Post a (200 word APA Format) explanation of how the cultural differences in the ethical norms and codes of conduct in your chosen countries might affect a public administrator’s perception of human rights within that country. Then, explain how both global

GLOBAL ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFLECTIONjore_473 204..222

Sumner B. Twiss

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the contributions that the international human rights community can make to the definition and framing of a practically effective global ethic, especially in light of ongoing concerns about social and economic justice, environmental issues, and systematic abuses of vulnerable populations. The principal argument is that the human rights movement in all of its dimensions (moral, legal, political) provides the pivotal foundation for a practicable global ethic now and for the foresee- able future. Evidence for the truth of this claim is discerned in the movement’s contemporary efforts to intersect explicitly with other areas of international law and politics. Examples adduced include develop- ments with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples, decision making about the environment, and transitional justice.

KEY WORDS: global ethics, human rights, indigenous peoples, environ- ment, transitional justice

1. Introduction

This past year I co-convened a working group on defining global ethics under the auspices of a Geneva-based foundation called Globe- thics.net.1 In this essay, I will first report the findings of this group and then subsequently compare them to features of the modern human rights movement. My own principal argument in emendation to the report is that this movement already provides—and will continue to provide—one of the pivotal foundations, if not the most pivotal, for a practicable global ethic now and for the foreseeable future. I believe that the human rights contribution to global ethics may be obscured by a general lack of awareness about the history and development of the

1 My co-convenor was Gerhold K. Becker, and other members of the group included Shanta Premawardhana, Kiarash Aramesh, Oscar Carvajal, Abhik Gupta, John Hooker, John M. Itty, Eunice Kamaara, Thomas Kesselring, Yersu Kim, David W. Lutz, Richard Ondji’I Toung, Jonathan Chan, Ingrid Shafer, and Ariane Hentsch Cisneros.

JRE 39.2:204–222. © 2011 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

human rights movement itself, including some of its most recent advances. I begin with the findings of the working group.2

2. Global Ethics

The use of the phrase “global ethics” has risen in popularity in the last decade, to such an extent that there are growing numbers of non-governmental organization (NGO) declarations as well as scholarly and non-scholarly books and articles about the subject. At first blush, the language of global ethics seems not only benign but indeed pro- gressive with respect to identifying moral values and norms intended to advance the welfare of human beings and their relations with other entities on the planet—for example, social communities, other species, ecosystems, and the like. Such language conjures up a holistic moral vision of peace, harmonious relations, equity and justice, and sustain- able living and development. At the same time, however, the phrase also carries pejorative connotations for some people, not least because it calls to mind the phenomena of globalization in the economic sense associated with rampant capitalism, neo-liberal economics, and Western economic hegemony that all appear to have little regard for the developing world, their economies, and their social and environ- mental well-being. From this latter perspective, “global ethics” con- notes domination of the world by the powerful, homogenization under a reigning moral and political paradigm, and a presumption against moral, political, economic, and cultural diversity. So, the first problem that faced the working group was the challenge of clarifying these tensive nuances and then staking out a mediating position on the meaning of the phrase.

From the group’s perspective, using the phrase “global ethics” helps to identify a rather unique set of moral problems that either cut across national boundaries or at least are shared by diverse peoples and communities despite their different geographical locations—problems that need to be addressed holistically and cooperatively if they are to be solved pragmatically. In the first case—transboundary problems—it seems clear, for example, that air pollution, climate imbalance, inter- national crime, military conflict, and terrorism observe no national boundaries and require systematic cooperative redress. In the second case, many peoples and societies, despite their geographic and other

2 These findings were reported and discussed at Globethics.net’s Conference on Care and Compassion: Sharing Values across Cultures and Religions, Nairobi, January 25–29, 2009. Although I drafted the group’s initial outline of findings, that outline itself was modified by the discussion at the Nairobi conference, and it should be emphasized that my brief report here is a synthesis of various participants’ original insights as nuanced and amended by the Nairobi discussion.

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differences, suffer from, for example, poverty, starvation, malnutrition, discrimination, oppression, decreasing biodiversity, and environmental degradation—problems that also need systematic cooperative redress especially with external aid from the developed world. Indeed, in both types of problems, it appears that the ever intensifying interdepen- dence of the world—economically, socially, ecologically—makes them of such common human concern that they can only be resolved (or at least mitigated) by a coordinated effort by the entire world population.

