist yoke. Although the regional patterns of the decolonization process varied considerably, the various iterations of Third-World liberationism contained similar ideological claims that mixed their socialist and humanist ideas with the assertion that "civilization" was hardly a singular European achievement. As Prasenjit Duara notes, the discourse of alternative civilizations was developed over several decades by figures like Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Liang Qichao, Gu Hongming, Lamine Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Kwame Nkrumah, and many others.¹⁹ Advancing the fiction of inclusive "nations" existing within political boundaries haphazardly drawn by the colonial powers, these voices were nonetheless forced to fit their nationalist program into the existing framework of the three-world order.²⁰ What were the major ideological claims of these Third-World liberationisms? What political means were considered to be most suitable in the struggle against colonialism? To answer these questions, let us examine the ideological perspectives of two of the most influential codifiers of Third-World liberationism: Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) and Frantz Fanon (1925–61).

Gandhi's nonviolent liberationism emerged in the first half of the twentieth century in response to the oppressive British colonial system in South Africa and India. Although the internalization of European

knowledge and its normative claims were instrumental for the young Indian lawyer's formation as a colonial subject, this process never led to total conformity. As he awakened to the plight of Indian immigrants in his adopted South Africa, Gandhi began to realize how the liberal construction of cultural difference according to the European civilizing mission discourse legitimized colonial practices that imposed on Asians the inferior identity of second-class citizens and subjected them to frequent racial slights, threats, beatings, and other forms of discrimination. The violence of British colonialism in South Africa was structurally embedded in a vast network of norms and rules which, through the meticulous regulation, dissection, and reallocation of time and space, imbued "Indianness" with essential qualities and definitive traits. Assigning proper names and authoritative meanings to all phenomena, authoritative colonial discourses employed invidious notions of difference to validate elaborate cultural, racial, and religious classification schemes that reified the sharp boundaries separating the colonizer from the colonized.

Pejorative terms such as "coolie" signified the immigrant Indians' particular location within the parameters of linear time and physical, psychological, symbolic, and discursive space set by South African whites. To be Indian meant, among other things, to partake in a particular historical record assembled by Europeans; to belong to an assigned ethnic category; to speak an identifiable language or dialect; to be affiliated with a classified religion; to live in a physical place named by the colonizers; and to follow customs and traditions duly registered by colonial authorities. On the level of daily experience, it meant that Indians were expected to know their inferior place in the colonial system and to validate this knowledge through public reenactments of submissive behaviors like removing one's turban in courts of law. Among the many obligatory performances expected from Indians were the acceptable ways of addressing Europeans; appropriate gestures and looks; correct manners of dress; and, of course, the strict adherence to a long list of forbidden acts and excluded spaces. Thus, Indian identity in South Africa was the indelibly marked result of technologies of rule that incessantly reenacted ideological claims of oriental cultural inferiority, thereby making humiliation and low self-esteem a permanent feature of Indianness.

Stung by continuous racist insults, Gandhi finally shook off his political passivity and began to confront the physical and epistemic violence embedded in the harsh technologies of European colonial rule. His political method combined the legal redress of grievances with nonviolent public protests.²¹ But the conceptual weight of the method of *satyagraha*

("truth-force") rested on his alternative conception of an "Indian civilization" rooted in spiritual and moral concerns rather than in Western conceptions of material progress. The best starting point for the exploration of Gandhi's perspective on Indian civilization is his eighty-page monograph *Hind Swaraj* ("Indian Self-Rule"), completed in 1909 upon his return from a disillusioning political trip to London. Written as a dialogue between two fictional characters—a newspaper "Editor" representing Gandhism and a radical "Reader" modeled after the political views of violent Indian nationalists like V. D. Savarkar—the booklet defends Gandhi's claim that "ancient Indian civilization has little to learn from the modern."²² At one point in the dialogue, the Reader asks the Editor to justify his blanket condemnation of Western civilization: "If [modern] civilization is a disease, and if it has attacked the English nation, why has she been able to take India, and why is she able to retain it?" The response comes without hesitation: "The English have not taken India; we have given it to them. They are not in India because of their strength, but because we keep them."²³ In other words, Gandhi insists that most Indians have accepted colonial rule for purely materialistic reasons: "[W]e keep the English in India for our base self-interest. We like their commerce, they please us by their subtle methods, and get what they want from us. To blame them for this is to perpetuate their power."²⁴

This charge of materialist corruption dressed up as the rational embrace of material progress anchors the first central ideological claim of Gandhism: the political objective of Indian home rule can only be achieved through a rigorous program of moral reformation that restores the nation to its spiritual health and ethical integrity. As Partha Chatterjee points out, the Mahatma's entire political project of nonviolent national liberation must be understood as predicated upon his commitment to identify, address, and rectify moral failure on the part of colonized Indians.²⁵ Although he bemoans their wholesale adoption of Western civilization, Gandhi himself constructs his vision of an alternative civilization within a historiographical framework developed by European Orientalists, particularly their linear model of India's decline from a classical Golden Age to its present "degenerate" and "stagnant" condition. Calling for a reversal of this trend, the Indian leader believes that the successful recovery of India's "authentic values" depends upon its people's ability to access the "eternally valid" moral resources of their ancestors. Drawing on deep symbolic resources contained in the language and imagery of a Golden Age, Gandhi infuses his idea of India's ancient civilization with socialist ideas his Marxists contemporaries derided as "utopian" and

"primitive." Still, Gandhian socialism cannot be separated from his moral vision of a spiritual civilization sustained by a communal people whose selfless character sets natural limits to the physical indulgences that come with material progress: "They [ancient Indians] saw that happiness was largely a mental condition. . . . Observing all this, our ancestors dissuaded us from luxuries and pleasures."²⁶

Rejecting large cities as "snares and useless encumbrances" corrupting people's "natural sense" of simplicity and reciprocity, Gandhi conjures up the agrarian-socialist utopia of self-sufficient "village communities." His vision resembles the belief of Russian Populists in their country's special path to an idyllic peasant socialism based on an idealized model of the traditional Russian village commune. Presented as paragons of social cooperation and harmony, such self-contained communities constitute the basic building blocs of Gandhi's socialist model of Indian nationhood. Like his Russian counterparts, the Mahatma manages to convince himself that twentieth-century villagers could revive traditional ways of forming intimate face-to-face relationships. For Gandhi, mutual trust represents a timeless virtue that allows political and economic decisions to be made collectively in direct-democratic fashion.²⁷ He urges his compatriots to follow their own occupations and trades without engaging in much competition and by embracing the same basic technologies of production utilized by their ancestors. Finally, he invokes India's time-tested educational system that rejects abstract schooling in the sciences in favor of practical skills and moral "character-building." By cultivating *swadeshi* ("home manufacture" or economic "self-reliance"), Indians would learn to resist the corrupting influence of the colonial powers and achieve genuine self-rule. Unsurprisingly, Gandhi decontests *swaraj* or "true home rule" not primarily as political independence, but as "observance of morality" for the purpose of attaining "mastery over mind and passions."²⁸ In other words, political liberation represents but the inevitable consequence of more important processes of psychological and moral emancipation from the ideological prison of the Western civilizing mission discourse.

