Order 1364653: Statistical autopsy & research breifing

Law and Human Behavior, Vol. 21, No. 5, 1997

The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors' Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?

Kevin S. Douglas,1 David R. Lyon,1 and James R. P. Ogloff1'2

Although courts in the United States and Canada regularly admit graphic photographs into evidence, little research exists on whether such evidence prejudices the decisions of jurors. Mock jurors (N = 720) read a detailed trial transcript of a murder trial, and were either presented with color, black and white, or no photographs of an actual murder victim. The proportion of guilty verdicts in the color and the black and white photograph conditions was approximately double that in the control condition. Both groups were more likely than the control condition to report emotional distress and physical reactions in response to viewing the photographs. By contrast, there were few differences between groups concerning the extent to which participants felt that the photographs influenced verdicts. Participants in all conditions equally felt that they had acted fairly. Implications surrounding the admissibility of graphic photographic evidence, and the seeming inability of participants to recognize that their judgments were biased, are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

I quite realize that to those of us who have been accustomed over many years to see and examine similar photographs, it may well be that we are not so easily disturbed or shocked, but these photographs when marked as exhibits, will be part of the evidence, and it will not only be the right but the duty of the jury to look at and examine them to such an extent as may assist in arriving at a true verdict (Boyd McBride, J., in Regina v. Sim, 1954, p. 383).

As the passage above suggests, there are occasions when juries are confronted with extremely shocking and gruesome photographic evidence of a victim at a crime

1Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada. 2To whom correspondence should be addressed, at the Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, British Columbia, Canada V5A 1S6 (e-mail: [email protected]).

485

0147-7307/97/1000-0485$12.50/1 © 1997 American Psychology-Law Society/Division 41 of the American Psychological Association

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

scene or autopsy. To the prosecution, such pictures may constitute a vital piece of evidence pointing to an accused's guilt; yet, to the defense the same pictures may represent inflammatory and highly prejudicial information which threatens the ac- cused's right to a fair trial. The purpose of this study was to investigate the possible prejudicial effect of graphic autopsy photographs on the perceptions and verdicts of mock jurors.

photographic evidence has been utilized in a large variety of criminal cases. However, there appears to be a limited number of grounds on which this evidence traditionally has been admitted at trial. The following six grounds for admitting pho- tographic evidence in Canada were summarized in R. v. Schaefler (1993): (1) to permit the jury to view the facts and follow the step-by-step process which forms the basis for an expert witness' testimony; (2) to exhibit details, such as the nature and extent of wounds, described in testimony; (3) to assist the jury in assessing the accuracy of testimony put before them and the weight which should be ascribed to it; (4) to link the murder weapon to the injuries inflicted upon the victim; (5) to shed light on the possible intent involved in the offense; and (6) to help the jury assess the validity of theories offered in court. Similar grounds for admitting photographic evidence to court exist in American case law (see Jacobs v. Singletary, 1992; United States v. Goseyun, 1986; United States v. Soundingsides, 1987). Furthermore, evidence of this nature also has been accepted into American courts for the purpose of showing the identity and condition of the deceased (Kuntzelman v. Black, 1985).

While any of the grounds reviewed may serve as a basis for admitting pho- tographic evidence, the mere presence of one or more of these grounds does not necessarily ensure that photographs will be admissible. Although there are several dif- ferences between the evidentiary rules governing admissibility in Canada and the United States, the underlying principles are very similar in both countries. The first consideration to be made before any evidence, including photographic evidence, is admitted, is whether the evidence is relevant (Ogloff, 1990, 1995). Without ventur- ing into the intricacies of evidence law, suffice it to say that evidence is considered to be relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" (Federal Rules of Evidence 401,1986). The rules of relevancy are intentionally broad, leaving trial courts with considerable dis- cretion to determine whether evidence is relevant (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma- ceuticals, 1993).