Although technically, economic globalization may be a recent phe- nomenon, globalization in the broader sense of cultural interaction and mutual influence in all sectors of human activity has been going on for centuries, assisting in much human development across the world. In this broader sense, cultures are permeable to and learn from one another. Cultural and moral diversity is a fact and a positive asset insofar as cultures can pool their ideas, resources, and strategies in order to address common or shared problems. As is becoming clearer by the day (as I write this), even economic globalization may not entail complete economic hegemony by one part of the world over all the rest. But dismantling hegemony (and aspirations to it) does require looking at the common or shared problems from the perspective of those most deleteriously affected—the people’s perspective rather than the big power agents in the world (for example, state agents, transnational corporations, first world nations).3 The wager of the people’s perspec- tive is this: problems can be more accurately diagnosed from this point of view and thus solutions better discerned in the long run. So there is no gainsaying that the working group’s understanding of global ethics has a built-in bias toward victims—for example, the suffering, the starving, and the oppressed. And this bias has a further dimension: its perspective suggests that the “haves” of the world (with greater power and resources) bear greater causal responsibility for the world’s prob- lems (effects of past imperialism and colonialism; environmental deg- radation; and the like) and consequently have a greater moral responsibility for their redress or alleviation. This corollary, so to speak, is a matter of compensatory equity, or, for want of a better term, natural justice or fairness. Let me be clear that from the working group’s perspective, global ethics imbeds a normative moral vision involving interdependence, solidarity, equity, and mutual cooperation in addressing transboundary and common practical social issues.

One of the main points of morality—in a functional sense—is to enable human cooperation in the solution of practical problems, and

3This notion of the people’s perspective is inspired by Richard Falk’s important distinction between the perspective of globalization-from-below, in contrast to globalization-from-above (Falk 1993).

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one initial step toward developing a normative ethical strategy—of the sort involved in developing a global ethic—is to ask: what do the peoples of the world already share in terms of important moral values and norms, even if contested in some of their specifics? In answer to this question, the working group came up with the following set of observations. All known human societies have analogous moral rules regulating within the in-group such things as violence, sexual activity, deception and truth-telling, theft, and dispute settlement. Sometimes these rules are codified into laws and legal procedures, sometimes not, but it seems hard to dispute that such rules are the socio-moral glue that hold a society together and enable a modicum of cooperation in socially responding to internal and external challenges. All known moral traditions imbed some version of the Golden Rule (whether positively or negatively formulated), the operation of which is based on reciprocal thinking, empathy, enlightened self-interest, and some notion of moral autonomy—which is used to facilitate cooperation not only within their respective societies but also between members of their societies and strangers. In the latter regard, many (if not all) moral traditions also imbed notions of hospitality toward non- threatening strangers. So there is a propensity in such traditions to expand the morality of their societies beyond simply the in-group—this is a propensity, not a hard and fast rule. We also regularly encounter both within and across societies and traditions—especially in this world of telecommunications—fundamentally similar moral responses (emotions) of indignation or resentment at perceived unjust treatment of non-proximate others and of empathy, sympathy, or compassion for such others when they are treated badly or are suffering (as we ourselves would like not to suffer or be so treated). There is in fact a rough cross-cultural consensus on basic human rights norms bearing on physical and civil security, socio-economic necessities for human survival and flourishing, and the importance of special protections for vulnerable persons and populations (for instance, children, women, the elderly, minority ethnic groups). Indeed, the world community accepts as ius cogens (preemptory) norms the prohibitions of genocide, slavery, apartheid, torture, and grossly unfair criminal law practices, among others. This is not to say that some human rights norms (other than ius cogens) cannot conflict in certain situations, nor is it to say that all such norms are interpreted in precisely the same manner. But it is to say that there is a broad consensus or normative agreement on many human rights—one need only to ask the oppressed and suffering to see that this is so. Speaking practically therefore we have much to work with in developing a global ethic.