Moreover, by emphasizing that the Third World's struggle for national liberation ought to be rooted in *satyagraha*, Gandhi firmly rejects violence as a suitable means for political change. Unlike the Russian Populists who fought Tsarist despotism with innovative forms of violence such as bombings and guerilla warfare, the Indian leader draws his political inspiration from his core concepts of *ahimsa* ("not harming" or "nonviolence") and *satyagraha*. For Gandhi, the exercise of violence for the purpose of achieving political independence was self-defeating for

three reasons. First, the colonized lacked access to and training in the advanced war technologies of their oppressors. Still, it cannot be stressed enough that the Mahatma's notion of *ahimsa* represents not merely a political tactic or a prudent means toward an end, but a moral way of life grounded in a metaphysical-religious view about the nature of reality. Reading Indian traditions of nonviolence through a lens colored by his Western education, he decontests *ahimsa* as a mode of being and action consistent with a provisional "truth" that points to the unity of all beings. Gandhi identifies two principal expressions of nonviolence: "In its negative form, it [nonviolence] means not injuring any living being, whether by body or mind. I may not therefore hurt the person of a wrong-doer, or bear any ill will to him and so cause him mental suffering. . . . In its positive form, *ahimsa* means the largest love, the greatest charity."²⁹

Second, Gandhian liberationism disputes the basic assumption inherent in Western political discourses that the nature of power lies in its capacity to unleash violence, and, consequently, that the exercise of political power inevitably involves employing violent means of coercion. In this respect, Dennis Dalton makes an important point when he argues that "soul-power" would be a better translation for *satyagraha* than "truth-force" or "soul-force," since force is usually associated with violence.³⁰ After all, it was precisely this supposedly natural connection between power and violence that Gandhi challenged in his assertion that *satyagraha* represented power "born of Truth and Love or nonviolence."³¹ For the Mahatma, then, the infliction of violence on another person presumed society's ability to pass ultimate judgment in terms of right and wrong. But since there was never absolute certainty as to the absolute truth of an opinion—including Gandhi's own perspective—there could be no fundamental right or even competence to punish: "In the application of *satyagraha*, I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of Truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent, but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be Truth to one may appear false to the other."³²

Third, Gandhi holds that even violence used against the colonial oppressor merely imitates the morally bankrupt methods of a materialist European civilization based on "brute force." Undermining the British Empire's moral and political authority, the Indian leader suggests that it was never in a position to ascertain at what point a particular colony would achieve a sufficiently high level of development to be permitted to rule itself. He seeks to bolster this claim by arguing that India

possesses a special relationship to the practice of *ahimsa*. Moving moral considerations once again to the core of his exposition, the Mahatma insists that any civilization worth the name ought to respect the correspondence of political means and moral ends: "...I wish only to show that only fair means can produce fair results, and that, at least in the majority of cases, if not, indeed, in all, the force of love and pity is infinitely greater than the force of arms. There is harm in the exercise of brute force, never in that of pity."³³ In their immoral reliance on violence, modern Europeans stand accused of having failed to grasp the significance of *ahimsa* as a superior truth-force. Ancient Indians, on the other hand, built their civilization on the nonviolent principles of self-sacrifice and passive resistance. Praising the imaginary lives of the subcontinent's communal peasants, Gandhi insists that faint traces of these virtuous practices can still be detected in colonial India: "The fact is that, in India, the nation at large has generally used passive resistance in all departments of life. We cease to co-operate with our rulers when they displease us. This is passive resistance [*satyagraha*]. . . . Real home rule is possible only where passive resistance is the guiding force of the people. Any other rule is foreign rule."³⁴

At first glance, Gandhi's call for the moral regeneration of the Indian nation appears to be an idyllic socialist translation of the modern national imaginary that had been exported to the South by the colonial powers. But, as we noted above, the formulation of national liberationisms culminated in a three-world order increasingly oriented toward a global frame of reference. This mounting tension between the bubbling national consciousness in the Third World and the strengthening of the global imaginary found its expression in the writings of virtually all anticolonial thinkers. Although he was assassinated at the outset of the Cold War era, Gandhi was no exception. Throughout his life, he struggled to reconcile his nonviolent struggle for Indian *swaraj* with his sympathies for a "world federation" based on nonviolence and beyond race and color.³⁵ Describing himself both as a "nationalist" whose "nationalism includes the well-being of the whole world" and a "cosmopolitan" whose mission was to "unite the world," the Mahatma believed that his vision of a nonviolent Indian nationalism was perfectly compatible with a "commonwealth of all world states."³⁶ At the same time, he emphasized that a genuine global society would only emerge after the successful completion of national liberation struggles in the Third World. Thus, Gandhi saw the process of nation-making as a necessary step toward the realization of a global order:

In my opinion, it is impossible for one to be internationalist without being a nationalist. Internationalism is possible only when nationalism becomes a fact, i.e., when people belonging to different countries have organized themselves and are able to act as one man. It is not nationalism that is evil, it is the narrowness, selfishness, exclusiveness which is the bane of modern nations which is evil. . . . Indian nationalism has, I hope, struck a different path. It wants to organize itself and find full self-expression for the benefit and service of humanity at large. Anyway there is no uncertainty about my patriotism or nationalism. God having cast my lot in the midst of the people of India, I should be untrue to my Maker if I failed to serve them.³⁷

There can be no doubt as to the remarkable *global* legacy of Gandhism. In the First World, its major ideological claims served as powerful catalysts for the formation and development of the “new ideologies” in the 1960s and 1970s. As we shall see shortly, Martin Luther King anchored his struggle against racial discrimination in the ideas and method of his Indian role model. Arne Naess, the Norwegian father of “deep ecology,” wrote his doctoral dissertation on Gandhian philosophy and its applicability to global environmentalism. Petra Kelly, cofounder of the German Green Party and active participant in the American civil rights movement, made sure that Gandhian nonviolence was enshrined as one of the “four pillars” of the Party’s official platform. Feminist activists like Barbara Deming embraced Gandhian nonviolent strategies in their influential campaigns for world peace during the 1970s and 1980s. In the Second World, dissidents like Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa openly acknowledged their debt to Gandhian ideas and tactics as they mounted their nonviolent challenge to communism in the 1980s. Likewise, Chinese students occupying Beijing’s Tiananmen Square from April to June 1989 based their determined struggle for democracy on the Mahatma’s principles of *ahimsa* and *satyagraha*. In the Third World, Gandhism inspired major popular forms of resistance to authoritarian governments like those organized by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina in the 1970s, the 1980s People’s Power Movement in the Philippines, the 1987–9 Palestinian Intifada in the Israel-occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, the ongoing Burmese Pro-Democracy Movement led by Nobel-Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, and the Ogoni People’s struggle for human rights and civil society in Nigeria in the 1990s, to name but a few.³⁸

Gandhian liberationism also dominated the political imagination in Africa during the early postwar period. Political leaders from diverse cultural backgrounds, such as Egypt’s Gamal Nasser, Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, and Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, embraced the ideas and tactics

of the Great Soul. Nkrumah, in particular, countered British colonialism with his creative program of Positive Action that included "legitimate political action, newspaper and educational campaigns and, as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts and non-cooperation based on the principle of non-violence, as used by Gandhi in India."³⁹ In the early 1960s, however, Gandhi's nonviolent liberationism came under sustained attack from African and Asian critics who called for the use of reciprocal violence to dislodge entrenched white settler regimes like those in South Africa and Algeria. Even Nelson Mandela, initially committed to Gandhism, changed his approach in the aftermath of the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, "Government violence can do only one thing and that is to breed counter-violence."⁴⁰

Perhaps the most eloquent and passionate proponent of such counterviolence was the French-Caribbean psychiatrist and journalist Frantz Fanon. Representing the militant National Liberation Front (FLN) of his adopted Algeria at the 1958 All-Africa Peoples Conference in Accra, he resolutely rejected Nkrumah's nonviolent model of Positive Action. His brilliant address to the conference delegates, destined to turn into the opening chapter of his book *The Wretched of the Earth*, posited the psychological and political necessity of violence in the struggle against the European colonial system of oppression: "National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon."⁴¹ Indeed, Fanon's literary masterpiece, completed only weeks before his premature death, is predicated on the ideological claim that violence serves as the "cleansing force" for the "veritable creation of new men" in the Third World: "It [violence] frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.... Illuminated by violence, the consciousness of the people rebels against any pacification."⁴² Thus, the Algerian psychiatrist draws particular attention to the pernicious psychological effects of the colonial system on subjugated populations. As Robert Young notes, Fanon builds his model of anticolonial liberationism on both psychological redemption and black empowerment. These ideals were first articulated in the 1920s and 1930s by Fanon's early mentor Aimé Césaire, the Caribbean founder of the cultural *négritude* movement, and by Marcus Garvey, the charismatic American leader of the Universal Negro Improvement Association.⁴³