Once a court has determined that the evidence is relevant, the judge next turns to the pivotal question of whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. Thus, in ruling on the admissibility of contentious photographic evidence, a trial court judge must balance the potential importance of such evidence against any negative impact it may have on the fairness and impartiality of the proceedings. Therefore, if the photographic evidence in question was particularly shocking or gruesome, and the benefit to the jury of seeing the evidence was mini- mal, a judge would be compelled to rule the evidence inadmissible. Given the com- plexity of the many factors that a judge must weigh when deciding whether to admit photographic evidence into testimony, it would be useful for judges to know what impact such evidence might have on jurors.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff486

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

Once a trial court judge has rendered a decision regarding admissibility, appeal courts on both sides of the border have demonstrated a reluctance to interfere with the ruling (in Canada see Draper v. Jacklyn, 1969; and in the United States see Daubert v. MerrellDow Pharmaceuticals, 1993; Futch v. Dugger, 1989; Nettles v. Wainwright, 1982; United States v. Goseyun, 1986; United States v, Whitfield, 1983). This situation is par- ticularly apparent in the United States, where a number of rulings have held that even in cases where photographs were erroneously admitted, the accused is only deprived of a fair trial if the photographs were crucial, critical, and highly significant in the accused's conviction (Futch v. Dugger, 1989; Nettles v. Wainwright, 1982). In Futch v. Dugger (1989), the llth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the introduction of photo- graphic evidence rarely renders the proceedings fundamentally unfair.

Despite the legal system's assumption that jurors will not be unduly prejudiced by graphic photographs, there are several cognitive psychology principles which might lead one to suspect otherwise. First, there is some limited research that vivid information may act in a more persuasive manner to impact people's decisions than pallid information (Bell & Loftus, 1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Shedler & Manis, 1986; Thornton, Kirchner, & Jacobs, 1991). A second possibility is that viewing gruesome photographic evidence could induce a dysphoric mood in jurors which influences their subsequent perceptions and judgments. It is well documented that mood-congruent information receives more attention and is recalled better than mood-incongruent information (Bower, 1991; Branscombe & Cohen, 1991; Forgas & Bower, 1987). Finally, it may be that such photographs generate a sense of moral outrage that demands someone be found responsible and held accountable. Al- though there are several mechanisms which could potentially cause graphic eviden- tiary photographs to influence the perceptions and decision of jurors, the purpose of this study was only to investigate whether such bias might result.

Only a few studies have investigated the possibility that photographic evidence could lead to bias in legal decision-makers. Oliver and Griffitt (1976) examined the impact of graphic visual evidence on the monetary awards of mock jurors in a per- sonal injury case. Participants read a fictitious case summary of an employee who had injured his hand on a piece of farm equipment that had been poorly maintained by the owner. Half the participants also were shown four color slides depicting a severely lacerated hand before and after medical treatment. While no differences were found in the degree of responsibility assigned to either party in the case, par- ticipants exposed to the color slides were found to award a significantly greater proportion of the damages requested than were the participants unexposed to the slides.

In a similar study, Whalen and Blanchard (1982) used a personal injury case to compare the relative effects of color, black and white, or no photographs on the monetary awards of female mock jurors. The case involved a boy who suffered injuries after entering an abandoned building. In addition to the photographs, the defendant's culpability (high, medium, or low) and the severity of the boy's injuries (high or low) also were manipulated. The authors found that presenting color pho- tographs of the injured boy resulted in significantly larger monetary awards than either the black and white or the no-photograph conditions, but only if the defen- dant was highly culpable and the victim's injuries were severe.

487The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

The only published study using a criminal case investigated the effects of vide- otaped crime scenes on the verdicts of mock jurors (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). Par- ticipants viewed a crime scene video, read a trial transcript of a murder case, and then rendered a verdict. Participants in the relevant-videotape condition were in- formed that the video had been recorded by the police shortly after the murder had occurred, whereas those in the nonrelevant-video condition were told that the video and trial transcript related to separate incidents in two different cities. The participants in the control condition did not view the videotape. All three groups rated the crime as equally violent, but those groups which viewed the videotapes rated the crime details as significantly more graphic than the control group. It also was found that participants watching the relevant videotape set significantly lower standards of proof for conviction. However, this did not result in any statistical differences among the verdicts of the three study conditions. The authors suggested that the failure to detect differences in verdicts may be attributable to the lack of evidence against the defendant and the low base rate of guilty verdicts that occurred across all conditions.

