Philosophy

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Relativism and Disagreement in Contemporary Philosophy

One of the things you may notice about the history of epistemology, or “theory of knowledge,” is that the primary

examples involve solitary knowers. Descartes discusses a person’s idea of the wax being the same when it melts or a

person’s innate idea of God. Locke describes an individual’s experience of �re as either pleasantly warm or painfully hot

depending on where that person is located in relationship to the �re.

More recently, philosophers working in epistemology have tried to look at the knower in a context: social institutions and

interpersonal practices. When we say we know how much a dollar is worth, for example, we are relying on a set of social

conventions and accepted practices about how we de�ne monetary units. One such philosopher is Alvin Goldman.

Reading Assignment:  "Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement"

Excerpts from "Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement" [Version of June, 2007 to appear in: R. Feldman and

T. War�eld, eds., Disagreement; OUP] by Alvin I. Goldman, Rutgers University. Please read below.

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1. Introduction  

Questions to Consider

As you read, consider the following questions:

Is there any way to claim that the beliefs or practices of a community are “right”?

Can two people reasonably disagree about a proposition or statement of knowledge?

What does the phrase “rationally justi�ed” mean when applied to propositions

describing observable facts, or ethical norms?

Making Connections

Goldman discusses how some knowledge is based on social convention and community agreement. How is Socrates’ trial an example of knowledge from a community? Is it positive or negative?

When Russell challenges the commonsense man in Unit 1, is that idea of common sense a problem for Goldman’s work? Is common sense merely a community-approved set of habits?

Listen

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Two active topics in current epistemology are epistemic relativism and the reasonableness of disagreement between

equivalently positioned agents. These topics are usually treated separately, but I’ll discuss them in tandem because I wish

to advance a new conception of relativism that bears on the issue of reasonable disagreement.

I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism.

This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different

epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic

states. Communities try to guide or regulate their members’ credence-forming habits in a variety of different, i.e.,

incompatible, ways.

Although there may be considerable overlap across cultures in certain types of epistemic norms (e.g., norms for

perceptual belief), there are sharp differences across groups in other types of epistemic norms.

What about the normative status of these different E-systems? Is one of them right and the rest of them wrong from an

objective or absolute point of view? Are some “more right” than others? Descriptive pluralism takes no stand on this issue,

but epistemologists generally want this normative issue resolved. A second brand of relativism, nihilistic relativism, does

take a stand. It augments descriptive pluralism in holding that there is no objective right or wrong in this matter. As the

sociologists of knowledge Barry Barnes and David Bloor (1982) express the matter:

For the relativist there is no sense attached to the idea that some standards or beliefs are really rational as distinct from

merely locally accepted as such. [The relativist] thinks that there are no context-free or super-cultural norms of

rationality … (1982: 27)

Philosophers would express the view by saying that there is no fact of the matter about which community is (“objectively”,

or “absolutely”) right.

Standing in contrast with nihilistic relativism is epistemic objectivism. This view holds that there is objective rightness in

matters of epistemic norms, standards, or principles. Epistemic objectivists characteristically hold that there is a uniquely

correct E-system and all systems incompatible with this one are wrong. Alternatively, an objectivist might hold that E-

systems can be ordered by the (objective) binary relation of being at least as correct as. Such an ordering does not entail

the existence of a unique correct E-system, because two or more non-equivalent systems might tie for the most correct.

Also, there might be in�nitely many systems for each of which there is a more correct one. For purposes of the present

paper, however, I’ll make the simplifying assumption that if objectivism is true, there is a uniquely correct E-system. 1

I shall propose a new form of relativism that strikes a compromise between nihilistic relativism and objectivism. I call it

objectivity-based relativism. As its name suggests, this form of relativism presupposes the truth of epistemic objectivism;

there is nothing nihilistic about it. Nonetheless, it manages to preserve some of the pluralism associated with relativism.

Moreover, I’ll argue that objectivity-based relativism allows the possibility that two people can reasonably disagree about

a given proposition even when they have equivalent evidence vis-à-vis that proposition.

I assume a close link between epistemic objectivism and the status of being (objectively) justi�ed or unjusti�ed with

respect to beliefs and other doxastic states. The idea is that a belief or another doxastic state is justi�ed or unjusti�ed so

long as it conforms or fails to conform to what is prescribed by the correct E-system, given the subject’s evidence. Since

mainstream epistemologists generally assume that beliefs are objectively justi�ed or unjusti�ed, the truth or falsity of

epistemic objectivism is a critical issue. The truth of objectivism is also important to the prospects for reasonable

disagreement, because such prospects depend on whether two evidentially equivalent people can each be objectively

justi�ed if they hold con�icting doxastic attitudes.