The author of *The Wretched of the Earth* paints a Manichean picture of colonialism as a "world cut in two." The colonizers' zone of respect,

prosperity, and order contrasts sharply with the colonized space of discrimination, exploitation, and oppression. As the author asserts, no conciliation is possible, "for of the two terms, one is superfluous." Fanon reminds his readers time and again that it was the European colonizers who first brought "violence into the home and into the mind of the native." Hence, they should not be surprised to reap exactly what they sowed. He emphasizes that the compartmentalized world of colonialism cannot be made whole by pacifists like Gandhi, because nonviolence suggests compromise where none can be had. Representing "violence in its natural state," the colonial system "will only yield when confronted with greater violence." Hence, it must be dismantled by "a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists." Fanon shows great confidence in the power of the colonized masses—composed for the most part of largely illiterate peasants. But although he endows them with superior "intuition" for "absolute violence," Fanon concedes that they face two gigantic hurdles on their path to national liberation. First, they must find the strength to withstand the furies of retaliatory violence unleashed by their European adversaries at the first sign of rebellion. Second, they must ignore the reformist siren calls of their native middle-class leaders. After all, the bourgeois sympathies for a "nonviolent strategy of liberation" expose not only souls deeply imprinted with "the essential qualities of the West" but also betray elitist fears of a radical, bottom-up decolonization process in which "the last shall be first."⁴⁴

Consciously stretching his revolutionary Marxist perspective to the point of replacing "class" with "race" as the master concept in his analysis, Fanon insists that Western imperialism is about much more than just capitalist exploitation. Racist denigration and exclusion lie at the very heart of a system that valorizes "whiteness" as the inherent foundation of any "civilization" worth the name while relegating "blackness" to the realm of a "primitive tribalism" rooted in animalistic drives and uncontrolled sexuality. Fanon's first book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, offers a dazzling account of how the constant objectification and animalization of the colonized feeds a "psycho-existential complex," that is, a socially produced but internalized sense of inferiority.⁴⁵ But it is precisely the white settlers' projection of colonized otherness as "bestiality bereft of all humanity" or "absolute evil" that discloses their deep-seated fears of the native. Indeed, the colonizers' anxieties are reflected in their preoccupation with security.

In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon picks up this theme, urging his native brothers to play on the colonizers' insecurities by "pulling out a knife" whenever they hear pretentious speeches about Western culture.

Overall, then, decolonization by means of violence constitutes, for Fanon, a necessary act of existential empowerment that unifies the colonized "on a national, sometimes a racial, basis." Their common exercise of violence binds the people together as a whole, since "each individual forms a violent link in the great chain, a part of the great organism of violence which has surged upward in reaction to the settler's violence in the beginning. The groups recognize each other and the future of the nation is already indivisible." Unlike Gandhi's moral vision of regenerating the nation by means of a nonviolent "truth-force," the Algerian thinker seeks to forge national identity in the Third World by prescribing generous doses of amoral violence. After all, it is the Manichean character of the colonial world that determines the content of morality in purely oppositional terms: "[T]he good is quite simply that which is evil for 'them.'" Fanon defines "truth" in similarly instrumental fashion as the "property of the national cause." After all, it "is that which hurries the break-up of the colonialist regime; it is that which promotes the emergence of the nation; it is all that protects the natives, and ruins the foreigners. In this colonialist context there is no truthful behavior. . . ." ⁴⁶

Given Fanon and Gandhi's conflicting responses to the question of the most suitable political means in the struggle against colonialism, many commentators have put them into opposing ideological camps. Indeed, their disparate views on the role of violence in the decolonization process seem to justify the introduction of two ideal types of Third-World liberationism. And yet, we must not ignore the considerable ideational overlap that exists between Gandhism and Fanonism: a common emphasis on the subjective dimension of colonialism; sympathies for some form of "socialism" based on the needs of the impoverished rural masses; and the insistence on the multiplicity of civilizations. But for the purpose of our discussion, their most significant ideological commonality can be found in their struggle to reconcile their political visions of national liberation with the rising global imaginary. Like the Mahatma, Fanon emphasizes the importance of regaining a sense of community in areas where social life was destroyed by the European colonial presence. Nationhood—even if only claimed by the representatives of the people—provides the community with a national identity, which, in turn, contributes to the restoration of their damaged sense of selfhood. Diffused to the masses, national consciousness allows them to take their destiny into their own hands. Because Algerians had begun to consider themselves as sovereign in spite of the continued French colonial presence, the country was "virtually independent." ⁴⁷ Like Gandhi, Fanon was convinced that the striving

for national existence and the strengthening of national consciousness through the process of decolonization would ultimately force the oppressor to vacate the land, thus bringing political independence as a result of a previous act of psychological liberation.

Fanon insists that the "national period" could not be skipped in the global South only because the region's "development" was limping behind the First World. In fact, he considers the establishment of independent nations in the Third World "the most urgent thing today." At the same time, however, he leaves no doubt that "the building of the nation is of necessity accompanied by the discovery and encouragement of universalizing values. . . . It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows."⁴⁸ Groping for a way to articulate the emergence of the global consciousness from its national shell, Fanon ends up reiterating Gandhi's claim that genuine humanist values must be realized first on the level of the nation before they can be spread throughout the whole of humankind. As for the concrete political and ideological manifestation of the global, the Caribbean thinker remains rather vague. In concluding *The Wretched of the Earth*, he speaks only in very general terms about a "new humanism" of global reach.⁴⁹ Born of the national liberation struggles in the Third World, such humanism would transcend both Anglo-American liberalism and Soviet communism in its ability to bring "the problem of mankind to an infinitely higher plane." Echoing Gandhi's belief in India's special mission to unite the world, Fanon assigns to the Third World the task of advancing humanity step by step without committing the grave error of regurgitating the central claims of established European ideologies:

It is a question of the Third World starting a new history, a history which will have regard to the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also not forget Europe's crimes, of which the most horrible was committed in the heart of man, and consisted of the pathological tearing apart of his functions and the crumbling away of his unity. And in the framework of the collectivity there were the differentiations, the stratification, and the bloodthirsty tensions fed by classes; and finally, on the immense scale of humanity, there were racial hatreds, slavery, exploitation, and above all the bloodless genocide which consisted in the setting aside of fifteen thousand millions of men. . . . For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.⁵⁰

Fanon's death from leukemia in 1961 at the age of 36 prevented him from working out these "new concepts"—presumably in the form of a

more concrete articulation of the rising global imaginary. This task of “reintroducing mankind into the world, the whole world” was left to the intellectual heirs of Fanonism—those voices around the globe who, like the inspiring Caribbean thinker, envisioned a world liberated from the triple scourge of poverty, race prejudice, and war.