Since some might regard the preceding observations as constituting an unstable empirically based consensus, the working group pressed

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further to ask whether there might be any deeper (normative) justifi- cations for this consensus. We identified a number of lines of possible argument.4 For example: Many believe that a notion of intrinsic or inherent human dignity and inviolability grounds the consensus. Some propose that a notion of universalizability or generalizability implicit in the concept of morality itself serves as a test or indication of what is properly ethical or not. Yet others argue that the concept or principle of equal respect for persons is presupposed by any sincere human communication and deliberation about cooperative problem solving; that is, practical and reasonable discourse assumes such respect. Still others propose that the Golden Rule can be exegeted in such a way as not only to be implicit in human reasoning but also to demonstrably ground other norms such as equality, fairness, solidarity, and human rights. Yet others argue that many important moral norms may, upon reflection, be intuitively recognized as moral truths by any psychologi- cally sound person. Additionally, some argue that the very notion of a distinctively human life requires the development of certain capabili- ties of, for example, bodily health and integrity, imagination and thought, emotional attachment, affiliation, and control over one’s envi- ronment, that themselves entail threshold moral norms regarding these matters. And, finally, intermingled with, or independent of these appeals, there are the metaphysical or ontological commitments of various religious and philosophical world views that ground important moral norms of the sort we have identified.

Not surprisingly, the working group reached no agreement on how to argue this “meta-case.” However, all accepted the specifics of the first-level consensus above—that is, the observations about shared moral norms—and were committed to working on the second or meta-level with the expectation that whatever emerges will not undermine that consensus but rather deepen and extend it to help solve common practical problems. The reasons for lack of agreement about the meta-case varied considerably, ranging across skepticism about all universalist justifications as question-begging (essentia- list claims, a suspect foundationalist epistemology, and the like);5

worries about deflecting attention away from local cultural inter- pretations of norms; a sense that any global synthesis of moral values is better understood as aspirational rather than accomplished; and even a concern that the very attempts at deeper justifications

4 Certain lines of these arguments are illuminatingly discussed in, for example, Kim 1999; Enderle 2008; and Morsink 2009.

5 There is, of course, considerable literature now challenging the bases for universal- ist moral positions; see, for example, Chan 2002 and Stout 2004. My own view tilts toward a minimal natural law view combined with moral intuitionism.

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are themselves simply diversions from the primary importance of real-world practical problem solving. What I might at this point add to the working group’s meta-reflections is this observation: the apparent empirical consensus on practical moral norms appears explicitly supported by diverse lines of justification that converge on these norms. So, one might regard these diverse justifications as functioning in a complementary manner to provide a coordinated set of meta-arguments—that is, one large multi-faceted justification imbedding multiple supports or grounds for the consensus. At the very least, this observation might help explain the working group’s own sense of optimism that whatever happens at the meta-level will not undermine the consensus.

Taking into account these normative reflections and the fact that the practical problems identified earlier clearly thwart a good and flourishing life for all—both humanly and environmentally, and for present and future generations—the working group proposed the fol- lowing reasonable parameters for any global ethic worth its salt. First, the normative goal of a good life for all must include minimal material requirements regarding, for instance, nutrition, shelter, edu- cation, physical security, employment with decent wages, appropriate levels of health care, and a social security net of some sort. Second, national civil environments must secure respect for life, liberty, equal- ity, justice, equal access to opportunities for self-development, and political participation in all decision making that bears on the com- monweal. And third, an international civil environment must be fos- tered that aims at economic equity among nations, their equal access to the global commons, and their active cooperation in combating shared problems that threaten not only the peace of the world but also environmental well-being now and in the future. Implicit in these parameters are normative ideas that include as a species we ought to live in solidarity; strive for constructing and sustaining authentic communities that coordinate and balance individuality and sociality (self-realization and the common good); develop and maintain a sense of interdependence where all of us bear responsibility for all; develop practices of participatory decision making built on relational under- standings of the person and social and natural environments; view social, economic, and environmental problems as ecologically or holis- tically interrelated; resist and rectify by peaceful means political domination by the few at the expense of all others; and recognize that, due to past inequities and present power disparities, some soci- eties have a particular responsibility to assist others in redressing ongoing problems.

In effect, then, the working group took the position that a global ethic must provide an inclusive approach to address and redress

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transboundary and endemic practical problems that builds upon common moral values and principles grounded in a moral vision of human dignity, personal and social responsibility, and justice. There are, we believe, already certain important angles of orientation and commitment in the contemporary world that assist in meeting these challenges—for example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and subsequent declarations, conventions, and regulations; the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment (1972) and subse- quent environmental declarations, conventions, and regulations. These types of development enjoy significant international consensus, though they need to be supplemented by the effective development of both individual conscience and socio-cultural ethos expressing and sustain- ing a sense of active moral responsibility in both the short and long term for survival, well-being, and flourishing in both the present and future. The working group proposed that such responsibility can be most effectively developed and maintained through practical dialogues—at local, national, regional, and international levels— focusing on urgent transboundary problems and involving representa- tives of the pertinent multiple stakeholders in the deliberation and resolution of these problems.

