

9

Global Civil Society and Human Rights

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Reader's Guide

This chapter explores the relationship between global civil society (GCS), understood as 'people organizing to influence their world', and the normative ideal of a 'global rule-bound society'. After an introduction on the concept of GCS, the chapter surveys some of the GCS actors involved in human rights issues and focuses on their background, methods, and influence. The activities of individuals and organizations in civil society in relation to human rights can be divided into three kinds, which can be considered as related to three different phases: shifting norms; making law; and monitoring implementation. The three types of activities will be illustrated with two brief case studies: norm-shifting activities in relation to economic and social rights, and lawmaking and monitoring activities in relation to the International Criminal Court.

What is Global Civil Society?

Civil society, let alone **global civil society (GCS)**, is a confusing term. There are as many definitions of civil society and GCS as there are authors (see for instance: Howell and Pearce, 2001, pp. 13–37; D. Lewis, 2002; Kaldor, 2003, pp. 6–12). Nevertheless, this chapter quite intentionally uses this term, rather than other current ones such as ‘global social movements’ (Cohen and Rai, 2000), ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), or ‘global citizen action’ (Edwards and Gaventa, 2001).

Its history is bound up with the notion of rules to protect citizens—i.e. civil rights. The term goes back to ancient Rome (*societas civilis*), but was used particularly in the **Enlightenment** to express opposition to the idea that a ruler could treat his subjects as he pleased. Civil society referred to a voluntary association, based on a hypothetical social contract that outlined the rights and obligations of citizens (see Seligman, 1992). With the exception of Kant, Enlightenment thinkers conceived this rule-bound society in national terms.

Some authors still prefer terms like ‘transnational’ or ‘international’ civil society, arguing that ‘global’ sounds too grandiose (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Florini, 2000). However, while ‘global’ may overstate the situation, ‘transnational’ understates it. A single border crossing counts as transnational; hence, the term does not capture the revolution in travel and communications and the opening up of many formerly closed societies of the last decades. Moreover, only ‘global civil society’ can be posed as a complement as well as a counterweight to the process now universally called **globalization**.

Finally, the term GCS has a normative aspiration that ‘transnational civil society’ does not. Just as the term ‘human rights’ has a universalistic intent that ‘civil rights’ lacks, GCS can be seen as an aspiration to reach and include citizens everywhere and to enable them to think and act as global citizens. Some of the literature on globalization stresses the emergence of a global consciousness, an ‘imagined community of mankind’ (Shaw, 2000). GCS is an expression of that consciousness, even if some participants cannot travel or even use the telephone (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor, 2001, pp. 16–17). At the same time, the post-War notion of universal human rights, coupled with a thickening network of international rules directly affecting citizens, has given birth to the dream of a global rule-bound society. As we illustrate, GCS in the modern sense of the whole of border-crossing, non-profit, non-governmental entities remains intimately connected with human rights law.

So what exactly is this GCS? In the *Global Civil Society Yearbook*, we developed the following working definition: ‘global civil society is the sphere of ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks, and individuals located *between* the family, the state, and the market, and operating *beyond* the confines of national societies, polities, and economies’ (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor, 2001, p. 17). Here, we adopt a definition that is a little narrower and much simpler: GCS consists of people organizing to influence their world. Hence, it involves some sort of deliberate get-together. It is a political definition, excluding people who organize to play darts or make money. It does include those who attempt to influence their world in undesirable directions, or by unpalatable means (see Box 9.1). The subjective ‘their world’ suggests people concerned with

BOX 9.1 DECONSTRUCTING: THE ‘CIVIL’

What is ‘civil’ about global civil society? While many civil society actors indeed aim to ‘civilize’ the state or the public, not all of them do this in a particularly ‘civil’ and peaceful way, or with progressive, liberal, and democratic ideals in mind. GCS is very heterogeneous, hence it also encompasses movements that are racist, sexist, or violent. But deciding what norms or what groups count as civil is problematic for many reasons. First, historically, colonial projects were often justified in terms of ‘civilizing’ the natives, even as the methods of subjugation were allowed to be uncivil. Second, to some extent all civil society manifestations are in some sense exclusivist: they claim the moral high ground for

their own position in opposition to all others. Third, civil—for instance democratic—aims do not necessarily coincide with civil—for instance democratic—behaviour. Uncivil movements may have civil outcomes and vice versa. Finally, civility is not the same as rule-following: adherence to existing legal or even societal norms is far from desirable in non-democratic societies, and proscribes challenges to the status quo even in democratic ones. Hence, GCS is best approached with a flexible concept of the ‘civil’ element, acknowledging that what constitutes civility is eternally contested (see Kopecky and Mudde, 2003, and Glasius, forthcoming for a longer discussion).

the world they see themselves living in, their *life-world*, not necessarily that they have planetary ambitions. That life-world is increasingly shaped by the forces of globalization. This definition, finally, suggests that (global) civil society is a contested terrain (Howell and Pearce, 2001, p. 234), populated by value-driven actors who do not necessarily share harmonious value systems: indeed, their values sometimes clash.

As an empirical concept with strong normative implications, the concept of GCS is not without its critics. We will outline four types of critique. The first is that lack of protection prevents the effective functioning of GCS. According to Chris Brown, 'there are major "law and order" problems in the international system, and these problems severely restrict the functioning of global civil society ... [non-governmental agencies] need the protection of a police force, and at the moment the only such bodies are provided by the individual states, and in many parts of the world are, at best, extremely ineffective, at worst, wholly corrupt' (Brown 2001). This view, however, takes a rather passive, 'hothouse plant' view of what GCS is. It may be intuitive that the emergence of a GCS depends on the development and observance of the international rule of law, but the opposite connection is missed: the history of humanitarian and human rights law (see Chapter 4) has been much more a product of the activities of people outside government than is commonly accepted. Almost every significant treaty in international humanitarian law originates with the **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**. The idea for a Universal Declaration came from a small group of lawyers, some of whom had themselves been political refugees; the insertion of human rights provisions in the UN Charter was the work of **non-governmental organizations (NGOs)**; and a post-War treaty like the **Convention Against Torture** was almost solely the brainchild of human rights NGOs (see Burgers, 1992; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 85; A. M. Clark, 2001, pp. 55–67). It would be naive to believe that international law could emerge without the backing of states or overcome the opposition of a majority of states. However, those parts of international law that protect the interests of humanity, rather than the interests of states, rely heavily on the involvement of GCS.