4.4. The End of Ideology in the First World?

In 1955, with the decolonization process and the Cold War in full swing, an obscure Scandinavian political scientist published a short article that amounted to the opening salvo in what came to be known in the West as the “end-of-ideology debate.”⁵¹ Within a short period, prominent academics and journalists on both sides of the Atlantic came to echo the Swedish scholar’s thesis. The grand political belief systems had lost their previous “grandeur and power,” Herbert Tingsten proclaimed, and the result was an unprecedented ideological consensus characterized by the absence of “metaphysical and speculative ideas.”⁵² Focusing on the postwar Swedish political system as an illustration of this overarching trend, Tingsten noted that the world’s “successful democracies” were showing a clear tendency toward a “leveling—both ideologically and in fact—which entails the growth of the fund of common purpose and the shrinkage of the margin for conflicts, particularly fundamental conflicts.” Postwar politics in the First World reflected a broad agreement among major parties—even on previously divisive issues like national defense, the status of church and religion, public policy and taxation, and government intervention into the economic sphere. Politicians of all stripes eagerly presented themselves as levelheaded problem solvers with nothing but contempt for anything that smacked of “ideological” utopias. Regardless of their different party labels, they equally emphasized “their patriotism, their feeling for democracy, their progressiveness and their striving for social reform.” Hence, Tingsten concluded, “Liberalism in the old sense is dead, both among the Conservatives and in the Liberal Party; Social Democratic thinking has lost nearly all its traits of doctrinaire Marxism.”⁵³

Attributing this wholesale “liquidation of the great ideological controversies” to people’s postwar disenchantment with the “extremes and follies” of communism and fascism, the Swedish scholar suggested that “common sense” and “pragmatism” were the creative forces behind the building of a common Western “community of values” based on a “kind

of unconscious compromise" that incorporated conservative, liberal, and social democratic elements. But such a "commonly accepted program" was clearly hostile to both early twentieth-century liberalism and Marxist socialism. "The essential point is that through the acceptance of the programme the importance of general ideas has been so greatly reduced, that—without falling prey to illusions about a clear difference between means and ends—one can speak of a movement from politics to administration, from principles to technique."⁵⁴ Although Tingsten expressed passing nostalgia for the lost "vitality nurtured on impassioned battles of ideas," he unabashedly celebrated the new conciliatory climate permeating Western democracies: "We cannot wish for vitality at the expense of stability." Although he hinted at some negative consequences of ideology's disappearance, such as the growth of the administrative state, the mechanization of politics, and the decline of civic engagement, Tingsten ultimately shrugged off those shortcomings as temporary ailments easily curable by political reforms designed to enhance democratic participation.⁵⁵

Five years later, Harvard sociologist Daniel Bell offered a similar assessment of the American political landscape. Bearing the suggestive title *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*, his book became an instant best seller exemplifying the political imagination of the First World in the late 1950s.⁵⁶ Bell not only reassured his readers that fascist totalitarianism had been vanquished for good but also postulated the "utter exhaustion" of Marxist socialism and classical liberalism. Built on what he saw as "speculative claims" like the "inevitability of history" or the "self-regulating market," these grand political belief systems had lost their power to inspire people hit hard by the misery of the Great Depression and the devastation of the world war. Convinced that these calamities had been brought about by the excesses of "ideology," Bell argued that Westerners had finally abandoned their simplistic beliefs in nineteenth-century schemes that projected illusive visions of human perfection and social harmony—be it the classless society of Marxism or the laissez-faire paradise of liberalism. Hence, the Harvard scholar arrived at his famous conclusion: "[I]deology, which once was a road to action, has come to be a dead end."⁵⁷ Although he acknowledged that communism still posed a formidable military threat, Bell nonetheless postulated that its core concepts no longer inspired the working class in the First World. Likewise, he insisted that the emancipatory message of Third-World liberationism was far too parochial, naive, and anachronistic to appeal to Western audiences.

Bell's account relied on a critical conception of ideology as utopian, distorting, emotionally laden, extremist, dogmatic, and irrational. Linking ideology to totalitarianism, he used these terms interchangeably throughout his book. Like his Swedish colleague, Bell showed much appreciation for the alleged cessation of major ideological battles in the West. The pragmatic "class compromise" underpinning the modern welfare state and its "mixed economy" held out the promise of enduring political stability and social security. Bell and his colleague Seymour Martin Lipset even suggested that the remaining problems of modern democracies were, in principle, solvable by levelheaded reformers endowed with the virtues of administrative efficiency, technical expertise, and scientific objectivity: "The only issues are whether the metal workers should get a nickel more an hour, the price of milk should be raised, or old-age pensions extended."⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Bell intuited that social reformism might not offer "a younger generation the outlet for 'self-expression' and 'self-definition' that it wants." With no personal experience of the ideological clashes of the interwar period and bored by their state-administered societies, young people could be tempted to recharge their dispassionate intellectual environment by drawing on the "apocalyptic and chiliastic visions" of the past.⁵⁹

In spite of their passing concerns with the possible social consequences of political boredom, the transatlantic participants of the end-of-ideology debate believed firmly in the dawning of a new Golden Age in the West. Its longevity, of course, depended on the durability of the underlying ideological compromise, which required the further cultivation of the existing First-World "community of values." Bell aptly summarized its virtues: "In the Western world, there is today a rough consensus among intellectuals on political issues: the acceptance of a Welfare State; the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed economy and of political pluralism."⁶⁰ Accepting the moral and political leadership of the United States, the West would remain strongly opposed to communism while seeking to enhance its appeal in the developing world. Safeguarding the socioeconomic aspects of the ideological consensus meant for Bell and his colleagues honoring the postwar commitment to socialize capitalism without abandoning market principles. A "well-defined" list of such "principles for action" included the achievement of prosperity through enhanced economic production; the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment; the avoidance of serious inflation; the creation of educational opportunities for all; the assurance of a decent standard of living for all, especially for the young, the aged, and the sick; and,

finally, the state's assumption of responsibility for the attainment of these goals.⁶¹

As illustrated in Chapter 2, the late nineteenth-century antecedents of such postwar welfarism—a loose amalgamation of liberal and social democratic political ideas attached to the core concept of the welfare state—can be found in the reformist schemes of British New Liberals and their social democratic contemporaries in Imperial Germany. While disagreeing on the ultimate goal of social reformism, both camps emphasized that the state had a positive duty to promote the welfare of all of its members.⁶² Modern welfarism with its dual commitment to political democracy and the state-directed regulation of capitalism emerged in the 1930s as an alternative to fascism and communism in industrialized nations that included Sweden, Belgium, France, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

Its theoretical justification—the return to a high and stable level of employment by means of countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies—can be found in John Maynard Keynes' writings, particularly his *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money* (1936). Although contemporary economic historians still argue about the actual influence of Keynesianism on public policy during the 1930s, there remains little doubt that the ideological consensus celebrated by Bell and his colleagues two decades later rested to a significant extent on the British thinker's prescriptions. Convinced that the old laissez-faire model was dangerously out of step with the conditions of advanced capitalism, Keynes had launched a frontal attack on the ideological foundations of classical liberalism as early as the 1920s: "It is *not* true that individuals possess a prescriptive 'natural liberty' in their economic activities.... The world is *not* so governed from above that private and social interest always coincide.... Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened...."⁶³ As the Great Slump persisted during the 1930s, Keynes' ferocious indictment of old-style capitalism as an "unintelligent" and "decadent" system lacking both in virtue and in beauty sounded like an apt characterization. Unable to find their way out of mass unemployment, industrial democracies had failed to "deliver the goods."⁶⁴

Keynes savored his role as capitalism's savior while lambasting the closed economic nationalism of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Arguing that classical liberalism's focus on reviving production was misplaced in national economies suffering from chronic underconsumption, he suggested that consumption drove production—and not the other way around. Thus he insisted that the road to economic recovery had to start

with the stimulation of demand by enhancing the purchasing power of the middle class and the industrial proletariat. Since Keynes held that chronically depressed economies were incapable of righting themselves if left to their own devices, he assigned to national governments the crucial task of slaying the dragon of mass unemployment. Working people would stimulate demand and private investment would resume. The vicious cycle of low economic expectations leading to low investment and low demand would be broken by countercyclical fiscal policies based on public jobs and heavy public spending. Even in the bleakest of economic times, Keynes suggested, national governments could procure the necessary funds through a combination of massive borrowing and progressive taxation schemes. Once the goal of full employment had been achieved, the inflationary tendencies caused by increased money supply were to be combated by countercyclical monetary measures such as the raising of interest rates.

