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*CMH Pub 104- 6

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT

IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA

-This publication rep laces DA Pam 20-291, February 1952,

Center of Military History United States Anny

Washington, D.C.

For ... Ie by t he Superintendent or Documento. u.s. Gover nment P r inting om"" w ... hington. D.C. 200\02

PREFACE

This study was prepared by a committee of former German generals and general staff officers under the supervision of the Historical Division, EUCOM. The material, based on the personal experiences of the principal a uthor and his associates, was written largely from memory, with some assistance from diaries, earlier studies, and documents. All the German officers involved had extensive experience on the Eastern Front during the period 1941-45. The principal author, for example, commanded in succession a panzer division, a panzer army. and an army group.

The reader is reminded that publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERIES were written by Germans from the German point of view. As in eMH Pub 104-12, Ru ssian Combat Methods in World War II, and CMH Pub 104-5, Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, the "Introduct ion" and "Conclusions" to this study present t he views of the German author without interpretation by American personnel. Minor changes in form and in chapter titles have been made to obtain greater clarity. However, passages which may reflect the authors' prejudices and defects, whatever they may be, have not been changed. and find the same expression in t he following transla tion as they do in the original German.

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CONTENTS

""-PART ONE. _ _____ _ _ _____ _ ____ _____ _ ____ _____ 1 PART TWO. WINTER

Chapter 1. GeneraL _______ ___ ____ _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ ____ _ _____ ___ _ _ ___ _ _ ___ 3 Chapter i. $now _______________________________ • _ ___ _ _ __ _ _ _ ____ _ __ _ 8 Section 1. Infantry ____ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ___ _ _ __ 8

II. Artillery _____ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10 III. Armored Forces_____________________________________ _ 11

Chapter 3. German laetle.__ ___ _____________________________________ 12 Chapter 4. Run ion Tgcll cs ___________________________________________ 16 Section I. Ski Troops __________ ________________________________ 16

I I, Unusual Russian Tactics __________________ _____ _______ 17 Chapter 5. Cla,hl ng, Equipment, Ratlan. ____________ . ____ .. ____________ 18 Chapter 6. Tranlpartatlan and Troop Mavemenh _______________ .________ 20 Section I. Roads _________________________ ___________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 20

II. Railroads ______________ ______ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2 1 Ill. Dran Horses ________________________________ .. _._____ 21

Chapter 7. Health and Maro le _______________ ... __ ... _ •• _____________ 23 Section I. Evacuation of Casualtics ______ _____ ... _ .. ___ _________ _ 23

II. Effeet of Cold on Morale _____ _____ . ___ . ____ ._. __ •. ____ 24 Chapter 8. Air OperQ'lanl _______________ __ ..• _ •. ______ .____________ 25 Section I. AircrafL __________________ .. _. ________ . ____________ . 25

II. Airfields _____ ____________________ ... __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 25 Ill. Flight _______________ ______________________ . _. _ _ __ _ _ _ 26 IV. Emergency E q uipment ______ _ . __________ . _________ ._.. 26

V. Ration8 and Clothing ________________ . __ ._____________ 27

PA RT THREE. SPRING AN D AUTUMN Chapter 9 . GenerQ!.. _______ _____ ________________ .. ___ •.. _ ____ _ _ _ _ __ 29 Section I. Spr ing ___________ _____________ . __________ .•• ____ .___ 29

11. AutUlnn _____ . __ . _ _ . _ __ _____ . __ . __ __________ ... _ .. _ _ 30 Chopter 10. Mud _____________ _____ . __________ .. _._ .. _ .••. __________ 31

Section I. GencraL _ ___________________ . ____ . _____ .. ________ ___ 31 II. I nfantry __ . __ ..•. _ ..... __ .•. ___ ... ______ ___ ...•• _____ 32

J 11. Artillery ____________________ _ . _ ... _ + _. ________ • __ • _ _ _ 33 IV. Armored Forcc8 _________________ . _________________ .__ 33

Chapter 11. Clath in g. Equipment, Ratlanl ____________ . _______ . ____ .___ __ 36 Chapter 1lt Tranlpartatian and Traap Movementl ____ ... ____________ .____ 38

Section I. Roads ________________________________ . _________ ___ . _ 38 I I. Railroads __________ . ___ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 40

II I. Bridges _________________________ ._. _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 40 IV. Small B oats ___________________ _______________ _______ 41

Chapter 13. Hea lth ___________ .. ______ . _____ . ____ .. ___ . ____ •. ___ _ __ _ _ 42 Section I. Troops ____ . ____ . ___ . __ . ___ _ ._ .. ____ .. __ .____________ 42

II. Hon!CS ____ .. ___________ . _________________ . ___ .__ ____ 43 Chap' er 14, A ir Operatlonl _______ _____ . ____ _ ._. ____________ . _______ 44

PART FOUR . SUMMER (hapter 15. G eneraL __________ _ • ____ ___ __ __________ • ___ • • ___ ___ •• __ _

Section 1. Sudd en ChangC8 in Ground COnditions. __ ... ___ • __ • ____ _ II. Dust a nd Sand ___________ __________ _________________ _

I I I . Wate r _____ ______ _____ ___ _____________ ______________ _ (hopter 16. Germon TQdlcs ________________________ __ __________ _____ _

Section I. Swamp a nd Sand _____________________ .. ___ __________ _ II. Swampy ForesU! _________ •• __ ____ ____________________ _

(hapter 17. Ruttian T aeticl _____________________________ • •• _ •• __ ••• __ _ (hapter 18. (lothing, Ratlonl, Oral. H onel __________ • _________________ _ (hapter 19. Health ______ ___ ____ __ ____ • _____________________________ _ (hapter 20. Air Operatl on' _. ________________________________ • ____ • __

PA RT AVE. NORTH OF THE ARalC (IRCLE

vi

.... , 4' 46 46 48 49 49 .3 . 6 •• 60 61

Chapter 21. G eneral _______________________________ • _ _ ___ _ ____ _ ______ 63 Section I . I nfantry ____ • ______ ••• _. __ _ _ _ __ __ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ 64

1I. Artille ry _____ • __ • _. ____ _______ . ___ . __ . _. _____ . _ _ _ _ __ _ 66 Ill. Armored _________________ .......... _ .. _________ 66

Chapter 22. (lothlng, Equipment, Ratlon' ______ .. _____________ ________ __ 67 Chopter 23. Tranlportatl on and Troop Movementl ____________________ ____ 71

Section I. Roads ______ • ____ • __ _ __ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ __ __ _ __ _ _ 71 I I . Railroads ___ ______________________________ _ •• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 72

Ill. Sk i and D ismoun ted Movement ______ _ .. _______________ 72 I V. D raft and P ack Anl mals __________________ __________ 73

( hapter U. Heolth and Morol e ________________________ • • • ____________ 74 Chopler 25. Air Operoti onl ____ .... ________ _ • _____ .. ___ .. ____________ 76

Section I. Gene ra L . ___ _ • __ • _____ _____________________ .. _______ 76 II. Flight. ________ " ____________________ • ____ • ___ ••• __ __ _ 76

PART SIX. CONCLUSIONS _____ • ___ •• _ ___ _ _ _ __ __ _ ____ _ _ _ _____ _ _____ 79

A PPENDIX. Tempe ratures and Preeipitation at n "hev Northwest of Moscow 1 Jo.nuary- 20 Apr il -1942 and 1 October 11)<1 2- 12 J anu ary 1943._____________ ____ _______ ___ ____ ____ 80

MAPS lin IJeq uc nee In, lde ro'Oer)

No. 1. General Reference Ma p. 2. Counte rattack by 6lh Pa uzer Divi sion uear Vo]okola mak 28-29

Decembe r 1041. 3. Advance ot F lying Column nails to t he P oreehye Bridgehea d. 4. Destructlon of Husslall Force Belov to the Rear of Fou rth Pam:er

Army 24 Muy- 22 J une 1042.

ILLUSTR'ATIONS

1. H\1881 1111 Cl vl1!n l1 s Cleurlng nond of Drifted Snow, Ukl'a ln e, 1942 9 2. Ger ma ll Supply Column Ualng ltu s81 1l 11 p anJe Slelgh8 ___________ 23 a. German Column 011 !tond Nenr Lake Ihuen, Sp ri ng Muddy 80080 11 __ 35 4. Germ nn Bridge Construction , Lovat Rlver __ __________ ________ 41 I). Ge r man Horse-d raw n Wa g-o il III $U lu mer Mud, 11)41.___ ____ _ ____ 47 6. Rein deer Used in Evacuation ot Germa n Wounded, Kandu lakslia l<'ront..___________ ___________ _____________ _______________ 73

(1 lIu/ltratLon/l 1 a nd IS are U. S. A r m,. ph otoa from ca p ture d G e rmlln IIL m!; 2. 3. 4, and o are f rom the COllcetiOD of eaptu.-..<! Gcrn,an combat palntl ng& now In t b e custody 0' t he Chief ot IIILlLtllry H isto ry. Spedal fUa«, U. S. Army. ]

PART ONE INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to describe "t he climaHc conditions encoun tered by the German armed forces during four years of struggle in European Russia. To this end the climate of the various regions is described together with its effects on men and equipment, combat and supply. Parts Two, Three, and Four are concerned with Euro- pean R ussia south of the Arctic Circle; Part Five treats of E uropean Russia north of the Arctic Circle. The study emphasizes the lessons learned and improvisations employed to surmount difficult situations.

A Western European army fighting in Russia is faced with COlldi - tions entirely different from those to which it is accustomed, conditions rooted in the peculiarities of Russia and its people. The most unusual characteristic of the country is t he climate, which affects terrain and vegetation and determines living conditions in general. The climate leaves its mark upon the Russian and his l and, and he who steps for the first time on Russian soil is immediately conscious of the new, the strange, the primitive.

The German soldier who crossed into Russian territory felt that he entered a different world, where he was opposed not only by th e forces of the enemy but also by the forces of nature. Nature is the a.lly of the Russian Army, and the struggle against t his alliance was a severe test 101' the Wehrmacht, exacting great sacrifices. To conquer the raging elements of nature was the more difficult because their fury and effect were not f ull y recognized by the Germnns, who were neither trained nor equipped to withstand them. The German command had been under t he impression that the Red Army could be destroyed west of the. Dnepr, and tbat there would be no need for conducting operlLtions in cold, snow, and mud.

Thi s publication replaces DA Pam 20- 291, February 1952.

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PART TWO WINTER

Chapter 1

General Winter in most pnrts of European Russia so uth of the Arctic Circle

sets in suddenly and lasts five to six months. The period of clear W(lathel' which follows the autumn muddy season lasts at most one month, too short a time for extensive military operations. Cold, ice, and snow may hinder operations as early as December, especially in the northern parts of the country.

Snowfllll varies greatly in European Russia. It is greater in the northern and central regions than in the south. A long the Jower Don !Uld Donets, in the winter of 1942-43, the first snow feU in mid- December and did not affect mobility during t he entire winter. The same winter saw more than eighteen inches of snow on the middle cou rse of theSe rivers and in the Kharkov area. Snow depths of three to four feet are common in the north, where whoolod vehicles can move only on cleared roads, and huge snowdrifts build up in valleys and llOliows. Here horse-mounted and dismounted troops move with difficulty except on roads, and t rail breakers must be used for cross- co un try marches. In de<lp -snow country even tanks and other tracked vehic les are restricted to plowed roads.

In Lhe Baltic and Lenin gmd regions the snow cover varies great ly f l'om year to year. Leningrad and its vicinity, for example, may have as much as twenty-eight inches of snow in severe winters, while in mild winters there may be less than two inches. Water courses to the south of Leningl'ud often freeze over by mid-November, and tem- peratures t here mlLy fa ll as low as - 400 F, Even during mild win- ters the mercury will drop to - 200 F.

In central European Russia, the Smolensk-Vitebsk area has noon temneratures below freez ing even during average winters. The Prip- yat Marshes usually freeze over ilJ. winter, and only during excep- tionally mild winters, or in case of an early snow cover, will large patches of t he Pripyat remain unfrozen and impassable.

3

4 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

The winter of t he southern steppes, longer and colder t h llO that of Central Europe, differs little from t he winter of central and northern Russia south of the Arctic Ci rcle. I n the Black Sea region, where two thirds of the annllal precipitation occurs between September and March, the climate is of the Mediterranean type.

T he winter of 1941-42 was most severe in European Russia. In the area northwest of Moscow the mean temperature during Janua ry 1942 was - 32 0 F., and the 26th of the month in t he same area saw the lowest recorded temperature of the entire Russian campaign: - 63 0 F. The so uthern part of European Russia, too, had record low temperatures during t he first winter, with readings ranging from - 22 0 to - 40 0 F., compared with temperatures of 14" to - 40" F., in the same area during the fo llowing winter. A chart of temperatl1res and precipitation near Rzhev for the period January through April 1942 and October 1942 through January 1943 may be found in the Append ix.

The obliteration of landmarks in snow-covered terrain makes orien- tation difficult. R ussia n villages are hard to identify from a distance, and often a church built on high ground or a church tower is the only visib le sign of an inhabited place. If neither is present, woods filled with screeching birds usually indicate that a village is ncar by. The Russian peasant "Stores his winter supplies in advance and digs in to spend the winter completely cut off from the outside world.

Cold reduces the efficiency of men and weapons. At the beginning of December 1941, 6th Panzer Division was but 9 miles from Moscow and 15 miles from the Kremlin when a sudden drop in temperature to - 30 0 F., coupled with a surprise attack by Siberian troops, smashed its drive on the capital. Paralyzed by cold, the German troops could not aim t heir rifle fire, and bolt mechanisms jammed or strikers shat- tered in the bitter winter weather . Machine guns became encrusted with ice, recoil liquid froze in guns, ammunition su pply failed . Mor- tar shells detonated in deep snow with a hollow, harmless th ud, and mines were no longer reliable. Only one German tank in ten lutd sur- vived the autumn muddy season, and those still available could not move through the snow because of their narrow tracks. At first the Russian attack was slowed with hand grenades, but after a few days the German prepared positions in villages and farmhouses were sur- rounded or penetrated.

The Germans held out to the northwest of Moscow until 5 bel', and on t he next day the first retreat order of the war was given. In the months of the offensive, German battalions and companies had dwindled to a handful of men. The Russian mud llnd winter had wrought havoc upon their weapons and equipment. Leadership and bmvery could not compensate for the lowered fire power of the Uer-

EffECTS OF CliMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 5

ma.n divisions. The numerical superiority of the Ru ssilms, Ilided by climlltic conditions, saved Moscow and turned the t ide of battle. Hit- ler neither expected nor planned for a winter Will'.

By mid-December, when the first phase of the German withdra wal ended, 6th Panzer Division was located in Shakhovskaya to refit IIlld receive reinforcements. (Mllp 2) On Christmas Eve the 4th Ar- mOl'ed Infantry Regiment, which hnd received replacements, was alerted to counterattack Rus,c;ian forces that had broken through Ger- man positions on the Lamn River west of Volokolnmsk, in t h e sector of the 106th Infnntry Division.

On 26 December t he regiment moved out in a snowstor m over roads already covered with deep drifts. The German troops werc inllde- quntely clothed for the Russian win ter, and in every village lengthy warming hal ts were necessary. Two days were needed to cover the twelve miles to the line of departure.

After a meal and a night's rest, 4th Armored Infantry Regiment attacked on 28 December together with German elements already in the area. Well supported by artillery and heavy weapons, the regi- ment advnnced throughout the day, and in the evening made contact with the 23d Infantry Division to the north, thus closing the gnp. Some shelter wns found in near-by villages and farmhouses. Strong socurity detachments were posted, and relieved every half hour be- clluse of the extreme cold.

The plan for 29 December was to regain the former German posi- tions on the Lama by envelopment of the Russian forces that had broken through. The regiment attacked eastward while the motor- cycle bnttaIion of t he 6th Panzer Division, south of the Il1I\in body, advanced northward townrd Vladychino. By noon the enemy break- through force was surrounded.

Night temperatures dropped to between -300 and - 40 0 F., and no shelter wus a.vail nb le to t he German troops. The near-by vi ll ages were destroyed and the entrenchments of the old German positions on t he Lama wero buried doop in snow. To l'ema.in oxposed wou ld have meant certa.in death to the troops who lacked adequate winter clothing, and withdmw al to a distnnt village was ordered.

When t he R ussians obse rved tlmt the encirclement had been abnn- doned, they concentmted for a new break-through wh ich eventually forced a withdrnwaJ of the entire German front in the area. Success had turned to failure because the Germans were not equipped to with- stand extreme cold.

Periods of moderate cold a1ternating with thaw are particul arly dangerous . At t he end of March 1942, in the Lake region, noon t.emperntures rose to 41 0 F., followed by a sharp fall of the mercUl'Y at night. Boots, socks, and trousers t hat had become wet

6 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

duri ng the dl\y stiffened with the night cold and froze toes and feet. Serious frost injuries developed when troops overheated from

combat were forced to spend the night in snow pits or windswept open fields, especially when the fatigued men took even t he sho rtest of naps. A German company that spent a day during a. thaw en- trenchi ng itself lost sixty-five of its ninety-three mell as a result of a sudden severe cold wave at ni ght.

Frostbite casualties among German troops were heavy during the first year of the war. At the beginning of December 1941, Fomth Army failed ill an attempt to penetrate the outer defenses of Moscow because the Russians were able to USe the rail net around the city to bring up strong forces. On the morning of 4 December, after three days of heavy losses, army fe ll back to its positions of 1 December to avoid further casualties.

On the same day, as the weather tUl'Iled bitter cold, the Russians attacked, and by 20 December the entire army front was heavily

A radio message intercepted at the time revealed that tho Russian drive was an all -out effort to knock t he Germans out of the war. Later information that t.he Russians had deployed 30 infantry divisions, 33 infantry brigades, 6 armored brigades, and 3 cavalry di visions on the Moscow front left no doubt as to thei r in tent.