Objectivism, understood as entailing a uniquely correct E-system, seems to imply the impossibility of reasonable (i.e.,

justi�ed) disagreement.

To further situate the discussion, I move to two recent pieces of epistemology: Richard Feldman’s paper “Reasonable

Religious Disagreement” (forthcoming) and a chapter on epistemic relativism from Paul Boghossian’s book, Fear of

Knowledge (2006).

One of the two main questions Feldman poses is the following:

(Q1) Can epistemic peers who have shared their evidence have reasonable disagreements?

To say that two people have a disagreement, according to Feldman, is to say that one of them believes a certain

proposition and the second disbelieves it. To say that two people have a reasonable disagreement is to say that each is

justi�ed in holding his or her belief (or disbelief). To say that people are epistemic peers is to say that they are roughly

equal with respect to intelligence, reasoning powers, background information, etc. People have shared their evidence

about a topic when they have had a full discussion of the topic and have not withheld relevant information.

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Let us slightly amend Feldman’s formulation. Instead of con�ning disagreement to cases of one person believing a

proposition and another disbelieving it, let the term “disagreement” apply to any case of two people holding contrary, or

incompatible, creedal attitudes toward the same proposition. This includes one person believing the proposition and the

other suspending judgment. And instead of restricting the range of doxastic attitudes to the tripartite categories of belief,

disbelief, and withholding, let us include graded beliefs or subjective probabilities among the set of categories, either

point probabilities or interval probabilities (i.e., partial beliefs that are somewhat fuzzy).

Finally, assume that not only belief but any doxastic attitude can exemplify the property of being justi�ed or unjusti�ed.

The core of Feldman’s paper is his defense of a negative answer to (Q1). A crucial element in this defense is what he calls

“The Uniqueness Thesis”:

This is the idea that a body of evidence justi�es … at most one attitude toward any particular proposition. As I think of

things, our options with respect to any proposition are believing, disbelieving, and suspending judgment. The Uniqueness

Thesis says that, given a body of evidence, one of these attitudes is the rationally justi�ed one (typescript, p. 10).

Feldman’s appeal to the Uniqueness Thesis leads directly to the question of nihilistic relativism’s viability, because if

nihilistic relativism is true there is no uniquely correct system of epistemic norms. And if there is no uniquely correct

system of norms, there is no guarantee that the Uniqueness Thesis is correct. Perhaps two or more different systems of

epistemic norms are equally legitimate. One implies that a given body of evidence makes doxastic attitude D vis-à-vis

proposition P rationally justi�ed whereas another implies that the same body of evidence makes an incompatible attitude

D* vis-à- vis P rationally justi�ed. Thus, if the Uniqueness Thesis is false, Feldman’s argument for the impossibility of

reasonable disagreement falls through.

However, let us examine relativism more circumspectly, looking at Boghossian’s treatment of the topic in chap. 5 of Fear

of Knowledge. Boghossian formulates epistemic relativism as the conjunction of three theses (the second of which is

abridged here):

(R1) There are no absolute facts about what a particular item of information justi�es. (Epistemic non-absolutism)

(R2) Epistemic judgments of the form “E justi�es belief B” express the claim: “According to the epistemic system C, that I,

S, accept, information E justi�es belief B.” (Epistemic relationism)

(R3) There are many fundamentally different, genuinely alternative epistemic systems, but no facts by virtue of which one

of these systems is more correct than any of the others. (Epistemic pluralism) (2006: 73)

Both R1 and R3 are good formulations of the standard version of relativism I shall consider. It is fundamentally the thesis

that there are no objective or absolute facts that make an epistemic system right or correct. If the justi�edness or

unjusti�edness of beliefs and other doxastic states is linked in the indicated way to the objective rightness or correctness

of a unique system of epistemic norms (E-system), then if relativism is true, no objective status (e.g., truth or falsity)

attaches to statements that a particular doxastic state is justi�ed or unjusti�ed, reasonable or unreasonable. Thus,

epistemic relativism seems to be equivalent to epistemic nihilism.