Having articulated the moral vision of global ethics agreed upon by the entire working group, I now want to speak only for myself about a certain degree of myopia in this vision, especially with respect to the issue of practicability and working within the ongoing achieve- ments of the human rights movement in the past six decades. Despite the fact that the group referenced the international consensus on human rights, I believe that I would not be far wrong in saying that some members of the group were suspicious of the human rights regime and failed to appreciate that projecting a global ethic comes close to trying to reinvent the wheel of human rights norms, codifi- cation, and regulations rather than simply enlarging and making more effective a conveyance that already exists. I also suspect that some—both within and outside the working group—regard global ethics as a moral revolution that is best developed afresh with con- cepts perceived to be different than those of human rights—for example, interdependence, holism, relationality, and responsibility. By contrast, I believe (1) that precisely such concepts are already built into the human rights movement and regime, and (2) that this move- ment is itself an on-going, self-correcting, and constantly expanding moral (and legal) revolution of the sort desired. Operating from this perspective provides, in my view, a more realistic and practically effective dynamic of moral, political, and legal development rather than creating a global ethic de novo, and this is what I hope to show in the remainder of this essay.

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3. Revisiting Human Rights

Although the concept of human rights has a deep history stretching back to twelfth-century discussions of natural law and natural rights, the human rights movement came into its own as a modern social practice in the mid-twentieth century in the aftermath of World War II. Following two years of drafting and debate involving no fewer than fifty-six country delegations from all parts of the world and represent- ing many of the world’s philosophical, moral, and religious traditions, the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948, adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as a proclamation to the world that certain social and material conditions were so crucial to human survival and flourishing that they were henceforth to be regarded as entitlements for all persons simply by virtue of their humanity. The articles of the declaration mandated conditions of physi- cal and civil security, material and economic necessities, political and civil empowerments, and legal protections of various sorts. The day prior to the UDHR’s adoption, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was also adopted and opened for signature and ratification (coming into force in 1951).6 Thus was born the contemporary human rights movement, which in the ensuing six decades has seen the adoption of some twenty human rights conven- tions as well as numerous declarations, the development of a legal regime for enforcement, the additional development of regional con- ventions and courts, and the proliferation of thousands of human rights NGOs—local, national, regional, international—all dedicated to helping ensure that people’s human rights are met. The movement was a global one from its very inception, and it was (and continues to be) explicitly designed to accept (within constraints) moral, political, legal, religious, and cultural diversity.

The movement has an in-built people’s bias or perspective, and its developments since 1948 have been specifically targeted for various vulnerable populations and groups the world over. These developments are responsive not only to historical and political crises—for instance, the dismantling of colonialism, special difficulties regarding social discrimination, and problems of the stateless and refugees—but also to hermeneutical interpretation, refinement, and expansion of the origi- nal set of rights outlined in the UDHR, including the emergence of collective and developmental rights for vulnerable minority groups and communities. This hermeneutical dimension rests on an international consensus that human rights function for all societies as protective

6 Many UN and regional human rights conventions and declarations are available in various collections of official documents on human rights; see, for example, Brownlie and Goodwin-Gill 2002.

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devices that regulate and mitigate dangers to persons stemming from violence, unfair social practices, and failure to provide economic and social conditions necessary for the development of the moral person- ality. The hermeneutical endeavor explicitly involves cross-cultural human rights dialogues as well as increasing attention to local cultural interpretations of human rights standards that help foster a human rights ethos in communities and institutions throughout the world. In a very real sense, then, human rights project a cross-cultural moral vision of conditions necessary (though not entirely sufficient) for a good life for all. They call for non-pathological civil environments in which all people are legally protected and civically empowered to participate in their own governance. And the development of human rights is guided—at least implicitly—by something like a Golden Rule and basic human moral responses such as outrage or indignation at violations of human well-being that “shock the conscience” of humankind (a formu- lation often cited in human rights declarations and conventions), not to mention a sense of interdependent responsibility on the part of all to help ensure the guarantee of human rights locally, nationally, and internationally. Human rights are self-evidently and self-consciously anthropocentric, but in their expansion and development they can apply to the nonhuman realm as well, inasmuch as human beings and their social communities are just as self-evidently imbedded in a broader natural environment, locally and globally. As an example, the human right to health is now understood to entail the human right to a healthy environment that has broad ramifications for the protection of integral ecosystems.