A second critique is normative, and claims that while GCS actors claim to call to account states or corporate power-holders, they actually support a larger neoliberal global order. Working within the confines of the existing global economic and political

system, GCS organizations choose to tinker in the margins with the rules of the game rather than fundamentally challenge the game itself. GCS, by offering regulatory band-aids, actually legitimizes the global capitalist order, and (no longer) functions as a counter-hegemonic force. Ronnie Lipschutz (Lipschutz and Rowe, 2005, p. 202), for instance, has argued that 'the arrangement of rules, regulations and practices characteristic of contemporary capitalist states operating under and through global neoliberalism do not and cannot address more than a fraction of the "welfare of populations"'. Much of the remainder of this function is increasingly being provided through civil society, some of which has been drawn into existence in order to address these lacunae ... much of what appears to be opposition—by civil society organizations in particular—is better understood as integral to governmentality.' Undoubtedly, different GCS actors at different times both challenge and support centres of power. It is for social scientists to study empirically when they confront, collaborate with, or are co-opted by state and other actors.

A third strand critiques the dominant, secular, and Western understanding of GCS. According to Raouf Ezzat (2004), 'Religious devotion is a fundamental motive for many social movements in the South, from Latin America to Africa and South Asia. In many of these countries, grassroots politics, whether local or global, depend heavily on sacred notions, images and principles, and the religious dimension is mixed with public mobilization.' This is really a critique of certain blind spots of Western social science and Western public opinion rather than a critique of the concept of GCS as such, and could be countered with better research.

The fourth critique relates directly to human rights advocacy: the notion that with their border-transcending, norm-setting aspirations, international NGOs (INGOs), giving themselves the grander title of global civil society, are doing something essentially undemocratic. Ken Anderson for instance argues: 'international NGOs are "international civil society", international civil society is the voice of the people of the globe, the voice of "world opinion", and so states and international organizations must make a place for these NGOs at the negotiating tables, in the halls of power, because if they do not, these states—even, once again, democratic ones—and international institutions risk illegitimacy' (Anderson and Rieff, 2000, p. 111). This raises the question to what extent INGOs

can legitimately claim to represent the needs and interests of smaller, local groups, and eventually of marginalized constituencies, at state and inter-state meetings. This tension between human rights advocacy and democratic representation will be revisited in the conclusion to this chapter.

This chapter explores the relationship between the empirical 'people organizing to influence their world' and the normative ideal of a 'global rule-bound society'. To avoid confusion, we use the term GCS only in the former sense to refer to 'actually existing civil society'. The next sections will introduce some of the GCS actors involved in human rights issues, focusing on their background, methods, and influence.

Global Civil Society Actors and Human Rights

The mother of international human rights organizations is Amnesty International, founded in 1961. It now claims to have more than 2 million members and supporters in over 150 countries. Its particular features continue to be its large membership base, especially in the Western world, and its emphasis on political neutrality. Human Rights Watch has a very different structure, with no broad-based membership. Instead, it draws strength from the research expertise of its staff. International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) presents a third model: comprising 178 local organizations throughout the world as members, its

international presence services and draws legitimacy from its grassroots human rights groups, especially in countries where there are severe violations. Next to these three giants, there are many international thematic groups (some of which, on food, health, and housing, are featured in this chapter) and thousands of national and local human rights groups.

The growth of human rights groups reflects and perhaps even exceeds the general growth of non-governmental organizations between 1990 and 2010. The biggest recent areas of growth have been in the areas of economic, social, and cultural rights (as we describe) and transitional justice. Then there are organizations and movements that represent a cross-over between human rights and other issues (such as Global Witness, which focuses on the relation between environmental exploitation and human rights abuse), or that do not identify themselves first and foremost with human rights but nevertheless draw on human rights frames, such as solidarity campaigns, Indigenous peoples' movements, or women's movements. But global civil society in the realm of human rights should not by any means be thought of as the sole domain of organized, let alone professional, groups. Journalists, academics and students, religious leaders, barristers, and, perhaps more controversially, even businessmen and government officials in their personal capacity can all at times be 'people organizing to influence their world' in the field of human rights. (See also Box 9.2 for a discussion of who has legitimacy to talk about human rights.)

BOX 9.2 CHALLENGING ASSUMPTIONS: WHO HAS LEGITIMACY TO TALK ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS?

Not only the 'civil' in GCS is problematic, so is the 'global'. Does it mean working on global issues, having global goals, or working in global networks? (See Williams (2005, pp. 350–1), cited from Bob et al., 2008.) With respect to the latter, there turns out to be an important imbalance between the West, where the majority of international NGOs are headquartered (see Table 9.1), and the rest of the world, which relies on less formal, more diverse, and usually less internationally influential forms of civil society. International organizations, with well-paid staff members trained in European or North American universities, are sometimes considered as too Western, elitist, and unrepresentative to speak on behalf of rights-holders. Local partners engaged in democracy and rights work are often perceived locally as self-serving and as more accountable to foreign donors than to local communities, giving governments an excuse to restrict their access to foreign funding.

Engagement with local civil society is seen as imperative for the accountability, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international human rights groups. But which civil society? Not all locally embedded civil society groups aim for progressive social change. As became clear in the so-called Arab Spring, some participants in the uprisings advocated for conservative values and discriminated against or harassed women and black Muslims joining the protests. International human rights organizations will defend the human rights of these people as a matter of principle, but should they also engage, partner, and campaign with them? Can they collaborate with those parts of civil society that are committed to the value of human rights, or at least to some human rights (e.g. to religious freedom yet not to sexual equality), but use non-peaceful means to reach their goals? Or should they only strengthen and cooperate with civil society groups that defend universal human rights and that reject violence, just like themselves?

Table 9.1 International NGOs per continent: Western bias?