Previous research on pretrial publicity highlights another subject of impor- tance for the current study. Studies of pretrial publicity have found that jurors fre- quently are not cognizant of their biases, or, alternatively, remain convinced of their ability to be fair and impartial. For example, Sue, Smith, and Pedroza (1975) com- pared the verdicts of mock jurors exposed to damaging pretrial publicity and neutral pretrial publicity. Even after eliminating those jurors who admitted having been prejudiced by pretrial publicity in either condition, those participants in the dam- aging-pretrial-publicity condition voted guilty significantly more often than the neu- tral-publicity controls. Thus, many of the participants exposed to the damaging pretrial publicity appeared unaware of the extent to which this information had influenced their verdicts.

Similarly, Ogloff and Vidmar (1994) found that mock jurors exposed to emo- tional pretrial publicity were significantly more likely to believe that the defendant was guilty than were unexposed jurors; yet, exposed jurors were just as likely to report they could be fair in the case. These results have notable implications for the legal system because objectivity and impartiality are the very foundations upon which it is built. Unfortunately, no study has examined the extent to which jurors exposed to gruesome evidentiary photographs perceive themselves to be fair and impartial fact finders.

To summarize, the legal system assumes that jurors likely will not be preju- diced by graphic evidentiary photographs, but there is very little empirical data to either support or refute this presumption. Judges must make decisions regarding admissibility without knowing what the potentially biasing effects of the evidence may be. Unfortunately, virtually all the research that has been conducted is limited to civil law cases and therefore it may tell us very little about criminal law cases, where the burden of proof is much higher and the rules of evidence are different. The only study using a simulated criminal trial was hampered by a low base rate of guilty verdicts, making it difficult to draw any conclusions. The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of graphic evidentiary photographs on the verdicts, other decisions, and perceptions of mock jurors in a criminal trial.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff488

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

Hypothesis 1: Viewing autopsy photographs will be more arousing and emotion- ally distressing than merely reading testimony describing the state of the victim's body. Several studies have found that the presentation of negative-affective visual stimuli is associated with greater self-reported arousal, behavioral reactions, and physiological responses (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993; Livesay & Porter, 1994). Fur- thermore, because the impact of blood likely is much more striking in color, it was predicted there would be greater emotional reaction to the color autopsy photographs relative to the black and white autopsy photographs.

Hypothesis 2: Viewing color autopsy photographs will result in a higher guilty rate than viewing black and white autopsy photographs, which in turn will result in more guilty verdicts than viewing no autopsy photographs. As the literature reviewed suggests, there is evidence that emotionally arousing photographs can influence sub- sequent decisions. To the extent that color creates more vivid, emotionally charged, or dysphoria-inducing visual images, it should also exert a stronger biasing effect on juror verdicts than black and white photographs.

Hypothesis 3: There will be no differences between participants' reported abil- ity to be fair and impartial jurors, irrespective of whether or not they were exposed to the autopsy photographs. Should viewing the autopsy photographs bias study participants as hypothesized, the extent to which participants are cognizant of their bias will also be examined. As previous research reminds us, people often are unable to recognize their biases and the impact it may have on subsequent decision-making tasks (Ogloff & Vidmar, 1994; Sue et al., 1975).

METHOD

Participants

Study participants comprised 120 students registered in first- and second-year psychology courses. All participants received research credit toward partial fulfill- ment of their course requirements. Due to the nature of the study, participants were warned that they would view graphic autopsy photographs prior to signing up for the study and again at the beginning of the study when the informed consent process was completed.

Materials

Each participant was presented with a fictional trial transcript and a series of photographic exhibits. The trial involved a man accused of first-degree murder in the stabbing death of his ex-girlfriend. Testimony on behalf of the prosecution suggested that the accused's failure to accept the victim's desire to end the relationship may have been the motivation behind the murder. The evidence of several witnesses and exhibits provided circumstantial evidence indicating the accused may have committed the murder. In his defense, the accused claimed to have been sick in bed all day and there was testimony from a number of witnesses corroborating several portions of his

4S9The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

story. Nothing entered into evidence either conclusively placed the accused at the scene of the murder or eliminated the possibility he could have been there, ensuring ambiguity with respect to guilt. Altogether, the transcript included the testimony of 10 witnesses and opening and closing statements by prosecution and defense counsel. Judicial instructions, based on pattern instructions used in Canada, informed partici- pants of their roles as jurors, various rules of law (e.g., they are the fact finders), and definitions of key concepts (e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt; burden of proof; the role of expert witnesses; and the elements of each charge in the case). The trial tran- script was 30 single-spaced pages in Times 12-point font.