I am uncertain about this interpretation of the conjunction of R1, R2, and R3 because thesis R2 proffers a construal of

justi�cation statements that seems inconsistent with nihilism. Epistemic relationism says that ordinary justi�cation

statements covertly refer to the epistemic system that the speaker accepts. It offers a relational translation of

justi�cation statements that ostensibly promises an escape from nihilism. Of course, Boghossian raises serious problems

for relationism (a critique I won’t undertake to assess2). But the relationist component of relativism presented by R2

seems to be non- nihilistic. For this reason, R2 doesn’t mesh so well with R1 and R3, in my view. So I am cautious about

saying, unquali�edly, that (epistemic) relativism is a form of nihilism.

However, I don’t myself wish to use relationism as a partial speci�cation of E-relativism. Under my preferred construal,

standard E-relativism is indeed a form of nihilism.

How does epistemic relativism, as de�ned by R1 and R3, relate to Feldman’s Uniqueness Thesis and to the dispute over

reasonable disagreement (among peers with shared evidence)? As de�ned by R1 and R3, E-relativism clashes with the

Uniqueness Thesis. Moreover, as a species of nihilism, E-relativism undercuts the entire dispute about reasonable

disagreement. Agents who disagree in their attitudes toward a given proposition aren’t objectively unreasonable because,

without an objectively correct E- system, their attitudes cannot be assessed as objectively unreasonable. At the same

time, there can be no assessment of their attitudes as objectively reasonable or justi�ed. So, as would be expected under

nihilism, the entire issue simply melts away.

Is there any respectable form of non-nihilistic relativism, and what would such a form of relativism imply about the

dispute over reasonable disagreement?  A chief aim of this paper is to articulate a form of non-nihilistic relativism and

explore its rami�cations. First, however, I shall advance a brief defense of reasonable disagreement unconnected with

relativism. This defense focuses on matters that need to be settled before discussing relativism, i.e., how to conceive of E-

systems and their connection to justi�edness or reasonability.

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2. Epistemic Systems, Doxastic Categories and Reasonable Disagreement

An epistemic (E-) system is a system of rules or norms directed at doxastic attitudes or choices. The norms in question

presumably take roughly the following form: “If an agent has such-and-such evidence pertinent to proposition P, or

possesses such- and-such prior beliefs, or undergoes such-and-such experiences or cognitive processes (perceptual,

memorial, or reasoning processes), then doxastic attitude D is the appropriate attitude for the agent to hold vis-à-vis P.”

With respect to such systems of norms, we can formulate the following linkage principle L:

(L) Agent A is justi�ed in holding doxastic attitude D vis-à-vis proposition P iff A’s total evidence vis-à-vis P (e.g.,

antecedent beliefs, experiences, and/or cognitive processes relevant to P) is such that the objectively right epistemic

system implies that D is the appropriate attitude for A to adopt vis-à-vis P; in other words, iff A’s holding D conforms to

the right epistemic system.

The formulation of principle L links justi�edness not to any random E-system but to a right E-system, because there are

inde�nitely many possible E-systems and conformity with an arbitrary system does not confer genuine, objective

justi�edness. Only a right epistemic system has the appropriate connection with objective justi�edness or reasonability

(see Goldman 1986, chaps. 4-5).

One question here is what “appropriate” should mean? Should it be construed as permission or prescription? A number of

writers, myself included (Goldman 1986), opt for the permission construal. The prescription construal might seem to bias

the landscape against the possibility of reasonable disagreement. For various theoretical reasons, however, I am going to

adopt the prescription construal. As we shall see, this doesn’t unduly prejudice the case against reasonable disagreement.

A crucial question is: What makes an E-system correct, right, or best? What is the ground, rationale, or criterion that

confers such a status on an E-system? The question isn’t whether or how we could we tell which E-system is right; this is

an epistemological question.4 The question is a metaphysical one, about the constitution or ground of epistemic

rightness. There are various possible approaches, and although I won’t defend any such approach in detail, we should at

least get a feel for some of the alternatives to persuade ourselves that the notion of such a ground or rationale isn’t a mere

chimera.

One family of approaches is externalist, roughly reliabilist. Here’s a specimen of this approach, a reliabilist criterion of

system superiority or comparative goodness that might induce a uniquely correct E-system.

(RCSS) Epistemic system E is better than epistemic system E* if belief-forming practices that conform to E would produce

a higher proportion of true beliefs than belief-forming practices that conform to E*.