Human rights, of course, are more than moral—cross-cultural or otherwise—as is clear from the fact that they not only are bound up with politics, diplomacy, and economics but also constitute a legal regime that has been developing ever since the post–World War II Nuremberg tribunals. Various aspects of this legal dimension warrant some mention and brief discussion: international treaties and conven- tions and their monitoring bodies; customary international law in the form of ius cogens norms; international criminal law and associated tribunals; regional human conventions, commissions, and courts; and domestic laws and remedies.7 Common to all these modalities is the fact that many human rights norms have been (re)institutionalized as legal obligations; that is, they have been legally codified. So, for example, the human rights norms of the UDHR were legalized when the requisite number of states signed and ratified the International

7 There is a vast literature on the history of human rights law—including humani- tarian law and international criminal law. Perhaps the most readable and accessible overview is Robertson 2006.

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Covenants for Civil and Political Rights and for Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (all now collectively referred to as the International Bill of Human Rights). Along with these conventions are treaty bodies or committees that periodically monitor state compliance with these conventions and that can receive and investigate complaints of state noncompliance. The soft power of circulated reports, diplomacy, and public shaming (which can have economic consequences) are the prin- cipal modalities of enforcement, which, despite realist skepticism, can be sometimes effective. In addition to conventions, there is also the development of customary international law regarding human rights— that is, informal processes of recognition by states and their wide- spread acceptance of ius cogens norms such as prohibitions on slavery, apartheid, genocide, and torture—as indicated not only by treaties on such matters but also rulings of tribunals, acceptance by paradigmatic legal authorities, and, most importantly, state practice. International criminal law and its enforcement began with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals (along with lesser known related tribunals) and, after being put on hold during the Cold War, reemerged in the early 1990s when the UN Security Council interpreted its Chapter 7 powers to include the establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals following the Balkans conflict and the Rwandan genocide. Around the same period, the litigation of Augusto Pinochet’s arrest (for torture and other crimes against humanity) in Britain at the request of a Spanish court resulted in a significant legal ruling not only stripping former heads of state from immunity from prosecution for such crimes but also providing important confirmation of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction (where any state in possession of the criminal can undertake prosecution of him for those crimes wherever they might have been committed). Needless to say, one significant outgrowth of more recent tribunals is the emergence of the permanent International Criminal Court, which, under its principle of complementarity, can undertake prosecutions when the state ordinarily burdened with such responsibility is unable or unwilling to prosecute.

Importantly, there are also regional human rights regimes in Europe, the Americas, and Africa, with the most effective being that associated with the Council of Europe: there is not only the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950; in force 1953)8 but also a European Court of Human Rights, which litigates complaints of human rights abuses by state members and which has developed a highly significant body of case

8 This convention has been amended and expanded by subsequent protocols. In addition, there is the European Social Charter (1961; in force 1965), followed by subsequent protocols, pertaining to socioeconomic human rights.

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law. Many domestic legal regimes have adopted (if they did not have them already) bills of human rights within their constitutions, thus enabling within many jurisdictions redress of complaints of the viola- tion of human rights. And, in addition to domestic criminal laws pertaining to human rights abuses, complaining individuals and groups have been turning increasingly to domestic civil courts to secure compensation for human rights violations.

For the past sixty years, then, the human rights movement has been a dynamic and increasingly global one with significant moral, legal, and political dimensions. This dynamic is evident in the aforemen- tioned legal institutional developments, but there are also other devel- opments to consider that bring the movement ever closer to being a practicable global ethic. Particularly important to consider is its expan- sion and refinement regarding the treatment of vulnerable popula- tions, ranging across women, ethnic minority groups, refugees, and indigenous peoples. Legal conventions now exist for these populations that precisely identify individual and group protections. Not insignifi- cantly, these conventions are often the result of bottom-up grass-roots (rather than top-down beneficiary) projects, and they explicitly address not only civil and political rights and powers but also socioeconomic and developmental needs. Also important to consider is the way that the human rights regime now quite self-consciously meshes itself with other regulatory and legal regimes—embracing, for example, the causes of environmental protections bearing on the welfare of the entire planet, the regulation of transnational corporate activity in the developing world, the combating of international crimes such as human trafficking, and modifying the structural adjustment policies of international financial agencies and altering their practices so as to have more democratic participatory decision making.