A bold thinker with a strong pragmatic streak, Keynes recognized that his plan for saving modern capitalism forced democratic governments to adopt interventionist economic policies with a decidedly socialistic flavor:

I conceive, therefore, that a somewhat comprehensive socialisation of investment will prove the only means of securing an approximation to full employment; though this need not exclude all manner of compromises and devices by which public authority will co-operate with private initiative. But beyond this no obvious case is made out for a system of State Socialism which would embrace most of the economic life of the community.⁶⁵

His lifelong aversion to "state socialism" notwithstanding, Keynes offered a theoretical justification for a mixed economy that provided a powerful macroeconomic rationale for the ideological codifiers of mid-century welfareism in the First World. Put into practice most spectacularly in Britain by the postwar Labor government of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, this innovative mixture of central planning, nationalization of key industries, and regulatory measures ushered in three decades of economic prosperity and political stability—the First World's Golden Age of "managed capitalism."⁶⁶ During this period, employers were generally willing to pay relatively high wages as long as putting spending money into the hands of consumers did not eat too deeply into their profits or investments. In exchange for maintaining labor peace and rising levels of productivity, workers received higher wages and important social protections.⁶⁷ Reaching the zenith of its popularity in the early 1960s, the modern welfare

state offered its citizens unparalleled social security benefits “from cradle to grave,” including universal health care, generous unemployment assistance, free or low-cost public education, and generous old-age pensions.

Indeed, the broad ideological appeal of welfarism went beyond the mere provision of social services by the state. T. H. Marshall, one of its most eloquent proponents, noted perceptively that the growth of social welfare had led to a significant expansion of conventional ideas of citizenship. Concepts of “civil” or “political rights” located at the core of liberal definitions had been complemented by the idea of “social rights.” Indeed, citizenship in modern industrialized nations now included “the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in a society.”⁶⁸ Although the nation-state still constituted the primary conceptual and geographical container of postwar welfarism in the West, the nearly universal acceptance of Keynesian principles had reduced the importance of the national imaginary and its associated political belief systems—hence Bell’s claim that ideology had come to an end.

4.5. First-World Liberationisms: The New Left

Ironically, the First-World “community of values” postulated by Herbert Tingsten began to show signs of serious strain as early as 1955—the very year his article was published. The demise of the political-cultural consensus was most obvious in the nation that saw itself as the political and moral polestar of the “Free World.” Although the Swedish scholar had skipped over relevant ideological developments in the Third World, he briefly referred to the “color question” in the United States as a “dark spot” in the overall “bright picture” of ideological consensus. But Tingsten and his colleagues were hardly prepared for the dramatic cultural and political impact of the American Civil Rights movement both at home and on the rest of the world.⁶⁹ At the same time, the leaders of this powerful movement owed much of their ideational inspiration to the liberationist voices in the decolonizing world. Mobilizing millions of people around the globe against deep-seated practices of racial segregation and discrimination, black liberationism in the United States came in two principal versions that mimicked their ideological predecessors in the Third World.

The first version, championed by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., and his associates in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), drew on a combination of Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy of

nonviolence, politically engaged forms of Protestantism such as the late nineteenth-century social gospel tradition, and liberal progressivism anchored in Enlightenment ideals of social equality, human dignity, and natural rights. Condemning the persistence of racism in America, King suggests in his famous *Letter from Birmingham City Jail* (1963) that the existence of social injustice anywhere represents a threat to justice everywhere. Hence, any decent human being bore a moral responsibility to support efforts underway in the American South to force state governments to dismantle the racist Jim Crow system of the post-Reconstruction era. As early as during the 1955 Montgomery bus boycott, the young pastor insisted that his followers adhere to the "four essential steps" formulated by Gandhi in his nonviolent struggle against British colonialism: the collection of evidence to document existing injustices; good-faith negotiations with authorities to achieve a satisfactory settlement; moral purification in preparation for the struggle; and direct political action ranging from mass protests to coordinated acts of civil disobedience. Rejecting his white opponents' charge that nonviolent direct action was deliberately designed to provoke retaliatory violence, King defended Gandhi's method of *satyagraha* as a moral device to confront deeply embedded forms of racial hatred and bigotry. In his eloquent "I have a Dream Speech," the civil rights leader stepped up his criticism of white America for having defaulted on its liberal "promissory note" insofar as citizens of color were concerned. Despite his profound disappointment, King refused to abandon his integrationist vision: "I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, sons of former slaves and sons of former slave-owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood."⁷⁰ Invoking the image of a "beloved community" that would protect the inalienable human rights and the pursuit of happiness of all its members, King gradually expanded his vision beyond America's political borders in the form of a powerful plea for transnational solidarity. Pointing to the "interrelated structure of reality," King adhered to a global frame of reference: "If we are to realize the American dream we must cultivate this world perspective."⁷¹

The second version of American black liberationism owed much to the theories of pan-African leaders like W. E. B. Du Bois, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, Marcus Garvey, Tiémoho Garan Kouyaté, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere, Aimé Césaire, and Lamine and Léopold Senghor. It entered the political arena in the United States full force in the mid-1960s with the founding of the Black Panther Party in California and the launching of the Black Power movement by former

supporters of King's nonviolent integrationism like Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) chair Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick, national director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). Frustrated by what they considered the systemic limits of electoral and institutional strategies of conventional American interest-group politics, young black activists around the country vented their disillusionment with the "emptiness of traditional liberalism."⁷² Gradually, they began to stake out a radical politics of black separatism and cultural exclusivity which they saw as a more effective vehicle for enhancing black people's power and psychological strength.

The ideas of black nationalists like Malcolm X were at the center of this new vision. A former leader in Elijah Muhammad's militant Black Muslim organization, Malcolm X characterized the nonviolent integrationism of King's SCLC as a philosophy supporting "the white man's tactics for keeping his foot on the black man's neck." For the youthful master orator, the solution to his country's race problem was not the "turn-the-other-cheek stuff" popularized by "ignorant Negro preachers," but the propagation of black supremacy and his community's rejection of an inherently racist white society.⁷³ Malcolm X's separatist alternative to King's integrationism became the ideological foundation of a militant brand of black liberationism that bore the ideological fingerprints of Fanonism: "Revolution is bloody, revolution is hostile, revolution knows no compromise, revolution overturns and destroys everything that gets in its way."⁷⁴ Shortly before his assassination in February 1965, however, Malcolm X's seemingly unyielding position underwent significant moderation as a result of his transformative pilgrimage to Mecca and his traumatic break with the Black Muslim organization. Seeking strong ties to Third-World liberation movements, his newly founded Organization of Afro-American Unity began to gravitate toward more integrationist language by emphasizing the importance of universal human rights and global justice.⁷⁵

In spite of their considerable differences, King and Malcolm X gradually expanded their frame of reference from the national to the global stage. Both men stepped up their criticism of the moral and political leadership exerted by the United States around the world. A discerning observer of ideological Cold War dynamics in the Third World, Malcolm X unleashed his verbal broadsides against "the earth's number-one hypocrite" long before King dared to go public with his condemnation of the American war effort in Vietnam.⁷⁶ Once he had taken this step, however, the Baptist minister began to distance himself from liberal reformism without

abandoning his Gandhian principles of nonviolence. Calling the United States the "greatest purveyor of violence in the world today," he accused the Johnson administration of testing its weapon arsenals on the peasants of Vietnam.⁷⁷ King's "revolution of values" envisioned a fundamental reconstruction of social relations on the global level. Deeply skeptical of Marxism-Leninism, the civil rights leader argued instead that revolutionary change on a global scale had to start with a profound reorientation of American foreign policy. Declaring his solidarity with "ordinary folks" in Southeast Asia, King considered his antiwar stance part of a worldwide ethical struggle against American neo-imperialism in the Third World. But his moral outrage did not stop with those war-related denunciations of his government. After condemning First-World countries for refusing to take a firmer stand against the apartheid regime in South Africa, King chastised multinational corporations for showing little regard for the well-being of people in the global South.⁷⁸

By 1968, the status of the United States as the political and moral leader of the First World had come under severe attack not only by determined African-American Civil Rights activists and increasing numbers of Vietnam War protesters but also by a broad phalanx of antisystemic voices of a "New Left" that had sprung up across the First World. The political upheavals of this remarkable year seemed to bear out their radical prediction that the forces of the establishment were losing their grip on power. Social revolution in the West no longer seemed to be a utopian dream but a real possibility reflected on the ground by powerful left-wing movements. As 23-year-old radical student leader Daniel Cohn-Bendit put it, "Our objective is now to overthrow the regime."⁷⁹ The surprising Tet Offensive launched by the Vietcong in the waning days of January and the March massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Vietnamese hamlet of My Lai revealed not only the vulnerability and brutality of the American military juggernaut but also made a mockery of American democratic values.

The assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968 triggered large-scale race riots in major American cities resulting in dozens of violent deaths, thousands of injuries, and considerable property damage. Three weeks after King's murder, students at Columbia University began their occupation of five university buildings that ended a week later with a brutal New York police offensive and the arrest of hundreds of youths. The assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in June deepened young people's alienation from the "system" not only in the United States but throughout the First World. During the long summer, legions of disaffected students and striking workers pushed France to the brink

of paralysis. The slogan "All Power to the Imagination" graced Parisian buildings, signaling the demonstrators' conscious intention to question deep-seated normative notions and images underpinning daily routines and commonsense social repertoires. Protesters in Italy, Spain, West Germany, Canada, Japan, and the United States followed the French example and disrupted "business as usual" for months. The tidal wave of youth and workers' protests spilled into the post-Stalinist Second World where Czechoslovakian students called for "socialism with a human face" and workers demanded self-management from the newly installed Communist Party leadership headed by the reform-minded Alexander Dubcek.⁸⁰ But the Prague Spring came to a traumatic end in August with the invasion of nearly half a million Soviet-bloc troops. This ruthless execution of the Brezhnev Doctrine was designed to send a clear message to the West that there was no place for ideological experimentation in the Second World.

The summer of 1968 also brought large-scale demonstrations to the Third World. In Mexico City, hundreds of thousands of students and workers marched peacefully chanting radical Che Guevara slogans when they were violently attacked by the police. Hundreds of protesters died in these clashes. Further to the North, the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago spawned a bloody spectacle when more than 20,000 law enforcement officers indiscriminately clubbed hundreds of street demonstrators in full view of television cameras. In September, scores of outraged feminist activists descended on Atlantic City to protest the commercial exploitation of female bodies at the Miss America pageant. Toward the end of this tumultuous year marking the end of his political career, President Lyndon Johnson offered his fellow citizens a sobering assessment: "Americans, looking back on 1968, may be more inclined to ask God's mercy and guidance than to offer him thanks for his blessings."⁸¹

No doubt, 1968 and its aftermath saw the substantial expansion of traditional social movement activity to students, feminists, ethnic minorities, religious minorities, gays and lesbians, environmentalists, indigenous people, poor people, animal rights activists, and other groups claiming marginalization or discrimination. Academics and journalists began to refer to these collectivities and their associated ideational orientations as the "new social movements" and the "new ideologies."⁸² Pervading the First-World political discourse by the late 1970s, these new political ideas were said to fan the flames of a left-wing "cultural revolution" that shattered the illusion of a consensual community of values. But what, exactly, was new about these social movements and their ideas?

Some observers point to a left-leaning humanism sensitive to cultural issues and sympathetic to unorthodox lifestyles. Unlike the prewar old left that embraced Marxist class-based categories, the New Left coalesced around ideological positions opposed to racial, political, economic, and patriarchal exploitation. It rejected centralized and bureaucratic models of political power while committing to forms of freedom and liberation that went far beyond purely material concerns. Expressing a fondness for participatory democracy anchored in ideals of individual agency, autonomy, and equality, the New Left emphasized direct political action and endorsed "spontaneous" desires and personal behaviors that ran afoul of established social norms and conventions.⁸³ There is little doubt that American and European activists who considered themselves part of the New Left did, indeed, subscribe to such forms of "humanist socialism" that were often shot through with pronounced libertarian or anarchist streaks. It is also fair to say that most members of the New Left fancied themselves the creators of a "radical culture."⁸⁴ But to call their ideological claims new runs the risk of ignoring similar positions previously held by the leading figures of French existentialism and the German-American Institute for Social Research during the 1930s and 1940s. The considerable ideational overlap that exists between these earlier currents and the New Left goes a long way in explaining the wild popularity of critical theorists like Herbert Marcuse with such radical student organizations as the Students for a Democratic Society in the United States or the *Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund*.

If the New Left's embrace of cultural humanism falls short of supporting the thesis of the novelty of its associated political beliefs, then what about its focus on "identity" and "difference"? As American sociologist Craig Calhoun observes, however, identity-based demands for political accommodation and cultural recognition hardly qualify as new features of modern social movements. Similar claims stood at the center of nineteenth-century mobilizations on behalf of ethnic minorities, women, religious minorities, and industrial workers. It appears, therefore, that identity-based demands have been part of all major social movement activities during the last 200 years. According to Calhoun, "The proliferation of 'new social movements' is normal to modernity and not in need of special explanation...."⁸⁵ Even if we assume that Calhoun overstates his case to some extent, it is hard to quarrel with his contention that identity and difference make rather unconvincing candidates for ideological novelty.

It seems that we are left with only one more possibility, namely, the newness of the issues themselves. But, as we have seen in the case of the Civil Rights Movement, Martin Luther King's impassioned critique of racial inequality and discrimination has deep political and ideational roots in American history and culture. The same applies to the women's movement. For example, Betty Friedan's pathbreaking *The Feminist Mystique* (1963)—often hailed as the founding text of feminism—did not invent a new ideology *ex nihilo*. Her brilliant deconstruction of the pervasive patriarchal norm of the "happy housewife heroine" surely helped to politicize millions of mostly middle-class white American women and contributed significantly to the 1966 formation of the National Organization for Women (NOW). Still, as Friedan readily conceded, her work was built on the efforts of first-wave women's advocates like Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Margaret Sanger.⁸⁶ By focusing their criticism on the gendered division between the "political" and the "private," Friedan and her fellow second-wave feminists did, however, expand the long-standing issue of women's oppression into previously uncharted territory. In this qualified sense, then, one can, in fact, speak of a new feminism. By the late 1970s, the ideological perspectives and political agendas of these second-wave feminists included traditional liberal demands for equal rights, socialist attacks on sex-based forms of economic inequality, and radical rejections of institutionalized heterosexuality and violence against women.

The same logic applies to the new environmentalism of the 1960s and 1970s that eventually broadened into various philosophical schools ranging from reform-minded conservationism to radical "deep ecology" and "eco-socialism."⁸⁷ Contrary to the myth still propagated in some quarters today, Rachel Carson's runaway 1962 best seller *Silent Spring* did not invent from scratch a novel set of ideological claims geared toward the protection of the environment. Instead, the author advances her main arguments by consciously drawing on the cumulative insights of a long line of biologists and conservationists that stretches back to the late nineteenth century. And yet, Carson's luminous indictment of the devastating effects of synthetic pesticides and insecticides on human health and the planet's biosphere did much to inspire a young generation of ecological activists. Redoubling their predecessors' efforts, they responded to Carson's challenge of developing imaginative new approaches "to the problem of sharing our earth with other creatures. . . ." ⁸⁸

Does this mean that the novelty of the new social movements and their political ideas consists of little more than updating old issues, reassembling various ideas, and expanding familiar concerns into new directions? Not quite, for it is possible to identify at least two entirely new dimensions. Let us start with the youth factor. Representing the heart and soul of the 1960s movements, students and young people coined the appropriate slogan, "Don't trust anybody over thirty!" The unprecedented representation of this age group in social movements cannot be explained solely as the inevitable effect of the postwar baby boom. In addition, the postwar socioeconomic stability celebrated by Bell and his colleagues made secondary and higher education a realistic and affordable option for increasing numbers of young people. Between 1960 and 1980, university enrollment in the United States and most European countries tripled and quadrupled.⁸⁹ The emerging youth culture expressed its antiestablishment sentiments in film, music, fashion, sexual attitudes, and, of course, in its passionate embrace of radical left-wing political ideas. Intense intergenerational tensions only stoked the passions of young people. As Eric Hobsbawm has emphasized, the novelty of the 1960s youth culture was epitomized in the new status of the adolescent as a self-conscious actor, increasingly recognized as an independent adult by the political system and by the captains of advanced industrial capitalism eager to expand the market for their consumer goods.⁹⁰