One obvious worry here is whether RCSS would really induce a uniquely best system. A second problem is that RCSS

takes account of only one type of credal state: belief. Since a general theory of justi�ed credal states is desirable, not

merely a theory of justi�ed belief, shouldn’t a truth-based criterion also make use of the truth-values of graded doxastic

states in addition to �at-out belief?

The latter problem might be accommodated by moving from reliability to the related notion of degree-of-truth-

possession, or veritistic value (Goldman and Shaked 1991; Goldman 1999a). Just as we say that someone “possesses” the

truth categorically when she categorically believes something true, so we can associate with a graded belief a degree of

truth possession (N.B., not a degree of truth) as a function of the degree of belief and the truth-value of its content. A

graded belief of degree n (0 ≤ n ≤ 1.0) with respect to P is assigned a degree n of truth-possession if P is true, and a graded

belief of degree n is assigned a 1–n degree of truth-possession if P is false. Thus, having subjective probability or credence

0.70 with respect to P yields a 0.70 degree of truth- possession if P is true and a 0.30 degree of truth-possession if P is

false. And so forth…

Veritistic Social  Epistemology

Goldman describes his theory as “veritistic social epistemology.”

“Social epistemology” refers to knowledge being fostered by practices and institutions, rather than one person’s

contemplation or sensory experiences. To do social epistemology, Goldman discusses methods of communication, and

standards of argumentation. The “truth” of knowledge is something we arrive at from interaction and social processes,

and knowledge is “veritistic” because we evaluate claims and arguments based on their “descriptive success”, in other

words, do they help the group in achieving new knowledge? Practices that help to generate justi�ed, true beliefs are said

to have veritistic value. Goldman relates this idea to society as a whole. For example, to have a successful and vigorous

democratic system, and indeed to achieve justice in governmental decision-making, we have to have well‐chosen

procedures of political discourse, legal arguments, and legal evidence.

Goldman says that there are two branches of epistemology: individual epistemology and social epistemology (or

"epistemics"). Both individual and social epistemologists want to know what produces true belief. Individual epistemology

focuses on one individual thinking subject. Social epistemology is different because it looks speci�cally at social processes

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and interactions that affect the beliefs of individuals and groups. We value having true beliefs rather than false beliefs,

and we really want to have some understanding rather than being left in uncertainty. The value we place on having true

beliefs is "veritistic value". Social practices can be divided into two groups: practices that make positive and negative

contributions toward increasing veritistic value. Making a positive contribution to veritistic value means that we have an

increase in true beliefs. These practices that make positive contributions could be arguing, news reporting, information

technology, legal procedures, and access to information.

Practices that make negative contributions are uncritically accepted claims that are not true to reality. Such claims are

mistaken regardless of how strongly they may be felt, or, how strongly they may be argued. If claims do not correspond to

reality (but were honestly arrived at) they are mistakes and therefore false. Anyone can be mistaken. It is human which is

why verifying beliefs is so important. However, it is the deliberate falsi�cation of metaphysical reality that troubles the

world. In this category are those who “practice to deceive” with lies, fake news, and “spin.” Liars and deceptive practices

mislead people in order to manipulate them into believing what is false. Their claims lack “veritistic value.”

Responding to Relativism

Philosophers have argued that Goldman’s social epistemology is a way to address the issue of “relativism,” the claim that

there is no way to adjudicate or choose between beliefs that are more or less true. (Often relativism takes the form of

cultural relativism, in which we are reluctant to have one culture’s values used to judge another culture.)

Goldman’s view responds to extreme relativism by evaluating actual and prospective practices in terms of their impacts

on true versus false beliefs. The concept of veritistic value opens up the possibility of judging between two different

epistemic (knowledge-making) practices. Goldman gives an example of this as it relates to medieval practices and tests for

witchcraft; after practices like water testing (seeing if someone �oated as an indication that they were guilty of

witchcraft) were shown to produce many “false results,” they were rejected as regular practices.

Another way that Goldman responds to relativism is by explaining that his theory gives a way to address relativism and its

opposite extreme, absolutism. Absolutism is a view that claims only one belief system is correct. Goldman’s social

epistemology project tries to advance a non-standard conception of epistemic relativism under which relativism is

compatible with absolutism. To quote Goldman, “Even if there is a uniquely right system of epistemic norms, people in

different communities can justi�ably (though not correctly) accept different epistemic systems as right.”

For more study and to test your knowledge, please take the Unit 3 Self Assessment - Goldman (not graded).