4. Examples of Global Human Rights Dynamism

Perhaps the best and most forward-looking examples of the dynamic expansion of the human rights movement can be seen in three par- ticular developments.9 One is concerned with the individual and col- lective human rights of especially vulnerable populations and communities in the world—namely, the indigenous peoples located within the territories of nation-states across the world. The second is concerned with the intersection and mutual influence of human rights, on the one hand, and environmental rights and responsibilities, on the other. And the third focuses on human rights–oriented principles

9 I have discussed some of these examples at their earlier stages of development and with a different purpose in mind in Twiss 2004.

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regarding post-conflict transitional justice. These three examples are paradigmatic for addressing the principal types of transbounday prac- tical issues identified earlier (human- and environment-oriented), though as we will see even this distinction is becoming muted by notions of interdependence.

For centuries and continuing up to the present day, indigenous peoples (First Peoples, Tribal Peoples) have been subjected to historic injustices, ranging from colonialization, dispossession of their lands and natural resources, forced relocation of their communities, forced removal of their children, massive interference with their social and cultural institutions, and despoliation of their natural environments to massive extermination programs. As dispersed and clearly outnumbered com- munities lacking the status of nation-states, these peoples wielded no or little political power as separate communities either to avoid these violations or even to claim or initiate forms of redress. Over the past twenty years, these peoples have been systematically cooperating as a political action group to address the problems that they have in common, and they have done so within the UN human rights system. As a result of their work, in September 2007, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted by a vote of 143 to 4 (with 11 abstentions) the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).

This instrument is an extraordinary one in a number of respects. First, it is the first human rights declaration that is genuinely and exclusively grass-roots: that is, it was drafted by elected representa- tives of the peoples themselves in a democratic decision-making forum.10 Second, it articulates a set of future-oriented collective human rights that derive from the recognized right of the self-determination of peoples to their political status as well as their economic and social development in a manner that is responsive to the past injustices identified, for example: collective rights (asserted against majority states and to the world) to their rights to self-governance in internal and local affairs; maintenance of their distinctive institutions, prac- tices, and customs; conservation of their natural resources and envi- ronments (for both economic and spiritual purposes); and so forth. Third, the declaration specifically affirms all presently recognized human rights of individual persons in such a manner that (1) man- dates changes in internal traditional practices that may, for example, discriminate against certain persons or groups within the society, and (2) affords special protection to certain especially vulnerable persons

10 In her address to the 61st Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 11, 2007, Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Chair of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, commented: “This Declaration has the distinction of being the only Declaration in the UN which was drafted with the rights-holders, themselves, the Indigenous Peoples.”

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and groups within the community (elders, children, women, and the disabled). Fourth, the declaration is explicitly past-referring not only in resisting historical injustices for the future but also in requiring redress with respect to the past, for example, repatriation of cultural property and human remains and restitution or equitable compensa- tion for usurped lands and resources. So, although it is asserted by these peoples that no new rights are being claimed by them,11 these features make the declaration quite distinctive—grass-roots initiated and developed; an extensive set of collective rights coordinated with individual rights; and the integration of past-referring and future- oriented aspects of human rights—and indeed proffer a paradigmatic model for subsequent developments.

The second example of a dynamic human rights development that signals another large shift is the emergence of a newly formulated human right to a clean, healthy, ecologically balanced, and sustainable natural environment. This is a substantive right that through various declarations, conventions, draft principles, and case law in various national and regional jurisdictions has been derived from other more basic human rights, such as the rights to life, health, and nutritional needs such as food and water—all of which can be invasively violated by, for example, air pollution, environmental degradation, ecosystem destruction, and even climate imbalance.12 In effect, environmental protection is viewed as a necessary precondition for the effective enjoyment of human rights of other sorts. This fact is explicitly recognized by the human rights and environmental protection legal regimes. Admittedly, the starting point of this interconnected concern

11 This point was made repeatedly by various speakers at the UN General Assembly’s 61st Session on the occasion of the adoption of the Declaration. For example, Les Malezer, Chairman of the Global Indigenous Caucus stated: “We emphasize once again that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples contains no new provision of human rights. It affirms many rights already contained in international human rights treaties, but rights which have been denied to the Indigenous Peoples.” The claim was reaffirmed and further elaborated on August 11, 2008 by S. James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples at the Human Rights Council’s 9th Session: “During the last three decades, the demands for recognition of indigenous peoples across the world have led to the gradual emergence of a common body of opinion regarding the content of the rights of these peoples on the basis of long-standing principles of international human rights law and policy.” This statement is followed by a detailed identification of the various instruments that constitute the “foundation of previously existing sources of international human rights law” pertaining to the situation of indigenous peoples and their rights, both collective and individual.

