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6. Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

The Barbie dolls, soccer balls, and stuffed animals that ‹ll toy store shelves in the United States and Europe were probably manufactured in other, less prosperous countries. In fact, many of the clothes, shoes, appliances, and housewares sold in the United States and Europe are produced by workers in the global South—Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America— speci‹cally for export to the rich industrialized countries. This is one of the most visible manifestations of economic globalization. Workers on this global assembly line,1 the majority of whom are women, are subject to haz- ardous working conditions, poor pay, and long hours. Understanding the link between globalization and gender requires a vision of the process that is multifaceted and goes far beyond export production to its effects on cul- tures, identities, and politics. Even so, these aspects of change are rooted in the growing integration of national economies as people, goods, machines, and ‹nancial capital ›ow across national borders.

Relations of trade and exchange have long had signi‹cant international dimensions. Venetian merchants, for example, facilitated trade between Europe and the Middle East during the Crusades. Marco Polo’s travels led to trade with China, and Dutch merchants plied their wares between northern Europe, Indonesia, and Africa. In 1600 Queen Elizabeth granted a monopoly charter to the English East India Company to secure the rights of English merchants to exploit India. These examples highlight the long global history of commerce.

But international trade today differs in both qualitative and quantita- tive ways from the global trading of earlier eras. Electronic technologies make global communications instantaneous, and new methods of handling cargo (containerization) have drastically reduced transportation costs. As a result, transnational corporations are now able to relocate their manufac- turing operations to parts of the world characterized by low wages and business-friendly political regimes. The geographic mobility of capital

95鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

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Sarah Miraglia

Chapter From: Barker, Drucilla, K. & Feiner, Susan. Liberating Economics: Feminist Perspectives on Family, Work, and Globalization. University of Michigan Press, 2004.

limits the ability of national governments to protect their citizens and undermines the power of workers to organize for better working condi- tions. At the same time, an increasingly conservative political rhetoric has emerged that champions free markets and rationalizes the dismantling of progressive labor legislation, health and safety standards, environmental protections, and social welfare programs.

Globalization creates winners and losers, exacerbating relations of dependency and exploitation. Critics of globalization argue that unfettered global trade causes greater inequality within and between nations. Income, wealth, health, and education are concentrated into fewer hands, while an ever larger share of the world’s population is consigned to poverty, disease, and illiteracy. The proponents of free trade argue that narrowly circum- scribed government regulation, combined with the free mobility of capital, will, in the long run, bene‹t everyone everywhere. In this view, free mar- kets have the potential to bring prosperity, via Western-style economic growth, to the impoverished peoples of the world. As feminist economists we are suspicious of the claim that national and transnational markets will meet everyone’s social needs. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, markets often fail to value caring labor, they do not eliminate discrimination, and they do not, on their own, reduce poverty or unemployment. Globalization is a feminist issue precisely because it plays a central role shaping labor markets by reinforcing the status quo gender division of labor and under- mining the ability of states to enact progressive social policies.

What’s in a Name?

The terminology used in any taxonomy of the world’s peoples and economies reveals quite a bit about the various ways of understanding global hierarchy and privilege.2 The term the Third World has its origins in the Cold War. In this taxonomy, the capitalist economies of the indus- trialized world were designated the First World, while the centrally planned economies of the Soviet Union and its satellites were designated the Second World. To assert their independence from the superpowers, leaders of countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Latin America formed an alliance they named the Third World. Initially this alliance re›ected their common interests stemming in a shared agenda for economic development. But by the end of the 1980s the Third World nations were more different than alike so that today the name no longer designates a cohesive geographical group.3

Liberating Economics

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

The terms center and periphery are similar to the terms First World and Third World. This classi‹cation was created by Marxist development economists to highlight the relationships of power and dependency between the rich, industrialized countries of Europe and North America and the poor, primarily agricultural exporting countries of Latin America, South America, Asia, and Africa. In this view, the colonizing center had tremendous economic power, while the colonized periphery depended on the center for education, capital, and technology.

Taxonomies do not correspond exactly to geography. There are pockets of the Third World within the First World. Some of these communities are created as poor people migrate, legally or illegally, to the wealthy indus- trialized countries seeking work as domestic servants or migrant farm laborers or other poorly paid, unpleasant jobs. Others are created when deindustrialization—the export of manufacturing to low-wage regions— destroys the economic base of cities. In many rural areas in the United States, the increasing concentration and centralization of food production by transnational agri-business has driven thousands of small family farms into bankruptcy, undermining regional prosperity.4 In sharp contrast, privileged elites in both the North and the global South live lives of lux- ury and ease in walled compounds and gated communities.

Scholars still use the category Third World but call attention to the fact that it is a contested term, expressing a relationship to centers of privilege and power. It does not refer to an essential attribute of people so designated, nor does it necessarily refer to a particular geographical location.5 Never- theless, it can still be said that the poor countries of the Third World, or the periphery, retain certain characteristics that set them apart from the rich, industrial nations. Many Third World countries suffer from severe eco- nomic deprivation, the people and the environment are harshly exploited, and the processes of globalization have created more misery, violence, and political unrest.6 For this reason, the terms North and global South, with their geographical speci‹city, are often useful. The North refers to the rich, industrialized countries of North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia, while the global South refers to the countries of Latin America, South America, Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Paci‹c Islands.