Continents	International NGOs as counted by the Union of International Associations**	NGOs with consultative status, UN Economic and Social Council*
Africa	2,396	524
Asia	3,836	612
Latin America and Caribbean	1,859	181
Oceania	1,049 (Australia=819)	74 (Australia=41)
North America (Canada and US)	10,257	979
Europe	21,276	1,193
Not specified	—	4
Total	40,673	3,567

* Number of all NGOs with consultative status (general, specific, and on the roster) at the UN Economic and Social Council.

Source: NGO Branch, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Available at: <http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=false> (accessed 19 February 2015).

** Different types of NGOs: 'International organizations, Dependent organizations, Organizational substitutes, National organizations and Dead, inactive and unconfirmed bodies'.

Source: Union of International Association (ed.) (2014). Countries in which international non-governmental organization headquarters are located, ranked by continent, *Yearbook of International Organizations 2014–2015: Guide to Global Civil Society Networks*, 51/5, Statistics, Visualizations and Patterns. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, p. 119. © Union of International Associations 1997–present.

While the impact of human rights activism should not be overstated, there are many positive examples where human rights groups and defenders in GCS have been crucial in pushing for progressive social, legal, and policy change. Human rights actors have not only managed to generate a wide acceptance of international human rights norms as valid and binding (*norm commitment*), but also play a key role in ensuring that states actually conform to them (*norm compliance*).

Global or transnational networks of human rights groups and defenders play a crucial role as 'norm entrepreneurs' in the processes leading from norm evaluation (translating, or **framing**, an issue into legally enforceable human rights), via norm commitment, to norm compliance. Their human rights advocacy helps swaying states and international organizations to endorse a norm and to codify it in domestic, regional, and international law. If the norm obtains a critical mass of supporters, it implies a 'tipping point' has been reached, and the norm can 'cascade' through the population. It then becomes internalized by a range of actors who will eventually take the norm for granted. If the norm fails to obtain a broad international consensus, the particular issue will not materialize into binding legislation, let alone normalize (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999).

But even an internationally accepted and institutionalized human rights norm does not immediately start guiding actual policy and programmes. Before states and other powerful actors start complying with human rights law and change their (corporate) behaviour, much ongoing pressure, coercion, persuasion, and support is needed by both state and non-state actors. The effectiveness of such pressure depends, in turn, on various conditions, including the degree of statehood and the regime type of the target state, the degree of centralization of rule implementation, and the state or other powerful actor's social and material vulnerability to such pressure (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 2013).

Human rights actors, as part of GCS, make use of various strategies and methods to induce norm compliance. Chong (2010, pp. 42–4) observes two dominant and often jointly used strategies of international human rights organizations. The first consists of research into human rights violations and 'naming and shaming' recalcitrant governments through mass media and petitions, accompanied by advocacy. The target of shaming actions is a violation of international law with a clear perpetrator and a legal remedy. A second strategy is court-based, involving (quasi-) judicial proceedings, and consists of methods like

strategic litigation, representing victims of human rights violations in courts or similar arenas, and submitting opinions known as *amicus curiae* briefs. Finally, global civil society impacts *inter-state* behaviour, campaigning for instance for sanctions against (Murdie and Peksen, 2013), or humanitarian intervention in (Murdie and Peksen, 2014), states that commit severe human rights violations.

KEY POINTS

GCS can be considered as a part and even a driver of globalization, but also as a potential counterweight to aspects of globalization.

GCS is populated by value-driven actors, organizing to influence their world, but they do not all have the same values. GCS is therefore also an arena of contestation.

GCS actors in the area of human rights engage in norm-entrepreneurship and framing to get new rules adopted and implemented, and in naming and shaming and legal strategies to monitor compliance.

Critical Thinking Questions:

Do you consider multinational corporations like Shell or transnational politico-religious movements like the Muslim Brotherhood as part of GCS? Why or why not? What are the pros and cons of including them as part of GCS? Can individual members or employees of such organizations be potential allies of international human rights organizations? Why or why not?

Case Study: GCS as Paradigm-Shifters: Economic and Social Rights

From Dead Letter to Activist Tool

Economic and social rights, despite being enshrined in international law via the **Universal Declaration of Human Rights** (UDHR) and the **International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** (ICESCR), had few civil society champions on either side of the political divide for most of the twentieth century, caught as they were in the crossfire between **liberal** and **socialist** ideologies (Glasius, 2012).

This began to change in the early 1980s, when small groups of activists and academics separately but simultaneously began to rediscover the most compelling of all economic and social rights, the right to food. Two

seminal texts advanced novel arguments. Amartya Sen's *Poverty and Famines* (Sen, 1981) challenged the consensus among developmental economists that famines were caused by a general decline in the availability of food. Instead, he argued, access to food depends on entitlements that are governed by socio-economic relations (Sen, 1981, pp. 154–5). 'The focus on entitlements', Sen concluded his essay, 'has the effect of emphasizing legal rights' (Sen, 1981, pp. 165–6).

Political philosopher Henry Shue (1980) attacked the distinction between civil and political rights, constructed mainly as *negative rights* requiring only a duty of non-interference, and economic and social rights, constructed as *positive rights* requiring active intervention (see Chapter 1). Instead, Shue distinguished three types of duties governing both types of rights: to avoid depriving people of their rights, to protect them against such deprivation by others, and to aid those whose rights have already been deprived (Shue, 1980, pp. 35–64). This categorization of obligations, later adapted to 'respect/protect/fulfil', has been a tremendous inspiration to subsequent generations of legal scholars.

At the same time, some grassroots membership groups of Amnesty International, frustrated with the organization's limited mandate, started networking with development and solidarity groups focused on the right to food. After three years, the network was transformed into a formal human rights organization, the Food First Information and Action Network (FIAN). Inspired by the Amnesty approach, it focused on blatant violations such as famines related to forced relocation, and undertook urgent actions, writing letters to governments, 'Even though we did not quite know what was a violation of the right to food, we were finding that out as we were doing it.'¹

Finally, international lawyers began to take notice of economic and social rights, formulating the **Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights** as a point of reference for interpreting the sometimes obscure and contradictory legal text of the ICESCR (see Chapter 14). This sparked innumerable articles and a spate of doctoral dissertations, constituting a new field of expertise within human rights scholarship. The literature began to address objections against economic and social rights as 'too vague', 'too costly', or 'not amenable to judicial review'.