By 5 January, when tempern.tures had risen somewhat, Fourth Army counted 2,000 frostbite casualties and half as many fro m enemy action. At thi s poi nt Hitler gave permissio n to pull back the army left wing in the face of a Ru ssian envelopment., and the withd rawal was completed acco rding to plan. There was no let-up in t he bat.tle, however, and German cllsualties from all causes continued to mount.. A snowsto rm which, since the 5th, had added to the German difficul - t. ies, stopped on t he 10th, and clear cold weather with temperatures down to -13 0 F. fo llowed, Here and there, supplies were moved up during quiet periods, but even then at great cost in lives and eq ipment.

The Germans fell back steadily and in March heavy snowfalls Immpercd the withdrawal as t he Russi!Ln offensive continued, On 18 April, t he first w!trm, sunny day of spring, the Russian attacks ceased, Foul't h Army suffcl'cd 96,535 casualties between 1 January and 31 Mal'clt 1942, of whi ch 14,236 wel'e frostbite cases.

Frostbite was frcquent among drivers and troops who were moved long dista nces in open t ru cks. So long as suitable clothing was not llvailable, constant indoctr ination in cold-weather precllutions was neCCSsn l'y. Frequent halts were mltde so men could warm themselves by exercise. Front-Jine troops became indifferent in ex treme cold; undel' cons tnnt ene my pl'essure they became mentully numbed. Med- icnl oflicel's and commanders of aU tanks had to make certain tJlItt

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 7

soldiers changed socks frequently, and that they did not wa it until swo ll en feet made it impossible to take off boots.

Some chemi cal heat packets Wel'e iss ued, but they protected only smu ll areas of t he body for short periods. Regulur use of tho 8a'llllla, a steam b!lth, was hel pful in prevent.ing ill ncsses cu used by cold .u.nd expOS UI 'O, but such baths were not alw nys avn ilabl o.

The RussiullS, too, suffered from t he oxtrcme cold when fo rced to remain out i n the Opell. Their supplies di d not keep up with t hem, p,nd they became weak and exhll usted. Consequently, they ulwp,y s made a great effort to capture v ill uges for overnight shelter. For exumple, in the winter of 1941-42, north of Rzhev, the Russians unsuccessfully attempted to drive Gennun forces out of '" vill nge und wero forced to s pend tho night in t ho open. Cut off from supplies und stiff with cold, the Russians were so weakened by t heir ordeu1 thut they wore unuble to hind er It. withdruwui of Germun troops, includ ing two batteries, from Ilo l,th of the villugo, even t hough t hu GOl'mll llS passed within 100 yard s of t ho Ru ssilUI forces.

Chapter 2

Snow A war of movement is difficult in deep snow. Foot ma-rches in twenty

inches of snow are slow; in depths of more t han twenty inches they arc exhausting. When snow was not too deep, the Germans used details, in shift,<;, to tramp down snow trails. Ski troops wore also llsed as trail brenkers. The Russilms uficd '1'34 tanks to pack down snow; the tracks Ilsed on German tanks during the first year of the war were too narrow for this purpose.

Movements on foot or with wheeled vehicles are impossible in snow depths above forty inches. Snow crust is somet.imes strong enough to bear the weight of small grou ps. Hard-frozen snow, however, can be used on ly for night movement, because the approach of troops over a snow crust can be heard at.a g l'cat distance. Snow in bushland, draws, and ditches will not support much weight.

Section I. Infantry

A normal infantry attack cannot be made in deep snow. Advancing by bounds is out of the quest.ion, because every movement must be made in the open, exposed to enemy fil'C. If infantry attacks had to be made, t he Germans always sought !1rens where the snow was less doop. If such areas could not be found, the infantry had to work its way forward under cover of darkness, digging as it went, or following It beaten path against. t he flll-nk and rell.r of the enemy.

Without adequate snow removal equipment, infantry movement during or afoo l' !1 snowsto rm is difficult. In December 1942, for ex-

the defent of Italian forces in the Voronezh area made it imperative that this sector of the fl'ont be l'Cinforced, A Gel1nan infantry division near Siniye Lipyagi was made available and Ol'dcred to march t he fifty-five miles south to the enoangered area, The march was to be mll.de th rough the rear arcus of several German di visions which were to assist the ttdvttncing unit by furn ishing ra tions and quarters, and the movement was expected to take three dll.Ys.

The division set out in the fil'sl:: flurri es of what proved to be a twelve-day blizzard. The march route was over lateral roads not used for logistical su ppOtt, and consequently not cleared of snow. It was just at this time that the dcspemte Germun attempt to l'Clievc Stalin- grad required all available snow plows. Instead of the expected three

•

EFFECTS OF CLl MAT£ ON COMBAT IN EUII:OPEAN II:USS IA 9

10 GEtMAN REPORT SEl in

days the march required fifteen . A command decision to make motol'w i"cd snow·clcaring equipment available would huve aided the move- me nt considerably. Such equ ipment, always in the GeL'lllan Army, wascontt-ol1cd at army 0 ,1' army g."OUP level.

Section II. Artillery

Artillery wns moved on existing roads, and if no roads were avail- llb lc, new tracks were shoveled. I n deep snow it was often impossible for the infantry to take fun ndvnntnge of artiller y prepttration, because it could not move forward fu st enough. Such nn instance occurred Ilt Gaytolovo (a few miles south of Lake Ladoga) on 21 December )041. The German infantry attacked at 0900 after a thorough artillery preparation. It too k so long for the riflemen to reach the Ru ssian posi- tions that enemy bunkers went into action again, and the assau lt was delayed. By 1500, when the infantry had penetrated nt several points, n withdrawal ordCl' was given, The troops would h!lVe frozen to death if they h ad spent the night in the open,

The effectiveness of artillery projectiles, particularly those of smull caliber, and of mortar ammunition, was seriously hampered by deep SIlOW. Snow dampened and reduced luterd fragmentation of artil lery Bhells, and a lmost completely smothered mortar fire and hand grenades. H en vy artillery weapons, s ll ch as the German 210-mm. mortar, re- mained hi g hly effective, Because of the cushioning effect of snow , mines often fniled to detonate when step ped Oil or even when dr iven ove l' by tanks. To keep detonators effective in extr amely cold weathe r, gun crews often curried them in their pockets.

Registration fire with aerial observntiOIl and with flu sh and sound waS hampered because the sno w swa llowed projectiles und bursts, Ar- tille l'y m!tp firing was impeded by a vast differ ence between meteor - ological conditions in Russia and in Central Europe, and the resultant rango dispersion. Metro corrections of German observation battalions were com puted according to Con trnl European stand !u-ci s, r esul t ing in less accurate 61'0, Checking ail' observation by sou nd lind flash rang- ing, and checking sound rnnging by !llIsh ranging and vice versa, disclosed deviations caused by climatic factors whose ultimate cau ses were never fu lly determined. The serv ices of qualified meteorologi clIJ technicians wou ld have beon useful.

By placing fire control and radio eq uipment in improvised wooden co ntainers padded with blankets it was possib le to protect t hem against frost damage and shock. Russinn peasant sleighs with built-in boxes wet'a often used fo r transporting mdio equipment,

EffECTS O f CLIMATE ON COMBAT 1N EUROPEAN I USS1A 11

Section III . Armored Forces

The princi pal shortcomin g of German tunks was t.he narrow wi d th of t.heil' tl'llcks, Tanks sank deep into t he snow, and beca use of their limited g l'Ound clearance, ultim ately became stu ck, Russian tunks, pa Lticu lariy t he '£34, KV1, Imd KV2, were able to drive through deep

because of their good ground elettran ce and wide tracks, and lay t hei r special effcct.iveness in winter warfal'e, After t he

first winter of the war, Germ ans stllrted to use wide, removable tracks, Theso solved the problem of snow mobility, but tanka equipped co uld not be moved on Germun railroad CUI'S and w(>re too wide to eross t he standa rd German mi litary bridge. Russian wide tank tracks were factol'Y eq uipment ; the broad gage of Russian railroads with their cor- responding ly wide flat cal's eliminated the transportation problem.

I n D ecem ber 1942 a Germtln armored div ision, divCl,ted from the abortive re lief t hrllst Oil SLiding l'ud to consolidate an extre mely critical situation on the Chir HiveI' front, was delayed twelve ho ul's becnuse tho sno w tmcks of its ta nks were 1.00 wide for n military bridge over the Do n, The tracks of more t han 150 tanks and assuult guns had to be removed in total darkness und I'cmOlln ted on t he fnr shore,

Chapter 3

German T aetics U nl ess f orced by circumsta nces t o do so, t he Germ an s d id not

ll\unch offensives in m id winte r. D uring loon,1 attncks commun icn.tion trenches or tunnels for infa ntry could be dug th rough snow with con- s iderab le speed. While such t nmches otfm'cd effect ive co nceal ment if ski llfully sited and ca mou fl aged, t hey werc prncticlLll y useless for protection. W henever artillery s upport was needed snow had to be cleared from firing positio ns and am mu nition storage ar cns.

For indivi du al movement thro ugh s now, sk is nre best. Large ski units are relatively ineffective s ince heavy wea pons cannot be cllrr ied or s up pl ied . T he Gcrmans d id not use ski troops in units !lh ovo bnt- ta.Ji on s ize, wh ile t he Russians used s ti ch t roo ps up to briga de stnmgth. Skis are a hindran ce in co mb at; lhey ha ve to be removecl before goi ng into action, and often become lo!>t.

Ski troops are dective for reconnaissance missions. For exnmple, in March 1942, a. ski patrol of 20 volu nteers f l'om the reconnaissance battalion of 6th Panzer D ivis ion infiltrated 15 miles into enemy ritory, captured 3 prisoners, and gained much valuable information, R ussian civilians living in the urea where the rccon nuissance was made, who had been we ll treated by Germans billeted in t heir vil - lages at an ear lier date, were of grant nssistnncc. Locld guides led t he p at rol around enemy und J>u r tisnn sti'ongholds, und provided shelter in fa r mhouscs. T he miss ion took fo ul' d ttys.

With th e onset of the Russian winter adeq ll llro shelte r is It neces- sity in tactica.l ope rutions. His intrench ing tools useless in frozen gro un d, th e Ger mun soldier could onl y cower in a s now hole and wa.it until a dugout or s imil ur shelter \Vus blasted out of the frost- bou nd soil. Blasted shelters were tl s uu l1y p itch dark, und the sma ll , open fires used for heati ng fi lled eve ry crev ice with s mu dge and smoke, For above-ground shelter, t he round tent proved h ighl y sel·v iccable. Troops werc tm ined to constr uct igloos, but t h is type of shelter never became po pular. Nati ve log ho uses in tho fo rests of t ho nor t hern and cen tra l regio ns of E uropean Russia 1H't! excellent heat reta iners and nrc h ighl y resi stant to concussion.

W hen Germ an t roo ps were atta cking Tikhvin in the winter of 1941 , cold set in sudde nly. Lucking winter clothing and adequate WI' , t he Germun s suffered more cnsuulties fl'om cold tlmn from enemy fire, and t he attack had to be halted as the more warm ly dressed and 12

UFECTS OF alMATE ON COMBAT IN EU IIIOPEAN IIIUSS1A 13

bcttor-eqnipped Ru ssians gllined the illitilltive. The Ger man troo ps were with dmwn to avoid further weathet· casualties.

The defender has a definite advantuge in winter becausc, li S a I'ule, his posi tions cu nnot be seen in snow except at very close mngc. He is able to koop his forces under cover and wait until the moment that fire ca n be used most effectively. The IlttllCker, on the other han d, is im}Xlded in his movements nnd is easily detected, even in camoufltlgo clothing. The principul weapon of t he defend er is the machine gun, It.. .. porformtUlCe is not diminished by snow, in whi ch morttlrs und light artillery lose most of their effectiveness.

When defensive positions were not occupied until winter , the Ge l'- muns found it impossible to bui ld shelters and emplacements in hu rd fro:r.cn ground. Machin6 guns and rifles hud to be placed on n snow ptu'npet that had been built up and packed hard. If well const.rn cted , fl.lld water pOUl'ed over it to form nn ice coating, t he pu rltpet offered some protection ugninst enemy fire ,

Where orgnn ized positions are esta bli shed be£OI'O snowfall , p1H'a- pets must be increased in height as the snow level ri ses, twd care tuken to keep t ren ch es and Ilpproachcs froo of snow at all times. Trenches und dugouts provide better cover in winter than in other scnson s. Snow-covcl'ed obstacles remain effective until covered by a snow crust that will heal' a mlm's weight. Barriers nguinst ski troops are effective on ly us long li S t.hey project ubovc t he snow. Obstacles must be removed when SIl OW begins to melt, or they wi ll obstl'uct visibility 8.11(1 fields of fire,

When swamps frecze over, the defendCI' is suddenly fneed with a situlltion cJ\lUlgcd to his di sudvanblge. Germlln divisions tJlIlt [ought defensive Ilctions when swamps were impassuble barriers were III II grcat di sadvun t nge against the same enemy, in the Slime location, when swumps froze over. The incI'Cased fl'O ntnge crented by the frozen SWlunp could be defended only by cmployi ng Ildditio n:d artil - lcry und mllch g l'eater qlliwtities of a ll ty pes of amm unition. S im i- ltlrly, t he winter freeze-u p is di sadvuntllgeous to It weuk defender tw · hind a wnter banier. The f l'eez(' IUl'll8 l'iv('I'S into rO lltes of IlpPI'oach toward the dcfensive posit ions.

'S ince .the Russians often penell'lLted urti ll ery tirin g positions, the Gel'mUn8 tmincd Itrti llcl'ymen in infulltry close-combllt tact ics. Be- cause snow sometimes mnkes it impossible to eVllcunte guns, 'lrt illel'Y crews were trained in demolition of field pieces.

The Ru ssian . winter covers roads, cou ntryside, and vehicles with a. cri ppling coat of ice und, when SIUld is not available, entire col umns are forced to halt. Icy roads can rob an offensive of su rpri se or be fatn l to a withdrawal. Ice conditions prevail every winter in all parts of Russia, During the German withdrawal from the Moscow

14 GEtMAN lfPOIT SUII:S

area in t he winter of 1041-42, ice hindered the entire operation. A few days before the order to retreat from the suburbs of Moscow, 6th Panzer Division, by bui lding & defense aroun d its last five tanks, held off an attack by S iberian troops who presented prime targets in their brown uniforms as t hey trudged forward in deep snow. This local success faci litated the disengagement of the division and provided time for the destruction of its last S8-mm. antiaircraft gu ns, necessary because no prime movers werc available. Twenty-five prime movers were lost in the autumn mud of 1941, and seven iUld fallen victim to winter cold and SIlOW. 'fhe withdl'lLWa.1 proceeded according to p lan on the fi1'st d ay but the next day, moving over hi ll y terrain, vehicles skidded on icy roads, und t rucks which had been abandoned during t.he preceding muddy season blocked the roads, adding to Ole dif- ficulties.

Fearful that the pursuing Ru ssinns would overtake and deslroy the real' if time were spent in extricnting each vehicle, t he Germans loaded as much matCl'iel as possible on tr ucks still serv iccable and put the remaining equipment to the torch. The rcar guard was re- inforced, and the withdmwal continued with brief delaying aclions based on villages. Inhabited places were vital to the Gorma ns, who lacked winter clothing, and attractive, too, to the R ussians who pre- ferred permanent-type shelter. The retreat oocnme a race fro m village to village.

In a few days the Gennans renched Klin, northwest of Moscow, wh ich could not be used to house the division overnight, as the city was on the main route of other divisions streaming west. (Map 1) How- ever, a large quantity of explosives wem found in K li n and wem used to bl ast temporary shelters in the ground outside the city. Attempts to obtain dilt from the blasted shelters for sa nding roads wem use- less because the explosions loosed grcut chu nks of solidly fL'ozen earth which could not be pulverized. The division held befoL'e Kl in for one and then completed its withdrawnl ncross the fOUl'- lnne Smolensk-Moscow h ighway.

Russian air activity during t he withd rawa l was ineffective, oocnuse it was limited to scnttered solties of a few planes which slrafed colum ns 01' drop ped small fragmentation bombs. During air tderts t he Germans burrowed in the snow tlt leust 100 yards from the road. Some cas unl ties were caused by delnyed-action bombs when men failed to remain down long enough after the missiles were dropped. If the Russians had used strong bomber forces, the results would have been disnstrous. In contrast to the losses fl'om enemy air, Germa n cnsualties due to cold weather and insufficient clothing were heavy..

The numerically sup.erior enemy did not succeed in enveloping and annihi lating t he German rear guu.l'd, because he could not employ his

EffECTS OF CLI MATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 15

heavy weapons in a fronta l attack in deep snow without suffering heavy losses. S uccessful envelopment was difficult for t ho R ussians because such movemen ts were usually attempted by cavalry, sId troops, and infant ry mou nted on sleighs who were unable to take t heir heavy weapons with them. The striking power that the Russian fo rces were able to bring fOl'wllrd was not s ufficient to destroy t he defender.

Chapter 4

Russian Tactics The Ru ss i;UlS wnm lly attacked !tlong existi ng l'Oads or on paths

beaten down by their tanks. Frequently, the infantry followed cloBO behind their tanks, usin g the tra.il made by t he tank tra cks. In other jnstances infantry worked its way forwa rd in snow t un nels toward German posi tion s, despite the heavy losses which resulted from s uch tactics. In mass attacks the Russians us uall y debouched f rom wood>; an d burrQwed theil' way t hrough the deep s now as quickly as p ossible. Mowed down by mach ine guns, the first wave wo uld be followed by II second attack which moved f orward a short distance over the bodies of the dead before coming to a standstill. This was repeated by as many as ten waves, 1l1ltil the Russians bogged down from heavy losses and exhaustion or until the German defenses were penetmted.