12 A reasonably comprehensive listing of the instruments—both international and regional—regarding human rights and the environment is provided by the Center for Human Rights and Environment at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/documents/25_ documents/.

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is anthropocentric, but the deeper and more significant point is that a human rights perspective is being extended spatially—to the local, regional, and global environments in which all humans are imbedded— and also temporally—inasmuch as what we have done in the past and will do in the future regarding the natural environment affects both present and future generations.13 The features of spatial and tempo- rary expansion are complemented by the evident fact that the right to a healthful environment (and thus to environmental protection and conservation and all that this entails) is both an individual right that each of us has as well as a collective right held by communities and indeed the entire world population.

Current conventions and case law also exist for making this sub- stantive environmental human right a reality through the prescription of procedural mechanisms to access to information about the environ- ment and the environmental impact of human activities and to mean- ingful public participation in environmental decision making and in the development of policies with environmental consequences. The 1998 Aarhus Convention (in force 2001)14 explicitly links human well- being, the enjoyment of basic human rights, the right to live in an environment adequate to health and well-being, and the duty (or responsibility), both individually and in association with others, to protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations. It furthermore asserts that in order to fulfill this environmental human right (and correlative duty) citizens must have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision making, and have access to justice in the form of redress in environmental matters. What follows in the convention is a set of twenty-two detailed articles and annexes that together specify the effective implementation and

13 This point about the spatial and temporal extension of human rights with respect to the environment in particular has most recently been eloquently argued in the 2009 law monograph by Burns Weston and Tracy Bach. In that monograph, the authors cite an insightful claim made by Judge A. A. Cancado Trindade in connection with a 2000 case before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: “Human solidarity manifests itself not only in a spatial dimension—that is, in the space shared by all peoples of the world—but also in a temporal dimension—that is, among the generations who succeed each other in time, taking the past, present and future altogether. . . . It is the notion of human solidarity, understood in this wide dimension . . . [on which] lies the basis of the whole contemporary thinking on the rights inherent to the human being” (quoted in Weston and Bach 2009, 25). With respect to the general topic of the temporal extension of human rights, see also Falk 2000, 192-94.

14 The full title of the Aarhus Convention (Aarhus being the city where the convention was adopted) is Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision- Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. The convention is a regional European one which came into force on October 30, 2001, after ratification by sixteen of its signatories, and it develops certain principles originally proposed in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

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protection of these procedural rights. The reality, then, is that human rights law and environmental law have converged to explicitly advance local, regional, and international approaches to the environment in order to mitigate problems of common concern to all of humanity, which in turn has a synergistic effect for environmental protection and policy, ranging across the atmosphere, ecosystems, water resources, animal species, and even plant species (namely, their importance for present and future nutritional and medicinal purposes).15

The context for considering the third example of the human rights movement’s dynamism is the development of intercultural, indeed global, dialogues about the meaning, interpretation, and refinement of human rights and practical strategies for their implementation in the contemporary world. This process has been going on for nearly two decades, and the dialogues include those that are internationally sponsored, government sponsored, and NGO sponsored (including in the latter educational institutions and associations).16 These dialogues have given rise to much talk of overlapping cross-cultural consensus about human rights standards as well as practical strategies for instantiating a human rights ethos in the communities and institutions of the world.

A case in point is the 2007 Chicago Principles on Post-Conflict Justice (Chicago Principles 2007), a joint project spear-headed by international NGOs on human rights, global affairs, criminal science, and penal law, assisted by a vast consultation with justice officials, law faculty, and NGOs from countries in North America, Latin America (Central and South), Europe (North, Central, and Eastern), and Africa (North and sub-Saharan). These principles attempt to integrate crimi- nal, compensatory, and restorative justice for post-conflict societies in a unique manner—by recommending the combination of reconciliation, prosecution, reparation, reconstruction, memorialization, education, and the advancement of healing and solidarity—all based on funda- mental human rights norms, both civil-political and socioeconomic.17

15 An extremely useful discussion of human rights and the environment is provided in the Report on the OHCHR/UNEP Experts Seminar on Human Rights and Environ- ment, held in Geneva, January 14–15, 2002, available at http://www.cedha.org.ar/ conclusions.htm.