Participants also were given a series of 8 by 10 in. photographs placed in envelopes and marked as exhibits A, B, C, and D. Exhibits A, B, and C contained photographs of the victim's apartment building, the door to her apartment which showed no signs of forced entry, a knife similar to one purchased by the accused some time before the murder, and a graduation photograph of the victim. These photographs were primarily included as 'decoys' to conceal the true purpose of the study. Exhibit D held the stimulus materials, which comprised three explicit pho- tographs of an actual homicide victim taken from different angles. The photographs included two closeup views of the victim's face and shoulder area which had been stabbed, and as a consequence was severely lacerated and bloody. A third photo- graph was of the victim's upper body, which also had received stab wounds. The photographs were chosen in part because they did not implicate the accused in the murder per se, but rather demonstrated the state of the victim after death. This characteristic of the photographs was considered important with respect to mini- mizing the probative nature of the photographs. Depending upon the study condi- tion, the photographs in this exhibit were either black and white or color.

Procedure

The size of each experimental session ranged from 1 to 6 participants. Al- though several participants took part at one time, they were separated by large dividers which blocked their view of the other participants and their respective study materials. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three study conditions. In condition one (Color), participants viewed color photographs of the victim in exhibit D. Condition two (B & W) participants viewed black and white photographs of the victim in exhibit D. Participants in the third condition (Control) were not given Exhibit D and therefore did not view any autopsy photographs of the victim. These participants only read the graphic description of the victim's body which was de- tailed in the testimony of the medical examiner contained in the transcript of all three study conditions. Thus, the only difference across the three study conditions was in the presentation of exhibit D.

Following the informed consent procedure, participants were informed to read the transcript and examine the exhibits carefully because these would be collected before they rendered a verdict in the case, participants were further instructed to examine the exhibits only when specifically directed to do so in the transcript and to place them back in the envelopes once they had finished. It took approximately 45 min. to read the transcript and view all the evidence.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogtoff490

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

Once all the study materials had been examined and collected, participants were requested to complete a verdict questionnaire. Possible verdicts in the case included a finding of not guilty, guilty of first-degree murder, guilty of second-degree murder, or guilty of manslaughter. Second-degree murder and manslaughter are two lesser and included offenses of first-degree murder indictments in Canada. Unfortunately, the verdict of guilty or not guilty is a relatively gross measure of mock juror bias. Therefore, participants also were asked to indicate on a 10-point scale the extent to which they believed the accused was guilty. To obtain more information about their attitudes regarding the case, participants also were polled as to the sentence length and period of parole ineligibility they would recommend for the accused. Although jurors do not consider these issues in most jurisdictions, the importance of including measures with potentially greater variability and sensitivity outweighed their lack of legal realism. The final queries on the verdict questionnaire related to the verdict or conditions pertaining to the accused's disposition (e.g., certainty of the verdict). Par- ticipants also completed two additional postverdict questionnaires. These question- naires focused on participants' emotional reactions upon viewing the photographs of the victim, their perceptions of their ability to be fair and impartial jurors in the case, and their opinions regarding the importance and impact of this type of photographic evidence. The total testing time lasted between 60 and 75 min.

At the end of the study, all participants were individually debriefed and time was provided to answer any questions or discuss the study in greater detail with any participant who expressed the desire to do so. All participants were treated in accordance with the ethical principles of the Canadian Psychological Association (1991) and the American Psychological Association (1992).

RESULTS

Demographic Information

The mean age of participants was 21.07 years (SD = 4.28; range = 17-40). Eighty-two (67.8%) were female and 38 (32.8%) were male. Five people (4.2%) indicated that they had been charged in the past with a criminal offense, and 29 (24.4%) responded that they had been victimized by an offense. There were no differences in verdicts across experimental groups as a function of these demo- graphic variables.

Emotional Impact of Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors

To test whether the presentation of graphic photographic evidence had its ex- pected impact on mock jurors' emotional reactions, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to determine whether, in general, self-reported emo- tional reactions differed across the three conditions. Because the MANOVA indicated that emotional reactions, in fact, did differ across conditions, Wilks F(2, 114) = 1.99, p < .01, the results of the univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for each self-

491The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

reported emotional reaction are reported in Table 1. Given the somewhat large num- ber of tests employed, alpha was set at .01 for these analyses. Tukey B posthoc com- parisons were used to test for significance between specific conditions.