Some international organizations classify nations by income or their degree of development: as high, middle, or low income or as industrialized, developing, or least developed. These classi‹cations require us to specify exactly what we mean by the term economic development. Is economic development a synonym for market-driven economic growth? Or is it a

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

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process that is directed at creating greater income equality, less poverty, cleaner and safer environments, better maternal health, reduced infant mortality, improved mass literacy, and greater longevity? The United Nations tacitly adopts the latter view of economic development when it promulgates the Human Development Index (HDI), a way of ranking nations that goes beyond the simple metric of per capita income to address the degree of human development, as measured by factors such as life expectancy, literacy, and education as well as income. The HDI yields important information because it re›ects a much more robust vision of eco- nomic well-being than the usual per capita income rankings.

Global Privilege and Global Misery

The dehumanizing brutality of poverty and deprivation that haunts much of the world’s population does not go away with our choice of global tax- onomy or development metric. Almost half of the world’s population, 2.8 billion people, live on less than $2 a day, and 1.2 billion of them live in even more extreme poverty, surviving—barely—on less than $1 per day. In South Asia, for example, 44 percent of the population lives at this level.7

Today, the average income in the richest twenty countries is now thirty- seven times that of the poorest. There are, moreover, enormous disparities of income and wealth within the industrialized countries. Recent interna- tional estimates ‹nd that one person in eight in the rich countries will experience some aspect of poverty like long-term unemployment, income less than the national poverty line, or a literacy level below that which is needed to function in society.8

Women and girls experience far more than their share of this depriva- tion. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), three-‹fths of the world’s billion poorest people are women and girls. Two- thirds of the one billion adults who cannot read are female, and women also represent a growing proportion of the people living with HIV/AIDS. More than half the world’s migrants are women, and women and children com- prise more than 80 percent of the world’s ‹fty million refugees.9

Today’s global inequalities are a continuation of the West’s colonial excesses. The former colonies of England, France, Holland, Spain, Portu- gal, Germany, and Russia provided the raw minerals, precious metals, and cash crops like coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, and sugar that were essential to the emergence of capitalism and consumer society.10 The colonies were also important markets for manufactured goods. As Eric Hobsbawm’s Industry

Liberating Economics

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and Empire makes clear, Western economic progress depended upon colo- nial exploitation.11

From the seventeenth through the twentieth centuries, the imperialist nations of Europe relied upon a combination of bribery, force, and persua- sion to impose political, cultural, and economic systems upon the institu- tions and customs of indigenous peoples. When indigenous kinship struc- tures, economic relations, or patterns of land use interfered with colonial interests, they were undermined or destroyed. Consider the transformation of indigenous family life. European colonizers brought with them a model of the Western, patriarchal family, with all its rigidities regarding the sex- ual division of labor and appropriate spheres for women and men. When Victorian gender ideology was grafted onto existing traditional, patriar- chal social norms, gender inequalities in colonial societies were exacer- bated, worsening women’s social and economic status. An example illus- trates this point.

In many African and Asian countries, women, not men, had primary responsibility for agricultural work. The land was held and farmed com- munally. When the Europeans changed the laws of land ownership and the patterns of land use to mirror those of the West, women lost their custom- ary rights to farm the land. Women thus lost the food security provided by subsistence agriculture.12 In Asia and in Africa, as in much of the rest of the world, feeding families is a woman’s responsibility. As women were squeezed out of agriculture and pushed into economic dependency in the household, their social status declined. Under colonial rule, this process occurred around the world, systematically undermining women’s ability to carry out the work of social reproduction.

The period of colonial expansion came to an end in the decades follow- ing World War II as the European colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were overthrown and newly independent nation-states were formed. These new nations, which came into existence in the context of the international order shaped by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, faced serious challenges in creating cohesive national identities and sovereign political institutions.13 They were extremely poor. Their industrial infrastructure—roads, factories, and communication net- works—had been built to meet the needs of the colonial powers rather than their own. Moreover, their economic, social, and political structures and institutions had been severely disrupted. These problems were exacerbated by the Cold War because these new countries became the terrain upon which the ideological battles between the United States and the Soviet

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

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Union were played out. This created a fertile ground for an international economic order that overwhelmingly favored the interests of the industri- alized North while pushing the new nation-states of the Third World deeper and deeper into poverty and militarism.14

The institutions for regulating international economic relations—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Recon- struction and Development (now called the World Bank), and the Gen- eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—also came into being at the end of World War II. Regulating international ‹nance was the job of the IMF, providing long-term development loans was the function of the World Bank, and setting the rules for international trade was the province of the GATT (which is no longer in existence, having evolved into the World Trade Organization, or WTO). All of these institutions were dominated by policymakers and academics trained in Western Europe and the United States. They believed that the solution to the extreme poverty and immiseration of the Third World was Western-style economic development. Economists and policymakers endorsed a simple recipe: Third World development required rural, subsistence-agricul- tural economies to transform themselves in the image of the West and become modern, industrialized, high-consumption market systems. The stages through which economies passed in their development from tradi- tional to modern could be speeded up through large-scale, government- directed investments in infrastructure like dams, factories, roads, and energy generation.15

Women and Development

From its inception, economic development affected women and men dif- ferently. Systematic attention to the issues around women and develop- ment began in 1970s as a result of the convergence of interests of two dif- ferent groups of women, the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women and the global women’s movement.16 The United Nations group was primarily interested in legal and educational equality for women, while feminists in the U.S. women’s movement were primarily interested in equal pay and equal employment. As their interests converged, the United Nations declared 1975 the Year of the Woman and marked this with a world conference in Mexico City. Subsequently, 1976 to 1985 was designated by the United Nations as the Decade for Women, with two more conferences, one in Copenhagen (1980) and one in Nairobi (1985).