In the NGO field, the foundation of FIAN was followed in 1987 by Habitat International Coalition, in

1992 by the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), and in 1993 by the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) in New York. All have grown from kitchen-table initiatives into medium-sized international NGOs, and have since been joined by hundreds of other, mainly domestic organizations working specifically in the area of economic and social rights. Many are now part of ESCR-Net (International Network of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), a civil society network founded in 2003.²

Between them, the philosophers, the lawyers, and the grassroots activists promoted a new way of thinking that considered issues such as hunger, homelessness, and ill health not just as personal tragedies or social problems, but as violations of human rights. But mainstream organizations, both non-governmental and intergovernmental, took some convincing of this human rights norm.

Elevation into International Politics

Mainstream global human rights organizations slowly and gingerly began to take up economic and social rights from the mid-1990s. Some, such as the International Commission of Jurists, have always supported them in principle but devote relatively little attention to them. In 2001 Amnesty International broadened

its mandate to enable it to work on all human rights, starting with 'respect' violations directly connected to earlier campaigns on civil and political rights (Amnesty International, 2005, 2014). While the vast majority of human rights organizations now recognize work on economic and social rights as a legitimate part of their mandate, there remains confusion and controversy on what that means in practice. Such differences of opinion were highlighted by a series of exchanges between Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (see Box 9.3), and Leonard Rubenstein of Physicians for Human Rights (see Box 9.4), and more recently on OpenDemocracy.net between Aryeh Neier, President Emeritus of the Open Society Foundation, and Margot Salomon of the London School of Economics (see 'Web Links' at the end of the chapter).

Within the United Nations human rights apparatus, too, economic and social rights remained something of a backwater until the second High Commissioner for Human Rights, the vocal Mary Robinson, committed herself to redressing the imbalance. She famously emphasized that extreme poverty was the worst kind of human rights abuse. This constituted a paradigm shift. Most human rights experts at that time, and perhaps still, would have identified situations of **genocide** or **ethnic cleansing** as the worst form of human rights abuse. Most development experts would have been

BOX 9.3 KENNETH ROTH ON HOW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS SHOULD APPROACH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Kenneth Roth contends that what international human rights organizations do best is 'investigate, expose, and shame', and that they can only effectively do so when there is relative clarity about violation, violator, and remedy. While progress has been made on documenting violations of economic and social rights, there is much less clarity on who the violator is, and what the remedy should be, than in the case of civil and political rights.

Therefore, international human rights organizations should restrict their work on economic and social rights to cases where governments are guilty of arbitrary or discriminatory conduct: for instance, South Africa's initial ideologically based denial of anti-retroviral treatment to HIV-infected mothers, or the US exclusion of child farm workers from general child labour regulations. International human rights organizations should stay away from economic and social rights issues that primarily concern allocation of resources. On the contrary, they need to move the public away from seeing economic and social rights purely as a matter of distributive justice.

Some developing countries simply lack the means to meet even the 'minimum core' standards set by the Covenant and its implementing Committee. In such cases, residents of the country in question have the clearest standing on how to allocate resources, and international human rights organizations are poorly placed to comment on government action plans. They cannot legitimately insist on trade-offs between different legitimate government investments.

Even when it comes to pressuring a Northern government or an international financial institution, international human rights organizations are not (yet) in a position to mobilize domestic human rights constituencies in Western states simply to demand more resources. Stigmatization on the basis of arbitrary or discriminatory spending is more likely to be successful.

(Roth, 2004a, 2004b)

BOX 9.4 LEONARD RUBENSTEIN ON HOW INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS SHOULD APPROACH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Rubenstein argues that human rights organizations must not rely on naming and shaming alone. They can collaborate with partner organizations in developing countries in lobbying for service delivery systems that respect economic and social rights, monitoring compliance of all states with the increasingly explicit legal obligations that they have in relation to these rights, and advocating for more resources from wealthy countries to be dedicated to economic and social rights.

International human rights organizations have decades of experience in making policy recommendations, including those with resource implications, in the area of civil and political rights, building up detailed knowledge on, for instance, weapons capabilities or designing an effective court system. If human rights organizations are not yet very good at identifying rights aspects of health or education policies, they will just need to get better at it. 'By the time bad social programs are designed and in place and the naming and shaming occurs, resources will have been misspent and human rights violated in a way that is not

easily undone.' It is not necessary to restrict advocacy of economic and social rights to situations where there is a single identifiable villain: dealing with multiple layers of responsibility is the bread and butter of human rights organizations. Moreover, such a frame will have more resonance with the communities affected: HIV/AIDS victims who are being denied treatment want to demand anti-retrovirals on the basis of their right to survive, not on the basis of arbitrary government conduct.

The ICESCR stipulates that a state must spend on economic and social rights 'to the maximum of its available resources', and that other states have a duty of 'international assistance and cooperation'. It is therefore legitimate for human rights organizations to advocate for more resources. Moreover, advocating for resources is not a zero-sum game. Both at the domestic level, where international human rights organizations may play a support role to local ones, and at the international level, pressure for resources tends to increase the pot.

(Rubenstein, 2004a, 2004b)

inclined to think of extreme poverty as an intractable problem, not a human rights violation. Also at the UN, a campaign to create an individual complaints procedure through an 'optional protocol' to the ICESCR has been a priority for human rights advocates since the 1990s. After years of deliberation, the Optional Protocol was approved by the **Human Rights Council** in 2008 and came into force in May 2013.

The international financial and trade organizations remain unconverted to the cause of economic and social rights, however. Despite protests, civil society has not challenged them effectively, as shall be discussed. Nonetheless, an important concession to the right to health was made, as the result of massive civil society pressure, at the **World Trade Organization** (WTO) negotiations in Doha: developing countries are allowed 'flexibility' in producing, importing, and exporting generic drugs when they can demonstrate that a national health crisis requires it (WTO, 2003).

National and Regional Successes and their Limits

Perhaps the greatest (or at least most visible) advances in economic and social rights have been made at the national level. Parliaments have adopted laws and constitutional changes that directly recognize economic

and social rights and attendant state obligations. Courts have begun interpreting national and international law in ways that require state redress of violations. Mostly, these new laws, legal judgments, and changes in policy have come about after sustained civil society campaigns.