Russian infil tration tacti cs were most effective in winter, becausc the Germnn defense sys tem, based on strong points, pract ically invited such tactics. Tho Germans were forced to adopt the strong point sys- tem of defense because thoy lacked suffici ent forces to occupy continu- ous lines backed up by reserves. The R\lssians always sought to s plit nnd annihi late defending forces, nnd to this end cavalry, ski units, ai r borne t roops, and, above nil, partisans were used in great n umbers.

Section I. Ski Troops On t ho night of 20- 21 March 1042, six hUllch'ed Ru ssian ski t roops

enveloped the command post of t he 269th Division in a village twelvo mil es northeast of Ly uba n. The flanking movement was made under cover of darkness over a bog whi ch had a. weak bearing surface and was therefOl'e but lig htly guarded by the Germans. As these troops nsslllli ted t he rear of the village, heavy attacks with armOl'ed support were la.unch ed against the entire d iv ision front. Aft er a bitter fight, division service ttoOpS managed to driv e off the ski troo ps.

Anot her instan ce of Russian use of strong ski f orces occurred at the ond of March 1942, after 6th P anzer Division had captured several villages southwest of Rzhev in a limi ted-objective attack. The area was immediately organized for defense; roads Were cleared in the three-foot-deep snow, and pat hs cleared'to the numerous bun kers taken in the action.

Under cover of darkness, a ski brigade of the Russian T h irty-ninth Gua rds Army, undel' comm and of a general officer, assembled in a 16

CliMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 17

wooded area. opposite a strong point held by t he 114th PunZCl' GrCllll' d ier Regiment plus an artillery battalion and so me flak. At daybreuk, the ski brigade attacked the German position, with the main e/fort ngainst the German rear, ThG defenders recognized the Russi ull in- tentions Itlld withheld fire until the attnckel's came within two to throo hundred yards, The Gel'mans then opened fire with 500 rifles, 30 machine guns, and 16 1l1'tiJIel'Y pieces, T he effect WIlS dcvllstnti ng. Such of the enemy IlS survived buried themselves in the snow in the hope of ret urning to the woods at night, Most of the weapons and all of the ski equipment of the forcc engaged in the mnill attack- wel'e cu.pturod, The greatest prize, however, was a map found on the dead commander which gave the di sposition of the entire 1'hitty-ninth GUlu'ds Anny,

The Russinns failed in their mission because they could not achieve surpri se, In cold weather sound tr'avels a g reat distallce, !lIld t heir npPl'Oach over the snow could cleul'ly be henrd, Furthermore, the nttnck cnl'l'ied !LCI'OSS open terl'ain and all the roads and pnths Ole Germull positi ons wel'o weU gUlLt'ded,

Uussian ski units were more successful when used in combinatioll with other arms, When Thil"<i Panzel' Army was withdrawing west of Moscow in December 1941, a. Ru ssian force composed of ski troops, ('uvalry, and sleigh-mounted infnntl'y succeed.ed ill cutting off the 6th Pan7.eI'l)ivision which was the l'anr guard of LVI Pam'.el' Corps,

Section II. Unusual Russian Tactics

In Octobel' 1941 a Rus.<;ill n force cl'o!;Sed the icc-covered Gu l f of FinM lund from Leningrad and made a. surprise nttuck on the 212th lnfll ntl'y Division , The attack, made under cover of darkness in It dr iving snowstorm, was t.hrown back to the shore afte r a stiff fi ght. The Rus- sirUls had mal'ched eastward across the ice from Leningrad to Kron- shtad t and then southward to hit the Germun flank and nar.

S im ilarly, at the end of January 1945 the Russia ns tried to unhinge the left fla nk of Third Panzer Army, which was on the Debne River, Ly envelop rllent aeross the ice of the Kurisches Huff, Throo times the enemy penetrated the urmy front as far as the town of Labiau, and each time was thrown back nfter hard fighting.

In t he winter of 1941-42 t he Uussinns sup plied Leningmd day after duy with food and ammunition by using an ice road over Lake Ladoga, The ice road, eighteen milcs long, was nine to twelve miles from the southern shore, At night t he sn me road was used to move regiments und even divisions from Leningrad to t he Eighth and Fifty-fourth Ru ssian Al'mies, The Germans fired 150-10 10. artillery against the i(.'C road, but could not stop t he Uussians, They continued moving h'oops and supplies despite all losses.

Chapter 5

Clothing, Equipment, Rations

Section I. Clothing

In t he winter of 194] -42, the most severe in Russia in It hundred yeu.I'S, the Germans, if they had any winter clothing at all, carried only the reg ular issue overcoat, sweater, belly-band, and hood designed for winter weal' in Germany. The bulk of the wbiter garments do - nated by tho German people did not reach t he front until the end of January 1942, after cold had done its damage. Frostbite casualties were numerous. For instance, a panzer division near Volokolamsk in January 1942 had up to 800 frostbite casualties It day.

During the inactivity of the autumn 1941 muddy period, fur pieces and felt boots were manufactured locally, purchased from civilians, or removed from dead Russian soldiers; but these sources supplied only It small number of troops. All available underwear was issued dO that several sets could be worn at one time, and each man managed to obtain a piece of cloth for use as a belly-band or head protector. Some Gennuns acquired Russian-type fur caps, which proved dan - gerous, since, despite the addition of distinguishing insignia ) the wearers were often mistaken for enemy and fil'ed upon by friendly troops.

Afoor the first winter of the war, clothing supplies improved, and although items lacked uniformity of appearance they served their purpose. Garments were worn in variotlscombinations, such as: heavy quilted trousers, fur vest, regular jacket, and regular overcoat; quilted trousers, sweater, quilted jacket, and regular overcoat; heavy quilted trousers, sweater, regular jacket, and fur coat; or regular trousers, knee protectors, regular jacket, and f ur coat. With these combina- tions each man wore warm underwear, gloves, scarf, and felt or felt- and-leather boots.

The Germans found the quilted suit with hood, worn over the reg- ular unifonn, plus a fur cap, felt boots with leather reinforcement or leather soles, and fur gloves best for cold weatller. This was the tyP{) of winter uniform worn by the Russians. Long sheepskin coats should be worn by drivers and g uards. Without winter clothing troops cannot rema.in out of doors in temperatures under - 10° F. 18

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 19

Wh ite camoufl age clothing should have some identify ing fea t ul'e. Wh ite·clnd German ski fonnnt.ions moving at. extended order t hrough wooded al'eas, or advancing during were so meti mes in- fi lt.rated by sim ilarly dressed R ussia n troops,

Section II . Equipment

Weapons

Mai ntenan ce of weapons is diffi cult in winter. Germ lUl rifles I\nd ll111ch ine gUlls developed maifullctions becn use the grease and oil used wero Ilotcold·resistan t.. Strikel"S ILnd striker spl'i ngs bl"Oko like glassj flu id in lU'ti llery recoi l mechanisms sol idi fi ed, cdpl>iing tho piece. Light. weapons had to be warmed in huts, und (i res were lighted under tho barrels of gu ns to get. t hem back in to action. Bofoloc su itable lu bricants were ava ih\ble, troo ps found an emergency solut.ion in t he l"(lIHOVIII of every tracc of gl"(lnse oil f!"Om t heir weapons. 1 J1 tho south of Russia, tho abundantly nvnilllb le sun fl ower oi l was used as a lubriCIUit. It is IlC id-free Imd coltl-I'eRiRtallt.

Ve hicl es

The need for spare moto .· vehic le 11I.d tunk part s inc reases Il t low tempera tu res. The Jl umbc l' of broke n springs, for instnllce, reached unu sually hi gh proportions. T he Germans cann ibalized broken- down and nbandoned vehides to get spare parts. The policy of fur- nishing as many complete ta nks lind motor veh icles as possible to the front was detrimen tal to spllre palts production, It W II S by no means unllslllll thnt some armored regiments sent t heir techni cal personnel on un authodzed trips to factories in Gelmany to obta in spn.I'C parts t h ro ugh personal contact.

Winter temperatures in Ru ssin render self-starters useless. The Germans resolted to prewarming engines by build ing fires unde.' t hem. I n this way II few vehicles Wel'6 started for towi ng, During Il lerts mot-ors weloc frequently kept ru nning for hom s.

Section III. Rations

During w inter, particular attentio n must be given to proper pack- aging and storage of foods sensit ive to cold. At extreme lo w tem· pel'lltures t he Germ uns found that even t he relatively short. haul from field kitchens to men on the line su fficed to turn food into lumps of ice. Foods sensit ive to heat kept almost indefi nite ly in col d weather ,

Chapter 6

Transportation and Troop Movements Section I. Roads

During winter, rond conditions arc usually favorab le except dur - ing had wcather. Road s kept free of snow arc easi ly passa ble, often better than in su mmer. With the onset of heavy snowfalls, however, difficulties arose on all traffic routes, which werc counteracted by the road services of the various German armies. The assig nment of one batta.lion per thirty mil es of road proved satisfact.ory for snow clear- ance. Civilian labor was hired for shoveling and for driving horse- elm wn plows.

At certain points along roads the Germans established relay sta- tions to provide wnrm quarters and food for drivel'S and small units that were held up by snowstorms. Other stations, manned by engi- IIccr person nel, were in tel ephone co mmuni cati on with corps and army, to whi ch road conditions were reported by 0800 each d ay. Army dis- tributed daily bull eti ns with maps showing road conditions.

If at all possible, each emergency station had one motorized snow- plow. Two or t hree motorized snowplows were held in reserve by army to clear the way f or important troop movements. It was the German experience that during severe snowstorms at least six power plows were necessary to keep a road open f or an infantry division.

S trong winds caused s no wdrifts wh ich blocked aU traffic. Shovel- ing durin g storms was futile, f or the roads quickly became covered again. To avoid drifts t he Germ ans routed winter rond s thl'Ou gh woods, where drifts rarely occur, or along the crest of high ground, where the snow is usually less deep.

Snow Fences

Whenever roads across open terrai n must be used, snow fences should be erected before the beginning of winter. The location of snow fences is important. They must' be set up on both sides of the road, fifty to se venty feet f rom t he shoulders. After It snowsto rm the fences must be placed on top of the snow wall that has fonned behind them.

In most instllll ces the prewar snow fences had di sappeared, and fences four to five feet hi gh had to be improvised out of latticework, wickerwork, or bl'llllChes of coniferous trees. If mntel'ials for COll- 20

EFfECTS OF CLIM ATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEA N RUSSIA 21

stru ction of snow fences were not avai lable} the Germans lIsed snow blocks.

Mark in g of Roads

If snow roads follow a difTel'(mt course from those indicated on mltps, they should be mllrked on the gro und so they can be fo llowed nftel' a heavy snowfall or whe n covered by drifted snow. The muns marked roads with tall poles topped with strnw or branches. Stakes with black or red tops 01' colOl'ed markers were also used,

Ice-Cov ered Roads

Serious traffic jams aro often clwsed by icy roads. It is important to ha.ve towing scrvice ready to render assistance in icy sections, In hi ll y te l'min the Germans set up sand dumps, and all veh icles were ol'(lered to carry sand, Vehicles with tm ilcrs were burred from icy ronds, since they often became st uck even if roads were slw ded.

Sed ion II. Railroads

Helwy snowfalls and drifting sno w interrupt railway traffi<; lind the Oel'lnans used local civilian "Ibor and snowplows to keep tmcks clelll'. Cold reduced the efficiency of GCI'nUUl locomotivcs which had boon built for the milder tempe l'lltu l'CS of Central Europe. During tho first winter of the war 70 percent of the German locomotives broko down. Only after a. pel'iod of t l'in! lmd errol' and pt'otmcted t.cch nical l'CSelu'Ch wh ich led to the introduction of a new type of locomoLive, did t he Genna ns ovel'como thei l' d illiculti es, Rtlilroad constru ction and milintonnnco requiring excava tioJl slowed down or stopped com pletely in cold weather. Cold crippl ed opel'lltions, caused Ll'(lffic congostion, and slowed su pply movement.

In the winter of 1941-42, so metimes only one third, and frequently less} of Lhe daily quota of twenty-eight tmins got Lhl'ollgh to Army G I'OUp ConteI', The Germ an Second Army and Second Panzer Al'IllY tOI:,-rether required eighteen supply tl'l\ins a day and rcceived only two, In November 1941 these tl1'lnics wel'e tlllnble to t.uke 'ruIn becausc their su p ply system had broken do wn . Even the most critical suppl ies did not reach t he front in ti me.

Section III. Draft Horses

Most of the German horses became accustomed to the Ru ssian winter} Illthough they needed at lellst emergency shelter, In the opon, horses freezo to death at temperatures under _4° F, Russian horses, with Lheil' Lhi ck shaggy winter coot can withsta nd tempcmtul'es as low ns - 68° F. if they ure sheltered aguinst the wind, Some German horses,

22 GERMAN REPORT SER IES

notably t he heavy cold-blooded breecis, were unable to withstand the Russian winter, particularly thooo moved suddenly from the mild climate of Franoo.

The Germans expected t heir draft horses to pull excessive loads in winter, and the an imal s became prematurely spent particul arly when t hey were g iven insufficie nt care, foruge, and water. Lighter breeds were bettor !Lble to stand t he cold , but were not stl'ong enough to move the heavy German equipment; they became oxhl\ustcd, Ilnd collapsed and died in the snow.

During t he first willtel' of the W!ll' German horses freq uently lncked wi nter shooing, a fa ctor which lessened t heir draft power on icy roads and caused them to fall . Sometimes ice was so bad that h orscs which had not been win t er-shod could not be led from the railroad station to t1te stables,

A groat mnny hOl'scs perished for hLCk of forage, In quiet sectors horses were worked us little as possible when food was short. Work teams whi ch were given extra feed wero used for routine duties.

There were no horse di seases directly traceable to or aggravated by the Russian winter. :Most of the 1,500lK>O horses which the Germans lost in Russia were victims of battle wounds, overexertion, foruge shortages, u.nd cold.

Chapter 7

Health and Morale

Section I. Evacuation of Casualties

In some respects conditions for evacuation of casualties during wi n- ter werc more favorable t han during othol' sensons. Even af ter n heavy snow, road t ra ffic was soon restored. In somo sectors native sleighs were used for evac uation, and special sleighs with enclosed wooden superstructures werc built and did good serv ice. Battlefield evacuation was done with small one-man sleds which arc easi ly pu l1 ed by ono or two soldiors.

A plentiful supply of blankets is ossenti nl, and the Germans also used pupel' coverings to protect limbs of cnsualties in tl'nnsit. Frost in ju ries rarely OCC UlTed du r ing evacuation, and only durin g t.he 6rst yen!' of the war, when hosp itul t rain s wor c immobilized for hOllrs by cold, did wounded fl'ccze to dellt h. Except fo r the length of time involved, evacuation gcne ndl y cU lI scd litt le discomfor t to cas ualties.

GEHMAN SUPPLY CULUMN uslug RIlsshw Panic sl eighs. 23

24 GERMAN REPORT SER IE S

Section II. Effect of Cold on Morale

The reverses suffered at Moscow lowered the morale of both offi- cers an d men who felt tlmt luck of prepal'ation for winler warfare was the cnuso of their defeat. Although it was too late to correct the bnsic mistakes, officcrs succeeded in convincing troops tlHtt tho retreat would soon end, and t hat defeat would not become disaster.

Many men who had become separated from Lheir units marched westward si ngly or in small groups and, when app reh ended, freely (\dm itted that thei r destination was Germany because "the war is over." These men were turned over to the nearest combat unit for rehabilitation. More serious were the cases of descrters who con- cealed themselves on farms and managed to obtain ci vilian clothes. The number of deserters to the enemy wns few.

Since gasoline wus precious, t hefts of fuel were common. Troops helped t hemselves wherever they found unglllH'ded stocks, und even drained tanks of unattended 'vehicles. S pare parts were scarce and were stolen whenever it was opportune to do so.

Chapter 8

Air Operations

Section I. Aircraft

In genel'al, German a.ircraft stood up well even under the worst winter condi tions. However, oil became quite viscous, and placed an cxcessivc stra.in on various parts, especin.lly hydrauli c equipment, and a special type of winter hydrauJic fluid had to be used. Lubri. eating oil was heated before starting engi nes, and elect.ric storage battcr ies were a lso prewarmed because cold reduced their efficiency.

Ail'endt tires did not show adverse effects at temperatures down to -300 F., but at lower tempcruturcs tires started to become porous. Other rubber parts, such as self-seali ng tanks tllld rubbel' packings of shock absorbers, deteriorated when exposed to prolonged, intense cold. Tarpaulins provided good weather cover for wings and tu.il uni ts of aircraft parked in the open, Ilnd served as camouflage.

The Germans kept some planes in heated "alurm boxes" during periods of low temperatures to assure un immediate take-off during an alarm. Skis were insta lled on light liaison planes for landings away from airfields. Combat aircna.ft took off on wheels from packed-down runways,

Section II. Alrflelds For winter operations, air installations must-have adcquate, heated

wOI'king space, heati ng equipment, snow-removal and snow-packing equipment, and good quarters, The Germans found that aircraft maint.eance in winter took severnl times as long as in summer unless heated worki ng 'Space was availuble.

Concrete runways and strips quick ly become covel'ed with snow, and ca reful maintenance through pack ing and removal of excess snow is necessary. Since snow in many areas of Russia remains dry and powdery throughout the winter, excessive snowdrifts pile up when- ovel' there is a strong wind. All obstucles must be cleRl'ed fro m run - ways, for even small bushes Rnd gasoline drums may be the cause of drifts several feet high.