Liberating Economics

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

Although a variety of interests and agendas regarding women’s status and gender equality were advanced, by 1980 the emphasis on women and development was ‹rmly established. “ ‘Women in Development’ became the Decade’s overnight catchphrase, a seductive one, which for a time at least, could evade the question of what kind of development women were to be drawn into.”17

The work of the feminist economist Ester Boserup played a crucial role in turning attention to the impact of development on women. Boserup’s monumental 1970 work Women’s Role in Economic Development set the stage for a long-running, extremely in›uential debate. Boserup accepted the dominant view that development involves the gradual change from subsis- tence family production to specialized production and commodi‹cation.18

Her important insight was that as development takes place, the socioeco- nomic functions of the family change, and these changes lead to changes in women’s roles and status. Boserup questioned the prevailing gender ideol- ogy that saw men as farmers and women as housewives. She argued that although women the world over did seem to have a monopoly on food preparation and other household tasks, this did not mean that men were the ones who did the farming. On the contrary, in much of the developing world food was produced primarily by women, with little help from men. In these female farming systems women’s agricultural work was essential to familial and hence national well-being. Nowhere was this better exem- pli‹ed than sub-Saharan Africa, which Boserup deemed the “region of female farming par excellence.”19

Boserup showed how women’s status in agricultural societies was deter- mined by their contributions to food production. Thus the change from female to male farming systems entailed the loss of both status and free- dom for women. As farming became more Europeanized, men monopo- lized the ownership of animals and machines. This process was exacerbated by European colonial administrators who, blinded by their Victorian gen- der ideology, ignored female farmers and reorganized agricultural produc- tion in ways that forced men to cultivate commercial crops for export. Although they saw that it was the women, not the men, who were chie›y responsible for farming, the Europeans believed that farmwork was far more appropriate for men than it was for women. The fact that indigenous men didn’t actually do agricultural work was attributed to laziness and not to the patterns of work and reproduction that had prevailed in the precolo- nial era. So great was the distaste of the Europeans for female farming sys- tems that in many cases women’s customary land use rights were taken

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

101鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

away and given to their husbands. Boserup forcefully demonstrated how women’s loss of status and freedom in African societies followed directly from the colonial policies of European imperialists.

The emergence of small family business in villages and towns also plays an important role in the transition from a subsistence agricultural economy to a commodity exchange economy. Here, too, Boserup saw women’s dis- advantage. In the transition from an agrarian precapitalist economy to an industrial capitalist economy, men’s customary right to dispense of women’s labor often is transformed into a right to a woman’s wages (if she works for pay) or a right to any pro‹ts women may earn as a result of their handicraft activities or the sales of foodstuffs. It is also important to con- sider the differential importance of human reproduction and fertility in agrarian versus industrial/urban society. As an economic system becomes more commercialized, the physical labor of children becomes less necessary to familial well-being, so children are no longer economic assets to the family. Pregnancy and breast feeding become obstacles to women’s eco- nomic independence since, according to Boserup, they interfered with women’s ability to fully participate in a modern industrial economy. Boserup, always mindful of similarities between developed and developing societies, reminds us that the power structure within large institutions continues to mirror the gender and age hierarchies of subsistence economies: the old men hold the highest positions, young men vie with each other to step into the shoes of the male leaders, women serve men, and the only space for very young women is at the bottom. Indeed, one funda- mental difference between women and men that is relatively constant across cultures, economies, and continents is that few women are permit- ted to rise in the social hierarchy as they age.

Boserup’s work has been subject to feminist criticism. Lourdes Benería and Gita Sen argue that Boserup ignored the exploitation of women in global capitalism.20 In other words, Boserup saw the spread of capitalism as a basically liberating force for women since she believed that the expan- sion of wage labor, and the commodi‹cation of food, clothing, health, and education, would free women from drudgery and domestic subordination. Benería and Sen point out the ›aws in this view, arguing that even as cap- italism spreads, women continue to be economically marginalized, not because they are less productive but because their subordinate gender sta- tus is reinforced as they are drawn into female occupations. Moreover, Ben- ería and Sen point out that Boserup overlooks the social signi‹cance of the unpaid labor performed in households and communities that is necessary

Liberating Economics

102鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

to maintain and reproduce the labor force. Reproductive labor includes childcare, cooking, and cleaning. (This concept is very close to the concept of caring labor discussed in chapter 3, the main difference being it includes tasks necessary to sustain life that do not necessarily involve caring: e.g., doing the laundry.) Since women are responsible for the overwhelming majority of reproductive work, one cannot understand women’s economic roles without considering how the tendency of market systems to under- value reproductive labor determines the relationship between reproductive and productive labor.

Boserup had, of course, noticed that in the societies she studied women did the cooking and cleaning. She also wrote about the adverse impact of this division of labor on women’s status and freedom. Ultimately, however, it was her conception of modernization and development that prevented her from treating reproductive work as analytically separate from produc- tive labor. As economic development proceeds, fewer and fewer goods and services are produced within the family, and more and more are produced by specialized private ‹rms, the government, or other public institutions. The question is how far should this process of specialization and com- modi‹cation go?

Although Boserup did not answer this question directly, she did argue that all contemporary societies are in a process of transition whereby sub- sistence production within the home will be (eventually) supplanted by specialized production for exchange. In her view, reproductive labor is not and should not be looked at as analytically distinct because work is work. This is not a trivial issue, and in many ways Boserup anticipated the con- temporary debates about welfare-state policies, especially as they relate to the provision of childcare and eldercare.

It is also important to note that Boserup’s conception of development mirrors the processes and transitions that occurred in Europe and North America. In this she is not alone. Most development economists (this was an interesting point of tangency between mainstream and Marxist econo- mists) agreed that the development of the Third World would mimic that of the First. In other words, the processes of industrialization and modern- ization that characterized the West embodied inevitable and universal stages that the rest of the world had to pass through to develop. The path from nomadic farming, to peasant landholding, to small artisan enter- prises, to industrial capitalism was inevitable. Nations and peoples could be helped through these stages by experts from the World Bank, the United Nations, and other international development agencies.