In South Africa, the landmark 'Grootboom' decision on the right to housing demonstrated that a judicial court could review and enforce even the 'obligation to fulfil' economic and social rights, using a standard of 'reasonableness' that is familiar in many legal systems (Pieterse, 2004). But the case also raises questions about how much lawsuits can do: the urgent housing needs of the South African poor have not been substantially alleviated since the judgment, which, in fact, was inconclusive on *how* the right should be enforced (Landau, 2012).

In response to a series of civil society-instigated lawsuits, India's Supreme Court has issued interim orders requiring improvements in state food distribution systems (Birchfield and Corsi, 2010). In Ecuador, civil society groups concerned over the implications of a Free Trade Agreement with the USA for access to affordable medicine succeeded in convincing their national trade delegation to take into consideration the constitutionally protected right to health (Ecuador, 2004).

Even in the United States—historically one of the staunchest opponents of economic and social rights, and one of only a handful of states that have not ratified the ICESCR—economic and social rights are gaining friends and prominence in civil society against relatively little resistance. The US government too has modified its rejectionist stance. The Obama administration recognized the interdependence of human rights and joined the international consensus on some resolutions promoting economic, social, and cultural rights at the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly (Amnesty International, 2014, p. 28).

There is no doubt that a ‘tipping point’ has been reached: a majority of relevant state and non-state actors now consider economic, social, and cultural rights as legal entitlements, rather than mere ‘aspirations’ or ‘goals’. Moreover, human rights norms are now accepted as ‘guiding principles’ for corporations and taken into account in WTO negotiations. But many countries still fail to enforce economic, social, and cultural rights domestically, and there are even larger challenges regarding international (financial or development) organizations and multinational corporations that disregard these human rights in their policy and practice abroad, leading Professor Samuel Moyn to regard economic and social rights as a failure (see Box 9.5).

Limited Convergence

Initially, due to ignorance or mutual suspicion, there was little contact or overlap between the anti-capitalist or social justice movement and the much smaller economic and social rights community. Recently, this has

begun to change somewhat. The 2005 **World Social Forum**, a global gathering of civil society activists founded in reaction to the World Economic Forum in Davos, made human rights one of its themes. Approximately one-third of the human rights events concerned economic and social rights topics (Forum Social Mundial, 2005).

One of the biggest areas of convergence has been over the right to health. One notable success was the South African Treatment Action Campaign’s triumph in persuading the South African Supreme Court that the right to health required national roll-out of a particular anti-retroviral drug, and then, in coalition with international NGOs, in persuading the WTO to allow more flexibility in the manufacture and trade of drugs. Other successes include HIV / AIDS treatment in Thailand, Brazil, and other countries (Seckinelgin, 2002, pp. 123–5). Patients (especially people with AIDS), health professionals, human rights lawyers, development organizations, and anti-privatization activists are all part of this growing movement. Another momentous area of synergy is the right to water. Like food, water is so vital to human life that to claim it as a right has intuitive appeal. This issue appeals to development organizations, anti-dam campaigns, groups focused on political conflicts such as that between Palestine and Israel, and to anti-privatization campaigns (Dicke and Holland, 2007, p. 126).

It is uncertain to what extent these convergences result in lasting coalitions between human rights and global justice activists. Economic and social rights framing has not been prominent in the global social justice movements of the past decade, and it has been

BOX 9.5 ALTERNATIVE POINTS OF VIEW: THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Some critics question the counter-hegemonic force of human rights to tame economic globalization: the integration of the global economy, trade and investment liberalization, and initiatives to privatize the provision of core public services (definition from Amnesty International, 2014, p. 33). Samuel Moyn (2014), for instance, calls human rights ‘a powerless companion in the age of neoliberalism’. Even though he rejects the claim that human rights are complicit per se in the success of neoliberalism, he questions the effectiveness of economic and social rights norms to tame or counteract economic globalization. Human rights, he argues, do not purport to provide an egalitarian agenda, at least not in the sense of distributive or substantive equality. Human rights oblige states to

prioritize ‘minimum core obligations’—to ensure minimum essential levels of protection for particularly the most marginalized and excluded—but they say nothing about the *maximum* level of inequalities in wealth and other primary goods that is permissible. Especially in the arenas of international trade law and policy, on the one hand, and corporate social responsibility, on the other, Moyn argues that ‘human rights have proved distressingly ineffective, and their record does not seem likely to change’. Moyn believes that they have failed to deliver real outcomes in the socio-economic domain. For him, human rights ‘need to be supplemented by both new frameworks of analysis and new modes of intra- and transnational activism’ to address rising inequalities related to economic globalization.

conspicuously absent from the anti-austerity and democracy protests of 2011 (Glasius, 2012). Doubts remain about the usefulness of human rights to attain economic justice, because they are neither aimed at nor made for the radical system change that the protestors seek (S. Burke, 2014). The human rights movement must do better in convincing others of the added value of its approach, and simultaneously explore new methods and frames to be able to create new synergies.

KEY POINTS

The economic and social rights movement has succeeded in generating a wide acceptance of these rights as valid, but has not succeeded well in ensuring that states and corporations comply with their obligations.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the WTO, and the private sector remain unconverted to the idea of economic and social rights.

Lately, the movement has seen the emergence of new synergies with other movements, but discursive and strategic differences with the global justice movement remain.

Critical Thinking Questions:

How effective do you think that economic and social rights are today, both in discourse and in methods, to address rising socio-economic inequalities and precariousness related to economic globalization and the financial crisis? What are the potentials and pitfalls of using a rights approach for (re)distributive agendas?

Case Study: GCS as Lawmakers and Monitors: The International Criminal Court

The Idea of an International Criminal Court

The idea that there are certain moral standards for the treatment of any human being is a touchstone of international human rights law. International criminal law and the **International Criminal Court** (ICC) go a step further, establishing enforceable penalties for rulers or other individuals who commit or condone crimes against a population. These steps embed norms in an international system of enforcement, seeking to

end the impunity of war criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity.