As is apparent from the results displayed in Table 1, people exposed to autopsy photographs, whether they were color or black and white, were more likely to report feeling anxious, anguished, disturbed, and shocked compared to those participants who did not view the autopsy photographs. The total score for self-re- ported emotion scales also differed significantly across groups — both conditions receiving autopsy photographs had higher scores than the control condition. There were, in general, few differences between people exposed to black and white versus color autopsy photographs.

Participants also answered, on a 10-point scale, "how did the photographs of the victim affect you emotionally?" A score of 1 was labeled "not affected at all," a score of 10 "extremely affected," and scores of 5 to 6 indicated being "moderately affected." Those in the control condition indicated being significantly less severely affected (M = 2.82, SD = 2.34) than those in either the black and white (M = 5.37, SD = 2.60) or color (M = 5.08, SD = 2.84) conditions, F(2, 117) = 11.34, p < .0001. Tukey post-hoc comparisons confirmed that both groups receiving the autopsy photographs differed from the control group, but not from one another.

Participants were asked whether the photographs of the victim helped to dem- onstrate the severity of the act committed. Of 40 participants in the color photo condition, 35 (87.5%) indicated that they did. In the black and white condition, 36 of 41 (87.8%) responded that they did. In the control condition, in which the only photograph of the victim was a graduation photograph, only 6 of 39 (15.4%) indi- cated that the photographs of the victim helped to demonstrate the severity of the crime, X2(2, N = 120) = 59.80, p < .000001.

As the final test of whether the autopsy photographs affected mock jurors, participants indicated whether they experienced any physical reactions (e.g., nervous stomach, sweaty palms, difficulty concentrating) upon viewing the photos. Half of the 40 participants in the color condition responded affirmatively to this question, 11 of 41 (26.8%) participants in the black and white group did so, and only 4 of 39 (10.3%) in the control condition did so, x2(2, N = 120) = 15.26, p < .001.

Factors Affecting Verdicts and Verdict-Related Opinions

The ultimate test of this experiment was whether exposure to graphic autopsy photgraphs would influence determinations of guilt. Those participants who were exposed to the autopsy photographs were almost twice as likely to find the accused guilty than participants in the control condition, x2(2, N. = 120) = 7.88, p = .02. Of the 40 people in the color condition, 23 (57.5%) voted guilty. Exactly half of the 40 people who made a determination of guilt in the black and white condition voted guilty. Only 11 of 40 (27.5%) people in the control condition voted guilty. The two photograph conditions did not differ from one another, though both dif- fered from the control condition.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff492

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

The Impact of Graphic Evidence 493

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

To test whether emotional reactions to the photographs affected tendency to vote guilty, a multiple regression analysis was conducted using the 10 emotional self-report variables shown in Table 1 as predictor variables, and the continuous variable of the extent to which participants believed the accused was guilty as the dependent measure. The forward stepwise procedure of entering variables was used. Of the 10 variables, 5 contributed to an overall regression model with Mult R = .36, R2 = .13, and Adj R2 = .11, F(5, 115) = 7.08, p < .0001. The more that partici- pants reported feeling sad (P = .28), vengeful (B = .22), outraged (B = .14), shocked (B = .28), and anxious (B = .22) in response to viewing the photographs, the more they believed the accused was guilty.

We were interested not only in whether graphic photographic evidence would impact verdicts, but also in the effects of the photographs on jurors' perceptions of the verdict-rendering decision-making process. To study this, we asked partici- pants whether they felt that they should be influenced by photographs of the victim, whether they felt they were influenced, and whether they felt they could act fairly and in an unbiased fashion in a trial if they were exposed to such photographs. Table 2 contains the results of these questions.

As is evident, participants from each condition, on average, felt that the pho- tographs of the victim should not and did not influence their verdicts to a great degree, although those from the color photo condition felt that they should and did to a significantly greater degree than those from the control condition. However, when asked to decide either "yes" or "no" to the questions, "did/should the pho- tographs impact your verdict?," there were no differences between groups, with each group responding "no" much more frequently than "yes." Perhaps most strik- ing, there were no differences between groups in terms of whether participants felt they acted in a fair and unbiased manner in this mock trial, and whether they could act in a fair and unbiased manner in an actual trial.