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

103鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

Gender, Debt, and Development

In the decades of the 1960s and 1970s development agencies like the World Bank ‹nanced massive, large-scale industrial projects encouraging nations to build high-technology factories and huge hydroelectric systems to provide energy to growing urban centers. Development agencies also encouraged the introduction of large-scale mechanized farming to increase agricultural productivity. As yields per acre rose, this increased crop sup- plies and drove down market prices. Falling output prices pushed subsis- tence farmers off the land, while export-oriented plantation monoculture expanded.

This process was typical of the Green Revolution, which championed the widespread use of new hybrid seeds to increase farming yields. The new seed types, unlike traditional crops, required massive amounts of fertilizer and water. Subsistence farmers could rarely afford the fertilization and irri- gation needed to cultivate these crops, but large plantations could. The Green Revolution promised more rapid growth and prosperity for all, but these did not materialize. Instead in many instances the Green Revolution sparked a decline in the production of food for domestic consumption, widespread migrations of men from the countryside to the cities in search of employment, and a signi‹cant rise in the number of poor, female-headed households.21 By the early 1980s these problems were compounded by what came to be known as the Third World debt crisis.

The conditions for the Third World debt crisis of the 1980s were put in place during the 1970s. The steep rise in the price of oil that took place in 1973 and 1979 fattened the bank accounts of the oil-exporting nations. The accumulation of these proceeds, called petrodollars, in international banks allowed the bankers to go on a lending spree, ignoring virtually all known principles of sound lending policy.22 Simply put, in the 1970s the world’s ‹nancial markets were ›ush with cash, demand for loans in the Western economies was weak, and real interest rates were extremely low. Govern- ments and entrepreneurs in the Third World countries sought ‹nancing for extravagant development projects, and the international ‹nancial commu- nity was happy to oblige.23 The net result was that by the 1980s the poor and middle-income countries were deeply mired in international debt.

In the 1980s the economic climate changed with serious repercussions for the international balance sheets of the export-dependent Third World nations. In the 1980s the industrialized economies were in recession, the prices of basic commodities (grains, coffee, sugar, and the like) were

Liberating Economics

104鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

falling, and interest rates were rising. The interest on Third World nations’ debts rose at the same time that their foreign export earnings fell. As if these problems were not serious enough, double-digit in›ation and badly managed, often corrupt, public sectors further undermined economic recovery. In this situation many Third World countries were simply unable to meet the payments on their international loans. The crisis came to a head in 1982 when Mexico announced that it was close to defaulting on its $800 million foreign debt. Other countries soon followed suit. These nations faced a dif‹cult choice. If they de‹ed the international ‹nancial community and defaulted on their debts, they would lose the opportunity to borrow in the future. Or they could accept the stringent conditions imposed by the lending agencies—structural adjustments—for debt rescheduling and payment.24

Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) are austerity programs imple- mented in indebted countries as a condition of receiving the additional loans necessary to meet debt obligations and avoid default. SAPs were designed and implemented just as economists and politicians rejected the belief that government planning (with help from development experts) was good for economic development. In the old view, tradition was seen as the principle impediment to economic development. In the new view, government inter- vention in markets—including public works projects, public support for health and education systems, and income redistribution—is the main prob- lem. This shift in thinking re›ects the in›uence of neoliberalism. Propo- nents of neoliberalism advocate a restricted role for national governments and promote market-oriented policies such as free trade, deregulation, and the privation of social services.

Re›ecting this thinking, SAPs were premised on the notion that coun- tries could return to economic health and repair their economies if and only if they reduced the size and in›uence of government on economic activity and opened all their markets to international economic forces. SAPs called for the reorganization of the economy: nations were to increase their exports and decrease their imports. As their foreign exchange balances rose, they would be able to meet debt repayment schedules, and as their debt was reduced, economic growth would accelerate. To these ends countries were required to devalue their currencies to encourage exports, make substantial cuts in public sector spending to reduce the size of the government sector, remove subsidies and price supports to eliminate interference in markets, and shift resources toward the production of goods for export rather than domestic consumption.

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

105鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

It is certainly true that policy changes were needed in Third World countries. Borrowed funds were often wasted by politically powerful and corrupt elites. Some development projects were ill-conceived. Third World rulers were encouraged to spend billions on weapons, and billions more ended up in the Swiss bank accounts of arms merchants, politicians, and drug dealers.25 Moreover, most Third World countries are character- ized by extreme inequalities of income, wealth, and status. This results in what the economists Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey Sachs have called ‹scal indiscipline.26 When powerful, high-income groups refuse to bear their share of the tax burden needed to maintain basic public sector activi- ties, the government is forced to borrow (de‹cit ‹nance) to keep roads pass- able, electricity ›owing, hospitals open, schools operating, and the mili- taries armed.

Borrowing is the easy way out in this situation. But when debt service becomes unsustainable, and the IMF steps in, the poor are left to pay for the ruinous policies of the well-to-do elites, and the public programs upon which they depended are eliminated. The poverty, hardship, and deprivations caused by SAPs fall disproportionately on the shoulders of women and children because women comprise a disproportionate share of the poor. Under the conditions imposed by SAPs, women’s work burdens increase: they have to work longer hours to earn the same income, they have to do more household labor because public supports are gone, and they have to work harder to get food since more food is directed to export markets.27

Feminist economists recognize the gendered effects of the debt crisis and structural adjustment. Many believe that the women in development (WID) framework, informed by Boserup’s work, is not adequate for theo- rizing these new problems. The question for WID practitioners and schol- ars was how to integrate women into existing development processes. They did not question the underlying view that equated development with Western-style modernization or the Anglo-European gender division of labor. Women’s subordination was seen as the result of con›icts between individual women and men, not the result of the impact of globalization on the complex intersections of gender, race, class, and nationality. Gender and development (GAD) emerged as a new framework for addressing the economic bases of the structural problems facing poor women in the global South.