The idea of such a Court was first mooted by Gustave Moynier, founding member of the ICRC, in 1872, and was widely supported by civil society organizations in the 1920s. It came under consideration immediately after the Second World War, but the **Cold War** foreclosed this opportunity. A draft code of international crimes languished in the UN's International Law Commission as ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda prompted the Security Council to establish ad hoc tribunals (see Glasius, 2006, pp. 6–14). The ad hoc tribunals provided proof that international criminal courts could work despite the lack of precedent and conflicting legal systems. They also formed a valuable training ground for those in GCS who were pushing for a permanent international criminal court.

The Campaign

The Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) was founded in 1995. By the time of the final negotiations on the ICC Statute in Rome in 1998, it had grown into a network of over 800 organizations, 236 of which sent one or more representatives to Rome (Glasius, 2006, pp. 35–7).

Drafting the rules of the ICC was a delicate but fascinating task from a strictly legal point of view: different areas of domestic and international law all converged in new ways in the Statute. But human rights groups had particular reasons to take an interest in the ICC. After decades of working to build regional and global human rights mechanisms, human rights experts began to realize that, while the body of human rights law had become substantial, human rights violations in the world were not actually declining. The emphasis therefore shifted towards implementation and the punishment of individual perpetrators as it became increasingly clear that the exclusive focus on states and their responsibility for violations obscured the complexities of power structures and interfered with human rights enforcement.

The large international human rights organizations dominated the ICC negotiations, devoting full-time staff and writing key advocacy documents. They also dominated the CICC Steering Committee, with repercussions for the wider campaign. Other groups working for the ICC included many women's organizations, peace and conflict resolution organizations, groups focused on global governance and strengthening the

United Nations, and representatives of churches and religious organizations. Active members of the Coalition engaged in lobbying, produced expert documents, convened conferences, and strengthened state delegations with legal experts and interns. There were remarkably few adversarial or media-oriented actions, such as demonstrations (Glasius, 2006, pp. 27–44).

Despite the loose formal structure of the CICC and its members' varied interests, it was extremely effective in its coordinating role, particularly at the Rome Conference. In order to be as effective as possible, it split up into three types of subgroups—regional caucuses, who lobbied state representatives of their own regions, issue-based caucuses on gender justice, victims, children, peace, and a caucus of faith-based organizations, and twelve working groups, which shadowed the working groups of state representatives and made daily reports available to NGOs and state delegates (Pace and Thieroff, 1999, p. 394).

The level of recognition of the Coalition's role by state representatives and United Nations officials was probably unprecedented. Various committee chairs as well as many other official delegates took the participation of NGOs in the proceedings for granted, and the Coalition was their first point of contact (see, for instance, Bos, 1999, pp. 45–6). It was also asked by the United Nations to organize the accreditation of NGOs to the Rome Conference, a unique form of self-regulation (Pace, 1999, p. 209).

Achievements of GCS

Many state representatives in the ICC negotiations, including the successive chairs of the negotiations, have remarked on the strong involvement and influence of GCS in negotiating the Statute (Bos, 1999, p. 45; Kirsch and Holmes, 1999, pp. 11, 37). Perhaps the strongest expression of this sentiment came from a diplomat who did not belong to the **like-minded group** of states in favour of a strong independent Court. Israeli Chief Counsel Alan Baker acknowledged: 'In all my years of international work, I've never seen the NGOs play a more powerful role ... They were in on nearly every meeting. They were in on everything' (from the *Wall Street Journal*, quoted in Pace, 1999, p. 201). Taking a broader view, it can be considered the achievement of GCS that there should be a Court at all. The idea was first conceived, kept alive, developed, and advocated in international legal associations for 125 years. Even a few years before the adoption of the Statute, CICC

coordinator Bill Pace was told by a leading expert in international affairs to 'keep working on this, but don't get your hopes up too high for it isn't going to happen in your lifetime, or your children's lifetime, or your grandchildren's lifetime' (Pace, 1999, p. 193).

In terms of the content of the Statute, undoubtedly the most important achievement was the prosecutor's authority to choose his or her own cases. By the admission of the key diplomats involved, this could not have been achieved without sustained and overwhelming NGO pressure. Beyond NGOs, the active involvement of the prosecutors of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals was central in legitimizing the idea of an independent prosecutor. Within a few years, GCS succeeded in persuading a majority of states—though not the USA, which has remained reluctant to sign the Rome Statute—that independent authority of the prosecutor was desirable and achievable (Glasius, 2006, pp. 47–60). Another achievement is the requirement that states automatically accept the Court's full jurisdiction for all the crimes in the Statute upon ratification, instead of the '*à la carte*' jurisdiction regime originally proposed. Automatic jurisdiction was the consistent and unanimous position of civil society actors, and, like the prosecutor, gradually came to be accepted by states (Glasius, 2006, pp. 63–6).

Largely through the advocacy of a very large, active, and expert Gender Caucus, the Rome Statute greatly advances the gender-sensitiveness of international law (see Bedont and Hall Martinez, 1999; Oosterveld, 1999). On the other hand, partly due to pressure from North American anti-abortion or 'pro-family' groups not affiliated with the CICC, the terms *gender* and *forced pregnancy* were defined so as not to pose obstacles to any state's ratification, regardless of its policies on gender (Glasius, 2006, pp. 28–35).

Intense pressure from civil society ensured the inclusion of war crimes committed in internal conflict situations. A special Victims Rights Group played an important role in forging rules that balance the need for fair and effective prosecutions with protection, sensitive treatment, and rights of victims and witnesses. The Child Rights Caucus played a role in the criminalization of conscription of children under 15, a new element in humanitarian law.

Controversies Within GCS

While the ICC negotiations were largely characterized by mutual respect and camaraderie, they were also


the scene of a confrontation between two civil society groupings with diametrically opposed interests: the women's movement and the pro-family movement. The surfacing of two social movements with contradictory aims at the same venue highlights recurring questions about GCS participation in international forums: Who is legitimate? Who is representative? Who has a right to be there? Women's groups have been confronted with diverse voices from within the movement, but they still tend collectively to consider themselves as the sole representatives of women's concerns. Self-identified 'pro-family' groups explicitly question this notion.³

The clashes between the two movements focused on two issues: the use of the word 'gender' and the crime of 'forced pregnancy'. Pro-family groups objected to gender as potentially providing 'protection for "other genders" including homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals, transgendered, etc.' (REAL Women of Canada, 1998), whereas women's groups insisted on the relevance of the socially constructed behaviour of men and women (see Chapter 11). Forced pregnancy was experienced in Bosnia, where Muslim women were not only raped but subsequently forced to carry their babies to full term. However, the Vatican and pro-family groups argued that defining forced pregnancy as a crime would make it illegal for states to prohibit abortion.