In view of possible changes in plans involving the redistribution of un its Rnd the movement of reinforcements, the Germans tr ied to keep even unused airfields ready for winter operation. To get fields

25

26 GERMAN REPORT SERIU

into operation Ollce winter had set in rcqui rod !t considerable expendi - ture of time and labor an d sometimes necessitated -the construction of l'Oads if no rai lroad con nection was for movement of materiel.

Section III. Flight

The very short days of winter made night fly ing necessary for ex- ten ded missions. Germ an crews not qual ified for ni ght fl yi ng wore therefore limi ted to missions 0-£ short duration.

Particular difficu lties were encountered in orientation from t he air because of the similal'ity of Sllow-covered grou nd to snow covel' on fror-en lakes and rivers. During winter-as well as durin g sp ring fl oods and mud-the Ru ssian landsca pe bears little r esemblance to whllt is shown on maps. New aerial photog raphic maps and sketches for each season are ind ispensable fOl' navigation an d for effective co- opcration with g round forces.

D uring early winter, ceilings and visibility below the clouds are usually favol'!\ble enollgh to permit flight s along' coastal n.reas. POOl' visibility and clouds r esembling hi gh alti tude fog frequently ap pear within the cold continental air masses and western warm ail' masses over t he Volk hov River and Lake Peipus. The danger of ice ti on during all seasons is greater in European Russia than in Central Europe. Frequently when Germany and western Russia have good fl yi ng weather the interm ediate & 1"C!t of eastern Poland has low over- custs, poor vi si bility, precipit at ion , and conditions which lead to for- mation of ice.

I n t he German experience the number of accidents caused by cli- matic cond itions in Ru ssia. wns neither g reater nor less than in Central Europe. E mergency missions necessitated by the ground situation , such as low-Jevel attacks to support. armor, or supply f1ights-espe- cially to S talingrad-na t urally brought about increased losses at - tribut.able to weathcr condition s. Virtually every emergen cy land. ing in win ter resulted in total loss of t he aircraft.

Section IV. Emergency Equipment

Bused on t he experiences gained in t he first. winter of t.he Wllr, normal emergency equi pment was su pplemented by short ski s with which fligh t crews could cover considerable di st.unces if f orced down. Snow- sh oes proved ullsatisfactory and consequent ly ski boots were issued instead of air foroo f ur-lined boots. Equipment for emergency lund- i ngs in all seasons included abundan t quantities of salt and pict ures of saints wh ich were used as bal'tel' items with t he loonl populution.

EfFECTS OF a l MAn ON COMBAT IN EUItOPEAN ItUSSI A 27

Section V. Rations and Clothing

T he campaign in Russia taught the Germans nothing basically new in the matter of rations for flight personnel. Standard preparations for long-range and high-altitude flight assured that personnel were properly fed for extreme climatic conditions.

Normal·issue cold-weather c10thing was adequate for flight a.nd maintenance personnel.

PART THREE SPRING AND AUTUMN

Chapter 9

General The min and mud of spring and autumn ha.ve a decisive effect upon

militnry opel'at.iolls in European Russia. Because both seasons arc similar, they are deal t with in the same part of this study. Mud is the domilHUlt climatic fnctor in mili ta.ry operations during spring and Ilutumn. With Ole first thaws of sp l'ing, most of European Ru ssia below the AI'ctic Circle becomes a muddy mass. The spring muddy season lnsts from four to six weeks, and ends when tho ground is sum· ciently thawed to absorb melted snow. The autumn muddy season starts in early October and lasts about four weeks. In sandy regions or on hi gh g round the adverse effects of mud upon military opera- t ions arc Jess sevCI;e.

The melting snows of spring cause heavy floods in addition to mud conditiOlls. nle spring muddy season does not end everywhere at once; t here are extensive wooded and swampy areas whi ch do not dry out unti l summer, sometimes not even t hen. The autumn mudd y sca- so n ends sudden ly-after- the first frosts mud rarely rec urs again.

Sedion I. Spring

In the northern and central a,reas of EUrOpelUl Russia t he melting snow, often nccompanicd by heavy rainfall, between the end of March and t he middle of April. During the fil'St days of this period, recurrences of cold spells with frost or snow are likely, fol- lowed by quickly rising temperatures which' ra,pidly melt the snow. The spri ng floods swell all streams. Rivers increase to as much as ten times their normal width, and fl oating ice threatens bridges often CIlusing their collapse. A ll river traffic is suspended whi le rivers are at flood stage. The excess water flows off in a comparatively short t.ime and leaves the countryside an ocean of mud. In open country one often sinks knee -deep j paved road s give way and motor veh icles become hopelessly stuck. All attempts to use force usually make mat-

29

30 GEll MAN RE POI T SER IES

ters WOrse, lead to useless wasto of energy a nd terrific cons umption of fuel, Ilnd end with the complete breakdown of the vehicle. Few rai l- roads, Ilnd fewer roads remain pasl1,able during the muddy season, a nd often Ilil'craft offer the only men ns of transpOL'tlltion. In s wampy tCl'l'ain t he mu ddy season IS particularly troub lesome because all con - tact with s ur r oundi ng Ilrens is intclT·up tcd. Roads p r ev iously d r y a r c saturated, and impuSSltbl e even on faot.

I n tho south, spring begins toward the end of February in t he low- lands, and in the higher region s one 01' two weeks later. Here the muddy period usually lasts abou t four weeks, and is particularly se- vero in the black eartJ\ belt of the Ukraine. H ero, too, uns urfllced rood s become bot.tomless, although most surfaced road s Clln still be used by motor traffic. In some regions of the so ut h the muddy period does not start as sudden ly; mO I'cover in its ea rly stages it is limited to day light hours. Night temperatures fall below freezi ng, on ly a superficial t hawing ; t he ground underneath remains solidly frozen . This makes it possible to cont inue large-scale movements through the first haH of t he muddy period.

Along the northern coast of the Sea of Azov the muddy period, with brief interr uptions, lasts throughout the winter, because in this coastal area winter temperatures fluct uate between just above and just below freezing. Alth ough the muddy period here lasts much longer than in other areas, it presents problems no different from t hose in other parts of the southern Ukraine.

In the Crimea, north of the Yail a Mounta.ins, climatic conditions at t he beginni ng of spri ng l'Ll'e similar to t hose in t he southern Ukraine, nnd are marked by warm wentlrer a.nd rapidly melti ng snow after mid-March. T he coastal strip south of this mountain range has a. subtropical climate beca.use of its geographic location, being sheltered from nOlthern winds and ope n to Lhe south toward the Black Sea.

Section II. Autumn I n northern and contl'lll Uussia the aut umn season is li mited to Sep-

tember and October, wh ile the south benefits from an additio nal month of autumnaJ weather. Du r ing the first half of aut umn the weather is dry and temperatures are moderate, and summer operations can continue through t his time without interr upti on, During the second half of autu mn tempel'atures drop and t he rains begi n, ushering in the muddy period. I n Ule steppe regions farthest to tlle sout h t he Ilutumn muddy season is less severe, but everywhere else traffic over open terrain and on loose surface roads is tied up.

Chapter 10

Mud Section I. General

The sp ring and autumn muddy seasons are the greatest obstacles to a war of movement in Russia, The attacker, who must seek to retain the initiative, is much more affectOO by mud than the defender. Operations are impracticable even for troops that are familiar with and equipped for the muddy pedods.

The Russians arc by no means immune to local climatic hard- ships. During World War II they made it a point not to launch or continue large-scale operations during the muddy season. They went so far as to halt their winter offensive before Moscow on the first warm, sunny day of spring (18 April 1942) despite the fact that their objective-turning the tide against the German invader- was virtually within their grasp. Whenever the situation forced them to move despite mud and mire, countless Russian tanks wouid wallow helplessly, and if the Russians were forced to withdraw, these tanks became a total loss. Morc than once an entire Russian tank corpS got barely a dozen machines into combat-the rest were stuck and churned through the mud for days before catching up. But Russian tanks are designed to take the worst of punishment a.nd usually reached their objective.

Large-scale operations are impossible during the muddy season. In the autumn of 1941, an entire German army was completely stopped by mud. The muddy Season of that year began in mid- October and was more severe than any other muddy season ex- perienced in World War I or World War II. DurilJg the first

cart and dirt roads were impassable, and then the road from Roslavl to Orel became mud-choked. Supply trucks broke through gravel-top roads and churned up traffic lanes unti l even courier service had to beca,l'ried out with tracked vehicles. FinaUy only horse- drawn vehicles could move; all other transport and the bulk of the tanks and artillery were stopped dead. The muddy season lasted a month.

Pursuit of the enemy who had been beaten at Bryansk was impos- sible. Only divisions which had reached the Bryansk-Orel- Tula road could move. U ni ts became separated and intermingled, .with only scattered elements in contact with the enemy. The bulk of the

31

32 O.IMAN • .,OU S •• IIS

force stuck fast or moved fitfully forward in short marches. Motor vehicles bl'oke down with clutch or motor troub le. Horses became exhausted and colla.psed. Roads were littered with dead draft ani- mals. Few tanks were serviceable. Trucks and horse-drawn wagons bogged down and railroad supply was not equal to the situation.

Defense in place is effective during the muddy senson. Any de- fensive operation involving movement is hampered by the same diffi. culties as offensive actions. An organized position is marc easily defended during the muddy $(lilSOll than in dry weather-the attacker is at fL disadvantage in mud and has to confine himself to local actions. The defender has time to organiY.e his position well in advance of the muddy season. He can establish commu nications that enable him to shift reserves to threatened sectors. The defender of an organized position usuo.lly ha.s rearward communications or ade- quate supplies at his disposal. He can counterac.t cold and dampness by preparing heated shel ters and fOl·tifications. His signal installn.- tions can be g iven regu lar maintenance. Defending infantry can fight from dry, well-concealed positions, while attacki ng infantry offer a prime target as it cl umsil y trudges through knec--deep mud.

A forced withdrawal from an organized position is the .worst possible turn of events for a defender. All his former advantages become hindrances, and he is as handicapped by the terrain as t he attn.ck:er. Further, he is pressed for time and is likely to lose his weapons, vehicles, and supplies. Defense begun without prepared positions, and a defense requiring mobile defense tactics, are normaBy carried on from villages or flu'mhouSCf' until tlie situation permits establishment of a continuous line.

Section II. Infantry

Limited-objectiv6 a.ttacks d ur ing a muddy period are Ieasible when uni ts eq uipped with tracked vehicles are used in conju nction with infan t ry. In October 1941, for instance, such a combination of forces captured Kursk. Trncked. vehicles in the lead, t he GOlmans advanced about twelve miles eastward from Dmitryev Lgovski to t he Usozha River, where the bridge had been burned and Russian Jabol' battnJions offered strong resistance on the cast bank, Suddenly, Russian cavalry supported by T34 tanks made a surprise raid on the stalled. German column. Only the timely arrivlLI of German dismounted. armored infantry, which succeeded in destroying a large number of T34's, pre- vented II. serious set back. Engineers replaced the bridge and the adva nce continued. The Russians 011, but the 95th Infa.ntry

"FECTS 0' CLtMATE ON COMBAT tN EUIOPEAN I USStA 33

Division made a wide swoop east of the road to Kursk and captured that strongly fortified city.

Se<tion III. Artillery

Artillery must be light to retai n mobility in mud. The German pieces were too heavy for mudd y terrain, and guns became so badly bogged down t hat teams of horses cou ld not budge them.

The roads, mud, a.nd swa.mps of northern Russia posed entirely new problems for the Gennan a.rtillery. Tactical concentration, nonnally a routine matter, became a.n art in t he desolate morass where new problems had to be solved each day. Reconnaissa.nce, selection, and occupation of observation and firing positions, and the installation of wire required hours of labor and a 'great deal of ingenuity. Work on roads and bridges wa.s even more time consuming. In many places extensive networks of corduroy roads hlld to be built, often by combat troops as there were not enough engineers to do the job. Prior tra.in- ing of artillerymen in road construction would have been useful, but the necessity therefor was not foreseen, much less planned for. Poorly constructed roads that constantly broke down under heavy loads of ammunition resulted. The maze of corduroy roads through swa mps and t h inly wooded marshy forests had but little natural covel' a.nd were easily seen by enemy air reconnaissance. To counteract this con- dition, roads were built far beyond g un positions and dummy roads constructed. These deceptive measures were not pa.rticula.rly effective sillce the artillery wa.s of necessit.y confined to the few dry a.reas available.

The Russians are familia.r with the swamp country and know exactly where such areas ca.n be T hey often penetrated or outflanked the weak German infantry and popped up in front of artillery posi- tions. Every gun position had to be made a strong point, and artil lery troops given basic train ing in infantry tactics, a subject w}Vch had received little attention in artillery training up to that time.

Mud impairs the effectiveness of artillery fire, dampens spli nter effect, and causes a. high number of duds, makilrg fire adjustment extremely difficult.

Section IV. Armored Forces

German losses of tanks and motori7.ed equipment of all types were extraordinarily high during the aut.umn muddy period of 1941, the first time that the mud of Russia was encountered. For example, Second Panzer Group, opemting in the Orel area. at that time, lost 60 percent of its tanks in mud. A division of Fourth Panzer Group,

34 GERMAN RlPOIT 51111S

operating in the area north of Gzhatsk during the sa me period, lost fifty tanks without a shot being fired, thirty-five of them within three days. These losses were most serious since no replacements were received. Germany at thaHime was producing only eighty-five tanks and forty assault guns monthly.

Armored operations in mud 0.1'6 most difficult. For instance, in February 1944 when two Gennan corps were encircled at Cherkassy, an attempt by a strong armored force to crack the Ru ssian ring from the outside bogged down within sight of the encircled corps, although the relief force did come close enough to its objective to make contact with some troops who had fought their way out on foot. In another instance, in March 1944, six thousand German troops cut off in the city of Ternopol were lost because a tank force of 35 Tiger and 100 Panther tanks attempting a relief thrust were prevented by mud from ing the beleaguered city. The task force was able to cross the Strypa River and knock out strong antitank defenses, but had covered only half of the twelve miles to Ternopol when forced by mud 1.;0 give up. Thousands of hou rs of labor were needed to restore roads and small bridges sufficiently to retrieve the stranded annoI'.

In early spring major operations with limited objective are possible if timed for the period when daytime thaws and night frost leave.but a thin layer of mud on deeply frozen ground. Operations begun just before a muddy senson, however, run the risk of fa il ure because t here is no wa.y of estimating how long terra.in will remain passable. For insta nce; in March 1943 when two panzer armies, together with t.wo German infantry corps, started an operation to retake Kharkov, their advance carried into high country, where spring usually begins later than in the lowlands. There was still so me snow on the ground when t he attack was launched. Just before the Germans reached their 01>- jective--the upper course of the Donets-a sudden rise in ture created a severe muddy condi.tion. AJI vehicles except those on the onl), road in the area, leading from Kursk to kov, became helpl ess. The infantry was able to slog forward, but heavy weapons and artillery were delayed and finally moved up with great effort. Even the T34 tanks of the Russian rear guard h&- earne embedded and could not be retrieved by the Germans until warm weather.

Operations begun when spring mud starts to recede and roads are usable can be successful. In March 1944, one panzer divi sion and two infantry divisions, using a main road passable for wheeled vehicles, made a twenty-five.-mile thrust which liberated First Panzer Anny from encirclement near Buchach.

Local, limited-objective offensives are possible during the muddy season if rail transport is ava.ilable to the attacking forces. In Oc-

EFFECTS OF CLI MATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 35

tober 1941, at the height of the autumn muddy season, the Germans determined by air reconnaissance that the Orel- Kursk railway was intact except for destroyed switches and water towers. Only pl\rtisllns and weak Ru ssian cavalry were believed to be in t he area, R.nd the Germans dec ided to attack fro m O'rel to establish 0. supply base at Ponyr i, about half way to K ursk.

Two Ilrmored tra ins ca pLul'oo fro m the R ussia ns were ill the Orel rail yards. One regi ment of infantry, some a.rtillery, ra ilroad engi- noOl'S, and fla k were entmincd and qu ickly moved. south, completely surprising t he enemy. After several minor engagements on the way, the combat team reached Po nyri and the rail lines were firm ly in Ger- man hands. T he oper ation took two dllYS.

GERMAN COLUMN on fou d nea r Lit ke limen, sprI ng mudd,. season.

Chapter 11

Clothing, Equipment, Rations

Section I. Clothing

The wet and muddy weather of spring and a.utumn subjects clot hing to excessive wcal' and tear. Uniforms become matted and qui ckly go to pieces. Accessible facilities for t he rapid repair of clothin g are essential, and ampl e supplies must be located as ncar as possible to t he front.

Footwear rapidly deteriorates. For wearing quality and protec- tion, the Germans found their half-length infantry boot best for muddy season wear. Rubber boots arc too cold when worn alone, althou gh they are well suited for weal' over shoes. Wrap puttees, are unsatisfactory because they become waterlogged and saturated with mud. Footwraps arc warmor, cleaner, and more durable than socks. Adequate shoe repair faci lities are necessary.

Section II. Equipment

Supply

The inevitable paralysis of highway transportation during the muddy seasons requi res long-range planning of a supply organization that remains unaffected by climatic conditions. Supply dumps and dcpots are best located at points which can be reached by motor trans- port even iR the most inclement weather. It is well to remembol' that woods or terrain offering concealment usually become inaccessiblc during muddy seasons, and goods stored in such places must bl!. re- moved well in advance of thaw or rains and dumped along roads. This systcw is di sadva ntageous in that it wastes manpower in moving stocks, requires dual administrative records, and calls for twice t he usual number of guards.

Weapons

Protecting weapons against the weather is difficu lt during the muddy seasons. Neglect of protective maintenance, shortages of cleaning materials and protective lubricants, or failure to shield weapons from wind and weaOrer result in such serious waste that even !L well-functioning supply organization cannot replace losses. Pro-

36

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 37

tective coverings for small arms bolt aSS(!mblies are especially important.