The GAD framework, which emerged during the 1980s, takes the social construction of gender and its interconnections with class, race, ethnicity,

Liberating Economics

106鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

and nationality as its starting point. In this view, gender is a relational term, referring to the differing roles, rights, and opportunities assigned to women and men. Women’s subordination can be understood as a conse- quence of a gender division of labor that assigns them to reproductive tasks. (As discussed in chapter 3, the gender division of labor has signi‹cant consequences for families and for the economy as a whole.) The GAD approach illuminates unequal power relations between women and men and facilitates an examination of all social, political, cultural, and eco- nomic structures from a gender perspective. The implication is that all eco- nomic policies and programs are likely to have asymmetric impact on women and men since they occupy different social locations. Gender analy- ses highlight asymmetric effects of economic and social policies that are hidden by conventional theorizing.

For example, GAD theorists Diane Elson and Lourdes Benería demon- strate that macroeconomic models that treat labor like non-produced inputs such as land are misleading. Diane Elson argues that the implicit assumption in such models is that the work necessary to maintain and reproduce the labor force, what has come to be known as caring labor, will be forthcoming independent of its valuation and compensation. When feminist analysis is applied to SAPs, this assumption is revealed and demonstrates that the full economic costs of structural adjustment were seriously underestimated. The bulk of these costs fall mainly on women and girls as they increase their paid and unpaid working hours.

Structural adjustment required government spending cutbacks on health, education, and other social services. As public provisioning was reduced, families had to provide these services for themselves or go with- out them altogether. Costs were shifted from the monetized public sector to the nonmonetized household sector. Policymakers assumed that there was an unlimited supply of women’s labor available to compensate for the reduction in public sector social services. Since the value of household labor is not of‹cially counted, these costs were hidden.28

Although the costs were hidden, the facts are not. The unavoidable con- clusion is that SAPs have failed to help poor countries. Today, the major- ity of middle- and low-income countries are still weighed down by inter- national debt obligations. That this debt can never be repaid is also coming to be recognized. At this count there are forty-one heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), most of which are in Africa. In 1999, the leaders of the G8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) endorsed the HIPC Initiative. The initiative built

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

107鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

on the Jubilee 2000 movement that was an international campaign to pres- sure the leaders of the leading industrial nations (the G8) to cancel the unpayable debts of the poorest countries by the year 2000. Research by Oxfam found that the HIPC Initiative will not resolve the debt crisis of the world’s poorest countries since it is too little too late.29 The entire initia- tive remains tied to IMF structural adjustment conditions, and like other debt relief efforts it is designed to bail out the creditors, not the region’s poor.

Although SAPs are a failure, a few of the middle-income countries have had some success emerging from poverty and debt. These countries, mainly but not exclusively, in Southeast Asia are known as the newly industrializing countries (NICs). South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Mexico, and Brazil all pursued what are known as export-led development strategies. Following the advice of the World Bank and the IMF, these countries opened themselves to world trade to generate export earnings. Simultaneously they opened their ‹nancial markets to interna- tional investors to attract large in›ows of private capital. This capital was used to ‹nance export-led development strategies, the most signi‹cant form of which involves subcontracting in export-processing/free-trade zones.

Factories without Borders

Free trade is not a new idea. Indeed, it’s been at the heart of mainstream economics for a long time. The idea is that different countries have differ- ent natural resources, labor force talents and skills, and industrial capaci- ties. Due to these differences, some countries can produce certain goods at relatively lower costs than others. Every country will bene‹t if it specializes in the production of those goods and services where it has the largest rela- tive cost advantage (i.e., faces the lowest relative production costs) and trades for the others.30 This is the principle of comparative advantage, and it provides a theoretical and rhetorical justi‹cation for free trade.

Free trade is, however, somewhat of a misnomer. In practice the statutes and regulations that govern international trade ‹ll countless volumes and vast libraries. Trade agreements—the formal, negotiated rule and regula- tions guiding how and what nations can trade with each other—can be multilateral (like the WTO), regional (like the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA), or bilateral (between two countries) agreements. These agreements have made it easier for transnational corporations to

Liberating Economics

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

move their relatively labor-intensive production processes to poor, low- wage countries in the Global South. These poorer countries, so the story goes, have a comparative advantage in assembly line production. Since wages are low in poor countries (since water is falling from the sky when it rains), internationalizing production bene‹ts poor nations because employ- ment and export production will rise, increasing national income and eco- nomic growth. This sanguine state of affairs also bene‹ts transnational stockholders since the company can now produce at lower costs. Not to be left out are First World consumers who gratefully purchase the goods at their lower prices. Even a cursory examination of the facts, however, casts doubt on this Panglossian conclusion.