In both cases, narrow definitions were finally negotiated that took the sting out of the controversy. In the ICC Statute, 'the term gender refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term gender does not indicate any meaning different from the above' (Steains, 1999, pp. 374–5). Forced pregnancy remained a crime in the Statute, but defined only as 'the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy' (Steains, 1999, pp. 366–8). On the basis of these definitions, both groups could interpret the outcome of the negotiations as a qualified victory (Glasius, 2006, pp. 91–2).

African civil society groups played an important part in the establishment of the ICC (see Figure 9.1). But fifteen years on, the ICC is under attack, not only from states but also from African civil society groups, for focusing almost exclusively on African cases, for prioritizing criminal justice over other, more local transitional justice mechanisms, and for prioritizing justice over peace processes (see Chapter 22 and also:

Figure 9.1 Regional representation



T. Allen, 2005b; Branch, 2007; Flint and de Waal, 2009; Du Plessis, Maluwa, and O'Reilly, 2013; Refugee Law Project, 2015). Indeed, all of the twenty-one cases currently before the court are African.

Advocates and activists in favour of the Court, including many African NGOs, in turn have emphasized the *universal* aspirations of the court, ensuring justice and accountability for victims in countries across the globe where domestic legal systems reflect an unwillingness or inability of local authorities to prosecute the perpetrators, as well as the important role that African countries have played in its creation. Africans have filled prominent positions, including now that of the Chief Prosecutor. For these reasons, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa has called the ICC 'Africa's court' (Letter on the ICC to AU delegates in 2013, cited in Lamony, 2014, p. 70). Nonetheless, the resonance of the ICC's alleged double standards against Africa puts NGOs seeking justice and accountability in a difficult position in the societies where they work. 'The ICC backlash has created a major dilemma for us, no doubt about it. Deciding the appropriate course of action has become a very difficult question', one human rights worker told *Foreign Policy* (15 July 2014).

These examples show that GCS is not a harmonious entity with a single set of shared values. It is populated by actors with strongly held values, 'organizing to influence their world', but these strongly held values differ; they may diverge or even clash. Plurality and even discord are part and parcel of GCS. But the case of the Gender Caucus and the pro-family movement shows that compromises can in fact be found in multilateral negotiations, while the Africa controversy

makes clear that the universal aspirations of human rights and transitional justice groups in GCS will not

be taken for granted by other civil society groups in a world marked by unequal power relations.

KEY POINTS

The International Criminal Court is a civil society achievement: the idea was first developed in civil society, was kept alive in international legal associations, and would not exist in its current form without the civil society campaign of the 1990s.

The influence of civil society on the Rome Statute was in part based on the close alignment in expertise and values between the civil society activists and a majority of state representatives.

Civil society does not have a common view as regards to the role of the ICC or its functioning. Nonetheless, its engagement

with the ICC may serve both to unmask state hypocrisy and to actually nudge the ICC towards being more responsive to the concerns of local communities affected by its work.

Critical Thinking Questions:

Are you in favour of consulting GCS when it is advocating for conservative social change? Should, for instance, anti-gay marriage advocates have a voice at UN negotiations on non-discrimination and equality legislation? Why or why not?

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted through two brief case studies to demonstrate the interdependence between the emergence of GCS and the development of human rights law. GCS in relation to human rights plays a key role in shifting norms through what Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 16–23) have called ‘information politics’ and ‘symbolic politics’. At the global and domestic levels, civil society’s right to inform, debate, and persuade on the basis of particular ethical convictions is not generally questioned. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the project of increasing the popularity of human rights had been incredibly successful. Not only politicians, but also corporate and religious leaders now routinely invoke human rights values, and outright rejection of human rights by any kind of public figure has become almost unthinkable. Because of GCS’ ongoing human rights activism and advocacy, many human rights have been accepted as valid and binding. They are no longer marginal, but have become mainstream (Hopgood, 2014, p. 12). Like any frame, however, human rights are susceptible to instrumentalization by power-holders. There is also the risk of co-option. The more human rights become institutionalized, the more they lose their counter-hegemonic force and may serve power rather than confront and challenge it. This raises the question how subversive human rights movements should be in order to remain effective (see Neil Stammers on Opendemocracy.net—see ‘Web Links’ at the end of this chapter).

Moreover, human rights are not the only ethical frame prevalent in GCS. In the early twenty-first century, at least two other significant ideological master

frames can be discerned: the social justice frame, more overtly concerned with power relations and redistribution than with human rights, and religiously informed frames, above all the frame of the ‘Umma’, the Islamic brotherhood of mankind. Adherents to all three of these frames have in common a global project and a belief that their frame alone offers solutions for the marginalized and downtrodden of the world. Yet all three have been open to abuse by power-holders. A fourth frame, of renewed importance with the advance of climate change, may be that of environmentalism (see Chapter 23). None of these frames is necessarily entirely incompatible with any of the others. Historic separation and suspicion tend to accentuate the areas of conflict, but the search for common ground is urgent if there is to be one (pluralist) GCS instead of several separated and opposing strands.

In addition to adding new issues as human rights norms on the agenda (of both news media and legislatures or intergovernmental policy-making bodies), GCS in relation to human rights also aims to influence policy formulation by helping to codify norms in laws and regulations. Its participation in lawmaking is, however, contested. A remarkable feature of the negotiations on the ICC was that leading state delegates appeared to take this participation for granted. As Adriaan Bos noted, GCS involvement ‘fills in gaps arising from a **democratic deficit** in the international decision-making process’ (Bos, 1999, pp. 44–5). That there is such a deficit is generally acknowledged, but can GCS really fill the democratic gap?

There are two issues at play here: the unevenness of GCS representation in global decision-making forums and the problem of representation within GCS itself. First, whereas the UN has created various inclusive and effective consultative mechanisms, GCS is neither officially represented at **international financial institutions** (IFIs) like the IMF, the WTO, or the World Bank, nor at important informal forums such as the various G+ summits. Decision making affecting the distribution of wealth and resources happens far away from the communities affected by economic globalization. It is important that GCS acquires a stronger voice in international decision making in financial-economic realms and monitors IFIs' policies and practices more closely from a human rights perspective.