Differences in Verdict-Related Opinions as a Function of Guilt Preferences

The verdict-related opinions reported above were tested to determine whether they differed as a function of guilt preferences (i.e., guilty or not guilty). The results are reported in Table 3. All participants, on average, whether voting guilty or not guilty, reported that the photographs did and should have little impact on verdicts. Those who voted guilty, however, did indicate that the photographs had a greater impact on their verdicts than those who voted not guilty, albeit not markedly. Interestingly, when forced to decide "yes" or "no" to these questions, both groups indicated that while the photo- graphs should not influence verdicts, people who voted guilty were more likely to respond that the photographs did influence their verdicts. Verdict choice had no impact on whether mock jurors reported that they were fair and unbi- ased in the present case, or could be fair and unbiased jurors in an actual case with such photographs.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff494

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

The Impact of Graphic Evidence 495

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

496 Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

Effects of Photographs on Other Legal Opinions

Finally, analyses were conducted to determine whether exposure to graphic photographic evidence influenced participants' opinions of legal matters other than guilt. The results are presented in Table 4. There were no differences between groups' mean preferred sentence ratings according to condition. Even though sen- tences varied almost not at all, participants in the two autopsy photograph condi- tions felt that their preferred sentences were and should have been impacted by the photographs. There were no differences between groups in terms of opinions re- garding the appropriateness of the death penalty, whether the accused should ever receive parole, or after how long the accused should receive parole.

DISCUSSION

In the United States and Canada, trial courts regularly admit photographic evidence and appelate level courts are hesitant to reverse such decisions. By ad- mitting such evidence, courts make decisions that the probative value of such evi- dence outweighs the inflammatory or prejudicial impact. The present study tested the hypotheses that graphic photographic evidence would affect mock jurors' emo- tional responses and verdicts. Participants' opinions about the verdict-rendering process also were examined.

There is some research which has indicated that vivid as opposed to pallid information impacts decisions to a greater degree (e.g., Bell & Loftus, 1985; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Shedler & Manis, 1986; Thornton, Kirchner, & Jacobs, 1991). Civil mock jury studies seem to support this line of reasoning (e.g., Oliver & Griffitt, 1976; Whalen & Blanchard, 1982). The lone study which used a criminal trial did not employ photographs, but rather videotapes of the crime scene, and verdicts did not differ across conditions, although this may be attributable to the low base rate of guilty verdicts obtained in the study (Kassin & Garfield, 1991). As such, most of the research on this topic, little of it that there is, has involved either mock civil trials with a continuous dependent measure of monetary award, or has used video- taped stimulus measures. The present findings add to this literature by testing whether graphic black and white or color photographic evidence would bias the decisions of mock jurors in a criminal trial, using the dichotomous dependent meas- ure of verdict.

This research supports the hypotheses that jurors who are presented with gruesome photographs will be more emotionally affected, and more likely to vote guilty, than jurors who do not receive such photographs. Various self-reported scales of emotional distress predicted the extent to which mock jurors believed the accused was guilty. Whether graphic photographic evidence was presented in black and white or color format was immaterial to mock jurors' decisions. However, it is in- teresting to note an exception to this pattern — namely, that while self-reports of emotional arousal did not differ between color and black and white conditions, participants in the color condition admitted more frequently than those in the black and white condition to experiencing physical reactions such as sweaty palms and

497The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

498 Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

nervous stomachs. Given that most dependent measures did not vary between color and black and white conditions, it seems best not to interpret this anomaly further, as it may well have been due to chance.

Some interesting patterns emerged regarding participants' opinions and percep- tions of the effects of the victim photographs. In general, participants in each condition indicated that the photographs should not and did not impact their verdicts. Further, regardless of condition, mock jurors responded that, on the whole (approximately 7.5 on a scale of 10), they acted in a fair and impartial manner in the current mock trial, and also could do so in an actual trial. Thus, it appears that, although the graphic photographs clearly influenced verdicts, participants felt that they should not and did not, and also considered their levels of impartiality to be moderately high. It may be possible that participants indicated that they were not affected by the photographs because they were told not to be by the judge in the instructions to the jury. However, the fact remains that they were affected by the photographs. This finding is particularly troublesome because if jurors cannot even recognize the extent to which such evidence affects them, it will be impossible for them to reduce or control the impact of the evidence when instructed to do so by a judge.