The other genuine novelty of the "new ideologies" relates to their broad reach beyond the national and regional boundaries of the three-world order. Their global appeal was perhaps most clearly demonstrated in the worldwide eruption of nearly 200 major student demonstrations from 1968 to 1970.⁹¹ Many observers began to realize that any attempt to make sense of these social movements exclusively within a national framework was bound to miss the global interconnectedness of these ideas and their worldwide political impact. As George Katsiaficas points out, "The global oppositional forces converged in a pattern of mutual amplification: 'The whole world was watching,' and with each act of the unfolding drama, whole new strata of social forces entered the arena of history, until finally a global contest was created."⁹² Even some of the former end-of-ideology warriors began to change their views. Edward Shils, for example, conceded that "The turbulence of student radicalism now has the appearance of being worldwide. . . . [T]here is a spontaneous and unorganized, or at best an informal, unity of sympathy of the student movement which forms a bridge across national boundaries. In 1968, student radical movements

seemed to be synchronized among different countries and uniform in content and technique."⁹³

The new social movements' global appeal and their ideological uniformity corresponded to the rising global imaginary. The sensitivity shown by young people to the entire planet as an interconnected political stage made their ideas a globalizing force in its own right. Indeed, its genuine novelty lay not merely in their ability to revise and add to the political vision of the traditional left, but, more importantly, in its fledgling attempts to translate the global imaginary into a unified political agenda. At the same time, however, these "new ideologies" lacked the ideational density and sophistication of mature ideologies. We will explore in Chapter 5 how and when this maturation process actually took place.

4.6. In the Long Shadow of Hayekism: The New Right

As the New Left was taking its first tentative steps toward translating the ascending global imaginary into concrete political programs, the ideas and beliefs of the conventional right, too, underwent significant transformation as a result of the gradual demise of the Keynesian socioeconomic consensus. This process started in earnest in 1971 when private investors and governments around the world sought to unload most of their dollar reserves for a fixed gold value before a widely expected devaluation of the American currency. Unwilling to defend the dollar by raising interest rates and cutting spending—and risk a recession only a year before a national election—President Richard Nixon sacrificed the dollar–gold convertibility that constituted the cornerstone of the time-tested Bretton Woods system. The ensuing decline of the dollar delivered both the desired US trade surplus and a temporary drop in unemployment, thus contributing to Nixon's 1972 triumph at the polls by a margin wider than that of any of his predecessors in the twentieth century. But, as political economist Jeffry Frieden notes in his landmark history of global capitalism, Nixon's pursuit of domestic objectives at the expense of America's international obligations came at a high price: the dissolution of Keynes' Bretton Woods system that had successfully blended international economic integration with national independence and the market with the welfare state.⁹⁴ The sudden elimination of the exchange rate constraint allowed governments to supercharge their economies. Prices in the United States shot up by 40 percent between 1970 and 1973, and by a staggering 70 percent between 1972 and 1973 in

Britain. Inflation ran amok in the First World—an ominous development that spiraled totally out of control when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled its oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and its Arab neighbors.⁹⁵

Unable to cope with the economic fallout of the Oil Shock, the industrial world plunged into its severest recession since the 1930s. The Keynesian model of countercyclical measures was rendered powerless by what US economist Paul Samuelson christened “stagflation”—the simultaneous occurrence of high inflation and rising unemployment. By the end of 1974, the American stock market had shed about half of its 1972 value. Industrial output in the First World had fallen by more than 10 percent, and the unemployment rate had exploded to levels deemed unacceptable by financial experts accustomed to decades of economic stability and growth.⁹⁶ Another round of OPEC oil price boosts in 1979 sounded the final death knell to the Golden Age of managed capitalism. Increasingly unwilling to sustain their costly social services in times of enduring economic crisis, governments began to listen closely to previously marginalized supply-side economists like Milton Friedman and his colleagues of the “Chicago School” who called for drastic anti-inflationary measures and rigid fiscal discipline, even at the risk of driving up unemployment.

The point of no return came in the fall of 1979 when incoming US Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker attacked inflation by raising interest rates to nearly 20 percent and kept them high for almost three years. Other industrialized nations had little choice but fall in line. Some, like Britain under Margaret Thatcher’s incoming Conservative government, did so enthusiastically. By the mid-1980s, inflation had been brought under control in most Western countries, but only at the cost of keeping unemployment at elevated levels. Moreover, budget deficits were ballooning as a result of increased military spending and new supply-side policies of austerity that included deep cuts in top-tax rates; the reduction of welfare programs; the curbing of trade-union power; the privatization of state-owned enterprises; the deregulation of the economy; the liberalization of trade; the reduction of government controls on cross-border investment; and the regional and global integration of national economies. The nearly universal adoption of at least some parts of this comprehensive public policy package in the First World reflected the growing power of a broad set of ideological claims centered on this D[eregulation]-L[iberalization]-P[rivatization] agenda. By the 1980s, it became generally known as “neoliberalism,” or, after its most prominent political proponents, “Thatcherism” and “Reaganism.”⁹⁷

This ideational D-L-P cluster formed the seed out of which the new ideology of market globalism would grow to maturity in the 1990s. Its most influential architects were the Austro-British economist and social philosopher Friedrich August Hayek and his American protégé Milton Friedman. A determined but rather obscure critic of Keynesian economic theory during his tenure as professor of economics at the London School of Economics from 1931 to 1950, Hayek achieved instant fame in 1944 with the publication of his trenchant critique of socialist collectivism, *The Road to Serfdom*. A smashing best seller in the United States and Britain, the book anticipated the First World's postwar turn toward the welfare state. The main objective of Hayek's polemic was to warn its readership against the "danger of totalitarianism raised by central planning." According to the author, even such laudable economic goals as the reduction of unemployment cannot justify the government's subversion of the "spontaneous social order" generated by competing individuals who pursue their own vision of the good in a free-market economy. As the author puts it, "[I]ndividual freedom cannot be reconciled with the supremacy of one single purpose to which the whole society must be entirely and permanently subordinated." For Hayek, economic freedom is not a secondary principle subordinated to political liberty and confined to the narrow sphere of material production, but a profoundly political and moral force that shapes all other aspects of a free and open society. Thus, he arrives at his central ideological claim: "Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily re-created in the free decision of the individual."⁹⁸

Hayek then proceeds to subsume communism, socialism, Nazism, fascism, and even social democracy under his master category of "collectivism." In his view, all of these ideologies share the same totalitarian impulse to embrace central economic planning. Concepts like the "common good," "social justice," or the "welfare state" are nothing but a "hodgepodge of ill-assembled and often inconsistent ideas" serving as a convenient mask for organized group interests. They provide ideological legitimacy for collectivists of all kinds who limit the economic freedom of the individual entrepreneur and thus undermine political liberty in general. A great believer in the free market's spontaneous ability to function as a self-regulating and knowledge-generating engine of human freedom and ingenuity, Hayek considers most forms of state intervention in the economy as ominous milestones on the "road to serfdom" leading to new

forms of government-engineered despotism.⁹⁹ Still, as he makes abundantly clear both in *The Road to Serfdom* and in his more philosophical later studies, the “dogmatic laissez-faire attitude” of classical liberals does not represent an acceptable solution. In fact, he insists that the “general principles of a liberal order” can only be realized by “purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions” and by “facing up to some real problems which an oversimplified liberalism has shirked.”¹⁰⁰