Section III. Rations

The Germans found that a good way to prevent shortages of rations-as well ItS equip ment.--was to store a three to fOllr weeks' rosel've in depots close to the front.. Wi t hdrawals from these stores must be prohibited as long as supply co ntinues from the rear. Similar stops must be taken to forestall shortnges of forage, which are apt to be serious during autumn when railroads are busy haulin g winter su p- plies. Expedients such as loading pressed hay and straw in crevices between other cargo are not enough to cover forage requirements.

In the autumn of 1941 German troops were without bread for daYfi and had to live off the land and such 10Cl\1 food supplies as the Ru ssians had not destroyed. Requisitioning of food in unoccupied territory was possible only with strong parties, as Stich areas wore infested with partisans and scattered Russian sold iers.

Chapter 12

Transportation and Troop Movements

Section I. Roads

The roMi net of European Russia is sparse and, except for a few well-built roads, is not equal to sustained use by heu.vy vehicles. The effect of the muddy season on roads and highways is so devastating that movement slows to a snail's pace and eventually comes to a com- plete standsti1l. Most hard-surfaced roads lack good foundations and Lecoma so waterlogged that they cave in under the smallest load. Roads need continuous maintenance, a job that requires thousands of laborers. Most of the bridges on mai"n roads and all those on sec- ondary roads were very weak, and the Germans had to replace them with more adequate structures. The peak of road and bridge con- struction and maintenance occurs during the muddy seasons.

The Germans had no conception of mud as it exists in European Russia. In the aut umn of 1941, when front-line troops were already st uck fast, the German High Command still believed that mud could be conquered by main force, an idea that led to serious losses of ve- bicles and equipment. At the height of the muddy season tractors and wreckers normally capable of traversing difficult terrain are help- Jess; and attempts to plow through the muddy mass makes roads even more impassable_ Tanks, heavy wreckers, and even vehicles with good grou nd clearance simply push an ever-growing wall of mud before them until they finally stop, half buried by their own motion. A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941 cemented a crippled, buried column into a state of complete uselessness, and it never moved again. Because it could not be reached in any other way, gasoline, towropes, nnd food supplies were airdropped along this li ne of stranded armor, but all attempts to move were futile. Often, when drivers found themselves bogged down far from any habitation, they abandoned their vehicles and set out on foot to contact fri endly troops in the nearest village, or so ught food and shelter from local civilians in order to remain alive until the worst of the muddy season passed.

For the muddy seasons, vehicles with high ground clearance, light weight, and low unit ground pressure are necessa,ry. German trucks had low ground clearance, and could not get traction in deep mud. S ince German supply carts had wheels too narl'Ow for muddy terrain, t.hey sank deep into soft ground. Even the German MauUier and 38

EFFECTS OF CliMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 39

Ostachlepper of the l ater war years bogged down in mud; their tracks were too narrow. The awkward-looking and slow Russ ian tractor of prewar vintage sal vaged t he heaviest, most deeply mired loads after German equipment fa iled to budge them. Russian trucks, too, were much better for muddy terrain, and the Germans promptly put cap- hired Russian vehicles into service.

The Russians know the effect of mud upon dirt roads, and there-- fore restrict traffic to paved roads during the muddy seasons. Their tanks and cross-country vehicles have wide tracks, and these they allow to travel alongside dirt roads, while light traffic is permitted on roads when they are hardened by night frost.

After their first experience with mud, the Germans adopted the Russian method of preserving roads through the muddy seasons. Troops were supplied in advance with food. and ammunition, and dirt- roads were closed off. Single vehicles were allowed to travel parallel to roads, with the distance between vehicles regulated by a block system. Repair and maintenance of roads was assigned to engineer t.roops and to Organization Todt [Ed: param ilitary construction agency of the Nazi Party, auxiliary to the Wehrmacht]. Corps head- quarters were responsible for roads in corps areas, although in prac- tice army assumed responsibility for main traffic arteries. Cha.nges were reported to the army engineer and road maps distributed da.ily, as during winter. One battalion could maintain thirty miles of dirt road in the muddy season. The Germans used a large number of Uussian civilians, mostly women, for draining roads and making other improvements. Roads that become badly rutted during the muddy season do not dry out to a usable condition unless leveled while still soft. In dry weather graded dirt roads are as good as hard-surfaced roads, but the slightest rain makes them slippery.

The Germans sometimes had to construct corduroy roads during an attack. In the autumn of 1941, when panzer units of Army Group North were given the threefold mission of cutting off Lenin· grad, establishi ng contact with Finnish forces, and seizing the baux.ite mines east of Tikhvin, the operation degenerated into a struggle against mud and swamp. Each unit had to construct its own corduroy road since the terrain was almost impassable, even for tracked vehicles. The Germans did reach Tikhvin, but did not accomplish their entire mission.

In another instance on the Leningrad front, in the autumn of 1942, when the Eleventh Army was to attack across the Neva River, the oper- ation did not get beyond the planning stage because of the lack of usable roads through the mud and swamp of the area. Neither the time nor the matedals were available to build the corduroy, concrete, or steel plank roads that would have made the terrain passable.

40 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

Sadion II. Railroads

The few railroads of European Russia are the only means of long· distance transportation during t he muddy season, and overburdening their facilities is inevitable. Opcrn,ting schedul es arc disrupted be· cause muddy highways prevent access to rai lheads. Repairs to dam- aged sections of track consume endless time because labor and rnnte l'ials must be transported by rail to the damaged places. The right of way must be resto red step by step, as simultaneous work on several sec- t.ions of track is out of the question. Supply shipmen ts suffer serious delay. During the Ger man autumn offensive of 1941 the supply flow was so reduced that operations in some areas came to a complete ha lt.

As an expedient, supplies were sometimes shuttled over serviceable sections of track. This was difficult when intact sections of track could not be reached because of muddy roads. In such situations· men and materiel were flown in by gliders to the place where rail movement could be made.

Mired roads make movement of troops and vehicles on top of dry rai lroad embankments a great temptation, but it must be avoided. Vehicles damage rai ls and switches wh ich ure hard to replace.

Russian railroad bridges are usuall y high enough to escn pe harm from spring floods. In only a few instances will the water level reach a rai lroad span. Even then superstructures suffel' little age, despite the f:tCt that they llre invll.l·iably of poor constr uction.

Sedion III. Bridges

Most rivers in R ussia are not regulated, and after sno w melts in the spring the rush ing waters make river beds extremely muddy, cia) ly neal' the banks. High water and muddy river bottoms make hridge construction difficult. For example, after the Gerlnllll nttllck ucross t )le Dnepr in 1941, a military bridge settled and broke under the weight of the first tank to cross. The trestles, which were placed on lin apparently firm gravel bottom, had sunk through a Inyer of mud below the gravel. The small footings used were not suitnble for porting weight on a muddy river bed. The delay during which the bridge was repaired prevented a panzer corps from ing a tactical surprise.

Flood waters carried heavy, floating ice which threatened bridges, and only high spans equipped with ice fenders withstood this danger. Well-anchored underwater bridges were widely used by t.he Russians. High waters can cut off bridgeheads from supplies, and for th is reaSon both Russians n.nd Germu.ns repeatedly abnndoned bridgeheads before spring floods.

EffECTS Of CLIMATE ON COMBAT. IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 41

GERMAN DRIDGE CONS'J'llUCTION, 1.o(l\'o,t R h'c r

Section IV. Small Boats

l"lood waters form channels and sand in rivers, and these irregula.rities constantly chnnge. Because of t his the Germans abandoned t he use of deep-draft motorboats and repla ced them with shallow-dra.ft assa ult boats for rivel' crossings in spring. Boat Cl'OSS- itlg8 during high water periods nre da ngerous, Ilnd fo rding strenm s, ot.her tha.n small brooks, is hnznrdous.

Chapter 13

Health

Section I. Troops

During t h e rainy and muddy periods the hum idity and cold in- duced mild forms of respiratory diseases which, however, rarely re- quired hospitali zation. Except for a lowering of resistance, the Germans found t hat· the general state of troop health remai ned satis- factory.

Of great concern throu ghout the Russian campaign was the typhus plague. During autumn- and winter-the infestation of troops with lice reached serious proportions in front-line positions. Typhus waS less co mmon am ong combat troops than among service person nel in rear a.rens, because frOl'lt-line troops had much less contact with the civil ian population. Major outbreaks of typhus among combat troops OCCUlTed when the men occupied captured enemy positions and im- mediately bunked on straw t hey fonnd in dugouts and other shelters. In some cases t he Gennans had to wi t hdraw and quarantine whole companies.

Conti nuous delousing is most importan t in fighting typhus. Dur- ing the fi rst year of the Ru ssian campaign the Germans did not have effective antivermin powders, and only at the end of 1942 did front- line uni ts get mobile delousing station s. Wherever possible, sauna baths were installed at supply units, and a more or less effecti ve de- lousing of clothing was carried out. The benefits were but temporary; after using the sauna, soldiers had to be returned to the front with its vermi n-i nfested positions, and they once again fell prey to lice.

Evacuation of wounded. is SO difficult duri ng the muddy seasons t hat unnecessary losses of personllel can be avoided only if facili ties for emergency treatment are placed well forward in the combat zone. Hours are needed to carry serious cases through a mile of knee-deep mud and marsh to aid stations. In situations where casualties could be evacuated only under cover of darkness, four litter bearers often required an entire night to bring out one man.

Motor trtUISport of wounded. to hospitals which cannot be reached via a hard-surfaced road is flo torturously slow procedure j ambulances towed by prime movers must wind t heir way through mile after mile of vehicles bogged down in mud. A thirty-mile trip under such con- ditions often takes six to eight hou rs. So many ambu lances broke 42

EffECTS OF a lMATE ON COMBAT IN EUIOPEAN IUSSIA 43

down that the Gennans started to evacuate wounded in supply trucks I'eturn ing to rear areas, an advantageous method. Eight to ten wounded can be transported in a truck, while only four can be carried by an ambulance.

Section II. Horses

During spring and autmnn, disenscs among horses wero no higher than in other seasons. Exposuro of animals to dampn ess a.fter sweat- ing caused colds, and deaths from overexertion were numerous. Horses collapsed on the road and had to be given weeks of rest. Supply difficulties during the muddy season caused shortages of feed which led to t he loss of many draft animals.

Chapter 14

Air Operations Advn.nce preparations must be made for draini ng airfields during

spring thaws; otherwise, they turn to mud and remain unusable for weeks. Drainage ditches are rarely s ufficient; as much snow as possible should be removed before it starts to melt. It is frequently helpful to puncture the ground frost, permitting WAter to drain off.

Durhlg the spr ing thaw the gro und often heaves with such force that runways arc destroyed for great lengths, seriously interfering with ail' operations.

44

PART FOUR SUMMER

Chapter 15

General Summer co mes suddenly so ut h' of the Arctic Circle, and literally

overnight all traces of spring di sappear. The g round hardens, roads dry out, and the mud of spring becomes It hard crust or turns to dust. Days arc warm, nights are cool, and only in the southern region is the heat intense. Moors and swamps dry up, and swampy lowlands which are impassable during the muddy seasons may be used by peasant carts and, to a limited degree, by wheeled and tracked vehicles. Narrow paths emerge from swampy tel'vain, and islands rise out of the receding waters to furnish partisans with hidin g places. The paths to these island strong points are water covered in many places, nnd contact with the enemy is diffi cult. -Tho rapid growth of vegeta- tion, especially in the so uth, provides natural cover which has a defi- nite effect upon operations.

All roads are passable in summer, and even driving in open terrain is possi ble, desp ite numero us fi ssures and cracks in the ground. So- called summer roads can be created at will without engineers or laborers-they form themselves by use. S peeds up to fifty miles pel' hou r are possible on summer road s and they are often preferred to regu lar roads which are full of holes. Summer roads are useless a fter rain, but if not used while wet they dry out to a smoot h surface and fu ll-scale movement can be resumed.

Summer not onl y dries out roads, but reduces the level of r ivers and streams as well. R ivers can be forded, and smaller streams are only minor obstacles. S wampy terrain remains a serious barrier.

Summer is the most favorable period for operations in European Russia. All arms are capable of optimum mobility. Counterattacks and raids on communications can slow an offensi ve, but are rarely enough to bring it to a halt. The attacker can bypass :fortifications or bring up his heavies t weapons against them.

45

46 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

Section I. Sudden Changes in Ground Conditions

Sudden thunderstonns can change easily passable dirt roads and open terrain into mud traps. Near Kiev, in August of 1941, such a storm was almost fatal to a regiment of a German try division. The division was ordered to block the last escape route of Russian forces encircled north of Cherkassy. Moving over dry roads, the division reached the area of encirclement in good time and, despite a strong attempt at breakout by the enemy, accomplished its mission. Relieved from the blocking positioll, the division was ordered to join Second Panzer Group for the drive on Bl'yansk. Hardly had the first elemen ts moved out when a heavy rain began, and -the roads became such a slippery mass that the last regiment stuck fnst. At this critical moment Russian tank forces, attempting a relief thrust on IGev, hit the rear of the mud-bound regiment; the Russian armor with its wide tracks could still move over the muddy ground, but the German motorized infantry was anchored by its own wheels. Lacking the fire power to mount a defense against the tanks, the infantry set fire to its vehicles and set out on foot to join the division which was also bogged clown to the north.

In another instance, a brief rainy period at the end of July and the beginning of August 1941 prevented First Panzer Group from closi ng a ring around Russian forces in the southern sector of the Uman area. The Germans started their advance east of Berdichev in three columns. The first two, using tracked vehicles and horse-drawn Russian peasant carts, made slow progress; the third and strongest element, using wheeled motor vehicles, bogged down completely. Mud and the Ger- man shortRge of proper equipment enabled a considerable number of enemy forces to escape encirclement.

After the return of s unshine, dirt roads dry out rapidly and can be used £01· normal traffic, provided undisciplined, over-eager drivers have not plowed them up while the roads are still soft. After 22d Panzer Division broke through the' Parpach battle positions prepara- tory to seizing the Kerch Peninsula in the summer of 1942, a sudden cloudburst so mired the road that movement was impossible. A perim- eter defense was thtown up, and the division sat it out until the storm was over and the summer sun had dried the road to a passable condition.

Section II. Dust and Sand

Right at the beginning of the Russian campaign the Germans expe- rienced the havoc which dust can wreak with motor vehicles. Even German tanks sustained severe damage from the dust they stirred up while crossing vast sandy regions. Many tanks had no dust filters,

EfFECTS OF CLi MATI ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 47

48 GERMAN REPORT SERIU

and on those so equipped the filters soon became thoroughly clogged. Quartz dust was sucked into engines, which became so ground out that many tanks were rendered unserviceable. In other tanks the abrasive action of dust reduced engine efficiency and increased iuel consumption; thus weakened, they entered the autumn muddy season which dealt them the death blow. Sand roads greatly slowed, but did not stop trucks. The Volk8Wagen [$d: German counterpart of the U.S. jeep] , which otherwise proved highly serviceable, stuck easily in sand because of its nanow wheels. Huge dust clouds rai sed by con- voys f requently provoked air attacks that. resulted in serio us losses of vehicles and horses.

Section III . Water

The water supply in European Russia varies greatly from region to region. During summer it is uniformly poor. Generally, the quantity and quality of drinking water deteriorates toward the south. To the north, nearly every inhabited place hus an adequate number of wells that furnish potable water. Between Leningrad and the Luga. River thero are many wells sunk as deep as eighty feetj the water from these sources is cold and of excellent quality. Ench village in central and southern Russia has one or two wells, but during summer their water is scant and warm, and drinking water must be taken from brooks and rivers. Many wells and cistems in southern Ru ssia nearly dry up in summer droughts, and such water us they furnish must be· boiled before drinking. The water supply in the bend of the Don River is poor. GeI'man forces that fought between the Don and the Volga in the battle of Stalingrad had practically no local water supply.

Chapter 16

German Tactics

Section I. Swamp and Sand

Even in sum mer , swampy and sandy terrain can have a decisive effect upon movement and combat. It is impossible to estimate the time required for a march through such areas, and careful ground and air reconnaissance must be made to compare maps with actual terra in conditions. provision must be made for supplementary gasoline. Extra engineer troops are necessary, and portable bridging equipment is indispensable for crossing water holes and swampy areas. Wreck- ers must be spotted to provide help where t he going is particularly rugged. The small and light column with the same organic structure as its parent unit is at a definite advantage in sand and swamp.

On 11 Jul y 1941, 6th Panzer Division was diverted from its east- ward advance toward Porkhov and Dno to assist 1st PtLll7.er Division whose d r ive via the Pskov-Leningrud Rollbahn [Ed: road designated as a main axis for motorized tmnspol'tatiOl.l] toward Luga had ru n into stiff enem y resistance near Novoselye. (Map 3) Hardly had Flying Col umn Raus, the leading echelon, started for the trouble spot, than the road, shown on the map as leadi ng directly through a swam p- lnnd to Novoselye, came to an end. Local residents said no such roud had existed for forty years. With gu ides and engineers ·to the front, the column took up a zigzag course from village to village over the best wagon roads thut could be found. At the first swampy hole, about thi rty feet wide, an apparently stllrd y bridge collapsed und er the weight of a light tank. The advance was delayed for five hours wh ile 1\ new bridge was built.

Wherever possible, driving" in the tracks of preceding vehicles had ttl be avoided, otherwise wheels sunk deeper und deeper until they became com pletely stuck. The column had to cross twelve swampy brooks, and at each olle a long delay was necessary while rotted bridges were strengthened with girders or entirely rebuilt. In trying to detour swumpy spots, vehicles and tanks broke through the crusted top layer of grQu nd and became so mired that they had to be tow.ed out by other tanks. In many instances the towing veh icle sank in beside the one it was try ing to assist. Sometimes veh icles roped to- gether to help each other' became so budly stuck that they ha.d to be pulled out one by one by the most powerful wreckers. To. get t he

49

50 GERMAN REPORT SERIES

huge wreckers to points where thoy were needed was an entirely sep- arate problem. The cart road s were so narrow and clogged that there was little opportunity to turn out. Commanders had difficulty in exercisi ng leadership because emergencies developed everyw here at th e same time and bottlenecks could be reached only on foot.