It should be emphasized that the autopsy photographs did not bear directly upon the accused's guilt. There was as much factual information in each condition. The photographs merely depicted visually what was described invariantly in the transcripts across conditions. Although results indicated that the autopsy photo- graphs helped to demonstrate the severity of the act committed, they did not im- plicate the accused in the murder. The photographs merely showed the condition of the victim after death. The photographs did not make it more or less likely that the accused was the actual murderer. As such, the possibility that the photographs helped to demonstrate the accused's guilt is ruled out. This being so, it is appro- priate to conclude that, although the photographs may have been helpful in dem- onstrating the nature of the victim's injuries, mock jurors were biased by the autopsy photographs to find the accused guilty.

However, while results support the claim that mock jurors were biased by the photographs, or that the photographs were prejudicial, it is important to point out that the probative nature of the photographs was not thoroughly investigated in this research. The photographs were chosen for inclusion in this study partially on the basis that they did not specifically implicate any given accused. They merely show the state of the victim after death. However, the photographs may have had benefits which were not assessed. For example, they may have made it more likely that jurors could integrate the testimony regarding cause of death with evidence directly relevant to the accused. Thus, the evidence in this study more strongly supports the prejudicial nature of the photographs than it does their nonprobative value. In other words, while it may have been shown that the photographic evidence was prejudicial, it was not necessarily demonstrated that this same evidence also was not probative. The reasoned assumption was that it was not. However, sub- sequent research could assess the probative value of evidence more thoroughly than the present study did.

Although mock jurors were biased by the photographic evidence, they were unaware of the biasing effects of such evidence on their verdicts. As noted above,

499The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

this is an important finding. Courts in both the United States and Canada admit graphic evidence which may not bear upon accuseds' guilt, assuming that its effects are not unduly prejudicial. The findings imply that the effects of such evidence may be prejudicial, and rather insidiously so, given that participants may not recognize the impact of the evidence upon their decisions.

There are a number of limitations of the present research which ought to be addressed in subsequent studies. First, and unavoidably in this line of research, we conducted a mock trial, not a real one. However, mock trials can be made to ap- proximate actual trials with greater authenticity through several methodological steps. Participants can be drawn randomly from the population of eligible jurors as a whole rather than from a student population. The mode of presenting the trial can be through video rather than transcript. The photographs may have been more vivid in comparison to a printed transcript than they would be relative to a videotaped trial. Jurors can be allowed the opportunity to deliberate rather than offer individual ver- dicts. Finally, a weakness unique to this type of study is that no attempt was made to reduce potential juror bias before it emerged. Although in the judge's instructions to the jury it was stated that the photographs ought not to have an undue impact on verdicts, there was no similar admonition within the trial itself when the photographs were presented. We recommend attempts at replicating the present findings under such methodological conditions before a firm conclusion is drawn about the effects of graphic photographic evidence on jurors' decisions. We also recommend that re- searchers address the possible causal mechanisms which may underlie the effects found in the present study (i.e., vividness, mood effects, and attentional resources).

Despite the above limitations, some tentative implications for the legal system flow from the current study. The findings bear directly upon the question to be an- swered in deciding whether to admit evidence — does the probative value of the evi- dence outweigh its prejudicial impact? In the current research, the photographs met at least one evidentiary ground for admission (to exhibit details), yet essentially were irrelevant to the linking of the accused to the victim or to the offense. Courts may be willing to admit gruesome evidence because of an assumption that jurors either will not be prejudicially affected by it, or, even if they are, that they will be able to put aside such bias when returning a verdict. The present study implies that, first, people's verdicts may be impacted to a greater degree than the law would suspect, and second, that because participants indicated that the victim autopsy photographs should not and did not affect their verdicts, it appears that people may be unaware of their biases. This further implies that they could not set their biases aside if they were asked to. Based on these findings, courts ought to approach the probative versus prejudicial decision with considerable caution, and with such issues in mind.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to tank Darren Nicholls and Grant Burt for their assistance on this project, Harold Hoodikoff, Lauri Ashton, and Kim Eichorn for their input into an early version of this research, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Douglas, Lyon, and Ogloff500

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .

REFERENCES

American Psychological Association. (1992). Ethical principles of psychologists and code of conduct. American Psychologist, 47, 1597-1611.

Bell, B. E., & Loftus, E. F. (1985). Vivid persuasion in the courtroom. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49, 659-664.

Bower, G. H. (1991). Mood congruity of social judgments. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp. 31-54). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Branscombe, N. R., & Cohen, B. M. (1991). Motivation and complexity levels as determinants of heuristic use in social judgment. In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp. 31-54). Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Canadian Psychological Association (1991). Canadian code of ethics for psychologists. Ottawa: Author. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 727 F. Supp. 570 (S. D. Call 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th

Cir. 1990, vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786 1993). Draper v. Jacklyn, 9 D.L.R. 3d 264 (S.C.C., 1969). Federal Rules of Evidence. (1986). Gould: Binghamptom, NY. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. Forgas, J. P., & Bower, G. H. (1987). Mood effects on person-perception judgments. Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 53-60. Futch v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 1487 (llth Cir. 1989). Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282 (llth Cir. 1992). Kassin, S. M., & Garfield, D. A. (1991). Blood and guts: General and trial-specific effects of videotaped

crime scenes on mock jurors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 1459-1472. Kuntzelman v. Black 774 F.2d 291 (8th Cir., 1985) Lang, P. J., Greenwald, M. K., Bradley, M. M., & Hamm, A. O. (1993). Looking at pictures: Affective

facial, visceral and behavioral reactions. Psychophysiology, 30, 261-263. Livesay, J. R., & Porter, T. (1994). EMG and cardiovascular responses to emotionally provocative

photographs and text. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 79, 579-594. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1982). Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment.

Englewood Cliffs, N3: Prentice-Hall. Ogloff, J. R. P. (1990). The admissibility of expert testimony regarding malingering and deception.

Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 8, 27-43. Ogloff, J. R. P. (1995). The legal basis of forensic applications of the MMPI-2. In Y. S. Ben-Porath,

J. R. Graham, G. Hall, R. D. Hirschman, & M. Zaragoza (Eds.), Forensic applications of the MMPI-2 (pp. 18-47). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Ogloff, J. R. P., & Vidmar, N. (1994). The impact of pretrial publicity on jurors: A study to compare the relative effects of television and print media in a child sex abuse case. Law and Human Behavior, 18, 507-525.

Oliver, E., & Griffitt, W. (1976). Emotional arousal and "objective" judgment. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 8, 399-400.

R. v. Schaefler, 71 OJ. 14 (Ont. Ct. Just. 1993). Regina v. Sim, 108 C.C.C. 380 (Alta. S.C. 1954). Shedler, J., & Manis, M. (1986). Can the availability heuristic explain vividness effects? Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 26-36. Sue, S., Smith, R. E., & Pedroza, G. (1975). Authoritarianism, pretrial publicity, and awareness of bias

in simulated jurors. Psychological Reports, 37, 1299-1302. Thornton, W., Kirchner, G., & Jacobs, J. (1991). Influence of a photograph on a charitable appeal: A

picture may be worth a thousand words when it has to speak for itself. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 433-445.

United States v. Goseyun, 789 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986). United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir. 1987). United States v. Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1983). Vrana, S. R. (1993). The psychophysiology of disgust: Differentiating negative emotional contexts with

facial EMG. Psychophysiology, 30, 279-286. Whalen, D. H., & Blanchard, F. A. (1982). Effects of photographic evidence on mock juror judgment.

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12, 30-41.

501The Impact of Graphic Evidence

T hi

s do

cu m

en t i

s co

py ri

gh te

d by

th e

A m

er ic

an P

sy ch

ol og

ic al

A ss

oc ia

tio n

or o

ne o

f i ts

a lli

ed p

ub lis

he rs

. T

hi s

ar tic

le is

in te

nd ed

s ol

el y

fo r t

he p

er so

na l u

se o

f t he

in di

vi du

al u

se r a

nd is

n ot

to b

e di

ss em

in at

ed b

ro ad

ly .