One of the ways that countries attract foreign capital is through the development of special geographic areas called free trade zones (FTZs) or export-processing zones (EPZs). The maquiladoras on the U.S.-Mexican border are well-known examples. Foreign factories import components for assembly and then export the ‹nished, or nearly ‹nished, products. The owners of the ‹rms that do the product assembly are not required to pay tariffs on the unassembled goods when they are imported or the assembled goods when they are exported. In addition to offering tax-free imports and exports, governments attract foreign investors to their EPZs by subsidiz- ing infrastructure support services such as water and electricity and exempting employers from labor laws and other regulations. In the words of the government of Bangladesh, “the primary objective of an EPZ is to provide special areas where potential investors would ‹nd a congenial investment climate, free from cumbersome procedures.”31 Similarly, the Zim- babwe government tells us “[the EPZ’s] highly streamlined investment facilitation framework allows an investor to set up operations without unnecessary delays. Its business is to help Zimbabwe develop into a value- added, technology driven, export-oriented economy.”32

Transnational corporations can internationalize their production in two ways. The ‹rst involves actually opening new factories in developing coun- tries like Mexico or Indonesia. This is called foreign direct investment (FDI), and research shows that most, around 80 percent, takes place between rich countries.33 Thus FDI is relatively rare in the developing countries. A far more common way for transnational corporations to carry out international production limits their involvement to the beginning and end of the product chain. That is, the transnational carries out the research needed to design the products and also the distribution and mar- keting needed to get them into consumers’ homes. The actual manufactur-

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

109鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

ing, which is the relatively labor-intensive part, is contracted out to facto- ries in countries where wages are low, unions are either weak or nonexis- tent, and environmental regulations are lax. Often these small to medium size factories are not owned and managed by the transnational corporation but rather by local entrepreneurs.

The feasibility of export-led industrialization is based on the availabil- ity of cheap labor to produce goods for export. In practice this means that export-led industrialization strategies require signi‹cant pools of women willing to work for low wages at monotonous, often hazardous, tasks.34 All over the world, most of the workers on the factory ›oor are female, while the supervisors and managers are male. This occupational segregation leads to a signi‹cant wage gap between women and men in the newly industri- alizing countries. As Table 6.1 illustrates, women make up anywhere from 31 percent to 47 percent of the nonagricultural labor force, and the gender wage gap ranges from 52 percent to 80 percent.

It’s important to point out that cheap labor means more than extremely low wages. Cheap labor also refers to the absence of health and safety pro- tections, employee bene‹ts, and social insurance to cover retirement, unemployment, or worker disability.35 Cheap labor is also ›exible labor: the work requires minimal training, the labor contracts are short-term, and there is no employment security. Around the world—in rich nations and poor—irregular labor force participation and a willingness to work for low

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110

TABLE 6.1. Female Share of Labor Force and Gender Wage Gap for Ten Selected Countries (%)a

Female Share (%)b Gender Wage Gap (%)

Botswana 47 52 Brazil 45 61 Eritrea 31 66 Hong Kong (China) 45 66 Korea (Republic) 38 59 Malaysia 36 63 Mexico 37 70 Philippines 41 80 Singapore 45 59 Thailand 47 68

Source: Data from UN Statistics Division, “The World’s Women, 2000: Trends and Statistics”; Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), “Progress of the World’s Women, 2002.”

aLatest availability data, 1995–2001. bNonagricultural employment.

鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

wages at jobs that do not require extensive training and carry little oppor- tunity for advancement are characteristics associated with women work- ers.36 The perception is that women in the developing world are docile, passive, and highly union resistant and hence easily subject to the disci- pline required by factory work.37 Thus, women’s attractiveness to transna- tional capital stems from their subordinate gender status. Yet poor work- ing women all over the world challenge this perception. At great personal cost, often risking their lives, they ‹ght to unionize and to force employers to provide more humane working conditions. The perception that women in the global South are docile re›ects their extremely limited options for earning income rather than any intrinsic gender traits.

Some argue that globalization entails a conversion of all labor to the conditions of female labor. They see a future where the global economy promises jobs that are more insecure, more ›exible, and even more poorly paid. As Guy Standing notes, the proportion of jobs requiring craft skills acquired through apprenticeship has declined, labor market regulations have been eroded, and unionized, full-time, stable jobs are disappearing. These jobs were traditionally the preserve of men who belonged to the aris- tocracy of labor. Standing refers to them as market insiders.38 Whatever we call them, they are becoming an endangered species as more men, as well as women, are pushed into insecure forms of labor. In Mexico, for example, large numbers of men are now doing what was once considered women’s work: they are low-wage employees doing work that requires little train- ing in factories producing textiles and electronics.39 The contemporary sit- uation of workers in the global South reminds us just how easy it is to exploit labor when there are few options for earning a livelihood, when there is an unlimited supply of people willing to work for subsistence wages, and when the power of the state to quash labor organizations is vir- tually unchecked by national or international institutions.

Globalization, and the technological change that fuels it, has created a situation in which only a minority of workers need specialist skills that require training and investment in human capital.40 The majority of people are consigned to jobs that require only rote learning and for which docility and malleability are the most important worker attributes.41 As early as the 1840s critics of capitalism talked about the division between manual and mental labor and decried the spread of mind-numbing work. Today, the global division of labor along these lines is becoming more not less pronounced. Sadly, after nearly one hundred years of progress we are seeing the reemergence of these labor conditions in the developed world as

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

111鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

well. Here, sweatshops, low-paid domestic labor, and menial, dead-end service sector jobs are now very likely to be the fate of many in the world’s largest, most cosmopolitan centers.