To keep t he colum n from becomi ng scattered, it had to be halted at regular intervals, where the terrain permitted, so that vehicles could close up. S uch a hal t was mad e ten mil es south of Nov oselye to let the troops assemble and recover t heir strength f or the impending engagement. The first vehicles reached the hal t point at 2000 after a day in which th e onl y fight was made against the swamp. At 0400 next day the last truck pulled in. The rate of march had averaged about one mile an hou r. Men and motors had rull out of water and Ole t roops were exhausted from the burning s ummer heat.

The rest of 6th Division was notified by radio of the conditions en- countered and took another route. The all -dny strugg le with the swamp, caused by t he inaccuracy of avai lable maps nnd the lack of engineer equi pment, prevented the column from attacking near Novo- selyeonllJuly.

Next morning the [ldvance guard of the Germall column attacked the flank of t he Russian forces, guarding t he Rollbahn, whose presence south of a. small, swam py stream had been reported the day before. After a 13ho rt, sharp engagement in which both sides used tanks, the flank g uard was thrown back across the river. American am- phibian tanks made their first appearance on the Russian front in thi s actioll, and six of fell victim to antitank and panzel· fire at close range from a wooded area-three knocked out on land and three while crossing the smaJl stream. Two amphibians which were still ser.viceable were seized by the fi rst German troops to gain the north bank.

A bridge was const ructed so t hnt the main body of the flying column could cross the six-foot-deep, swam py stream whi ch was not fordable. Toward 1000 the entire column was across, and after de- stroying more Ru ssian light tanks, drove the enemy to a point just so uth of Novoselye. In the afternoon t he Germans launched an all- out flank attack while a.nother fo rce, includi ng a panzer battalion, hit the enemy rear. After a bitter fight the main attack caved in the enemy flank, and as the panzer thrust hit the real', the entire Ru s- sian defen se collapsed. The 1st Panzer Di vis ion took up the purs uit.

Hardly had t he flying column reorganized than it was ordered to march northward to seize the bri dge over the P lyussa River at Lyady and establish a. bridgehead on the far bank. The ordcl' ruined all cbances f or a night's sleep, and early on 13 July, after t hree hours of

the march began. The advance led through many swampy

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EU RO PEAN RUSS IA 51

places and moved forward slowl y. Ti me and again single vehicles or whole sections of the convoy stuck in swamp or intermediate sandy areas, and motors ran hot as t hey were forced undor the strai n. Nu- merous halts to add water to rad iators wcre necessary and consumed much time. At several steep places trucks lmd to be towed by tnnl{f; or wreckers.

South of Lyady the forwflrd elements ran into light enemy resist- ance, which was quic kly smushed, an d t he immedilLtely fo llowing pursuit brought t he bridge intact into German hands. The span was over 600 feet long, of new wooden constr uction, and quite sturdy. After the last rcmnants of enemy resistance were cleaned out of Lyady, the bridgehead was estublished. The objective had been reached aftcl' a mar.ch of thirty-seven miles in nine hou rs- a ra te of sl ightly better tha n four miles lin hour.

The tr oops had just finished n. meal and com pleted fi rst echel on ma intenance pl'epumtol'y to taking a well-earn ed rest when they were alerted for a new mission . The corps commander ap pea red and 01' - dered t he divisionu\ column to make a qu ick thrust to seize and hold the two large wooden bridges over the Luga nea l' Pol"t'chye, the so- called Gateway to Leningra d, With the order, the impol'tance of the assignment beca me clenr. U p to t hat. time no German Huit. had been ab le to penetrate the Luga River line wh ich wus p rotected by un ex- tensive swu mp nlld defens ivo fortifications. Eighteenth A r my wus sutlled in fron t of Nnrva t.o the Horth, Illld Fourt'h P all zer Grou p WIIS held up before the city of Lugl1 to the so ut h.

T he slogan 1I0pen the gates to Leningrad" had It mag-i cnl ldfect, and wea r iness WIIS forgotten liS 111lit afte r uni t rolled towa rd the new objective, T he road was good, 1md it was hoped that t he sixty miles could be cove red in n few hours, At the en tran ce to the SWtIl UP .Y

southwest of La ke Sa mros hopes were dashed whell t he roa d b<o- came It swampy pn th of th e worst type, ProgL'ess became inCl"eusingly difficult, and before dllsk tanks t.hat ha d tri ed to skirt especi all y bad spots and t hose thllt t ri ed to drive through swampy ponds by main force were stuck fust. After hou rs of wurk by every oflker an d man to make the way passable by t he use of t ree trunks, boughs, planks, and the lnst availnble fascine mats, the fi rst moor was crossed,

T he column gained momentu m beyond the swump, but ,'elief was short-lived as It b urnt-out bridge loomed up to the f ront, its timbers still glowing. Quickly, a diversionary route was found th rough It neighbori ng village, As the leading elements npprollched t he v ill age, explosions were heard from all sides, fo llo wed by fires which S0011 engulfed t he narrow )'ond thro ugh the settlement. 11'01' the nex t two hours the fi re mude movement im possible, As t,he fl nmes died the column moved slow ly through the smol deri ng em bers an d fulling

52 GERMAN REPO RT SER IES

boards. By then it was midnight and a great dist.ance-remained to be cove red. Time and again radio messages were received urging speed because of the importance of the mission. With g reat difficulty vehicles t ri ed to find t heir way in the dim light, and for a few thousand

t he column moved jerkily forward. Then real trouble started . SW!lmp hole after swamp hole appeared, and bridge after bridge broke under the weight of tanks and disappeared in the mud. Time and material to r ebuild bridges wore not avai lablej tree trunks were gathered and thrown over the collapsed bridges until a sufficient, though precarious bearing surface was built up. This method was followed in num erou s places until t he hard-surfaced road near ZlIru- chye was reached eight hours later.

On the good road speeds up to twenty miles an hour were possible lmt i n a short time there was another ha lt- t he bridge IlCI'OSS a deep f'wamp lake was on fire. Engineer troo ps ru shed forwnrd in nrmored vehicles and extinguished the blaze. The span was blackened, but still serviceable, and the column rolled on.

Suddenly the cry "Enemy aircraft I" WIlS heard but the pla nes made 110 attack, and the column continued. Again t he planes appeared, sigll!lll ed with lights, and dropped pamphlets. "Identify you rselves 01' we will fire," was the Russian demand ns translated by t he interpre- reI'. The march continued, nor did it halt as t he pamphlets were again dropped, and the planes flew away. Theil' doubt was und er- standable. The Germans had advanced through It large, swampy area with enemy on both sides, and were deep in ellemy te l'ritory. The position of the German units had given the pi lots cause fO l' sus:' picioll, but the contin uance of tho column must have convinced t hem that the troops were Russian. This is borne out by the fact t.hat the phmes neither attacked, nor reported the presence of the colu mn, because li ttle less than un hour later both Luga bridges were captured without a shot being fired, the small Russian secu rity detachments surprised and overcome, and a bridgehead was established. Shortly t horeafter the last Russian in t he area was rooted out of his observa- tion post in a church tower overlooking the near-by Russian airfield. He was completely surprised and apparently had not seen t he uction wh ich led to the seizuro of the bridges. A German tank attack towllrd the airfield answered the request to "identify you rselves"- nn imme- diate attack by planes from every airfield in the Leningrad area, in- cluding naval planes, left no doubt on that point.

In three days and nights of continual str uggle against climate and termin Flying Column Raus had advanced 160 miles, and on 14 July stood at the gateway to Leningrad, sixty-five miles ft'om t he city itself.

EfFECTS OF Cli MATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 53

The movement of the flyin g column through the swam p area south- west of Lake Sltml'os had so torn up the dirt roads and turned them int.o such a morass that the following div isions completely bogged down and required days to cover the same distance. They had to make completely new road s with tree trunks and fascine mats placed parallel to the unu sable route. The first troops to get through were those of a motorcycle battnlion, whose me n cal'l'ied their motorcycles and side cars ovel' the swamp arellS for five days and nights.

Meanwhile the flying column in t he bridgehead was surl'ounded by three Proletarian divisions reinforced by over 100 tanks and all the 'lir stren gth in the Len ingrad are!L. Time and agai n the Russians at- tacked the bridgehead in attempts to take it at all costs. The situation wns very serious. The Gel'mans had no communication with their follow-up forces. The message whi ch reported establishment of the bridgehead reached corps on ly because a signal detachment moved back about th irty-five mil es to relay the news, as the German radios could not span the entire distance Over the swam p. This procedure could not be repeated because the approach rou te had fallen to the enemy- II Russian infantry regiment reinforced by artillery hammered the German real'. The Germans coul d not contact their air support, whose communications center was on the move and no longer operational in its old location. (The story of the German breako ut fro m the bridgehead area may be found in CMH Pub 104-12, Russian Combat Methods in World War II, pages 81-82.)

Section II. Swampy Forests

At the close of the spring mllddy seaso n of 1942, Fourth Panzer Army attempted to destroy 01' rout a large enemy forro which was operating between army real' and army group, and succeeded only be- cause the Russians delayed t.he start of thei r su mm er campaign for almost a fu ll month. (Map 4)

Throughout the sp r ing of that year , a force under General Belov constantly harassed t he rear of Fourth Panzer Army, which was under helwy attack f rom the east. On 18 April , the first day of the muddy season, the main Russian attacks ceased. The Germans decided to destroy t he enemy to the real' at t he close of the muddy season. This decision wus made even though t he Germ ans ran the risk t ha t Hussian attacks from the enst might be resumed during t.he large-scale mop- ping-up opemtion.

Despite t h is danger, army grQup :f urnished a corps with three divi- sions, and army made two divisions available for t he u ndertaking. Aince fiv e divisions were not enough to completely surrou nd Force Belov, the first phase of .the operation was limited to the swampy forest of Bogoroditskoye.

54 GERMAN REPORT SER IES

The Gel'mu ll assembly, whi ch begun in mi d -May, was hftlnpe L'ed by con ti nuous rains which mudd ied ronds to a great dept h. No post- ponement to await bettor weather was possible, because the t roops

by army group were scheduled for a later operation in another urca.

On 24 May t he Germans jumped off in a pouring rain and ran into very stron g resistance, es pecially f rom t he cavalry an d pa mchute troo ps wh ich wor o part of Force Belov. A lmost wo r se than t he enemy worc the swollen rivers and mud dy terrai n. T he large at

was swe pt away, and t he Ugm R iver was crossed with g ]'eut difficulty. GUllS sank up to the axles in mud , and us t he ruin continued next day even the li gh t prime mov ers and horse-cl l'l1wn Ru ssian penslUlt ca r ts used by the Germans bogged down. S ome of t he in f ant.I·Y slogged bar efoot t hrough the mu ddy wntm', The rain sto pped on 26 May, but terl'llin conditions d id not improve ver y much as t he troops struggled slowly fo r ward.

As the Russians attempted lo breah: out of the f Ol'est t own I'd the west, the two German flank divi s ions sta rted an envelopment wh ich link ed up at F U1'SOVO on the a f ternoon of 27 May. The next few dnys wer e spent in cutting up t he encircled clements of t he Belov f orce. At this point one division reve]' i:E'd to nrmy group for co mm itment (\l sewhe1'e,

The m pidity with which the £il'st phfl se wa s com pleted, plus the of the Russian forces f acing the FOUl'th Panzer Army fro nt

to a ttack, p rompted army to orde r t he mop-up continued, with t he enemy in the Yelnya a rea as t he next objective.

The new attack was made on 3 June. On 2 June th e re were cloud- bursts in t he area of the tw o d ivisi ons on the r ight, twd on the day of tho attack thero were numerou s thnn der sho we L's, T errain and 1'oilds wcre again deeply mired, and in a short t.ime most of the tiln ks al1(l all of the g uns bogged down. Force Belov, which had received r einfor cements by ail', fought bitterly, and the German speal'heftd s inched f orwn.rd throu gh a ma:r.e of Ru ssillll mine fields as the main bodies engllged in a series of fi r e figh ts. The Germ an Ilrmor cou ld not gain th e momcnt.um r equired to CIU'l'Y out the army plan of qui ck unnol'ed thr usts which wer e to f an out :md block t he R uss inn forces, and t.he nclvnnce becnmea slow pnsh insteftd of a qui ck punch.

On 5 JI111e f orces fro m a r my g roup th1't1 st. ll orth waJ'(1 and linked up with the left di vision of t.he Germnn attack forces, corneri ng Rus- sia n e lements in the Chashchi [trelt and preventing their movement west, The two divi si ons on the right took Dorogobllszh on 6 und 7 June, and the elements of FOl'ce Belov around Ch ashc h i werl' Jeft to 1II' Ill y grou p t r oop s as the two divi sions on the lef t conti nued west,

EFfECTS OF CLI MATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPfAN RUSS IA 55

The Russians in the swampy forest and around Chashchi were no longer factor, and t he bulk of Force Belov was blocked to t he west and southwest by army rear area troo ps. The enemy sought and found an escape route south nca r Yelnya, which was lightl y heJd by two weak German secur ity d ivisions. By the afternoon of 9 J une 8,000 to 10,000 Russians and over 1,000 veh icles had broken throu gh, with the apparent intention of joining with forces in the K li n forest for a drive to the east. Three divisions of the German force were now transfer red to another area, and the remaining divisions plus some army rear arCll. troops were moved quickly south to surround the K lin forest.

General Belov rallied such of his force as was in t he southern part. of the forest and, on the night of 16 June, broke through to the east in unknown strength. A blocking li ne was set up to prevent the break- out force from reaching Kirov, and German mobi le units pursued and destroyed most of t he Russians in' t he southern part of t he forest. The enemy in the no rthern sector of the Kli n forest was destroyed , und on 22 June Force Belov ceased to ex ist as a fighting force. Russian losses were over 4,300 dead and 9,000 captured.

The first attacks against t he Fourth Panzer Army f ront were made on 17 June north of Kirov. The Russians had made no attempt to rescue Force Belov, IUld tho position of Fourth Panzer A rmy was considerably improved.

Chapter 17

Russian T adics Entirely new to the Germnlls was the Russian use of forest fires as

a hot wenthcL' weapon. In mids ummer, when the trccs wero t inder- dry, the Ru ssians attempted to delay German forces by putting forests to t he torch. Not only the physical, but t he psychological impact of s uch fires was severe. The crackling of burning trees, the acrid grny- blnck smoke, the increasingly unbenmble hent, nnd the feeling of uncertainty put troops under a severo strain. Fleeing befo re tower- ing s heets of flame, men would. fight through mile uftcr mile of huming forest only to be confron ted by ellemy bunkers and fortified positions. Ammu nition dumps blew sky high and guva the impres- sion that fiCI'ce battles wer6 mging to the rear.

The co mmnnd post of a German brigade was nearly wiped out by a fire in a pine forest on the Luga Rivcr in July 1941. The bivouac urca wns ncar a sand l'oad wh ich led through t he forest, with a. cleared urea t hirty to sixty yards wide between the road IlIl d the forest itself, The cleared arca was ovcrgl'own wilh swump gl'ass, All the vchicles of thc brigade headquarters and the artillery echelon WC IOC parked in tho underbrush and wem well cumouflaged by the high t rees, The enti re a.rea WllS under enemy observation , and shell s continually landed within 90 to 120 yards of "he Clunp perimeter with 110 hits scored on impoltant tllrgets. There WU$ no wind, I n the belief thut the position was secure, llO thought WIl S given to the possibility of forest nre.

One dllY II strong easterly wind Clune up, and artillery fire into the ceased except toward the east, where an occnsiOlla l mutlled burst

was heurd to which no attention was paid. Suddenl y the Gel'llUHl !:iCntries run out of the woods with bewildered exp l'C5.'lio ll s shouting "Fire! Fire I" And behind "hem could be seen high, wide wall of Ihoc I'ushing and roari ng toward the command post. at g l'eltt speed, At the edge of the clearin g the progress of the fhtmes slowed, but the lire crept a long through the high grllSS. At one point a row of trees lLenr the sand road burst into f1llmes, but the threat to the wooded Ilrea across the road did not mnterialize.

Brief, short orders orgn nized the soldiers, and in a moment every- one was battling the bhtze · with pick and shovel, cutting trees, a.nd smothering the fire with sand. Only the fact that the comma nd 56

EFfECTS OF CLI MATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEA N RUSS I A 57

post wn s opposite a cleared area p revented great loss of life and matCriel.

As the danger of forest fires becnme apparent, bi vo uac areas Wel'(l more caref ull y selected, and precautionary measures increased. A Yew weeks after the fire on the Luga River, 2,000 trucks OY a pam:er division were di spersed in an extensive wooded area along t he only approach rouoo to the Luga bridgehead. The yorest was lightly wooded, had sandy soil with little undel'gl"Owth, and was broken by numerous open spaces. Many eart roads wou nd through the widely Hpaced trees to individual parking spaces, and trucks were well dis- persed in depth. Each vehicle IH\d room to turn in its own area, and was plU"ked facing the road, some 200 yards dista.nt, with driveL'S close by. A fire gua rd signal system was set up, and a field grade officer with a small staff placed in charge oy fire discipline. The evacuation plan was tested in a fire drill

Flames broke out one day a few yards north of the dis- persld area l\nd the alarm was sounded. Fanned by a light wind, the blaze advanced slowly t h rough the woods, its progress broken here nnd there by the sandy open Sp llCCS. Evacuation was carried out as plallned, IUld all vehicles were saved except It fow which were trapped in the sand Ileal' the point at which the fire started.