16 I have analyzed and discussed the aims and methods of some of these dialogues in Twiss 1996.

17 Some examples of the pertinent language of the document addressing both civil- political and socioeconomic human rights concerns include these: “[G]enuine peace requires the creation of a positive foundation for social, political and economic growth grounded in the respect for fundamental human rights”; and “States should engage in broad social and economic reforms that address basic structural causes of conflict, including: significant economic inequality [and] structural mechanisms of social and political disempowerment” (Chicago Principles, 11 and 41).

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The principles are quite specifically victim oriented, including not only the primary victims of repression and atrocity but also their families and communities, and they make a special effort to foreground women’s rights and to include “traditional, indigenous, and religious approaches to justice and healing” (as appropriate to a given society).18

The principles are divided into the categories of prosecution (with preference given to domestic or hybrid domestic–international courts); truth-telling and historical reconstruction of past atrocities; victims’ rights and remedies; vetting policies and sanctions for restricting the participation of past perpetrators in future governments; memorializa- tion and education of historical memory; integration of traditional and indigenous justice norms; and institutional reform of various sectors of society and government. Throughout, it is made clear that other more-developed and -stable states as well as the international commu- nity as a whole must bear much of the fiscal burden for initiating and sustaining these processes.19

Lest it be thought that these principles are efficacious only in theory but unrelated to practice, I would observe that they are being actively referenced and invoked even now by officials of the current ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda in connec- tion with justifying their outreach educational programs to citizens of those regions and in planning the devolution of future criminal cases back to domestic jurisdictions, which, in the case of Rwanda, interest- ingly include indigenous traditional forms of dispute settlement.20 More importantly, we see in these principles and their nascent operation quite explicit themes of relational understandings of person and community, cooperation among national and international agencies, and a sense of shared responsibility for reconciliation and reconstruction, not to mention a special onus being placed on more advantaged nations to

18 Women’s rights is my way of referring to the document’s calling special attention to “vulnerable groups” (including, for example, women, children, and minorities), the “special needs of women,” and the “often gendered nature of political violence” (Chicago Principles, 13 and 16). The role of traditional indigenous and religious approaches to justice, healing, and reconciliation is addressed by Principle 6 (Chicago Principles, 36–37).

19 The document emphasizes the role of the international community in such lan- guage as this: “It is essential . . . that there is adequate international funding and support” (Chicago Principles, 12).

20 The Chicago Principles were specifically referenced at a conference of experts held at Florida State University, January 30–31, 2009, under the title of International Criminal Tribunals: Problems and Prospects and sponsored by FSU’s Center for the Advancement of Human Rights. The Rwandan traditional courts are called “Gacaca,” a term which translates literally as “grass,” referring to traditional dispute settlement held by community members sitting on the grass (Ochieng 2009).

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assist and support these processes—all themes integrally connected to the global moral vision of the working group I described earlier.

5. Conclusion

My point in offering these examples of recent human rights devel- opments is to highlight the fact that the human rights movement as a whole incorporates in a significant way the very features, norms, and goals that the advocates of global ethics find definitive of their con- cerns. These include the normative goal of a good life for all; respectful and democratic national civil environments; an international civil environment involving economic equity and mutual cooperative respon- sibility among nations; and a firm and effective commitment to pro- moting broadly participatory practical dialogues at all levels about transboundary and shared social, economic, political, and environmen- tal problems. I suspect that many globalists might overlook these defining similarities because they misconstrue the open-textured nature of human rights and the human rights regime. Contrary to the common misperception that international human rights are simply an expression of neo-liberal economic hegemony, they are in fact firmly rooted in relational and interdependent understandings of persons and communities that coordinate strong notions of personal and communal entitlements among present and future generations in all matters bearing on the survival and flourishing of our species and the world as a whole. As understood by the human rights movement, human rights norms constitute a global ethic that precisely addresses all of the concerns of the latter’s advocates, and does so in a way that is self-consciously responsible to cultural pluralism as well as recurrent and newly emergent challenges to human well-being as integrally related to the well-being of social and natural environments. Moreover, it should not go unnoticed that the human rights movement is well- entrenched throughout the world and of particular concern and value to the victims of political and economic oppression in their respective contexts.

It is certainly well and good to speak of the development of a global ethic, but it seems more than prudent to recognize that this ethic has in fact been emerging over the past six decades precisely in the human rights movement, with a record of accomplishment achieved by no other agency in the world. It also seems prudent to build upon what we have already achieved rather than reformulating over and over again the same moral points that we have already agreed upon. We already have a global ethic. We simply need to do better at making it a sustained reality.

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