The Marketization of Governance

One of the important results of the liberalization of trade and ‹nance is that developing countries now compete with each other to attract foreign capital to ‹nance export-led development. Beginning in the mid-1980s, and continuing till the present, the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO urged countries all over the world to open their economies to the free ›ows of goods, services, and international ‹nancial capital. Only one commodity can’t follow the whims of the market: people. People, unlike goods, ser- vices, and money, are constrained by border police and immigration of‹cials. The asymmetry of free-›owing commodities and capital, com- bined with the legal barriers to legal migration, further increases the power of transnational corporations to seek pro‹ts and disregard human costs. Nonetheless, free trade, capital mobility, privatization, and decreased gov- ernment regulation of transnational corporate activities were the panacea held out by elite policymakers as the solution to poverty and underdevel- opment. Because this view re›ects the disproportionate in›uence of the United States on international institutions, this conceptual framework is called the Washington consensus.42

The SAPs that were imposed in the 1980s were one manifestation of this framework. The ways that multilateral and regional trade agreements are constructed and enforced is another. These agreements, like SAPs, ignore gender equity and other social concerns and implicitly assume that women will continue to provide the caring labor necessary for social repro- duction, regardless of the additional burdens placed on them.

The scope of contemporary trade agreements far exceeds the movement of goods and capital. Indeed they are replacing democratically enacted laws and regulations on the national level with international edicts. This has been referred to as marketization of governance.43 The rights of citizens to enact laws protecting public health, workers’ rights, or the environment are secondary to the “rights” of corporations to expand their markets and earn pro‹ts. The WTO, for example, has no minimum standards regarding health, safety, workers’ rights, or the environment but does have the judi- cial power to dismantle national standards regarding these things.

This power stems from the fact that trade agreements do more than just

Liberating Economics

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

eliminate tariffs on imported goods and services. They also require nations to eliminate what are called nontariff trade barriers. Nontariff trade barri- ers are national regulations that prohibit imports that do not meet certain content standards, licensing requirements, or safety and environmental regulations. These regulations may be deemed barriers to trade under the rules of the WTO. For example, the WTO has required Europe to allow the importation of hormone-treated beef despite well-founded concerns about its health effects, and the United States has been forced to abandon its efforts to outlaw the sale of tuna caught with nets that endanger turtles and other ‹sh.44 When national standards about content, safety, and the environment are replaced by international standards (set by supranational organizations and negotiated in secret), trade “harmonization” is said to take place. George Orwell was prescient: under the rules of globalization, war is peace, and harmony is dissonance on a world scale.

Trade rules, which also apply to investment, prohibit national govern- ments from giving preferential treatment to domestic industries and can even require that governments compensate corporations for any loss of pro‹ts caused by changes in public policies. NAFTA provides a case in point. It explicitly allows Canadian, U.S., or Mexican investors to sue the host government if their companies’ assets, including the intangible prop- erty rights of expected pro‹ts, are damaged by laws or regulations. The case of Methanex v. United States is an excellent example. In this case the California legislature voted to ban methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), a carcinogenic fuel additive. Methanex, the Canadian company that manu- factures MTBE, sued the U.S. government for $970 million in compensa- tion for the damage California was in›icting on its future pro‹ts.45 Cases such as these do not go to court but rather are heard by secret arbitration panels. This case was no different. It was eventually settled, and California has dropped its opposition to MTBE. A similar situation occurred when the Canadian government proposed requiring all cigarettes to be sold in plain black-and-white packages with vivid warnings about the health effects of smoking. Cigarette companies in the United States threatened to sue, and although the suit was dropped, the Canadian government dropped its plan to regulate cigarette packaging.46

These examples are all from wealthy, industrialized countries with the legal, ‹nancial, and political resources to resist corporate abuses. Consider then how much more dire the situation is for developing countries without such resources and with the urgent need to create jobs. The environmental degradation of the global South is well-known: severe air pollution in

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

major metropolitan areas, water pollution from the runoff of pesticides and fertilizer in the countryside, deforestation and soil erosion, and the loss of animal and plant habitats. The marketization of governance and unchecked power of transnational corporations only exacerbate these prob- lems.

Privatization, in particular the privatization of services, is another key component of the marketization of governance. Health, education, and water services are all targets of transnational corporations who view them as pro‹t-making opportunities rather than as services that states are obli- gated to provide for their citizens. Privatization is a key component of SAPs, and so as a condition for debt relief, many poor countries were forced to abandon public spending on water, health, and education. This has cre- ated opportunities for private, for-pro‹t companies to come in and sell these services as commodities. As a result, many people who lack the income to purchase these basic services must make do without them.

The trend in water service is particularly troubling. Water, which is an absolute necessity for human life, and access to it should be a human right, is becoming increasingly scarce. According to United Nations estimates over one billion people do not have access to clean water and two and half billion do not have adequate sanitation and sewage. In the face of this scarcity, water is becoming just another commodity to enhance corporate pro‹tability. The World Bank provides ‹nancing for water privatization. The WTO allows national laws protecting public water systems to be chal- lenged as trade barriers, and the IMF has required countries to adopt water privatization as a condition for loan renewal.47

The consequences of privatization, combined with the protections offered to transnational corporate pro‹ts, raise particularly troubling prob- lems for all citizens concerned with gender equity and progressive public policies. As has been shown time and time again, women are generally responsible for providing healthcare, education, safe food, and clean water for their families, tasks that are made far more dif‹cult by the privatization of social services. Feminist economist Marjorie Grif‹n Cohen points out that national governments are increasingly reluctant to subsidize national services providing childcare, healthcare, and so forth because some of these services are provided by private, for-pro‹t companies who may charge that government-subsidized services constitute nontariff trade barriers and threaten their pro‹ts.48 Likewise, Farah Fosse, of the International Gender and Trade Network, points out that women make up the majority of ser- vice workers. Many of these jobs are in the public sector, which provides

Liberating Economics

114鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

relatively better job security and bene‹ts. When public sector employment is reduced, women lose good jobs. In addition, af‹rmative action programs and other preferences for marginalized workers may be considered trade restrictions further limiting women’s opportunities.49 And, of course, when education is privatized, particularly in the poorest countries, girls are pulled out of school ‹rst.