Several square miles of forest were destroyed, and the reeking, dlarrcd hulks of the t rees which sti ll stood made the area unbearable. III any event, all natural covel' was destroyed, and t he site was no longer suitable for dispersal. A good fire plan saved nearly all t he oi vision's vehicles.

Chapter 18

Clothing, Rations, Draft Horses

Section I. Clothing

The clothing worn by the German soldior proved too heavy for sum mer. As a result, men perspired too easily, became very thirsty, IUld wore soon caked with dirt. Only the mountain t rou sers and field jackets which were worn by the mountain and light infantry arc practical for year l'ound weal'. For protection against dust, masks for mouth an d nose and gogg les should be issued. Individual equip- ment should include a mosquito head net. Hard-packed dirt roads cut like g lass into shoe and boot soles quick ly go to pieces. Spare boots sho uld be carried by every soldier.

Section II. Rations

Even during the first summer of the Russian campaign, the Ger- mallS wore uble to obtain part of their cereals and forage from local sources, although the retreating Russians burned large quantities of grain and destl'oyed mltny agricultural implements. Some grain and almost all the cattle of the collective farms were carried away in the Russian retreats.

Locnl procurement improved in direct ratio to the ability of the Gennan civil government detachm ents to regulate cultivation and har- vests. Local potato supplies were s uflici ent until the autumn of 1941, and t hereafter they ran sho rt. Vegetable cultiv!ttion was generally limited to small garden plots which barely covered the needs of the civilian population. Fruit was available only in the south, and then in limited quan tities. Forage is plentiful in summer j s ufficient pasture land is available in almost all parts of the country.

Local procurement improved after the first year of the war and the Germans were independent of grain and flour shipments from Ger- many. Only at the t ime of t he great German reverses did this ad- vantage diminish. To the very end of the war, however, the rations of the combat forces remaincd relatively unaffected by retrograde movements. In summer small German units used wood fires for cooking. 58

IiFfECTS Of CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 59

Section III. Draft Horses

During summ er German horses as well as those from Ge rm an-oc- cupied western count.ries soon became accustomed to the Ru ssiltn cli - mute. Diseuses direct.l y traceable to the climate WC I'C extremely rare. By subjectin g hOl'ses to a. quamntine period before Shippin g t hem to the Russian f ron t, communicable diseases remained practically un - known. The only exception was sporadic outbreaks of mange, whi ch always requil'ed replacement of the entire horse strength of the unit affected.

The light and medium breeds of western European countries proved generall y satisfactory for summer duty. HCllvier breeds were less hardy and needed excessive amounts of forage. It would have been better not to have used heavy breeds in Ru ssia..

The Panje horses (Ed: th e small native breed of Eastern Eu rope] p roved extremely enduring, as well as easy to feed, handle, and stab le. Thoy have very hard hoofs and need not be shod for soft ground. I n all seasons and in all situations this horse proved outsttL ndin g for pack and draft use. It is the horse for Eu ropean Russia.

Chapter 19

Health During summer the woods alld swam plands of Russia. teem with

mosquitoes, including malaria carriers, wh ich for weeks scourge man and beast. Even mosquito nets do not furnish complete p rotection ugainst bites· on the head and neck. Flies tot"mont mell and animals in hot weather. Many of the wooden huts in the northern and central regions are infested with vermin such as bedbugs, fleas, head lice, and body lice. The mud hu ts of the south arc cleaner, but the dust storms of this area cause inflammation of the eyes and resp iratory organs.

T he health of German troops during s ummol' remained. generall y good. Diarrhea was fl-equent during the midsu mmer fly p lague, but seldom requi red hospitalization. In swamp regions there wore isolated cases of malaria, and occasionally cases of cadaveric poisoning wet'e noted. Volhynia fever appeared in 1942, some cases requiring long convalescence. Many soldiers contracted jaundice di seases which lasted two or three weeks, and sometimes required hospitalization. Gas gang rene was not infrequent. Vaccinations may be credited with prevent ing epidemics.

Evacua.tion of sick and wounded during summer was often handi- capped by bad road conditions, heat, and dust. Moreover, when roads were being used for sizable troop or convoy movements, delays made evacuation trips a tOlture. The Germans took fu ll advantage of ai l' eva.cuation of casualties. Medical liaison aircraft often picked up casualties from right behind the f ron t lines.

60

Chapter 20

Air Operations Aircraft. eng ines need special protection llg1linst summer du st. Pre-

cauti ons must be taken against raising dust on unpaved airfields. Dust storms in so uthern Russia occur immediutely ufter the cnd of the spring muddy senso n, and visibilit.y d uring take-olTs and landings is greatly reduced.

61

,.,

PART FIVE NORTH OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE

Chapter 21

General The Arctic zone of European Ru ssin extends from the arcti c

oust of Kirkcnes southward to the BllY of Kandu!nkshu, a di stance of about .190 air mil es. This area contnins the southward routes of Jand comm uni cation from MUl'mnnsk and commands t he shipping hm cs to the 'White Sea ports. Clim!ttic conditions in thi s lllnd of'midnight sun and poilu' night pose se rious problems not on ly in the cond uct of military Olle l'ations, but also for mom survival.

North of the Arctic Circle the condu ct of operations is circu mscr ibed by time nnd space elements unknown in temperate.regions. The night Still of summer , the night of winter, and the muddy tra nsitio n periods of spring und llUtmnn nullify conventional co ncepts of freedom of maneuver.

In the arctic a mili ta ry decision commun icltted by un order is ilTev- ocable. Whatever forces Imve been committed, course of action has been ini tiated, an interminable time elapses between origi - nal impulse and filllil effect. Once stlll'ted, the chain reaction mllst run its course. To sto p, to reverse, to chnn ge direction is to run t.he ri sk of losing the initiative. First decisions must be correct. Command procedure must be udapted to the unorthodoxi es of wn rfnl'e iii the 11 0rth . Leaders at all levels, down to the squad, must, make decisions fur transce ndin g the SCO pe of t heil' usual responsibi lities.

North of the Arctic Circle t he enol'lnous land mass of Em'o lK'lln Russin, with its wide seusomt! runge in temperuture, borders on the ilul'ents region whic h is modcmted by the wa rm current of the Atlantic Drift. While the oceanic influence is strongest in the fjord !> on t.he arcti c coast, the continental climate of interior Russia dOIll - inates the inland sea. A c..'O mparison of mean tempcrnt.ures in nort hern Knrelia with t hose in co rresponding latitudes in S iberia strikingly illustrates the influence of the Atlanti c Drift. In winter, for example, this wu rm current rui ses the level of mca n tempemlurcs by at Icast 3/) 0 F., alld , t hrough the wnl,tlling influence of the sea quickly dccl'Ca8Cs

63

64 GEIMAN REPORr SElIi$

tOWIll'd tho in terior, tho JIIIlU IU'Y menn in the in la nd Ill'Ctl of the Kola P eninsula is slill 18° F . h ighe r than in correspond ing latitudes of 8 iool'in..

T he m eall Wj lltCl' I cmpcl'I\ttl r c on tho MUL'IIUIII (''Ol1st, 13° F., is the stun o as the Ja n uary mCRn at Minllcupoli s, Minncso bl. The m eitH tem pcrutul'C durin g Ju ly- the hottest month- is 53° F., equal to t he Iwcrnge May temperat uro 011 t he North Sea coast of Centrlll Eut'ope. The comparison, however, appli es on ly t o mean va lues j actu u! day-to- day vlll' illtions in tempemtu re nrc substanti ally g reater and much more abl'u pt than in Ce ntral Eu rope. In win ter a tran s ition f r OIll thaw to severe fJ'ost may be a ma tter of a few hou rs, lind t he mercury may ri se again jus t. as sudden ly. Winter readi ngs on t he arctic coast rlln ge h"Om 43° to - 31° F. S ummel' mnximums on the const vary betwccn 75° lind 85° F., with tempe l'lltures in the interior r isin g us high as D5° F. Night fl"OstS !tl'e never t heless fairly common durin g t he subpoltu' summer, On ly the constn l reg ion 1ms onc whol c month of tcmpel'll* tures above fl'cezing-J uly.

Generally speaking, there tll'6 but tw o seasons north of the Arctic Circle: t he long, cold , und dark win ter; and the short s umlH er with no n ight. The ideal time fo r lurge-scale gl'o und operation s is late wintol', Ule two-month period beginn ing around Murch. At t h at time the d ays g l'OW longer, lakes llnd s wamps nre still fl"Ozen , and ice roads cnn be used t o move men lin d ma tOl'iel. E ar ly wi nter, right after the formation of ice, is also fuvorllble, but un operation in early winter run s the ri sk of continuing into the udverse conditions of t ho polar n ig ht, S umm er is the seuson leust suited to g round operations. Large IU'ell S of the terrn,in are impllssab le, and t he land routes of the arctic ure ill t he worst possiblo co ndi t ion at thi s timo,

Housi ng is vi l'tuully nonexistent in the hi gh latitudes of European Uussia, F inn ish -ty pe log huts aro best for permanent qUllrtel's up to lll titqcle 6D o N., and fatiher north timbered dugouts are best. The Germnns f oun d collapsible wooden bll.l'l'acks usef ul th roughout t he nOI'th. S now is usullll y too looso und powdery for igloos, nnd ol'di nul'Y shelter tents are inadequate, The Finnish pl ywood tent and the S wedish cloth tent wit h stoves al'e excellent, and in emergencies snow - covercd windbrenks havin g pine-bough 1"00fs and heated by low 1'0* flectin g fires offer good protection,

Section I. Infantry Sma ll unit actions, away from establis hed front lines, are fellsible

in t he deso la te arctic. The limi ted visibility of the polar ni ght favors opel'lltions at co mpan y, battalion, or, in exceptional cases, rcgime ntul strc ll gth. Opcmtions al'C usually of limited duratioll, becn use every

EffECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUR'OPEAN RUSSIA 65

bit of equi pment mu st, be cR1'l'ied along. Onl y h'oors in excellcnt physical condi tion can be used. F ighting and marchin g tlll'ongh wastela nd , forest tangle, and brush demands endumnce, esprit de corps, a nd th e Itbility to exploit every terrain feature to the utmost.

The Germans leal'lled that only mountain and ski troops shou ld be used in the arctic, and that such t roop s are most effective when or- ganized in ski un its 01' mobile task forces. The mobile t.ask force shou ld include both combat and supply elements, and It large percent- nge of its personnel shouM be equipped with ski s to prevent t he force from becoming roadbound, Its heavy weapons should be suitable for break down into one- man loads for the same reason. Ski units should he cnpable of at least t hree days of combat in any kind of te rrain with- out resupply.

Visi bilit y in the close tenain of the tlrctic is so poor that t he Ger- mans were forced to o"gnnize infa.ntry observation battal ions to Jil-e of infantry howitzers nnd morta rs. Captive balloons were also 11 8('(1 for 'observation. T he XXX VI Mountain Corps, 011 tho Kanda- luk8hn 'f ront , had a permHnently Ilttached balloon section.

Finnish Tactics

Finnish units in t he al'ctic operated wi t.h what they clLlI ed Sissi and lIlotti tactics whi ch are planned to permit small, battle-seasoned units to fight on even terms against numerically superior forces.

Sissi combat denotes small unit nctions which have the objective of hitting the enemy nt one point. Each participant is briefed on the objective, n.nd the met hod of exccution is left up to the g roup.

Motti tacti cs arc, on a small scale, analogo us to the envelopment tn cti cs of German doctrine. Motti uses small forces for envelo ping- nlmost snenl{ing around-t.he enemy, and atb\cking IUld annihi lati ng him once the ring has been closed.

Roth methods take lldvll utllge of concealment, defilade, and flank protection offered by lakes and watercou rses, nnd depend upon the self reiilUlce, initilltive, and fighting spirit of officers and men.

Commando-type Actions

Commando-type mission s in the arcti c require hi ghly trained s pe- cinl purpose units. Finnish troops who rn ided the Ru ssian-held i\1m'mnnsk r!dlway were s pecially trained and equipped.

The Ru ssinns dropped parachutists, includ ing female radio opel'- at.ors, behind the German lines. The prese nce of t hese Ru ssia n te.ams usually became known only through "interceptioll of radio mess1lge..<;.

66 GERMAN REPORT SER IES

Section II. Artillery

A r tillery f or the vi r tun ll y l'oadless arct ic must he light fmd mobile. Long-range 1l1'tillCl'Y is usel(>-ss in close ten ain. The Germans e u- t.ercd the arctic campaign of World War II with divi sion al artillery that r equired ten horses for di splncement an d GHQ artillery thnt included 175- mm. and 280-mm. pieces. These w el'C soon supple- mented with light uncI medium mortnl'S because t he big gUllS had no tUl'gots at which to fire. The Gm'mans used antitank guns to knock ou t enemy bu nkclos above groun d , while the Russ ians used antiai," craft a r tille l'Y again st gro u nd targets.

In win ter , artil lery cun be disp laced over icc. Many Russi ll ll IIt- t.l'mpts to cross ice under cove l' of dnl'lmcss wcre foiled by the Gel' - man method of stn t.ioning so ll nd -l'nllging tenms, equ ipped wit.h seis- l1lologicn l inst.rum ents, at. t.he edge of froze n lakes to detect enemy movem en t .

Gc])(md ly, German arti llery te('hniqnes in the arctic were no di f- feren t th!Ln those used in winhw in t.lle lo we r la t'il udes of Ru ssia.

Section III. Armored Forces

'funks and self -p ropelled !Il,tillery are of li mited va lu e in the arctic region of EU l"o pen,n Ru ssia. Huge gra ni te boulders cover the land- sca pe, maki ng cross-coun try operations impossible. Armor can be moved only on the few available roads. No Germa n tank or self- pro]Jt>lIcd gun ever sa w action north of the Arct ic Circle in W orld War II.

The climatic condi tions of t.he a rctic ca n be an d were mastered by t he Germans who were able to learn many lessons f r om the Finns, but nevert.heless had to go t hrough bitter experiences of t heir own. T he observation s on polar wllrfare presented in thi s st udy were drnwn from both sources. A number of other lessons, such as t he l'col'gnni- znt.ion of units for arctic warfare, s pecia l training, tho {J aw of r eplace- ments, and Russian a nd Finnish combat methods are treated in CMH Pub 104-1, Military Improvisations During the Russian Campaign; CMH Pub 104- 12, Russian Combat Methods in World War II ; and CMH Pub 104-24, Warfare in the Far North.

Chapter 22

Clothing, Equipment, Rations

Section I. Clothing

Winter uni forms must be desig ned to give pl'Otection against the extre.me cold of the arctic region. The Ger mans found several layers of cloth ing better than merely thick, henvy appa.reL Trousers should fit loosely enough to permit wear ing of at lenst two pairs of drawers; t rouser legs sho uld be cut full around the calf !lIld fit tightly about the ankl e. Blouses must be large enough to be worn over extra un- derwear and a fur vest. Windproof, snowproof parkas are essential for ski troops. Chemical warming pads inser ted under clothi ng add to physical comfort. Fur outer cloth ing is required for sentrics, driv ers, and others engaged in limited physical activity. Fur cloth- ing is not suitable for ski troops because it induces perspiration i quilted uniforms are best for ski wear. A wool toq ue plus a felt or fur cap with car flaps is best for winter. White camouflage coats or coveI'll lis arc essen tial for combat t roops, and the Germ ans also found white face masks usef ul. Cnmouflage covers are needed for headgear.

For summer weu r in th e arctic, the regula r uniform plus a mosqu ito veil and sunglasses proved adequate.

'rhe jagged rocks, swa mps, and snow of the arctic require stu rdy, wntCl'proof boots, which shou ld be lldllptable for sk iing. Only' boots of top-grnde, double-stitched leather give adequ ate protection against frostbite and trench foot. Ru ssians taken prisoner complained that thei r U. S. army boots were not water -repellent, were inadequately stitched, and were generally unsuited to arctic wear. S ki boots must be hu'ge enough to permit extra socks and felt inner soles to be worn. The best ski boot is double-stitched with a long tongue that is securely stitched to the upper, and full leather sole under a ribbed composition sole. Soles sho uld extend beyond the sides of the toe caps and be covered with brass inserts. Canvas leggings pl'ovide good protect ion in loose, (leep sno w.

Fur-lined boots large enough to accommodate heat packets are needed for sentl'ies, and drivers sho uld h ave felt boots. Lapp shoes, soft shoes made of reindeer hide, are needed by ski troops for tent wear.

67

.8 GERMAN REPORT SER IES A limited quantity of rubber enough for about 15 percent of

combat personnel, is required for thaw and muddy period s and for occasional su mmer weal'.

Section II. Equipment

Individual Equipment

In the arctic t he primary cons ideration is 110t how much the indi- vidua l ca n carry, but how much he elm possibly leave behind without impairing his chances for survival. The German soldier undoubted ly presented a more military appearance than the Finn 01' Russian, but many of the German items turned out to be mere ballast. About all the Finnish soldier carried was a rifle or submachine g un and a dagger on his belt. He carl'ied no gas mask, no steel helmet, no bayonet.

For construction of shelter and clearance of trails combat t roops need saws or hatchets th at can be carried on the rucksack or pack.

The Finnish oil-filled wrist com puss is best f or extreme tem pera- tures, but even t his type compass is subject to serious devintiOIlS due to natural mineral deposits and the effects of the aurora borealis.

Pack Equipment

The rucksack is the best pu ck for the arctic. It offers less inter- ference in passing thl'ough narrow clefts or underbrush, and is more comforhtble for skii ng. The Gerllltll1S found that fOity pounds is t he maximnm which should be carried on lengthy missions; heavier loads impai r speed and mobility.