Second, while it can be argued on the basis of the ICC case that GCS can greatly strengthen certain features of democratic procedure, in particular transparency, equality, and deliberation (Glasius, 2006, pp. 114–27), GCS cannot be seen as offering a form of representation of the global *demos*, or at least not representation in its traditional form. It could be conceptualized as a form of participation ('a voice not a vote' (Edwards, 2003)), but in practice this participation is so limited and so uneven (see Table 9.1) that GCS cannot entirely be considered to be an adequate 'functional equivalent' (Rosenau, 1998) or 'alternative mechanism' (Scholte, 2001) to parliamentary democracy operating at the global level.

Even if it is accepted that GCS moves states towards appreciating, or at least appearing to appreciate, 'ethical' or 'common good' arguments over national interest arguments, the question remains which ethical projects make it to those forums and get taken up. In the ICC negotiations, while there was some open and some muted contestation, there was clearly a dominant

civil society project: to prise away from states the power to punish perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. But if multilateral institutions like the United Nations are serious and sincere about being 'open to civil society', they should be open to all civil society representation, not just representation that reflects their own values. If human rights groups have a right to be active at forums such as the ICC negotiations—and they have fought hard for that right—then so do other groups. It is only on the basis of such ethical pluralism that GCS participation in international lawmaking can be defended.

Finally, GCS aims to affect the implementation of human rights law and policy by monitoring its effectiveness and influencing governments to commit the necessary resources. This form of GCS activism in the field of human rights compliance monitoring raises yet another democratic question. Civil society activists take personal risks in order to bear witness to violations of human rights of which we might not otherwise be aware. But what typically characterizes these efforts, whether in Tibet, Syria, or Mali, is that the population cannot speak freely about its own political aspirations. Therefore, human rights activists end up making recommendations for these populations without any mandate, save their own consciences. This is a necessary function of GCS in an imperfect world, but it should at the same time be recognized as a problem.

GCS cannot be artificially insulated from money, violence, or existing power structures, but what sets GCS apart from other international actors is that it operates on a different logic: the logic of persuasion. Human rights activism has been characterized by courage and determination, but this must be combined with humility and openness to other civil society perspectives for the human rights paradigm to remain persuasive.



QUESTIONS

Individual Study Questions

1. In what ways are GCS and the international rule of law interdependent?
2. Why were the civil society actors engaged in negotiations on the ICC relatively successful?
3. Is there a danger of civil society actors being co-opted when they are close to power-holders? Where would you see yourself as a human rights activist: outside protesting or inside negotiating?
4. Does participation of GCS in international negotiations, such as on the ICC or on a complaints procedure for economic and social rights, make such negotiations more democratic? If so, in what ways?
5. What could human rights organizations do to hold international financial institutions accountable?

Group Discussion Questions

1. What is GCS according to you? Is it really global?
2. If you were a social justice activist concerned with rising inequalities in income and wealth related to economic globalization, would you campaign on economic and social rights? Why or why not?
3. Should civil society groups be given a role in the deliberations of an intergovernmental body such as the Human Rights Council? If so, on what basis?
4. Which recommendations do you have for global civil society organizations to increase their accountability to the communities in which they operate? What about for human rights organizations in particular?
5. Is it possible to distinguish between legitimate criticism of the Northern and elitist character of GCS, and the instrumentalization of these kinds of arguments by governments to deflect attention from their own human rights record?
6. Do you believe that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC should consult civil society and victim groups before deciding whether to prosecute someone? Why or why not? Should it interfere in situations where local civil society cannot freely deliberate, for instance because of social conflict or intimidation?



FURTHER READING

Bell, D. and **Coicaud, J.-M.** (eds) (2007). *Ethics in Action: The Ethical Challenges of International Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

This edited volume is the result of a project bringing together leaders of human rights NGOs and political theorists to discuss ethical dilemmas.

Glasius, M. (2005). *The International Criminal Court: A GCS Achievement*. London: Routledge.

A detailed account of the role of GCS in the establishment of the ICC, with some wider considerations about the role of GCS in global governance.

GCS Yearbook Series (2001). For 2001–3 published by Oxford University Press, Oxford; 2004 onwards by Sage, London.

The most exhaustive resource on all aspects of GCS. Each book contains a section on concepts, on issues, on infrastructure, and a data programme. From 2007/8, the books are themed.

Ishay, M. (2004). *The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

This history of human rights is at the same time an accessible history of the human rights movement.

Kaldor, M. (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

A readable yet insightful introduction to the concept of GCS.

Keck, M. and **Sikkink, K.** (1998). *Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Groundbreaking work on the emergence of transnational advocacy networks, with an emphasis on human rights networks.

Murdie, M. (2014). *Help or Harm: The Human Security Effects of International NGOs*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Discusses, based on quantitative analysis, to what extent international NGOs act in a purely principled manner, and if they do, under what conditions they are able to impact human rights and development outcomes.

Willetts, P. (2011). *Non-Governmental Organizations in World Politics: The Construction of Global Governance*. London and New York: Routledge.

An accessible and informative textbook on the role and participation of NGOs in global policy making.



WEB LINKS

<http://www.civicus.org> CIVICUS is a large general alliance of civil society organizations dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world.

<http://www.escr-net.org> ESCR-Net is an international network of groups and individuals around the world that aims to advance social justice through human rights.

<http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights> A multilingual online forum for debating human rights movements worldwide.

<http://www2.lse.ac.uk/globalGovernance/research/globalCivilSociety/publications.aspx> Free downloads of chapters from older editions of the *GCS Yearbook* (as mentioned in 'Further Reading').



NOTES

1. From a telephone interview with Rolf Kuennemann, founding Director of FIAN, 15 December 2005.
2. See the ESCR-Net website: <http://www.escr-net.org/>.
3. See the REAL Women of Canada website: <http://www.realwomenofcanada.ca>.



Visit the Online Resource Centre that accompanies this book for updates and a range of other resources:
www.oxfordtextbooks.co.uk/orc/goodhart3e/