Consequently, Hayek assigns to the state the crucial task of designing and safeguarding a legal system that would “preserve competition and make it operate as beneficially as possible.” His core concept of liberty—decontested negatively as a condition “in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others”—becomes linked to the notion of “legality.”¹⁰¹ In turn, Hayek defines the “rule of law” as the “known rules of the game” according to which the “individual is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.”¹⁰² As one of his sympathetic biographers has suggested, Hayek’s preferred social order is not necessarily one in which the state has been shrunk to insignificance, but one where governments maximize competition, support economic competition and private property, and provide for the free exchange of goods and services on the basis of voluntary contracts impartially enforced by law.¹⁰³

Its attempted revival of liberal economic ideals without endorsing nineteenth-century laissez-faire conceptions makes Hayekism difficult to categorize.¹⁰⁴ In fact, what provides it with such a suitable platform for the evolution of market globalism is its peculiar mixture of liberal and conservative ideological claims. Some commentators have referred to this ideational eclecticism as “libertarianism”—a label for which Hayek showed very little enthusiasm. An enthusiastic proponent of the power of ideas in history who thought of himself as a “liberal,” the Nobel-Prize-winning economist nonetheless strays time and again into conservative territory by emphasizing the limits of human knowledge and the pivotal role of ignorance in public affairs. Clearly at odds with the rationalist constructivism of the Enlightenment tradition, Hayek’s reactive attitude of confining the role of reason to the evaluation of existing social practices clearly smacks of conservatism: “Human reason can neither predict nor deliberately shape its own future. Its advances consist in finding where it has been wrong.”¹⁰⁵ The Austrian thinker also betrays a clear conservative preference for social change occurring slowly in accordance with the existing traditions of Western societies. Indeed, he considers

the "spontaneous order" emerging from free economic activity a natural development while criticizing public policies based on "rational design."¹⁰⁶ Finally, he tempers his spirited defense of negative liberty and individual economic entrepreneurship with a good dose of conservative elitism. As Michael Freeden observes, Hayek's idea of progress is "conceptually tied to inequality, being spurred on by those who moved fastest, and, although accompanied by a process of catching up by the rest, it would be undermined by undue leveling and redistribution." Such elitism, Freeden insists, "is not to be found in the prominent types of modern liberalism."¹⁰⁷

But the incorporation of conservative concepts into Hayekism does not represent the only case of creative conceptual cannibalism. Surprisingly, there is strong evidence for the conscious absorption of some socialist elements. In an essay addressed to the members of the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS)—an anticollectivist, free-market think tank Hayek founded in 1947 together with Milton Friedman, Walter Eucken, Jacques Rueff, and other like-minded individuals—he explicitly compares the intellectual task of the newly established organization to that of avant-garde socialist "think tanks" like the British Fabian Society at the turn of the century.¹⁰⁸ Admir- ing their "intense intellectual effort" to draw up a theoretical program of social development that would gain the support of powerful political and social elites, Hayek suggests that his organization ought to imitate the socialists' attempt to paint a compelling "picture of a future at which they were aiming, and a set of general principles to decisions on particular issues." However, his unexpected fascination with socialism extends from mere strategic considerations to issues of ideological substance as well. In a strikingly militant passage, he praises socialists for their "courage to be utopian," adding that the MPS should formulate the mirror image of a "liberal utopia" based on the principles of free trade, individualism, and economic freedom. The popularity of the mixed economy and the welfare state would ultimately be undermined by a utopian "appeal to imagination" that gave no thought whatsoever to its feasibility in the near future. Indeed, Hayek's utopian proclivities are hardly indistinguishable from those of the French student protestors who, in 1968, proclaimed their faith in the "power of imagination." In fact, the Austrian economist displays the same militant spirit by insisting that the main purpose of the MPS was "to kindle an interest in—an understanding of—the great principles of social organization of the conditions of individual liberty as we have not known it in our life-time . . . We must raise and train an army of fighters for freedom."¹⁰⁹

Most importantly, Hayekism shares with the "new ideologies" of the left a remarkable sensitivity to the rising global imaginary. Already in *The Road to Serfdom*, the author shows considerable fondness for the universalistic "idea of the world at last finding peace through the absorption of the separate states in large federated groups and ultimately perhaps in one single federation. . . ." ¹¹⁰ After the creation of the MPS, Hayek moved from a fairly conventional liberal sympathy for regional cooperation and internationalism to a conceptual framework centered on the entire planet as interconnected space for intellectuals engaged in the spread of liberty and free markets around the world. An ideological movement without borders, the MPS issued a "Statement of Aims" which called on "liberals around the world" to work for the creation of an "international order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty, and permitting the establishment of harmonious international economic relations." ¹¹¹ Committed to the vision of a single, self-regulating global free market, Hayek suggests that modern capitalism requires the weakening of traditional bonds of solidarity—a "revolution in consciousness" hostile to the anachronistic concepts of "foreigners" and "strangers." Elaborating on this theme, the aging economist drew up plans for the denationalization of money that would allow people around the world to choose the most stable currency as the global means of exchange. ¹¹²

The global orientation of Hayekism and its ingenious ideological mixture contributed greatly to its increasing popularity in the 1970s and 1980s. Still, its growing political influence cannot be explained exclusively in terms of its ideational appeal or the global influence of the MPS. Providing a crucial opening for Hayekism, the stagflation of the 1970s seemed to confirm the susceptibility of Western mixed economies to those structural problems its opponents had described decades earlier. Indeed, sudden crises in the political and economic environment open up opportunities for new ideas to penetrate the dominant social imaginary. New ideologies never develop in isolation from the political arena. As Monica Prasad notes in her analysis of the rise of neoliberalism in the First World, the policy implementation of ideological commitments is significantly constrained by political factors such as entrepreneurial politicians in search of issues that resonate with public opinion. But even institutionalist critics of ideational causation like Prasad concede that the ideological claims formulated by neoliberals like Hayek and Friedman clearly provided inspiration and guidance to Thatcherism and Reaganism. ¹¹³ No doubt, the national context still played an important role. Deregulatory measures were at the heart of American neoliberalism,

whereas privatization initiatives like the sale of Telecom and public housing units quickly rose to the top of Prime Minister Thatcher's agenda. In both the United States and the UK, however, the development of the free market and the emasculation of trade unions stood at the center of New Right thinking. In both countries, newly formed alliances between business leaders and previously marginalized right-wing academics carefully copied Hayek's "socialist" strategy of encouraging well-endowed think tanks to persuade political elites to abandon welfarism. This was not an easy task given that even traditional conservatives like Richard Nixon had proudly proclaimed their Keynesian sympathies as recently as the early 1970s. Political standard bearers of the New Right like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan would have never imbibed Hayekian ideas without the expanding activities of well-endowed think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs, the Centre for Policy Studies, the Hoover Institution, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, or the Cato Institute. These corporate-funded institutions proliferated in the First World during the 1970s. Mobilizing the advertising industry and educational business associations, they promoted the peculiar Hayekian combination of global free-market liberalism, elitist conservatism, and militant socialist utopianism variously known as "neoliberalism," "neo-conservatism," or "free-market fundamentalism."¹¹⁴

These designations invite the conclusion that Hayekism recharged and rearranged various ideas of the political right for the post-Keynesian First World of the 1980s. The leading voices of the New Right expressed enthusiasm for free markets, a clear preference for traditional values over rationalist designs, and an aggressive stance against communism reflected in a muscular foreign policy. As we shall see, even "neoconservatives" like Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz who regarded themselves as the defenders of traditional family values threatened by runaway consumerism offered at least "two cheers" for Hayekian turbo-capitalism. Indeed, they called on business to organize, "think politically," and save Western civilization and the cause of freedom.¹¹⁵ But it took the dissolution of the three-world order for these various neoisms of the New Right to mature into the comprehensive ideology of market globalism.