Ski Equipment

Most ski movement in the arctic is ovel' fl tlt tel'ruin, and skis should t herefore be light lmd narrow, about two and one-half inches wide, without reinforced edges. Tips should be slightly turned, and holes provided for pull ropes. S now should be used for camouflage, since paint dries skis and leads to damage. A sim ple .Cl'oss-countl'y binding is best for arctic usc.

The Germans found stool ski poles with tightly woven webbing adequate, although steel deflects co mpasses. Ski climbers arc neces- Sllry when pulling sleds or similar loads. An important item for ski troops is a small tool kit, about one pel' squud, for emergency repairs.

Snowshoes

Snowshoes arc needed fOl' personnel cu rryin g henvy loads, The Germans foulld that wooden-frame sllowshoes with lenther webbi ng

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA 69

rendered excellent service, while snowshoes with willow webbing proved un satisfactory.

Small Arms

In the wilderness of the north, where the fire fight is usually cnrried on at close runge, a high cyclic rate of fire in small arms is more im- portant than accuracy. The submachine g un is ideal for arctic com- bat. The early ty pe of German sub much ine g un frequently jammed at low temperatures and, until an improved design was brought out, German troops preferred to lise the Russian model. In extreme cold air-cooled wea.pons are superior to water-cooled. Ammunition was lI sually a critical item for Germans in the arctic, and strict fire disci - pline was maintained. A plentiful su pply of ammunition for !t few weapons is better than many weapons with little !\mmllllition. Ger- man experiences with sm ull Ilrms in the arctic differed little from tJlOSO in Russia generally.

Hand Grenades

The stick hand grenade- was found to be un safe in the arctic; it ca.tches on trees and rocks, and the Germuns replaced it with egg-type grenades. Deep snow renders g ren ade bursts harmless.

Mortars

S ki troops effectively employed 81-m m. mortal'S. Medium mortar shells are effective, evcn in deep snow.

Radio Equipment

Arctic warfal'C consists mostly of small unit 'actions, and therefore great reliance must be pluced on radio commu ni cations. German equipment was too bulky and too limited in range for arctic use, and the small , powerful American-made equipment used by the Finns was much better. The component paJ.1s of signal equipment must be adaptable to pack-animal transport .

Low temperatures damage storage batteries, and the Germans cradled them between heating pads to preserve their power. Troops starting on extended missions should take f l'eshly charged batteries.

Radio communications in the arctic are di stu rbed by the aurora borealis and by magnetic fields.

Vehicles

Motor vehicles must have good ground clearance to permit passage over rocks Ilnd boulders which protrude from such roads as ure found in the In'ctic. Roads arc too narrow to allow passing, and long drives

70 GERMAN REPORT SER IES

in low gear strain engines and transmission. Starting vehicles re- quired the same precautions as those used by the Germans in E ul'()'- peana R ussia below the Arctic Circle. Fnscine mats are useful in mud and snow, and adequate stocks of snow chains and sled runners are important.

German horse-drawn wagons are suited only for movement over roads, and found little use in t he arctic. The two-wh eeled Finnish cart drawn by onc native horse is well adapted to arctic condit ions. Terrain impassable for wheeled vehicles can be traversed by the purilla, a sledge fashioned from a forked bough or two slender tree tr unks. T he purilla can easily be pulled over rocks and mud and can t:arry twice the payload of a pack animal.

T he F i nnish peasant hOl' Se sleigh is practical for arctic usc, as are the Finnish akja and loijakka. T he akja is a small boat-shaped sled which weighs about t h irty pounds, readi ly gh des over obstaclcs, and always maintains a steady balance. The loijakka is a larger akj(t, and is suitable for moving bulky cargo. Both are usually drawn by reindeer, though they can be p ulled by ski personnel. Two men can pull 100 pounds in flat co untry, and three men can pull t he same load in mountainous terrain.

Motorized combat sleighs ar med with a heavy machine gun and cnl'l'ying t h ree to five men were extensively used by the Russians. T he Germans made IL few experi men ts with this type of equipment. German models were successfu l only on frozen lakes with a t h in snow cover.

Section III. Rations

The rigors of the arctic req uire foods which provide extra energy. The Germ ans issued extra fats and bread, while t he Finns relied on extra rations of suga r. German winter food su pplies consisted of frozen beef, pork, and vegetables; dehydl'Rted potu toes and legumes; cheese and cunned foods. Since the Baltic Sea was usually blocked all winter, food was stocked in advance for an entire year.

Chapter 23

Transportation Troop Movements

Section I. Roads

There are few roads in the arctic wilderness. On the Kandalaksha r. 'ont in World 'VUI' II a sector extending 250 mil es in 1\ north -so uth dil'C(.'tion contained only one east·west !'Dad which, by European 01 ' even Ru ssian staIlChl]'ds, WIIS not a road at all.

Scouts probing into enemy territory hud to murk out. a route of lldvnllce for infantry. Later, constru ctioll troops tm ll s fOl'fllCd the track into!l. wagon trail. At first, the wngon t rail wou ld be t.he only supply route, and thousands of hou rs of work were needed to widen the trail to accommodate horse-drawn veh icles and tru cks. The Finns IUld so me AmCl'i cnn road-building mn ch inel'Y which was most helpful.

The Germans found t hat. It calVS needed two to fOll l' battalions of troops to m!lintnin rond s once they wm'e built. Jagged

rocks co nsta ntly worked to the sud'ace, lind in nllLddy terrain corduroy 01' chcspa lin g had to be used .

Duri ng sunUllel' the numerous lakes, swa mps, nnd ri vers of the arct,ic make large-scale operations entirely dependent upon man -mad e routes of communication. Progrcss is inevitably slow, Sometimes the cnemy is able to control avnilnble ron ds so ell'ectivcly that only wide envelopmcnt, so metimes upward of ten m ilcs hltcrnlly, can re- du ce h is positions nnd opcn the way fO I' the advance of frie nd ly forces. ) 1'01' instance, in the Slimmer of 1941 , when the Gcrmans were incx- pcrienced in arcti c wnrial'c, thc Ru ssians blocked the solc route through t he wildcl'llcss Lo Knndnlnk s ha with a line of bunkers rein- fo rced by artillery, while the road itself was patrolled by tunks, Any GC I'mall mllnCllvcr short of wide envelopment would have mcant a costl y hammering tlt the Ru ssian posi tion s. Wide ellvelo pment, how - ever, required co nstruction of puths for the main atta ck nnd trails for the secondary close-in envelopments, The Gerllllllls fou nd tllIlt evel'y one of fOlll' twel ve-mile advances in the opem tio n l'Cquired f0 1l 1' weeks of preparation fOl' seven day s of combat.

'l'el'l'ain difficulties lire less pronounced in winte r, whcn frOZCI! lakes, s wamps, and rivers bt.'come good rou tes of communi cation.

11

72 GEllMAN REP$RT SERIES

Snow and Ice Roads

An ice covel' of th ree feet 01' more on /I. lake supports the heaviest loads, and the Germans mad e ice road s by s imply clearing snow with It conventional or rotary snow plow.

Snow roads were built over swamps by r emoving S IIOW and then pouring water over the cleared su rface until a frozen s urface was built up. The Russians used forty-four regiments in the construction of snow roads on the Kandalaksha front in 1944. Ench mall was made responsible for about five sq uare yards n day, and in this manner ]'WO 65-mile stretches werc completed virtually ove rllight.

Snow clearance was car ried out and snow fences wore bui lt in the same way us in other parts of Russia.

Section II. Railroads

Locomotives for arctic use must be designed to burn wood, the only fuel available in high latitudes. Locomotives equipped with SIlOW plows wem used to keep rai lroads open, and in one installce the Ger- mltllS converted a Russian tank into a motor-driven railway cllr that was equipped for double duty as a snow plow,. Russian and Finnish railroads are broad g auge.

Railroads ,Over Ice

In the winter of 194-1-42 the Baltic frmm over, completely cutting off German forces in Finland from sea communication with homeland. Even the most powerful Swedish ice breakers were'unable t.o get through. A plnn for a rai lroad over the ice from Reva l to Helsinki, similar to the Russian undertaking on Lake Ladogll, was abandoned because the ice of the Baltic was constantly in motion. The Finns attempted unsuccessfu lly to mo ve motorized columns across the narrowest part of the Gulf of Rothnia in the winter of 1939-40.

Section III. Ski and Dismounted Movement

Ski ma l'ches !lre the most pmcticill form of movement during win- ter. In difli.cu lt terrain with n moderately deep snow covel', t he Ger- mans found that small units shoul d not exceed two to two Itnd one- half miles per hour, and larger units about one and one-half miles per hour. Foot t r oops should move about one-half mile per hour, or about OM-third mile per hOUl' when carrying loads ot' evacu-

casualties. Unreasonable speed on skis or on foot stimulates perspiration and induces chills and frostbite.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUrOPEAN RUSSIA 73

Section IV. Draft and Pack Animals

Heavy, cold-blooded horses lack t he stamina required for servi ce in t he urctic. Finn ish, Esthonillll, and the small Norweg ian horses proved best for pack and draft duty. Mere windbreaks suffice for their shelter, and they readily accept thawed-out hay. Sickness among horses was r are.

The reindeer is a better work animal t han the h orse in the arctic. It is efficient in d eep snow, gets along with very little fora ge, nnd

little shelter. Despite t he reindeer's no rmal self-s ufficiency, pns- tw",;e must be selected in advance of the winter season, and moss and simi lar forage gathered to avoid starvation in case of unu sually deep snow.

On ly reindeer broken to harness are suitable for military purposes. Trained reindeer are capable of p ull ing 150 to 250 pounds up to thi l'ty- five miles a day, with one day's rest ulternating with two days' work. As a pack an imal, the reindeer can carry forty to sixty pounds. In deep snow it is advisab le to have skiers break trai l for reindeer.

By late spring, the reindeer rev('.l'ts to its wi ld state of ronming the forest, and does not seek contact with ma n u ntil t he autumn. The reindeer can not endure a strange scent, and can be handled only by its ownol'. It evon ref uses to drink except from its illdividual water hole.

REINDEER used In c\" !lCllntlon of GCl'lnnll woundf'd, Knndllink shu ft'"m.

Chapter 24

Health and Morale

Section I. Health Lnck of s unsh ino du ring th e long polar nig ht CUtises doficiency

sy mptoms, and t.he Germans rigidly s uper vised daily adm inistration of vit.a mi ns, pnlticu lndy vila min C and cod Jivcr oil.

Get'man Lroops in t he nl'cti c s uffered kid ney di scnscs, pel'haps as res ult of colds, al t hough Finnish medical auth Ol 'itics spoke of the

presence of a co mmuni cable k id ney ailment.. Leptospirosis, II. com· Illunicablo sickness of nbout twelve-days' dUL'fltion, and havi ng tllltinrialikc sy mptoms, wns widesprc Rc1. Thi s di sense Wfl.S attributed 10 contact wit.1I the ('X('I'{'In('nt. of lemmings, lllo1 clike brown nll d white rodents.

The saum.a., or steam hath, WI\S widely used by t he GCl'mlllls. It t.o ughens the body and builds li p resistance to the arctic climate. Itt; regular use not only helps p l"Ove nt colds an d rh eumatic ailments, but nlso constitutes a vitnl mOl'llle booste r in cases ot so-called Lapp- hap piness, t he melancholia wh ich ma y bo induced by lhe monotony ot midnight sun and politi, night.

Gorman t roops in the ltrctic wel'e adequately clot hed, and frostbite caSualti es wore ra re. Nonbtlttle casualties in the lu'ctic during t he cntirc war amounted to on ly nbollt 2 pm'cent of tota l t roop strength,

flgnro which co mpared fnvol'!lbly with that of the best health ymu"S of peneotim e.

M ed ical Care

The Gennans found that d uring the pola r n ight p I'ompt treatment and evacuation of cas ualties, no matter how lightly in jUl"Od, was essen tial to speedy I"CCO\'el'y, Early medicill nid cou ld be rendered on ly if ski lled medi cal personnel were immedia tely llva illlbJc, and proced ures were devised f ol' rendering fi rst ni d on combat patrol s, at strong poin ts, and on t.he firing line. The di01 cul t ies were In /my, Cnsullltics were often fill' I I'om established positions, roads we re few, and f ootpaths wero nurrow and 1"oo l<y. Young, able-bodied medica l oflicers were attached to comba t t.roops, and on ly doctOl"S ubl e to ski were p icked for s uch duty. Some enlisted medi cal perso nn el were g iven ndvnnced trnining in fil'st nid and nssig ned to eo mbilt. t.roops whe n no medicill ofliccrs were nvnilnble. 74

EFfECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSS IA 75

Evacuafion

J1'inding and evacuating casualties in deep snow 01' close terrain is difficult, and the Germans sometimes used dogs to t rack down wounded 01' injured personnel. EvaCUlltion was accompl ished on st mt.chcr fl'ames slung between two horses hitched in tandem, by ptuilla, or by si ngle-wheel moun tain litter. Reindeer were also used to pull the akja in evacuation operations.

Elllergency sleds for evacl1!ttion CUll be fushioncd from skis! usi ng !-.k i adnptel's 01' sk i poles. Dog teams were used for evacuation over fla t 0 1' ge ntl y ro ll ing tel'l'ain. Evacuation by litter hearers was slow, lm d required hLl'ge numbers 01 personnel. Casualties located in ex- t.remely ill!lccessible purts of the wilderness were frequently eVltCll- Med by aircraft. In winter frozen lakes provided landing areas! and in summ er lakes were used for hydroplane landings.

Section II. Morale

The psychological strnin of the twenty-four-hour su mmer day and the seemingly endless polnr night had an adverse effect on troop morale. The Germans found thnt combat personnel past their mid- twenties we re more nffectcd by arctic conditions than younger troops.

When ever possible the Germans, to raise morale, encolll'tlged h unt - ing, fi shing, regulnr lise of the lIau1Ut bath! and provided t.ile oppor- tunity fOl' sold iers to cook II meal of t heir own choice.

T he use of dist inctive 111S1g111a fOI' arctic troop!; bolsters morale cOllsiclel'llh ly.

Chapter 25 Air Operations

Section I. General If proper preparations urc made, ail' opemtiolls CIU! be conducted

the year round in the arctic. In summer, each lake is a sheltered water landing und, in winter when frozen over, an excellent Inndi ng field for aircraft of mod erate size. 'With air superiority nnd s uitable hmd· ing areas, air transport is an important factor in supplying advanced ground units and in relieving other supply facilities. Small unit!:! can be supplied by airdrop.

It is diffi cult to camou fluge air installations in the far north. Thel'O nre either huge wooded areas into which the profile of all airfield cuts sharply or the tenain is bare and rocky, and thus susceptible t o enemy observation. The German remedy in the lattel';instance wns to hollow bunkers and hangars out of tho rocks.

Latticed wooden runways were used with s uccess by t.he Germans during the spring and autumn muddy periods. When this was dOlle lLircraft were, of necessity, parked neal' the landing strins ; construc- tion of latticed taxi strips would have involved tremehdous extm effort.

Section II. Flight

Snow covers all irregulurities in the terrain dm'ing winter, ice llIahs coastal boundaries indistinct, and orientation during flight is generally difficult. Flat vapor and fog layers seen fl'om the air are dillicult to distinguish from snow.

Warm fronts from over t he Atlantic are frequent in January. These fronts produce heavy cloud formations over land and sea, fOf! that extends to hi gh altitudes, and scattered rain 01' snow. Icing und poor visibility result.

Over the Arctic Ocean ice will begin to form at 6,500 feet, even ill su mmer, During spring and autumn ice forms at very low a.ltitudes in cloud formations, and in winter this dan ger increases. In winter even comparatively thin cloud layet'S produce snow.

In extremely cold wea ther., pools of vel'y cold, dense air for m ove r t.he interior of fjords. If !I. strong wind blows act'OSs a fjord at !l cer tain angle, some of this cold a.ir will be sucked out, alld replaced by warmer uil' fl'ol1l Ilbove. This process ('.au cutlse a violent storm in II 76

EFfECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMIAT IN EUIOPfAN IUSSIA 77

matter of minutes, with winds of hi gh velocity Ilccompanied by a sudden rise in temperature.

Modern ah' forces may revolutioni ze arctic warfare. In summer every lake provides a convenient Willer landing; in winter an extensive airfield. Anti ci patory measures to use the arctic for air operations ellil bo taken at nny ti me. Such preparations can counteract to some ex tent. t he difficulties presented by lack of overland routes and t.he inhospitality of the polnr region . Even with extensive use of aircra£t, tho lessons pl'csented ill this study willl'emain valid.

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PART SIX CONCLUSIONS

Combnt in Eu ropea n Russia was greatly in flue nced by climatic conditions. La rge-scale opemtiolls !wd small unit actions wer e equally nffcct.ed. The influence of climate was felt in every effort of t he German mili tary establishment, whether on land, over watel" or i n t he nil'.

Cli mate is It dynamic force in the Ru ssian expanse; t he key to suc- cessful milit!u'y opemtions. He who recognizes and respects this force ca n overcome it j he who di sregard s or undcl'ootimntcs it is threatened with failure or destruction.

In 1041 t he Wehrmacht did not recogn ize this force and waS not p repared to withstand its effects. C ris is upon crisis and unnCCCSSlU'Y suffering worc the result . Only t he ability of German soldiers to bear up under misfortu ne prevented di saster. But the German Alroy never rccovered fl"Om the first hard blow.

Lat-')I' t he German armed forces unders tood the effects of climate and overcame t hem. T h at victo ry rem ained ooyond re!lch was not due to climate alone, but in g reat meas ure to t he fact t hllt the German war potential was not equal to suppOl-tin g a global W!U'. The macht wns weakened by climatic conditions, and destroyed by th e ovel"powering might of enemy a l'mi cs.

79

APPENDIX

80