The liberalization of international ‹nance is another aspect of the mar- ketization of governance. Countries were persuaded to open their ‹nancial markets—their markets for stocks, bonds, and currency—to foreign spec- ulators working for large institutional investment ‹rms. Money managers send speculative balances around the world seeking the highest returns. This is called portfolio investment. Managers of mutual funds, hedge funds, and pension funds can buy and sell at a whim the ‹nancial assets— stocks, bonds, and currency—of other countries, including developing countries.50 This has drastically changed the structure of debt in the devel- oping countries. In 1981, before the Third World debt crisis erupted, 77 percent of the foreign investment in developing countries was ‹nanced by stable, long-term, bank loans. By 1993, 74 percent of the foreign invest- ment in developing countries was portfolio investment.

Portfolio investment can induce widespread economic instability because capital is as free to leave as it was to arrive. Moreover, the invest- ment decisions by money managers are not made on the basis of sound cal- culations about the pro‹tability of particular ventures like new factories, infrastructure, or housing. They are instead gambles, pure ‹nancial specu- lation. The current term for this phenomena is casino capitalism.51 As early as 1936 the economist John Maynard Keynes was critical of casino capital- ism. Students of economic history may remember his famous quote, “when the capital development of the country becomes a by-product of the activ- ities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done.”52

Casino capitalism fuels speculative bubbles that always burst. When they do, the people who borrowed the money and enjoyed its bene‹ts are rarely the same people who are left to pick up the tab. The Asian ‹nancial crisis is a good example. It began in Thailand during the late 1990s. Large amounts of unregulated and unrestricted capital ›owed into the country in the form of short-term loans. These loans ‹nanced the construction of shopping malls, of‹ce buildings, and apartments, fueling a speculative bubble that pushed real estate prices above their sustainable values. When the bubble burst, and speculative capital ›ed, the results were predictable. The baht (Thailand’s currency) fell radically in value, the Thai economy

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

115鐨鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅 � 鐅鐗鐕鐕鐙鐓鐅鐺鑓鑎鑛鑊鑗鑘鑎鑙鑞鐅鑔鑋鐅鐲鑎鑈鑍鑎鑌鑆鑓鐅鐵鑗鑊鑘鑘鐓鐅鐦鑑鑑鐅鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鑘鐅鑗鑊鑘鑊鑗鑛鑊鑉鐓鐅鐲鑆鑞鐅鑓鑔鑙鐅鑇鑊鐅鑗鑊鑕鑗鑔鑉鑚鑈鑊鑉鐅鑎鑓鐅鑆鑓鑞鐅鑋鑔鑗鑒鐅鑜鑎鑙鑍鑔鑚鑙鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑘鑘鑎鑔鑓鐅鑋鑗鑔鑒鐅鑙鑍鑊鐅鑕鑚鑇鑑鑎鑘鑍鑊鑗鐑鐅鑊鑝鑈鑊鑕鑙鐅鑋鑆鑎鑗鐅鑚鑘鑊鑘鐅鑕鑊鑗鑒鑎鑙鑙鑊鑉

鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

went into recession, and unemployment skyrocketed. Again the IMF bailed out the international ‹nanciers and left the Thai citizens saddled with more international debt and a deeply devalued currency. Once again, the consequences of ‹nancial speculation were gendered: the poor suffered the most—women make up the largest proportion of the poor, and women’s work burdens increased even as male unemployment increased.53

Conclusion

This chapter has covered a wide terrain both chronologically and concep- tually from the origins of development, to gender and development, to the marketization of governance. We have been quite critical overall of the effects of globalization on the lives and material well-being of the majority of the world’s population, and we have stressed that women and girls are the ones who suffer the most from neoliberal policies. The rights of corpo- rations to cross borders and earn pro‹ts are enshrined in law, while the rights of citizens to protect their health, their environment, and their eco- nomic futures are swept aside. Our critique does not, however, make us protectionists or isolationists. What we are arguing against is the marketi- zation of governance, the dismantling of publicly provided social services, and the unchecked power of elites to use people and natural resources with- out regard for the real social costs of their actions.

One signi‹cant social cost of globalization has been its pernicious effect on caring labor. To the extent that globalization encourages the expansion of markets, it has penalized the providers of care. Countries are able to stimulate economic growth by shifting production from unpaid care ser- vices to the production of market commodities. This is precisely what has happened as developing countries have pursued industrialization policies that rely on the labor supply of poor women willing to work for low wages and few bene‹ts.

Women’s increased labor force participation means that the care services they traditionally provided must now be purchased in the market or pro- vided by the state.54 As discussed in previous chapters, relatively af›uent women are able to purchase care services from the market. Women in poor households, on the other hand, have to shoulder the burdens themselves. The poorer the household, the greater the burden. In parts of Asia and Africa where male migration from rural areas to towns and cities is preva- lent, women are left to take care of the children and elderly. Absent sup-

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓

port from either husbands or the state, these women face triple burdens of caring labor, farming, and wage employment.55

One of the ways that women are coping with greater demands on their labor time is to participate in the informal sector of the economy. There they work as domestics, as home-based pieceworkers, as street vendors, and as sex workers. This sort of work is ›exible and allows women to combine earning a living with caring for their families. It is also insecure and poorly paid. We turn to this topic in our next chapter.

Globalization Is a Feminist Issue

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鑚鑓鑉鑊鑗鐅鐺鐓鐸鐓鐅鑔鑗鐅鑆鑕鑕鑑鑎鑈鑆鑇鑑鑊鐅鑈鑔鑕鑞鑗鑎鑌鑍鑙鐅鑑鑆鑜鐓